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AfUJiY Sl!.CURITY AGENCY

Waah1ngton 1 D. C.

EUROPEAN AXIS SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE Il\1 WORLD WAR II

AS REWALED BY '~ TICOM'. INVESTIGATIONS
('. AND B~ OTHER PRISONCR OF WAR INTERROGATIONS
AND CAPTUllliD MATERIAL, PRINGIPAlJ..iY GERMAI~

VOLUME 5--Tllli GERMAN AIR FORCE S!GNAL

INT~LLIGENC~ SERVICE

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 DOCID: 3560829
l8P. SEGi£.1 CREAM

VOLUME 5
~he German Air Force Signal Intelligence Service

Chapter I. The Service in Gen~:ral; :;ouz-oes of Info~tion

·Concerning It
Chapter II. Development of the German Air Force 51gnal
Intelligence Service
Chapter III. The Chi-Stelle
Chapter IV. Organization and Operation ot the Field Units
Section A. Operations in the West
Section B. Ope!"ations in the East
Section C. Operations in the South
Section D. Operations in the Nol'th
,_ Chapter V. Cry:ptanalya 1.s
Chapter VI • . Liaison
Chapter VII. Critique or the Organization and Operatioils of
th~ Germ.an Air Force 81gnaJ. Intelligence
Service
Appendix: "Early Warning" by Technical Sergeant Gerd
Watkinson, Duty Officer, Meldekopf l~ German
Air Force Signal Intelligenoe 8ervloe.
Tab A: Glossary

JOP SE.GR~T CHEAM

 - .
DOCID: 3560829

VOLUME 5
THE GERMAN AIR FORCE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Chapter I. The Service 1n General: Sources

of Int"ormat1on Concerning It
Paragraph
Introduction ....................... , .................... 1
Ob Jee tlves • .............................................. 2
Detailed Successes .... ~ •.••••.••...••• ~ •••••••.•.•••••••• 3
Adm1.n1st!'at1 ve D1f1"1cul ties:. ••••• ·• . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • . • • 4
Sources of Information •. ~ .............................. 5

1. Introduction~- This volume presents a discussion-of :i

the history, org&ri!zation a.n~ operations of the German Air ;-1
Force Signal Intelligence Service from its beglrmi.ng 1n 1937 •:
until the German capitulation 1n 1945. '
The outstanding ach1evemen1~ of the German Air Force Sig-
nal Intelligence Service uas ita development of 11 aignal intel-
ligence without cryptanalysis. ":l The exploitation of every··
radio manifestation, vhich .for the Germans included radar moni-
toring, the monitoring of beacons, the evaluation of tuning
transmissions and chatter, highly efficient direction finding,
radio telephone monitoring and traffic ·ans.lysis, provided valu-
able strategic and tactical intelligence.
The 3erv1ce vas expanded from one officer a.nd twenty o1v11-J';I
1a.ne in 1937 to thirteen thousand persons in 1945, of vlrl.ch .~
sixty-six hundred vere 1n the West, four thousand 1n the East,
and tventy~rour hundred 1n the South.
2. Objectives~- The lightning advances or the Germana in
l939 had resulted In the German Air Force Signal Intelligence
Service placing its main emphasis on radio telephone monitor-
ing and tactical eva1Ua.t1on. During the quiet period after
the fall or Prance, stress vas placed on st~ategic evaluation
1n order to present a coheJ'ent picture of Br1t1sh Air Order of
Battle and long range intentions. In addition, small units
were located-in the Balkans to provide 1ntell1genoe of Russian
deployment and intentions. Strategic evaluation continued
throughout the ~ar, but as all1ed raids ~e~ 1ntene1f1ed in
194} tactical eval.uat1on a.gain· became important as a means o~
providing early we.ming or lm;pending Allied ra.1.ds~ For th1e
purpose an intricate system of reporting centers {Meldekopfe)
and a central varning unit {Zentraler Gefechsetand fuer Funk-
ausvetung) ve:re established 1n 1944. The evalustion of the
traf'fic or tactical air rorce units operating in conjunction
vith Allied ground armies vas also stressed as the Germana
were fol'ced on the defense on a.11 fronts.

tI 42 p 4
I
- - ~~===~~-====================:::o::::=======>==============-=-==----=-==------------,1
-- -- --
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 DOCI-D: 3560829
3. Detailed successes~al Intell!S_ence.--The steps
lead1n.g to the 'succegs ot"the G·erman Air Force Signal Intell1-
gonce 1n their attack on Alliec:l radio traf"f1c will be treated
1n later chapters. A summa.r;y: <>f' 1b.~~-: ~':19£.~~~...Jf~.;JJ.---~
here b~!br1eflX sketchlilg the results achieved against Russia,
the Un1-eed States, and Britain. ···
~ a. ~--Throughout the course of the war against Rus-
sia 85 pe nf of the Morse ground-to-ground traffic or the 1·1
Soviet Air Armies, Corps and Divisions and of the supporting
ground organizations was deciphered. Ground-to-growid ra.dio :
traffic (such as fighter contr<>l) consisting of simple word en- ·
codements was continuouely solvable. The air-ground traffic
of the Soviet lon5-range bomber formations# although only par-
tially deciphered,, permitted G-erman tra!'f'ic-analysts to chart
Soviet air raids 1n time . to give adequate warning. The great
volume ~f 1ntormat1on derived from message contents and from
traffic analysis of the structure and funct1on1ngs of the net-
works enabled the Gema.n Air Fe>rce Signal Intelligence Service
1n the East to present to its j.ntelligence authorities &n ac-
curate and current listing of the 3fJviet Air Force order of
battle on the three operational fronts,, and of' the deployment
of the Rua31an ground forces to which the Soviet air f orcea
served as a.n adjunct. Furthermore tlus information prov::.ded
immediate and timely varn1ng of a1r raids, route-tracking of
bomber rorznations, &D Vall &S indicated long-range intentions
of both Soviet ground· and air f'orc~s,, and provided information
of supply a.nd economic conditions. Although up \lnt11 the time
or ~taling~ad signal 1nte111ger.Loe warnings had not been heeded,
when the signal intelligence unit on the Southern Front correct-
ly advised that the Russians had assembled 5 air armies in the
Stalingrad sec~or, us1g1nt vas held to be the ~in source of
intelligenae. 11 -~
h. (Untted Sta.tes.--The chief success against the United
States -Air Forc-e ·w&s ma.de possi.b le b'y alert traffic· ~lya1a.
Althou.gh ·a1r-ground systems, us~d jointly by the Americana
and Er1t13h, '\rere read 1n mt.UlY cases (e.g. Bomber Code, REXOlI,
&nd SYKO); the ef'~eetivenese ot cryptanalyeis ·vas defin1te1Y.
limited. ·
The Chief of the German Air Force Signal Intelligence Agen-
cy, Lt. Col. Fr1edr1ch, cla!m~a th&t he had "no contents from
grou.nd-ground ra.d1o ·trs.ff1c;" and interrogations sho~ed that
uhatever success was achieved with M 209 vas usually too late
for exploitation.
'1r~.ff'1c analysis, however. va.s able to provide A-2 lfith a
comprehensive and continuoua picture of the battle order a.nd
deployment of the United States Air Force 1n Britain, later on
1
j
the· continent, and 1n the Mediterranean. Numerous predictions
were also ma.de of long-range &1r force intentions. Tactically.
traffic analysis or "all radio manifestations" (vhich for the
Germans included everything from radio signals to beacons} gave

2 1 10 p 4
('-·
3I 41 p 7
41 70 p 5
...
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lmmed1are"..e.a& ti·fu~lJ- '!:Ya.Nling of Amer.1oan air raid&. As a re-

sult of· rihat Fr:t-edrich called "the reliance on good encipher-
ment and neglect or supervision of American radio traffic •••
the almost continuous radio traffic in the air •.• and radio
traffic beginn1~ regularly and uniformly, al~ays sent by rou-
tine procedure . . 5, the Germans ·t:rere able to re cons true t in ~
the West the organization and strength or the 8th United States
Air Force (and its bomber and .fighter commands), the 9th Air
Force, and the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (consisting of
.the United States 9th Air Force, the 1st United States Tactical
Ai:r Force and the 2nd Brl ti sh Ta·~t1cal Air Force). The United
States 1st Tactical Air Force, Allied A1r Transport Units and
other air Wlits ~ere successfully monitored. Major long-range
operations, such as the invasion and the break-through at Av-
rnnches ~ere, with some degree or success, eorreotly roreeaat.
Tactical monitoring or the United States a1r support parti~e
"yielded much more information about Allied Al'my order of battle
than did the regular e.rmy net vorks, 11 6 since the air support
parties acted in conjunction u1th spec1r1c ground units.
In the Mediterranean and Middle Ea.st the German Air Signals
Regiment 352 was able to reconst:t"uct with minute accuraey the
dispositions and stre~th of the Allied Air Force -- the 9th
Tactical Air Command (one Combat Mapping group, 4 fighter groups~
and one medium bomber group), the 57th Medium Bomber Wing, the
5th, 47th, 49tb, 55th, and 304th Heavy Bomber ~ings, the 15th
Fighter Command and the Mediterranean Air Transport Service.
The accurate reconstruction of Allied order of battle a t - · \
teats to the arrectiveness of the German analysts. American
A-2 evaluation or German signal intelligence operations direct-
ed against the United States 9th Air Force states tbat the por-
tions of the German d.1scuss1one ndealing vith the operations and
activities of the 9th Air Force reveal a full and complete knov-
ledge on the part of the Luft~ar~e Signal Intelligence Service •••
'.l'he success of (their) er.forts e..nd the degree to which (their)
operations had been developed vas an uncomfortable surprise •••
The in.formation of the enemy was thorough, complete, and accu-
rate in its broad aspects; there Yere minor discrepancies~ 1n-
aocuracies, confusion; .•. but, in general, it may be said that
tha Lu.ftvaffe Signal Intelligence Service was a most ec1ent1f1cp
professional and able organization, performing a valuablep meti-
culously complete, and reliable service for the enemy."7 Opara-
tional strengths vare in the main correctly estimated and the
precision vith ~hich unit move~nts vere follo~ed is said to be
truly impressive.
The euoeess of the German A.11• Force Signal Intelligence in
its analysis o~ American Air Force tra.tf1c was not exploited by
the German operational units, which ve~e sluggish in acting up-
on the information pi'ovided them. Friedrich complained that it
tras not his job to get the Vind.mills (German fighters) airborne.
c It ~as up to him merely to give the Y&rni.ngs.
5
I 70 P 5
6IF 182 p 83
7J.F 177 p 24 3
DqCID : 3560829
I

In the Mediterranean, according to membere or Air Sign.ale

Rgt. 352, . "it ve..s a course of' bitter chngrin to the Lui'twa:t.fe
S1gna.l Intelligence Service that the German Command lacked the
resources to aranslate its realistic intelligence into offen-
sive ac~~on. ~~
c."-..;Brita1n.- Royal Air Force systems produced the great-
est amount o:t-1h.tell1gence on air-ground cirouita. SYKO, REKOH.
Slidex and the Bomber Code were cU?Tently solved. Although the
RAF 4-figure code vas changed in November 1942 and thereafter
proved most difficult for the Germa.ns,9 it had been reac up to
that time. Both on the strategic and tactical level. German
Air Force Signal Intelligence achieved notable results on Brit-
ish Air Poree traffic. ln the West the Germans vere able to
reconstruct accurately the order of battle, deployment. strength,
equipment, and intentions of the Royal Air Force, and through
it, of the growid organ.1zation:10 In order or battle, the rol-
lowing RAF units vere continuously folloved throughout the var:
The lst , 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th 1 8th, 9lst, 92nd, 93rd, Bowber Groups;
the lOOth Group, the 9th. 10th. 11th, 12th, 13th, and ~2nd Figh-
ter Groups; the 15th, 16th, 17th, l8th 1 19th Reconnaissance
Groups of the Coastal Command; s.n.d units of the 2nd Tactical Air
Force» and of the RAP Transport Command.
On the tactical level the monitoring of RAP VHF and centi-
meter radar transmission and navigational aids permitted the
German Air Force Signal Intelligence Service 0 to acco~lish the
following:
(1) To give accurate, long and sho~t · interv&l, early ~arn­
ing of both daylight and night re.ids of heavy bomber formations;
(2) By continuously tracking heavy bomber formations to
present to the fighter defense a lucid picture of the air a1tu-
at1on, from the time of take-off to the landing or enemy forma-
tions• further,
f3) To interpret the picture of the a.ir situation in such
a manner. as to predict tae enemy's strength in,i~rma.tion, depth
of penetration, ts.rgetsp &nd deceptive tactics. i
In the Mediterranean areaR German Air Foroe Signal Intel-
ligence vas able to chart RAP operations throughout the Va.l'>.
In the ~irst yea.!"S or the Wal' German Air Poree Signal Intelli-
gence service succeeded. by break1n.g "the most frequently uaed
crypto~Dhic systems • • • to read the bulk of the mess~es inter-·
ceptaa:"l.2 The extensive use of radio communi.cations (occa-
sioned both by the geograpltlcal extent of the Meditenanea.n t~­
aterR and an ina~iciency of v1re communication facilities )

8IP 185 p 24
91 70 p 5
lOIF 182 p 42
llIF 183 p 2
12 IF 185 p 2
1'u 185 p 2
.1
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DOCID: 3560829

permitted a minutely nccurnte reconstruction of RAP order or

· battle, strength, equipment &nd intentions. GeFman A1r Force
Signal Intelligence vas able to follow RAF op~ratione dovn to
squadron level. · The t'ollowing uni ts vere monitored: tha 206th
and 225th Reconns.1ssam.ce Squad1:-ons, the 414th and 416th Night
Fighter Squadrons~ the 8th Fighter Group of the South Atr1can-
A1r Force, the various units of the RAF Desert Air Force (MASAF),
elements of the 90th Mediterranean Allied Photo RecoJlllaiesa.nce
\ling, the RAF Medite?'l'anean Allied Coastal A1r Foroe (MACAF) and
the various components of RAF Middle East~ including the RAF Bal·
kan A1r Force~ RAP Air Headquarters, Greece, Eastern Mediterra-
nean, ,~d Air Tl,ansport Command.
~,,:;:··4. Administrative Ditfioulties.--The success of the Air
/ll'ol'Ce ana.lytie effort seems to have been achieved in spite ot
rather than because of the administration of the organization.
Interminable dioputes prevented the smooth functioning of the
service. one of the issues frequently diuputed was vhether 1t
vas bette~ for the Signal .Intelligence Agency to be subordinate
to the Chief Signal Officer ~n~r.al Nach~ichten.Fuehr.er~ - abb.
Gen. Na1'1e), or to the A-2. l ~other subje-ct of' "C~ontroversy lf&& 1'
the separation ot.iidillinistrative from operational control, set
out at least on paper, botveen the Senior Signal Intelligence
Officer (Hoehex-er XommandeUl' de:r Funkaufklaerung~ abb. Hoe Jtmdr
d Funkauf'k:lrg) a.nd the Signal Intelligence Agency. '!'here uere
a~guments over the exercise of the various t}'P8s ot control
(administrative, tacticalpoperat1onal, strategic-operational,
etc.) over the units in the field# that is the Air S1gnal . Reg1~
ments and the Air· Signe.1 Battalions (Luttna.chrichten Regiments,
abb. LN Regt, and Luf'tnao.hrichten Abteilungen, abb. LN Abt).
The latter diaputee involved the rival cla.i~_fo~th~-~9ntro!_
of the Air Poree Signa.l Intelligence, the centralized Signal
Intellisence AgencyD the aecent~alized local Air Porces ·{Lutt- /
flottenJ, the Senior Signal Intelligence Officer, and 1n the .
latter stages of the var, the Chief o~ the ilr Raid W'a~ Ser·~;
vice for Germany (Funkautklaerungstuehrer Reichg .;, bb. FAF). '·;
These claims.a -when they vere settled at all~ vere resolved ; '
by compromise and appeasement. In general, the Signal Intel- 4·
1
ligenee Service vas subordinated to the Chief Signal. Officer ;
and not to the A-2, although the latter ~as the chief consumer 1.·
._ot the 1ntell1gencc::i P-roduct. _ _ __ _ -·-- ___ __
The control over the field regimsnta and b&.ttalions may
be outlined as follo~s:
a. Administrative or serv1ce matters: Contl"Ol t1as exer-
cised bf the Senior Air Signal Intelligence Of~ieer (Hoe Kmdr
d Lu FAJ to ~~hom the Commande~s of the Air Signal Regiments and
B~ttalions vere subo~dinated.
b, Tactical D!Qtters (strategic movements and deployment):
Control lfas exercised by the Signal Officer of the local air
force (Lutttlotte) to vhioh the rield unit vas attached.
c·. Operational motters: Control vas exercised by the
I
Signal Intelligence Agen<JJ' (Lm Abt-350 in the 1944 reorganiza-
tion) ot the Air Force (Oberbefehlshaber der luttvatfe, abb. /
Ob d L). /
I'

5
DOCID: 3560829
5. Sources of Information~- Several sources of informa-
tion were used for this volume:
a. The TICOM interrogations of ~risonera. (The I Reports)
b. A 13-volume i-eport entitled The Signal Intelligence
Service of the German Luftvaffe" compiled by Col, J. G. Seabourne~
chief or the Air Technical Intelligence Team of the USAAF. (IP
175 thl'ough 1.F 187) .
c, Report of the British Air Ministry (A.D.I.(K)),14 en-
titled nGerma.n Air Fo~ce Signals Intelligence in the War.''
d. German documents captured by TICOM teams consisting of
minutes of 31gnal Intelligence meetings, repo~ts, etc.~ lnclud-
inS filmed excerpts from -the Supplementary Volume B to War Diary
2 (Division 1) (Anlagenband B. Zu Kriegstagebuch II [l Abt) ).
(1) TICOM, through 1te interrogations of priaonera, obtain-
ed a vork1.ng picture of the German Air Force Signal Intelligence
Service. Traffic analysts and cryptanalysts active 1n the Ch1-
Stelle and 1n the various field units explained the details of
their operations. Chief among these were Lt. Col. Friedrich,
head of the 3rd Division of the Office of the Chief 51gnal Ofticor
(Gen. Nafue III) uhich dealt vith si.gnal intelligence, and at the
same time Chief of Air Signal Batt.a.lion 350 (LN Abt. 350 1 The
Signal Intelligence Agenoy). Specialist (Regierungnrat) Dr.
Voegele, Chief Cryptanalyst of the Gel"DJ&Jl Air Poree S1gnal Intel-
ligence Service and specialist on Anglo-American systems, made a
number of reports. Lt. Ludwig, chief evaluator on the Western
front; Major Feichtner, Comma.nding Officer of Air Signe.ls Regi-
ment 352,,which operated on the Mediterranean front; Captains
Herold and Sohe1dl, let Lt. Werther and Chlubek; ~nd L1eutenanteg
Smolin and Rasch, all active on the Eastern front against Ruasiab
and Major Oeljeachlaeger of Friedrich's staff, provided reports
1
of their respective activities . ·
(2) The 13-volume report prepared under the direction or
Col. J. G. 8eabourne, Chief or the Air. Tech!Uc&l Team contains '
minutely detailed discussions by German Air Force Signal Intel-
ligence Service personnel of the history and functions of their
service. Col. Seabourne, vho vas "charged Yith the mission of
securing and compiling data relative to the operations of the
Lu.ft~a.ffe Signal Intelligence Service in the course of World War
11,t1l.5 lfas successful 1.rl obtaining elaborately illustrated ex~
positions from German Air Force Signal Intelligence personnel.
The reports ere generally thorough, careful, and reflect the
kno~ledge of the expert. The main subjects covered and the names
of the chief reporters follov:
(a) History in General
Evolution or the Signal Intelligence Major Feichtner
Service 1914 - 1939
Ori.gin of the German Air Force T/Sgt J'ering
51gnal Intelligence Service:
The history and operations of the
Chi-Stelle and of its various I
sections (Referate) vh1ch operated I

+4 zy 18~
l5IF 177
DOCID: 3560829
",~d~j1 iJi"J.e {;t;li.t:....al ~;o..a.>t.11 cl.1.1 .1:•.1.'~ ·i., i:mt.
vere later co-located with the field
evaluation companies.
(b) Operations West
History or operations T/5gt. Jering
Fighter varnings of Allied T/8gts, Wa tldneon
Strategic Bombings and Jering
American Aircraft Warning Service Lt. Ludvig
a.nd intelligence derived rrom
Allied navigational aides, captured
documents, and equipment.
Technical operations: Lt. Ludwig
Ludvig's studies consist of a
detailed and documented account
of" the methods used tc> produce
strategic intelligence on Allied
order of battle and long-range
intentions, and to give tactical
intelligence on the operations of
the American Air Support Parties
and the British and Canad!an tentacles
(net~orka by which ground troops tte-
ques ted air support against German
ground concentrations.)
Cryptanalysis of Western systems Lt. Ludvig
(c) Operations East
Organization and history 1n general Col. Eick
from 1936-and particularly the story
of the 1st .Bn LN Regt 35'
Central Front operations Major Windels
Windels vas CO of 2nd Bn, IJf Regt ,53
Southern Russian Front Capt. Herold
Herold was CO of the 3rd Bn,
LN Regt 353
Strategic evaluation of Soviet Lt. Chlubek
Air Force tratf ic
Tactical Evaluation of traffic o~ Lt. Rasch
Russian Long Range Bomber Force
Russian Radio Procedure Lt. von Lackum
Air Poree R/T traffic Lt. Mucke
Cryptanalysis of Soviet Syste~~ Lt. Chlubek

7
DOCID : 3560829

(d) Operations South

History Major Feichtner
and T/Sgt.Jering,
Technic~l operations of Lt. Lier, MaJor,-
Ln Regt 352 Schultze, and
Feldwebel Schlott-
man
(e) Organization of the Central Air Col. Forster
Warning Service. Forster vas
Ch1e.f o.f the Reich Defense Signals
Intellisence Service (Funkau.fklael"Uilg-
sfuehrer Reich, abb. FAF)
In addition, m1.scellaneous studies and detailed biogra-
phies of various German Air Force Signal Intelligence Ser-
vice personalities were included.
The TICOM and the Seabourne reports taken together pre-
sent a comprehensive picture of the German Air Force Signal
Intelligm ce Se.rvice. The many dets.1ls and care.fully ex-
ecuted diagrams contained in the Seabourne reports provide
a wealth of material for further study. Liberal quotations
from it will be found throughout fg1s paper. ·
(3) Tho Air Ministry Report consists of a
ser1es of
reports comprising an account of the German Air Force Signals
Intelligence Service from its beginnings, and describing the
development of intercept, advance warning, route tracking and
forecasting of air offenses, the breaking of Allied crypto-
graphic systems 1n the West and in the North. It is pointed
out, hovever, that further evidenc~ from captured GeI"lnEJ.D. Air
Foree documents has been helpful 1n supportllig these 1nter-
roga t1ons. In general, the material is organized on the
lines of the Seabourne report. A detailed description of the .
organization snd operation of the unit operating in noruay
(LN Abt. 355) is contained in. the rins.l portion of the Air
M1n1stIT Report.
( 4) The above reports of German prisoners of var., ob-
tained ~ter the capitulation of Germany, are supplemented
by v&l'ious documents written du~in.g the course of the var.
The most important of these, the War D~. aey, gives a complete
Table of .OrgBJdzs.tion for the Chief Signal Officer, (General
Nachr1chten Fuehrer, abbreviated Gen Nafue) and a descrip-
tion of duties tor all offices under his control: particu-
larly relevant for this pape:r• are the sections on Gen Naf'ue I
(allocation and employment of s1ena1 Troops), Gen Bafue II
(communications and cryptography), and Gen Naf'ue III (Signal
Intelligence se~vice). . .
Minutes of various Supreme Commander of Armed Forces
meetings vhich ~ere attended by German Air Force Signals
Intelligence Service personnel and copies of actual opera-
tional reports rendered rr~m time to time . prove a useful aup-
plement to the 1n.terrogat1ons and monographs.
DOCID: 3560829

Volume 5
Chapter II. Development of the German Air Force
Sign.al Intelligence Service
Paragraph
January 1937 to September 1939 ...................... 6
September 1939 to November 1941~ . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . • • 7
Reorganization on the Starr level in November 194'~ d
Reorganization or the field units in NoveMber 1944 .• 9
Staff offices .of the German Air Force Signal
~ntelligence Service and their functions ........... 10
a. Office of the Chief Signal Officer
b. Chief of Staff, Office of the Chief Signal Officer
c. Divisions of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer

6. Januart 1937 - September 1939 .--0n January 1, 1937 r

a Signal Intel Igc.:.l.ce ~gency vas established wider the Air / 1·
Ministry for the Commander in Chief of the German Air Force. !
It vss called Chiffrier Stelle, Oberbefehlshaber der· Luftwarfe 1
(abbreviated Chi Stelle, OB d L). The Air Force was a nev JI
branch of the Armed Forces {Wehrmacht), legally in existence .
slightly mol'e th.an a year. The Sign.al Intelligence Ageney of_ :
the Commander in Chief of the Air Force (Chi Stelle ·OB d L) .
~as the Air Force's first official ent~y into signal intelligence
and consisted of but one officer and tventy civilians. · Prior
to the Chi Stelle•s establishment, all intercept and evaluation
of f ore1gn air force traff lc had been done by German Army
\ signal intelligence units.
Fixed intercept stations ~ere eatab~ished during 1937
according to German Army prototypes and given the cover name
of' ''\feather Radio Receiving Sta~fone" (Wetterfunkempfangs-
atellen, apbreviated W-Stellen), The intercept stations
Yere supplemented by direct1on-f"1nd1ng s'tat~ons l:fhich l!el'e
called "Weather Research Stations" (Wetter.fo:r-schungsstellen,
abbreviated Wo-Stellen). In add.1t1onJ mobile inte2~ept
platoons vere established to ope:r-ate in the field. The
platoons• original mission·vaa the monitoring or German Air
Force traffic f"or aecur1ty purposes, but late in 1937 they were
expanded into mobile Radio Intercept Companies (Luftn.achl'1ehten
Funkho:rchkompan1n Mot.) t:1h1ch collaborated t:rith the f1xe~
stations in tha.interce9t of foreign sir force traffic. 3

21 IF 181 p 14; IF 189, 403, p 2

22 IP l89J 403 p 2
23 IF 189J 403, P 3

9
 DOCID: 3560829

The intercepted material b'SS ·passed to the Signal

Intelligence Agency for analysis and evaluation after pre-
liminary tratf1o analysis ~nd cryptanalysis had been per-
for1ned. The Agency completed the p~ocessing of the traffic and
t~ansmitted any intelligence derived from cryptanalysis or
traffic analysis to the Commander· in Chief of .the Air Force,
the Army, the Navy, and back down to local air force (Luftflotte)
commanders. The Agency had the further duty of assigning broad
interoeot missions to the fleld units and publishing general
orders for signal intelligence aetiv1ties in general. 2q
It soon became evident that the intelligence needs of
local air force commanders could be more quickly satisfied by
having evaluation performed at l<:>'t1e:r> level a than at the Signal
Intelligence Agency. As a result field evaluation centers
o~ company strength were established and given the cover name
of.' 11 \'/eather Control Stations" (Wetterleitstellan, abbrevlated
W-Le1t). 25 .
In 1939, after seve.r•el exper! ments at reorganization"
the fixed and mobile signal intelligence units vere combined
into signal 1ntell1genco battalions, removed rrom the admini-
a ·c!'n ti ve control ot Chi Stelleg and attached to Local Air
Fare~ Signal Regiments, in each eas~ as the third battalion of
~hat ~as prima~ily a ccmmunications regimsnt. Each signal
tntelligenoe battalion l:T&s composed of an evaluation unit, tlfo 2 r..
mo1)1le intercept oompanies and three fixed intercept stat.J.ons. v . _
As a result of the above Signal Intelligence activities,
it can be said that prior to the outbreak of l!P..r in September
1939 the G~rma.n Air Force High Command had "a quite accurate
picture or the air a~mament, deployment, Dnd st~ength of
i"oreign air fo:s...ces.P as uell as thel:r organization and expansion. "27
7. September 1939 to November 1944.--The quick successes
o~ the German llrrosd Forces in overrunnlng Poland in eighteen
days in 1939, and J.l'rance in a fe1:1 lmeks :tn the spring of' 1940
denied the German Air Force Signal l:ritelligence Service an
opportunity to distinguish itselr. 2J As the Bl-1t1sh Air
Ministry Summary states:
11
It is almost a truism that signal 1ntelligenoe
has its greatest value when the war is going badl7
and is o!' least importance lfhen all is going vell.
'· Thus Germany ' s early lightning successes ltere a
great handi cap to the ruture development or its
signals intelli gence, ror they rendered almost su-
perfluous the help tthich it. could have given if duly
appreciated and developed. All that seemed necessary
2 4· IF 181
25 IF 181 p 16
("'- 26 IF 189, 403, p 4; IF 181 p 16
27 IF 180 p 4

10
DOCID: 3560829

'
vaa to listen to enemy R/T traffic ~hile the German
armies and the Germsn Air For-ce were hammering their ~ay
vay .forvard ... 11 29
Ho~ever, in Dacember 1939 the German Air Force Signal \
Intelligence Service demonstrated. its value ~hen lt enabled '.\ 1
German fighters to destroy a large Wellington formation over 1 ~
northern Germany by liupplying the fighter coJnDW.nd l11 th the 1~
location, height, speed and size of the raiding foree.30 The ,
result of this signal intelligenoe success ~as the reali2at1on
that signal intelligence had an important place in Germany's
air raid defenses.
With the stabilization of the Western f'ront in 1940 and
the opening or a campaign on the Eastern front in 1941, a
great expansion of the German Air Force Signal Intelligence
Service ensued. Because of the diverse .fronts covered and
the fundamental differences in their problems, the German
Air Force Sigrial Intelligenee Service field wiits operated
as self-contained entities in the Western, Eastern, and
Mediterranean sectors. Technical coordination existed
bet~een the individual specialist sections (Referate) of the
Chi-Stelle, d~scussed in the.next chapter, and the evaluation
Wl1 ts (W-Lei t ·) in the f .ield. 31 The Chi-Stelle exercised
09erational control over the Evaluation Companies (V-Leit),
handled field unlts' requests ror personnel and special
signal equipment, remained in constant touch ~1th all signal
1ntell1gence problems in the field and was "accustomed to
D181ntaining direct contact ~1th the Le1tstellen as ~ell as
_ffith eaeh ·indiv1dual outstation. This achieved the purpose
or assuring a rapid exchange of rundamental intelligence
't!ith1n the Signal -Intelligence domain. On the other hand,
the General Staff was kept in the picture thzoough the reports
fUr'nished by the _;1 ef'erate. "3Z
As allied air raids became more frequent in 1942 and 1943.
the tactical a1r raid ~arn1ng .a spect or signal intelligence
was exploited. The evaluation centers lrlth the field units
Tlashed advance ~a.rning of allied heavy bo~ber raids to
civilian ~nd military authorities and carried on route tracking
or the bombers for the benerit Of German righter aontrol.33
This tactical ~~ng activity developed into an 1ntr1cate
system Of tao~ioal air raid ~arning centers ~hich are described
in detail in Chapter IV of' this paper.

