SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

UNDER SIMONETTE SIBAL-PULIDO

TOPIC CASE TITLE CASE DOCTRINE

EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, NOTES:

SETTLEMENT vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
VENUE- Residence is where he actually resides at the time of his death, not
OF ESTATE respondent., G.R.No. 133743.
February 6, 2007.
where he died. It was proved by membership to the club in alabang, leters,
title to the property they owned

(Rule 72-90) -He is governor but he resides in Alabang. It should be filed in Makati (the
court having jurisdiction of Alabang)

-improver venue does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, NOTES:

JENNETH QUIAZON and
MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON,

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Petitioners, vs. MA. LOURDES
● You cannot say he is in tarlac with his first wife because they have a
BELEN, for and in behalf of
marital feud filed in the court. Clearly, he does not live there.
MARIA LOURDES ELISE
● actual residence lang needed.
QUIAZON, Respondent. G.R.
No. 189121

AGTARAP VS. AGTARAP, 651 The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate
SCRA, JUNE 2011 or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of
the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely
exercises special and limited jurisdiction. However, this general rule is
subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.

First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a

testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination
of ownership in a separate action.18 Second, if the interested parties are all
heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and
the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on ownership.19 Verily, its jurisdiction extends
to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the

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 property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.20

We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering
that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will
be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the
determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but
collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs. NOTES:

ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,
● Nag-file si legitimate grandchildren (Isabel) letter of administrator
G.R. No. 183053, October 10,
kaso sabi ni court co-adminsitrator sila ni illegitimate grandchildren
2012
(Emilio) so sabi ni legitimate grandchildren dapat sole administrator
lang siya. (pinagaaagawan ditto is estate nun namatay na lola)
● Isabel claims that she is the nearest of kin. Si Emilio kasi is illegitimate
at hnd pwede magmana sa grandparents kasi connected lang
relationship niya sa adopting parents, not to the grandparents.
● Pero si Emilio kasi, inadopt ni lolo at siya inappoint ni lolo
administrator.

The appointment of administration may be revoked:

1. order of the preference

2. disloyalty (per Isabel, Emilio failed to render inventory of Cristina

decedent)

He also disobeyed the court’s direction.

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Before there was co-administrator but then court only appointed sole
administrator because of his ineptitude.

● The appointment of administrators is left to the discretion of the

court.
● the court decided na si Isabel na lang since nun co-administrator sila,
there relationship is not good.
● it is improbable that they cannot work together. The hostility
demonstrated by Emilio prejudices the settlement of the estate.
● his interest is adverse and hostile when he concealed the asset despite
the orders of the court. So his interest is not just an interest but it is
adverse.
● so there is two conflicting interest here which is detrimental to the
estate.

Two remedies available to Emilio even if he is not appointed as

administrator:

1. he will be notified of all the accounts that will be rendered

2. he will be notified of all the encumbrances to protect his interest by being

able to participate in the hearings and intervene. And to object if he thinks it
is prejudicial (example: the administrator sells the property where in fact
the obligation to pay that debt is not true, or the sale is unreasonable) before
the sale is made, it needs an approval of the court.

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 The moments debts are paid, you distribute it.

LEE v. RTC OF QUEZON CITY, Any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir
423 SCRA, FEBRUARY 2004 pending final adjudication requires court approval and any unauthorized
disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there
being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.

An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under
administration under NCC 533 which provides that possession of hereditary
property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the
moment of death of the decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such
portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate
by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all
debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been
given their shares. This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or
undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein.

The increase in Philinterlife’s authorized capital stock, approved on the vote

of petitioners’ non-existent shareholdings and obviously calculated to make
it difficult for Dr. Ortañez’s estate to reassume its controlling interest in
Philinterlife, was likewise void ab initio.

THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. Succession; Support; Allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule
RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, 83 should not be limited to the “minor or incapacitated” children of the
Executor, petitioner, vs. THE deceased—the law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to

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COURT OF APPEALS (Former support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age
Special Sixth Division), of majority.—It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of
MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, Rule 83 should not be limited to the “minor or incapacitated” children of the
MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law
CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, in force at the time of the testator’s death, provides that during the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased’s legitimate spouse and
MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and
children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are
THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to
OF PASIG, respondents. [G.R. education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.
No. 118671, January 29,
1996, Same; Same; Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from
the funds of the decedent’s estate.—Be that as it may, grandchildren are not
entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent’s estate. The
law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and children” and does not extend
it to the deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court’s
order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending
settlement of his estate.

Same; Settlement of Estates; Conditions before distribution of estate

properties can be made.—In settlement of estate proceedings, the
distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts,
funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if
the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court
conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.

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Same; Same; Taxation; The estate tax is one of those obligations that
must be paid before distribution of the estate, and if not paid, the rule
requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to
meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in
the inheritance.—In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of
the titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the
private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first
publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of
“notice” to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz
allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not
hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those
obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid,
the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions
as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in
the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of
the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.

Same; Same; Wills; Probate of Wills; The probate of a will is conclusive as

to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the question of
whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law—questions as to
intrinsic validity may still be raised even after the will has been
authenticated.—It was also too early in the day for the probate court to
order the release of the titles six months after admitting the will to probate.
The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic

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validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will,
the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Executors and Administrators; The right of an

executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real
and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be
exercised “so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration.”—Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly
claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take possession of
all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal
properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised “so long
as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Trusts; An heir’s right of ownership over
the properties of the decedent is merely inchoate as long as the estate
has not been fully settled and partitioned; An executor is a mere trustee
of the estate—the funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he
is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest
order.—Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the
properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been
fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father’s
estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to
the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot

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 unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents’ properties and the
fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real
and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his
administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the
obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the
court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.

