Munoz V Yabut GR 142676

1/29/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 650
G.R. No. 142676. June 6, 2011.*
EMERITA MUÑOZ, petitioner, vs. ATTY. VICTORIANO

R. YABUT, JR. and SAMUEL GO CHAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 146718. June 6, 2011.*
EMERITA MUÑOZ, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SAMUEL

GO CHAN and AIDA C. CHAN, and THE BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondents.
Actions; Reconveyance; Land Titles; An action for

reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose
property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system
in another’s name; As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed
as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with
the land registration court.—Civil Case No. Q-28580 is an action
for reconveyance of real property. In Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v.
Enriquez, 449 SCRA 173 (2005), we described an action for
reconveyance as follows: An action for reconveyance is an
action in personam available to a
_______________
** Additional member per Special Order No. 994 dated May 27, 2011.
* FIRST DIVISION.
345
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 345
Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.
person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the

Torrens system in another’s name. Although the decree is
recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the
registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a
remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action
in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land registration
court. Reconveyance is always available as long as the
property has not passed to an innocent third person for
value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the
certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action
in court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an
innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the real
owner. (Emphases ours.)
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001774d1a186aa12f6fed003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/32
Same; Same; Same; An action for declaration of nullity of title

and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a
real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular
individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing—
any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly
impleaded.—The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding
upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a land registration
case or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is
binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest but not
upon strangers. A judgment directing a party to deliver
possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding
only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action. An action for
declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real
property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in
personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it
concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; No man shall be affected by
any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case
are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court—a writ of
execution can be issued only against a party and not against one
who did not have his day in court.—Since they were not
impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in
Civil Case No. Q-28580, the final judgment in said case cannot
bind BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The effect of the said
judgment cannot be extended to BPI Family and the spouses
Chan by simply issuing an alias writ of
346
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
execution against them. No man shall be affected by any

proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are
not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same
manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party
and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real
parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein
and by writs of execution issued pursuant thereto.
Same; Same; Same; It has long been ingrained in our
jurisprudence that a void title may become the root of a valid title
if the derivative title was obtained in good faith and for value.—
The fact that the titles to the subject property of Emilia M. Ching
and the spouses Go were already declared null and void ab initio
by final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 is not enough, for it
does not automatically make the subsequent titles of BPI Family
and the spouses Chan correspondingly null and void ab initio. It
has long been ingrained in our jurisprudence that a void title may
become the root of a valid title if the derivative title was obtained
in good faith and for value. Following the principle of
indefeasibility of a Torrens title, every person dealing with
registered lands may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and he is not required

to go beyond the certificate and inquire into the circumstances
culminating in the vendor’s acquisition of the property. The rights
of innocent third persons who relied on the correctness of the
certificate of title and acquired rights over the property covered
thereby cannot be disregarded and the courts cannot order the
cancellation of such certificate for that would impair or erode
public confidence in the Torrens system of land registration.
Same; Ejectment; Forcible Entry; There is forcible entry or
desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth
—in such cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning and
the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto;
Any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may
recover such possession even from the owner himself since such
cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the
plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue
deprivation thereof.—There is forcible entry or desahucio when
one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such
cases, the possession is
347
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 347
illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on

who has the prior possession de facto. In filing forcible entry
cases, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the
municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must
allege prior physical possession of the property, and second, he
must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of
the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is also
settled that in the resolution thereof, what is important is
determining who is entitled to the physical possession of the
property. Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior
possession de facto may recover such possession even from
the owner himself since such cases proceed independently
of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to
prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.
Title is never in issue in a forcible entry case, the court should
base its decision on who had prior physical possession. The main
thing to be proven in an action for forcible entry is prior
possession and that same was lost through force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, and stealth, so that it behooves the court to
restore possession regardless of title or ownership.
Same; Same; Same; Summary Procedure; The Rule on
Summary Procedure prohibits petitions for certiorari, like a
number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays
and to expedite the disposition of cases.—The purpose of the Rule
on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical
rules. Pursuant to this objective, the Rule prohibits petitions for

certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent
unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases.
Interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters
that do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the
proceedings. An order granting a preliminary injunction, whether
mandatory or prohibitory, is interlocutory and unappealable.
Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; While it is true
that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice.—The prohibition in Section 19(g) of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure is plain enough. Its further exposition is
unnecessary verbiage. The
348
petition for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut in Civil

Case No. Q-94-20632 is clearly covered by the said prohibition,
thus, it should have been dismissed outright by the RTC-Branch
88. While the circumstances involved in Muñoz’s forcible entry
case against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut are admittedly
very peculiar, these are insufficient to except the petition for
certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut in Civil Case No.
Q-94-20632 from the prohibition. The liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper
cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is
true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally
true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decisions and

resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera Law Office for petitioner.
Felix B. Lerio for respondent Spouses Chan and Atty.
V. Yabut, Jr.
Benedicto, Verzosa, Gealogo & Burkley for respondent
BPI.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before Us are the following consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In G.R. No. 142676, Emerita Muñoz (Muñoz) is seeking
the reversal, annulment, and setting aside of the Decision1
dated July 21, 1995 and Resolution2 dated March 9, 2000 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35322, which af-
_______________
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), pp. 67-74; penned by Associate Justice Jainal
D. Rasul with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Eugenio S.
Labitoria, concurring.
2 Id., at p. 101.
349
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 349

firmed the Orders3 dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 (RTC-Branch 88) of
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. The RTC
dismissed Civil Case No. 8286, the forcible entry case
instituted by Muñoz against Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr.
(Atty. Yabut) and Samuel Go Chan before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 33 of Quezon City; and
nullified the MeTC Order4 dated May 16, 1994, granting
Muñoz’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction which restored possession of the
subject property to Muñoz.
In G.R. No. 146718, Muñoz is praying for the reversal,
setting aside, and nullification of the Decision5 dated
September 29, 2000 and Resolution6 dated January 5, 2001
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019, which
affirmed the Orders7 dated August 21, 1995 and October 3,
1995 of the Quezon City RTC, Branch 95 (RTC-Branch 95)
in Civil Case No. Q-28580 denying Muñoz’s Motion for an
Alias Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of
the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 532978 against
respondents Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and the
spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan (spouses
Chan).
FACTS
The subject property is a house and lot at No. 48 Scout
Madriñan St., Diliman, Quezon City, formerly owned by
Yee L. Ching. Yee L. Ching is married to Emilia M. Ching
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 75-94.