29 IF 189, 402, p 2
}O I 109 p 7
31 IF 180 p 6
}~ IF 180 p 6 ·
33 1 109 p 7

11
 DOCID: 3560829

r" The development of airbol"ne and navigational radar by

the allies made necessary the creation or a radar observation
service (Funkmessbeobschtungsdien~t), and the radar jamming
0
ser-vice {Funkstoerdienst). Radar_observat1on and jamming
units vere accordingly auded to the existing wireless intelli-
gence units in the West and South (in the sULlroer of 1943).
The radal" control .oost (Funkle~tstand) of the_,~B d L vas c:ree.ted
to correspond vi th the Chl-Stelle OB d L ... 11 .J
From the oubbreak of var until the middle or 1944,
operations of both the central and field Unite vere su~riciently
developed to provide a continuous flow of infOl'mation to the
Air Force High Command A-2. Hovever, the many channels of
tactical and oue~ational command to vhi.ch these units ve~e
subject and t~ growth and development or their vork compelled
a reorganization in the last stages o~ the var. This reorgani-
zation constitutes the most coherent rorm of tho German Air
Force Signal Intelligence Sel"vice_, and is descr:.bed immediately
belo"I (para.graphs 8 and )) as the norm.
8. Reorgani za ti on on the Staff level in NoYember 1844. - -
The dynamics of signal intelligence operatior:s-inakE["Itifficult
to find any point of rest at which an accurat~ statement of
organization is possible. Hovever, the severil reorganizations
of the entire service that occurred in 1944 to fill the needs \ :
arising throughout previoun operations gave th\' service :tts r
final form. ·~
In the spring of 1944, the first of. these r~·organlzat.::..ons I I
took place. All signal 1ntelltgence uni ts, incL,ding the Chi- :.t. 1 r
Stelle '1hich heretofore had been under the Germa1\ ~'.J.r Ministry ./ . \ ]
( :L. e., Chi-Stelle OB d L) vere placed under the tact~.ca.l i
command of the Chief Signal 0ff1c-9r, 3rd Di vision (Ge"\J~sfue III).· j
in order to unify operations wider a central cormnan<l ..... ; ~
This eentI""alization in tact.lcal matters and the decu1trali- 1
Zf?>.tion in administrative af'fa..i..J'.'S to the rteld comr.i.and uru_i~s, I

led to difficulties in guid1lnce and supply. As a result, ~..n

the fall of i91~1i, after an abortive order by Goering to uni•'y
all German A5.r Furce Signal Intelligence units through comb1-Ling
all listening, jamming. and radio trarfic units as pa.rt of Ai~
Signal Regiments 37, a new cot1)rehensi ve organ1za t1on va.s
finally created. This nev organ5.zation uni:f"J..ed a.11 home and '
field un1. ts into inde ;:>endent air signals regiments and battalion:
lfith numbers rang::ng from 350 to 359. Administration vas ·
centralized in a so-called· Senior Sigt~l Intelligence Ofricer
(Hoehoerer kommandeur der Funkautkllierung, abbreviated Hoehr
Keil" d Funka ufklrg} .

3 4 IF 189, 403 p 5
35 IF 180 p 5
(6 IF 189, 403 p 6
37 No. 180-186 D 4 I 42

12'
DOCID : 356082 9

This final orge.nization provided for centralized control

in the Chief Signal O~fioer (General Naohr1ohten Fuehrer)
instead ot the A-2, or Air Ministry. Unde?' the Chief' of Staff
'of the Chief Signal orticer vere three divisions: the first
(Gen Eafue/I) supervised the assignment of air signals troops;
the eecond (Gen Nafue/II) directed communications and German
Air Force cryptography; and the third (Gen Natue/III) directed
signal intelligence, crypte.ne.lysis, and security.
Oen Na.f'ue/III had administ~Ative control over the Ch1-
Stelle ·· o~ Signal Intelligence Agency, and the caromanding
off'iae1• of Gen Nafue/III 1 Lt. Col. Friedrich, l:ras also the
commanding off.teer of the Chi-Stelle. Under the reorgani-
zation of November 1944 the Chi-Stelle was redes1gnated Air
Signals Battalion }50 (Oberkommando der Lurwatte,
richten Abteilung 350, abbreviated "OKL/LN Abt 350").
Lu;9nach-
Friedrich, in his position of dual command, regulated the
planning f o~ the entire German Air Force Signals Intelligence
Service and ·"a.s the representative of the Chief Signal Officer
remained the supreme authority until the very end on all Sig-
nal Intelligence Service matters of decisive importanoen
(Gen Nafuft I, II, and III al'e desc~ibed more ~ully 1n para-
graph 5).'9 nominally, hoffever, the 'aAm1n1strat1on of 'ale
Signal Intelligence Service vas placed in the bands of the
old Signal Corps retainer, General Klemme , ~ho ~aa named Senior
Signal Intelligence Officer (Roehr Kmdr d FunkauncJ.rg). All
signal intelligence matters pertaining to tbe defensa of the
Reich uere plaoed 1n the hands ot an Oberst Forster, vho vas
named Chief of the Reich Signal Intell1genae Air Radio Warning
Agency (Funka.Ufklaerungsf'uehrer Reich, FAF).

3~his is designated . "81~ Intell1se~ce Ag&n~y of the Air-

force High Comm&n.11 ( OKL/LN Abt 350) n throughout other vol-
umes of this report, as it vae actually such an agency.

13
DOCID: 3560829

9. Reorganization uf the Field Units in November 1944.--

The d~spoait!on ana designation oFthe fieTd unite after the
reorganization uas as follo~s: ·
West: Air Signals Regiment Yil (LH Regt 351). Thia
Regiment consisted of three battalion.a, and
operated in conjunction ~ith loeal Ai~ Force 3.
Mediterranean and Middle East:
Air Signala Regiment 352 (LN Regt 352). This
Regiment consisted or t~o battalions and
operated ~1th local Air Force 2.
East: Air Signal Regiment 353 (LN Regt 353). This
Regiment consisted or three battalions . The
first battalion operated vlth local Air Force l
on the Northern Russian Front, the second, vith
local Air Force 6 on the Central Russ1an Front,
and the third, v1th local Air Force 4 on the
Southern Russian Front.
Scandinavia:
Ai~ S1gna.l·Battal1on 355 (tu~ Abt 355). This
Battalion operated with local Air Force 5 .
lfith the Reich:
Air Signal Bllttal1ons 356 and 357 ~ere limited
to advance ~arning and tactical operations, the
former deriving its evaluations from "enemy"
signals, the latter from the use of radar and
navigational aids.
Air Signal Battalion 358 was concerned ~1th training.
Air 31gnal Battalion 359 engaged in radar jamm1ng
and operated ln conjunction with the Luftflotte ·
Reich. -- - - - --- • .& -· - - _ ,,, _ --· - --- .... ......._. - ...
- - ·- . .._.._ .._,

10.Starr Offices of the German Air Force Signal

Intelli~ence service a:na: their Functions. --The information
on theescription Of' Ille T'o
~filch follow are derived rrom
Supplement B to War Dia17 J.! , D1 vision l of the Air Foroe
High Command (Anlagenband B zum Krleg-s tagebuch 4 (I. ABT)
vol i.1. 45 bis 15.3.45) 40 ·
40
·Translat1on of this document is knolfn as T-2558.

14
 DOCID: 3560829

It should be emphasized that actual practice did not always

reflect the T/O description of function.
a. 0£f1ce o~ the Chier Si8!!!1l Ofrieer.--The responsibili-
ties of the c'hler-B'Ignal arricer, Gene~al Martini, included
the folloving:
"Regulation and direction of use of men and
equipment in the Air Signals Troopa; direction or
operations and maintenance o!' .a1gnal communicatlona
of the Air Force; direction of use and operations
of Air Sec~ity and Ground Inetallations for the
Radio Navigation, A1.r Reporting (including fladar
and Pighter-Control Service), Signals Intelligence,
Radar Observation and Jamming Ser~!ces ... " The
Chief Signal Officer "is responsible µersonally to
the Reich Minister for Aviation and the Cotil111Snder-
1n-Ch1ef of the Air forces; organizationally and
ope~at1onally to the Chief' or General Starr or the
Air Forces."
b. Chier of Staff,· Of'fiee of the Chief s1~al Officer ... -
the subordinates of the Ch"le~ Signal otrrcer was 'tne
AI!lDng
r· Chief of Staf'f (Chef des Stabbea) Obslt. Morgenstern, 11ho
uas charged with carrying into effect the duties of the Chief
Signal Office~ noted above. The execution of these duties
followed three n~in lines of action:
."(1) Review of Air Signals Troops allocation and employmant •
. ~' (2) Preparation, construction, maintenance, and operation
of all signals communications of the Air Force.
"(3) Operational planning and direction ot the Air
Security, Air Reporting (including radar}, Signal Intelligence,
Radar Observation and Jamming Se:r-vice. 11
c. Divisions of the Office of the Chief' Sign&;l Officer. --
The three duties of tne Ch!er of Starr noted above vere
performed by three diViB!OnB (ubteilungen) or the Ofrice Of
the Chief Sign.al Officer. The organ1zat1onal pattern consisted
in a separation or each division into toUl' or five runotio.nal
groups, eaoh or· ~hieh vs.a in .tern subdivided into sections.
(1) Gen Narue/I.
The first division, commanded by Major Franze, is
described as a "specialist section of the Air Force, vork1Il{i
over the allocations and employment of men and equipment ...
('· and .. therefore to be .iof"oI'med by the 2nd and jrd Divisions
on basic problem~ of allocation~ employment of men and equipment,

15
DOCID: 3560829

of operations, of signal intelligence and of jamraing services. 41

~Phis d1vision 11as organized into .four groups. Group I
directed Troop Allocation and Em~loyment, supervised the General
Signals Service, and published Organizational and Operation.al
Regulation. Group II supervised Radio Navigation and the Air
Security Service . Group III supervised Air Reporting (including
radar~ and the fighter-cont1•ol service. Group IV 1:ras occupied
with 'Navy Liaison, 11 which meant the reviev of signal questions
arising bet~een the Navy and the Air Force and cooperation
between the tvo services in settling such questions. The
specific duties or the various sections into which thes~ grouµs
were divided are set rorth in detail in the War Diary. 2
(2) The second division (Gen Nafue/II) controlled German
Air Force signal colilIDun1cat1ons·and cryptography. The exact
nature o~ the control is no~ known, but it was probably both
operational and administrative. The second division was
headed by Lt. Col. Dr. Schulze, and was divided· ·into four
groups (Gruppen). Group I did control planning for the second
div1s1on. Group II supervised telephone service. Group III
supervised teletype ae:rvice. Group IV supervised communications
and cryptography. By this ls meant that it supervised the
issue of cipher machines, cryptographic systems, and corapiled
and distributed keys. It did not make cryptographic security
studies, ~hich vas the duty of Group IV of the third division.
The War Dlary passage describing the work of Group IV
illustrates the scope or Signal Intelligence activity of Gen
Nafue/Il. Pertinent excerpts from this description are there-
fore orinted below. 43
The areas of signal actlvity over vhich Group IV had
supervision are of interest f'or their diversity. All the
administrative functions are listed in full in the War Diary 44.,
and simply those pertinent are noted belov. The largest of
these sections, with the exception of' the "Special 0.f'.f1ee,"
consisted of only four ~ersons.
a. Section A.
Radio Operations and Cryptography
Direction and surveillance of' all radio air security
operations of the Air Force.
41 T 2558 P 17
42 T 2558
43 T 2558 pp 28-31
44 T 255&

16
DOCID: 3560829

Review of regulations affecting radio and air

security and air reporting operations, and revie~
of Air Force enciphering regulations (the latter
carried out in cooperation l:fith the unite concerned
in the. Supre~e Command Ar~ed Forces, the Army High
Command, and the Navy High Command).
Surveillance o:f tactic.9.l radio o:.oerations and radio
deception measures.
Allocation of cryptographic systems wider control
of the Air Force.
Execution of radio practice and radio test1.iig.
Publishing o:f operational directives ror rad1o-
operations-off1ces, and radio-control-of~ioea or
the Commander-1n-Chie:f of the Air Forces.
(b) Distribution of literature on radio· operations.
Section B.
Revie~ or all operational codes of the Air Force,
includ~ng the setting up of distribution 11sts 1 and
rev1ev orrequ:tsitione necessary for the coordination
of rad.10 operations vithin the Armed Forces {erreoted
in cooperation with the other branches of the Service).
Allocation and employment or flares and other signal )
devices (both ground and airborne} used 1n oonnect1on
with Air Force activities (carried out in cooperation
with the other branches and the Axis powers).
Section C.
Compilation and preparation of secret writing methods
of all t ypes, ln cooperation with the agencies of
other branches,, and cou1pila.tion of operational codes.
Distrlbutlon, shipping, and control or all secret
vr1ting devices and of operatlonal codes.
Distributi on and c ontrol of all ciphe~ machines,
with the exception of the enciphered teletype ·
machine. Carried out in cooperation v1th Air
Signal · Ordnance Department.
Development of nev enciphering procedures.

17
 DOC-ID: 3560829

It should }?e empha:~1zed· that · Section C's function was

purely adminiatratlv~ and that the actual lfork out-
lined above, except ror development or new enciphering
procedures, vas carried out by a "S9ecial Office"
having at least T/o parity vith the other sections.
Section D.
Rev1e~ or operational literature for Air Security
Radio Operations.
· Supervision of the setting up of radio beaoons 1
plane recognition, and the allocation o~ call signs.
(3) Gen Narue/III
The third division vae the Signal Intelligence Service
(Funkaufklaerung) of the orfice Of the Ch1er Signal ort1cer.
As such, its primary runction vas the direction or all the
analytic operations or the servJ.ce, which were c~ried on by
the Sign.al Intelligence Agenc1 or Chi-Stelle (Chltfr~er Stelle,
Oberbefehshaber der Luf"twarreJ. In general, othe~ matters,
p~rt1eularly those of' organ:t~ation, equl;m1ent, secur1 ty, and
personnel of this division were carr~ed on by five different
("'· groups. Group I dlrected the total allocation, employment,
and operations of signal intelligence .and of the ja1JJD1ing
services. Group II supervised the equipment and technical
administration for intercept. Group III supervised equipment
and technical administrat19n for enemy radar monitoring and ·
jamming (funkmessbeobachtungs und Funkstoerd1en~t). Group IV
conducted security studies on German Air Force systems, issued
secUl'ity directives, and assisted in the developmen4 or ne~
systems. Its duties, as described in the ~a~ Diary, 5vere
performed by three sections: ·
(a) "Section A. Control of Cipher Systems and ciphel"
equctpme.nt

Testing or·key1ng-procedures in use in vire and viI"e-

less signal commWlications of the whole Air Force.
(1) for possible decipherment.
(11) ~or fU'eas or use and volume, density,
and d1st~1bution of trarr1c.
(iii) for message form and content.
Requisitions for sampling cheek-up pn German signal
commwrl.cat1ons and evaluation or observations, in
collaboration vith the 2nd Division (1.e., Oen Nafue/II).

'~S T 2558 p 29

18
DOCID: 3560829

DJ.rectl.ve=a foJ'' execut~LOH cf camauflage and radio-

dece:>tion measures in German communications operations
(in coo·1;eration with ·1~he 2nd Divis1o.I\l

Evaluation of dec~_ pherment i·esul ts of German and

enemy intercept services and working out or counter-
measures.
Examination and testing of keying methods of Allied
Pove~s· Air Foree.

Cooperation with agencies or other branches.

(b) "Section B. Development of' Keying Nel;lns and Keying
Methods
Develo·pment of nev keying means and procedures, in
cooperntion ~1th the 2nd Division (Gen Nafue/II).
Working out of directives for special keys according
to demands o:f .the 2nd Division.
Cooperation on tactical-technicnl demands 1n develop-
rnent of keying equipment.
Use of enemy results for own develo?ment.
Cooperation w.i.th ngencies cf other branches.
(c ) '1 Sec ti on C . Keying .Dlrec ti ve s
C":wperat.!.on on publication of Signal Operations
instruct1.oa in 0009era ti an with 2nd Di vision.

Coo:;Jera ti on on publl.ca ti on of' keying d.irec ti ves

for new enc1pherrnents, ln cooperation w.:tth the
2nd Division."
Group V was concernP.d vith Personnel.
(4) General Comments
Both by the Rbove !JSper de$cription and in actual
practice, Group IV (Security) of the Third Divis~on and
Group IV (Cryptography) of the Second Uivision worked in
close liaison. The f?"equent repetition of the phrase "in
cooperation with the 3econd D:i vision," appearing in the
duties of the security section attest to this coordination
.of effort. Minutes of high-level meetings of OKW/Chi shov
the repeated attendance of' both Lt. Col. .Dr. Schulze,. head

19
DOCID: 3560829

of the ::>econd Di vision and or Ca:pta;.n .Port}), head of Group IV

of the Third 1)tvlsion. 46 At these meetings, i t was deterutined
ths. t OKW vol-1< .· ''in close collaboration l:fi th the appropriate
departments or the . . . Air Force" in ueveloping enciphering
systems, but with respect to security, OKW/Chi is resp~nsible
for roak.tng "a security checkn on all Air Force codes. l
It is frequently av(·rred that the "production o:r ker,s .1.s
. the af'ta1r of the separate branches of the Arr1\ed Forces' 4d
and th.at guidance, alone, was furnished by OKW/Chi in devising
keys. Hovever, there a9peara to be ao1ne" dia ~'ute about OKW' s
right to test A1r Force systems. Practicing cryptanalysta of
other services (Fricke and Huettenhain) declared 49 that there
was no coordination of key testing, that each organization
did its ovn and vas under no obligation to submit its systems
to OX\f. Bovever, Gen. Lt. Gil1Wller, Ch.lef of Armed Forces
Communications Branch, at a ·conference in November 1944
stated:
11
0KW/Ch1 is appoi.nted as the only organization of
the Wehrmacht f'or testing and checking a.11 cipher
systet11a used and proposed for uae 1n the I1e1ch. "

In the description of the duties of both the crypto-

~raphic and security groups a .;:r;iear the phrases "radio disguise,"
1
false transmissions, 11 "directives for execution of camoutlage
and radio-deception measures in German comr.1wiications
operations." Friedrich had alvaya furbidden lfireless deeept1on
on the groWld that ''deee·p tion is t1orse than useless and
inevitably betrays lfhat i t is meant to conceal." 50

46 D 57
47 D 57
.PP 7 8
48 ..
D S5
49 I 84
50 I- 13

20
DOCID: 3560829

VOLUME 5

Ch8pter III. The Chi-Stelle

Paragre.:ph
Organization and Development •••••••• o••··•••••••••o•• 11
Section A, Staffing, Allocs.tJ.on and Employment .•••••• 12
Section B" Evalue.tion Hest •••••••••••••••••••••.••••• 13
Section B-5, Allied Ferry and Transport T~a?fio .••• o. 14
Section C, Evaluation South •••.•.•. Q•o•••············ 15
Section D, Evaluation East ••.•.••.•••••••••• , •••••••• 16
Section E, Ceyptanalysis. • • • .. . • • • • . • . • . • • • . • • • • • • • . • • 17
The Radar Cont~ol Poet (Funkleitatand) •••••••••.••••• 18

ll. Q.r.p;.e.n1zation and Developmentv- This Chapter con-

cerns the o~ganizntion Slid oevelopment of the 3ignal Intel~
ligence Agency of the Commander in Chief or the Air Poree
(Chiffrier Stelle, OberbefehleJ:::a.aber der Luftvaffe" abbrevi-
ated Chi-Stelle/OBdL, as of November 1944 Air Force High Com-
ma.nd~ Air Signal Bnttalion 350p Oberk~mmando der Luft~affe~
Luftna.chr1chten Abtellung 350p abbreviated OKL/LN ·AB~ 350
and ra~arrad to throughout this volume aa Chi-Stelle).
The Chi-Stelle of the Air Force uas the most important
of the units under the third Division or the Office of the
Chief Sig:nc.l Off'ioer~ (Gen Nafue/III) from a signe,J~_!n_telli::.
gence point of v1el!' o It U'Qa the highest authox-i_ty _for...the __
Germ.an Air Poree Signal Intelligence Serviceo;;-!ts _functions · f
a.re summarized by one German e.s follotts: "It directed the ,
activities or the llstoning service in ~ccordwice ~1th th~ ! 1
demands of the Germo.n Air Force Operations Staff and ~as re-
. sponaible fo~ the long-teFm evaluation ot ~asults·a.nd report- 1 1

ing to the latter; it alsg prov1ded the meens or collaboration

uith the other serviceso"~1 From its origin in 1937 witil ·
1940 it was loco.ted in Berlln; but right after nthe atQl."t of
the Polish cwnpeignD the Chi-dtelle moved from BeFlin to the
.Marstallp the ridin~ academy of Frederick the Great in Pots-
dam-Wildpnrk. 1 The Na.rste11v became e sort or second name
for the Chi-Stellep si.uce it ~emained there until just.before
the Garman coll~pseo"52 It ~as divided into specialist sec-
tions (Rafer~te)D uhich reflected the geographical. diversity
of its inte?esto. At the time or the collapse the principal
sections ~el"0 ao follo~s: A. Staffing, ~!location and em-
ployment of intercept seta; B. Evaluation West; a5. Evalu-
ation of Alliad t~nnaport and Ferry traffic; C. EVQluat~on
Mediterranee,nz D. Evaluation Ea.at; E. Crypt811Qlysia.

5l!.F 190 No. 40~ p l

52 !F 180 p 5
DOCID : 3560829

The bulk of the evaluation sections acted in close col-

laboration vith the field evalus.tion companies attached to
the Ai~ Signals RagizaentQ and B~ttaliona QD.d ultimately ~ere
co-located t:Tith them, · sine~ "it vas considered more erfective
to have the long-teFlll evalue.tion center cloee to the inter-
cept unit~~~ather than close to the st~fa ~h1ch they hQVe
to reed."~/ For e~v.mpleR &£ter the rall of France (1940),
Ref. B moved from Potsdam-Marstal.1 to Asnieres near Paria,54
Section BS moved in 1943 to Munich/Oberhachinl! (near an in-
tercept station devoted to ferry tra.f~ic),55 56 Section C»
after a long sta7 at central headquarters~ ultimately in
earl' 1945 moved to Premsta.etten to Join the evaluation com-
pany ot Air Signe.la Regiment J52;657 and Section D, directly
after the beginntng of the campaign against Russiaa follo~ed
the Gene~~l Qtaff to Zh1tom1r, then to Warsa~, snd finally to
Cottbus.~ In every instance these sections vere finally
merged vith evaluation companies of the field units, Section
B ~1th _ 25 Co of LN Regt 351, ~hen both vere co-located at

53IF 189 No. 404 p 1; I 109 p 27

541 109 p 27
~Ul~ p"
56a5 appearn to have achieved the statuo ot an independent
section on a parity with B, (See IF 189 404 pl, par~­
graph 1, and Ibid p 2 paragraph 6.) The other sections
of Section B m;re:
Lic1son Officer ~1th Army
Li~iaon Detachment at PW camp
Liaison Officer uith Operations Staff
B Iansdiate Eveluation
B1 RAP Bombr~r Co~Q
52 8th o.s.
Bomber Com&and
B3 Captured Material
B4 Fighter Fonnationa
B6 RAF Coast~l Command
B7 Master Index
BS Combined Army ana Air Force
57 DI 18o P 35
58IF l8o p i4
DOCID : 3560829

Limburg after the Allied breakr..hrough at Avranches;5~ Section

C TT1th the 25 Co or LN Regt 352 at Premstaetten, after ma.ny
delays;6u and Section D with the 25 Co or LN Hegt 353 at Cott-
bus. 0 1
The cryptanalytic Section (Referat E) maintained a cer-
tain a.mount of centrality of operat~o~ with respect to Anglo-
Ame~ican solution, although the various fie:d units were en-
trusted with the solution of lower grade._sys.tems, such as
Bomber Cod.est the Mediterranean U.S. M-209, SYKO etc. 0 2 All
Soviet solution was shi.f ted as far forward as possible because
of the ease ·with 'l:lhich 85~ of the systems uere read, and even
the sub-section or Section E. engaged on Russian Air Force
Cryptanalysis (Section J-.· l)moved v1th the Ea.stern evaluation
section (section D) to the front. Th6§ decentra.11zat1on 1a
criticized in the Air Ministry Report~ as follows: " ••• the
crypto service should have been centralized; the output of a
la~ge centralized crypto service exceeds the sum total ot the
contributions of its individual members and is higher in qual-
ity.'' Hcruever, the operational needs fo'!' speedy solution made
it Dta.ndatory for solution on the ·spot, where and \:l'hen,, it
vaa needed. Moreover, the lack of homogeneity of traffic on
both the Russian and Western fronts made it \:l'ise to de~entral­
ize the cryptanalytic operations.
a. Some opinions of the Chi-Stelle-- The evidence in the
interrogations indicates that all did not run smoothly with-
in the Chi-Stelle. According to the witnessesi1 uho may \:l'ell
have been using the opportunity for their personal gripes as
well as to impart in.formation, there existed '\:11th1n the organi-
zation the fa.m1l1ar conflicts between the incompetence ot
favored officers and the unrecognized ability or progressive
officers aware of the potentialities of signal intelligence.
They indicate further thct al.l the usual s-ymptoms of an
organ1zat1on at odds mth itself' "trere manifest. Few of the
personnel respected the ability of the others, these on the
working level decried the veakness and 1ndeo1s1veneas of the
coll1Dland1ng officers, commanding officers complained because
of the division of responsibility a.nd lov morale continually
hampered operations.
The Chi-Stelle, at Ule Marstall "traa said to have a "m1ni-
ster-1a.164a.spect and a ''relatively extravagant manner or exis-
tence. 11 Al though Lt. Col. S'riedr ich, head of the service,
"1as said to b·? a ~ood replacement for the previous le~ders,
none of \Thom had fully measured up to ~equ1rements, ••05 it
later became clear, at least to Tech Sgt . Jer1ng, a crypt-
analyst of' Chi-Stelle uho had occasion to observe Fr1edr1oh
59r io9 P 27
6olF ·l84 p 53
6lr i21 P i2
621 112
6}IF 189 No. 402 P~
6 4IF 18u p 5
65IF lou .P lSI 23
 -
DOCID: 3560829

a.t work=> that "the choice of &ll orr1cel' vith no signal o:r
intelligence tra1n1.ng as chief of so hi~y apecializea a
service tta.s not exactly a. fortunote one.n In : describing
o.ne o:f the Sections,, he commented upon " ••• the spirit or
· mental prostit~t1on pervacing the lw.lls or the M.-irst&ll
el.nee the bsginn3ng o~ the var, nui'turing a l&itge o~se of
p~vileged indolents lfbo aesiduloualy opposed 8ZJ.Y' change
o~ 1nnovation."b6- Of the owne section Jering observed "the
o~ersll complexion of inefC1c1ency ••• became uorse during the
last tl:fo years of the trill' as duty hoUl's lfeFe lengthened,
rations becama olimaer~ e.nd air raids regulal"ly interfered
v1th the night's i"epose. Polit1cnl sycophantBg the threat
ot being sent to the f'ront, vhich ••• u-ould have beon relished
b~ no ono, nnd the tear or transfer by uay of disc1p11nary
a()tion., all served to suppress and curb_men and ~oman trorking
t~elve hours and more at a stl'&tch •• ~"~1 It shou1d be ob-
served that Jering h1.mse1r may vell have sutte~d the 'bit-
terness ~hich fr~quently grovs 1n a brilliant subordinate
uorking und0r officera leas QOUte than hi.msalf D and that
therefore his rBJ11£1'ka in no sense constitute a reliably ob-
jective account of this aspect of the organization.
The description of. Lt. Col. Friedr~ch•s personality and
e.4m1n1stration vritten by ~ftjor Ferdinand Feichtner, a man
ot outste.nd1ng reputation, is a more objective appreciQtion:
"When the then Major Friedrich of the General Sta.ff
took over oommand of the Chi-Stelle Ob. d. L. after a
··. succession or predecessors as corrupt as they were in-
capable; everyone hl!.d for a time the improaaion that
~t lcat ·the right man lfas 1n the :right pl&ce. By vir-
tue of his close relation ~ith the Lui"t~t\f'fe High Com-
munc •• o the Chi-Stelle became for the til-at ti.me a cen-
t~~l e.nd ~uthor~t~tive ~orge.n.1.sm of oommond~ ovep vhioh
no Lurwaffe A-2 could set himseli" any longer. F:r1ed-
r1ch brought along neu ideas a.nd points of vie~ to aig-
nol intoll~ce operations from hio Qenere.l staff ex-
perience. Be deserves most ot the credit for the close
11Qiaon ~e enjoyed vith the High Commana. Rs gav~ the
ideas end eJtporiences of the apeeiCl.l.ista a hs~lng.,
b~cked them up ffithout conaidering himself and Qccept-
ed and ccted on ·good suggestions that ~el"S ofrered to
him. Unfortunately he failed to contin\llS hia high pro-
mioe. 1. have the feeling that after 1942 the highly
speo1al1zed daps.rtments of the signal intellig1a11ca ser-
vice grew too much foi- him to keep up ~ith, technically
as uell G.\C .from the vielf point of -p ersonnel. Ba often
admitted that tschn.ice.l mo.tteroa lYer& f'undo..mentally in-
compatabila uith his being" and cs a Genall'&l staff Of-
ficer he had no 5.ignQl Corps tre.i.nil\g. But the Vorse
66 u 180 p 34
67IF 180 p 35
68IF 179 Fore~ard
DOCID: 3560829

feature or all ~as that he 'ti'as unable to introduce a.ny

~ational policy into . the Signal Intelligence Service
methods ·of assigning personnel. He never understood
the situation enough to relieve the tension at the be-
ginn1 ng of the l1S.r between the old ci Vil servan·~:s, vho
had been in for yea.rs :i and ho.d become mostly pa~:-asi tic
gx-otn~h~, and the young blo<>d which had just come i.n,p
and had proved itself vorthy~ The old .guard had built
an imp~egnable political atronghold for itself in the
Marstall, and taken care of its ovn by giving them all
the key positions. Another shortcoming ~as his failure
to bring it about that th1s service, becoming ever more
specialized, should be comms.nded by men vho vere f&m.11-
. tar 't:11th these specialities. He was much more likely
to depend on commanders vho kne~ lees of the actual in-
terests or the radio intelligence service than he him-
self g but uho had no idea vhatever of the purpose ~d
mission of the service vh1ch of course they~ themselv~a~
should have been duty-bound to represent and stand up
for. Moreover he filled his staff ~1th his ovn grave-
diggers8 advisers uho did not measure up to the respon-
sibilities they held, either ae people or specialiats 8
but vho nevert11eless knew how to play up to the1r chief,
~hose mind vas alvays on a thousand different things
and uho ~as_rwtdamentally too good.natured.
"A branch or the service .,which included the cream
or German intelligence and vhich called for ·the highest
degree of m~ : ntal sharpness R technical ability, and know~
ledge of th& world and the people in it, should have had
a chief who uas made differently from this professional
soldie~, ffhose horizon and ability never rose above the
level of a good company clerk.
"Friedrich knev himself well enough to turn dm·m
the coDll:'...ruid .of the signal intelligence division which
i:JQS offered to him. His inabilit-y to make · up .his mind
m;i.s at times most paralyzing to the dispatch of' busi-
neDo •••• He al~ays insisted in particular upon clear
thi.n1ing and decision on the p~rt of his subordinates,
'but Hhenever one sent him a teletype for an order, one
~culd come back l:1hich vas as ceutious as the Delphic
oracle, a.nd alvays placed all responsibility on the re-
cipient. 11 b9
The problem of the control of the Chi-Stelle by either
the A-2 or the Chief Signal Officer ~as resolved 'by a four-
sided orge.nizetion: The Chief ~1g.nal Officer 11 Y&B regarded
cc. the supreme authority on all technical signal matters,"
A-2 Hos to provide "guidance of the intelligence activities
of the Chi-Stelle," the ne1:1ly-created Senior Air SlgnalD
Intelligence service Officer (Gen. Klemme) had supreme a<:Unlni-
strative control over tpe Chi-Stelle and the field units, and