Union Bank v. Santibanez, NOTES: The claim was dismissed because the court has no jurisdiction. It
452 SCRA 228 was filed in the RTC Makati as an ordinary action when it should have been
filed in RTC of Iloilo where the testate proceeding is being heard. Money
claim is not instituted in a separate action or in a separate court but in the
settlement of estate court. Because we want to settle everything in one
proceeding. It cannot be filed separately.

The joint agreement was void because it was not approved by the court. The
voluntary agreement between the two of them must be probated in order to
pass real properties.

The fact that they assumed the agreement voluntarily is not valid. Here, they
assumed the liabilities to pay the tractor however, since it was not probated
yet, the liabilities did not arise yet since it was not yet partitioned.

Heirs of Maglasang vs. MBC, Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estate of Deceased
706 SCRA 235 Persons; Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the
settlement proceedings of their estate.―Claims against deceased persons
should be filed during the settlement proceedings of their estate. Such
proceedings are primarily governed by special rules found under Rules 73 to

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90 of the Rules, although rules governing ordinary actions may, as far as
practicable, apply suppletorily. Among these special rules, Section 7, Rule 86
of the Rules (Section 7, Rule 86) provides the rule in dealing with secured
claims against the estate: SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate.—A creditor
holding a claim against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other
collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the
manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the
assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his
security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party
defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the
mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other
proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency
judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely
upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any
time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall
not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of
the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the
executor or administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or
pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the
direction of the court, if the court shall adjudged it to be for the best interest
of the estate that such redemption shall be made.

Civil Law; Mortgages; The secured creditor has three remedies/options

that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness.
In particular, he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the
entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b)

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foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary
claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and
foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription, without the right
to file a claim for any deficiency.―Jurisprudence breaks down the rule
under Section 7, Rule 86 and explains that the secured creditor has three
remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his
indebtedness. In particular, he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and
claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary
claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and
foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription, without the right to
file a claim for any deficiency. It must, however, be emphasized that these
remedies are distinct, independent and mutually exclusive from each other;
thus, the election of one effectively bars the exercise of the others. With
respect to real properties, the Court in Bank of America v. American Realty
Corporation, 321 SCRA 659 (1999), pronounced: In our jurisdiction, the
remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not
cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the
other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit
for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure
of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by
the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice
but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made,
in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118.

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 Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Foreclosure of Mortgage; Venue; The
stipulated venue and that provided under Act No. 3135 can be applied
alternatively. In particular, Section 2 of Act No. 3135 allows the
foreclosure sale to be done within the province where the property to be
sold is situated.―Case law states that absent such qualifying or restrictive
words to indicate the exclusivity of the agreed forum, the stipulated place
should only be as an additional, not a limiting venue. As a consequence, the
stipulated venue and that provided under Act No. 3135 can be applied
alternatively. In particular, Section 2 of Act No. 3135 allows the foreclosure
sale to be done within the province where the property to be sold is situated,
viz.: SEC. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province which
the property sold is situated; and in case the place within said province in
which the sale is to be made is subject to stipulation, such sale shall be made
in said place or in the municipal building of the municipality in which the
property or part thereof is situated.

Pilapil vs. Heirs of M. Remedial Law; Civil Law; Settlement of Estate; The settlement of estate
Briones, 514 SCRA, February whether testate or intestate is a proceeding in rem and that the publication
2007 in the newspaper of the filing of the application and of the date set for the
hearing of the same in the manner prescribed by law is a notice to the whole
world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and
time indicated in the publication.—While it is true that since the CFI was not
informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court was not
able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the intestate
proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate,
whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication

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in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the
hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the
whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the
date and time indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of
the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all
interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the
settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs
or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was
voluntarily or involuntarily made.

Same; Same; Same; The manner by which the CFI judge conducted the
proceedings enjoys the presumption of regularity, and encompassed in such
proceedings is the order of publication of the notice of the intestate
proceedings.—This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the
result of the intestate proceedings instituted by Donata before the trial court.
As this Court pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner by which the CFI
judge conducted the proceedings enjoys the presumption of regularity, and
encompassed in such presumption is the order of publication of the notice of
the intestate proceedings. A review of the records fails to show any
allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also failed to order the publication
in newspapers of the notice of the intestate proceedings and to require proof
from Donata of compliance therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason
or explanation as to why Maximino’s siblings could have missed the
published notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.

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Same; Same; Trusts; Prescription; It is already settled in jurisprudence that
an implied trust as opposed to an express trust is subject to prescription and
laches.—Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donata’s
misrepresentation constitutes fraud that would impose upon her the implied
trust provided in Article 1456 of the Civil Code, this Court still cannot sustain
respondents’ contention that their right to recover their shares in
Maximino’s estate is imprescriptible. It is already settled in jurisprudence
that an implied trust, as opposed to an express trust, is subject to
prescription and laches.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that an action for reconveyance
of real property based on implied trust prescribes ten years from
registration and/or issuance of the title to the property.—Prescription of the
action for reconveyance of the disputed properties based on implied trust is
governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code. Since an implied trust is an
obligation created by law (specifically, in this case, by Article 1456 of the
New Civil Code), then respondents had 10 years within which to bring an
action for reconveyance of their shares in Maximino’s properties. The next
question now is when should the ten-year prescriptive period be reckoned
from. The general rule is that an action for reconveyance of real property
based on implied trust prescribes ten years from registration and/or
issuance of the title to the property, not only because registration under the
Torrens system is a constructive notice of title, but also because by
registering the disputed properties exclusively in her name, Donata had
already unequivocally repudiated any other claim to the same.

