THE ETHICS OF MATHEMATICS: IS MATHEMATICS HARMFUL?

Paul Ernest

ABSTRACT
In this paper I challenge the idea that mathematics is an unqualified force for good.
Instead I show the harm that learning mathematics can inadvertently cause unless it is
taught and applied carefully. I acknowledge that mathematics is a widespread force for
good but make the novel case that there is significant collateral damage caused by
learning mathematics. I describe three ways in which mathematics causes collateral
damage. First, the nature of pure of mathematics itself leads to styles of thinking that
can be damaging when applied beyond mathematics to social and human issues.
Second the applications of mathematics in society can be deleterious to our humanity
unless very carefully monitored and checked. Third, the personal impact of learning
mathematics on learners’ thinking and life chances can be negative for a minority of
less successful students, as well as potentially harmful for successful students. I end
with a recommendation for the inclusion of the philosophy and ethics of mathematics
alongside its teaching all stages from school to university, to attempt to reduce or
obviate the harm caused; the collateral damage of learning mathematics.

Introduction

Mathematics is a rich and powerful subject, with broad and varied footprints across
education, science, culture and indeed throughout all of human history. Both the academic
world and society in the large accord mathematics a high status both as an art and as the
queen of the sciences (Bell 1952). Mathematics has a uniquely privileged status in education
as the only subject that is taught universally and to all ages in schools. Hidden behind this
elevated status is the assumption that mathematics is an unqualified force for good. Is this
ethical assumption correct? Does nothing but good flow from mathematics? In this chapter I
argue that mathematics does harm as well as good. My claim is that mathematics in school
has unintended outcomes in leaving some students feeling inhibited, belittled or rejected by
mathematics. In sorting and labelling learners and citizens in modern society, mathematics
reduces the life chances of those labelled as failures or rejects. In addition, even for those
successful in mathematics, the discipline serves as a training that shapes thinking in an ethics-
free and amoral way. Thus mathematics supports instrumentalism and ethics-free governance.
This is exploited in warfare, heartless corporate activity, the misuse of humans and the
environment, and in many acts that treat persons as objects rather than moral beings, entitled
to respect and dignity. I conclude by suggesting solutions. To avoid or remedy the negative
effects in schooling we need to attend more closely to the causes of success and failure, and
become fully aware of how these have far-reaching impacts on learners. Further, in order to
forestall the harmful effects of mathematics in society we need to teach the social
responsibility of mathematics, through including philosophy and especially the ethics of
mathematics alongside mathematics itself. All students of mathematics and fully fledged
mathematicians should be able to view the uses and applications of mathematics critically,
seeing the mathematics in play and understanding the ethical implications of the issues
involved.

1
As a mathematician myself, someone who has devoted his professional life to furthering the
teaching of mathematics in school and university, I might be expected to be among the last to
question the value of mathematics. However, I believe that both the place of mathematics in
the world and the benefits it brings are strengthened through looking at mathematics as a
critical friend. This entails not only lauding and feeling pride at the benefits mathematics
brings but also recognising the harm it can do, and not shying away from it. Acknowledging
that there are negative outcomes opens the doors to solutions, to possible means of
ameliorating and rectifying the possible damage brought about through mathematics.

Is Mathematics an Untramelled Good?

In this chapter I wish to challenge the myth that mathematics is an untramelled good, and that
promoting and learning mathematics leads solely to beneficial outcomes and never causes
harm. The received wisdom dominating the institutions of mathematics, mathematics
education and society in general, is that mathematics of itself is a wonderful boon for all of
humankind, and in areas where its positive benefits are not remarked it is simply neutral
(Gowers n. d.). Even stronger, Burnyeat (2000) argues that studying mathematics is good for
the soul, basing his claims on the arguments of Plato. By contrast, a web searches linking
mathematics to harm or damage reveals nothing that challenges the claim mathematics is an
untramelled good.1

In place of the generally uncritical plaudits that mathematics receives I wish to ask what are
or might be the actual outcomes and potential costs of elevating and privileging mathematics
in education and society, including any unintended outcomes? Looking at such outcomes,
does mathematics cause any harm or evil? To mathematicians and many others even asking
this question, let alone answering it in the affirmative, might seem unthinkable, a ridiculous
questioning of what has hitherto been unquestionable. To educationists it is not so difficult to
ask this question, or even to answer it in the affirmative, when the impact on disadvantaged
students and society is considered (Stanic 1989).

Before I address the potential harm that mathematics may do, let me begin by affirming that
mathematics has great value. The overall value of mathematics comprises the benefits and
goods it offers to humanity as a whole. There are two types of value that mathematics
possesses. First, there is the intrinsic value that mathematics has as a discipline or area of
knowledge, the value of mathematics purely for its own sake. My claim is that mathematics is
one of the great intellectual products of human culture. Thus teaching mathematics is
enabling learners to encounter and engage with this great cultural product. Second, there is
extrinsic value, the general social value of mathematics on the basis of its applications and
uses in society. It is the language of all scientific and technological achievements. It is a
universal language that allows us to understand and share our understanding of all physical
forces from the sub atomic to the cosmic. Teaching about this aspect of mathematics opens up
the world of mathematical applications to learners allowing them to appreciate its immense
practical power as well as to participate in using such applications themselves. In addition to
the social benefits of its applications mathematics also has personal value. This is the value of
mathematics for learners and for other persons more widely as it plays out in terms of
individual benefit. Such benefits will vary across individuals according to personal

1
The one exception that I have found lies in feminist critiques of mathematics as oppressive and patriarchal,
see, e.g., Burton (1995) and Shelley (1995).

2
circumstances, experiences, social contexts and so on. For many students the learning of
mathematics results in great personal power, manifested in increased social, professional and
study opportunities, as well as enhanced feelings of mathematical self-efficacy and overall
self-worth.

The intrinsic value of mathematics

Mathematics has intrinsic value, and as I argue elsewhere the furthering of mathematics for
its own sake is an ethical good for humankind (Ernest 2016b). Mathematics expands the
human intellect, broadening our conceptual horizons and opening up vast areas of pure
thought. Mathematics is a powerful exploration of pure thought, truth and ideas for their
intrinsic beauty, intellectual power and interest. In its development mathematics creates and
describes wondrous worlds of beauty, populated by linked crystalline forms that stretch off to
infinity in richly etched exquisiteness, like the vision of the net of Indra. In addition to their
intrinsic value, these forms make up the language of structure that frames virtually all
possible abstract conceptual relationships, including those of the sciences and computing.
Part of the intrinsic value of pure mathematics is its widely appreciated beauty (Ernest
2016a). “Like painting and poetry mathematics has permanent aesthetic value” (Hardy 1941:
14). “Mathematics possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty – a beauty cold and austere,
like that of sculpture” (Russell 1919: 60).

These virtues and values are not only appreciated by those initiated into the most exclusive
inner sanctum of mathematics, the area occupied by the ground-breaking creative
mathematicians. They also elicit wonder from the public. We are often confronted with
complex and fascinating mathematics-based images in the media, for example multi-coloured
pictures of fractals, complex tessellations and other beautiful representations. These
contribute to the public perception that mathematics can be both beautiful and intriguing, and
has an intrinsic value.

The Extrinsic and Social Value of Mathematics

First, with regards to science, mathematics is known as both the queen and servant of science
(Bell 1952). As its servant mathematics provides the language through which modern science
is formulated. Models, laws, theories and predictions, going back 2000 years ago to the
Ptolemaic model of the universe, could not be expressed without mathematics. Since the
industrial revolution, scientific applications based in mathematics have underpinned
engineering, technology and the whole material basis of modern life.