69IF 179 PP 53 - 54
DOClD : 3~0~u.s ln-r.e.LLigence ~'='rv·.J..c~ vuJ.~.L .1. uz· i...tl~ .ne1ic1! \.r·JU"--
~--:,1. • ,;_;1~:-.:°t::::',i -~-...~.~ :~:~ '.'~~·!. ;~,:··-· ·~ -·t•·.~-u•·!'";:;.·J-. it!' t_ ·!~ ...aJ.J: ·1;:;.e·~-:·:--.~ -r.~- ~A1 -aY.. ·t l"\4"
- • , -.. ·--- ----·w
to the defense of the Reich.
b. Relations ~1th A-2 and the ~h1ef S1S!,!al Offieer:--
As seen in Chspter I the question 0 .1.; vhetherthe signal Intel-
ligence Service should be ou'bord1nst.ed to t~e O:f.f1ee the gr
Ch1e.f Signal Officer or to the A-2 C'asoften debated. 7
The -~ advantage of s·ubordin1.~t1on to the Chief Signal
Office~ vas 'the increased fac111t~ uith vh1ch signal com-
munication could be provided and re..\ lio· equipment allocated."
The excellence or the communicatio.t1 systemJI t:rhich existed to
the ve!'y end 1 was undoubtedly the ~ ··3sult or this signal con-
trol. On the other hand, the clo:.e 11a.1son betlieen signal
. intelligence EUld signal security, l-'hich the Chief Signal Qf..
f icer' a control vas also supposed t ~ produce"' "failed of reali- ·
2.a.tion_, since in spite of the accur.ite lmo\iledge of Allied
m1ste.lces in the field or radio and cry:ptogrc~hic procedureJI
as revealed by the work or Signals .lntellige1\ce Service"' de-
linquencies or the same nature were ~ither not corrected at
all, or only partially ao, by th0 C)(!r:'D\QnB. There ~as an ap-
parent ls.ck of' a quslir!ed expert Vh•l might have evaluated
the results of the Signals Intel:Lige1.\ce ~.ervice vith the end
in view of 1?DJ,2ioving the security or Luftvatre radio com-
munications • .,-,
The chief &:rgument in faVO)' or uubordinJJ.tion or the Chi-
Stelle to A-2 i1s.s that all intc·lligenoe agenaies vould then
be under a central adm!nist1•a.t·1ve control. J\ctually, hovever_,
subordination to the Signal Off iaer rather ttan to the A-2,
proved no bar to effective -i:roI>L, and relation-r.hipe betlfeen
the real specialist personnel ,,f the Chi-Stelle and ~he higher
intelligence authority vhich t.\ey served vere 1.1ood. 7 In the
Chi-Stelle' s 't!ork vi th A-2 the :c"amiliar ditfiC~llty wa.s at
ti:rst encounte?>ed that A-2., on t.he one handJI d.\d notalvays
recognize the v~lue of' signal 1:.1 telligance; an<t.o on the other,
that Chi-Stelle• s reports vere ~ r:ritten in Sigru.1 Intelligence
terms, c£1.ll signs,, f"requenc~les, otc., vith A-2 being left to
orav its own conclusions. In t:lue however; "tl:n evaluators
learned to transform signal int<'='Lligence into an operational
intelligence picture. ''1::J Once t.1e evaluators 'H'ore "imbued
with tactical concepts"' they so;'Jetimes tUl'Iled t1:i the other
extreme, wishing to pez-form the ,.\-2 fUnction thr::mselves, and
arbitrarily mixing signQl i.ntell\gsace with J.ntell!ge.nce from
other souttces ~ • • Only 1n the cou~1 se of time '\las the happy_
med1wn found. 11 The appointment of lt liaison officer did not
c•'.re the dilenmw...11 since, according ·.-,o "Wont"' 1~ young man trBs
chosen "vell indoctrinated vith dr11~1• regulations, but pos-
sessing very little signal 1ntellige;1~e expe111ence. unror-
tuna.tely he became no more a.dept wit~ l time, ~1£>\d but slight
tactical knowledge," a.nd, in bl'ief, d j_t1 more l!B.:rm than good.
Although the specialist personnel of \.he Chi~Stelle became
immediately avare o~ his deficiencies, neve~nneless more than
a yeal'" elapsed before a change took p la.ce • .,.,

1ou 183 P 1a
71Lt. Martin Ludwig of. Ohi··Stelle in li\' 183 l>.P 78 - 79
72IF 183 p 80
731F 183 p 80
74T.F 183 ~ 81 26
 DOCID: 3560829

r" .
c. Relations with the Flelo units:-- The creation 1n
the Fall of 19ij.4 of the post .of Senior "signal Intelligence
Officer (Hoeherer Kommandeur der Funkaul'klaerung abbreviated
Roehr Keir d Funkaufklrg) was 1ntendea to centralize the ao-
m1nistrat1on of the affairs of the Chi-Stelle and the field
units. Th1s centralization continuoo the '.'obscure relation-
.,
' ships" at the h1gheat headquarters and was the antlthesls of
what the Cleld units required.
The centralization of administrative control "or the
Signals Intelligence Service ••• 1n the hands of one Qf the
,.. ,.,-: .
ma.ny supernumerary Luftvaffe Signal Corps generala"7~ ms.de
the aamln1atrat1ve problem of the field units more acute than
ever.. "In this case, also, the Chi.:.stelle .t"a1led co.mpletel;y;
since it had planned and supervised all Signals Intelligence
Service operations from the beginning, it ~ght ~g~tly have
been the contral e.dm1.n-1:.strative authority also.u-r . The dif-
ricult situation confronting the Field units ~&s eased by
the cooperation of the local Air Forces. The local comman-
ders of ·a~~se often furnished quarters, rations and other
services when the field units own supply servioe broke covn. 77
,,
"'.>
Th3 various Sections of the Chi-Stelle exercised control
of the Field units according to their location, ult1mate'l'Y
~orking on the spot with these units. The organization and
functioning of these sections will be treated belo~ in the
.following paragraphs of this chapter.
d.. Relations with the- Z}\F mid FAF:-· As the strength
o'f Allied air ra.1ds InoreaseCi, ·tactical evaluation assumed
an over greater importance, and it became necessacy to e·s-
t'a.blish a.n agency trh1ch would oummarize a.nd integrete a.111
·the reports o.nd information made available by the outlying
tactical evaluation centers. · This need was met by the crea-
tion of the Air Raid Warning Agency for the Reich {Zentraler
Gefechtstand fur Funksuswertung, abbreviated ZAF) Treuen- '
brietzen. This unit, headed. by Colonel Fo:rster, vas under
· the operational direction of the Chi-Stelle but admin1stra-
t1 vely subordinate directly to Gen Nafue/lII. In ol"der to
facilitate ~oo~dinat1on between the all .1mportallt ZAF and the
other agenciea affected by the 1."lformation it d1asam1.nateo
a nev position vas created, · and designated Chief of the Air.
Ra1d . Wo.rn1.ng Service for Germany (Funkauf'klaerungstuehrer
Re1oh, abbreviated FAF) Col. r'oI>ster, hsad of the ZAF, filled
this position also. ·tn this capac~ty he vas st111 under the
Chi-Stelle for operational purposes, and aot~d aa e..dviser to
the CommQlloing General of ·Fighte~ Cof"Ps I.7~

75rF iao P 22
76IF 180 p 22
77I 130 ·p 4
78IF 181 p 62
DOCID : 3 560829

r i .

12.Section A-- Start

This Seetio~ ~ c was c ose1y connecte ~ h he o ce of
the commanding officer, aas d1v1ded into the follo~ing sub-
seotione: Operational Planning (pl.D.nning f'or m~'nit9ring
operations an all fronts, p:r»epai-ation of Tables of Orga.n1-
zat1on and equipment and allocation of personnel to Signal
Intelligence units); Personnel (routine pe~sonD.el matters
ror entire Signal Intelligence); War Diary {a ~!ting of de-
tailed diary of the Signal Intelligence activities); Pro-
curement (procurement of all special signal equipment for the
Signal Intelligence Se~vice)( &YJd Research (examination and
0

repair of captured equipment J • "f':J

13. .S ection B~-Evaluat1on West--SO Section B vas one
o~ the best operation&! evaiua.t1on sections of the Cbt-s-t.elle.
Able personnel and intelligent a.dministratio~ permitteq 1t
to make significant contributions to German Air Po~ce intel-
ligence. Before the outbreak or the ~ar~ Section B ~as able
to provide a comprehensive picture of RAP orgQ.J112ation, 1oca-
tions, strengths, ai~craft t,-pea, pe~Gonnel axid supply. 81
Ite move to the Western front a.t'ter the conquest of Prance
served to intensjj'y its activities.
The atarr of Section B consisted initially of civil ser-
vice personnel vho hac performed the same type of ~ork 1n.
peace-time. A large number of soldie~s--moatly university
men, or business men versed in languages--vere transferred
to the section. As the civilians wel'e dr&rted, despite their
strenuous objections {since they usually :received low ranks),
distinctions betYeen civilian and soldier tended to diaappear.
The soldiers became acquainted vith their vork and in many
casea obtained better results th&n the civ111anso
The vise policies of limiting personnel changes, train-
ing .i n signal intelligence and cutting dolfll milita;r:v duties
~o an absolute m1nimum promoted enthusiastic vork.H2
' .

79IF lBO p 8
80Th1s account is virtually a vord~for-vord repetition of the
materials on Section B . · · . iee: TICOM, I 109 pp 26 - 33,
1

the Ai~ Minist:ry Report, IF 189, Wo 4o4 and Volume V. of the

Seabourne Repo~t, IF 180 pp 27 - 32
8lIF 18o p 9 .
82Th1a vas in sharp distinction to almost every other unit
of German Air Force Sigrml Intell.1.genca 80~v1ce. ·~ ....
DOCID: 3560829

At the end or 1942 some of the male clerks and etat~s­

tic1ans' vere replaced by vomen 's auxiliaries (the Luftnach ..
tr1chten Helfer1nnen}. The concensus is that althoUSh "these
female auxiliaries were better than the soldiers, in vork as
assistants, on the other hand, attempts to employ vomen on
independent wo~k 1n e~4luat1on 1 apart from a rev exceptions
vere not successf'"ul."~~
a. Organization-- "There were tvo diametrically opposed
theories on the subject of the organization of the evaluat~on
section. The first claimeo that organization should be made
to cont'orm to the sources bei~ covered; 1.e. W/T evaluation,
R/T activity evaluation, and D/F activity evaluation, and
that all results should be dombined 1n a 1"1.na.l evaluation." 84
This plan, which vas not adopted for the Sections of the Ch1.-
S tel leca was actually U"Seci 1n the evaluation col!Jjilanies iu the
field. 0 5
"The second theory, vhioh vas proved superior for long-.
term evaluation in the West (and also 1.n the South), ravol'ed
an organization covering the setup of the enemy air force
formations, 1.e. RAF Bomber Command, VIIIth U.5. Bomber Com-
mand~ AEAF. eto." Accordingly. Section B consisted of the
f oll01·11ng sub- seotions:

B-1----Immediate Evaluation~ Reception, Distribution,

and routing of messages.
B-2----RAF Command, Strategic Evaluation
Bombe~
.
B-22---US. 8th-Bomber Command; Strategic Evaluation
B-~----C&ptui-ed equ1pment, material an.a navigational
evaluation
B-4--~-Fighter Formations {RAF a.nd 8th A.F. Fighter
Commands, AEAP Fighters and Night Fighters). Th.18
unit vas engaged 1n a&e
evaluation Of Tactical Air
Force radio trarr1c. ·
B-5----0rigina.lly USAAF outside Europe, and later ferry
and transport tra.f'fic. {Thie sub-section became in-
dependent at the end or 1943, and is discussed belov as
a separate Section).
631 109 p 27; IF 189 No 404 p 2
84IP 189 No 404 p·2
85The organization of the evaluation co~anies of the 1st,
2nd and 3rd Batt&lions or L1f Regt 353 on the Russian :front
provides a good illustration of this type of organization.
It ia described later in this volume.
SGIF 180 p 28
29
DOCID: 3560829

B-6----RAF Coastal Command, Strategic evaluation.

B-7----Master Index of Units a.nd Locations.
B-8----Combined Army and Air Force. Traf'fic of the Air
Support Parties and the tentacles; the 2nd Tactical Air
Force, the U.S. 9th A.F., RAF ACC.
In addition a liaison detachment vas stationed at the
Air Prisoner of War Transit Cs.mp (Durchgangslager Luf~abbre-
v1ated Dulag) at Oberursel. ·
Relations ~ere also maintained betveen the heQd of Sec-
tion B e.nd·a liaison officer of Army Signal Intelligence
Regiment 5 (KONA 5) and a liaison officer o~ German Air Fo~ce
Operations Starr I c (Intelligence).
b. g_pera.tions-- The chlef ta.ske of" Section B were the
evaluation of "enemy" transmissions. control of intercept'°
and evaluation of captured material, equ.J.pment and naviga-
tional aids.
(1) Evaluation: Section B, in Tulfilling its task of
providing a long~term e~aluation for the Weet>ha.d to collate,
evaluatE!!a.nd check the results o~ the intercept units in the
West a.no North. These units were in the West, Signal Intel-
ligraace Regiment West (later LN Regt 351) and LN Abt. 357
after its v1thdraval from LW Regt 351; and in the North, 3rd
Battalion of LN Regt 5 (later LN Abt 355).
Section D based its evaluation judgments partly on the
worked-out results of the Evaluation end Intercept companies
and partly on ·l.he ortginal operators' logs (day reports) 13
especially for R/T traffic.
The principr .J.- me. terials s. t 1 ts disposal were:
1. The daily radio situation ~eports of the in-
11

tercept or evaluation companies. vhich ~ere mostly sent

in by telet-ype, but sometimes also by radio or by co1::..•ier.
2. The detailed composite reports of the inter ...
11

cept companies (appearing monthly), or the previously

evaluated reports produced monthly by the Evaluation
Conq>s.n.1es.
"3. Somet1mes,, especially for R/T evaluation,, the
original intercepts or the operatora (day reports).
"4. Other sources of in.formation: P/w's state-
ment~ captured mo.te~ial, press and wireless (especially
BBC)· etc. These sou~oes served to supplement or elu-
cidate the section's ovn findings. Great care lfas .trucen
tp see that n,o Sigint 1nfo~tion lf&S mixed 1n lfith thia.
I~ recourse ~as ha.d to other sources~ these had to be
named. "~7 · ' ·· ·
DOCID : 3 560829 .

The following description of function appea~a:

''With the division or labor la.1•gely clarified I the spe-

cialie ts of section B had only to keep up to date and to
clear up 1n cooperation v1th the Dulag and the relevant in-
te:rcept unit any changes which occurred.
'Ir there appeared any new fields (e.g. appearance of
the USAAF 1n Great Br1tt:\in, :::et ting up of 2nd TAF etc.) it
waa the task of Section ·B to encourage its advancement by
using the best evaluators and to keep giving encouragement
to the s1g1nt un1ta.
''In this connection, it proved advantageous not to ha.ve
the personnel subordinated to LN. Regt West and thus to Luft-
flotte 3. In this way it was possible to announce all findings,
and also to raise s.ny necessary complaints, v1thout regard for
rank or appointment. On the other hand much duplication or
wot•k was caused by this peculiar position or Section Bii and
for this reason many people held the v1ev, personnel of Sec-
tion B included, that the best solution would be to 1ncor-
~orate the Section 1n the Regiltlental evaluation section
(25/351). Quite a satisfactory solution of these questions
was reached by their being later brought togethe~ in the same
area at Llllburg • 11 (:S8 .
(2) Control of" intercept ~ '' One of' the moat important
functions of Section B was the control of listening activi-
ties. It vaa the Signal Intelligence Agency's practice fo~
Evaluation to assign missions, and th.is was true of all the
echelons of command. At the lover levels, the Evaluation
Companies assigned missions to the intercept stations~ The
various Rere:rate, in turn, controlled the intercept 1.n their
respective sectors. In such case "the necessary instructions
were not issued directly by the Referat to the Comps.nia~ bvt
via. the higher format1on 11 for example 11 LN Regt West." '-3
~ Such supervision vas necessary since all the intercept
stations tried to cover the frequencies vlllch produced the
greatest number of messages and therefore 0Tfered 11 at least
superficially, the opportunity to produce the best results.
Section B had t .o see that not only the most productive
frequencies but all frequencies important for obtaining a
complete picture vere monitored. In some instances pressure
had to be put on intercept companies to keep them monitoring
the many ground netvorks of the RAF and the USAAF because
these fz-equencies vere not productive of the sort of im-
mediate action intelligence vhich it pleased the companies
to pass to the flying units. None ~he leas :monitoring of
these networks vas demanded because they clearl~ sho~ed the
order _of" battle.

88 1 109 p 29
891 109 p 30
31 .
DOCID: 3560829

When a neu line ·or traffic appeared, the intercept units

orten t:ried to keep to thei:r ~ccustomeo monitor~ program
and to pa.ss of.f nelr tasks to other intercept uni ts. In theao
casea Section ·B alvaya he.d tC> control intel'ception according
to the exigencies of the s~tuat1on and orten do the evaluation
itself at first, e.nd then pass it on to the evaiua.tion oom-.
ps.ny.
As will be seen 1n a later chapter the {Jerman theory of
signal intelligence·, vhich f.laced the prime emphasis. on evalu-
ation of" "'1.ll enezay signals 1 and theret'ore imposed the exer-
cise of intercept cont~ol 1n the evaluation sections, re6ult-
ed in difficulties fo~ the oryptana.lysts.
(3) Evaluation of ca~tured material., equipment and navi-·
gational aids· (3ect1on B-3r.
All the sub-sections of Section B, with the exception·o~
B~3., vere engaged in long term evaluation~ s~3 vas organizec
to evaluate captured documents and material, including navi-
gational aids, obtained fr-.am a1rcra.:ft s~ot dovna The in-
c~eaeed Allied aircraft losses up to the period of the de-
clihe of the German air defense produced more and more of
this captured material for signal intelligence.
The :following were the ma.in tasks or B-2:
"a. Clal'ification of Allied navigational aids through
the evaluation of captured documents e.nC equipment;
"b. Directing the monitoring of the radar intercept.
stations;
"o. Instruction · of the intercept stations of the
Signal Intelligence Service regarding !nt'ormation ob-
tained from captu~ed documents (frequencies, call-signs,
codes, etc.);
"d. Examination of captured radio and navigational,
equipment, and informing si~al intelligence units of the
:results or this examination. ~0
11
·
Acoord1nglyp this sub~aection WQs especia.lly interested
1n the followi.D.g seQret and confidential documents and apparatus:

"l. X- or Q- group lists.

"2. Call-sign lists (R/T and W/T).
"3. Frequency lists (chiefly wfr}.
"4 Bomber codes. ·
"s:
Airfield lists giving exact dQ.ta on station
call-signs and frequencies, position ot airfields., radio-
beacona, etc. (especially frequently found 1n aircr~t
of VIII Bomber Command shot dovn)_
"6. Note-books l1'1th important entries.
11
7. Lists of' radio-beacons and other navig'1.t1onal
a.ids.

90IF 181 p 46
 DOCIO: 3560829

11
8. Deeer!pti0J1s of apparatuses.
"9. Maps.
"lo. Radio and nav1gs.t1onal sets.
"11. Crystals fr-om VHF-sets. 11 91
Aa it came in, capt·~eu
l'.:l'..terial vaa far1:7arded by those
eal vagi.ng 1 t to Duls.g Obe~· ;.1fi'- · ·
If aircrs.f t vere shot down
near Signal Intelligence o~f1cee or stations, the officers
and officials of the Signal Intelligence Service had the
right to e.xam.1.ne those things that interested them. In the
Fall or 1944, this sub-section ~as ~1thdravn - from Section
8 and subordinated to the Radar Control Post (Funkle1tsland)
st Fotadam-Eiche.92 ·
Tlle evaluation of captured documents relating to navi-
gational aids, and the examination of equipment such as air-
borne search receivers, recognition C!ev:l.ces and the naviga-
tional aidsilll.1.S intended to suggest nev proeedUl'es, de.te1•m1ne
whether ~ navigatione.1 aid ~ould be useful to the Oorme.ii Air
Force flying un.itsJ and vhe»her. the Allies lfere using Germ.an.
transnd.tters as aav1gat1onal aids. Because these nav1gat1onnl
devices ~ere continually monitored by the Germans, intense
intereat vas displayed in any or them that became available
from Clll.pture.9' The results or research into these navigational
('· a!da ~ere published approximately each month in the Navigation
Reports and passed to all interested units.

91 IF 183 p ·.30
9·2 IF 183 p 30
93'I'he following pieces ot equ!pme~t were listed: Group Radio
Beacons» "Splasher" beacons (cover name "orcheateraessel");
J-Beams (cover-name "Rodelbahn"), the locations. treque.nc1ea.
and recognition signals of vhich were all learned f"rom cap-
tured documents; Ciroular Beacons (including "SE" be&eona,
airfield beacons "Eureka." beacons,, etc.); Hypex-bole Navi-
gation: ·(G-:Box); "Boomerang" procedure; "GH" ~rocedure (cov~r
name "Disk:us"); Micro-H Systems (cover name Schleu<1erball );
H2S" or "Magic Box 11 (British airborne search rooe.r; 11 cover
nwne "Rotterdam", latett "La.ubfrosch", 2 cm. band); H2X 11
("Mickey", American s.irborne search radar; covett name "Meddo"D
":"S cm. band); !FF (airborne recognition devicesr c~ver name .
11
Flamme"); ASV a.ppa?atue (cover name 11Eule ) ; Weapon" (night
fighter set\rch radar; cover name "Grille 0 ) ; night fighter
varning devices ("Monica"), and Infra-red recognition· devices.

,:
DOCID: 3560829

Anothe~ task of B-3, in collaboration vith salvage de-

tachments, especially those of the Luf'tga.ueJvas to provide
for the investigation or captured radio sets and 017~tale.
Through many personal contacts vith B-3~ the salvage detach-
ments vere conv.iliced or the importance of their vork and co-
operated vhole-heai~tedly with the Signal Intelligence. Af'ter
every investigation o~ a shot-dolm. Allied aircraft, the sal-
vage units telet~ed the most signifioant resu1ts to the Sig-
nal Intelligence Service.
Thie tJPe of report led to the following pesults:
"l. Comparison vith existing documents, to see if
R/T traffic from the approaching or shot-do"mi aircraft
had been picked up. If possible the squadron number
vs.a established f'rom the call-signs. Comparison v1th
squ&dron r&eog.n1t1on m£!.rk1ngs .
"2. I f the fi-equency-range o-e the ;formation 1n
question vas knotni,p the gaps 1n that range oould be r111 ..
ed in. An 2ccurete knowledge of all frequency ranges is
most important to long-term intelligence for setting up
chains of subordination.
"3 . Whenever questions 'tfere raised, Dulsg Luft vaa
in.rormed, all briefing being passed via the Re~er&t B
liaison detachment at·Dulag to tbe interrogating officers
at Oberursel." ·
(4) Lia.1.son 'tfith PV Transit Ca.mp (Dulag Luft) . The
Liaison Detachment ot Sect1o.n B at the PW Tl'ansit CQ.mp (Dul&\g
Luft) at Obe:rursel vas responsible for providing close coopera-
tion betveen Signal Intelligence service a.nd PW interrogation.
PW interrog&tion resulted .1n v~luable inf'ormation, partieul.Q.r-
ly upon the numerical designation of wdts, detatla concern.ing
enemy equipment, and the changes 1n ememy tactics.~4 It a.lso
expedited the .evalue.tion of all -captured material. dealing
uitb radio. Important findings such as nev call-signs or t:re-
quencies were immediately reported by direct telephone line
to Section 8. The operations are described by Lt. Martin
Ludvig 1n his article on liaison betveen Du.lag Luft and Sig-
nals Intelligence Service95 as follovs:
"Sign.a.ls Intelligence Service derived great bene-
fits from the evaluation of captured materie.1. All docu-
ments salvaged from Allied aircraft "l:lhich had been shot
do"1n. 1 crashed, or ma.de emergency landings~ ~ere ~assed
on directly to Dulag Lut't by the salvaging unit (usually
an air base headquarters}. As · long as commuilications
vithin Qermany remained relatively 1m1mpa1red (until the
fall of 1944) 1 captured :material reached Dulag com-
paratively quickly. There it we.a assorted according to
94rF 183 - p 84
95IF 183 pp 87 88
I
;4
.
 DOCID: 3560829

topic, and all documents perta1n1ng to radio or radio

navigation plaeed immediately at the di.sposa.1 of the
Sign.a.ls Intelligence Service Liaison team. Thi.s team
had on hand all lists o~ frequenc1e~. eall·signa, Q-
groupsD etc.~ and determined whether the captured docu-
ments containe~ any neu inte111g~nceD suah as the oall-
signs and frequancy or a nevly occupied airfield. Any
such new discoveries vere immediately telephoiwd to Re-
ter•at B. L&tel", the origin&ls of all captured documents
'trere sent to Referat B for detailed examination. 11
o. ijeports.-- The most important units to which 5ect1on
B had to report lTere:
1 Gernian Ail' Force, Operations Starr Intelligence
2 Chief Signal Officer, Army High Command .
; Naval High Command
4 Army liigh Coamzand
s· Local Air Force
6 Chi-Stelle Section C (for information of listening
units in the south).
(7) Interrogation Centre (Oberursel).
!n many eases (the Commande~ in Chief West, Looal Air
Force Command) and the evaluation unit of Signal Intelligence
Regiment 5 at st. Germain received reports from Section B.
The ~olloving reports ~ere issued by Section B:
· Immediate reports (teletype OP telephone) for im-
portant nev tacts, Intention.a to attae'.k·.' , changes ot
lQcation, etc.
Radio Situation Reports, daily conBolidated survey
of the events of tlie precedliig 24 hours.
10-Day R~~orts. concise reports on the long~term
1nteli18ence o the last ten days.
Monthly Consolidated Reports~_ detailed repo~tl!i.th
mnps and dio.grQIDs, us\liilly ~ to oo typed pages in length.
Special reports, e.g. iArmy-A1r Co-operation'~
'Control of British NightF1gh.ters'~ etc.
A chart· or these routings shovs the many headquB.l"tera
serviced by the Section. (Cha.rt 5-2)
14. Section B- -- Allied Fer and Trans ort Tra.ffic--96
~1thin Section B
.. . . In 19 1 a section ~as established . to
monitor America. This ·in turnP wo.s divided into t"e"o sub- ,..
sections. One analyzed traffic vhich 'e'QB concerned "e"1th the
96The text for the d1scu~s1ons on Section B-5 is taken, vith-
out chwlge, from Tech Sergeant Jering•e discussion of the Chi-
r'· Stelle contained 1n volume 5 of the Seabourne Report - IF 18o
pp 32 - 34
971F 180 pp 32 - 34
1 I