4 Id., at pp. 95-100.
5 Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), pp. 61-72; penned by Associate Justice
Eubulo G. Verzola with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo
P. Cruz, concurring.
6 Id., at p. 73.
7 Id., at pp. 127-130.
8 Id., at pp. 111-126.
350
(spouses Ching), Muñoz’s sister. Muñoz lived at the subject

property with the spouses Ching. As consideration for the
valuable services rendered by Muñoz to the spouses
Ching’s family, Yee L. Ching agreed to have the subject
property transferred to Muñoz. By virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale, seemingly executed by Yee L. Ching in favor
of Muñoz,9 the latter acquired a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 186306 covering the subject property in her
name on December 22, 1972.10 However, in a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972, Muñoz
purportedly sold the subject property to her sister, Emilia
M. Ching. As a result, TCT No. 186306 was cancelled and
TCT No. 186366 was issued in Emilia M. Ching’s name.
Emilia M. Ching, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16,
1979, sold the subject property to spouses Go Song and Tan
Sio Kien (spouses Go), hence, TCT No. 186366 was
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 258977 in the spouses
Go’s names.
On October 15, 1979, Muñoz registered her adverse
claim to the subject property on TCT No. 258977 of the
spouses Go. The next day, on October 16, 1979, Muñoz filed
a complaint for the annulment of the deeds of absolute sale
dated December 28, 1972 and July 16, 1979, the
cancellation of TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Go’s names,
and the restoration and revival of TCT No. 186306 in
Muñoz’s name. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-28580 and raffled to RTC-Branch 95. On October 17,
1979, Muñoz caused the annota-
_______________
9 According to Yee L. Ching’s Answer with Cross-Claim in Civil Case

No. Q-28580, he was out of the country at the time he supposedly executed
the Deed of Absolute Sale in Muñoz’s favor. Emilia M. Ching was
somehow able to make it appear that her husband, Yee L. Ching, signed
the said Deed of Absolute Sale. When Yee L. Ching confronted Emilia M.
Ching regarding the papers, Emilia M. Ching abandoned him.
Nonetheless, Yee L. Ching ratified the transfer of the subject property to
Muñoz (Rollo [G.R. No. 142676], pp. 111-112).
10 Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), p. 102.
351
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 351

tion of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 258977 of the

spouses Go. In an Order dated December 17, 1979, the
RTC-Branch 95 granted the spouses Go’s motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and
ordered the sheriff to put the spouses Go in possession of
the subject property. The writ was implemented by the
sheriff on March 26, 1980, driving Muñoz and her

housemates away from the subject property.
Muñoz filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the Court of Appeals, assailing the issuance of the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 10148. The appellate court
dismissed Muñoz’s petition on January 4, 1980. Yee L.
Ching and his son Frederick M. Ching filed an urgent
motion for leave to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 10148 and
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
The Court of Appeals issued a TRO. However, in a
Resolution dated March 18, 1980, the appellate court
denied the motion to intervene of Yee L. Ching and
Frederick M. Ching, and cancelled the TRO previously
issued. Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching challenged
before this Court, in G.R. No. 53463, the Resolution dated
March 18, 1980 of the Court of Appeals. Eventually, in a
Resolution dated June 3, 1981, the Court dismissed the
petition in G.R. No. 53463, for lack of merit and failure of
Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching to substantially show
that the RTC-Branch 95 and the Court of Appeals gravely
abused their discretion. In a subsequent Resolution dated
June 21, 1982, the Court clarified that its Resolution of
June 3, 1981 was without prejudice to the continuation of
the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-28580 still pending before
the trial court, “in order that proper and final adjudication
may be made of whether or not the deed of sale by Emerita
L. Muñoz in favor of Emilia M. Ching is a real, genuine and
authentic transac-
352

tion, thereby to settle once and for all the issue of

ownership of the property herein in question.”11
Trial in Civil Case No. Q-28580 proceeded before RTC-
Branch 95.
In the meantime, Muñoz’s adverse claim and notice of lis
pendens on TCT No. 258977 was cancelled on October 28,
1982 on the basis of an alleged final judgment in favor of
the spouses Go.12 The spouses Go obtained a loan of
P500,000.00 from BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family)
and to secure the same, they constituted a mortgage on the
subject property on November 23, 1982.13 When the
spouses Go defaulted on the payment of their loan, BPI
Family foreclosed the mortgage. BPI Family was the
highest bidder at the auction sale of the subject property.
The spouses Go failed to exercise their right of redemption
within the prescribed period, thus, BPI Family was finally
able to register the subject property in its name on October
23, 1987 under TCT No. 370364.14 Apparently, the original
copy of TCT No. 370364 was among those razed in the fire
at the Quezon City Register of Deeds on June 11, 1988. As
a result of the administrative reconstitution of the lost
title, TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) was issued to BPI

Family. On December 3, 1990, BPI Family executed in
favor of the spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan
(spouses Chan) a Deed of Absolute Sale15 covering the
subject property for and in consideration of P3,350,000.00.
Consequently, TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) in the name of
BPI Family was cancelled and TCT No. 53297 was issued
in the spouses Chan’s names on January 28, 1991.16 The
spouses Chan obtained a loan from BPI Family on October
2, 1992 for the construction of a building on the subject
property, and to secure the same,
_______________
11 Id., at p. 113.
12 Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), p. 101.
13 Id.
14 Id., at pp. 102-103.
15 Id., at pp. 104-105.
16 Id., at pp. 106-108.
353
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 353

constituted a mortgage on the subject property in favor of

BPI Family.17
On July 19, 1991, RTC-Branch 95 rendered its
Decision18 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, against Emilia M.
Ching, Yee L. Ching, and the spouses Go (Emilia M. Ching,
et al.). It found that Muñoz’s signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972 was forged; that
Muñoz never sold the subject property to her sister, Emilia
M. Ching; and that the spouses Go were not innocent
purchasers for value of the subject property. The fallo of
the said decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing for

lack of merit [Emilia M. Ching, et al.’s] respective counterclaims,
cross-claims, and counter-cross-claim, declaring as null and void
ab initio the following documents, to wit: (a) Deed of Absolute Sale
dated December 28, 1972, copy of which is marked in evidence as
Exh. M; (b) TCT No. 186366 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon
City, copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh. N; (c) Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 16, 1979, copy of which is marked in
evidence as Exh. 3; and, (d) TCT No. 258977 of the Registry of
Deeds for Metro Manila District III, copy of which is marked in
evidence as Exh. 4, and directing defendant Register of Deeds of
Quezon City to cancel from the records of the subject property the
registrations of all the said documents and to restore and revive,
free from all liens and encumbrances, TCT No. 186306 of the
Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, copy of which is marked in
evidence as Exh. L, as well as ordering defendants Emilia M.
Ching, Go Song and Tan Sio Kien jointly and severally to pay
[Muñoz] the sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees and to
pay the costs of suit. The court also hereby dismisses the rest of
the claims in [Muñoz’s] complaint, there being no satisfactory
warrant therefor.”19
Emilia M. Ching, et al.’s, appeal of the foregoing

judgment of the RTC-Branch 95 was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 33811
_______________
17 Id.
18 Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), pp. 102-106.
19 Id., at p. 106.
354

before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision20 dated March

4, 1993, the appellate court not only affirmed the appealed
judgment, but also ordered the spouses Go and their
successors-in-interest and assigns and those acting on their
behalf to vacate the subject property, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed

from is AFFIRMED, with costs against [Emilia M. Ching, et al.].
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued on December
17, 1979 is hereby set aside and declared dissolved. Defendants-
appellants Go and Tan, their successors-in-interest and assigns
and those acting on their behalf, are ordered to vacate the
disputed premises and to deliver the same to [Muñoz]
immediately upon receipt of this decision.”21
Emilia L. Ching, et al., filed before this Court a motion

for extension of time to file their petition for review, which
was assigned the docket number G.R. No. 109260.
However, they failed to file their intended petition within
the extended period which expired on April 23, 1993. In a
Resolution22 dated July 12, 1993, the Court declared G.R.
No. 109260 terminated. The Resolution dated July 12, 1993
of the Court in G.R. No. 109260 became final and executory
on July 15, 1993 and was entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgments on even date.23
More than two months later, on September 20, 1993, the
RTC-Branch 95 issued a writ of execution to implement the
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
The spouses Chan, who bought the subject property
from BPI Family, then came forward and filed before the
RTC-Branch 95 on October 22, 1993 an Urgent Motion to
Stop Execution as Against Spouses Samuel Go Chan and
Aida
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 107-123.
21 Id., at p. 123.
22 Id., at p. 124.
23 Id., at pp. 125-126.
355
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 355