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Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule on non-prescription of action for
partition of property owned in common does not apply to the case at
bar.—Even though respondents’ Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No.
CEB-5794 also prays for partition of the disputed properties, it does not
make their action to enforce their right to the said properties
imprescriptible. While as a general rule, the action for partition among
co-owners does not prescribe so long as the coownership is expressly or
impliedly recognized, as provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil Code, it
bears to emphasize that Donata had never recognized respondents as
co-owners or co-heirs, either expressly or impliedly. Her assertion before the
CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R that she was Maximino’s sole heir
necessarily excludes recognition of some other co-owner or co-heir to the
inherited properties; Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action
for partition of property owned in common does not apply to the case at bar.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Laches; The defense of laches
which is a question of inequity in permitting a claim to be enforced applies
independently of prescription which is a question of time; Laches
Defined.—Other than prescription of action, respondents’ right to recover
possession of the disputed properties, based on implied trust, is also barred
by laches. The defense of laches, which is a question of inequity in permitting
a claim to be enforced, applies independently of prescription, which is a
question of time. Prescription is statutory; laches is equitable. Laches is
defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it

15
 has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based
upon grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale
claims for the peace of society.

Same; Annulment of Judgments; Fraud; Prescription; An action to annul an

order or judgment based on fraud must be brought within four years from
the discovery of the fraud.—Nonetheless, this Court also points out that an
action to annul an order or judgment based on fraud must be brought within
four years from the discovery of the fraud. If it is conceded that the
respondents came to know of Donata’s fraudulent acts only in 1985, during
the course of the RTC proceedings which they instituted for the settlement of
Maximino’s estate, then their right to file an action to annul the CFI Order,
dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R (earlier instituted
by Donata for the settlement of Maximino’s estate), has likewise prescribed
by present time.

Sabidong vs Solas, A.M. No. Remedial Law; Probate Proceedings; The rule is that as long as the order
P-01-1448, June 25, 2013 for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated.―A thing is said to
be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court,
but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the
judge. A property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement
continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order
declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as

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 long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied
with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The
probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after
the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs
entitled to receive the same. Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc.
No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and
terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage
dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be “in litigation” subject
to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.

ARANAS VS. MERCADO, 71 NOTES:

SCRA
Duties of administrator:

1. post a tru and complete inventory within 3 months from the time he was
appointed of all properties come to his possession and knowledge.

2. post bond.

-The issue here is the inventory and jurisdiction of the court.

-may hindi sinali iyong spouse sa inventory kasi according to her nabenta na
yun. Kaso nakakapanghinala kasi binenta siya 2 days before mamatay si
testator.

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Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr., Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Probate Courts; The probate court
733 SCRA 183, G.R. Nos. having jurisdiction over properties under administration has the authority
208828-29 August 13, 2014 not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an
unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs or administrator.—At the outset,
we emphasize that the probate court having jurisdiction over properties
under administration has the authority not only to approve any disposition
or conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized sale by the prospective
heirs or administrator. Thus we held in Lee v. Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 85, 423 SCRA 497 (2004): Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold
specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It is well-settled
that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the
decedent’s estate. In the early case of Godoy v. Orellano, we laid down the
rule that the sale of the property of the estate by an administrator without
the order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser.
And in the case of Dillena v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that: x x x x It being
settled that property under administration needs the approval of the
probate court before it can be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition
does not bind the estate and is null and void. As early as 1921 in the case of
Godoy v. Orellano (42 Phil. 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by an
administrator of property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the
probate court is null and void and title does not pass to the purchaser. There
is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the
disposition of the property under administration, made by private
respondent, the same having been effected without authority from said
court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve
the sale (Sections 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can
declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings had not been closed or

18
 terminated. To uphold petitioner’s contention that the probate court cannot
annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power
pertaining to the said court. (Bonga v. Soler, 2 SCRA 755 [1961]). Our
jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property
by an administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires
court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can
be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a separate action
to annul the unauthorized disposition.

Butiong vs. Plazo, 765 SCRA Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons;
227, G.R. No. 187524 August The general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to
5, 2015 name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or
refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court,
then the decedent’s estate shall be judicially administered and the competent
court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in
Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.—It must be recalled that the
general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name
an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses
the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the
decedent’s estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court
shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6
of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. An exception to this rule, however, is found
in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who
left no will and no debts due from his estate, may divide the estate either
extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for partition without submitting the
same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an
administrator by the court. The reason is that where the deceased dies

19
without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an
administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real
owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled.

Same; Same; Same; Partition; Unless and until the issue of co-ownership is
definitively resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of an
estate.—Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of
the issue of ownership. In fact, the determination as to the existence of the
same is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition, as held in
Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576 (1989): The first phase of a
partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of
whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e.,
not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement
of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a
co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on
the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits
received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that “the parties are unable
to agree upon the partition” directed by the court. In that event[,] partition
shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the
rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the
parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award
for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in

20
the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x. An action for
partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or non­existence of
co-ownership between the parties. Unless and until the issue of
co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would be premature to effect a
partition of an estate.

Same; Civil Procedure; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; Since the action
herein was not merely for partition and recovery of ownership but also for
annulment of title and documents, the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and thus cognizable by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).—Under
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), amending Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Since the action herein was not merely for partition and recovery
of ownership but also for annulment of title and documents, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence,
considering that the trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its
decision, the instant petition for annulment of judgment must necessarily
fail.

Same; Same; Judgments; Immutability of Final Judgments; A judgment which

has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence, may no
longer be modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors or mistakes,
all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to
rest.—Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except to

21
 correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties being
deemed resolved and laid to rest. It is a fundamental principle in our judicial
system and essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice
that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through a
mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Exceptions to the
immutability of final judgment are allowed only under the most
extraordinary of circumstances. Yet, when petitioner is given more than
ample opportunity to be heard, unbridled access to the appellate courts, as
well as unbiased judgments rendered after a consideration of evidence
presented by the parties, as in the case at hand, the Court shall refrain from
reversing the rulings of the courts below in the absence of any showing that
the same were rendered with fraud or lack of jurisdiction.