35 ..
DOCID: 3560829
k.1.:m;y ..u.1U. iUi. val 1.11~ !" u1•c..:;e~ vi t.i.1..::.: Jr.:.1 i..~G. ;;:, i.a t~ s -w;hicli. \ie1•e
then being built u~ hastily. This traf'fic was monitored in-
sofar aa it could be heard by Signals IntelliGence Service
stations in Ga:rrnnny J France, and Norway. 1£his sub-section·
reached its peak at the tUl'n of the ~enr 1~42-1~43, when the
fundamentally changed war situation aictated·a mora con3er-
vative ~se of radio raceivers. The second sub-section worked
on ferry service traffic on the North Atlantic route at first
in connection with Atlantic reconnaissance tr~fflc (Coastal
ComDl.13.nd). The South Atlantic route, as vell as Pan-American
Airways traffic in South America, was taken care of until
1942 by Section C. When the coverage or tra.rrtc rrom the
United States ~roper vas reducedJ the afore-mentioned· sub- -
section of Section B took over ~he monitoring of this South
Atlantic commitment from Section C.
The Ame:rican ferry service increased in imlJortanae, and
in the Middle oi' 1~43 this 11 Amerlca.n 11 s~ct1on was taken away
from Section B. Rein:f'orced with certain a;>ecialist personnel
from Section C it was installed in I1unich/Oberha.ching as a
separate Section (BS), in which the analysis of all ferry
traffic ~as now combined. At the same time the large w/T
intercept platoon located in Oberhaching, vh1ch administra.-· ·
tively belonged to the Marstall battalion, took over the
monitoring of all ferry traffic "With the exception of that·
on the North Aclantic ~cutes, whiah as previously, continued
t0 be covered by the 16th Company or LNR 3 in Angers. The
new Section evaluat.~ci all traffic and had the following re-
s,t.ionsib111t1es:
''a) The monitoring of the United States ,lJro_perJ which
although it only touched the surface, still furnished an in-
sigh~ into the ~rinc1pal networks of the Army and Naval Air
Forces, into training activity, air transport, defense zones,
and the activation of nev combat aviation units.
"b) The monitoring of the Atlantic ferry service. The
Middle and C~ntral Atlantic routes were monitored by the W/T
platoon in Oberhaching and by Luf twa.ffe Signals Intelligence
Service outsta.tions in Spain, which operated under the cover
name of ".Purchasing Agencies"; the North Atlantic route was
monitored by the 16th Co., LNR 3 and reports furnished to the
Sec~1on.
"c) The monitoring of the American Air Trans,1.)ort Com-
mand by the platoon in Oberhaching.
"d) The monitoring or the RAF Transport Connnand, and
of both Amertcan and RAF troop carrier commands. The greater
part o.f this interception was also done in Oberha.ching. ''
Airfield radio tower tra.f"fic (R/T on 644u kcs.) was in-
tercepted in Madrid, Montpellier and at various Signals Intel-
ligence Service out-stations in the Balkans and Itnly. This
traffic was evaluated by Section B5, with the aid.of exten-
1 sive .files.
The Section also had a small cryptanalytic tea.m of its
own, which deciphered intercepted messages on the s~ot. ·
Section B5 remained operational until the last weeks of
the var, and vas thus in a position to cover the British air-
borne landing at Docholt. One week before the capture of
Munich.by the Americans its male personnel withdrev to the
Alps, while 1ts women auxiliaries were discharged.

j6
DOCID : 3560829

15. Seot1on C -- Evaluation South-- Section C has· been

described a.a the lea.st capable of all the specialist units of.
u1e Chi-Stelle. Its connnitment.11 the evaluation of Mediterranean
traffic, ~as largely handled by the Air Signe.is Regiment in the
south (LN Regt 352). Jer1ng, apparently a chronically sour critic,
observes of 8ection C. "During its entire career Section C pro-
duced not one special report; this in spite or the fact ~he,t
ao~ivity in the South p~ovided fertile material for such appreci-
ations •••• The members of the Section buried themselves 1n the
details of a highly specialized daily routine ~1thout anyone in
the Marsta.ll becoming much acquainted ~1th the real problems facing
the Signals Intelligence Servi ce battalions in the South ••• In
general, as clumsiness, distrust, and dodging of responsibility
characterized the Chi-Stelle Command, so they ma.rked , the les.der-
sh1P of Section C. In order to keep its surplus or personnel
occupied, ridiculous and unnecessary tasks, involving a labyrinth
of pa.par '1ork, vez-e invented. As a resultl> all reeling ror 1 · ·
straight-ro~ardness and oonscient1ousness vas lost. The majority
of members of the Seetionp in spite or years or servioe in the
Chi-Stelle, had never even seen a Signe.ls Intelligence Service
out-station. This reluctance to fave realities naturall~ geakened
the influence of the Section. In consequence its opinion in organi-
zational matters carried but little weight, and ror. the most part ·
it vas limited to special problems of evaluation."~ 8
a. Orga.nizatio~--99 Section C, similarly to Section B, was ·
organized into sections vhich corresponded to Allied units or .
activities (MAT.AF, 15th USAAF and 205 Group RAP, long range recon- ·
naissance, radar reporting networks, transport and fer~y service,
and airfield radio tover traffic). In addition, t~o other sections
one devoted to press reports and prisoner of var intelligence, and
the other to po1nt-to-po1nt net~orks, were especially successful.
The t~o sections, in close cooperation with theother sections
dealing with air-to-ground tra.f'fic, and making use of all collater
1ntelligenceg oollaborated·1n. producing and maintaining a detailed
organizational picture of MAAF ~hich the Luftvaffe A-2 used to
include in his monthly reports.
The f'ollowing "sub-sections" ware attached to Section C:
(l) Turkey
T~ee men revised and edited the material. intercepted and
evaluated by W-Leit Southeast, and prepared weekly and qua.rter-
annual reports for the A-2.
(2) Sveden and Free France
Even the air toroes of these countries ~ere monitored in
sketchr. torm bj several out-stations and they pl'ovided the "raison ·.
d'etre' of several. evaluators. Here also, reports ~ere prepared ·
for the A-2, sometimes monthly, sometimes less frequently. Arte~
the German vithdra~e.l from France this section vas united uith
Section B.

98IF 180 pp 34, 35, 36

9gquoted from IF 180 pp 35-37

37
 DOCID: 3560829
(J) ~eotion C :2_ '.L'h1e 1\Juo-Section 11 vas created in
1942, and vas engaged in prepa.l'ing a text-book on the radio
&nd navigatiollk'IJ. procedures of the British, Ame~ice.n and
.Russian Air Forc0a. This opus was given ~~de distribution
and all the lc.rge:F Signals Intelligence Ser'Vice units eere-
given copies for the ed1~1cat1on ot Signals Intelligence
Service personnel. Current supplements loopt the uork up
to date. In the middle or 1944 the pl'Oject use abandoned
and the pe~sonnel transferred to Signals Ir,telligence Se~­
v1ce out-stations.
b. -OJ;!erationn-- Each mol'lling the teletypad materio.1
uhich had coma in during the night from the tvo Signals
Intelligence 5arv1ce battalions 1n Italy and the Ballro.us 0
from the company in Montpell1er, the Sign.ala Intelligence
Service stations 1.n Spain; and later from· the ZAF,, as uell
&a from those out-stations which vera authorized direct
commu.nica.t1on ~1th the Section, ~aa aaso~ted by the Chier
of the Seotion and d1atr1buted to the appropriate sub-sec-
tions. Assembling and checking these reports lrith b'.ny data
of their 0t:n1 0 tha sub-sections, ill the couras or the fore-
noon"' prepared the daily report of' the 8ect1onb Aftar baing
edited by tho e~e.J.uation oKfioer1 it fonnad the baaiD for
the daily sitWltion conference at 'f:lbich a.l.1 controversial
pointa t:re:ire diocu:aeedo It was then mimeographed and arqun.d
noon lfS.S ready for distr.ibution. One eop7 ~tlQ aent bf COU1'-
1Gr to thG Genel'al Staff, the others \i'e:re mailed to the r:;i-
c1p1ents. ·
The afternoon as a rule vas devoted to the atudy of
incoming reports and a l"eviel:T ot the log aheets sent in. from
the units 1n the f'1eld6 maps vere prepared~ and preliminii'.ry
work done on the month1y report, the distribution or which
corresponded ill princi.ple to that of section B0 a reports.
Correspondence u~th the regiments and ba.tteJ.ionij ~&G to\ken
care or; comments from the GE>neral Staff were studied Wld
those relevant ~ere passed on to the field units conoernedo
16. SeotJ.on D -- Ev&lua.tion East--100 In.peace-tima
this Dection ev~luatGd trittlc Intercepted fl'Om Russia~
Czechoalovald.a., Poland and the Balkan States. alld kept the ..
General Sta.tr briefed on air activi.ty in th~sa countrieo
through current reports. After the subjugation ot these
smaller countries, it concentrated entirely on the Soviet
Union vhi.ch had been conside~d of prime importQllce from the
beg1nn1ng. <Ming to the dU.ferent structure ot tha SignalD
Intelligence Service in the Ea.st# the fro~th G.nd development
of this Oection varied eaaant1ally from tha.t of Bect~on B
nnd c. Whereas in the 'tfest and South ceypts.nalysis bad to
be abandoned to a. certain extent., and the .malll a~ia from
the beginning of the var lra.a on tra.tfic a.nalyGiG and R/T eval-
uation, in the East the majority ot enciphet-ed ~ssages cou1d
be read., uhich placed Signals Intelligence service vork on
this Front in a. quite ditterent aspect. A further tunda.-
m3ntal distinction ~as that in the West the eneJUJ emerg~d

.-- lOOquoted from iF 180 pp 13 - 16

38
DOCID: 3560829

prsctically each lilOllth ~ith a ne~ QJld revolutiOJla17 radio

or rade.r techniqueJI vhile the f'oUl' years' struggle in the
Ea.st brought relatively f"&H" technical illnovt1t101uJ 0
To this
ue.o Q.dded ths fact thQt during the course ott t.he·'ti'a.r aaoh
of the Russian air ~es developed its otJn.partieular ra·
dio procadureD the i.Udividual evaluation or ~hich~ of neces-
sity JI had to be left to the Signals Intell.igenc·e Service
battalions located on the va~1ous sectors of the Front vhich
~ere apecialiste o1l. this subject. .
Thus Section D 11 more than any other Section~;. had to
limit itsel.£ to a compil.atory career, It began itG activity
in the Marsta.ll,, in the lfWce or German advwices Qt the be-
g1 rtn1ng or the campaign in the Ea.st (end of ·l.9"41) it move~ ...
to Biederaee in EaEt Prusaiaa From hel'e, in v1ev of the .·
large-scale operations planned on the southern· sector for
the spring or 1942, it £ollo~ed the General Sta.tr to Zhito-
mir, 'H'he:re it re~ed until May"' 194,.. The Ruseian advance
caused its retreat to Wars!H.1 ~bereg at the begim11.ng of'
!944 it sat up a Meld~kop.f' ~hich '1&s incorporG.tea into
tha Signals Intelligence Service detenaa system of the ZAF 0
(Central Air Raid Warnixlg Unit). When~ 8.f"tar the bresk-
through at Minsk, the Rusaia.ne bega.n to threaten tf9.rSa'ffp
it moved again to Cottbua; south of Bel911n. There, tot<.Tard
the ond ot 1944~ it ~as me~ged ~1th the :regimental eva.l.1W.-
tion company ot Signals Intelligence ServicG Regiment 0 Eaot~
~hioh ~as formed at about that time,
a. Or~zation QJJ.d ~rations-- onl.y dv.ring th~ first
t~o yaara ~the l:f&r did section aend its ds.i1y a.n.4 ro~~
nightly reports _dil"Octly to the General Sta.f.f. At thia end
of 1942 a Signals Intel.ligance 58?-'11ce l.ia.iaon team vaa eG-
tsblished in the or.rice of the A-2 to deal nth signal in..
tell.igence origin£l.ting 1n the East. The reports ot Sect~on
D ~e~ almost unintelligible to a non-specialist, since
they were crammed ~1.th teohnical <hita Wld terminology; hence
thGY '!:rare edited and reur1tten by this liaison team., Cffling
to the uncomplic~ted aspect of the '!:rork~ the Section com·
prised only a te~ highly qualifi~d men; 1n all there Hare
only ten members. A rather le.rge cryptanalysis platoon ·
vas attached to the section. At its height the platoon con-
s ;.ated of about ninety menj but its i.q>ortanae dvindlad
app:reciably in the la.at yBa.rs ot the ue.r. The raaaon for
this "Uas that Russian ccyptographic &ystems bacwne ever
more 1.ndividua.l in cha.r.a.cter, and centl"'a.l treatment of them
vaa round to be impractical~
Thel"e vaa also attached to the Section a large inter-
cept platoon vhich monitored the point-to-point netuorks
of the Russian 1'0ar defense zones. A Signals Intallige~ce
5en1ce company 1n Rzaszov, later ?fwn&lau, oent material
interc~pted to the Section by teletype; ~t ~as dec~phe~ad
by the c~yptan.alyais platoon and the intelligence thel'ein
incorporo.ted into the daily :report. The second main. aourca

lOl,~Repo~t~ Center" P further d~~~ribad 1n Chapter IV

DOCID: 3560829

•
of material for these reparte vere teletyped summa~ies from
the ~hree S18Ilals Intelligence ~ervice battalions in the r.:e.at.
From lY43 on, H/T traffic from Hussian tactical aviation units
increas~~ in signtficance, even being important to f lnal evalu-
ation. ,·During the latter yea.ra of the var it vas particular-
ly important on the northern aecto:r \.1here good land-line com-
1nun1ca.t1on limited the use of W/T.
''MeldekoiJf Warsaw" consisted or a teem of a.bout ten men.
~ince Russian lon~-range bombers were active only a~ nigh.ti
its personnel, radio operatora and evaluators alike, vas only
occupied during the evening hours. If trarr1c vaa intercept-
ed on any of the lcnown bomber frequenc1ee- 1 t vas rej,)orted im- -,
:nediately to the ~AF as a.n early warning. Neither the radio I
dlsci~line nor navigational ab1llty or the Rus~ian bomber crews
was comparable to that of Allied crews in the West. Therefore,
as a ~ule, the Meldeko~f was able to report to the ZAF and to
other appropriate headquartersJ the exact strength, composi-
tion, and probabl~ target of en enemy bomber formation__ This
information vas usually determined, at the lat~~t, ~hile the
Hussian bombers were crossing the front l1nes.1U2
· l7. Section E. -- Cry~tanaltsis-- The cryptana.lyttc Sec-
L1on (Section J) was forme with n
the Chi-Stelle arter the
creatton of the German Air Force Signal Intelltgenoe Service
in 19..38. At the out.break of the war there were only 11:> to 18
c!'ypta.na.lysts. Fifty nevly tnducted enlisted man without the
remotest training in cryptanalysis were then assi~ed to Sec-
tion E by the Chief Signal orf1cer. The ~ection expanded
oont1nuously, and towa.rd the end of lS.42 reached its. !Jeak ~ . "- -·
strength or approximately 400 men." 'I'he Bubsequent release .
&f vhystcally-fit men to combat units and their replacement -l
by vomen auxil1ar1es 11 cau3ed cry}>tanalysis to su:rfer many a. _ •
set-bacit. "l0} Nevertheless, it 1s claimed that "even in Janua~Y: ~
1~45 the Section could boast of having__broken.35,UUU messages ..
1n tqe West and 15, OOU 1n the Ea.st .•• Trl 04 ..
a. Organization-- Section ~ was divided into tvo main 1

uni ts: E-1, _vhich worked on Ea.stern systems 1 particularly

Russia; and E·2 and E~3, which vorked on Western systems, par- 1 1
.ttcularly British and American. Sub-section E-6 ~as engaged :.J
in IBM work.
1
The decentral1za.t1on of oryptanalytic vork, d·i scusaed· 1
aboval05 was occasioned by the necessity of placing low-grade - ~
solution as .far front as possible and tbe failure of the . Air .· -, ~ '.
Force cryptanalysts to solve such high grade systems as · :'
SIGABA or the Russian one-time pads. · l t is stated that ''nev

102
IF 180 pp 13 - 16
l03IF 180 p 17
, l0 4 IF 180 17p
105chapter II
40
DOCID: 3560829
dirr1~ul t cry;:.itanalytic _problems "Wore .first explored by St-Jc- ·
tion .E in tne Marsta.11. La ter U' the deciphering procedure 1,
Vas established in detail, a team o.f crypta.nalysts familiar 1
'With the system, was sent to that Signals Intelligence Ser- .,
vice battalion or com~any where the greatest amount or traf- r
I'la in Chat ~artlcular systen was being inte~ce~ted. Thus,
eventually the personnel o.f ~ectton E vas scattered all over 1~
Europe . 11 Cryptana.lys1a ,..is discussed in more detail in Chap- :\
ter V of this volULie.luo

18. Funkleitstand)-- 'Ihe Ra-

dnr 1ntercep con ro yost un e tstan , a though an 1n-
dependen~ unit originally under the aontrol or the Hudar Ser-
vice, fina1ly was placed under the undivided jurisdicl;.:i..on of
Gen Nafu~ III. In pract~oe, "it was a Section for radar in-
t.arce!}t ••.1.0'( and a tyk'e of C.hi ... gtelle for ro.dar evaluation.
The inter-relations betveen the Funkleitstand, Section B-}
(navigational uid evaluation), and the Cen~ral Command Post
for Air-Raid Warning (ZAF) are dirficult to aseertsin. It
has b~en stated that ''the vhole manner in which the radar
interce~t ~roblem was treated is indicative a~ the confusion J
bw.1~t1ousness and lack of coordination which ~reva1led in
all nigher b.aa,dquarters in Germ3.ny durlng the last two years
of the "Wa.r. 11 lU8
Friedrich gtated that from ~ure trafric analysis or
British radar service, the German radar monitoring service
·was enabled to ascertain or to establish:
"l. The mode of operation of ground sets. In cooper-
ation with the listenin~ service, it vas possible to
aacerta1n the areas in which interception by (or of)
the enemy was not ~ossible.
"2. Clarification of nnviga.tional aids to the extent
tha.t the English control sys telJls became known ( e.dvanee
warning).
3. Data ror our wn jamming s~rvice and technical.
11

hints ror our own development of' similar sets.

"4. Carrying out of' route-"trncking of formations in .
the air; in most cases from take-orf until landlng."luy
The German Air Force Signals Intellisence service early
realized the potentialities or radar interce~t evaluation
and created radar 1nterce~t centers (Funkbefehlsstaende) at
"the individual f'ield Signals Intelligence Service battalions,
which "vere intended to per.form locally the same function~
as the Ra.da.r Control Center (Funkle1 cstn.nd) a. t .t'otsda.m. n..LJ.U

l061F iao P 17
l071F l8u .P 3~
lv8IF l8u ~~ 4o, 41
HJ~! 70 :..>.t> 6 .• '(
llOIF l~O p 40
DOCID: 3560829

In 1~44 the radar 1ntercevt centers were incorporated into

the evaluation companlas of theiP respective Signals Intel-
ligence Service battalions, and radar interce~t flash me~s­
ages vere sent directly to the reporting centers (MeldekBpre),'
vnich were agencies collating all types of signal 1ntelli·
gence data rela.t1ng to impending air-raids.

42
 ------------.
DOCID : 356082 9

() Voluw£ 5
Cha..!,Jt~r II/ .. Organization and Operation of the Field Units
Section A. Ope1•ations in the West

Pars.graph
()1•ganiza·i;:!..or1 of Fie:t.d Uni ts ln the West.. • • • • • • •.• • . • • • • • • 19
1ntercep-l; J;ii.3sion:J o'!; Field. Uni ts in tb.e West. • • • • • • • • . • 20
~):~ ~tril:nt:i.on of He:oorts by F i.eld Unite in the West. • • • • • 21
Signal Comnn.u11C!lt1·:>r1 o.f Field Uni ts .Ln the West ••..•.••• 22 •
Stx·R teg.!.e E·,,-aluat.t ::m by F:leld Uni ts in the West.. .. . . • . . . 23
Tact.tca.1 Evalur-1t.ion JY F ..i.eld Uni ts in the West •.••• • •.•. 24

19. Or·gan:tzat.f.cm o·f Field Uni ts in ·the 'W est-·- The .final
German AiF"'?Orc~-~::i:gn.a! Inte11Tgence--Serv1c(~uni t in the West,
Air Sie:nal neg:1.meat 351, w:as the result of' foi!:.~..,Y..filU'L£f
C£!lt1r:_!:!,g.l'r ".g;.e.:;.~a.t~§..i~§.t. B.r...ile~.(~ -~(hP.-c.event~a~~Jy, the .
Westei-i:1. A:l.l:l.e;\. T::.y th€' time the. Nove1abe::a."' -r9'4"....,x-e(-;l"ganization
fc>c1k pJ.aee, its a.ct:tv;i.t..i.es had beco111e raB.inly cent.ered upon
the ta.~tioa.l evaluat.lou ()f Allied bor.1bing operations. As
n l"'esult cf thi:~ el!.rphasi s, tl!'O ';ind.eponrl.ent" battalion~,.
A:ir Siena+s Battf!:i.:!.c•n 356 (concerned with radar intercept ::.n
n· the iki:i.chJ ~.nci ./\.ir ~>.!.gnals Battalion 357 (concerned v:L th
in te!'cept '3!.!.fl e·"aJ.us t:!.on of Allie a. boml:ier c onnnwii ca ti on.s)
WtJre crganJ.z(~d. 11
t c some degree, these two bat ta.lions were
cr~~at.ed fr..:>m units W'h:'u~h had been part •):f.' Air Signals Reg~.ment
Wea"!:. from "Whtch Air• Slgnals Regiment 351 had been earlier
ierived.
Air Sign.aJ.s i~egiment 351°, also de:!'ived origir..ally fro111
A:i..:-.~ 3:~gi1s.J.~ J.1·:>3irne11t West, was organ!zed into th.re,e battalions
eai::h of 1·:hich had four to f'1 ve companies. The first battalion
(I/L.'11& R'!'.:'gt 351) con.talned the regi1;1ento.l .Evaluation qompany
{25th Co IJl R<:)gt 351}, the cor.nr.un.ications company (20th Co
Ree;t 351) and tlf~ otr+E?r servlce ccmpa.nies, the tactical
!'econne 1. ~ sa:\lce eompa:.1y { 1 Co Re gt 351) and the s~gne.l re .: >air
cor.ipany (2nd Cc Hogt 351). The second battalion {II/l.Jl Regt
35J.) h~d a ill!F {vel'Y high frAquency, Le. ntdio telephone)
ints:rt:ept .'3.11d D/F company (7th Co Regt j5l). \;hich operatt:1d
asainst the Tacti.eal .Air Force Jt.,ighter Cotm118.nd; two HF {high
.::'l•equcnffy, :l. e., usual Morse channel3) in-.;ercept cor:1µ~.nies
(3th aud. 9th Gos, I\13gt 351). lfhich ope rat.eel a.ga~.n:::it th.-:• French
Al :r Fo1·~~e and the 1st u. s. Ta.cticnl Air· Fo:rce; and a re.dar
1.n-tereept cot1pany (lOt.h Co> ·negt 351). j.
I
I

. 'I1hc thiru bat talion (III/I~ neg t .)51) had three HF

inte1•cept. 'Wmpan:i.es (12th, 15th, and 15th Cos Regt j5l) which
'
operat.ed l"'·~s:;:;ect~.vely aga:tn3t Allied ·t.ransport uni ts,·
~,~r.:tiaal Aix• Force and naval aJ.r raid varning serv:tce; a VHF
(Ve1"y High fi'1•cquency} R/11 1~tercept ~ompany (1·4th Co Regt 351},
vhtch ope.rated again.st t.he Tactlcal A:i..r Force Fighter Comwand;
and a rad.nT' :i..n!~erce )t com9any (lGth Co Hegt. 3~)1}.

43
DOCID: 3560829

2li. Intercept Missions of Field. U~U.ts-"*

Intercept
sions ~rnpe a~rnlgnea in the West by Section B of the Slgnal ·
mis-~ .
Intelligence Agency, which ma~e the assignments to the Regiment ' ~
(L!~ RE-:~t ?5~) or to the eval~ffion company (originally w-Leit, ~JI .
later ?.5tn LiC. LN Ragt 351). Section B also directed search r.
cov~r :i. inr.luding tho employment of the aearch receivers and I 11
the 10.entification of new traffic. 1 12 Search missions were ;;
a.lloc:.;.t:~d by e.ssign.ing specific portions of the frequency spec-- ~ :
t rum l.o dl~fa:;i~nt sets. An ope:ra.tcP with records of known ·
a.nd identH'ied traffic could detel:'mine immediately whether l'
t.1"aff j_c he in tcrcepted was known. New traff le also appeared
direc t ly en or near frequencies ~egula.rly eoveredl:q the inter-
cept comsJanies. t'f'hether picked up on search, or on i'ixed assign-
reents 1 the newl:l discovered traffic was re-examined by the
evo.lt:.n.tlon soct:Lons, identif'ied, where possible, . and put on fur-
the r cover, vhere unidentified. Further monitoring d18closed
Yhe th0r 1 t w~s practice or bona fide · ta~tical traff"ic. J.J.;i

21 . _pl~~!lE}-ltion of' Reports b;r Field Units in the West--

ail possible lQVels: at the inter-
Evalu;:;, t:.i on wa3 poI·f'or:mea at
cept stations b~r intercept platoons; at tlle battalions and
regim ent by evslut>.tion companies; e.nd finally, at the Chi-Stelle
l~vel i)y S1.:: ction B, which worked 'Wi~h the field units. The
lnter c;;!_tJt compo.nies issued daily radio situo.tion reports, which
·were ~:.:·an ~mi tted to interested headquarte:£>s (including Section B)
E<ithc:i:' bJ teletype , radio, or cou:£>ier. Eve!"y month a detailed
compe>3itc r>eport was made by the 1ntercept co~tnies, and a.n
~valt1.at1on r e1.> ort by the Evaluation companies.
nccoroing to Jar1ng,
"Ec ch SIS station and SIS contpany unalyzed its allotted
Iilater~_al ·..i i th much flourish .•• Two reports vent daily to
the \.-1-Le itstelle (the regimente.l evaluation unit) and to
the pe::i.~tinent Refera.t. The daily logs were sent by courier
to the W-Leitstelle and to the Referat concerned, and there
exarJin~d and evaluated. In spite of this duplication of
work, the individual companies ware alloved to operate
indepe?;dently, their indepandence varying wit~5he ability
of th0 c~mpany connna.nder and the evaluators."
lllIF 181 28p
112IF 18) p 60
ll3IF ·1 83 P 01
114r 109
ll5IF 181: p 26

44
DOCID: 3560829

The rle 1 rel,_1)n1e11t ·.Jf tact~cal evaluation resulted in

the I"Otrs:Lng of re:)~;. rts ~irectly from the :i..ntercept stations
and the i.11·~cr~e:;t com~)an::_es to t.he operational headqua!'ters
concerner.l. ll6 Thi:.> dnily a.nd monthly reports were then
cU.vid.ed intu ';tact1cal and tecl:mical sections. The tactical
~nclude(.1. a •:ie ncript.L.-m o f enemy a:i.r activity frorn the Signal
In tell·\ g~nce rJo.int o~ view,. while the techn5-cal part was a
ay3t~mat~c comp~ lation and identiffcation of all interce pted
tr·affic. "llT
The d5.strib·lttion of a typical report glves sorae clue to
the recip~.ents of ·th'= intelligence produced in the West. For
i.n::-1ta.nce, f:·. l"e port wade by Evaluation Company 14/LN I1ep;t 3,
dated 23 A::;:t'il 19.!;.4, discussing "Ar:1erican Fighter and Fighter-
!3omber ii'o:r1nat:!..ons :i.n England, 11 covering the ile;i;iod from d-ld
Apl1 ll has e:: cov0:P sh.eet reading as follows: lld
',(
· ''!'
11
D.~ s tT·i bu ti on

II F .. ~ t en.L.n.g R gv,
·'- l
I / fr·
_'."·'I\ l.JJ..S ~ neS t • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • •
Lr

I/{Evaluation Co) GAF Listening Rgt. West .......•..... 5

cjr'\
:1 1
-w···1k""""--f
La . ..,r..u:J ~- .... n-"''
.';=: ..'> Co • ) " 11
" • •••••••••• •. 2
01 ) ln t f:roep.,J.,
, , I I - -lo- J 0
n vc -) II II II
.•••••••••••• l
8/ ~ II •I ) rt It II • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
9 /1( •: 1r ) n t1 ,, • " • • • • • • • • • • • 2
LJ.~ t~v:t.5. !;z I,~.n~ son Of~~0er, Luftflotte 3, le for
attn Lt. neser ............ l
· II 11 II
JK.II for atten Oblt .
z. rJieden. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 1
" " Jd. 4 for> atten
Feld. Roeckerath .•.•.••... 1
II
" Jd. 5 for- atten
Lt. Schw..:.etzk~ ....•......• l
II ti
Jafue 4 for atten
Lt. Roschger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l
II II
" Jafue 5 f or atten
,, Obl t Gruendl. . • . • . . . . . . . . . 1
" " Jafue Brittany for
at ten Feldv. Z :f.et11er. • • . • • • 1
l~/(Fvnluation Co .) GAF Listening Rgt 3
(3 cop:;.. es fur VHF Platoon (mobile)) ................ 7
Cc ~j:r t'o1• i.n.for!;Ja ti on to Main Crypt. Office,
c~ ;\f' Se c ,. B . . . . . . . . , . . . .. . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 25"