Chan,24 opposing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case

No. Q-28580. The spouses Chan asserted ownership and
possession of the subject property on the basis of a clean
title registered in their names under TCT No. 53297. The
spouses Chan further contended that the final judgment in
Civil Case No. Q-28580 could not be executed against them
since they were not parties to the said case; they were not
successors-in-interest, assigns, or acting on behalf of the
spouses Go; and they purchased the subject property from
BPI Family without any notice of defect in the latter’s title.
It was only at this point that Muñoz, upon her own
inquiry, discovered the cancellation on October 28, 1982 of
her adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on
the spouses Go’s TCT No. 258977, and the subsequent
events that led to the transfer and registration of the title
to the subject property from the spouses Go, to BPI Family,
and finally, to the spouses Chan.
In its Order25 dated December 28, 1993, the RTC-
Branch 95 denied the spouses Chan’s urgent motion to stop
the execution. According to the RTC-Branch 95, the
photocopy of TCT No. 370364 in the name of BPI Family,
submitted by the spouses Chan with their motion, could
hardly be regarded as satisfactory proof that Muñoz’s
adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated therein
were also missing from the original copy of said certificate
of title. Muñoz’s adverse claim and notice of lis pendens
were annotated on TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Go’s
names as P.E.-8078 and P.E.-8178, respectively. So when
TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go was cancelled and TCT
No. 370364 was issued to BPI Family, it could be presumed
that the Register of Deeds regularly performed his official
duty by carrying over Muñoz’s adverse claim and notice of
lis pendens to TCT No. 370364. In addition, the RTC-
Branch 95 pointed out that in this jurisdiction, the entry of
_______________
24 Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), pp. 98-100.

25 Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), p. 127.
356

the notice of lis pendens in the day book of the Register of

Deeds was already sufficient notice to the whole world of
the dispute over the subject property, and there was no
more need to annotate the same on the owner’s duplicate of
the certificate of title. Finally, the RTC-Branch 95 held
that TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) of BPI Family and TCT
No. 53297 of the spouses Chan shall be subject to the
reservation under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 2626 “[t]hat
certificates of title reconstituted extrajudicially, in the
manner stated in sections five and six hereof, shall be
without prejudice to any party whose right or interest in
the property was duly noted in the original, at the time it
was lost or destroyed, but entry or notation of which has
not been made on the reconstituted certificate of title.”
Thus, the spouses Chan were deemed to have taken the
disputed property subject to the final outcome of Civil Case
No. Q-28580.
On January 3, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 issued an Alias
Writ of Execution.27 On January 10, 1994, the writ was
enforced, and possession of the subject property was taken
from the spouses Chan and returned to Muñoz.28 In its
Orders dated April 8, 1994 and June 17, 1994, the RTC-
Branch 95 denied the spouses Chan’s motion for
reconsideration and notice of appeal, respectively.29
G.R. No. 142676
Pending resolution by the RTC-Branch 95 of the spouses
Chan’s motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal in
Civil Case No. Q-28580, Muñoz instituted before the MeTC
on February 4, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry with
Prayer
_______________
26 An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of

Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed.
27 Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), pp. 128-129.
28 Id., at pp. 130-134.
29 Id., at pp. 185-186.
357
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 357

for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction30 against Samuel Go

Chan and Atty. Yabut, docketed as Civil Case No. 8286.
Muñoz alleged in her complaint that she had been in actual
and physical possession of the subject property since
January 10, 1994. She hired a caretaker and two security
guards for the said property. On February 2, 1994, Samuel
Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, along with 20 other men, some of
whom were armed, ousted Muñoz of possession of the
subject property by stealth, threat, force, and intimidation.
Muñoz prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction directing Samuel Go Chan and Atty.
Yabut and all persons claiming right under them to vacate
the subject property. Muñoz additionally prayed for

judgment making the mandatory injunction permanent
and directing Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut to pay
Muñoz: (1) compensation for the unlawful occupation of the
subject property in the amount of P50,000.00 per month,
beginning February 2, 1994 until the said property is fully
and completely turned over to Muñoz; (2) attorney’s fees in
the amount of P50,000.00, plus P1,500.00 per court
appearance of Muñoz’s counsel; and (3) costs of suit.
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut denied Muñoz’s
allegations, insisting that Samuel Go Chan is the valid,
lawful, and true legal owner and possessor of the subject
property. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut averred that
the Turn-Over of Possession and Receipt of Possession
dated January 10, 1994—attached to Muñoz’s complaint as
proof that the subject property had been placed in her
possession—is a falsified document. The Writ of Execution
issued on September 20, 1993 in Civil Case No. Q-28580
had already expired and the Sheriff’s Return on the Writ—
another document purporting to show that possession of
the subject property was turned-over to Muñoz on January
10, 1994—was then being challenged in a complaint before
the Office of Deputy Court Ad-
_______________
30 Id., at pp. 137-145.
358

ministrator Reynaldo L. Suarez of the Supreme Court.

Samuel Go Chan’s possession of the subject property has
never been interrupted. His sister, Cely Chan, resided at
the subject property and was never removed therefrom. On
February 2, 1994, Atty. Yabut was at the subject property
only to protect the rights and interest of his client, Samuel
Go Chan, and since the latter’s possession of the subject
property had never been interrupted, Atty. Yabut entered
the same peacefully, without intimidation, force, or stealth.
The other people at the subject property on February 2,
1994 were there to attend the services at the Buddhist
Temple which occupied the fourth floor of the building
erected by the spouses Chan on the subject property.
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, thus, asked the MeTC to
dismiss Muñoz’s complaint for lack of merit and legal
basis.31
The MeTC received evidence from the parties on
whether a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued,
as prayed for by Muñoz. In its Order dated May 16, 1994,
the MeTC adjudged that the final judgment in Civil Case
No. Q-28580 was already executed against the spouses
Chan and there was, indeed, a turn-over of possession of
the subject property to Muñoz. Accordingly, the MeTC
granted Muñoz’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary mandatory injunction, restoring possession of
the subject property to Muñoz.
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut questioned the
foregoing MeTC order through a Petition for Certiorari
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction32 before the RTC-Branch 88, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. They asserted
that they were not bound by the execution of the final
judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 as
they were not parties to the said case. Muñoz, on the other
hand, argued that the MeTC Order of May 16, 1994 was an
interlocutory order, and under
_______________
31 Id., at pp. 178-184.

