MIR 

‐ Project Proposal - Ahmet Polat Yılmaz

A Further Analysis on the United Nations and the Politics of Selective Humanitarian

Intervention: The Effect of the ‘Complexity’ of the Domestic Disturbances in Syria and Libya

Since the Second World War, several humanitarian crises and large-scale human rights

violations have happened in several regions of world. And the United Nations, which was established

after the World War II, has responded some of these crises in various ways, such as imposing

sanctions, deploying peacekeeping operations or military interventions. However, throughout its

history, United Nations Security Council’s interventions have been “highly selective” (Binder, 2016).

While the Council has chosen to intervene in some humanitarian crises, it has taken no action in some

others.

When I delved into the literature about the United Nation’s decisions of intervention and non-

intervention on several humanitarian crises in different parts of the world, I have noticed that there are

several studies analyzing the historical, legal and political backgrounds of the Responsibility to Protect

(R2P) norm, ICISS Report in 2001, UNSC Resolution 1973 for Libya and international law for the use

of force. For instance, while Bellamy (2008) focuses on “R2P’s contribution to the problem of military

intervention” or “moral hazards” regarding it, Ainley (2015) analyzes the R2P norm as “to be game-

changing in their challenge to power politics and state sovereignty”. Some scholars have seen the R2P

as a reflection and a hidden sign of the national and material interests. Garwood-Gowers (2013) argues

that “R2P could be used as a pretext for regime change”. Also he claimes that even if the Council’s

rapid action in Libya “seemed to point to a new era of international cooperation on civilian

protection”, “removal of the Gaddafi regime in Libya has reignited longstanding suspicions about

R2P” (Garwood-Gowers, 2013). Similarly, Atılgan (2014) claimed that “humanitarian intervention is a

mere fig leaf for an effort to form a legal basis for intervention”, which would “erode the concept of

R2P”. Also, Rabbia (2012) examines the “internal circumstances” and the effects of domestic politics

on the Russian attitudes in Libya and Syria comparatively.

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 In another study, while analyzing the UNSC’s Libyan intervention and Syrian non-

intervention, Von Einsiedel et al. (2015) state that the permanent 5 member states can “most easily

agree on collective action in Africa” because Africa is not in the “exclusive zone of influence” of any

of these states or of any great power. They also explain Russia’s attitude in Syria with the motivation

to “protect its last remaining ally in the Middle East” and with the “concern that destabilizing the

Assad regime might lead to metastasizing Islamic radicalism” (Von Einsiedel et al., 2015). Also,

Aidan Hehir (2014), analyzes the effects of veto power in UN in terms of world order and of human

rights, which can provide a considerable explanation in the analysis of selective intervention. He

claims that veto power is abused, and it is “simply incompatible with the protection and promotion of

human rights”.

Additionally, as a well-structured and comprehensive examination of the selective

humanitarian intervention decisions of UN Security Council, Binder (2016) examines the common

patterns that affect the UN decision makers’ reaction to such violations around the world and provides

framework that could explain the majority of the humanitarian crises after the Cold War. According to

the article, how strongly the Council reacts to huge human rights violations depends on “the extent of

human suffering”, the extent of “spill over” to neighboring regions, the ability to create a

“countervailing power” against a possible intervention, and the extent of institutional and material

investments made by the Council in the past, or in other words the extent of “sunk costs” (Binder,

2016).

I would like to conduct a further analysis on the effects of the complexity and abundance of

warring parties in the country that suffers from a humanitarian crisis. Having lots of warring parties

with various interests and alliences could be a reason for the drawback for the intervention, as in the

case of Syria, but not in Libya. While, in 2011 Libyan civil war there were three main belligerents,

which are anti-Gaddafi forces, NATO and Libyan Jamahiriya of Gaddafi; there were much more

parties in Syria such as Syrian Arab Republic, Hezbollah, Iran, Russia, Iraq, Syrian Interim

Government, Turkey, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Syrian Democratic Forces, Combined Joint Task

Force that was established by US-led international coailition. Based on the abundance of warring

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 parties, Syrian civil war is much more complex than Libyan civil war. We can observe that interests

and goals of each of the anti-Gaddafi forces were not much different from each other so that they

could assemble under the same roof against Gaddafi rule. However, it is almost impossible to gather

all the parties that are against Assad regime because each party has a particular interest and objective

in Syria. This brings about a conflict of interest, which, I will argue, tends to increase depending on

the rise in the complexity of crisis. But, again, this was not the case in Libya, where there was a

harmony of interests, or at least an absence of conflict of interests, regarding the military intervention

against Gaddafi regime. Moreover, we can also observe that some warring parties could form alliances

against a specific actor but they can have conflicts regarding another specific actor in Syria. For

example, while Turkey and US are allies against ISIS, they are in conflict about US’s support to SDF,

which threatens Turkey’s southeastern borders. So, unlike Libyan case, even the alliances are turbulent

in Syria, which increases the complexity of the civil war. I would like to examine the effects of this

complexity on the non-intervention decision of UNSC by comparing it to Libyan case, which was

relatively less complex in terms of the variety of involving parties.

REFERENCES

Ainley, K. (2015). The Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court: counteracting
the crisis. International Affairs, 91(1), 37-54.

Atilgan, C. (2014, Fall). Arab Spring: the responsibility to protect and a selective international
response. Air & Space Power Journal - Africa and Francophonie, 5(3), 81+.

Bellamy, A. J. (2008). The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of military

Binder, M. (2016). The United Nations and the Politics of Selective Humanitarian Intervention.
Springer. Chapters 1 and 6.

Garwood-Gowers, A. (2013). The responsibility to protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the
exception, Syria as the norm. UNSWLJ, 36, 594.

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 Hehir, A. (2014, December 06). World Order, Human Rights, and the Security Council Veto.
Retrieved February 2, 2021, from https://www.e-ir.info/2014/09/02/world-order-human-rights-and-
the-security-council-veto/

Rabbia, N. (2012). The Selective Russian Behavior In Libya And Syria. nova, 1.

Von Einsiedel, S., Malone, D. M., & Ugarte, B. S. (2015). The UN Security Council in an age of Great
power Rivalry. Tokyo: United Nations University Working Paper, (4).

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