Second, computing and the information and communication technologies that form the
language and basis for all our modern media, knowledge systems and control mechanisms,
rest solely on mathematics and logic. Both the knowledge representations and the
programmed instructions upon which information and communication technology depends
can only be expressed by means of the coding and logic supplied by mathematics.

Third, and far from least, finance, economics, trade, business, and through them, social
organisation, rest on a mathematical foundation. Money, the intangible embodiment of
economics, is the lifeblood that circulates throughout these bodies and activities. The
commercial basis of modern society simply would not be possible without money, and thus,
without arithmetic. Money is number that utilises one possible type of unitisation, a
quantification of exchange value. This is not surprising given the evidence that tax, tribute

3
and trade and the associated needs for systematic recording is what gave birth to written
mathematics five thousand years ago (Høyrup 1994).

Each of these domains of application has undoubtedly many great benefits in terms of human
flourishing, including improvements in health, nutrition, housing, transport, agriculture,
manufacturing, education, leisure, communications and wealth. More human beings than ever
live longer, healthier, better educated, more comfortably and wealthier as a consequence of
the mathematics-led developments in the sciences, technology and engineering, especially
over the past two centuries.

In addition to these social benefits shared by so many, mathematics has great personal value.
Learners and persons in general benefit from mathematics as:
1. an enlarging element of human culture,
2. a means of personal development and growth,
3. a valuable tool for use socially, both as workers, and citizens in society
4. a means of gaining certification for entry to employment or further education.

We live in a mathematized social world. The immense utility of mathematics must be

acknowledged as a great strength and virtue. Without it not only would we have to forego
many of the tools we as individuals and society rely on, but many of the necessities of life we
enjoy and much of our prosperity would disappear. Mathematics is arguably the most
generally applicable of all human knowledge fields and many if not most of the good
qualities of modern living depend on it.

Features and characteristics of mathematics

An immediate question is what are the components of mathematics that contribute to its great
intrinsic and extrinsic value? The most obvious dimensions are that of number and
calculation. Calculation is central to mathematics, and it dominates both history and
schooling. Mathematics as a scientific discipline is claimed to originate around 3000 years
BCE (Høyrup 1980). Thus it was already halfway through its history, around 500 years BCE,
before proof entered into mathematics. Prior to that number recording and calculation, plus
some geometric measurement, constituted pretty much the totality of mathematics. Even
since then, numbers and calculation have dominated both the practical uses of mathematics
and its educational content, with Euclidean geometry playing a minor role, and that just in
elite education.

At the heart of calculation are rule-based general procedures. In these, the overall meaning of
numerals, especially the place-value meaning signified through the relative positioning of the
constituent digits, is largely ignored during most of the algorithmic processes. Further, largely
as a result of Islamic contributions, algebra emerged in the Middle Ages. This provides the
abstract language of mathematics upon which all modern developments depend. Algebra is
generalized arithmetic in origin and as such is subject to generalized arithmetical procedures
and rules, and its strength is that specific numerical meanings are detached. This was
explicitly noted over 300 years ago by Bishop Berkeley.

… in Algebra, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to

proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that
particular quantity it was appointed to stand for. (Berkeley 1710: 59).

At its heart, algebra is variable based, thus forcing the linguistic move in the language away

4
from specific values and meanings to general rules and procedures concerning variables. This
move has some great benefits. It enables the miracle of electronic computing in which
mathematical rules and procedures are wholly automated and no reference to or
comprehension of the meaning of mathematical expressions is required.

Overall, during the application of algorithms and other permitted procedures in arithmetic
and algebra the meaning of expressions can largely be neglected with no detriment to the
efficacy of the procedures. Meaning is dispensable.

A further characteristic of school, university and research mathematics is that they are
represented in the symbolism and language of mathematics, and this is fundamentally in
sentences. Mathematical sentences, although often containing symbols, conform to the usual
subject-verb form, or more generally, to the terms-relation form, where a relation is
equivalent to a generalised verb. In a detailed analysis Rotman (1993) found that although
there is some limited use of the indicative mood, the predominant verb form in mathematical
language is the imperative mood. Imperatives are orders that instruct or direct actions either
inclusively, such as: let us …, consider …, or exclusively, such as: add, count, solve, prove,
etc. Imperatives occur more frequently in mathematics than in any other academic school
subject (Rotman 1993; Ernest 1998). In addition, mathematical operations require rigid rule
following. At its most creative mathematics allows choices among multiple strategies and
representations, but each of the lines of choice pursued involves strict rule following.
Consequently mathematics is very unforgiving. There is no redundancy in its language and
any error in rule following derails the procedures and processes. Thus students of
mathematics must learn to use its language and follow its rules with great precision. The net
result of extended exposure to and practice in mathematics is a social training in obedience,
an apprenticeship in strict subservience to the text, be it printed or spoken. Mathematics is not
the only subject that plays this role but it is by far the most important in view of its
imperative rich and rule-governed character. Furthermore, the rule following is done without
any need for attention to the meaning of the signs being worked on and transformed.

One of the most important ways that a social training in obedience is achieved is through the
universal teaching and learning of mathematics from a very early age and throughout the
school years. The central and universal role of arithmetic in schooling provides the symbolic
tools for quantified thought, including not only the ability to conceptualize situations
quantitatively, but a compulsion to do so. This compulsion first comes from without, but is
appropriated, internalized and elaborated as part of the postmodern citizen’s identity. We
cannot stop calculating and assigning quantified values to everything, in a society in which
what matters is what counts or is counted.

The teaching and learning of mathematics in schools, and thus the development of
mathematical identity requires that, from the age of five or soon after, depending on the
country, children will (Ernest 2015):

1. Acquire an object-oriented language of objects and processes,

2. Learn to conduct operations on and with them without any intrinsic reasons or sense
of value, thus operating with deferred meaning,
3. Decontextualise their world of experience and replace it by a deliberately unrealistic
and very stylized model composed of simplified static objects and reversible
processes,

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 4. Suppress subjectivity, experiential being and feelings in their mathematical operations
on objects, processes and models,
5. Learn to prioritize and value the outcomes of such modelling above any personal or
connected values and feelings, and apply these outcomes irrespective of such
subjective dimensions to domains including the human “for [your] their own good”
(Miller, 1983).

King (1982) researched the mathematics taught and learnt in 5-6 year old infant classrooms.
He found that mathematics involves and legitimates the suspension of conventional reality
more than any other school subject. People are coloured in with red and blue faces. “A class
exercise on measuring height became a histogram. Marbles, acorns, shells, fingers and other
counters become figures on a page, objects become numbers” (King, 1982, p. 244). Further,
in the world of school mathematics even the meanings of the simplified representations of
reality that emerge are dispensable.

Most teachers were aware that some children could not read the instructions properly,
but suggested they “know how to do it (the mathematics) without it.” … Only in
mathematics could words be left meaningless (King, 1982, p. 244).

In the psychology of mathematics education instrumental understanding, defined as knowing

how to carry out procedures without understanding, versus relational understanding, which
includes in addition knowing how and why such procedures work, is much discussed as a
problem issue (Skemp 1976, Mellin-Olsen 1987). It is no coincidence that what is termed
instrumental understanding is also a form of the instrumental reasoning critiqued by the
Frankfurt School, and which is discussed in the sequel.

In summary, many procedures on signs are carried out with abstracted or deferred meanings,
and many mathematical texts, be they calculations, derivations or proofs, involve the reader
following rule-governed sequences or orders. In education. mathematics is the subject most
divorced from everyday or experienced meaning, and the objectification and dehumanisation
of the subject are a necessary part of its acquisition.