ALVARICO VS. SOLA, 382 A private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action
ESCHEATS SCRA which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding
certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the land covered
(Rule 91) thereby will again form part of the public domain.

Only the SolGen or the Officer acting in his stead may do so. Since, Amelita
Sola’s title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a
matter between the grantor and the grantee.

MALTOS VS. HEIRS OF REVERSION NOT AUTOMATIC

EUSEBIO BORROMEO, 770
The sale of a parcel of agricultural land covered by a ree patent during the
SCRA 397
five-year prohibitory period under the Public Land Act is void. Reversion of
the parcel of land is proper. However, reversion under Section 101 of the

22
 Public Land Act is not automatic. The OSG must first file an action for
reversion.

NOTES:

-not automatic reversion. The OSG must institute the escheat proceedings. So
in effect, bumalik sa mga heirs yun lupa na grant sa tatay na binenta within
the 5 year prohibitory period.

-the right of the purchaser is only up to the purchase price and interest (?)

Sec 29 vs sec 101

-sec 29 automatic reversions – no title yet is given. Only the right to cultivate
the land. So only the award is made but you still have to go to procedure to
perfect the title.

-sec 101 OSG must institute escheat proceedings. –title is given already.

GOYENA VS. LEDESMA NOTES:

GUARDIANS GUSTILO, JAN. 13, 2003
Pilar Goyena was not appointed since she concealed the deteriorating state
AND of mind of Julieta before the trial court, which is reflective of a lack of good
faith. It was Goyena who could be considered as to have an adverse interest
GUARDIANSHIP to that of Julieta if it is true that 50% of Julieta's holdings at the Makati
Medical Center has been transferred to her. Furthermore, her allegation that
(Rule 92-97) AS she felt Juleita Ledesma, the sister of the respondent, was disliked by
respondent, is a ground which does not render respondent unsuitable for
AMENDED BY appointment as guardian. Although Pilar Goyena has declared that she is not

23
 interested to be appointed as Pilar's legal guardian, her advanced age of 90
A.M. 03-02-05 years also militate against her assuming the guardianship of the
incompetent. Hence, the respondent, being the nearest kin of the
SC (Guardianship incompetent person, sister of Julieta Ledesma, and showed and established
all her qualifications and none of the disqualifications, was appointed as the
on Minors)
guardian of the incompetent person and was given preference over the
friend of the incompetent person.

● Opposed the administration of the sister of the incompetent person

● She said na competent naman talaga un tao and if ever man na she is
found to be incompetent, the guardian that should be appointed is her
and not amparo.
● She says that amparo interest is antagonistic to pilar. Based on the
letters.
● But the court took note of that goyena concealed the condition of pilar.
● Also goyena and pilar are not married. If kasal sana, edi sana siya yun
guardian kaso hindi. So sa family niya binigay guardianship.

Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals, Actions; Pleadings and Practice; What determines the nature of an action as
268 SCRA 640, G.R. No. well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
110427 February 24, 1997 complaint and the character of the relief sought.—It is axiomatic that what
determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction
over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief

24
sought. An inquiry into the averments of the amended complaint in the Court
of origin is thus in order.

Same; Same; Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; A complaint for unlawful

detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the
refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology
of the law.—Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been
adequately set out. It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, to
allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the
plaintiff is deemed sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is
sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to
vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; An owner’s act of allowing another to occupy her
house, rent-free, does not create a permanent and indefeasible right of
possession in the latter’s favor.—The argument is arrant sophistry. Cañiza’s
act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a
permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter’s favor. Common
sense, and the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that that
act of liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the
necessary burden on the Estradas of returning the house to Cañiza upon her
demand. More than once has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies
the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission without any
contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he
will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against him. The situation is not much different from that

25
of a tenant whose lease expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance
of the owner, in which case there is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession as of the date of the demand to vacate. In other
words, one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally
occupying the land or property the moment he is required to leave.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there had been more than one demand to
vacate, the one-year period for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer
must be reckoned from the date of the last demand, the reason being that the
lessor has the option to waive his right of action based on previous demands
and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises.—It may not be amiss
to point out in this connection that where there had been more than one
demand to vacate, the one-year period for filing the complaint for unlawful
detainer must be reckoned from the date of the last demand, the reason
being that the lessor has the option to waive his right of action based on
previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises.
Now, the complaint filed by Cañiza’s guardian alleges that the same was
“filed within one (1) year from the date of the first letter of demand dated
February 3, 1990.” Although this averment is not in accord with law because
there is in fact a second letter of demand to vacate, dated February 27, 1990,
the mistake is inconsequential, since the complaint was actually filed on
September 17, 1990, well within one year from the second (last) written
demand to vacate.

26
Same; Same; Same; Same; Guardianship; A judicial guardian is clothed with
authority to withdraw the ward’s earlier express permission given to third
persons to occupy a certain property.—The Estradas’ possession of the
house stemmed from the owner’s express permission. That permission was
subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial
that the withdrawal was made through her judicial guardian, the latter being
indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence
that Carmen Cañiza had executed a will bequeathing the disputed property
to the Estradas; that circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the
premises after demand to vacate on the theory that they might in the future
become owners thereof, that right of ownership being at best inchoate, no
transfer of ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly
probated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the issue is possession de facto, not de jure,
the proper remedy is ejectment, not accion publiciana.—In any case, the only
issue that could legitimately be raised under the circumstances was that
involving the Estradas’ possession by tolerance, i.e., possession de facto, not
de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate that the proper remedy for
Cañiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary action in the RTC or
an action that is one for recovery of the right to possession de jure.