32 Id., at pp. 146-156.
359
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 359

Section 19 of the Rules of Summary Procedure, a petition

for certiorari against an interlocutory order issued by the
court is one of the prohibited pleadings and motions in
summary proceedings.
In its Order dated June 10, 1994, the RTC-Branch 88
issued a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
implementation of the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994.
On August 5, 1994, the RTC-Branch 88 issued another
Order resolving Muñoz’s motion to dismiss the petition for
certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632, motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated June 10, 1994 of RTC-
Branch 88 granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, and motion to resolve with additional grounds
for dismissal. According to the RTC-Branch 88, the MeTC
failed to distinguish the issue of finality of the judgment of
the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 from the
assertions of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut that the
spouses Chan are not covered by said final judgment
because they are not successors-in-interest, assigns, or
privies of the spouses Go and they are purchasers of the
subject property in good faith. The issue of whether the
final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 extended to the
spouses Chan was then still being litigated in the same
case before RTC-Branch 95, where the spouses Chan’s
motion for reconsideration of the denial of their notice of
appeal was pending. The RTC-Branch 88 further found
that the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not
dismissing Muñoz’s complaint for forcible entry on the
ground of “lis pendens,” as the issue as to who between
Muñoz and the spouses Chan had the better right to
possession of the subject property was the subject of the
pending proceeding in Civil Case No. Q-28580 before the

RTC-Branch 95. In the end, the RTC-Branch 88 decreed:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders

judgment—
(a) Denying the motion to dismiss of respondent Muñoz for
lack of merit;
360

(b) Denying the motion for reconsideration of respondent

Muñoz for the recall and/or setting aside of the writ of
preliminary injunction granted to petitioners;
(c) Declaring the Order dated May 16, 1994 of Public
respondent Hon. Elsa de Guzman in Civil Case No. 8286 illegal
and therefore null and void; and
(d) Dismissing the ejectment suit in Civil Case No. 8286 on
ground of lis pendens.
Without pronouncement as to costs.”33
Muñoz appealed the Orders dated June 10, 1994 and

August 5, 1994 of RTC-Branch 88 before the Court of
Appeals. Her appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
35322. Aside from the nullification of the two orders,
Muñoz additionally prayed for the dismissal from the
service of the RTC-Branch 88 presiding judge and the
disbarment of Atty. Yabut.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 21,
1995, sustained the appealed orders of RTC-Branch 88. The
Court of Appeals held that the MeTC should have
dismissed the forcible entry case on the ground of “lis
pendens”; that the spouses Chan were not parties in Civil
Case No. Q-28580, and impleading them only in the
execution stage of said case vitiated their right to due
process; that the order of the RTC-Branch 95 involving the
spouses Chan in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was null and void,
considering that they are strangers to the case, and they
are innocent purchasers for value of the subject property;
that the notice of lis pendens was already cancelled from
the spouses Go’s certificate of title at the time they
mortgaged the subject property to BPI Family; and that the
title to the subject property was already free of any and all
liens and encumbrances when the spouses Chan purchased
the said property from BPI Family. The Court of Appeals,
in its Resolution dated March 9, 2000, denied Muñoz’s
motion for reconsideration.
_______________
33 Id., at p. 94.
361
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 361

G.R. No. 146718

Meanwhile, Muñoz filed before the RTC-Branch 95 in
Civil Case No. Q-28580 a Motion to Cite the Register of
Deeds in Contempt of Court for the failure of the Register
of Deeds to restore Muñoz’s TCT No. 186306 despite having
been served with a copy of the writ of execution on October
11, 1993. In its Judgment (on the Contempt Proceedings
against the Register of Deeds of Quezon City Samuel C.
Cleofe)34 dated March 18, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 denied
Muñoz’s motion, convinced that the Register of Deeds had a
valid excuse for his inability to implement the served writ.
The Register of Deeds could not cancel the spouses Chan’s
TCT No. 53297, the subsisting certificate of title over the
subject property, absent any authority or directive for him
to do so. The directive in the final judgment in Civil Case
No. Q-28580 and the writ of execution for the same only
pertained to the cancellation of the spouses Go’s TCT No.
258977.
Thereafter, Muñoz filed a Motion for Contempt against
the spouses Chan and a Second Motion for Contempt
against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut. Muñoz also filed
a Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for
Surrender of the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No.
53297,35 in which she prayed for the issuance of an alias
writ of execution directing the Register of Deeds not only to
cancel TCT No. 258977 and all documents declared null
and void ab initio in the dispositive portion of the
Decision36 dated July 19, 1991 of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil
Case No. Q-28580, and to restore and revive, free from all
liens and encumbrances Muñoz’s TCT No. 186306, but
likewise to cancel the present certificate of title covering
the subject property, TCT No. 53297.
_______________
34 Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), p. 110.

35 Id., at pp. 111-126.
36 Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), pp. 102-106.
362

In its Order dated August 21, 1995, the RTC-Branch 95

denied all of Muñoz’s aforementioned motions. The RTC-
Branch 95 was of the view that Samuel Go Chan’s title
should be litigated in another forum, not in Civil Case No.
Q-28580 where the judgment had already become final and
executory. The RTC-Branch 95 also stressed that since the
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 had long become final
and executory, it could no longer be changed or amended
except for clerical error or mistake. Accordingly, the RTC-

Branch 95 resolved as follows:
“1. Ordering, as it hereby orders, the denial of [Muñoz’s] first and

second motions for contempt and hereby absolves respondents Samuel
Go Chan, Celia Chan, Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr., and several John
Does of the Contempt Charges against them.
2. Ordering, as it hereby orders, the issuance of an alias writ of
execution directing the Court’s Deputy Sheriff:
(a) Defendants Go Song and Tan Sio Kien, their successors-in-
interest and assigns and those acting on their behalf to vacate the
disputed premises and deliver the same to [Muñoz];
(b) Defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel from the
records of the subject property the registration of all the following
documents, to wit: (1) “Deed of Absolute Sale” dated December 28,
1972; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 186366 of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City; (3) “Deed of Absolute Sale”
dated July 16, 1979; and (4) TCT No. 258977 of the Registry of
Deeds for Metro Manila II, and to restore and revive, free from all
liens and encumbrances TCT No. 186306 of the Registry of Deeds
for Quezon City; and
(c) Defendants Emilia M. Ching, Go Song and Tan Sio Kien jointly
and severally to pay [Muñoz] the sum of P50,000.00 as and for
attorney’s fees and to pay the cost of suit.”37
_______________
37 Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), p. 128.
363
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 363