However, I need to qualify these claims. Although mathematical signs and procedures are
detached from meaningful referents in the world, engagement with mathematics can create an
inner world of meanings. Successful mathematicians work within richly populated conceptual
universes that are very meaningful to themselves. Success at mathematics at most levels is
often associated with having a meaningful domain of interpretation of mathematical signs and
symbols, often within the closed world of mathematics. In addition, applied mathematicians
interpret mathematical models in the world around us so in applications meanings are
reattached. Likewise, although mathematical language is very rich in imperatives, successful
users of mathematics at all levels have certain degrees of freedom available to them, such as
which methods and procedures to apply in solving problems, as is acknowledged above.

These qualifications notwithstanding, the study of mathematics instils both the capacity to,
and the expectation of, meaning detachment during reasoning and calculative procedures.
Likewise, it prepares its readers to follow the imperatives in the text during the technical and
instrumental reasoning involved in mathematics.2
2
In addition, in more advanced study of mathematics in high school or university, students learn to reason and
draw inferences from assumptions and postulates that are not necessarily true. Such hypothetical reasoning adds
yet another level of detachment from the world we live in, weakening the bonds to reality, values and ethics.

6
Mathematical thinking as detached instrumental and calculative reasoning
My claim is that the linguistic characteristics and moves indicated above have costs,
including unanticipated negative outcomes when extended and applied beyond mathematics.
For as I have argued, the mathematical way of thinking promotes a mode of reasoning in
which there is a detachment of meaning. Reasoning without meanings provides a training in
ethics-free thought. Values neutrality and ethical irrelevance is presupposed because
meanings, contexts and their associated purposes and values are stripped away and
discounted as irrelevant to the task in hand. Furthermore, as I have argued elsewhere, there is
a widespread perception of mathematics as timeless, universal and imbued with absolute
certainty, and hence it is viewed as an objective, value-neutral and ethics-free domain of
thought (Ernest 1998, 2016a, 2016b). Such reasoning and perspectives contribute to a
dehumanized outlook. For without meanings, values or ethical considerations reasoning can
become mechanical and technical and ‘thing’ or object-orientated. These modes of thinking
foster what have been termed separated values.

Gilligan (1982) proposes a theory of separated and connected values that can usefully be
applied to mathematical and other types of reasoning. Her theory distinguishes separated
from connected values positions and places them in opposition. The separated position
valorises rules, abstraction, objectification, impersonality, unfeelingness, dispassionate reason
and analysis, and tends to be atomistic and thing-centred in focus. The connected position is
based on and valorises relationships, connections, empathy, caring, feelings and intuition, and
tends to be holistic and human-centred in its concerns. These two value positions can be seen
as oppositions, with separated values (first) contrasted with connected values (second,
respectively), providing the following oppositional pairs: rules vs. relationships, abstraction
vs. personal connections, objectification vs. empathy, impersonal vs. human, unfeeling vs.
caring, atomistic vs. holistic, dispassionate reason vs. feelings, analysis vs. intuition.

The separated values position applies well to mathematics. Mathematical objects are entities
resulting from objectification and abstraction and are naturally impersonal and unfeeling.
Mathematical structures are constituted by abstract and rule-based sets of objects and their
structural relationships. The processes of mathematics are atomistic and object-centred, based
on dispassionate analysis and reason in which personal feelings play no direct contributing
part. Thus separated values fit mathematics very well and indeed can be said to be an
essential part of mathematics. Mathematics both embodies and transmits these values.

Separated values and the associated outlooks are necessary, indeed essential, by the very
nature of mathematics, and their acquisition constitute assets and are undoubtedly beneficial
for thinking in mathematics. A separated scientific outlook is also useful in reasoning in other
inanimate domains, such as in physics and chemistry, where atomistic analysis, strictly causal
relationships and structural regularities yield high levels of knowledge. However, thinking
exclusively in the separated mode can lead to problems and abuses when applied outside
mathematics and the physical sciences to society. In the human sphere exclusively separated
values are unnecessary and potentially harmful, since they factor out the human and ethical
dimensions. In seeing the world mathematically, the richness of nature and human worlds,
with all their beauty, contextual complexity and linkages, and ethical responsibilities, are
replaced by simplified, abstracted and objectified structural models. The outcome parallels
Wilde’s (1907: p. 116) dictum about the outlook “that knows the price of everything and the
value of nothing”. Although mathematical perspectives and models are powerful and useful
tools for actions in the world, including the improvement of human life conditions, when

7
overextended they risk becoming a threat to our very humanity. Inculcating these values can
lead to a dehumanized outlook if applied to social and human worlds. Furthermore, separated
values extended too far beyond mathematics can also lead to the view that mathematics and
its applications have no ethical or social responsibility. While there are legitimate
philosophical arguments that pure mathematics is ethically neutral, although I argue the
opposite (Ernest 2016b), it is near universally agreed that mathematical applications bear full
social responsibility for their impacts on the world, just as do the applications of science and
technology.

My claim is that subjection to mathematics in schooling from halfway through one’s first
decade, to near the end of one’s second decade, and beyond if one so chooses, structures and
transforms our modes of thought in ways that may not be wholly beneficial. I do not claim
that mathematics itself is harmful. But the manner in which the mathematical way of seeing is
integrated into schooling, society and above all into the interpersonal and power relations in
society results in the transformation of the human outlook. This is a contingency, an historical
construction. It results from the way that mathematics has been recruited into systems
thinking instead of empathising (Baron-Cohen 2003) and separated values instead of
connected values (Gilligan 1982), that dominate western bureaucratic thinking. It also results
from the way mathematics serves a culture of objectification, termed a culture of having
rather than being by the critical theorist Fromm (1978).

One framework that acknowledges these aspects of the application of mathematics is the
critique of instrumental reason and rationality provided by the critical theory of the Frankfurt
School. Instrumental reason is the objective form of action or thought which treats its objects
simply as a means and not as an end in itself. It focuses on the most efficient or most cost-
effective means to achieve a specific end, without reflecting on the value of that end
(Blunden n. d.). Instrumental reason has been subjected to critique by a range of philosophers
from Weber to Habermas (Schecter 2010). This includes Heidegger, who argues that
instrumental reason and what he terms calculative thinking lead us into enclosed systems of
thought with no room for considering the ends, values and indeed ethical dimensions of our
actions (Haynes 2008). As Heidegger puts it, even “the world now appears as an object open
to the attacks of calculative thought” (Dreyfus 2004: 54). The central argument that means
must never trump or eclipse ends, when human beings are the ends, can be found in Kant’s
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals of 1785. There he derives his Categorical
Imperative from first principles, with the following as one of his conclusions. “Act in such a
way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never
merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.” (Kant 1993: 36)3

A broader-based critique comes from the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School (including
Adorno, Fromm, Habermas, Horkheimer and Marcuse) who see instrumental reason as the
dominant form of thought within modern society (Bohman 2005, Corradetti n. d.). By
focussing on technical means and not on the ends of their actions, persons, governments and
corporations risk complicity in the treatment of human beings as objects to be manipulated, in
actions that threaten social well-being, the environment and nature. This outlook underpins

3
This chapter is intended as a contribution to the philosophy of mathematics education and does not summarise
the range of ethical theories positions available beyond those of Kant (and the Critical Theorists). These
philosopher provide a powerful basis for my argument, but others can also be cited. For example, Emmanuel
Levinas is another philosopher who argues that we must treat other humans with infinite respect. According to
Levinas another person, the ‘Other’, is infinitely complex and not fully knowable or reducible to an object that
can be known (Levinas 1978).

8
the behaviours of some governments and multinational corporations in reducing costs and
chasing profits without regards for the human costs. Such actions by corporations have been
termed psychopathic (Bakan 2004). We are now so used to the economic, instrumental model
of life and human governance that most persons see it as an unquestionable practical reality, a
necessary evil, and are not shocked or outraged by corporations or governments treating
persons as objects with no concern for their well-being.