Wills and Succession; A will is essentially ambulatory—at any time prior to

the testator’s death, it may be changed or revoked, and until admitted to

27
probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder;
An owner’s intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing
property by his tolerance is not inconsistent with the former’s taking back
possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient.—A will is
essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it may be
changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever
and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: “No will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court” (ART. 838, id.). An owner’s intention to
confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is
not inconsistent with the former’s taking back possession in the meantime
for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient
cause for the owner’s resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to
generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities
afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.

Guardianship; The ward has no right to possession or control of his property

during his or her incompetency.—Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a
competent court the general guardian of both the person and the estate of
her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship dated December 19,
1989 clearly installed her as the “guardian over the person and properties of
the incompetent CARMEN CAÑIZA with full authority to take possession of
the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it
may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the management
of her properties **.” By that appointment, it became Evangelista’s duty to
care for her aunt’s person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to

28
assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to
relatives and friends. It also became her right and duty to get possession of,
and exercise control over, Cañiza’s property, both real and personal, it being
recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of
his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward’s
estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from
anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful
for this purpose.

Actions; Ejectment; Even when, in forcible entry and unlawful detainer

cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence
to resolve the issue of ownership only to determine the issue of
possession.—It may be pointed out in relation to the Estrada’s defenses in
the ejectment action, that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the
undoubted competence to resolve “the issue of ownership ** only to
determine the issue of possession.”

Same; Same; Parties; An ejectment case survives the death of a party.—To be

sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Cañiza’s demise did not

29
 extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian. That
action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have
taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.

Neri vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Civil Law; Succession; Legitimate Children; Legitimate children from the first
Uy, 683 SCRA 553, G.R. No. and second marriages are entitled to inherit pursuant to Articles 979 and 980
194366 October 10, 2012 of the Civil Code.―It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are
indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second
marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are
entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980
of the Civil Code which read: ART. 979. Legitimate children and their
descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction
as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages. xxx
ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their
own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

Same; Extrajudicial Settlement of Estates; No extrajudicial settlement shall be

binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.―In the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion
should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were
admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not
properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon
them and consequently, a total nullity. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of

30
Court provides: SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between
heirs.―x x x The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall
be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided
in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.

Same; Guardianship; A father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor

under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the
property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian
of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured
in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of
Court.―Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property
and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any
act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the
patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or
mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does
not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such
power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property
and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with
the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.

Same; Ratification; Words and Phrases; Ratification means that one under no
disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or
defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on
him.―Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and

31
gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which
without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice,
knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore
unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the
ratification. Once ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when the person
knowingly received benefits from it, the contract is cleansed from all its
defects from the moment it was constituted, as it has a retroactive effect.

Same; Sales; A person can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell and
the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the seller can
legally transfer.―“A person can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to
sell and the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the
seller can legally transfer.” On this score, Article 493 of the Civil Code is
relevant, which provides: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.

Same; Prescription; An action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence

of a contract does not prescribe in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil
Code.―On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that
the present action has not prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the

32
 prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no
application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were deprived
of their lawful participation in the subject estate. Besides, an “action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe” in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.

Same; Same; The action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10
years from the time the cause of action accrues, which is from the time of
actual notice in case of unregistered deed.―The action to recover property
held in trust prescribes after 10 years from the time the cause of action
accrues, which is from the time of actual notice in case of unregistered deed.
In this case, Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas claimed to have knowledge of the
extrajudicial settlement with sale after the death of their father, Enrique, in
1994 which spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997
was well within the prescriptive period of 10 years.

OROPESA VS. OROPESA, 671 NOTES:

SCRA, APRIL 2012
● Tatay at kabit, gusto nun anak siya na mag manage kasi nilulustay nun
babae niya yun pera nun tatay but there was no clear evidence to
prove that he is incompetent. In fact, it was found that he is still sharp.
● The neurological/medical may only prove but it is not mandatory. If
you don’t have expert testimony, then the court may observe the
person and that observation is relevant to sufficiently prove the sanity
or insanity of a person. Sanity is presumed, so the person alleging his
insanity has the burden of proof of proving the same. But in proving it,
it is not necessary nor mandatory that expert testimony be rendered.

33
 It is sufficient that the court observe and by other testimony showing
the competency of a person. What is needed is a clear, positive and
definite.

ABAD VS. BIAZON, 687 SCRA, NOTES:

DECEMBER 2012
Biason died pending the resolution of the instant petition. Hence, Biason’s
death rendered moot and academic the issues raised in the petition. It is a
well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is
necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward. The
supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety
of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has
already been dissolved. Other reasons for termination of guardianship are
the following: When the incompetency of the person who has been declared
incompetent ceased to be one and was judicially determined to be
competent; When guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of
discharging his trust; Guardian has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or
failed for thirty (30) days after it is due to render an account or make a
return; Guardian resigned; the marriage or voluntary emancipation of a
minor ward terminates the guardianship of the person of the ward; and
Guardianship may also be terminated when guardianship is no longer
necessary and when the ward has come of age or died.

ADVENT CAPITAL AND NOTES:

TRUSTEES FINANCE CORP VS.
● Si Alcantara trustees nila si advent. ngayon according sa trust
ALCANTARA, 664 SCRA
agreement nila, automatic charcharge ni advent yun mga charges niya

34
 sa Alcantara at the end of the quarter which the advent fails to do so.
(Rule 98) So Alcantara opened up their account with Belson with the cash
dividends they earned from advent. So eto si advent naniningil nun
mga charges na hindi niya nabawas. Doon niya kukunin sa funds kay
belson but belson cannot do so because they are trustee. The money
comes from the alcantaras so they cannot just dispose it. The advent
should file separate suit. Because the collection for some money is
adversarial thus should be filed separately.