Unrelenting, Muñoz filed a Motion for Clarificatory

Order, pointing out that the spouses Chan are the present
occupants of the subject property. The Order dated August
21, 1995 of the RTC-Branch 95 directed the deputy sheriff
to deliver the subject property to Muñoz, and this could not
be done unless the spouses Chan are evicted therefrom.
Resultantly, Muñoz prayed that “a clarificatory order be
made categorically stating that the spouses Samuel Go
Chan and Aida C. Chan, and all persons claiming right
under them, are likewise evicted from the subject premises
pursuant to the Order of 21 August 1995.”38
Once more, the RTC-Branch 95 denied Muñoz’s motion
in its Order dated October 3, 1995. The RTC-Branch 95
reiterated the rule that after the judgment had become
final, only clerical errors, as distinguished from substantial
errors, can be amended by the court. Furthermore, when
the decision or judgment sought to be amended is
promulgated by an appellate court, it is beyond the power
of the trial court to change, amplify, enlarge, alter, or
modify. Ultimately, the RTC-Branch 95 pronounced that it
was “restrained x x x to consider as mere clerical error the
exclusion of spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan in
the Decision of the Court dated July 19, 1991, a final

judgment, which judgment cannot now be made to speak a
different language.”39
Attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC-Branch 95 in issuing its Orders dated August 21, 1995
and October 3, 1995, Muñoz filed before this Court a
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which was
remanded to the Court of Appeals in observance of the
hierarchy of courts, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 40019. The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
on September 29, 2000 dismissing Muñoz’s petition. The
Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC-Branch 95 that the
spouses Chan could not be
_______________
38 Id., at p. 293.
39 Id., at p. 130.
364

covered by the alias writ of execution considering that

they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The
cancellation of TCT No. 53297 in the spouses Chan’s names
could not be done apart from a separate action exclusively
for that matter. The spouses Chan are deemed buyers in
good faith and for value as the certificate of title delivered
to them by BPI Family was free from any liens or
encumbrances or any mark that would have raised the
spouses Chan’s suspicions. Every person dealing with
registered lands may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and he is not
required to go beyond the certificate and inquire into the
circumstances culminating in the vendor’s acquisition of
the property. The Court of Appeals denied Muñoz’s motion
for reconsideration in a Resolution dated January 5, 2001.
Muñoz comes before this Court via the present
consolidated petitions.
Muñoz posits that the final judgment and writ of
execution of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 bind
not only Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, but also
their successors-in-interest, assigns, or persons acting on
their behalf, namely, BPI Family and spouses Chan. The
spouses Chan cannot be deemed innocent purchasers for
value of the property since the cancellation of the adverse
claim and notice of lis pendens on the spouses Go’s TCT No.
258977 is completely null and void.
Muñoz further argues that the MeTC Order dated May
16, 1994 in Civil Case No. 8286 correctly ordered the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
restoring possession of the subject property to her, as she
had already acquired prior possession of the said property
upon the execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No.
Q-28580. Also, the spouses Chan’s petition for certiorari

before the RTC-Branch 88, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
94-20632, challenging the Order dated May 16, 1994 of the
MeTC in Civil Case No. 8286, is a prohibited pleading
under the Rules of Summary Procedure; and the RTC-
Branch 88 and the Court of Appeals
365
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 365

should be faulted for giving due course to the said petition

even in the absence of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, in their comments to the two
petitions at bar, the spouses Chan, Atty. Yabut, and BPI
Family assert that given the peculiar factual circumstances
of the case, RTC-Branch 88 was justified in taking
cognizance of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut’s petition
for certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632; that Muñoz is
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch
88 after participating in the proceedings in Civil Case No.
Q-94-20632; that the spouses Chan’s title to the subject
property is not affected by the final judgment of RTC-
Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and the said
judgment cannot be executed against the spouses Chan
since they are neither parties to the case, nor are they the
successors-in-interest, assigns, or persons acting on behalf
of Emilia M. Ching or the spouses Go; that BPI Family and
consequently, the spouses Chan, obtained title to the
subject property as innocent purchasers for value, there
being no notice of any infirmity in said title; and that
Muñoz is guilty of forum shopping for filing her petition in
G.R. No. 146718 even while her petition in G.R. No. 142676
is still pending.
II
RULING
For the sake of expediency, we will be discussing first
the merits of the petition in G.R. No. 146718.
G.R. No. 146718
Civil Case No. Q-28580 involved Muñoz’s complaint for
the annulment of the deeds of absolute sale dated
December 28, 197240 and July 16, 1979,41 the cancellation
of the spouses Go’s
_______________
40 Purported sale of the subject property by Muñoz to Emilia M. Ching.

41 Purported sale of the subject property by Emilia M. Ching to the
spouses Go.
366

TCT No. 258977, and the restoration and revival of

Muñoz’s TCT No. 186306. The final judgment of RTC-
Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was in favor of Muñoz
and against Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go. The
problem arose when during the pendency of the said case,
title and possession of the subject property were
transferred from the spouses Go, to BPI Family, and
finally, to the spouses Chan. BPI Family and the spouses
Chan were never impleaded as parties and were not
referred to in the dispositive portion of the final judgment
in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
Muñoz questions in G.R. No. 146718: (1) the Order dated
August 21, 1995 denying her Motion for Contempt against
the spouses Chan, Second Motion for Contempt against
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, and Motion for an Alias
Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of the
Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 53297; and (2) the
Order dated October 3, 1995 denying her Motion for
Clarificatory Order, both issued by the RTC-Branch 95 in
Civil Case No. Q-28580, and upheld by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019. In sum, Muñoz was
seeking in her aforementioned motions: (1) a categorical
order from the RTC-Branch 95 that the final judgment in
Civil Case No. Q-28580 be executed against the spouses
Chan; and (2) the surrender and cancellation of the spouses
Chan’s TCT No. 53297 and restoration of Muñoz’s TCT No.
186306.
There is no merit in Muñoz’s petition in G.R. No.
146718.
Civil Case No. Q-28580 is an action for reconveyance of
real property. In Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez,42
we described an action for reconveyance as follows:
“An action for reconveyance is an action in personam

available to a person whose property has been wrongfully
registered under the Torrens system in another’s name. Although
the decree is recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, the
_______________
42 G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 173.
367
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 367

registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a

remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action
in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land registration
court. Reconveyance is always available as long as the
property has not passed to an innocent third person for
value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the
certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action
in court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an
innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the real
owner.”43 (Emphases ours.)
The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon

the whole world, such as a judgment in a land registration
case or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is
binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest
but not upon strangers. A judgment directing a party to
deliver possession of a property to another is in personam;
it is binding only against the parties and their successors-
in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action. An action for declaration of nullity of title and
recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is
a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a
particular individual only although it concerns the right to
a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only
upon the parties properly impleaded.44
Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the
opportunity to participate in Civil Case No. Q-28580, the
final judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family and the
spouses Chan. The effect of the said judgment cannot be
extended to BPI Family and the spouses Chan by simply
issuing an alias writ of execution against them. No man
shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any
judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a
writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not
against one who did not have his day in court. Only real
parties in interest in an ac-
_______________
43 Id., at p. 190.
44 Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 426 Phil. 61, 86-87; 375 SCRA
390, 408-409 (2002).
368

tion are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of

execution issued pursuant thereto.45
A similar situation existed in Dino v. Court of Appeals,46
where we resolved that:
“As the registered owner of the subject property, petitioners

are not bound by decision in Civil Case No. R-18073 for they were
never summoned in said case and the notice of lis pendens
annotated on TCT No. 73069 was already cancelled at the time
petitioners purchased the subject property. While it is true that
petitioners are indispensable parties in Civil Case No. R-18073,
without whom no complete relief could be accorded to the private
respondents, the fact still remains that petitioners were never
actually joined as defendants in said case. Impleading petitioners
as additional defendants only in the execution stage of said case
violated petitioners’ right to due process as no notice of lis

pendens was annotated on the existing certificate of title of said
property nor were petitioners given notice of the pending case,
therefore petitioners remain strangers in said case and the Order
of the trial court involving them is null and void, considering that
petitioners are innocent purchasers of the subject property for
value.”47
We further stress that Section 48 of Presidential Decree