Much of the Frankfurt School critique was prompted by the rise of Nazism in Germany, with
its authoritarian leaders (Adorno et al. 1950) and the heartless complicity of ordinary citizens
in Germany and occupied territories before and during World War 2. The capture,
transportation, enslavement and murder of millions of fellow citizens was not simply
undertaken by monsters. These wholesale activities would not have been possible without
many ordinary citizens unquestioningly doing their everyday jobs as part of this monstrous
programme. Arendt (1963) terms this ordinariness, from the actions of Eichmann downward,
the ‘banality of evil’. The fact that many ordinary citizens were highly educated did not
prevent them from complicity in mass murder. As Dr. Haim Ginott, a school principal who
survived a Nazi concentration camp, wrote in his advice to his teachers:

I am a survivor of a concentration camp. My eyes saw what no man should witness: gas
chambers built by learned engineers, children poisoned by educated physicians, infants
killed by trained nurses, women and babies shot and burned by high school and college
graduates. So I am suspicious of education. My request is: help your students to become
human. Your efforts must never produce learned monsters, skilled psychopaths, educated
Eichmanns. Reading, writing and arithmetic are important only if they serve to make our
children more humane. Ginott (1972: 317)

My argument is that mathematics plays a central role in normalizing instrumental and

calculative ways of seeing and thinking. From the very start of their education children are
schooled in these ways of seeing and being. As I have argued, the detachment of meaning and
the following of imperatives in mathematical texts provides the central platform for
instrumental thought.4

There is a further factor too. Among philosophers, mathematicians, as well as in school and
more generally, in society, mathematics has the image of objectivity, of unquestionable
certainty, with claims being settled decisively as either true or false as well as being ethically
neutral (Ernest 1998, Hersh 1997). Thus a training in mathematics is also a training in
accepting that complex problems can be solved unambiguously with clear-cut right or wrong
answers, with solution methods that lead to unique correct solutions. Within the domain of
pure mathematical reasoning, problems, methods and solutions may be value-free and
ethically neutral. But carrying these beliefs beyond mathematics to the more complex and
ambiguous problems of the human world leads to a false sense of certainty, and encourages
an instrumental and technical approach to daily problems. This is damaging, for when
decision making is driven purely by a separated, instrumental rationality, then ethics, caring
and human values are neglected, if not left out of the picture altogether. Kelman (1973)
observes that ethical considerations are eroded when three conditions are present: namely,
standardization, routinization, and dehumanization. Since mathematics is the essence of
4
Of course the right social circumstances are needed too. A society with values of strong social-conformity and
a culture of obedience to authority is needed, as Milgram (1974) showed in his experiments. However, as I have
argued, subjection to thousands of hours of school mathematics and schooling in general will contribute to this.

9
instrumental reason, with its focus on means to ends and not on underlying values, and its
procedures require standardization, routinization, and dehumanization, the concomitant
erasure of ethics is no surprise. Thus a training in mathematical thinking, when misapplied
beyond its own area of validity to the social domain, is potentially damaging and harmful.

Qualifying the critique of instrumental thinking

However, I need to qualify the above critique of instrumental thinking and the role
mathematics plays in it, so as not to be one-sided in my evaluation. It would be naive not to
recognise that not only are reason and rationality essential for the fair running of complex
modern societies, but also that depersonalized and objectivised thinking is necessary for all
modern management. Complex modern societies and institutions cannot be run ethically or
fairly, let alone effectively, without abstracted, depersonalized and objectivised thinking.
Central to modern governance is the accumulation, allocation and distribution of resources.
Whatever the political and ideological orientation of a government it needs to calculate where
resources will most benefit society according to their values. It is the essence of democracy
that the priorities for the distribution of resources varies with different elected governments.
Whatever are the priorities and values of legitimate governments, and the social goals which
are aspired to, resources need to be allocated to fulfil these goals effectively. We would not
be able to pursue the practical meaning of our ethics and principles without working out their
rational implications. In addition, systematic and rational record keeping is another necessary
for fairness and equity. Thus calculative reasoning and instrumental thinking in the service of
societal values and goals is a modern necessity. However, this is not an alibi for the blind
following of orders from ‘above’. In a good society there must always be a place for ethical
objections and whistle-blowing, where individual conscience can be exercised, when values
or laws are transgressed, or unfairness or injustices are perceived.

Above I emphasized the values of connectedness and caring in contrast with separatedness
(Gilligan 1982) and rationality, because of their absence from mathematics. However, when
it come to the fair running of society impersonal reason and rationality are essential. Only
giving benefits to those one cares about or empathises with leads to inequality, favouritism
and nepotism. As Pinker (2012) argues, against the dictum of the 1960s, love is not all you
need, if you seek to be fair or just. In a just society you must treat strangers and other citizens
as having equal rights and deserving equal treatment irrespective of any personal feelings
towards them. This is also the basis of all legal systems. The law is based on a set of
principles or precedents from which applications are deduced or reasoned in its practical
applications to cases. Fairness and impartiality of reasoning underpin the dispensation of
justice in the courts. Thus depersonalized objectivised thinking is necessary for all modern
management of resources, human or material, within an overall framework based on ethical
principles. It also underpins the law. Thus the rational and impersonal reasoning inculcated
through mathematics makes a positive contribution to a just and fair society.5

The social impacts of mathematics and its application

One of the key areas where instrumental modes of thinking are widespread lies within the
applications of mathematics. I have described some of the broad range of applications of
mathematics in society and their widespread benefits. Alongside these beneficial outcomes it
is also possible to use mathematics in ways that are hurtful or harmful. My argument is that

5
Note that the terms justification and justice have the same roots. From the 14th century CE on justification has
meant the action of justifying and the administration of justice, and justice is the quality of being fair and just –
the exercise of authority in vindication of what is right (Harper n. d.). Justification draws on rationality and
impersonal reasoning, which therefore cannot be decoupled from values and fairness.

10
applied mathematicians should endeavour to be aware of the uses to which their applications
are put, and if these are potentially hurtful or harmful should at least consider the
consequences and their own involvement as facilitators. Applied mathematicians should
assume some responsibility for the applications and technological innovations they help to
create. It has been suggested that there should be a Hippocratic Oath for mathematicians
(Davis 1988). Given the widespread views of the neutrality of mathematics, even of applied
mathematics, this would seem to be an unlikely development. Although there is a British
Society for the Social Responsibility of Science, and even a group called Radical Statistics
concerned with social responsibility in statistics, there is no society for the social
responsibility of mathematics (pure or applied). Indeed the very idea of the social
responsibility of pure mathematics will seem to many a contradiction in terms.

There is an outstanding use of mathematics that is not often counted among its applications.
This is the role of mathematics as basis of money and finance. Money and thus mathematics
is the tool for the distribution of wealth. It can therefore be argued that as the key
underpinning conceptual tool mathematics is implicated in the global disparities in wealth
and life chances manifested in the human world. It is not an exaggeration to claim that many
current forms of capitalism distort equality in and across global societies to the detriment of
social justice, as well as promoting consumerism. Of course this is a hot political issue. My
argument is not that we should oppose the western capitalist system like the Anti-
Globalization and Occupy movements (Wikipedia n. d. a, b). In the successful mixed
economies of the West well regulated capitalism is the vital source of wealth and meaningful
employment, and provides work, goods and the services we rely on for good living. Instead,
my proposal is that we should foster an ethical and in particular a critical, social justice
oriented attitude towards mathematical applications alongside mathematical skills, so that
students and citizens in our democracies can make up their own minds. There is a substantial
literature on critical mathematics education that promotes this goal (Ernest 1991, Ernest et al.
2016, Skovsmose 1994, Powell and Frankenstein 1997), Furthermore, the idea that our
actions should be ethical and, in particular, promote social justice is now mainstream
thinking, at least in Europe, for example the European Union Treaty stipulates that it shall
promote social justice (European Union, n. d.).