The power, duties and responsibilities which belong to the trustee is

governed by the trust agreement between them.

LBP VS. PEREZ, 672 SCRA

Ilusorio vs. Bildner, 332 SCRA Actions; Habeas corpus; A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
WRIT OF 169, G.R. No. 139789, G.R. No. illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto—it is devised as a
HABEAS 139808 May 12, 2000
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
CORPUS freedom.—As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a
(Rule 102) person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a
person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his

35
 constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. It is
devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
A.M. NO. restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.

03-04-04-SC Same; Same; The essential object and purpose of the writ of ha-beas corpus
is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person
(Rule on Custody of Minors and therefrom if such restraint is illegal.—The essential object and purpose of
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
relaMinors) restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To
justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty
must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.

Same; Same; Mental Incapacity; The fact that a person is about 86 years of
age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated; Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition
but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.—The evidence
shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the
writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.
Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the
capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

36
Same; Same; Right to Privacy; A person of sound mind is possessed with the
capacity to make choices, and even as the choices he makes may not appeal to
some of his family members these are choices which exclusively belong to
him.—As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s mental state, the Court of Appeals
observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the
relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court. Being of sound mind, he is
thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial
choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with.
The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but
these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear
before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his
house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint
on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of
Appeals.

Same; Same; Same; A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right
of choice may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free
choice.—With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice,
Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his
free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless
to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. The Court of
Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a
petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right.
The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject’s sanity.

37
 Same; Same; Same; Husband and Wife; Marriage; In case the husband refuses
to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any
penalty attached to the exercise of his right.—When the court ordered the
grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall be enforced
under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such
assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary. The Court of Appeals missed
the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor
child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to
see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any
penalty attached to the exercise of his right.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; No court is empowered as a judicial authority

to compel a husband to live with his wife; Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
mesne process.—No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a
husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of
a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne
process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man
and woman’s free choice.

SERAPIO VS. ILLEGAL CONFINEMENT. Serapio, State effectively deprived him of his right
SANDIGANBAYAN, 396 SCRA to bail when Prosecution delayed conduct of bail of hearings and insisted on
443 joint hearings with Estrada. Citing Moncupa vs. Enrile: Writ of HC lies when
detention becomes arbitrary even if it was valid at inception.

38
 SC-General rules apply.

Writ of HC will not lie if a person is detained pursuant to a lawful order.

Serapio voluntarily surrendered and is detained pursuant to warrants of
arrest issued because of an amended information.

The continued detention has not yet become arbitrary because bail hearings
have not yet commenced. Delay is not solely due to the fault of the
Prosecution.

Writ of HC not proper to assert right to bail if the entitlement to bail is

discretionary

LACSON VS. PEREZ, 357 SCRA WRIT WAS NOT ALLOWED. There is no actual detention. Writ of HC did not
756 issue because impending arrests of Lacson, Mancao, Aquino- speculative. On
the other hand, Miriam Defensor, being in imminent danger of being arrested
was not shown at all. Authorities stated that she will not be arrested.

SANGCA VS CITY ISSUANCE OF WRIT MOOT. The Supreme Court held that the issuance of writ
PROSECUTOR OF CEBU, 524 becomes moot if the detainee is already released. Singular function of writ of
SCRA 610 HC is to protect freedom of physical liberty.

MANGILA VS. PANGILINAN, WRIT WAS NOT ALLOWED. Detention was lawful. Restraint that is lawful
701 SCRA 355 and pursuant to a court process cannot be inquired into by HC.” Writ of HC
will not issue if detained by virtue of a court order issued by a judge with

39
 jurisdiction. Writ of HC is NOT a WRIT OF ERROR. Not review errors of law
not involving jurisdiction.

Tujan-Militante vs. Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Habeas Corpus; Considering that the
Cada-Deapera, 731 SCRA writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the
194, G.R. No. 210636 July 28, issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule
2014 102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No.
03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed with any of the proper Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs) within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is
sought.—Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial
region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they
be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed with any of the proper RTCs
within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought.

Same; Same; Same; Summons; Service of summons is not required in a

habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC.—As regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was
improperly served, suffice it to state that service of summons, to begin with,
is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, 105 Phil. 315
(1959), a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a
summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.

40
In The Matter of the Petition Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Habeas Corpus; An application for a writ
for Habeas Corpus of of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court or any
Datukan Malang Salibo vs. of its members, the Court of Appeals (CA) or any of its members in instances
Warden, Quezon City Jail authorized by law, or the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or any of its presiding
Annex, BJMP Building, Camp judges.—An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a
petition filed before this court or any of its members, the Court of Appeals or
Bagong Diwa, Taguig City,
any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the Regional Trial
755 SCRA 296, G.R. No.
Court or any of its presiding judges. The court or judge grants the writ and
197597 April 8, 2015
requires the officer or person having custody of the person allegedly
restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the
writ is then conducted. The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart
from that which issued the writ. Should the court issuing the writ designate
a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall
proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation,
the lower court “acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits
of the [petition for habeas corpus.]” Therefore, the decision on the petition is
a decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over
decisions of the lower court.

Same; Same; Same; Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of
habeas corpus “shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.”—Called the “great
writ of liberty[,]” the writ of habeas corpus “was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and
as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.” The remedy of
habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent with the

41
law’s “zealous regard for personal liberty.” Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus “shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or
by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto.” The primary purpose of the writ “is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.” “Any restraint which
will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.”

Same; Same; Same; The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to
any offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas
corpus.—The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any
offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It
may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or when there is an alleged
violation of the liberty of abode. In other words, habeas corpus effectively
substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in
the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. Habeas corpus
being a remedy for a constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious
and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will
not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.