116
IF 181 p 35
117 IF 1a1 p 34
113 DF 10 pp 1 2

r 45
 DOCID: 3560829

In the !.:i ;ml stages of the Signal Intelligence

o ;:i~rntJ.0:·.1 :Lr· the West, when tactical evaluat.:.on was all
im9ortn!1-~; , :•.><:om· -~ s were ro'..lted by the various intercev..t and
t:'valuati on ·~umpa.n:le~".J to the Rep;)rt.:..ng Centers (Meldekoy.>fe).
These centers were the collating ~gencies for tactical
5.nt,~lli_set!ce ooncern'!.ng air ralds, and functioned as instruments
af' lia :;_ ~:Oil h-~tween f',lgnal Intelligence. Service and the Combat
UP.its. ('l'l1ey a1•e described more fully in Paragraph G, of
t°iT~_ s c11~;;1te1·. ) The · uni ts l ) f the lJ'.j Be gt 351 routed thei.r
Pe ports t-~ He r.iorti11g Center 2 _. the co1r.~anies o:f LN Abt 357
(Bo:~ber I11tel"'cer.1t) routed ~he;. rs t0 He::iortint; Center 1, and
thE- c01:.-'.)an::..es of L!'! .1\bt )?v (Hadar Interce~:it) i'ed li'.eport!.ng
Center 3. In tuT'n the He )O rt.::_ng Centers broadcast their
evalua V.on nnd •.rn1•n.:LuQ sur.mmr:.!.cs to the c~~ntral Air na.~d
War.;-;::.ng Un::. t (the ~~AF} and to va .i.'i ou.s Ar-my, Navy, end A.:lr
Fm·ce 0 ;)e:i:-·a tional Co1m11and~,

22. -~-_i~"l!l1 Co~'lr:1unications _9f P.leld Units in the ~est-­

In the Li:;.-:idlP. or I91J.O the ...rire channeJ. system was in gener.:tl
as follows~ 'Teler.:hone or teletype llnes connected each Signal
IntE:lligence Sl·I'v.ice company and stati on w:l. th the Regimental
Evalua.tiori Comp~ny (W-Leit), and in turn linked the latter
unit w.J_ th the -ner=tin.ent Chi-Stelle Section, the local Air
!t..,01~c e (LuftflQ:t,-t.€) headquarter-s _ . e.nd t.he neighboring evaluation
companie-s . TeJ.2phone or telety:pe lines also connected the
Signal Intt:ll.:.gc.::lce companies arid the Regimental Evaluation
CorJprtnlE ::; •:':i. th t 11e German Alr Force exchanges. The var~.ous
Slgrtal Intelligence comI>anies and stations were linked to
e.s ~h otl'~;:::r an(\ 'f:·:J their outstations a11d D/F 1 s by telephone. 119
/\ s Ge.'-"many' s position dete1~:torated the cor:m1unica tJ.0:1s
~ystem~~ W<}:i' e enJ l;i:t:"ged to accm-;'lmoda te the ever increasing flow
oi' int el l:i. ~o:' nce. In general, the cor.rr.mnica t.j'_ons channels
be tvreen :i_r~.t e:e ce·pt sta ti:.:m, D/F' stat~on,, Evalun ti on Company,
Ch i--Ste1J.e .3cction, and A.Lr Force operational cor.mlBnds under-
~!(mt c ·Y· 1 t:~!rnous ex)ansion. "The whole construction of the
cor.-1r:iun.i.cu t:i.ons network was fou.'lded on the ::->r:.i.nci;.>le of passing
on ! nt er ~e p te d trafric as quickly as possible. A delay or
r.:ore than tv.o minutes could not be tolerated.'' 120 Major
Fel"'dinand Feichtner 1 e report J.esi:r:!..1:><3s the expans:i..on of wire
corcnmn~~ ca t i. ons in the m:J..ddle of 19'~2 as follows:

In a c.h E t,:7.011 tu the lndi vi dual telety~e l~Lnes

w5.. -;:.:~ the corn~).i:tn:i.es, several telephone lines were
av ~.t llable, rnost of them running from the sw:t tch-
boards of the evaluation cornpan.~ es to the i nterce pt
compa.n5.cs. Likewl se there were one or tvo lines
to the SIS lia~son officers as headquarters ....
(and) var:i.ous direct 11ne3 :fron the com::Janies to
tht=.! SIS-liaison officers, the 1Jurpose of' which was:"
(' 119
IF J.81 P!' 27 28
120 IF ldl _o, '44
.. 46
 DOCID: 3560829

to s.chie ve a minimum or delay .... ·This considerable

expa.rwion made necessary the building of large
tel~phone . centrals:
11
Lrnhange Pira.te 11 -------I<1eldekopf 1 of the 1st Battalion
11
Exchenge Br·eukvater"---Radar Intercept Center West of
the 2nd Battalion .
Fxchnnge "Clairvoya.nt"--Evaluation Company of the jrd
Battalion, and also the
regi111ental exchange
The :regime.n.tal exchn.nge r1nally comprised 5-7 FD 16 1 a ·
{ swi tchhoa:r-ds} tri th about 150 trunk lines and 250- 300
local drops. ,
In addition to the normal tele9hone centrals, in . the case
of the Bth Cm.1pa.ny and the 5th Company; D/F control
communicat~ons had to be installed. The regimental
teletype central had 6-8 lines to the Luftwaffe exchanges,
:i.n addition to lines to the companies and s·r s-11a1aon
off .i.c€PS. There were three tele-~. ype-cipher machines ror
to p secret messages; o.nd 8-10 fOI' secret connt1unications.
Altogethe ri about 500-700 teletype messages were handled
daily, II 12
'The cont.i.nuec\ ex~ansion o:r the Signal Intelligence
Ser.v:i. ce and .i_ ts or~_ en ta tlon in the direction of preserving;
the ne .Lch ~<>rorn ail" raids led to the rormation of a Signal '
IntP-lligence Ba ttali.on attached to the German Horne Defense
Air Fo:rce. Thls, plus the assignment of Signal Intelligence
lia.:i.son office:i.~s to the components of Fighter Wing (Jagdkorps)
I "1~iade numerous circuits necessary, both vi th.1.n Germany,
and from Germany to the occupied territories. These wire
requJ.r-etuents increased when the ·ZAF obtained an additional
vi re s~rsterr;. 11
I 22
I-1ajo.r.' Feichtner describes an interesting practice made
n.ecessa1'y by the intensified operations:
11
The extensive construction of D/F and radar
in.tere.spt stations, both in Germany proper and in
occup:Led te::::'r5. tori es, made i t impossible for each
of the Regiment's ·176 out-stations and the 60 out-
stati·ons o!' the SIS-battalion ReJch to have its
own dl:r•ect lines. For this reason the "Dante," or
oper2tional connection vas introduced for the SIS.
Upon use or the code-word "Dante" any conversation
taking place over n9rmal Lu.ftwaffe circuits would
be termine.ted ~nd the line use.d .for · :£J~·. ssing tectical
reoorts for the <.lurat:.:..0n of an air rai.d or other
engageme.nt.1 2 3
121 IF 181 p r 44 45

0 12 ~~
.Llf' 101 p '::A
123
IF 131 p ~)5

47
DdCID : 3560829
I ..

.A3 fo1• Ra.c11o Comm~nica.tions., Major Feichtner reports aa

:rolJ.OllS: • , ' . . .
•
11
Xn the begi.iin~ of 1944 radio stations.were set
ap. by the regiment at out-stations; comm~d-poste· and i
com9a.111es. J~aeh company had: ·I
a) A D/F Control network, or a ~adio link with
its out-stations; · .
b) . A radio link vi th its batt.a.J.1on;
c} A radio link with the pertinent Meldekopf.
The Melde~8pfe were included, either in -the DiF aon-
trol netvorks, · or 1n the radio links between oompa.n1es and
9ut-ste.tions.· In this way 1t was provided that, 1n ease
of' line trouble, a.ll 'tactical reports would reach the Mel~
deko!;f as quicJ~ly as possible, and :r~om there woul~ be · ·
broadca~t as · signal intelligence flash ~ep~rts to.interested
hea.dq.u a.rters. Th.e code used b-y the Mel.d.ekopf for.a these
flash ~epcrts consisted of e code book of 1000 me~.nings.
These encoded .messages were -reaiphered with the app~opriate
-clyhel:' table a.nd ~ant out on both long wave and short • .
\iave ~~- 5-~igu~s groups. The cipber systems of M~~~eldlpr
2 were l13ld by· the · Army a.a f~ dotr&'l d.;a d1v1·:.:Jion. 1
0

. 23. St.;! "s.t.e gic ~v~u.s.tion bz.11~~.ft Units J.n the 1/e·s;--
In the denc~ iptlon or actu8l op~~ationn {~ is frequeil~~y dlf-
ficul t ta db1t:.r.1igi.1~-sh clearly bet1.;- cen stl'&teg1c . and .tactical •
.evalua.t,1011 1 G...:i some overlapping va.s 1nevita.'b1e;. lio;re·<l'el', the
. ~vo types or evaluation ma.y be dif'ferent1ated in terms o~ their
objaotives. The objectives of strategic evaluation for ttie . _
Air Foree Signal In~elligenae were to establisli the order _of ·
bat·t le to~ the opposing Air Forces, ·to determine the orde:zt of.
.battle and intant;!ons of the Ct~ound Forces as revealed through
~ ir Fo.t 'ce CO!lJmunice.tions, and. to predict lopg-range intentions
01.. the opposing P.ir Forces~ ·
Each of .tibese objectives was most carefully pursued, but
the success '1!a~ Ulost remw.~kable 1n the .e stablishment. ot the
• Allied Air c.l'cler of ba.'?tle. Through their tho1'ou8h. and highly .
skilled traffic ane.lysts, the 0-ermans obtained a oont1nuous and
highly e.ccura.te picture ot the .strength and disposition .of ·
the ' Allied Air Forces in Britain, ·1n ·the Mediterranean., the
Near Ea st, -and later, on the Continent. · Frequently, the re~
constl'uot1.0D rre.s precise to the most minu:te detail, and call·
a.igns, rrequ.anciea o.nd networks were· 1~ the vast major:tty of
oases abeolutely accurate.
·.
•
'.
J;>OCID: 3560829
. -
A great ~.t~;tcunt of' rt1.ate!"illl is available in the TICOI~
1.nte:rJ-ogaticn.s and in the Seabourne I~eport (esµeclally
Volume VII) documented by cha1•ts and diagl'a111s shoving th~
re cons tzauoted o:r.•der o~ ba:ttle ·of' the. IMF and the USAAF.
Exatll!)les of 1~hese a.re aru1exed 'td show the meticulously · -
careful vork of 'the traffic analysts: (Charts 5-3, 5-4, 5-5,
5-6) ' . .
The e.stabl1sh111ent of the Ground Forces -..:.I'c!er of' b!lttle
thJ>ough analysis of' Allied air traffic was of co\ll'se ·more
d1f.f1cul t. In the r/est, Ail'" Fo.!'ce t:raf'fic' ordinarily did
not reveal the ~round force 01•ganizat1on. However, a.fter
the Invasion, when the Alr Force was acting in direct
·support of g.?1ound ::>f.1erat1ons; much 1n:rormat1on was disclosed
o 1" v!i l ue Le; t.he Garmans • .
As for t~e pred:l.ction of long-range 1nt~nt1ons of the
opposing fl:ll" Forces, ..i.ndicationa of coming. events were
freqf1ently derived f:r-om strategic evaluation. The exte11t ..
to wh.ieh Gerr.!an /\ir Po.r·ce Signal Intelligence was able to
· foreca~~t the DJ.eppe raid, and the ;Invasion etc., has already
b.een nc;t.c~d & t tentlon in the first cha-p~er of this volUtne.
The degroe t.o vhich 1nfol:'tDat1on V"ital to the defense of
the Heioh was olJto.ined thro~ the Signal I11telligence
activities .i.n the West is illustrated by the .follow111g pn~sage
r1~om' an n/r lle9ort dated 4 A9r11 1944 or:tglnated by the :)th ,
( "Fun..i<empfang ") Company, .;rd Battalion of W'lreless I
Interec~1t Hegt West (later LN Regt 351): _
11
0perat.ic>:-is on the part of the US. '\AF
. agalnst
Reich te~rito~y, and operat1o~s against· Western
occupied t~:rr1 tory-. dUl'ing -e'he period under review,.
· tfe1'e picked. up again as from the .first ap1Jearance
of f'ly:!.ng activity· over . England.
"I!y thorough observation or, for the r11ost part'
very st:rong·fighter protect.ion, the d.irect!on or
the ~ttack may be ascertained, in spite o.f the
dec~ptivf~ cou:t"se. tak~n by tl:te waves of bombers.

"~~he change in call s.igns et'rected by the U~AF

at the beginnlng o~ the month undet- review did not
. lnterfere with intelligence, and even within a few
days it was 9ossible to brLng documents here·cor.i-
pletely U:)- t~-tl&te.
. .
The D/F base line was again particularly ef'.feetive.
11

By endeav9r.ing- to follow all three bOlliber divisions

ve:riy closely, it was possible, ;l.n addition to incursion
~nto Re:tch territory, likewise to D/F the div~rsionary
attacks against the occupied ·territory at the same time.
It we.sJ thel'efore, again _possible t.o place the :tnt"or-
mation available here at the disposal or the tactically
important positions for the air defence Of the neich,
un to thl'ee hours before the enemy formations crossed ·
the coast of the Continent." 125 ·

.125 DF 11 p lJ'
t 49
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DOCID: 3560-829
l '

, .
..

24.
Te.eties.l Evaluation b
Tc.etics.l c·va.luat on vas ar more ortant en stra e c 1n
the oparbtions in the Vest: · The prima.ry pu.rposD o~ tactical
·eya.lua.tion waa to provide a prompt and etf'ioient service warn-
irig of Allled air-raid 1nours1ons. The operational. necessities
of scch a ~ervice, d~ded alert interception of' Bll possible
signal msnlfe~t3t1ons (signals, re.dar, beecons. noises and
a1l,eucea, :tnter slia ) , prour9t and reliable ev&lwiti.on, and \ .
·iieJledia.te Cltsaem1nat1on of' the intelligence "-'rived to the" opera-
tional unite and the derense org&nizat1ons ooneerned..
. The n:.a!s or svaUab1e data regarding the organization and
' opar.atiOI:.s Of this service and the results 1 t aoh1eved· allows
the outstan~ing success ot this undertaking. If Germa.n.7 was
not able to counteract the attacks it was not the rault ot
sign~l intelligence whieh gave the warn~s. So efficient was
the o::,Jer~tion that it von the attention of the very highe!~
CHlmm&-nde, u.nd Goeza:2:ng was proud. of tlle listening service. 6

l.?GThe Garme.ns tell a atory., probably. apocryphal but neve~tliel~ss·

s1gn1f1cat1t., to this et't'ect: ·
Gearing at first deprecated the poss1b111ty of deriving
a.tr re.id warnings from trat.r1c. · Ho~ever, on the oocasion of' .
ona .or the vj.sits the Luf"tvaff'e Chief · made in tb.e West, a
master-sf:l~gem1t ('Who wee.re two stars as his 1ns1gn1a.,;-zwe1 ,,.,~
Stern~) pleaded With Goering to listen 1n hilUself: "Please~ v!
H~~r Raiehsmarachall, i t you would have the kindness yo"Q.r-
self to li~ten . .• u Goering listened to~ half an hour, was ·
a.st;on1ebed a.t the amount ot talking that went on. The~eupon
Qc:er:tilg tu.i:'ned to his off1cers and dil'eoted that the master-
sex-geant pe p!'omoted. However, there vaa no further enlisted
ra,n.k he could receive. When the officers tol.d Goering that1 .
he said: "Make him a sergeant v1th · three eta.rs" ( 11 Feldwebel ·.
mit d!'ei Sternen"). Ne~ tables or organizations pay :scales,
allotments, etc., had to be dev1eed to c~ply v~.th the
.Reichsli!fil'sc)lell' s request. ~ p
\

50
..

• I
DOCID: 3560829
.
A't .t 1is !nte~rogacion 127 !' he stated that. Capt.
RtA.eekhc::.111 (wh~ comma..r,ded LN Abt 357 and who was insti-ument~l
in actltrat:!.ng the Meldekop.r o:rganization) passed "him situ-
. a.tion r.~po:c-t$ ever-y evening at about 6 P .M. over a direct
:;J!'i va t{lt :ri ne ..•. e"Y'en in the middle o.f the night~ 1.f o.9era ti ons
WC'l'e on, he could r.:i.1.ag up Rueckbe1m and obtain the very
lE.test :tnf,..rmation on the position; this enabled Goe:r~ng to
b.!·ef..k t n personally Qn the conduct o.r any operatipn at a.ny .
t~me; for example, vhen hls . sta.rr said that the raiders
were go:I.ng fqr Berlin, he might have more up to 'date 1ntell1-
gunce <li re~t t'rOt.'1 Rueckhe1m and could say 'No, they are ·
going for Stett:~n. ' 11 128
The r~al:i,,:;a¥lon that ai:r fotge si.znal intelU.genge could
produe~ tact .~ cal l.ntellige~ce came a.s the result of a
aucc13szful !Jl"edic.t ion or a Wellington raid .in Decei..1ber 1939.129
Anti-a.:i.rera.ft. (flak} wi1·: .s had been -relying on "ground observer ·
seri;iee of the old type (vis\ial and ac.oustic). · It aup~le­
mented t.hat serv~ce with its own tJ'"oop wilts of ground
observe:t:"s, and later with !.ts own l'"adar,"130
a. Org_!ni.zatign:--As a un1.fied ccirmnand foz- route-t'racking
P?..'..x•pos1~soee2nienecessar7, a nel1 orr:toe was created, that of
Chief or the Ai.r Raid W~:rning Service f"or Germany (Funkauf'klae-
?ltmg Dfuehrer Retch, abbreviated FAF) . He was put under the.
Ch:l - StC'J.le fo:r> operational .purposes, and acted as advisor to
'L.lic-t CO!!U1ll.:l.Ud1ng GeneI·al or the. Fighter Co:rps (Jagdko:rps}, .,
'erJ.tl"tlB-Ccd '.r:i.th the defense of Germany. Th:e duties ot the FAF ·
a:re described b~r Col. Forster: ·
"e) He was responsible for the tracking ot the
cncrny' s ~3 tra tegic air. ro~ce s. He was d1reet-l7 under
the Ct1ief Signa.l O.f.fiae:r of" the Luftwaffe ( OKL, General
Ma::· ~in~.), vrho gave h1s cormna.nds and orders through the.
Chi---Stolle (c·o 1. Friedrich}. In the matter o.f military
tiec :i.s:i.c•ns the l"lmkaufklaerw..gsfuebi-er Reich vas sub-
or~'..lnate to . t.he Chie.:f or the Signal Intelligence Service
(G~nei-al Klemme).
"b) was adviser to tlle Commanding General ot
He
Jagdkorps I~ ¥.'as res-ponsible tor. the. Reich 1 s ·
v~1ich
de~ense. llie - ~omm&.nd post (ZAP) was therefore near
· the commend post of" Jagdkorps I.
"c ) . ·He wa.s respon:sj.ble for the .functioning o.f
·!#he Signal Intelligence Service· in the · West; and.
"d) He was i-esponsible .ror the direction or the
entire jatmrling service within tile area of Ger~ny.) l'l
127 I 11~:;
128 I 143.PP 15.16
129 I 109 J> 'f ·
l. ~o
Co~.
· ·
I?or~te~, head ~
81
. . . .
_, of FAF, IF .p 60
l3~ Ilt"' 131 p 63 •
. \ 51
• •• .•:• • •I• • ......
 DOCID: 3560829

.0

b. The ZAF-- The central Reporting Center (Meldekopf)

for Go!'.'i:lla.ny wasknown as t~e Central· Air Raid Warning Unit
(ZentrGle~ Gefachtsste.nd Fuer Funkauswertung, abbreviated
"ZAF1
"}. It was located 1n Treuenbrietzen, near Berlin,
e.nd was ·i;he control and evalu.e.tion center ror all tactical
w·:1.rnings significant in the de.tense of the Reich. It eon-
t~olled for pu~poses of ~act1cal operations all the Reporting
Centers on all the fronts, but was most important.· in the·
Gei>m&.d det'ense against Bzt1t1sh and American stx-a.tegio long-
raJ18e bombers. The ZAF was serviced by. -excellent signal
colll!U.unication·from the t1e1d Reporting Centers. Circuits
carrying tactical intelligence from the ZAF led to ra.dar'
sites., Signal Intelligence 11&.ison officers at ·tactical ,
headqua'.('tera, ft~d Reporting Centel'·3 ·and even out-~tat1ons .13'
( l) Eval ua t1on vi tll1n ZAF ·· .
Evaluation vithln the Z.AF meant pr.1mtar1ly the t:racking
or enemy aircraft- All information ~rom 51gns.J. Intelligence
We!•vtce and collateral sources vas plotted on special w.all
rr.te.,p3 within the operations room, f'rom. which the m1nute-to-
minute position ot enemy bombers vith their tighter cover
could b~ detsrmined at a gl.ance. If a ~aid were being
. foll-at'f.~d in the west, ·specialists on that area manned the
operations room. (See chart 5-7) Ordinarily~ this specie.list
personnel worked 1n the evaluation section ~J; vh1ch, though
of ke1 importance, va.s small. Ita work va.s mainly the eol-
l~tlon of ~epo~ts trom the t1eld. On the basis o.t these
it iss\led a :repor·t on the air situation over Germany every
tvelve·nours. A conterence to brief all eva.1uators on the
1:1tGntiona and operat"l.ons ot the tactical. units was held
every ev~ning at 1800 hours a.n.d . ~as usually attended by
Col. Forster., F.AF.134
The command post ·ror the· jamming of all allied trans-
1rd.. t.te:in~ ua.a located in the ZAJ:i'. This ~rangement avoided ·
tl1c ,P.;m.:1.v.g or allied transm1tfe?!s that were currently produciD.I!
1ntell:tgenee fol' the Gel'lDB.lls. ~:;,
It muet be emphasized that the ZAF did not reduce the: ;
1mpcrtG.IlC? or 9ther 51gnal Intelligence activities. The
COJI!batting Of heavy bomber ~ncursions Was such a.n im»ortant
pi-oblem. the Germans were s1mply torced to centralize tact1c·al
lrarnings. in ,a, spec~ unit. · -
l32IF- i8l p 71
l33IF 181 .P 72
l3 4:q~ 181 P. 7 j
l351F 181 p 74
52
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DOCID: 3560829

I .
c. ~}£P'?~~ Cer1ter (Mel.dekopf_ lJ: -- Reporting_
Canter J.~ t'.fj,aoTdest and most e:tf'1cier1t or the tactical,...
warning ~ent~~s, operated against the Western alllea.13o
Its opex-~~- tin~ technique served as a model ror the Re.:;>ortlng
, Centerz c:.1. all f'ronts, and this center will be briefly
described as it is characteristic of all the others.
It tms creaJ~ed originally in the summer of 1942 as a
prepa:N.ttory derenae n1easure against the RAF, and was made
up of ~f.fir::_e:r.s, eva·luators., and WIT operators f'rom Signal ..
Intelligence uni ts 1n the \-lest .137 J:n l ts. final .toi.~til •
Repo1•tinc; Centel' J. exex-c.:tsed local ta.ctic~l operational
........ control c>t the 31gnal Intelligence uni. ts operating at,:ainst ,
-strategic bomhe~s based in Great Britain nnd ·1ater on the.
contin~nt. 'l'h::a central was limited to tactical operations;
and fo.:a ad.r.1i:i:Ls~7'ation the Signal Intelligence f'ield units
still ,..,~Jte sabc,x·d..:..neted to local Signal Intelligence
' ' ts. 1-<l
U.."'l.,. :; . ,
The tac t.ics.1 m1.saion of: He;Jo:rt1ng Center 1 may be summed
up as.. follow.a:
\
a. tc'.g:l'le eccu:rate early warning of the raf.ds by
"heavy lH'>mbc r~s ;
t.. i··y con:t.~:nuously tracking the heavy bombers, to present
t.0 Gerr.!an :C!ght~r units a clear picture of the air situation;
0_._ c. to interp:r.et tha air situation 1n such a way as to
ll~'e'.l~.ct th~ :strr.~th' a.nd p:roba'Qle t~rgets and tactics of'
,

all.ed bomoe~s. 3~
In 1.lle f5.11al year of t~ var, Reporting Center l at
II~:!..J.1g0.1stadt,140 was part of the ls·t Company of' the Signal
Intelligence ~ield battalio~. LI~ Abt-357. From this Bat-
---
--- taI'ion i1ep~,rt1rig Center l rece1 ved reports. It sent 1 ts
o•·m rre::_J ..::.rt..s to the Air Force operational he.!ldquarters .c~n­
c~rned~ ~~j to such naval units a~ Admiralty Deutsche
Bucht, . "E 11 Boe.t Connnand, Small .Naval Forces Command and Naval
D/F seci,J.on Deutsche Bucht. (See· chart 5-8)
The center• developed into a War Room, w1 th 1 ts own tele-
phone ej~change e.ud ra.dio station. Cur.rent ta.ctical infor·matlon
was instantly plotted, and immediate reports flashed to ~AF
and 'tactical wiits in the area. (See chart 5-9)141
1}6 IF 183 p 1
137 IF 185 p
'
l
138 IF 183 "P 3
139 IF l.83 9 2
140
lF 133 p 9
141
(l IF J.33 !J 9. '
53
 DOCID: 3560829

Du:·.··.ng t.h.'...s :~::.rr:e tlle 2nd Com,')any of LN Abt-)57 was

cotTrcdtted ·cu m0nl.toring r:.;-F tra:Ln~.ne units, the jrd Company
t,o the t·nrnbEr.cti.·.:~.s::.ons of the Eighth USAAF, and the 4th
Cc.)m::in~.y to f<.'\f:' Bom'L>e:> Command. 'rhe battal~on was au@i1ented
'oJ a r.3.•1.D.r ini~i;:>l'N~Pt. cuw~)any and a VHF R/T COlil'3any as weli
as e D/i' t.~3;; line covering Western Ger1.iany .14~ The stations
.!.n ~~i.e D/r b~se l~.ne were coordinated from the Reporting
Cc:1te.r> .:i ~~cc-dsary mea:-:sure if' 1 t was to supervise route
t:c·dcxiug. 1 )
Ta~tical evaluation ~motions r1ere created within each
::.r.-t.:·r~e ;)t cor!T;:a.?1y. 'l'hese sections :r..a.intained. close contact
1~ :. l;b the Jiio:-.~~:.~ a~:i(-;:i:•a to.!~s and p~ssed the slighte ~t s:!.gn of a
bc!r.l.·.~l" ::_ne nrs~.o::. bac:c to the Reporti~ Center. 141i
d. ~~:P_~~~iill!: Ce;i.te:rs 2 and 3-- In the \·lest there we1'e
t ~r:i otl: :0::. l: C~)():!.-·t :'..ng Genter a in aadi 'Ci ~n to t1m t just d:i. s-
1

c iw 2ed. Rc;-;02'7-l~ Center 2 was pal"t of the 25th CoYJpany 1st

50.tt;:i.l:.oa of l.N F-:;3t 351, and number 3 was pa1•t or the 1st
Com'.)&n-;,· of L··~ Abt }56. The O!)el"ations within these units
:-:·cs0mb:i... ~J ;-,11 )~;e ':·!i. th~~n Reporti.ng Center 1, wi.th o"erall co-
0:!:'·:15J.1.at·:_on e:>:&!.'Gi3eil by the ZAF, and it \!Ould serve little
·pur·}·)S~ to det.::iJ_l uc:tivities uith1!1 those units. Attention
sb~uld be e::,lled, hoveve:r .• to the wide disser.1:i..nn ti on of
:r·eportc r:,ade b~T Tiepo1'ting Cente:.i."' 2. The repol"ts sent by
the ·;.r1:1:i:·Jou::: co1m.1a11.ie3 of' the thr.ee bci. t tali ons of LN Jier;t )51
w}~.tch we:i.1 G s.;;~1t to Rt:porting Center 2 besides being broad-
cast t1.:i ti:!E: Z1\.F" r..rcre rad:!..o~d to the follo~ing uni ts:

Air F'urcti: .JU. r Staff' west

J.-1{tl1) 15th, and 16th F
\.t>'liegerdi vi slone..11}
2~ 28 757, and 72 JG (Jagdl~o:rps) ·
3rd and 4th Flak Korps.
(These f lghter and anti-aircraft unlts
could take o~erational counter-measures
to the ensuing raid)

Cornmnnder-in-.Chief West
Arrny Groups H, B1 and D
25th, 7th, and 19th Armies
87th Army Corps (and five or six others)
5th ?anzer Army
11th Panzer Division
1st Parachute Army

142IF :hip" p 7 1

143rF 183 p 9
(' 144IF i33 p 8
54
 DOCID: 3560829

·ctvilia.n· Oauleiters of Wurzburg and Kal'laruhe'

D0fense:- Air.Warning Services of · INNsbru~k.; Munich,
Nuernberg, Darmstadt, Halle
N&V'f "E '' Boa._t Comma.nd.er
Reporting Center 3,. which received.reports tromLN Regt 356
{reda~ eveluation), reported to the A~r-Foroe operational
units ·conoez•nec. vith the defense of the Reich. (See chart 5-
- \
lO)
In the final days of the war, the reports ot the Reporting
Centezss regulated l11"e v1th1n Germ.any as far as air raid · -·
precautions were concerned. The complete charts vh1<$ follow
picture in detail the routing and recipients of the 1ntoFmB.-
tion derived at the Reporting Centers. Tecbnical Sel'gea~t
Ge:i:id Watkinson or Reporting Center l writes that "never,
once a. report he.d been released to the ·ef:fect that a night
would be free of enemy aerial intrusion, did ~he perspl'Ulel
of the Mf¥dekopf need to blush for a mistake in its oalcu• ,
ls.ti on. 11 5 . .

55
I
 - -- - - - - ·- ---- - ·- -------------~

DOCID : 3560829

VOLUME 5
Chc:.;.1te1• IV Organizar.ion and Operations of the Field Units.

Sect.ion B. Oper•a.tions in the East.