The social impact of the image of mathematics

An indirect way through which mathematics impacts on society and individuals is through its
images, which for the purposes of discussion can be divided into social and personal images.
Social images of mathematics include public images, including representations in the mass
media, such as film, cartoon, pictorial, and computer representations of mathematics and
mathematicians. They also include school images which incorporate classroom posters,
equipment, textbook, teacher presentations, and school mathematical activities as experienced
by the learners. Parent, peer or others’ narratives about mathematics also contribute to its
social image. Personal images of mathematics include mental pictures, visual, verbal or other
mental representations, and can be assumed to originate from past experiences and
encounters with mathematics, as well as from social talk and other public representations.
Personal images of mathematics comprise both cognitive and affective dimensions and
effects. The types of mathematics as portrayed in its images can include research
mathematics and mathematicians, school mathematics, and mathematical applications, both
everyday and more complex. Social and personal images of mathematics are intimately
related, as personal images must be assumed to result from the lived experiences of learning
and using mathematics and from exposure to social images of mathematics. Likewise, social
images of mathematics are constructed by individuals or groups drawing on their own

11
personal images, which are then represented and made public. Both kinds of image can have
implicit elements of which individuals are not explicitly aware. Thus, what is termed the
hidden curriculum comprises those accidental or unplanned elements of knowledge
representations and learning experiences within the school curriculum, which can include
images of mathematics (Ernest 2008).

One widespread public image of mathematics in Western countries, which may extend more
widely, is of mathematics characterised as a difficult subject, viewed as cold, abstract,
theoretical, ultra-rational, mainly masculine but nevertheless important (Buerk 1982, Buxton
1981, Ernest 1995, Picker and Berry 2000). Mathematics also has the image of being remote
and inaccessible to all but a few super-intelligent beings with ‘mathematical minds’. For
many people the image of mathematics is also associated with anxiety and failure. For
example, when Brigid Sewell was gathering data on adult numeracy for the Cockcroft Inquiry
(1982) she asked a sample of adults on the street if they would answer some questions on the
subject. Half of them refused to answer when they understood the subject was mathematics,
suggesting negative attitudes, or even mathephobia (Maxwell 1989). While attitudes to and
images of mathematics may have improved in the past few decades, following the increase of
student-centred mathematics teaching approaches, a recent review of the literature reports the
persistence of negative images and attitudes toward mathematics (Belbase 2010).

Some of the problems associated with widespread social and personal images of mathematics
follow from the perceptions that it is a masculine subject, much more accessible to males than
females; and that it is a difficult subject only accessible to a small and gifted minority. The
effect of these images, coupled with the negative learning experiences reported by some
students, is to foster negative personal images of and attitudes to mathematics often
incorporating poor confidence, lack of mathematical self-efficacy beliefs, and dislike of and
even anxiety with respect to mathematics. One of the contributors to the negative images of
mathematics can be the absolutist image of mathematics as objective, superhuman and value-
free (Ernest 1995, 1998). For many this contributes to a sense of alienation and exclusion
from mathematics (Buerk 1982, Buxton 1981).

However, it needs to be mentioned that in contrast to these problems, for a different and more
successful minority this absolutist image is part of the attraction of mathematics.
Mathematics can be seen as unchanging, perfect, and a safe haven from the chaos and
uncertainties of everyday life, and for this reason and others making it attractive to this
successful minority. Thus no simple generalization can express the complex and varied
effects of the public images of mathematics. The same dimensions or perceptions of
mathematics may simultaneously attract and repel different groups of students.

One of the persistent myths of the twentieth century has been that females are ‘naturally’ less
well equipped mathematically than males (Burton 1990, Rogers and Kaiser 1995). So two of
the detrimental effects of images of mathematics that I shall foreground here are first the
negative impact on female students following from the masculine image of mathematics.
Second, the negative impact of mathematics related experiences and images on the attitudes
and self-esteem of a minority, including many girls and women. The problem with these
negative impacts is that mathematics is a highly esteemed and valued subject in schools and
universities, perhaps even overvalued. Mathematics examinations are used as a sifting and
filtration device in society. Life chances and social rewards are disproportionately correlated
with success at mathematics, even within many areas of study and work in which

12
mathematics plays little part. Sells (1973, 1978) has termed mathematics the ‘critical filter’ in
determining life-chances.

In addition, success in school mathematics is strongly correlated with the socio-economic

status or social class background of students. Although this is true with virtually all academic
school subjects, mathematics has a privileged status. It is the examinations in mathematics in
particular that serve as a fractional distillation device that, to a significant extent, is class
reproductive. Talented mathematicians from any background may be successful in life, but
the net effect of mathematical examinations is remains the grading of students into a
hierarchy with respect to life chances. This hierarchy doubly correlates with socio-economic
status and social class, understood in terms of both the social origins and the social
destinations of students. So it is not merely raw mathematical talent that is reflected in
mathematical achievement. It is also partially mediated by cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986,
Zevenbergen 1998).

While mathematical knowledge has important uses and applications in modern societies, the
status and value of mathematical achievement is elevated beyond its actual utility.
Mathematics is increasingly hidden from citizens in modern society behind complex systems
including information and communication technology applications, and the vast computerised
control and surveillance systems. These regulate and monitor modern societies for the
purposes governance, security and commerce. Advanced mathematical skills are not needed
by the many that operate these systems, for such persons can do so successfully without
awareness of their mathematical foundations (Niss 1994, Skovsmose 1988). It is the much
smaller number of mathematicians, programmers and information technologists that design,
implement and test the systems who need advanced specialist mathematical skills.

My claim is that the social image of mathematics as experienced by learners contributes to

their personal image of mathematics and that this is an important factor in their success in
mathematics. Personal images of mathematics include attitudes to mathematics and these play
a key role in success at mathematics via multiplying mechanisms which I call the success and
failure cycles (Ernest 2013).

The mechanisms are as follows. Some students suffer from negative attitudes to mathematics,
including poor confidence and poor mathematical self-concept, and in a minority possible
mathematics anxiety (Buxton 1981). Based on Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs theory, it
can be said that persons will do a great deal to avoid risks including the risk of failure in a
socially esteemed activity, with its concomitant threat to personal self-esteem. So negative
attitudes lead to reduced persistence, and even mathematics avoidance in some cases,
resulting in reduced learning opportunities. A consequence of this is lack of success in
mathematics, which in the strong case is failure. Students who experience an overall lack of
success and repeated failure at mathematical tasks and tests develop or strengthen their
negative attitudes to mathematics, completing a self-reinforcing cycle, leading to a downward
spiral in all three of its components, illustrated in Fig. 1.

Figure 1: The Failure Cycle (adapted from Ernest 2013).

Negative attitudes to mathematics

Poor confidence and mathematics self-
concept. Possible mathematics anxiety

13
 ì î

Mathematical Failure Reduced Learning

Repeated lack of success in ç Reduced persistence and
mathematics. Failure at learning opportunities.
mathematical tasks and tests. Mathematics avoidance

In this, as in any proper cycle, there is no identifiable beginning point. All three elements
develop together, and any one of them could be nominated as a starting point. Thus, outcomes
shape attitudes, and in particular failure often leads to poor attitudes. Negative attitudes
impact upon behaviours, such as disengagement and low effort. Disengagement in turn
reduces the chances of success. So once the cycle is started it becomes self-reinforcing and
self-perpetuating, a vicious cycle.