No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, clearly provides that “[a] certificate of title shall
not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.” Herein, several Torrens titles were
already issued after the cancellation of Muñoz’s.
Certificates of title had been successively issued to Emilia
M. Ching, spouses Go, BPI Family, and spouses Chan. Civil
Case No. Q-28580, in which a final judgment had already
been rendered, specifically challenged the validity of the
certificates of title of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go
only. To have the present certifi-
_______________
45 Orquiola v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 323, 332-333; 386 SCRA 301,
311 (2002).
46 G.R. No. 95921, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 422.
47 Id., at pp. 432-433.
369
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 369

cate of title of the spouses Chan cancelled, Muñoz must

institute another case directly attacking the validity of the
same.
The fact that the titles to the subject property of Emilia
M. Ching and the spouses Go were already declared null
and void ab initio by final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-
28580 is not enough, for it does not automatically make the
subsequent titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan
correspondingly null and void ab initio.
It has long been ingrained in our jurisprudence that a
void title may become the root of a valid title if the
derivative title was obtained in good faith and for value.
Following the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title,
every person dealing with registered lands may safely rely
on the correctness of the certificate of title of the
vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go beyond the
certificate and inquire into the circumstances culminating
in the vendor’s acquisition of the property. The rights of
innocent third persons who relied on the correctness of the
certificate of title and acquired rights over the property
covered thereby cannot be disregarded and the courts
cannot order the cancellation of such certificate for that
would impair or erode public confidence in the Torrens

system of land registration.48
Hence, we pronounced in Republic v. Agunoy, Sr.:49
“Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioner’s own judicial

admission, the lots in dispute are no longer part of the public
domain, and there are numerous third, fourth, fifth and more
parties holding Torrens titles in their favor and enjoying the
presumption of good faith. This brings to mind what we have
reechoed in Pino v. Court of Appeals and the cases therein cited:
_______________
48 Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 753, 765; 300 SCRA
565, 576 (1998).
49 492 Phil. 118; 451 SCRA 735 (2005), citing Pino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
94114, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 434, 445; Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 43972, July 24, 1990, 187 SCRA 735, 741; Duran v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 223 Phil. 88, 93-94; 138 SCRA 489, 494 (1985).
370

[E]ven on the supposition that the sale was void, the

general rule that the direct result of a previous illegal
contract cannot be valid (on the theory that the spring
cannot rise higher than its source) cannot apply here for We
are confronted with the functionings of the Torrens System
of Registration. The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a
fraudulent or forged document of sale may become
the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title has
already been transferred from the name of the true
owner to the name of the forger or the name
indicated by the forger.”50 (Emphases ours.)
Although the RTC-Branch 95 had declared with finality

in Civil Case No. Q-28580 that the titles of Emilia M.
Ching and the spouses Go were null and void, there is yet
no similar determination on the titles of BPI Family and
the spouses Chan. The question of whether or not the titles
to the subject property of BPI Family and the spouses Chan
are null and void, since they are merely the successors-in-
interest, assigns, or privies of Emilia M. Ching and the
spouses Go, ultimately depends on the issue of whether or
not BPI Family and the spouses Chan obtained their titles
to the subject property in bad faith, i.e., with notice of
Muñoz’s adverse claim and knowledge of the pendency of
Civil Case No. Q-28580. The latter is a factual issue on
which we cannot rule in the present petition, not only
because we are not a trier of facts, but more importantly,
because it was not among the issues raised and tried in
Civil Case No. Q-28580.
In support of her prayer for an alias writ of execution
against BPI Family and the spouses Go, Muñoz cites our
ruling in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,51 in

relation to De la Cruz v. De la Cruz.52
_______________
50 Republic v. Agunoy, Sr., id, at pp. 137-138; p. 753.

51 G.R. No. 76265, April 22, 1992, 208 SCRA 215 and G.R. No. 76265,
March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 88.
52 215 Phil. 593; 130 SCRA 666 (1984).
371
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 371

De la Cruz is an action for reconveyance of Lot 671

founded on breach of trust filed by Augustina de la Cruz, et
al., against Lucia dela Cruz (Lucia) and Iglesia Ni Kristo
(INK). We upheld the validity of the sale of Lot 671 by
Lucia to INK, and thereby validated the title of INK to the
said property.
Calalang actually involved two petitions: (1) a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition originally filed by
Virginia Calalang (Calalang) before this Court, and (2) a
petition for injunction with damages originally filed by
Augusto M. de Leon (De Leon), et al., before the RTC and
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-45767. Calalang and De Leon,
et al., assert titles that were adverse to that of INK. De
Leon, et al., in particular, claim that their titles to Lot 671
were derived from Amando Clemente. Calalang and De
Leon, et al., sought from the court orders enjoining INK
from building a fence to enclose Lot 671; requiring the
Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NLTDRA) to conduct an
investigation of the anomaly regarding Lucia’s
reconstituted title to Lot 671; and dismissing the
proceedings instituted by the Register of Deeds for the
cancellation of their titles. We dismissed the petitions of
Calalang and De Leon, et al., on the ground of res judicata,
the legality or validity of the title of INK over Lot 671 had
been settled with finality in De la Cruz. De la Cruz was
applied to Calalang and De Leon, et al., since the facts on
which such decision was predicated continued to be the
facts on which the petitions of Calalang and De Leon, et al.,
were based.
Muñoz’s reliance on Calalang is misplaced. There are
substantial differences in the facts and issues involved in
Calalang and the present case.
In Calalang, there is duplication or overlapping of
certificates of title issued to different persons over the same
property. We already upheld in De la Cruz the validity of
the certificate of title of INK over Lot 671, which effectively
prevents us from recognizing the validity of any other
certificate of title over the same property. In addition,
Lucia, the predecessor-
372

in-interest of INK, had her certificate of title judicially

reconstituted. The judicial reconstitution of title is a
proceeding in rem, constituting constructive notice to the
whole world. Hence, we rejected the petitions of Calalang
and De Leon, et al., to enjoin INK from building a fence
enclosing Lot 671, and the concerned public authorities
from instituting appropriate proceedings to have all other
certificates of title over Lot 671 annulled and cancelled.
In the instant case, there has been no duplication or
overlapping of certificates of title. The subject property has
always been covered by only one certificate of title at a
time, and at present, such certificate is in the spouses
Chan’s names. As we have previously discussed herein,
Muñoz cannot have the spouses Chan’s TCT No. 53297
cancelled by a mere motion for the issuance of an alias writ
of execution in Civil Case No. Q-28580, when the spouses
Chan were not parties to the case. Civil Case No. Q-28580
was a proceeding in personam, and the final judgment
rendered therein—declaring null and void the titles to the
subject property of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go—
should bind only the parties thereto. Furthermore, despite
the void titles of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, the
derivative titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan may
still be valid provided that they had acquired the same in
good faith and for value.
More in point with the instant petition is Pineda v.
Santiago.53 Pineda still involved Lot 671. INK sought from
the RTC a second alias writ of execution to implement the
judgment in Calalang against Conrado Pineda (Pineda), et.
al. In opposing the issuance of such writ, Pineda, et al.,
asserted that they held titles to Lot 671 adverse to those of
Lucia and INK and that they were not parties in De la
Cruz or in Calalang. In its assailed order, the RTC granted
the second alias writ of execution on the basis that the
issue of ownership of Lot 671 was already determined with
finality in favor of Lucia and INK.
_______________
53 G.R. No. 143482, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 47.
373
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 373