Paragraph
Dovelo1.m1ent. a nd geogra.phica.l d1spos"ition
of t he· f~. . e: ld. units ......... .. ............ . ....... . 25
Operations wi i:;hi.n the bat ta.lions .....•....•......•.•• 26
D1:39loym;:mt or" the bu.t'talions ..•.••••••.••.•...•..••.•• 27 '
s ·::.:;:•a to_gic results of LN Regt 353 ...•••..........•.•.• 28 .·:.r.
Oper a t i ans aga.:tns t the Long Range Bomber Force •.•••.• 29
O y r~z· e.t. cions against the Air Armies .•..•....•.•....•... .30
Immedia r~0 report·s issued by LN R~gt 353 ....•......... 31
R~!!'!u.1 t s of t.he 0.!)e1"'ations of LW Regt 353 ..•••......•. 32

25. peyelopment an~jE~hical d.ispos.ition of' the

~1..d un)~-- ~t1he activation 01' l.N Regt 353, the fina.i s1gna.l ·
1r.:tel).1gence unt t in t.he Ee.st, W8.s th~ last s t.e.v in e.n evolu-
t :Lon that had 1 ts beginning in 1936. I:;>U ·
ItL 1 ~)6, a. · fixed Radi o In'tercept Ste.t ion waa erected . :tn
Gl :L11dm·1 :- n e ar Berlin. In. 1~3r{ -1$138, f:t.ve more atat1on·s were
· e:i:•ec ced at Braslau, .Pilsnitz, Bromberg, Kobbelbude, and
HiJ:' scllste.et,ten near Vienna. 'l'hese field units were respon-
slb l 0 for preliminary analysis ·and evaluation of . Rust-d an Air
F ore.:: ·1:.ra.f;fic, t;he fin<i.l evaluation being done by the Chi-
St-:-:lle. · The Chi-Stelle. had op~ratlona.l control of tl'le· out- ·
s t. ::it iO!l:3 1.:.houg.h administratively these were subordinated to
the Signa l Regimen~s of t.he Air Fo1"ces in whose a.rea they
op01"atecl. Stilt.ions a. t H1rachsta.etten and Breslau were as-
sj.gned r.o L N Regt. 4, r.he reet to LN Regt l. Signal Intelli-
g e a ce pe:c·sorme l cons:-:_dered this e ba.d arrangement as they
WO£ !~ bound- t o t 1!0 meaters, and were constantly . involved in
ju:d. s c1J.. ct1onal disputes. .. .
The r:.10nitoring or Rusa.i an radio tl')a.ffic was extensive
a~~.d ·~omplice.ted. · :Not only did each Russian Air A:rmy have its
own s:Lgr.ul _procedures and c_r yptographic systems, but the
m;;:thod used. i n . the assignment of ca.J.l signs and .frequencies ·
b o0a:.11.'3 ever mo:ee complex. This situation, added to the fact
tha t ths Air li'orces resented. the ext~a che~nnel represented
by the Chi-Stelle and vere ·eager _to obt$1n intelligence
directly :trom the operating units, led to. a reorganization
i n the sl.lmlller or · l~j8. This reorgB.nization saw the ~ormation
of collecting e.nd eva.lua.tj.on · agencies known aa Wetter-Le1tsteJ.-
len (W-Lei t) 1 whose function was to issue 1Jlter1m reports to.
~
~· ) ­
1 50rF 186 pp 2·- 5

-·
'DOCID: 3560829

the local Air Forces and to exped1 te the flow of tnater1a1.

to the Gt.!.l--Stelle. Cryptanalytic and evaluation personnel
ve:re drawn lilS.i.11ly fx-om the fixed Radio Intercept stations and
to s lesser degrae from Chi-Stelle. A fll?'ther step in
orgenizat~on was taken during the summer of 1939 when these
collect:i.ng and evslllation centers (W-Leit) end the f!xe~ and
mobtle Radio Interce:\t comr•an1ea were f'orrued admin1s·t.:rat1velJ'
1.n.to Ba ttal~.~.as. Each o~ these battalions was the third
b&ttal1on ln lts l ..espeetive A1.J"t Force Slgnal Regiment. Former-
ly the Si.g!'lal Regiments had not dealt with intelligence ,
matters.
At the outbreak or var vith ·?oland~ Section D of the Chl-
Ste lle exerc~. ~:ed operational control CJVer two gi-oups of w11 ts
adm1n1s t1•a ti vely organized. under two A.tr Signal Regiments.
Under 3rd Ba ttallon Lt-I Regt l, W'-Le:t t-1 in Del'nau eon.trolled
opel"ll.t.i.011ally the Signal Intelligence stations at Xobbelbude
and Brombe~e. {Later moved· to ?ilsnitz) Under the .jrd
.Sattal~.on :L.l'IJ Regt 4, W'-Leit-4 in Vienna controlled the \fixed
F.a<iio. Inte:r>ceJ)t. stations at .Breslau, l'remstaetten (latter at
Hirschstaetten) and Budapest plus the 10th Compani, LN
Ragt ~~. 151
The years 1940 through 1942 sav raod.1.f J.cations in the )
organization or Sj_gnal L'ltelligence units concerned with"
Rus:3ian t1~affic. There vaa or course a general sh:tft in geq-
gra!Jh1cal d1sp·:Js1 tion towards the Eaet and accompanying changes
of a.d.1ninlstr.a.ti ve control. The organization 1~· the ~ast
remained fairly stable through 1943, but in 1944 an important
reorgan1zation of German Air Force Sig."'1.8.l Intelligence units
ve.s eff'eeted. 'J_ih:Ls took place in November of that year and
consisted nhi.e.:tly in the acti ve.·t1on of ~ Jiegt 353 to en-
COlill)ass all P·ignal Intelligence activities on the Es.stern
Front. The cUvlsion of 09erational and ad.min1otrat1ve_ control
vn~1 niai.trt:~:l.nc:tl. Section .D of the Chi-Stelle still exercised
ooerathmal control throughout the structure, vhile the Chief
Signal O:t'f:i_c<~.l'"- t-rtu.~ a.d1a1n1strative head t·hr-ough General Kleti1llle,
a pur·el~r tl.cl:.:1ln.::_st1~a ti ve of.ficer- At this time also, a S:i,gna~
Inte1llgencf.t regimental headquarters, with the 25th Co
(e'1a1us.tionL .nnd the 12th Co (lnte~ce'Pt) vas activated in
Cot.tbus. Tha b{llance of LNR-353 included three battalions as
followa:152
11
s.. li::t Bn, Li"'l Rt~gt 353 (i°lJ?'merly 3rd Bn Ln Regt l)
of ~ou:r companies in East Pru&sia.
1
'b. 2nd Bn, LN negt 353 (Signal Intelligence Sn
:east) of five companies lr1 Poland.
· "c. 3rd Bn, LN Regt 353 (3rd Bn LN Regt 4) of ~ive
companies in Austria.

l5l IF ~36 p 2 5
152 IF UJ6 !l Ql!'t
57
 · . DQC°ID : 3.5608
. 29
. •, ~· ~ .... '· .
. .· ·----.......,_
. . . ..
.'
.~

; ) ,, . .·. .·
__
. ..
' !
,
!,
,. .
• • • •. • '!'
' ~ ' , .

•
I i • ..-....
. A.s rh~ <:anapaj_m.1' i r~ t:t!e E~~t ,degen,era.te'd for :tpe./Oe~~~ns; .:·i;
: '. the Reg,l.me!!tal Hes.t,lqua:rters an.~ !.~s two .c;ompani~s ·~e~reat~d, ~, .. · .,t.:
~ arr:l. v111g in J?resden in .F.el;l.r:ua~y . i?!•5;· · .F~om Dx·esden; .the he~d~ , . : · '. · :· :
. quarters t!ll')y-ed · on. J.:n~o ~he "Alpi~e Hedoubt "· where .it· was.: · . .. · ·t r ·
I/ ·
~

'joined b:y the 2~d- and 3rd .Battali9ns in ·wagrien . ., A.: .70-•~ :· · _. · .. '- ···
plat()On opel'ated dur:f.ng 1.the· move. ' The lst .Battal1Cll ste.y"'d· ·.. ·
-l.n
-1 t•n·e 1•:
~'or th . . . · . .• • •. · · " · ._ · • · · ·· · . • . · , ·..,
... .. ,. .
'" · After Gernt.anj. 1 3 ciap1 tulation the · negiment· r.iovt?d· vfa .Zell · · · :· ·.. :
· . a~n See ~'.!1d Lalr.e. Chiem ~·o ·the Lu.f.twaJ."fe .concentratlon ·area in · • . · ·'.,
A~chbach in aouthern· Bavaria... All personnel o~ t~ Head~. .: · ·. ·'. ...··.
· quarter~~ ;I. ts. c~omµanie s :.and the ·2;110. and 3rd. Ba_t ta.l:1;<ins · were. '.~ :· ·.
dt.selia;~gnd fror.1 t.here. ·::~he .1 st· Ba·ttal1on fell into l3rl t ·1 sh . ·
J:lr:lnds at· J,,ueb~ck tn April .
·.1945.153
. · · : . · .· . : ' .. :. ~ \•

. . . " . . . l . -:· .•~... •

· ·26. Opc:?ratj.ons within the Battalioris--The operatfons or .: .;..~ . ~1
L!l Regt · J~)j 1n tne .]:a~~· OJ.?Tel-'i<fSreatii f'i'oL1 tfui ·operat:i,o~~ . . .· ·;~~ -~
of'~ its s:tster ·uni ts in·, the West. · This d1f'.fe.Z.~nce ..tn ·o;:>er~t:l,ng ·,·"· ·:.
technique ~eflected the capabilities of the.. Soviet· :Union_as · . "
' compareri . Wi tn those Of. ;' the .lfester.n Allies in the ~u~iness of. ·. ·'. ~ . '.·_.·
· s :Lgn~l ccmmunicat:i.on. · ·Ge~~ A'~r ,;Foree .Signal Int~lll8e~1c·e· · ··- ~·. ·. · ·
·was · ~esigned .~·o ~xplo~~--~u~_s1an weaknesses as. Soviet cr-Ypto-." · ' ~.
gra ph1c and I'&di-o · deirelopment · .w as ; behind · that or Bri ta~n and . .. ·
-~he ..fJn1te~ ·States:.· The ·western Front ·w$s ·the :sphere ·or: the '. ·. ~ ~ .
tra:f'fiG ~haly~t·, but · t~e Eastern uni ts ·emphas.ize.d ·, tl1e · ~ ~ · ·, >,,· ·~
cryptanalysi s .of Sov.iet .ciphers . .. · · · ,. · 1~::. : ~
. o
· ,..-~. . ~ . . , T~e admin1 s ~rat~ ve 1 az:id ·.ge.ograph-i c changes_ LN Regt 35 3 or .· i' · .
I'
. .
•
·•·. -
• ·h.a.ve ·been. d1.acussed. ·
• •.An e.xamiruition
"' of the· three bat talions . · .- :· ·· ·::.: .·
A" . . · (Ab.teilUl'1ge~) and the orgazi.lzati,o~ ·9t t~e four· .·or .five. co111pa- ., .. ~<
nies "W'l·t hin ea.ch battalion follows. ' · · ··
.-The hell!'t of t~e b~ttnl-1on wa'o . the evaluatl on com:pahy and : . ~;
..
.
:!.ta seven a~ctions~ Ip. addition, the. batts.11on 1:µc;:lud~d a:n . , .. ~>
·op~r~.ting a.qd <>ut-s ta tlon ·company and "two interc;:ept c.ompan1ea. . . . . "
.
(See cha.rt · ')-11). · ln ~.raa~r to c:q..ai"i!':y the operation of -a unit ~· "·:~1
ns complex. as the battalion, this discussion w:i..11 "start With · · .. · ~
' r ' the ~rat•f'i<: II in the. itjt~loCe"Jlt CO~nJ' ·a nd OU~ .. S~a:tj.OD' COmpB.DJ' .~~-. ; .... ...,
and trace· 'C.h~ cour~e qt the _inte;rc-epted messag~ U:1'l't:t.l 1 t · : .·, ·:
emerge~ from· ·EV$luat1:on .as· 1ntellige~~~- . . · .· · · ·. ·'" ·~... · i
a:. Intel'eept Com:Pa&--:-' Lia;ts~~ between ev;alu.,a·t ioil and · - ·.. ···"'::I
.. intercept ,.,as very cl9~e. ·· Operationally, ·the J,.nte~cep~ · ...'. · l .· . !
compa~- W~$ su'bordi~te<;i . to tlie. T/A :section of ·th~ evaluation .,~:.r.r.1
ccmp!lny. T!:s- i 1/A section &.$.81~~d.' the mlsaiona ahd ,re· se~ved · ·· r ·, ·
the !'i gh l; ..;,f_ direct-':<>~ over t.ht~ watcp· of.f:tcers 1Jt th~ .inter.;.· .~ -. , . i ·.: .
cep·:; rcc:n . . -.,.1he· op ot: the . !nter~ept company was respon~ible ; : . · ,. · ·
f c:.. ull :U.1'l:r.:. ·.C'~pt o.f ~401•se traffic, which vas. cop~e~ in the. · .· : .
~t-:.:•:!'O or· :ti; s~• permanent 3.nstallati·on of the. Battalion.154 ;.
.. . As far .a:i ·posel.bJ:e, · ~ach . intera_ept .oper~to:r·· ~pec.i.ai12ed ·~n
a pa.rticul0.1• · ci:rcui ~ ~B.;nd .learned ·the. pe9u11ari ties of· 1 ts· . .
~., ~ ···~
·: ... :,. : ~iJ
ope·rator·s. · · · ·. ·· · . : .
. . f • , •: - ~ : ~!
:-- ..
• . ....
...
. i I - ._ ·• I ~I
! . .;..· . ~ :' . ~ .:.,. ~ ·:!
. . . .. _ • . • :"" ".. : • ~I

., .{: .~ ~-:~..:~~)
 DOCID: 3560829

n-. A D/F cqnt2'ol station vaa located in the· 1.ntercept room

to take oe~~i~s on unknown stations, vh1le the D/F section
of the evaluation company stood ready to perform immediate
plotting to asoist intel"oept.155
b. O;>e.:rat1J'&_ nnd Out-station Compaey-- The CO was
rea·i'.)Onsib"''.f~--ro.r-trie'""Bii t'ta"1Ion7 s sign.al communlcation and
~or the teehntcal operation of the out-stations and D/F
sites. Out--stat.t.one were usually maintained at tighter ·
s'tr.i.µs and were responsible f'or R/1' in·terce-pt. Each R/T
inteJ"cept t)!:iez-ator had d:irect c<)tntnunication w1 th the neareat
D/F site and crJuld ew1 tch. over- -and have a fix taken.
Telephoi1~ and teletype c!r-cu:l.ts to higher headquai-tersJ
oth~r battaJ..:;.onsJ and subordinate un.i ts ,.,ere rn.a1ntained
where wi1•0 linee vere :possible. The com'9any operated radio
ci1·cuits tc• the out-s:ta~lons, D/F · ai tes,, othe?- battal1ons,
and higher headquarters. T~ Gel"mans never z-eaclled the ideal
s~.tuation 01' hav:l.ng land. lines between all D/F and intergept ·
lm:L t.s ~ a.ud rad.Lo vae extensively used for D/F contl"ol.15
o. F.v3luation. Companz-- The CO as head of all evaluation
srrH.nged a daily ~rtuatlon conf'e~ence attended by- the bat- .
talion ccrminander a.nd the heads or the seven evaluation sections.
Tbe coni'er.ence eoo1"dlnated the uork or the entire unit based
011 'i:.he requests of. the local.Air Force (Lut:£flotte) and Wing
(Flj.egerk<:)J:•ps) se1~v1oed.l57 Evaluation was regional and only
loosely aligned vith~the othel" battalio~s bec~use or the large
distances 1nvol vec.L l:;>U
How the Go:1~i.1ans contl'olled tha intercept uni ts and pro-
cesseu the :ra"r t!•sff'ic into .Lntelligence can best be made
cJ.e~\r by b:r:i.er comments on each of' the seven evaluating
sections.
(J.) H/T (F.ad!o Telephonef Evaluation--The R/T evaluation
oub5ectlcnwas~nerTual rest ng place Tor the R/T intel'ce:p:t
copiec1 :l.n. the out-stations. The out-stations had already issued
immed:tate intelligence to tly.tng 1'orrfl..at1o.ns, but it was the
function of R/T evaluation to extr~ct Ol'der or battle in the
form of pilots' names, Russian unit designat1-ons,,, map grid
tnforrr.ation a:nd. all the miscellaneous bits and pieces to be
gleaned from R/T. · ·
Qn the technical side, the section worked out the relation-
uhi-p between f1"equency e.nd call sign changes and checked this
tnforma.t.ton with the traffic analysis subsectic;>n, as R/T·and
Morse cil"'CUi ts liere often su9erimposed.159

l55r 182 p 13
156 1 182 p 9
157
1 182 'P 4
n-- 1581 q.2 p 2
159r 182 p, 5
J
 f
DOCID:. 3560829

(2) Lo~ Range Bombe:rs--This subsection was mannell only

when alerte~y Soviei recee or weather airoraf't or by the
receipt of a Russian operational message. It vas an integral
part or the tac~tical warning system that v:Lll lie described in
the -~ecti9n on tactic6l operation• against Soviet lo.rig range I

.J
honbers.luO , I

{3) Tra.fr":lc An.all,_819_-- The traf:f'1c analysis subsection

exer~!aad ope~2tional control over the Morse intercept compa-
nies and assisted their operation by reconstructing Russian
radl~ networks, schedules and oall signs. Each evaluatoF
s?l~c1.al1r.eo. in a pn.rticula.l" Soviet. air art:lY. T/A passed a
Iax·ae amount o.f order of battle o:f' Russian ail" aruties to final
evaluation. The section kept its own situatlon maps and
reco~ds ~nd through 1.n.ference added to the oveNlll intelligence
p:i.cture.lt:Jl
(4) D/F (Directt~n FiAd1AZ) Evaluation-- Th~ results or
'the field~ sites wetre recelve;j by the '!J/F evaluation sub-
sect:on daily. Tlie results in the form of-station locations
were passed to the T/A section as an aid to T/A 1 s reoonst:ruct1on
of' ~uss1.an netl-Torks. Another function of the il/F Evaluation
subsection should be noted here. In addition to its other
task:s,, :Lt evaluated the· results of railar c1::.>nitor.i.ng done by
tvo ·:t>a<J.aJ• monitor.~.ng un1ts_,.(WIM-Truppe) attached to the lat
Batt~lion or Ln R~gt 353.lo~ Soviet uee of radar was never
extensl ve, tho ugh :. t va s used 1n the Leningrad area. The
.n fact that the radar ei tea .:n thls area comr.mr1icated ·by R/T
me.de it possible for German Signal Intelligence to warn German
:rtghters that they had been apprehen;.led by Russian l'adar.
(5) Crypta_!!alysis-- Incoming messages wel'e registered
and ~orted according to whether or not they were currently
read(1ble. ~'raf'fic in sys terns as yet w1broken was ref~:rred to
a 1'ei3ee.~cll party. The balance was inu.nediately decoded and the
results ~ssed to final ev6luation . .
The importance of the cryPtanalyt1e subsection is
1llu~trated by the number of persons it contained. Twice as
ma.ny people worked .in the cey;)tanalytic section as were in
the other combined six sections of the evaluation company.
Roughly 85 p~r cent of' nussia.n traffic vas readable. This
weakness in Soviet c.t;:>her l"etarded the develo.ar:ient of' more
advanced '1'/A methods in LN Regt 353. Evaluation received a
r1ealth of message content n-iterial that ms.de inf"erence
unne~es.sary.163

160 ~

I 182 pp 5-6
161 l 182 p 6
162 I 163
"P 3
163 l 132 ;-J 7
() 60
I I.
DOCID: 3560829 .
/

( 6) ~·l~~t._l1er.Jiirc1.l1J.at.;,,2!J-- i~leteor.ological messages vent

.fil.::.•E'ctly Trori-. the "interce;?t operato.r to veathe:r evaluation.
Hesults or sc1v~d i"ir:-ssap;es_ went directly t9 flying Wlits and
t.c t.he v~~ :J:~r O•.!ntei• at the, A.ii~ Fol"ee High Conn:Jand.16't
··(7) r: nr.l :r:''fi.lua t~.on-- The d.iscuaslon or Final Evaluation ·
h~. " been PL":i:Ooae"!j'""i)laced-a t the encl of the 'break-d.ovn or the ·
e-v~iltta.t:. 0r1 t)nN,aey a~ it was heI>e ·that all the battalion's
?unc ·;;iom::1 c:-e j.'e ·b:rntig~t togethe~~ Decoded messages f'raom the
CA....r:H.analytic aec ti on were tl"anslated. Formations, natles
c•f -~oople o.ntl u.rii ts· and tMlr locat1o.n· and all other 0 B .
l~t~.?i&• .i.n:t ..rero ·car!! :indexed and coordinated v.t th the results
~f 1!:/A anr.1 H/T evn1u.~1tion: Items of -immediate irnpol"tance
.,,; ..: ~.· ~ d!3!>lli,-,:::.ted .i.ur..iediateJ:y, and a daily repoJJt to the local
A.~. ~ .r,orc•"' er>d t:'le i'11ng vas rendered that dealt with new
ci·deti of 'tfl t tJ..-3, eonet.ruotion of· new air f'ieldA, strength
~€ l;urne .: fuel uuT,µ11es, and new operational targets .165 '
I.
rhe daily report to these two units tollo~ed roughly a·
5·-~ragraph P.st1tllc?.te' of the situation as tollovs:.
.I ~

{a) ee..,· i ru"vrma·;;1cn on o:r;der of battle, airfield

1ooatio11_, su9ply dump activity and RR activity.
'J!h:t.s section vas telety~Jed in advance • .
,I
.
I b ,\ · Ccr. . s:!.dera G!on or the a.tl" lu~mres as to flying
and g!'ound units.
(' . Ordt.Jr ·of btlttle of the long-range bo111ber
fC1' i.10. t .~On3. .
Heview of Black Sea or Baltic coastal units.
Ji:s t J.r.ilEl. te of Hue.sian horr.e defense f'orma tlona .
Sernl- <i1·:.> ~1thly re?orto folloved the same fnrm::i but vere
much mo:re detatled. · Distribution vas made to Air Fo:.rce
High Cc r:tr:?a!ltiJ the S::..P."nal Intelligence Agency, Arrq Signal
Intellige1\c~). A.1r F·~roe,, Wing, and to· subord.£.nate Wlits with-
in LNn-353 . lu6 ·.
27. ~~.i1.,~-olc .z::.1ett .Er- the Battal~ons-- µI Regt j53 vas
an Air Force un1t, bu its ncti"vities vere often or t:re- .I
r::Endcua · help to the German Arnr-j. The Russians attacbed one
. a.i.r army tc. ea.eh a:rncy- g:roup in line Vi th their conception of
· t:he llSe of P. fr rorc;e .167 '5trat6gic ·moves of' the Russian . I
~
.al'my grouµA ":tezie cpnrpromised by . German signal intelligence
activities nga in3t the accompanying air a!'ll11ea. Tho ground
Wli ts would mo~1e up under ra<;lio silence, but it is eJ1:tremely
<l:t..':'f .:cult to l:tcve s.ircraf't vltbout using tl'answltters, hence
the rad~•. o act:i..Yi ties ot th~ aircr&f't vould be~ray them.
., 161~
l 1°:32 p B
165 !132 p 5
lt;i? I 107 :pp 3 4
167 ,.IF ~87
~f
;
- '
 I \

DOCID: 3560829

The folloving order or battle will show how LN Regt .353 _, ·!

.~as deplaye.d against. the Russians:
a. lat Battnlion Northern Section in East Prussia
mon.i t:c,red:
Bal tic:: Red Banner Fleet
15th ft.J.r.Army (2nd Baltic Front) ·
::r-J. Air Army (lat Bal tic Fron·t) ·
l~t. Air Al-m7 (3rd White Russian front)
4th Air Army
J.6th·A~.r Arm7 llst
White Russ:;..an Frontl
l;Y;h. Alr ArDJ7 2nd White Russian Front
l:+th Air Array 2nd White Russian Front
o. 2nd Battalion Central sector ln Poland monitored:
2:nd A.1~ Arl!iy (1st Ukranian Front}
All Russian ra<U.o beacons 1
· c. 3rd ·.Battal.ton·~ .southern sector :in Austria:
Bth Air Ar;;q
17th A.i.r Army
:;th Air Array
l~uss1.anC::ommand networks
le.th Atr Army (long range bombers)
The Get'ii·ans vere quick to 1mp:rov1se on all fronts. For
;brntl3.nce, 11ben the 1st Battalion .found that -the Russian 1st,
3rc.i,. and 15th · A11 Armies and· the .Baltic Fleet Air Arin were
1
• I
u~h~ a di~~r~port:'!.ol"'..ate ~mowit o:f BIT, its o·perations were ad-
juoi.c)d to cai:it:i.lize on this tact.168 A detachment war:i put
aboc>.rd the cruiser 11 Pl'1n.-~ · Eugen" to monitor the Fleet Air
AY·?a. · Communication rr6m the out-~tations Yas apeeded up to
111'.::.tf:d.ia tel7 ex~lo~- t 11 hot n items The R/T in this sec to~
o.ft(;'n uncoVf):'ed armoured and trcop qoncentrntions:
28. et~~t~ic fie&Ults pt LN Rest . 353-- LN Regt 353 lltls
a h1ghly successful slgna.l 1nte1Tigence 0~3anizatlon.
Ru:> sian hao~r9.~c:L."'leHH~ in oommunica t1on technique we.a., o:r course 1
a s.;.:gn1f':i.~an.t ra-cto:r in this success. The Soviets used their
rad:1.()s extc..i1s1vely=· and they seeme9, to have difficulty con- ,
st:.r1.rnt1.r:s udsqua~e nl"e. lines. 1i''lll'the:rmore,, Russian R/T .
orrered no great problem to the Germans as vei'y little errort
was made to disguise 1mportant· !n:rortnation. As ro-r Russian
as has been seen eigi~ty-tive pe~
en~ipheP.ed ~orse traf~lc,
cent of this was ~·ead.

..
62

.'
 DOCI o·: 35,i082 9
....~c n-s1 -,0:d·::a ~)J."' the !'ly_;_ng .ror·ma t.1\>ns, buth air/ground
.o::in1 gr~;und/g1·~nL'l'i, llere n1;.;.st i.LJ9ortant for short tit.le tactical
"""' intelll~ence, but the evalnat~on ot this intercept did give
\ · so~e 1m~ortant strategic order or battle intormativn,
e3-pee:la.J.l1 the de t>loy13ent or u.n.: ts and personnel. 81m!larl7,
though long-r~nge bQmber circuits ve~e studied mainly tor
tactio~l info~mation, strategic moves and la~ge atr otfensivea
ve~~ pr~~ioted aometimes days in advance. But netvorka or
or
the gl'Ol·~.J. Oi'gS.n.i :Z:ll t1o.n the R&d Air Force Vel'e the tnoet
prol:tric. sour•ees or strategic intelligence, and solution or
th!i:t t:r-:•.rrie d!~closed the deplo,.ment. and intentions or tbe
Red Alr rorce, its logistic set up, the condit1on or nir ~1slds
and &J.1•nrart end provided a complete -personal!..t7 o:rdar o!"
l:mttle.1°9
~ignal :tntelligence had muoh tnrluence over the way 111
llhic:h the Ge1"T:Jan.a uscrl their air .force. Because or the
scarcity ot fuel, the tlying collilne.nds would not se11d u~'l i)lanea
unt11 1ntell1gonce gave them a target, !.a good :Lntell:tgence
cut out fuel con~~ng routi.lle µatrola. 1 0 In fact, the hiRh-
es t strategic intelligence levels ~ere assisted ~ the in-
sight :i.!'lto Russlan econ01rtic, political, and morale conditions
gi "en to them by Lrl negt nJ .171 .
29. Operations against Lo;ll8~ra~e Bo~ber Force-- The
Rusaian Long-range B0Ti1bei- ~orce vas:A:nUei>endent ot the Air
Armies. .?r1or to 1945, it consisted of nine Co:r-pa tiil"ectl7
controlled by the start at i.1oscov. Earl~ 1n this 7ear, hov-
e-.rer, the f01'ce vas l"eorgan1zed as the loth Air Al9tn'J con-
r e! s tlng o-r tour cor ;Js. 172 Though a rev tour-engine PE-J' a
appeared at the e:1d of the vs.?' as pfl.l't or the Force, Sovl.et
long-range bornbel"s were strictly meJ.ium bor:ibers by United
States stan:.lcrjs 1 cons.i.3ting cllierly of IL-4•a, IL-2•a,
a-25•a, and A-20 1 s. Th~ l~th Air Arr.13' (the Long-Range
Bomber Jilol"'ce) nu:nbereu o.bout 1300 ;Jlanes.173
The .l'P.C<1rd of Lhie long-ra:ri..ge bomber force was not very
i.t.1.:n"ess~ ,!I'.:!. Crelia i1e1,e ;:>oorly trained for large acale night
o~eratlcns : and the Sov~ets di~ not attempt daylight raids
until j;_,st befi>re Germany• e colla;>se, vhen her resistance
ua~ brol.:·:m. I·n gen~ral, the Moscow Cormaa.nd used l ts bomber
fo~ce conser-vctively to preserve a1rcrBft and crevs. Sixt7
Russian bombel'S ne\~ded one holl!' under favorable weathe.?" con-
d.1. M. ~ns to tlllce olr and assemble for ru1 opera t~on. Take-off
ti.as sc~duJ.ed for late a:rternoon and the lines wera crossed
at n:t.ght-f'all. R/'f and l'·1orae t:raf.fic was plentiful durill8
tnke~orf, asuembly, and dlll'ing the bombing rwi. ~oreo~er,
poor Ru:-.fJian navigation re~ulted in numerous requests for
bearings and D/F fi:r.es. 174
1691 134 p:p 3 4
11or 163 I> 6
17 11 70 !l 4
172 1 107 p 5
173IF 187 p 33
l7 4IF 187 pp '5 36
 DOCID : 3560829

z..t.: Rgt 3~} 1 3

activities against the long-range bomber
fQrce tras· regional in its organization. As. the ra1d1ng air-
c~art ~assed f~o~ one battalion ~egion to another it vas '
p1clced uµ and l'llOnitored until the mJ.ssion was completed or
until it pa~sed into a 'third battalion's zone. Within the
battal~.'on, th-=~ l~ng-i-ango evaluation seat1on coordinated, the
activities of D/F siteo, out-stat.1.ons and Morse receivers
at the ::ie::-ent unit. The, section was purposely located in
the saii:3 room v:t th the intercept 09era tors at the battalion.
(See cho.iot ~·-12)
Tho pe1·~9m~l ~1r the long-range bomber evaluation section
was ale:i·ted 7J'hei:. ndv:-tnce warn.1.ug of' ira:>endin..~ bomber operations
vas recciv~~. rl'h.:A.s ndvance varn!ng could come from c~~pt­
analy~is o~ lonc-:....:inge bo~ber ground trar~ic, f~om the 1nter-
ce:Jtion or a pi•c-CJ:>erat:tonal "winds-aloft" veather r.ieasase or
!'hen Sov.:..et ~reA.t.hel' or reconnaissance planes vere sighte·d. 175
-. U9on b1:?1ng .\J.J.cr~ed, the section vai-ned all ou.t-stations of
the im::.r.·11d.ing !·:nsiJ~t.n. operat.1on. The 20 or 2~ knovn frequencies
were ;~~sed out to all intercept units. As soon as activit7
vaa hea.l'd ·=>n a f"rcc~uency, U/F va-s 1.nt"ormed and a f1x taken.176
Soviet bcr.1be1"s w·~re usually first hea?-d upon take-off.
R/'r an.1 J.ic:-..~se O.i1,-grc>w1d traf:f"ic '\f8S plentiful on the Soviet
side of' the lines, >trh1ch allowed D/F route tracking until
radio s~.lence waa clamped dovn over German tel"ri tor7. The
mon1to1•ing of gro•.tnd control stations also helµe4 in locating
the bo:nber fo1·c~.
Within th~ battalion evaluat.ton section, the current
locatit..1.n oi' th~ · 1·aiders vas .plotteJ. on an illUIJlinated 1118.p with-
in sight of ·i;he intercept operators. Upon this map, all D/F
res:ult3, ~epo~ta rrom out-stations, and local- 1nte~cept were
plottej, Thc:~e wns no dearth of 1.ni'"ormation to be posted.
The 5ov1ctt co.v-e cwa.y their position at times through careless
use of R/T. ~heir air-ground Morse traffic was partially . .
ree.dabJ.e, nnd thGiI" D/F bearing activities furnished valuable
data.. The radar service was kept i~oJ?med fror.1 Minute to
minute An.d as aoon ao the Soviets shut down ro.dio silence,
rada~ was 1n a ~oaition to take over.177

175
D 8 p 7, I 32 p 6
176 I d2 p 6
177 IF ld7

0 - 64
DOCID : · 3560829

· The Central A~r Ha.id ~·far·n.i.ng Unit~ last located a.t

Treuenbr~etzP.n, received cu~rent re9orts from each individual
inte~cept wilt on the eastern front. After evaluation,, the
..;.nformation was .flashed to thE5 flying and f'lak units o.nd to
the Home Defense Air Force. 17 v .