In contrast, positive student attitudes to mathematics, including confidence, a sense of

mathematical self-efficacy, pleasure in and motivation towards mathematics lead to increased
effort, persistence, and the choice of more demanding tasks. This is because of the intrinsic
rewards gained, such as intellectual satisfaction and pleasure gained through success. The
increased efforts and engagement in turn lead to students’ improved learning, as well as their
experience of further success at mathematical tasks and mathematics overall. Consequently,
positive student attitudes to mathematics are reinforced, completing a success cycle, in an
enhancing upward spiral.

Figure 2: The Success Cycle (adapted from Ernest 2013).

Positive Attitudes to Mathematics.

Confidence, Sense of Self-Efficacy,
Pleasure, Motivation in mathematics

ì î

Mathematical Success Engagement and Learning

Success at Mathematical ç More effort, Persistence.
Tasks. Increased Success in Choice of more demanding
Mathematics overall tasks in mathematics

Psychologists including Howe (1990) have shown that a mechanism like that shown in Fig. 2
is an important factor in the development of exceptional abilities among gifted and talented
students. Students who demonstrate some giftedness and talent at around the age of 10 are
often very significantly further ahead of their peers at the age of 20 precisely because of the
factors shown in the figure. Early success and the attitudes it breeds lead to much greater
effort, persistence, and choice of more demanding tasks which lead to the flowering of the
later manifested exceptional abilities. Howe found that the exceptionally talented invested an
extra 5,000 hours in practice of their skills and abilities. This was double the time spent by
their capable but less outstanding peers. This finding has been popularized as the ‘10,000
hour rule’ by Gladwell (2008). This rule proposes that 10,000 hours of practice in any activity
or skill leads to expertise and mastery.

14
Figure 2 contains within it practical means of overcoming or ameliorating the failure cycle
shown in Figure 1. Students need to be given tasks and support in learning mathematics so
that they experience success. This needs to be real success at tasks that fall within their zone
of proximal development (ZPD), that is tasks that lie beyond what a learner can do without
help, but which are within their grasp with guidance and support from teachers, adults or
peers (Vygotsky 1978). Relatively low level tasks that use knowledge and skills that students
have already mastered may seem too easy to them, and may not contribute to a sense of
success. However, when students experience repeated success at more demanding
mathematical tasks, and become used to increased success in mathematics overall, one can
expect improved attitudes to mathematics. Over time, students should come to ‘own’ their
success and feel pleasure in it. They will therefore grow in confidence and develop their
sense of mathematical self-efficacy.6 They should gain motivation in engaging in and
completing mathematical tasks. Following on from their increased engagement we would
expect them to make more effort on mathematical tasks, become more persistent in solving
mathematical problems, sometimes even choosing more demanding tasks. Thus they are now
following a success cycle (Figure 2). With this in mind the teacher’s role is to set tasks that
fall within the learner’s ZPD, and to offer support and encouragement so they experience
success and develop positive attitudes. If a student is firmly in the grip of the failure cycle
(Figure 1) it may take some time and significant personal support to initiate the success cycle.
But once initiated there should be an upward spiral in terms of gains in attitudes, engagement
and success.

Another impact of the social image of mathematics is in sex-differences in mathematical

achievement and participation. Traditionally Western females have had lower levels of
achievement in school mathematics and lower levels of participation in advanced
mathematical study and in mathematical careers than males. Although school level
achievements in mathematics have more or less evened out between the sexes in the 21st
century, research shows that females continue to have, on average, more negative attitudes to
mathematics than males, and this continues to be reflected in continuing lower levels of
participation after the age of 16 years (Forgasz et al. 2010). It is widely claimed that the
social image of mathematics is a significant causal factor in these sex-differences (Mendick
2006). Thus widespread gender stereotyped social images of mathematics include the view
that mathematics is a male domain and is incompatible with femininity (Ernest 1995). This
contributes to gender stereotyped school images of mathematics which are manifested in a
lack of equal opportunities, such as in classroom interactions in learning mathematics
(Walkerdine 1988, 1998). Social images, as well as these school factors lead to gender-
stereotyping in females’ individual images of mathematics and impact negatively on their
confidence and perceptions of their own mathematical abilities (Isaacson 1989). The
disadvantaging effects of these factors result in underachievement and lower participation
rates in mathematics post-school.

However, in the past two decades, female underachievement has been balanced out by male
underachievement due to a separate set of factors, such as many young men’s disengagement
from school, especially in Anglophone countries such as United Kingdom (Forgasz et al.
2010).7 However, rather than meaning that equality between the sexes has been achieved, it

6
Students with positive mathematical self-efficacy attitudes often attribute their success in school mathematics
to stable and intrinsic causes such as their own skill and ability, while attributing their failures to extrinsic and
unstable causes such bad luck, or a lack of effort (Weiner 1972).
7
This problem is particularly acute for boys from lower socio-economic status groups, who are often less
engaged with most academic school subjects including the sciences (Banerjee 2016).

15
means that there are now two different gender-rated problems related to school mathematics,
and that these partially cancel out by negatively impacting differentially on both boys and
girls. Furthermore, the lower female participation in higher mathematics post-school remains
a significant problem.

Of course I have reported this in a primarily Anglocentric way, and many countries do not
follow this pattern. For example in West Indian, Pacific Island states and some Middle
Eastern countries girls have been outperforming boys in all subjects, including mathematics.
In Latin American countries and Southern European countries the stereotypically male
pattern of success in mathematics and science related studies and careers has fallen away.
Furthermore, in many Eastern countries mathematical success is seen to be due to student
effort and not due to inherited ability, including that associated with sex. However, where
such problems persist, as they do in the most populous English speaking countries, images of
mathematics are regarded as making a significant contribution.

Summary and provisional solutions

I have critiqued the idea that mathematics is an untrammelled force for good. Instead I offer
the metaphor that mathematics has two faces, the good and bad faces. The good face displays
the benefits and value of mathematics. I have argued that mathematics is intrinsically a force
for good, a creative development of the human spirit and imagination. It is also good in its
utility, for it has many benefits in its social applications and personal value that benefit
human flourishing. But, more controversially, I also claim that mathematics has a bad face. It
does harm through dehumanized thinking which fosters instrumentalism and ethics-free
governance. Also, because of its over-valuation in the modern world through education it
facilitates social reproduction and the perpetuation of class-based social injustice. Through its
social image (coupled with school learning experiences) it aids the development of negative
attitudes in some learners, and its gender-biased image maintains social disadvantage for
females, especially in the English speaking world.

There are of course, in addition, ethically questionable and harmful applications of

mathematics, as there are of any scientific and technological subject. Thus, for example,
mathematics, science and technology are used in the manufacture of guns, explosives, nuclear
and biological weapons, battlefield computer systems, tobacco products, and other potentially
destructive artefacts and tools. But, there is a well known and legitimate argument that it is
only in the choice of applications of mathematics in such activities that ethical considerations
and violations emerge. My critique is independent of such deliberate applications, and
perhaps even precedes them. I question whether mathematics itself, even before its wider
applications beyond schooling, is solely a force for good, incapable of detriment and social
harm. This view, which I might term a myth, hides the fact that mathematics through its
actions on the mind is already implicated in some potentially harmful outcomes even before it
is deliberately applied in social, scientific and technological applications.