Same; Same; Same; The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final
decision on the petition for the issuance of the writ.—This court cited Mayor
Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to make a Return of the Writ. As
to the legality of his acts, this court ruled that Mayor Justo Lukban illegally
deprived the women he had deported to Davao of their liberty, specifically, of
their privilege of domicile. It said that the women, “despite their being in a
sense lepers of society[,] are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens

42
protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens[.]” The
women had the right “to change their domicile from Manila to another
locality.” The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the
petition for the issuance of the writ. It is the writ that commands the
production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her
liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final decision where a court determines
the legality of the restraint. Between the issuance of the writ and the final
decision on the petition for its issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is
essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry
on the legality of any deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs
of habeas corpus even if the petition for its issuance “on [its] face [is] devoid
of merit[.]” Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be
suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety requires
it, the writ itself may not be suspended.

Same; Same; Same; It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be
issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful
process or order of the court.—It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no
longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a
lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has become legal, and
the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. Rule 102, Section
4 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge
authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the
writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any

43
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.

Same; Same; Same; Moot and Academic; The filing of the Informations,
according to the Supreme Court (SC), rendered the Petitions for habeas corpus
moot and academic.—This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas
corpus in Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990). Roberto Umil, Rolando
Dural, Renato Villanueva, Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo
Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, Vicky A. Ocaya, Deogracias Espiritu, and Narciso
B. Nazareno were all arrested without a warrant for their alleged
membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army.
During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however,
Informations against them were filed before this court. The filing of the
Informations, according to this court, rendered the Petitions for habeas
corpus moot and academic, thus: It is to be noted that, in all the petitions
here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts
against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of
habeas corpus will not be allowed.

Same; Same; Same; Instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy

of a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process or
order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual
remedies.—Instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a

44
petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process or
order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the
usual remedies. This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the
information or the warrant of arrest.

Same; Criminal Procedure; Motion to Quash; At any time before a plea is

entered, the accused may file a motion to quash complaint or information
based on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court.—At any time before a plea is entered, the accused may file a motion to
quash complaint or information based on any of the grounds enumerated in
Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may
move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) That the court
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) That the
court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d)
That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) That
it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) That more than
one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses
is prescribed by law; (g) That the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished; (h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute
a legal excuse or justification; and (i) That the accused has been previously
convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

Same; Same; Same; If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion to

quash, the accused “hypothetically admits the facts alleged in the

45
information.”—In filing a motion to quash, the accused “assails the validity of
a criminal complaint or information filed against him [or her] for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in
the face of the information.” If the accused avails himself or herself of a
motion to quash, the accused “hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the
information.” “Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the information
are not to be considered.”

Same; Same; Same; If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the
complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall
order the amendment of the complaint or information. If the motion to quash
is based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or information
do not constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.—“If the motion to quash is
based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be
cured by amendment, the court shall order [the] amendment [of the
complaint or information].” If the motion to quash is based on the ground
that the facts alleged in the complaint or information do not constitute an
offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution “an opportunity to correct
the defect by amendment.” If after amendment, the complaint or information
still suffers from the same defect, the trial court shall quash the complaint or
information.

46
 1. Tapuz vs. Del Rosario Writ of Amparo; The Writ of Amparo, Explained.—To start off with the basics,
WRIT OF the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances,
AMPARO and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to
the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns
that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we
shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo—in line with the extraordinary character of the writ
and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands—requires that every
petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying
allegations of fact.

Same; The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminary satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting
affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to
or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was
or is being committed.—The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily
satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable
from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to
what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of
the aggrieved party was or is being committed. The issuance of the writ of

47
amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore
quoted, that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition.

Same; If the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators
criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary
criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the
writ of amparo.—Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from
satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would
justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that
pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent
incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on
the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the
alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the
realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.

Same; The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as
substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately
interfere with these processes—the situation obtaining in the present
case.—Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too
at this point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners’
present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge
to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify
before the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial
measure. We discern this from the petitioners’ misrepresentations pointed

48
out above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse
itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo
based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To
be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of
deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures,
neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo—extraordinary though they
may be—will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo,
particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal
or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these
processes—the situation obtaining in the present case. While we say all
these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on
the institution of separate actions, for the effect of earlier-filed criminal
actions, and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of
amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action. These rules were
adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the
issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel
recourses.

WRIT WILL NOT ISSUE. For purely property or commercial concerns. Writ
of Amparo is not a substitute for appeal or certiorari.Amorphous grounds,
issue of possession of land no allegation of threat to life, liberty, or security is
imminent or continuing.

49
2. Canlas vs. Napico Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; Petitioners’ claim to their dwelling,
Homeowners Asso., 554 assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse
SCRA to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security; There is,
therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.—The
threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the
court, which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos.
177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the enumeration
of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a
writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming
they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them,
does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no
legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Same; Same; No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation
of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be
protected.—The factual and legal basis for petitioners’ claim to the land in
question is not alleged in the petition at all. The Court can only surmise that
these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled in the
four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a
clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to
be protected. Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ
upon the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said
writ.

50
NOTES:

WRIT WILL NOT ISSUE. If there is a final judgment. The threatened

demolition of a house by virtue of a final judgment affirmed by the SC is not
a ground to issue the writ of amparo. Claim for dwelling is not part of the
enumerated right. Moreover, claim for dwelling has been denied by the SC.

51
3. Castillo vs. Cruz, 605 Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data; The coverage of the writs is limited to
SCRA 628 the protection of rights to life, liberty and security; The writs cover not only
actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.—The coverage of the
writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And the
writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.

Same; Same; To be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondent must meet
the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission.—To thus be covered
by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present
controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial
Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the
acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and
security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into
the property.