30. Operat.:tons ~gair.wt the Air Armie~-- The discussion

or strategic intelligence activities emphlisized the battal.:!.on 1 s .
it1;:iortance ln the nroduction of order of battle and other
long-range intelligence. Very often the cryptanalysis and
t.l"affic analysls of the Morse traffic copied at the battalion
accounted .for immediate tactical varnings, but it l-!as in the
out-stat.lons that the tactical n/R nnd D/F act1v.tt1es were
C<':!.rried on.
The out-stations were co-located vith f'ighter and re-
connaissance squadrons and groups, of'ten in the same building
a~ the aircraft reporting center of the headquarters o:f the
f oriaa tion they ¥.ere serving. The procuretilent of personnel
for these out-stations with the intelligence and language
ability to ue good R/T interce)t operators was a sel'ious
!1l:'oblem. In S;ll te of' this c.li.fficul ty, the Germans u;;.d very
well with those they had.179
Ordinarily, fixed 1nterce.~t schedules w.rere not observed.
Search receive.rs were em·:' )loyed and the tac tica.l networks
were scanned constantly. Only 1r the aircraft of the for-
mation to vhich the out-statlo.n was attached took off on a
mission, or enemy aircraft were hea.ru in its sec tor> were
particular frequencies covered. As soon as hostile aircraft
were heard, D/F was infort:!ed and constant route tracking ·
began, and as soon as tae r.us~ian bombers or fighter bombers
were accurately l ocated., German fighters were airborne. 'l'he
resul tr. of Ger111un ?.aJar served to amplifv the findings of'
Signal Intelligence. l oO ') "
The H/T l1etw·orks ~)f gr·,rnnd sup;)ort liaison officers and
even the TI/'r of armored un:i. ts helped identify and locate
targets for German fighter b(11,1bers.

173 6
I 182 p
l?g I 182 pp 9-10
lSO I 182 p 11

65
j"
I
DOCib : 35608 2 9

n·
.,;1. It1media te Re oo~ts 1sBued by L1f Eeat
Imtned1£• te1·'30Ci~ts ~ere-Tsi"Ued"Ylienever IiitOrme.t on vaa
22i--
l'ece1vcd 0.!1 ~{hioh uil'ect act1on ntigh.t be taken by German '.
rorces. ~1.3Y may be considered under three main subject
. headill6S: ·

a. Inro~rnatlon on the activ1t7 of Long-range Bombera.

'l'"'.ais included lltll"nillgs that l;>mnbers had taken 'otf and D/P
fixes 'on. the aircraft in rlight.
b. Inforblation about rallva7 activity, such as the
a~rival or t:ratns with important freight at p&l'ticula~ rail-.
va~ stations . ·
c. Requ9&ts for air support from liai~on ~fflcers with
the tied , ,rtr1/.

The most impo1•-tant recipient of these reports was the

local A"!..r r.'ni'ce·. There vere two direct land-lines between
the &l~t,ilion E>.nd local Aitt Force headquarters~ which were
ma1ntainnd th:£iougl1out the ~ changes 1n location .nsceas_i - .
ts ted .b~ the f J. uc ·t ua tio.ns in the land :f'indi11g. Thus, 1 t :vas ·
neve~ necessary to fall back on sta.nd-b7 radio c~nnele.
Il11med1ete repor.ta were also passed to the reg1ment~l head-
quarters. vh:lch 1n ,turn lras in close touch Yith th~ Air · ·
Force I!1gh Comrw.ud. e.nd all the f'l'11ll8 un1ts . l~l ·
• • . :~.: 1 ~ • • •

32 R~1nilt.~-:~~~~ 'Operat:!.ons of LN Tiegt jl)3-- The .

chiet_con'"f"r~ou~~~~e ty LN Regt 355.to iact1oel operations ·
on tpe ~ast~rn Fra;n_ti V&$ the constant supply of 1nte_ll1gence
that ma<Ao poss!.blc .,the economJ.c and. eff.1.cie.ut use of' German
aircttaft. Hi th ~ ahol'tage c>f a i rcraft ca ~able of opera t1ng
and vith the shortage or fuel 1n particular, missions were ·
usually f lolra b'i the formations in accol"dance vi th the
dcc1s1o:;.s of tho :lntercept ser\rice. Once German alI•eraft
vere airbcl~.rte un a i::\ission the ground cont:rol kept them. · ..
Constantly :tr1.form~d Of the intentions .and dispos1 tion Of .
Russ tan f 1ght3l'S" and bombers.
r

ldl
I J.07 P ;;

66

r·
 . .·
DOGID: 3560829
.' ..
1.
" Volune '.:>
.I
Cna,ter IV. .O~gani2ation and Oper~t1on of the Field 'Unit~.
Section G. O:;.wra ti one in the South.

Paragraph •

His to~y from 1938 to August 1943 ·.............•...•. ·-· . ~:}

History from August 1943 to October 1944 .... : ....... :. 34
History Octobe~ 1944 to German Collayse .....•......... ~5
Intercc pt wJ. thin ·LN Regt 352. . . . • • • . . . . . . • • • . • • • • . • . • • 36
Eva.luatton vitll.1.n LN Regt· ?52 ..•••••••.••••..••••••.•• 31
Commumuntiona ifithlli LN Regt 352 •.••••••••••••••••.•• 3d
Results of' LN Regt .352 .................• ............ - • . • . 39
33. HistorJ tram 1933 to A~st 19.#:;--
1ntelligencel""rii7t operating In southern
'!'he
seoto~,
lnBt· Signal
LN Regt 352J
began i:n J.93d as a :fixed !Jtat1on, V-Leit 13, in Oberhaobing.
'l'hi:i Wll.t r.ionltored French and English traffic from Af:rioa.
Se~·tiori c of· th~ Chi-Stelle (F:ranoe) exerc!.sed COl{l.Ple.te control
over W-Leit.13.
The war in the Medi terrane.an was t{e 11 under vay when a
more or less comp~ahensive Signal Intelligence Servlee was
c::i:•euted in the $outh under Section ·c, vhich was moved from
F:rance back: ~co the Ma.:rs tall. · Signal Intelligence South .
included 9th Co,, L.l'f Regt 40 at Athens, and Signal. Intelligence
' platoon f:ron~ ·1.-;t.3 B t Pale:rino 'l and a fixed statlon, w..:.Lel t 14,
at Vougl.:.amenct. neal' A'I.hens. lv5 ·
_ Du.i-.:i.ug this ea::aly "?er1od, evaluation meant ·the deciphe.r:tng
an:i ~ranslnti:)n of all..;.ed t.raf'tic, and each 51.gnal Intelligence
unit d:!..u ~ tn own l.adependent eval-yation. The deciphered -
message3 we?'e sent 1wme~ately 186 to Section c.. other Sign.al ,,.. ·
lntelllgcnca o~gsnizat~ons, and flying ~.ts. - The A-2 of the
flyJ.ng unJ. t dl.d the ~ctue.l evaluat~on. ld'"t ·
By the m"idtlle of 1941, the RAF hac:i been :reintorc~d and to
offset tha ad.J.ed·Hl'.'it.tsh strength, local A!r Farce 2 vas
vi thdra\-;n from the eastern 1'ront and sent to Sici;Ly. \rli thin
Air Force 2 wcFe Wing 2· (Fliegerkorps II) in Messina, · Wing 10
(Fliegel"ko~ps X) In Ii2ra.klian, and the African Air Command.
Each W1J:\.g 1 . or Fliegel'lcorps, had a Signal I.nteliigence ~ompsny
and the Cpnnri&nd had a platoon. l<-:-Le1t 2, an evaluation comp&DJ,
was att~ched to the local Air·Force and became the center_Qf
Signal Intelligence ~ctfvity. vith1n the local Ai~ Force.llru

lS~ IF 181~ p 1-5

lB6 IF 184 1J 6
I·
..
l87 IF 1=_84 · p 6-7
l~B IF l84·p 8
'·
·.
fir
 I .
DOCIO : 3560829 . I

Meunifhile~ :t.he 9th Company · at Athens had bec-:>tne' very·

. act;;.ve. This ml.it and it·s satellites. were formed into one
battalion nnd the W-Leit 2 and its· subordinates into another.
The ne.w .tm5.t (~he old 9th Company) be·cate .w-Leit 2., southeast.
Zones of o~Gratfons ~e~e·aeparated by a l:lne drawn through
Cape.Passepo~ Malta and Tr1pol1. W-Le1t 2 took everything
wes.t Of the line lll'ld \f-Leit 2 Southeast everything eas·t.
Lack of foresight· and i!l-1 ve vae reQponsible fo.l' the tvo uni ta
not being formed into a Regiment .1~9 ··
The two .'W'-Le':tt :res~veq the right of final evaluation.• . !

Thei::- u:ateria+. o.ame r.1llinly rrom subordinate ~ts that .favored ·

the inte!'cc:lt:. . 0n of air-ground tra.fric and that had been
s~ccessful in'thelF ~ryptanalys1s o.f point-to-point trarr1c.,
es9eclnlly in the case of the RAF 4-.figure code. V-Le1t 2
organized its evaluation on the b&s~s or righter R/T, reoce and.
bomber R/T~ and air support traffic, vh1le W-Leit Southe~et•a
evaluatlnn -w~s bn-se-d upon enemy t.mJ.:ts mon.1tored. (201 N C G~oup,,
205· Gr"tm, 9th 1IDJl..AF nnd Deee?"t Air Foroe).190 JUl unite
in t.he ~lad!teJ;>ranean area overlapped as to the ·A llied units
they mon:i. t"l1red in o!'der ·to service their ovn local headq·uarters
v1 th :fl~nth :repoI'ts. .The Signal Intell~&tnce Agency .: ·.. .tailed
miserably in coordlnatirig their efrorts,191 ·
ThP. steady ·d egeneration or the war situation · in the South
...-fo1• the G~1'w:o.ns in 1943 tnada unification of t'he two uni ta
into a Rag:tme.&~t more and more urgent. 'rµe High Command's
solution was the activation or a short-lived liaison unit at
local Ai~ Force (Luft.flotte 2). This unit was intended to
li~k the twQ ~val?.18.tion Centera (W-Le~t) and the Chi-Stelle
Secti.on ·w1t11 the .flir Force command in Italy and Gl'eece. It
m1s rri thdra·un e.fter six months. · ·- .
. Sec-:;:Lon C :o'f ·tb<J Chi-Stelle began its mo$t ·etticient
c,t)e::i;~ation::; !n 191~3. · It had strengthened .1ta control over the ·
field 'battalions and acted as a .final judge on policy r:iattera.
Tcchnicn~ expey.ts v.e~e sent to.the field whenever the field
.units nceued h~l~. S~ction c•s be.st ·pel'fo~noe vaa on log
·analysls nnd '1'/A 192. · . .
Duri.ng 194:; rcany ·i-s.dar and. VHF intercept out-atatione ·
were erected. The VHF stat1QI18 vere ·und.el' W-Leit 2. These
outsta1~ions ca~ried the brunt of the .o !)eratioJlS, and
. . thoroughly rnon.i tored the allied uni t .s. operating against 'the
German suppl~ line from Sicily to the .Af'r.ica· Corps holed up
' in Tunisia.193 During the aq.me period., W~Leit Southeast· be- ·
gan to concent~ate more and more on T/A, route tracking~~R/T,
and rada1• evaluation. The RAF 4-figuI'e' ciphe~, vhich had been
l'eS..d continuo~s~y aince March 1940, had become ~eadable,
entailing.the shift in o~erat1onal emphasis • .
189 IF-184 ? 8

igo IF 1'l!1- pp 16 17
..
l9l l°F 184 )'.I 15
.() 1 92 Dr 134 p 26
l93 · IF ,J:84 p 27
68 .
•. ..
DOCID: 3560829

}4 History- August 1943 - October· 19J~JJ.-- The two Signal

Intell.i..gcnce-"tllirt"E'In the-~o.uth continued to expand, but :tn
d1!"f13:rc-;nt d:i.1•ections. W'-Le:tt 2· t-ras charged w:tt~ monitoring
the units opeJ."ating against the Germans in Italy,, while \i'-Lett
Southeac·i:. cov:ered the Adriatic coast, 'which was under threat
of inv~siou. Doth units were engaged in flight-tracking the
~!astons flown by allied bombers ,.,hich by now ~rere based" ::..n
Fog~ia.
Tlu•ee days be.fo1->e the landing on S:f.cily-, the evaluation ·
.com-~a.ny W·-1..ei t 2 mis rlown f':rom Taormi~ to Frascat:t, neaza
Ror.1e, and ·~he rest of the un1 t .followed cl<>se behind. _While
the unit v:as a.t F?'aecat1, Italy f s surrender caught 1 t lmaware.
Just befo~e it'~oved to ·Padua, it was so badly mauled in a raid·
by 170 ·B·-2l~ 's tMt ror a time the. German Command could leal'n
of the J1~ou;1d ~ 1t ua t:l.on in Italy only thl"ough Allied ·a1r
suptmrt t:'ler~:Ja.geg> 111terce;ted in Southern France. 194
At ·Pa~l:..\a 11\vst :)f the ke7 officers were relieved and .l'e-
pJ.nced. Ai't~1· trrq r.1onths or moving and of being inopepati ve,,
'W-Le:I. t 2 .eet up sho_:i~ nia1.nly as a tact.1cal rrarning service •
. Among the tasks pe~for~ed by thi$.un1t was the interception
·of the tra f' r :.. c _of the me di \ll1i bomber· a _, wb1 ch w~re engage.d at
this tir'.l.e 1.n. gj_ vfng the l"onds and brLdges :i.n the Gertillln zone
a going over.. il-Lei t 2 exoeeded t ts cc:.i~lln:1. tme.n.ts by oontrlbu~
ting to the l'OULc-t,Ni.Cklng Of heavy bo1r1bers heading f'Or
Germany. 195 . ·
W-L~lt. Southeast~ had for its mission the cover Qf.
fl'eguenc:tes heard :i.n · the Adria.tic Area in general and the
l'Oute-t:!'acki11!~ of heavy bombers heading into the Balkans.
Owing to the reverses in the fighting~ the local Air·Force in
tho Southc~stern a:...ea moved from Athen.f,ll to Salonika taking
the'Signal 'Int~lJ.igence units along. In January 19 44 W'-Le!t
Southeas~i; moved. v~. th the local Air Force neal' Belgrade. The
unit net up a centrnl_neport1ng Center ~or the Southeast con-
nected to a.11 i..mits by direct land line. Tlle oytpost covered
a.~ area from Crimea to Crete a,g,d :rrom Munich to Styria. Tllel'e
,.,ez:ie seven cor.1pan:t.es J.n all. 190
Durjr.J.g this period W-Leit Southeast monitored R/T and
~orae of the heavy bombers, but it became especially pro-
f'1.cient in D/V: :.i.:11g the IFF and ~')anora1a.i.c devices aboBl'd
all:ted bonberrJ. · . ··
The Rcpo:r.~t:.L1'lg Centers and a.J.l lllli ts ·of' .~f-~:1. t Southeast
were of nec.(~asity r~i.~hly mobile,, and when the Russians broke
thJ:"ough, tl?e unit wa.s· moved. and re£;stab_J;ished a.-t Premstaetten.197

l9 4 IF ldl~ p 42
195 IF J.84 P.43
196 IF 1d4 p 49
19·r IF 1~31~ p $JO
 DOCI D: 356082'9

35.' H.tatory · Octob~.!:. 1944.-per111a.n Oolla:.J.ae-- After the !

rctl'ea t~• rul'.d raversea exper:i.enced in Italy, the Signal
lntel.l.i5anee un:~ ts had to be rebuilt fl-um the ground up. A.-
11e'W' ref.111'!ent, LU n~~t 352, (See cbll:rt 5:.lj) vas craateds
and th.L.a i-e~:111..ed ..:.n the cotabin.:i.ne of the tvo evaluatlon ..
oci~.i!)an:.co vf' the bat.tallons (1-l-Lelt 2 aml ·:f - Lelt 2 Southea;1t)
.:_ato a ..r·.71[~:!.0 rc~s.:.mental evalust.:i.on co1n~ny (25th ConJ?)S.n.y).
Re!)o:r·tf Jg Ce&1te1~ (Mtaldeko;>f) ~~ va.s 1tm:JP.diat.ely eubord:tnate.d
to ::•eg.-:.. ..~=-:n~al b~a.Jq~art.era as the 26th Oom,mny. 'FW'theroore,
esch or ttie t.W"o liA t :;,nl!Dns ooml1r;. sed three ::-adio intel"eej)t.
com-;mru.~~ a.no. one radar intercept company. All evalus.tion
a;id wc~1'-,icnl direct.:on vas·oentrall~ located·l.n the Evaluation
Compan!' .1 t reg.:!.wents.l headquarters. 198 ·
Although the f~>l&l activaticn of Lri Ragt }52 was a good
move, ·1 t. re-stilted in no ~rked increase · in signal intelligence
effic1en.cy i.n the Sou.t.h. Germany 1 e battle liriea were collapsing
and cor,~::.n.icationa within the count~ we:re 1n a sorry state.
Euly 1n 19'i5, the regimental otarr, the evalu.ntion company,
nnd one ~. nt<.:rt ".Pt compall1' moved to Atte~~ee ahead or the
Russians. \1hcn V:tunnn fell they l!ere joined by Report1I'..g
Center I~ and the intercept companies i9rom that area. Out-
atat;tono t-Fe~a w:ttJ1drl\un and· the- 2nd Bat.ta.lion woved to
Ste1riach .. Pue::-~;g. Al.l w11.ts tmder lccal Ail" Force 6 moved to
the inte:i~m;w~nt car.lp at Ascbbach ~rhen Gerrr.any surrendered.
. :anttnlioll
The 1st .
was captured by. the B1~itish at Canazei.
· 36. Intercept Vii;hin I.u."'f Eegt 252- ... The receivers an
hnnd and ·task assignments within LNnegt :1:.-2 J.llustrate the
Regirnente' depioyt11ent against the Allie~ in the South. The
al.looatl<.n was ns rollovs; 199
'
· ~Allied e.i:x' su!)port uni ts 65 receivers
All1.Gd f;t.1®1' Nct'-'orks 30 receivers '

Comr.:t!nd r~etvo1•lcs; Eastern 50 receivers

.M edi tl.':n:anean a11d Balkans;
trano~ort li.ru.l su9ply traff~o

l5til U3AAP, 20? Grou;>-RAF 25 receivers

.35 reca1vers
'
HF D/F - 3ets 23 D/F's
Radar in 15 out-stations 100 rece 1 vers ·

19~ IF- 184· pp 69 70

(°" 199 IF-181~ P 70

70.
.•,
DOCID: 3560829
}(. Ev~luation vithin LN Regt 3~2-- A sharp distinction
between tacT.:tcal anustrategic "opera'Eious .1 ould be very
di.f:f"1oul t to d.:'""'av i!1 d1souss1ng evaluation tn the South. In
the early days, ~hen German fortunes were aacendant, the
ernphasin i.n the Evaluation Companies (W-Leit; was upon crypt;-
analys~t-a and th~ :-econstruct:ton· of AlJ.1.ed ordE:.r or battle.
Gradually) aa allied ciphe~s became more diff~~ult and a~
Germany changed over to the defensive, t&ot!oal, short time
va:rn:i.ng3 became the !::le.in Signal Intelligence comt1~1tment.
:~hi.le dm>ing the early· stages ~ the wal' Germ&..'1. evaluation
~..ras 11mi ted to li11.~ssage content nnd elementacy CJ..1/A, . . . llied
use uf b~tte?> cipher and more cotnplex means or cotmntmicat.ton
fo~ced the Germans to adjust thei~ evaluation methods accordingl~.
By October 19~.Jt, 11hen LN Regt 352 was ·activated, the
C-ermans w~~e using every signal b"18.D.1te~tation to extract
intelligencf?. Tlie Marse !Joint-to-point and ai.r'/ground traffic
was u/Fid :m.d evaluated~ R/T in both BF and VHF ranges accounted
tor tactical varnt.ngs, the radio links between allied radar
sites sho~ed thei~ activity against Gertnnn aircraft, the ·
actual "."ton.:Ltm... :l.ng of allied radar disclosed those .areas not
be.lng ccveired,, t-lnd the .D/F :tng of' IFF and airborne rad.al' was
Ut:le.! to !'•.Jute-tl'G.ck allied bombers. 200
The Ge:etinns .i.n th~ South had more success against the US
15th AAP tr.tan e.ga~nst the UAF's 205 Group. British use of
W/T ~ R/'11 und :N!d12 ting devices was much mol'e careful.: 201 Major
.Fe.r:Hn.n,;!d ?elchtner, 00 oi' LN Regt '352, sumruarized the
operatt'.)ns agn:'...nst the 15th USAAF as f'ollows:
a. Air Gi:•ound f..1i.,rse
Pr-ewarni1i.g or· bomber :flights was g~ ven by the tuning
t1..aff .le. During the ·flight to the te1~get the b~ubers sen~
short r.1e.ssages on a. half hour schedule that could be D/F' d..
b~ Air-Ground R/T · . ·
Interception of thie tra!'fie p~avided information con-
ce:rni~ the flying uni ts involved and their approJtima te
strength·dur~xi,g the take-orr on an ·o:peration.
c. '\:'"HF Ai:.."' /Air R/T
Th:f. s traf f 1c !H...::rvided valuable in!'orma t1on re,SS:rding the
fighter:.:: uc-eompanytn.g the bombers. Continuous D/F ing vas
poa~ible.
d. i~ed1o-Equ.ipment ·
The D/F tng of ;.1addo was of ass1 !.• tance in lo~atlng bombe~
f'orces !Jcattered over a large area. ·
e. IFF Device .
The A!'.:'"iericans dld not shut ot-r their IFF over German
terr1to~y. The Ge~mnns used the1~ radar unit F~eya-D to rae.ke
the dfflriCe :c-adiate. Mea~urerrients and tracking were possible
up to 280 miles. 1
f. Hctec~ologionl Observation Planes
The c1,hc~ system used by the met recce planes could be
l"t(lB.d and tha:Lr ~~ranamissions D/F 'd. The :!.nterce_pt1on of this
t~a.ff'ic gavd rn~uy z,~dvanced YBl'nings or US bomber incursions. 202
.;:
200 IF 126 p l'i
. 20l IF 126 o l'{
. ' .
eo2 I 126 p 17;..18
71
DOCID: 3560829

Reporting Center 4 vas one and the saine vtth 26th Com-
pany ot LN Regt .J.52. In this unit 1 the tactical warnings
from signal intell.igenee ve:r,te qoordina.t ed with reports from .
the Ge1•man radar. and observation -services. Immediate wazanings
ver~ flashed to t1ghte~ units{ Air Forces. and to c1v111an
air l'a:l.d def'enee o1'f'1c1&ls. See chart 5-14) · . .
38. Communications within LN llegt 35?-- ·L1' Regt 352
maintained excellent sigDal con:imunlcations despite f'requent
moves and general ·militarJ ~everses. Direct telephone lines
we1"e maintained bet-ween the Regiment and its uni ts and to
.the local ·Air Foroea and tactical units in its v1cin1ty.20'
(See chazat 5-15) Moreover, the regiment had its ovn private
teletype systam to all headquarters, the equipment being ·
ho th plain text and enciphered. ( G-Sehre1be~) v.ariet:r. 2Ulf ... · ... .
(Seo chart 5-16) A ro.d1o net1tol~k wa.s sup)~r-1.mpol[ied on the · ·~ ·
oth~r 1u~ans of oommunicat1on1 within ~thich the Enigma lfas
used fOF securit7.~05 (See chart 5-17) ·
~ :;9. Resu?:;ta · of LN Rest ti2.;- The s·tl'Q.teg1c · 1mportance
or l1M Hegt~ and the unitsat preceded it may be illua-
trs.ted by the s.coom,pa.nying diagram fJ:tom the Seaboul'ne report.
(~ee chartr 5-18) The signal intelligence units in the South
l--econstructed th~ oom.p1ete al11ed air order of battle from ·
s1gn.ul intelligence ene1D7 tratr1c and kept it up to date.
On. the tact:i.cal side the Signal Intelligence Service did
a s'ltperb jobot lceeping the tactical units and o1v111a.u -de-
fene3 aaenc~es inf'Ol'med or allied bomber attacks. Col. Bans
Forster, FAF, Chief of the Air Ra14 WB.l'ning Service for
GeriUUly, ~tated that "suprises out of the South r&l'e1y oc-
ourl•ed. n2Ub

203!F 184 p 71 .
20~l!i1 18'~ p 72
20511jl 184 p 7}
20?!F 181 » 69

·1~
I
 --- - -- .. - -

-- ------ --------------------
DOCID: 3560829

Chapter IV. 0.l'"ga...:t.1.za ti~n nnd Opera. ti.1n of Field Uni ts.
Section D. O~:ra.tioru; in the Morth

flaragra;:>h

lJ'ie·i;ory· hom 1940 to 1943. •. . . ......••..........•.. > • • 40

Hiatorv f'rom 1944 to 194~. . . . . . • . . . . . . . • • • . . . . . . . • . . . • 41
S~rmmation or actlvity in the Horth •.•....•..•...•..... 42
1w. Hi.stOl'l f:r>on• 1940 to 1943-... L.~ l.Iay 1940, soon after
Norway was in·iraded, a g=l('oup of' signal intelligence !)erson.Jiel
was sent from Husum to Oslo, Norway to set u~ the nucleus of
signal intelligence activity in -the Ho1•th. T'.ae new unit,
W-Leit 5, had as its mission evaluation and the supervision
cf any intercept units asa1g.ned to Norway. Its commit.cents
were ell Morse and R/T circuits of the RAF '~oasta.l Command
operating against the West Coast of Nor\."B.y and all traff lc
origins tiilg in the No:rth Sea • rea. The ·first intercept and
D/F unit W-Stelle-25 w&s set up at Trondheim-Skatval d~ring
the same mo.µth-210 W-.Ctt!l.le 25 covered mainly the Norse 8.nd
R/'t of' ld Group Coastal Cor.nnand. W-Stelle 25 uoved to
Stavanger at the end of Augu~t. ·
j By the end of 1940, ;)rd Battalion Air Signals Regirnent 5
had been .formed and 5.ncl.uded ~/-Lei t 5 (a.n intel'cept unit),
I .0 9 L!"lf Regt 5 at .Noerland .and \I-Stelle 22 at Hussum 1n Schlesv1g
Holstein. The jrd Battallon of LN He~t ~ covered 15 and lU
Grouns Coastal Comr:iand and the high fr\:quency R/T or fighters
bs.aed in Northern U .K. Beacons anll Meteor~logioal tra.ffic .
vere ~nterce~ted and C0astal Co~~~~d Syko vas read at Husum.211
When tbe .f~g_~.te:r un.::: te of t.he RAF conve:r-ted .f:rom liF to
VJ:IF P./T in A:.ir:tl 19J~~,, a '1ery 1'ru1 tfuJ. sourca of' 1.ntelligence
dr::.ed up on the Ge!'ma.n.t un'~ .l they ~oultl be equipped vlth
4

pr·o~.:ier receive:rs. It <lev~lc:;eu the t the~ i~e~er \o/ere.