However, some caveats to this argument are required. First of all, from the perspectives that I
term absolutist philosophies of mathematics (Ernest 1991), the image of mathematics that I
have criticised follows as a necessary feature of mathematics emanating from its very nature.
Although I and some others reject the associated absolutist epistemologies and ontologies,
these remain legitimate philosophies of mathematics. Secondly, the fact that the mindset
fostered by mathematical thinking can lead to harm when it is misapplied to social and other
philosophical issues is a defect of human or social thinking, and not an intrinsic weakness of

16
mathematics. Thirdly, such instrumentalist and abstracted modes of reasoning are necessary
in modern governance and management, and provided the background values are humane and
directed at human flourishing should do no harm. Fourth, the damage done by social images
of mathematics is mediated by interpretations of mathematics, that is, socially and personally
constructed images of mathematics. These images are not inescapable logical consequences
of mathematics itself, for they can, are, and have been different in different societies and at
different historical times. Thus the force of my critique is not directed at mathematics itself,
but at the social institutions of mathematics, including training in mathematics, and the false
social images of mathematics that they can legitimate and project. The harm that I am
highlighting comes from what are largely unconscious misapplications of mathematics,
including the modes of thought it generates, and from the image of mathematics that many
find excluding and off-putting, as well as the current overvaluation of mathematical
achievement in school and society.

Thus mathematics is not intrinsically bad or harmful, but as I have argued, its applications,
both conscious and unconscious can be detrimental to many. This provokes the question: how
can we prevent, ameliorate, or rectify this? In the space here I can only sketch a few
possibilities for addressing these problems. I have already sketched how the personal damage
done to some via the teaching of mathematics can be ameliorated or rectified. My further
proposal is that we should include elements of the philosophy of mathematics and of the
ethics of mathematics and its social responsibility in the teaching mathematics at all levels
from school to university.

1. Teaching the philosophy of mathematics

My proposal is that we should include selected aspects of the philosophy of mathematics in
the school mathematics curriculum and in university mathematics degree courses. Students at
all levels should have some idea of proof and how mathematical knowledge is validated. This
includes knowing that no finite number of examples can prove a generalisation, whereas a
single counterexample can falsify it. Students need to understand the limits of mathematical
knowledge, including the following: the certainties of mathematics do not apply to the world,
there is always a margin of error in any measurement; no mathematical application or
scientific theory can ever be proved true with certainty, and this applies to any mathematical
model of the world. Likewise we need to teach the limits of mathematical thinking: the
true/false dichotomies we find in mathematics do not apply to the world, where matters are
almost never so clear cut. In addition, students need to be aware that there are controversies
in the philosophy of mathematics over the nature of mathematics, especially the basis of
mathematical knowledge and the status of mathematical objects; that there are controversies
over whether mathematical knowledge is absolute, superhuman with an existence that
predates humanity, and over whether the objects of mathematics exist in a superhuman
Platonic space. A recent issue concerns whether humanly unsurveyable computer proofs, such
as that of the 4-colour theorem, are indeed legitimate proofs. Strong disagreements rage over
whether mathematics is intrinsically value- and ethics-free or value laden, and over whether it
is invented or discovered. I believe that elements of the history of mathematics and
mathematics in history can serve to make some of the above recommended points and to
humanize mathematics. This can be reinforced by illustrating the ubiquity of mathematics in
culture, art and social life. I have just picked out here some philosophical questions and
issues that mathematics raises, and many more could be added.

Overall, my proposal is that students should see mathematics as more than just a set of tools,
and instead be shown that it is long-standing discipline with its own philosophical issues and

17
controversies, including human and ethical dilemmas. They should learn that mathematics is
not an isolated and discrete area of knowledge, which despite having a distinct identity has
rich connections with all other dimensions of human activity, practice and knowledge. The
importance of grasping aspects of the complex interrelationships between mathematics and
the human world is that some of the misunderstandings arising from an isolated and separated
view may be obviated. By exploring some of the basic philosophical issues and
presuppositions underpinning mathematics, as well the nature, validity and limitations of its
knowledge, some of the ills that I have described can be reduced or avoided.

2. Teaching the ethics and social responsibility of mathematics

Although there is a widespread misperception, from my perspective, that mathematics is
neutral and bears no social responsibility, clearly its uses and applications are value-laden.
We should, in my view, add the ethics of mathematics to all university mathematics degree
courses so that mathematicians gain a sense of its social responsibility. We need to teach that
mathematics must be applied responsibly and with awareness, and that it is wrong to ignore
or label its negative social impacts as ‘incidental’ outcomes or as ‘collateral damage’, thus
allowing them to be viewed as outside of the responsibilities of mathematicians. In addition
to teaching the ethics of explicit mathematical applications we also need to teach that
mathematics has unintended ethical consequences. Thus, we need to teach the limits and
dangers of instrumental thinking which mathematics can foster, and how it can lead to
dehumanized perspectives in which people are both viewed and treated as objects.

Part of the social responsibility of mathematics is to foster public understanding.

Mathematicians, including the wider professional mathematics community, have the
responsibility both to promote the understanding of mathematics and to counter
misconceptions and misunderstandings about the meanings and significance of its uses and
applications in the public domain, especially in the media. Modern citizens need to be
critically numerate, able to understand the everyday uses of mathematics in society. As
citizens, they need to be able to interpret and critique the uses of mathematics in social,
commercial and even political claims in advertisements, newspaper and other media
presentations, published reports, and so on. Mathematical knowledge needs to be critical in
the sense that citizens can understand the limits of validity of any uses of mathematics, what
decisions are conveyed or concealed within mathematical applications, and to question and
reject spurious or misleading claims made to look authoritative through the use of
mathematics. Citizens need to be able to scrutinize financial sector and government systems
and procedures for objectivity, correctness and uncover hidden assumptions. Ideally they
should able to identify the ethical implications of applications of mathematics to guard
against the instrumentalism and dehumanization that can be hidden behind technical
decisions. My claim is that every citizen needs these capabilities to defend democracy and the
values of humanistic and civilised societies, and it is part of the social responsibility of
mathematics to help provide them. This responsibility begins with school teaching, where all
students spend thousands of hours studying mathematics. The critical mathematics education
movement has over the past quarter century provided both theoretical analyses and practical
examples of what teaching critical mathematics means (D’Ambrosio 1998, Ernest et al. 2016,
Frankenstein 1990, Skovsmose 1994).

A purist objection to such additional teaching targets is, first of all, that they would steal
valuable time and thus detract from the teaching of mathematics, and second that these not
the responsibilities of mathematicians. With respect to the first objection it can be said that
what I am proposing is not intended to take up even 2% of the time devoted to mathematics

18
teaching in schools and universities. At school, such issues can be brought up within the
mathematics curriculum periodically but without taking even a whole lesson. A discussion of
examples, models and applications can lead to the issues being raised ‘naturally’, provided
mathematics teachers have been well prepared to do this. Furthermore, using problems
concerning the environment, international trade, world development issues, for example, will
motivate and engage learners in their mathematical studies as well as highlighting the social
responsibility of mathematics. At university a small, time limited course on ethics and social
responsibility of mathematics could easily be added as a mandatory course alongside pure,
applied or service courses in mathematics. Thus, the costs in time could be very small,
meeting this objection, although the positive impacts, in terms of mathematicians’ and other
mathematics users’ awareness of the social responsibility of mathematics, could be
significant.