Same; Same; Absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that
there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty and/or that there
exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be
secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.—Although
respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily hinder
supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an

52
allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on
their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the
efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ
cannot be justified.

Same; Same; Petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary
remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and
executory decision in a property dispute.—It need not be underlined that
respondents’ petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are
extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution
of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.

Same; Same; Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a

defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a
petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.—At all events, respondents’
filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been
barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they
were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the
proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by
respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and
habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made
available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.

53
 IMPORTANT DOCTRINES/NOTES BAHALA NA:

● WRIT WILL NOT ISSUE. For purely property or commercial concerns.

Property dispute between Government and respondent. No allegation
that threat is imminent or continuing.
● SC denied petition for writ of amparo in view of pendency of crim
cases Direct Assault, Trespassing, Light Threats. Respondents may set
up defense of illegality of arrest or proceedings

4. Razon vs. Tagitis, 606 ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES. Elements of enforced disappearance

SCRA 598
1. arrest or abduction or deprivation of liberty

2. carried out by agents of State

3.followed by refusal to acknowledge detention or concealment of detention

4. placement of disappeared person outside protection of the law

Evidentiary difficulties

1. deliberate concealment of identity of perpetrators

2. deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of disappearance

3. deliberate denial

54
 ● SC- affirmed CA issuance of privilege of writ of amparo
● Tagitis disappearance is an enforced disappearance within the
meaning of the UN Convention
● PNP and CIDG responsible for his disappearance
● Relying on Kasim Evidence/suppression of evidence
● Concerted denial and dismissive attitude of PNP shows concerted
effort to conceal relevant evidence

Note- requested for pic only three months after disappearance report-
investigation for show

1. Confirmed Writ of Amparo issued by CA

2. Holding PNP, thru PNP Chief and PNP CIDG responsible for disclosure
of material information related to disappearance and conduct proper
investigation using extra-ordinary diligence with obligations to show
result acceptable to the court
3. Holding Kasim accountable to disclose material information and
assets
4. Referral to CA for monitoring of PNP plan of investigation with
quarterly report
5. PNP has 1 yr to complete report

CA WRIT OF AMPARO

1. Respondent DOROMAL CIDG Chief to order his men Chief CIDG in

Zamboanga to aid him

55
 2. Respondent Razon to order his men, TASK FORCE TAGITIS to aid him
as their superior and to exert extraordinary diligence to protect the
life, liberty and security of Tagitis and extend privileges to his family
as submit periodic report

To submit periodic report “specified courses of action directive to police.”

56
5. Roxas vs. GMA, 630 SCRA Writ of Amparo; Doctrine of Command Responsibility; The doctrine of
211 command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability
and by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a
party-respondent in an amparo petition; The doctrine is used to pinpoint
liability.—It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the
doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the
public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not
incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive
law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal
basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition. The case of
Rubrico v. Arroyo (613 SCRA 233 [2010]), which was the first to examine
command responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding, observed
that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability.

Same; Same; The doctrine is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or

administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding; The writ of
amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of
the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the
court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.—Since the application of
command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it
is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather
than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature
of the writ itself: The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at
providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and

57
directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific
violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or
threats thereof had transpired—the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability
for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil
or administrative under the applicable substantive law.

Same; Same; The inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in

an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military
or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition
were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence; Commanders may
be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but
rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.—It
must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any meas ure,
preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the
complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded—not actually
on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their
responsibility, or at least accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis (606 SCRA 598
[2009]), the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and
accountability were given special and unique significations in relation to an
amparo proceeding.

58
Same; Same; In Amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to
parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on
the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the
potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators;
Direct evidence of identity when obtainable must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity.—In Amparo
proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as
evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or
non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly
proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of
identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial
evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably
offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy
inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.

Same; Same; An order directing the public respondents to return the personal
belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive
pronouncement of liability.—To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the
petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of
whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible
for the abduction of the petitioner. In the first place, an order directing the
public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is
already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order
itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the

59
public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As
already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere
summary amparo proceeding.

Same; Same; Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, which defines the scope and extent
of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.—But perhaps
the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies
with the fact that a person’s right to be restituted of his property is already
subsumed under the general rubric of property rights—which are no longer
protected by the writ of amparo. Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, which defines
the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property
rights.

Same; Same; Inspection Order; An inspection order is an interim relief designed

to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition,
in order to aid the court before making a decision.—An inspection order is an
interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner
in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. A
basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is
that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the
allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not
require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and
precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection
order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to
make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.

60
Same; Same; Same; An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations
that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.—Since the very estimates
and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a
prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of
the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on
the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.

61
6. Burgos vs. Esperon, 715 Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; Enforced Disappearances; As the Supreme
SCRA 208 Court held in Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), the writ of amparo
merely embodies the Court’s directives to police agencies to undertake
specified courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of an
individual.—We note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted
above, that the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in
the present case. As we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), the
writ merely embodies the Court’s directives to police agencies to undertake
specified courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of an
individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a curative role.
It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators
through the investigation and remedial action that it directs. The focus is on
procedural curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific
criminal or the resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique nature of
Amparo proceedings has led us to define terms or concepts specific to what
the proceedings seek to achieve. In Razon Jr. v. Tagitis, we defined what the
terms “responsibility” and “accountability” signify in an Amparo case. We
said: Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this
Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal
and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
Account­ability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that
should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to
the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those

62
who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence
in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court emphasized that its role in a writ of
amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an enforced disappearance
has taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to define
and impose the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.—As a
final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of Amparo proceeding is
merely to determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to
deter mine who is responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. As shown above, the
beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case
with the CA’s final determination of the persons responsible and accountable
for the enforced disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of criminal
action against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation and
prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo
proceeding now before us.

63