The writ ordered the deputy sheriff to eject Pineda, et al.,

from Lot 671. When the matter was brought before us, we
annulled the assailed order as the writ of execution issued
was against Pineda, et al., who were not parties to Civil
Case No. Q-45767, the ejectment suit instituted by De

Leon, et al. We elaborated in Pineda that:
“Being a suit for injunction, Civil Case No. Q-45767 partakes of

an action in personam. In Domagas v. Jensen, we have
explained the nature of an action in personam and enumerated
some actions and proceedings which are in personam, viz.:
“The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action
determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or
in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined
by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding
in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and
obligations brought against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right
to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek
to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with
the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding
in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a
court, some responsibility or liability directly upon
the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits
to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or
actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in
personam is said to be one which has for its object a
judgment against the person, as distinguished from a
judgment against the propriety to determine its
state. It has been held that an action in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations;
such action is brought against the person. As far as
suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled
that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs,
the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce
personal rights and obligations and in which personal
judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations
between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for
recovery of real property are in personam.”
The respondent judge’s jurisdiction is, therefore, limited to the
parties in the injunction suit. To stress, the petition for
injunction,
374

docketed as Civil Case No. Q-45767, was filed only by therein

petitioners Augusto M. de Leon, Jose de Castro, Jose A. Panlilio,
Felicidad Vergara Vda. De Pineda, Fernando L. Vitug I, Fernando
M. Vitug II, Fernando M. Vitug III, and Faustino Tobia, and later
amended to include Elena Ostrea and Feliza C. Cristobal-
Generoso as additional petitioners therein, against Bishop Eraño
Manalo, in his capacity as titular and spiritual head of I.N.K.
Herein petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al. never became parties
thereto. Any and all orders and writs of execution, which the
respondent judge may issue in that case can, therefore, be
enforced only against those parties and not against the herein
petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al. In issuing the assailed Order
dated 22 April 1998, which directed the issuance of the 2nd Alias
Writ of Execution to eject non-parties (herein petitioners), the
respondent judge clearly went out of bounds and committed grave
abuse of discretion.
The nature of the injunction suit—Civil Case No. Q-45767—as
an action in personam in the RTC remains to be the same
whether it is elevated to the CA or to this Court for review. An
action in personam does not become an action in rem just because
a pronouncement confirming I.N.K.’s title to Lot 671 was made by
this Court in the Calalang decision. Final rulings may be made
by this Court, as the Highest Court of the Land, in actions
in personam but such rulings are binding only as against
the parties therein and not against the whole world. Here
lies another grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge when he relied on the Calalang decision in his
assailed Order dated 07 May 1998 as if it were binding against
the whole world, saying:
“After evaluating the arguments of both parties, decisive
on the incident is the decision of the Supreme Court in favor
of the respondent I.N.K., represented by its titular and
spiritual head Bishop Eraño G. Manalo, sustaining its
ownership over the subject Lot 671. This Court could do no
less but to follow and give substantial meaning to its
ownership which shall include all dominical rights by way
of a Writ of Execution. To delay the issuance of such writ is
a denial of justice due the I.N.K.”
As a final word, this decision shall not be
misinterpreted as disturbing or modifying our ruling in
Calalang. The final ruling on I.N.K.’s ownership and title
is not at all affected. Private respondent I.N.K., as the true
and lawful
375
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 375

owner of Lot 671 as ruled by the Court in Calalang, simply

has to file the proper action against the herein petitioners
to enforce its property rights within the bounds of the law
and our rules. I.N.K.’s recourse of asking for the issuance of an
alias writ of execution against the petitioners in Civil Case No. Q-
45767 and the respondent judge’s orders in said case, granting
I.N.K.’s prayer and enforcing the alias writ of execution against
the present petitioners, constitutes blatant disregard of very
fundamental rules and must therefore be stricken down.”54
(Emphases ours.)
Consistent with Pineda, and as appositely recommended

by the RTC-Branch 95 and the Court of Appeals in the
present case, Muñoz’s legal remedy is to directly assail in a
separate action the validity of the certificates of title of BPI
Family and the spouses Chan.
G.R. No. 142676
G.R. No. 142676 is Muñoz’s appeal of the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 8286, the forcible entry case she instituted
against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut before the MeTC.

There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived
of physical possession of land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases, the
possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic
inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de
facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that
two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to
acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior
physical possession of the property, and second, he must
also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of
the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution thereof,
what is important is determining who is entitled to the
physical possession of the property. Indeed, any of the
parties who can prove prior posses-
_______________
54 Id., at pp. 64-67.
376

sion de facto may recover such possession even from

the owner himself since such cases proceed
independently of any claim of ownership and the
plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto
and undue deprivation thereof.55
Title is never in issue in a forcible entry case, the court
should base its decision on who had prior physical
possession. The main thing to be proven in an action for
forcible entry is prior possession and that same was lost
through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth,
so that it behooves the court to restore possession
regardless of title or ownership.56 We more extensively
discussed in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals57 that:
“Ownership or the right to possess arising from

ownership is not at issue in an action for recovery of
possession. The parties cannot present evidence to prove
ownership or right to legal possession except to prove the nature
of the possession when necessary to resolve the issue of physical
possession. The same is true when the defendant asserts the
absence of title over the property. The absence of title over the
contested lot is not a ground for the courts to withhold
relief from the parties in an ejectment case.
The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment
proceedings is—who is entitled to the physical possession of the
premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the
possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to the
property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into
public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be
approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the

actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a
strong hand, violence or
_______________
55 Bañes v. Lutheran Church in the Philippines, 511 Phil. 458, 479-480; 475
SCRA 13, 34 (2005).
56 Domalsin v. Valenciano, G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 115,
132.
57 G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492.
377
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 377

terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed.

Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can
recover such possession even against the owner himself.
Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has
in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security
that entitles him to remain on the property until a person
with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only
issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right
to physical possession.”58 (Emphases ours.)
Based on the foregoing, we find that the RTC-Branch 88

erred in ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 even
before completion of the proceedings before the MeTC. At
the time said case was ordered dismissed by RTC-Branch
88, the MeTC had only gone so far as holding a hearing on
and eventually granting Muñoz’s prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Muñoz alleges in her complaint in Civil Case No. 8286
that she had been in prior possession of the subject
property since it was turned-over to her by the sheriff on
January 10, 1994, pursuant to the Alias Writ of Execution
issued by the RTC-Branch 95 to implement the final
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The factual issue of
who was in prior possession of the subject property should
be litigated between the parties regardless of whether or
not the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 extended
to the spouses Chan. Hence, the pendency of the latter
issue in Civil Case No. Q-28580 before the RTC-Branch 95
did not warrant the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 before
the MeTC on the ground of litis pendentia. The two cases
could proceed independently of one another.
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut aver that the spouses
Chan have never lost possession of the subject property
since acquiring the same from BPI Family in 1990. This is
a worthy defense to Muñoz’s complaint for forcible entry,
which Samuel
_______________
58 Id., at pp. 510-511.
378

Go Chan and Atty. Yabut should substantiate with

evidence in the continuation of the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 8286 before the MeTC.
In addition, Civil Case No. 8286, a forcible entry case, is
governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
Section 19 whereof provides:
“SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions.—The following

pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases
covered by this Rule:
xxxx
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against
any interlocutory order issued by the court.”
The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to

achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases without regard to technical rules. Pursuant to this
objective, the Rule prohibits petitions for certiorari, like a
number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary
delays and to expedite the disposition of cases.59
Interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental
matters that do not touch on the merits of the case or put
an end to the proceedings.60 An order granting a
preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory,
is interlocutory and unappealable.61
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by
the MeTC in its Order dated May 16, 1994, directing that
Muñoz be placed in possession of the subject property
during the course of Civil Case No. 8286, is an
interlocutory order. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut
assailed the said order before
_______________
59 Go v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 214, 224; 297 SCRA 574, 583
(1998).
60 Silverio, Jr. v. Filipino Business Consultants, Inc., 504 Phil. 150,
158; 466 SCRA 584, 595 (2005).
61 United Coconut Planters Bank v. United Alloy Philippines
Corporation, 490 Phil. 353, 363; 449 SCRA 473, 474 (2005).
379
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 379

the RTC-Branch 88 via a petition for certiorari, docketed as

Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. The RTC-Branch 88 gave due
course to said petition, and not only declared the MeTC
Order dated May 16, 1994 null and void, but went further
by dismissing Civil Case No. 8286.
The prohibition in Section 19(g) of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure is plain enough. Its further exposition
is unnecessary verbiage.62 The petition for certiorari of
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-
20632 is clearly covered by the said prohibition, thus, it
should have been dismissed outright by the RTC-Branch
88. While the circumstances involved in Muñoz’s forcible
entry case against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut are
admittedly very peculiar, these are insufficient to except
the petition for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty.
Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632 from the prohibition.
The liberality in the interpretation and application of the
rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is
not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every
case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration
of justice.63
Nonetheless, even though the peculiar circumstances
extant herein do not justify the dismissal of Civil Case No.
8286, they do require limiting pro hac vice the reliefs the
MeTC may accord to Muñoz in the event that she is able to
successfully prove forcible entry by Samuel Go Chan and
Atty. Yabut into the subject property (i.e., that the sheriff
actually turned-over to Muñoz the possession of the subject
property on January 10, 1994, and that she was deprived of
such possession by Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut on
February 2, 1994 by
_______________
62 Bayview Hotel, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119337, June 17,
1997, 273 SCRA 540, 547-548.
63 Don Tino Realty and Development Corporation v. Florentino, 372
Phil. 882, 890-891; 314 SCRA 197, 205 (1999).
380

means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth).

Taking into account our ruling in G.R. No. 146718—that
the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 does not
extend to the spouses Chan, who were not impleaded as
parties to the said case—the MeTC is precluded from
granting to Muñoz relief, whether preliminary or
final, that will give her possession of the subject
property. Otherwise, we will be perpetuating the wrongful
execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
Based on the same reason, Muñoz can no longer insist on
the reinstatement of the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994

granting a preliminary mandatory injunction that puts her
in possession of the subject property during the course of
the trial. Muñoz though may recover damages if she is able
to prove wrongful deprivation of possession of the subject
property from February 2, 1994 until the finality of this
decision in G.R. No. 146718.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we:
(1) GRANT Emerita Muñoz’s petition in G.R. No.
142676. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated
July 21, 1995 and Resolution dated March 9, 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35322, which affirmed
the Orders dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 of Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q-94-20632. We DIRECT the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 33 of Quezon City to reinstate Emerita
Muñoz’s complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 8286
and to resume the proceedings only to determine whether
or not Emerita Muñoz was forcibly deprived of possession
of the subject property from February 2, 1994 until finality
of this judgment, and if so, whether or not she is entitled to
an award for damages for deprivation of possession during
the aforementioned period of time; and
(2) DENY Emerita Munoz’s petition in G.R. No. 146718
for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the Decision dated
September 29, 2000 and Resolution dated January 5, 2001
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019, which in
turn, affirmed the
381
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 381

Orders dated August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995 of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 95 of Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q-28580.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Del Castillo

and Perez, JJ., concur.
Petition in G.R. No. 142676 granted, judgment reversed

and set aside. Petition in G.R. No. 146718 denied, judgment
and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—A court cannot hold a witness liable for

damages – a judgment cannot bind persons who are not
parties to the action. (Maccay vs. Nobela, 454 SCRA 504
[2005]) When the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be
reconveyed, prescription cannot set in. (Santos vs. Lumbao,
519 SCRA 408 [2007])
——o0o——
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1/29/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 650

G.R. No. 142676. June 6, 2011.*

EMERITA MUÑOZ, petitioner, vs. ATTY. VICTORIANO

G.R. No. 146718. June 6, 2011.*

EMERITA MUÑOZ, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SAMUEL

Actions; Reconveyance; Land Titles; An action for

VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 345

Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.

person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the

Same; Same; Same; An action for declaration of nullity of title

346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.

execution against them. No man shall be affected by any

certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and he is not required

VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 347

Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.

illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on

rules. Pursuant to this objective, the Rule prohibits petitions for

348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.

petition for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut in Civil

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decisions and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 349

3 Id., at pp. 75-94.

350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Muñoz vs. Yabut, Jr.

(spouses Ching), Muñoz’s sister. Muñoz lived at the subject

9 According to Yee L. Ching’s Answer with Cross-Claim in Civil Case

VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 351

tion of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 258977 of the

sheriff on March 26, 1980, driving Muñoz and her

352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tion, thereby to settle once and for all the issue of

title, TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) was issued to BPI

VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 353

constituted a mortgage on the subject property in favor of

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing for

Emilia M. Ching, et al.’s, appeal of the foregoing

354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision20 dated March

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed

Emilia L. Ching, et al., filed before this Court a motion

20 Id., at pp. 107-123.

VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 355

Chan,24 opposing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case

24 Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), pp. 98-100.

356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the notice of lis pendens in the day book of the Register of

26 An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of

VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 357

for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction30 against Samuel Go

the subject property. Muñoz additionally prayed for

30 Id., at pp. 137-145.

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ministrator Reynaldo L. Suarez of the Supreme Court.

granted Muñoz’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of

31 Id., at pp. 178-184.

VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 359