With regard to the second objection on lack of social responsibility of mathematics, it is first
interesting to contrast the received views about the responsibilities of mathematics and
mathematicians with parallel views about the social responsibilities of science and scientists.
Unlike the case in mathematics, there is widespread acknowledgement of the social
responsibility of science. Many have argued that what they term the Promethean power of
modern science and technology warrants an extended ethic of social responsibility on the part
of the scientists and technologists (Bunge 1977, Cournand 1977, Jonas 1985, Lenk 1983,
Luppicini 2008, Moor 2005, Sakharov 1981, Weinberg 1978, Ziman, 1998). In particular, The
Russell-Einstein Manifesto called for scientists to take responsibility for developing weapons
of mass destruction and urged them to “Remember your humanity, and forget the rest”
(Russell and Einstein, 1955). This manifesto initiated the Pugwash meetings which
emphasised “the moral duty of the scientist to be concerned with the ethical consequences of
his (sic) discoveries.” (Khan 1988, p. 258). When accepting The Nobel Peace Prize on behalf
of himself and the Pugwash conferences Joseph Rotblat stated “The time has come to
formulate guidelines for the ethical conduct of scientist, perhaps in the form of a voluntary
Hippocratic Oath. This would be particularly valuable for young scientists when they embark
on a scientific career.” (Rotblat 1995). Thus Rotblat and his colleagues propose that ethics
needs to be included in the training of young scientists, a call that is echoed by many others
including Bird (2014), Evers (2001) and Frazer and Kornhauser (1986). This call has been
taken up authoritatively by UNESCO which emphasizes the theme “Ethics of Science and
Technology” (UNESCO n. d.), and according to which “The ethics and responsibility of
science should be an integral part of the education and training of all scientists”. UNESCO
(1999: section 3.2.71). Beyond this, Ziman claims that what is needed is what he calls
‘metascience’, an educational discipline extending “beyond conventional philosophy and
ethics to include the social and humanistic aspects of the scientific enterprise” (Ziman 2001,
p. 165). He argues that metascience should become an integral part of scientific training in
order to help equip scientists of the future with the skills necessary to tackle ethical dilemmas
as they arise (Small 2011).8

The situation is rather different in mathematics with the exception of the Radical Statistics
group (n. d.), which publishes analyses of social problem topics with the aim of demystifying
technical language and promoting the public good. Generally, very few mathematicians
acknowledge the ethical and social responsibilities of mathematics, although there is some
acknowledgement of the social responsibility of mathematicians, as I recounted above. Hersh

8
The inclusion of metascience in science teaching loosely corresponds with my proposal to include the
philosophy of mathematics in or alongside the teaching of mathematics.

19
(1990, 2007) discusses ethics for mathematicians, Davis (1988) proposes a Hippocratic oath,
and the American Mathematical Society (2005) provides Ethical Guidelines for
mathematicians. However, the content of these recommendations is primarily about
professional conduct in research and teaching for professional mathematicians. Davis (1988)
goes beyond this and argues that mathematics should not be put in the service of war or other
harmful applications, and mathematicians should exercise their consciences. Ernest (1998,
2007), Davis (2007) and Johnson (2015) argue that mathematics needs to acknowledge its
social responsibility, with Davis (2007) arguing for the need for ethical training throughout
schooling for mathematicians and non-mathematicians alike. These, however, represent
marginal voices in the mathematical and philosophical communities of scholars.

If one looks beyond mathematicians and philosophers to the area of mathematics education,
there are many voices asserting the social responsibility of mathematics. Of course it is
uncontroversial to claim that education is a value-laden and ethical activity, since it concerns
the welfare of students and society, and the objectivity, purity and neutrality of mathematics
itself is not at stake. In consequence, there is a very large literature comprising many
thousands of publications on social justice and social responsibility in mathematics teaching,
the first theme to be mentioned here.9 Some of the main dimensions in this literature are
mathematics and exclusion based on race and ethnic background (Powell and Frankenstein
1997), gender and female disadvantage (Rogers and Kaiser 1995, Walkerdine 1988, 1998),
low ‘ability’ and handicap as obstacles (Ernest 2011, Ruthven 1987), and disadvantages
correlated with or caused by social class and its correlated cultural capital or other factors
(Cooper and Dunne 2000). A second theme is the role mathematics plays in critical
citizenship and the public understanding of mathematics (Frankenstein 1990). A related third
theme is the Mathematics Education and Society (Mukhopadhyay and Greer 2015), Critical
Mathematics Education (Skovsmose 1994, Ernest et al. 2016) and Ethnomathematics
(D’Ambrosio 1985, Powell and Frankenstein 1997) movements which consider both the role
mathematics plays in society and how it impacts on the first two themes. The Critical
Mathematics Education movement also looks critically at mathematical knowledge and the
institutions of mathematics and their role in denying the relevance of ethics and values to
mathematics, and thus denying its social responsibility (Skovsmose 1994). It shares this
concern with the Philosophy of Mathematics Education movement (Ernest 1991, 2016a,
2016b), to which the present chapter and indeed this entire volume represents a contribution.
However, within the mathematics education research community, beyond any commitment to
the teaching of mathematics in a socially just way, the idea that ethics needs to be taught
alongside mathematics remains a minority opinion, except perhaps within research in the
third theme distinguished here.

Conclusion

In this chapter I question and challenge the idea that mathematics is an unqualified force for
good. I acknowledge the traditional argument that like any other instrument, mathematics can
be applied in both helpful and harmful ways, and I acknowledge the many benefits it brings.
But I nevertheless endorse the minority view that mathematicians and other students of
mathematics need to be taught the ethics of mathematical applications to question and limit
harmful applications. They also need to be taught to think critically, understanding the uses of
mathematics in society and in arguments justifying political claims, social policies and

9
A very partial bibliography of mathematics education published 20 years ago has over 800 mathematics
education entries concerning the issues of society and diversity (Ernest 1996).

20
commercial interests. However, my main argument is more radical. I argue that in addition to
the explicit and intended applications of mathematics, the nature of mathematical thought and
the role mathematics plays in education and society can lead to collateral damage; some
unintended but nevertheless harmful consequences. Mathematics has a hidden role in shaping
our thought and society that is rarely scrutinised for its social effects and impacts, some of
which are negative.

First of all, there is the harm caused by the overvaluation of mathematics in society and
education, with its negative impacts on the confidence and self-esteem of groups of student
including females and lower attainers in mathematics. These unintended outcomes of
mathematics in school in leaves some students feeling inhibited, belittled or rejected by
mathematical culture and perhaps even rejected by the educational system and society
overall. In sorting and labelling learners and citizens in modern society, mathematics reduces
the life chances of those labelled as mathematical failures or rejects (Ruthven 1987). This is a
hidden impact of mathematics that is usually brushed over as the fault of the individuals that
suffer, rather than as a direct responsibility of the role accorded to mathematics in education
and society.

Second, even for those successful in mathematics, in shaping thought in an amoral or ethics-
free way, mathematics supports instrumentalism and ethics-free governance. Instrumental
thinking leading to the objectification and dehumanisation of persons in business, society and
politics, has the potential to cause great hurt and harm. This is manifested in warfare, the
actions of psychopathic corporations, the exploitation of humans and the environment, and in
all acts that treat persons as objects rather than moral beings deserving respectful and
dignified treatment throughout (Marcuse 1964).

I do not claim that mathematics is intrinsically harmful, but that without more careful thought
about its role in society and thought it leads to harmful, albeit unintended, outcomes. The way
we teach and how we use mathematics and its impact on our thinking is what is harmful. My
proposal is that to obviate or prevent the potential harm done by mathematics as well as
improving the teaching of mathematics we need to teach the philosophy and especially the
ethics of mathematics alongside mathematics itself. Part of this teaching is needed to
overcome the idea that mathematics, unlike any other domain of human knowledge bears no
social responsibility for its roles in society, science and technology. All human activities
should contribute to the enhancement of human life and general well-being and no domain
can stand apart from such ethical scrutiny, although this should never be used as a reason for
limiting advances within pure mathematics itself. However, the intended and unintended
applications of mathematics and their consequences do need to be scrutinised and held
accountable within the court of human happiness and human flourishing.

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