By the end of ths year a !l Sig.illil J;nte!.l igence uni ts were
aubo~dinated to J.sN Regt 5 nnd included 4 Adcock D/F 1 s and
5 inter-cept ~natalletion..~. .
Teletype llnea we~ la:.. ii to !·! a,•al and German Air Fo.rce ::>
exchanges at Oslo aE ~ell ns to Be:ilin.t Hm:;J ~ , and Noe:rland.21_
An important devAlop-ment d'..U"·ing l9l!-2 \J'&R tne orga.n1zat1on
of jJfF Base Atlantic, n '!:ar:les er. D/F' :lta.t,~:. on~ at Bodo, Orla.ndet,
Nosrland, Busum in Geru.my,, a~:! Brest in E'rsnee. The main
function of tlie D/F tase we.a tl7.e D/F ing of' the aircraf't of
15 Group Coa?tte.l Comn:an.d on convoy e:::ic·ort B..t"1.d other units on
anti-submarine pat~ol.
210 i 183 410/1945
211 I 183 4l0/194S p 3
212 .
I 183 410/1945 p 4
DOCID: 3560829

'l'lw :-:~~J. ~11.~t.i:aU.on ar :..1~ f,e:;t. 5 add~ll the dth intercept

company "Lll th.;, f8l.l ot'" l~h2. W-Le1 t 5 \'as redesignate:l
1.!i /LN Jl~gt :; :uu.\ W-22 becnrae 15/LN Regt 2 .
Inte:.:•c:m:;1~ coverage Ya~ expanded to .,;.nclude all Mor:1e and
R/T in the No:!"th Sea, the Iceland bases and Horth Sea convoys,
but o~">era t.l0n~1 in genel"a.l were hampered bJ bad a ti:iosphere.
'.l1he listeni.ng serviee :i..u t.he North remained fairly stable
t.hroughvut 1911_,, Excellent ?'eau:&.ts were ga!.ned from D/F Base
A tl:H1t:!.-::, nnd ctwel'age was extended to include the traf.fic
\., f cvur·:: e1· ;>la.r..es o;>e1•at1.r1g between Sweden and F.ngland.213

!H. l!la tm7 f'r0m 194Ji to 19;~5- - The year 19tf·~· brought
about a gC'5i?rAI re :)rg!in:!.zativn ~;,f the ent11•e Ger~n A!l' Force
5.i ~na l In te 11.i.gence Sel'vice. The uni ts 1n Norway vere renaced
au follvws :
,
14/L!i Regt ·~) became l/L?J Abt 355
3/LN 1\egt 5 beoa!lle 2/LN Abt. 55~;
9/Ll'i He.gt 5 LiecaMe ..1/LM Abt )55
l'.)/LN P.egt 2 he!!&me '5/LJ.l. Abt 35'"(

w.- s ·telle 10, ·Ghe contz•ol station v1 th!n Ciertnan7 for

Norvegian units vns renamed Le1t~telle der Funkaufklirung. A
raob:i. le :! Rdio intelligence unit was set up in Norwa1 as an
1

a.ni".i-invasion measul'e. 211.1-

2/LN Abt 355 was moved frorn Bardutoss to Holden because of
poor r~cept1on.
D/F Ba2e AtJantie lost. its le.ft wing when Brest .fell to the
a.11~.ea, s.nd 1 ts 3vanik base when Northern Norvay was evacuated.. 215
The Vfili' ex~ericents that dated .from 1941 vere finally
dro~ped ro~ t~chnieal reasons. Good intelligence was 3leened
from the Morse t:r•aff!c or Coastal Command and US and British
botnbe:r- un:Lts. R/J~ t:r-affic vas picked up when allied Wl1 ts
e,n1rQac:ied ·t..he rtoi·vogian coast .
.An :i.r:l'po1.. t11.n ·c ~ource of ::intelligence on the North · Sea con-
voys \f8t'I the tl"Rfi"!c of long rallb~ recce and car:rier aircra.ft. 216
i~2. Swr.uia. ti on of ac ti ,,1 ty in the No_!'_!h- - The German Air
Force 85.p,nnl r.11t.er1.tgenco'J .service in Norway wa.B Ii fairly suc-
cessful orenniz.'!?.tion i:rhen one c<>ns1ders the bad atmospherics
in the ~eg1on and th9 difficulty exper~enced· by the wi1ts in
the North in obta!ninf~ proper equipr.&e.nt.
No major land aetie>n or air· 01·reneive vas ever carried out
by the :, llies in the !iorth, eo the Gerr.m11 Signal Intelligence
effort ln the r~orth vas a side show in comparison with German
signal 1ntell1gence upere.t1ons on the ~./estern and Eastern t:ronta.

213 I
183 !~10/19 1~5 ·p u ~·

211,
I U33 1~10/1945 ~ ..,
215 I 183 410/1945 p a
216 I 18J !il0/1945 p 8
DOCID: 3560829

VOLUME 5
Chapter V. Cryptanalysis
Paragraph
Introduction. . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 43
S~cce~ses Yith US Systems••••••••••••,•••••••••••••• 44
~uccesses Wi"Gh B:ritish s,stems ••••••.••••.•.•• ~····· 45
C~ypt~graphy of Soviet Systems ••••••••••••.•••.••••• 46
Succe3ses with Soviet Systems ........................ 47
Stenna~d ope~ating procedure in dealing with
Soviet Sya""cemc .••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••• · .,~ ••• 48
Successes with systems of other nations •••••••.• ~· -"·. 49

43. Introduction-- The central cryptanalytic bureau

of th~ Alr·Torco ufil'Cn both directed and carried on the
crypt.s.nalysis foi- that Ol'gs.nlzat1on was Section E of the
Signal InteJ.ligenr;e Agency (Chi ..stelle). The organization
e.nd functions of that section have already been described
in Ch:ipte1-: III and 't-!111 not be further treated here. This
chapter. desc1"'i°bes rather the sy2tems studied by the German
Air F~rce oryptanalysts. It is divided into oectlons ac-
cording to th0 countries whose systems are discussed. In
each :3ection~ the systems studied will be listed,, and brief-
ly co~":"fillentsd upon.
In general, the cryptanslysts appeared to fee1 their
effor·~s did not receive the conside:i;-at1on ·they deserved.
Fo1• instance, Specdal1st (Regie:c>UDgs Rat Dr.) Voegele;
Chief of the Crypt~~mlytic Section (Section E), declared
the.t t.he pziimary c;bject of intercept ti't1.s traffic an~.lys!s
and e'Jf'. . lus.t~.on and that cryptanalysis was considered of
3econde,ry J.t.1por·ta11ce. He coin~lained that he never was
allm:ed e.ny r;,ay :J.~ ths a.lloca. tion of the intercept tasks.
Re further .f(.)und tn.t1.lt with t;he traffic which he did re-
ce:i.vr;;, pointing out tba.t he frequentl:R" was passed eight
or nine versions 01· the same message •2 2 0 The denial to
the: c:vypta.mi.lys'ts of a voice 1n directing coverage is ,,
l1oted by Te<;hn:tc.a.l Sergeant .Ter1ng of the Signal Intel- \l
1:
:i
ligence Agency as i·iell: I:
11
A g.•eat d1ff'1eulty 'Which ')xistGd l'Ia.s that the ·'
Referat could exercise no definite influence on the I
number or locetion of intercept receivers covering ii

22or 112 p ?
DOCID: 3560829
0

t.ra.f.fic in '"'hich it was interested. u221

In choosing the location of or1ptanalyt1c units tp..e
Germans folloued the principle of going as far .f'orYerd as
posoible. On the Weste?>n Front and in the fl1ed1 tarrs.nean
area imrr~dis.tely exploitable Allied systems such as the
bomber code, the alrcra:ft reporting code, SYKO and REKOH
verc ~orked on in the field battalions. On the Eastern
Fr·ont. the Battalions o:f Air Signals Regiment 353 car~iad
on the cur!'ent analysis of Russian 2, 3, and 4 figure sys-
tems.
All material impossible of solution in the field was
returned to the Chi-Stelle for re3ea~ah. Th'Uo, the Chi~
Stelle car~ied on the analys1s of United states strip
systems, M-209 re~aa.rch,, tbe recovery of' tbe W'a.r Depart-
ment Teleeraph Code and ziesee.roh on the Al·l-2 (SlGABA).
Ru~sian 5-figu.re material ~hich uas 1.Dcapable of solution
:f.n the .field vas studied by tbs Chi-Stelle ..
lJ4. Successes vith U. s. Syatems--
M-209 Accorolrig to Voegele tlm f4-209 vas first
read in lriarch or April 19~4 • The Germam aver-
aged 6~8 days of currency each month on the West-
e~n Front, 1-2 days 1.n the Med1teri-enean srea.
A "kaychart" was captured 1n October 1944, g1V1ng
r the Germans 26-27· days of currency.
Voegele claimed 22 \hours ae 11.13 organization• s
bast time on the comolete solution of' an M-209
system. The average- ~1.me l&g vas 8-10 days due
to the delay in receiving traff"io. Eventually,
the Air Force dropped ~~~ M-209 job, vhich vas
performed b1 the Army.
· Ludt-rig o la.1.med tbs. t the I'1-209 traffic of
the U. s. 8th Fighter Command (65th, 66th, and
67th vings), ~bich carried adm1n1strat1~e 1n-
fo~mat1on and particulars about the Mustang
fighter, vas broken in Februar: 1944 bJ the
Army Signal Evaluation Center or Signal Intel-
ligence Regiment 5 (NAAS 5) at St. Germaine,
France. After the invasion, battle losses o:f
the .lOlst A1:rborne Division vere read. Ludvig
also named the 9th Air Derense Co11£8.nd e.nd 9th
221 IF 180 p 17
222r 117 P 4

76
 DOCID: 3560829

Engii1eer Com:tn2.Dd as uni!ts whose tr&fi'ic was r~ad.

The re~1ng o.f a .XXIX TAC l-i-209 message helped
t1p-•)f'f an of:f'i;nsive in the Aachen e.rea.223
The analysis of the M-209 ~as tlade more
difficult when each army and command began using
separate settings. V~gele's discussion on the
Ger.m.9.n~ · analysis of the M-209 included the fol-
lowing requisites Tor solution or the daily
machine set~ings:
s.. Two m2ssagas vb.ere part of' the pls.in
text could be assswned and superimposed.
b. Message vith mistakes later re-encipher-
ed in correct system and key. 50 or 60
· letters of deeipher-ment were necessary
to obtain a 12-hour settingo
The Germen A1r Force~s traffic totals for
M-209 solution were about 100 per day in tb~
West:. '11hc f4edit~r1~anean Area aver-aged 49 mes-
SF.eas poZ> day. 22~
Section E vest of the Ch1-Stelle22 5 read
th•:? Southern Route Strip Sys·i.~eill . (indicator CENEB)
~s early as May 1942. Voe3ele desc~ibed this as
r a 30 atr-1p system. The introduction of a device
incroa.sing the security e.nd a gradual reduction
in t!'a:ffic volume f'oriced the discon·c1nuance of .
•·rork on this system. The Ger-mans estimB.ted ~- oo
~c::-r:.~.~es per day as the minimum i~equ1s1 te for
solut~~~J of a strip cipher with .channel el1rn1na-
t.~: ,·. ·.• ·- Voegele sa.id :lt :req\\i!'ed t~ro months
to b:re .:.•,:r o. st2"ip system using band methods, but
ti1~ evs.lltual use of IBM ms.~.b.1naziy cut the tlme
to .from t :'1o to four ;feelcs • .2 7
The Ge1•ir:a.n solution of the CENEB strip c1-
phe1• uas very stra:tghtfo~ard. They first .fou.i,d
tbe 15 letter period and m;tChined tha t~aff ic on
this basis. A depth of 80 passages o~ pa.~allel
co11struction was needed to reconstruct the 100
st:Pips, or vhich 30 v.ere used each day.
22 3r 209 p37
2241:.- 175 p 16
225see Che.pter III
226IF 175 p 15, I 112 p 5
221r 219 p 3
11
 DOCID: 3560829

A few messages lrere read 6 weeks. a.fte:r

ch8.nn£il elt1nina~ion. wa:r. iP.~§oduced in 194',,
but tne traffic fell off .c
A f:iystem t-:'"ith indic:s.tor~ XOOA~ :;.::1 the
:lonthern Rout.~ could not be read.~ ~
Section F. Weat read e.n. r.I··~J{. system ~-Tith
the 1ll.-i:.i.cator URS.All t•;i:"c:r.l the summe:r of 1942
until Del=tn!lber 1~45 .2;}0
Oae day 1 s .A tlru1 tic-Forry-Hou te tl'af.f'ic
of 60 mess.g,ges vas deciphered by ~he 16th
Compsny, LN·~agt ~(later p~t ot 'rd.Battalion
LN Re~t 351). ~he evalua.ticn section cons14mr;.
ed. it ui!.1mportant and thG project was d.rcpped. 2Jl
ln Febl"UA.l'Y 194~, the Airer-aft Raper-ting
Cc•c:le ·vc.s brcJkcn by 16th Cu.nipa.ny LN Regt 3 in
Aneer:s due t.o the :.. arga volume c>f tx=af".fic. I
I

.Pt.Y.'ticJ. d.ecipharm~n.~ we.s possible w$.th 150

!Resse.~es per day • .1 -
Ii
The A:tr.:::?a.ft !4ovem<::nt Code Ya.s solved and
. (" read currentlJ' ·e.rtilr the fa.ll of 1942. Vaz-1Sllts,
chan.z~s eve1~y 12 h·jurs, and ae,Pare.t:! British
5.nd U .s. edtt1one of eystems >.as.de tba problem
inczre-!l.ni:ngly d1ff1cul t. \·!hCjn the code refused.
to yield to m~chine methods aur1ng thF- summer
or 1944 .. :thQ solution l·:a;~ CC!l.t.Sidered r.1.0 101.igel:" I

poas1ole. ~-'-' - '

Lt. Ludw1.g of Chi-S ~ell~ Section :B (Evalu&-
tj.on Wast) c:laimed tna·, t'i1e Bombe1, COdE:i was
nea.rlj· all-rays sol veo. by c:.·~n>teno.lysis ~rhen
n~cess3.19y. Ve~y ofte~ the Chi-Stelle Section
raceived covie~ ~rom aircraft shot d~wn at
night and c.p~>lied them to the next day•s .J
·I
traff 1'3. The tact that the codes t-n~re gcod
from 1800 hours o~ one day unt1.l 1800 hours
of.'. th.e r..ex~-1:~1:'!.y mede for an ideal compromiEe
situa."&1on. :J

22U·-"'
.L.. 175 .£.I ,-;.J
c

229
1 llSI .P 5
230x 112 p 5, IF 175 p 14, I 11~ P 5
2 31 rF 175 .V 16
232IF 175 .·· p 11
233:r.F.l75 p 12
..0 .,,
7.8
78
.
-

DOCID: 3560829

War The one-part code feature of the War Depart-

~r-tm~nt ment Telegraph code (indicato~ TELWA) gz-eat1~
Tee~r>s.pr.t­ facilitated solution. The edition introduced
voae--- in Octo~er 1943 had yielded 12.000 gl'OUps by
Iiay l')Ji4 and va.s absolutely currant ~!"tor Feb-
i~uary l 9115 • 235
DFC-17 ~as captured in ttm Mediterranean
a.rBa. and helpad in the ev~l;)"tual solution of
DFC 1 s 19, 23~ 28J and 29. 2 jO
US A..irrc'
11
The Germans pl&ced no impo~tance to the
~ 11 <i·f.oups secul"1ty of tha "Q 0 groups. As uith the Bomber
Cede, copie§ vere recovered from shot dr:mn
ai~c:..~.a.ft. 23-, ·
11
Ra.d:.Lo oegele spokia of' a 6 letter indicator"
17
ifalefypc system betr1e;en t.r..e USA sncl Africa.
- ·;··-.-:-,01.et~e
··.- · -.--- · · fx:on April to oct.ober 1944. The system ~7as
·never read.238
Jones The Germans never succeeded in solving
Tempf?,:te the U5 Jones Template nm.p gl'id systemo239 ·.

Voegele or Section E and Geriaa.n Ai~ Force

Signal Intelligence .\gency s~~aes c~tego~ically
that the ABA vas not broken. Lt. Lud~ig,
section B, Yhose knowl~dge ~as mainly hearsay,
claimed army eY.parts con::iidered AM 2 (German
desig~ation ror the .ABA) breakable up to the
end of the "7a.I', but he never heard of any
success.
45. Successes uith British Systems-- .
RAF Fo".lr- The RAF tour figure system Has an enciphered
Fllgure tl10 part code used by the RAF ror point-to-p.oint
comm-J.nicat!on bstveen units and airfields. '!'he
desc~iptions or this code in the·TICOM documents
are given in much greater detail than for other r
·'
'
2 35r i12 p 5
236IF 175 p 16
237r io9 p 40
238r 112 p 5
239I 109 p 39
2401 112 p 4
79
 DOCID: 3560829

sy~tems; hence the c0de is more :ruJ.ly discussed

!;1:re. Tt~e Ge?;·.lllB.ns be~an work on the system late
.l.:::l 1939 .•.;;nd. w~re in a position to read the system
\dth 1nc :•eatJ1ng ease :f:"OUl March 1940 until l Nove:::i·
·acr 1942 . when a code book change resulted in re-
ducing th.1~ amount o~ trnff'ic read to fragments.
Intercept :!on wt. . ~~ stopped 1n the summer of l944.24J.
Four :fig~·~ traf'fic originating in G::riea~
Br:I. ta.in ·1a.3 ~~~ke d on at l'otsdam-Ma.1~ stall w1 thout
cny s ucc. 'a~. '· .J:t l1a.s in tho Medi ter.ranean areei.
~hat a i:.mall ~'.JnO~n~. of· work was done in September
1940 at Ta.orm1nE, ::.itc1ly, and later at Athens .
·r he Gar:aan All" J.·or(;-. surmoun·L·.ed many difficulties
o.m.>ing this J,Je'l' i.Od; t_~Oing thl"ough two code book
C lJ.i'lng~ :: and enc .l.phC:1~~c. ~i.:.t changes at times every
th:c-ee l;C ~even \·.:ya • Tra.t'.f ic totals varied from
600 per d:a.:y C.J.\::t"' .'. '.g the heav·..est to lO<J per day
i mmed1.a.t3ly be.tv.''3 the Germans c/.iscont1nued \lork
on the -;roblem. Yhc knc.:wledge gc.ined fi~om the
f ou~ f :i..gure enctvnert.~d c .1de .formed tfi~ basis for
e 1n~.lu1.t1ou for the re..:t. c f the wai• . 2 ~.,,
'.i:l~.a bas1r: hoc.\: Ol' :..he RAF-; s eaciphered code
sys ter:: l-:as a. c\;1 · p t\rt co<'.,; or 10,000 groups. The
k ey r: te.ble rr '\Hi:.. ·-'· l10Ck Of ·.,, 00 pages) 20 lines
on fl. page, a.n·.i ~1 f ..·..:=-C.:!.~:t ·i, key c';rOUps on a
l i1·:.e. Each ::S. i!1~ .·: ta•i a. fo:ir i1git indicator
i:..r.J e.s ther-...:: li:J,s no colum!1 C(.orr.J.ir1.a tes; the en-
c lp.herment al': .. ~ys began e ;-; th •.~ beginning of the
linr~. Th'..: line :i.nd1catOI'3 1:1ep; enciphered by a
separate tabl1~ oi.' 100 grnups a.r.d. appeared as the
~econd :~rou.p 1)i' ·.ate enci~··he:!'ed message. The f1r8t
-cu r) d1 ;-:i.t;~.> of' th 3 f'irat ;_;'('OU~) 1t11de up the control
for ·:..ne ino.i.c.:.. to1~ enciphe:c ment; the third and
f c. irth were m:·lls. The convers:i.on f'rorn plain
fror;r the key. ': 4 't
co(~ 9 to c1ph~1: wa.s made b,11 subt::•acting the code

2 jnI F 175 jJ 19
242r lOSt p 35
2 431 109 p 35
244r 112 p 10

r
3o
·DOCID: 3560829

r
Given sufficient t~af'fic, the inherent
weakness of this key· system soon manifested
itself. During the early stages of analysis,
when the line indicators ~ere not enciphe~ed,
overlapping messages could be identified.
On the 24th and 3lat of December 1941,
unenc1phered messages were t~ansmitted, com~
promising many grou~s in the basio book.
After. the indicators we~e enoi.Phered,
stereotyped traffic made possible overlapping
by externo.J. cipher "hits." The beginning greups
or the over~app1ng messages were al.~ays some
multiple. of five ape.rt, and_aetting up of the
overlaps vere facilitated by the fact that en•
cipherment a*~a.ys began at the beginning of tbs
line. The "hits" 'ltere indexed by machine, and
i'requency dtl'ferences in the code. 4
their v·d.:i..idity tested by the use· o~ ~novn high.·

01,ee t~~-:) messages \Jere ovcrlapped.11 the

hignly stereotyped context made stripping the
1'·• · .·.,.-'! ··!·· easy
,: '··Th~· recon~truot1on of the indicator. key
had to we.-'!.t until overlaps '\:fore set up. Evel'y
message that directly overlapped had the same
underlying indicator. 'l'heretore, by arbitre.rily
assigning 0000 as the value for the first p!a1n
indicator, all othe~s that toll~ed oould be
stripped on a relative basis snd reduced·to the
same tel'Jile. The German relative table of 1nd1-
c~t f:j:·· kay l·ra.s ju~t as good ~~6 practical purposes
as the .British prime table.
The delay between interception ~ ~ec1pher-
1ng °t'TB.S between tl:!'O and fOU'.."'-tOen days~ 4r(
Sykd ThG Royal Air Force Naval Code \Jas the basic
Car s · book of a.n enciphered code sistem of vhich the
Syko Card was the.enc1pharmeat. A copy of tha
basic code vas recovered from.·:.. Wellington shot
do~n over Welhemshaven· in September 19,9. The
British did not ser1ous1y alter the code to~ the
du;:>ation of the war:
2
~I 112 p lo
246I 152
247rp 175 .P 20
81
 DOCID: 3560829

The daily 1'eciprocB.l enciphering table was

belng reconstructed by Februa?'y 1940. Messages
on the daily table could be read by 1600-1700
hours. The introduction af'aeveral cards a day
complicated the solution slightly 1 but 40 mes-
sages sufficed to solve a single card.
The traffic, which contained information
concerning British and Axis convoys, submarines,
naval vessels, and meteorological reports,
averaged between 80 and 300 messages .<:. d.l!!l.r .2 48 ·
Rekoh Rekoh rirst app~ared 1n 1942-1943 and wa5
simply a non-reciprocal Syko. Slightly more
trarr1c was nec~~~ary to accomplish solution
than v1th Syko. Y ·
Aircraft The Aircraft Repo1..·cing Code replaced Syko
Regortil'lG and Rekoh in July 1943 and was used by reconna.1s-
co e ana . sance pla.nss 1n the West. 16th Company LN Regt
UCO 3 in Angers solved the system in February 1944.
ETA messages 1 frequency changes~ and hourly
barometric pressure b~oadcasts assisted the
initial break-in.
The AlrcrtJ.ft Reporting Code bad a particular
impot-tance in that it .afforded a crib into UCO
(the grounl'l/a.1r· meteorological code) • It was
broken by c~ibb1ng the pressure reports f'rom the
Aircraft Reporting Code. The fixed Signal Intel-
ligence station at Husum carried on this work.
Lack or intercept in ~he last days conr1ned solu-
tion to the met r;rib. 5u
Aircraft. Tb.a Aircraft Movement Code va.s used on f'erry
f.lovemant flight~ f'rom Tokoradl to India and totalled about
Code 500 messages per day. The systeo was composed or
pronoU?lcea.ble 5-lettei· code words, which were
chs.nged every 2~ hours at first and later every
12 hours. W-Leit, SoutheastJ in Athens began work
on it 1n the rall of 1942, and reading stopped
solution impossible. 5
in February 1944 whe~ ioo .n:iany variants ma.de

248!F 175
~
p 18, I 109 p 36
249IF 175 p 19
2 50IF 175 p 22, I 112 p
..,
::J
2 51 IF 175 p 21

82
[ '·
DOCID: 3560829

A1rore.f't A thr3e letter cede ~1th s~rial numbsra

.Movement in claar e.nd repeated indicato~s passed batl:reen
gode @.K) th.a UK and ete.tions on tha Balgi&n-Fl'ench boi'dai'.
Tbs Q0rma.ns never solved it ~ aasut!>fid it to be
an administrative or supply system.~5~
RAF 2- Pages ot t'.ml Bombax- Code,, used jointly by
letter .RAF and USA.AF/I uera obtained from a crashed
l!om'6~n:.' ail'cra.f't in l1ovemb3r ox- racsmber 19~2. Tuo
cooe ueeks lP.ter the Gal'U12lla vers relM11ng tbs ayatem
Cl"YJ'tan~1Nt1callyo T.i"a.ff'io e.v0raged 150-200
mesaages per d.a;y with 600 par daJ as h1gb.. 300
messages yielded 50-6~ of th0 values. Lattars
and numbe19 hom massages containing sptillsrs or
frequency 1ntorm£1.tion af"fol"'ded tb.9 daily bree.lc-in.
The code cha.Dpd ooily at 0300 encl could 'b3
broken during the US da.y raids &lid used ~o decode
RAF trafi'ic d~ing tm: night OIP3~t1o,;m. This
conflicts t1ith Lt. LudlJig•s aecount.253 Lud"eiS .
gives 1800 hou~s aa the tilna tlta coda uas obangad.
The JDl3mbers of the US 8th Air Fo?'ce tlsx-e the day
tims ~ortu.ne.tes uho lmd thsi~ tre.f'f ic '10coded
on the basis of code values ~~overed during t~
RAF raid the previous nighto25 .
Slidex Sl1dGX uae a d1grapbie substitution system
used in the &rmy and air support ne"~orks. The
coordinates of the substitution table clm.nged
dSlily, but orrere~ DO great problem to ths German
Air Force Cl'1Pta.nalyata.
The 3rd Da.tta.lion 1 Signal Intelligence
Regimant West (later LN Regt 351) bagan uork
on Slidex in May 1943 at Bougival,, ne&r Paris.
I~uch pro~sa l1as mad.IS during the p~-inira.sion
"Spartan exe~eises in Brit&.1.D, &Z!d by t~ t1m3
the All1~s 1nvad~d tha Signal Intalligenc9
EvaluBtion Canter fNAA.S 5.af' the Army) or the
Signal IntQlli~nce Regiment 5 (Xona 5 or the ·
Army) e.n<i 14/3 (W-lt3it 3) bad bad su!'.ficient .
sxpsri~nce to braak the system operationallJo
The daily strips ~e~ recovered by 0700-0900
hour~ ... Tm traffic avaragad 15-40 massa.gas ~i'
day.·;:),5

2 5~I 112 p 3
253r io9 p 38
254IF 175 p 22
2 55r 109 p 38 IF 175 P 22
1

83
1.-- - -- -- - - -- - - - -- -
I
•
J DOCID : J5608 2 9
I
{ fl /
, Goverm:Dent Work upon this a7stem vas begun by the
~lesraphle Signl!tl Intelligence Agency of tbs SUpre:me
COde 6ommabd Armed Forces . (OXW/Ch1) 1D May 1939. and
given to the L~tvaf'1"e . 1n ' August 1939. The
tl'&ff1c. containing ma1n1J' casua.lt1 and admini-
strative 1nrormat1on,aver4ge~ 200 JDBsaagea per
month. The Germans consi(leNd .the s1stem ot
ama.ll 1.mportanee 1n tbe 1-st 1ears . ot the var.•256
India The ID41& Code ve.s an unencl·p bered 4-letter
eaae code tranem1tte4 1D 5-letter groups. Sec1;·1 on B
at least partia~il read this tMf'fio until tbs
end or the var. 5T ·
The basic book o~ this 4-digit eno1pbered
...code s1stem vas ce.pt~d 1n Bergen, Nortn:i.l' in
June 1940. A1r at~ches ·1 n tile Near East,, Portu-
gal, Sveden and Sll1tzerland used the e7stem.
Switzerland vas $luays one table behind the others.
Voegele, o~ Chi-Stelle &Jction E,, received a
pbotost.at _coPJ and began vork on -t he s7ste1Q.
Tra.f'fie ~as exchB.nged vitb O!Jj1 and CJnf ~ tbs total
volume being about 100 messages per month.
Tvo tables vith indicator patterns CVCVC .
and vcvcv (vhere v • vowel and c ;; '. consonant l \
vere used, and both vere :broken most successrullJ
1n 1940 .. 41 vben the t&l>lea cb&nged que.rterl1.
The d&te breaks occurred at intervals or .·
betveen s1X veeks to tvo months. .
Work on the Iilter-Depa.rtmsnt:al Cipher was
stopped 1D lg4~_beoauae the .decodes were useless
to evalua.t1on.25tS .
Bentley .. The Bentley Code -..s used by British Over-
eooe a·eas A1.rwa7s and vas COP.ied from south Africa ..
Southeast Atr1ca, Egypt and 811'1&! During-. tbe
var, about 1."ive bUndl'ed :5-lette?' groups beginning
vi th Y vere added... One ·e ncipberment tar c·o n-
f1dent1al administrative tra1"f1c vaa added during
the winter or 1942-43. ·The solution vaa so simple
ths.t Voegele used it to ~ tr&in beginners in Cl'J'Pt-
&nalJ'Bis,, and the whole ·proJeet vas ·dieopped in
256IF 175 p 18
.257IF 175 p lS
2581 119 p 4,, IF 175 p 21

. ... . ". ··- ··· ' :

: .. - ·. -·· .: - . j .
DOCID: 3560829

1944 bscause £valuation vas no longer 1ntGrested~59

t!eathar The solution or enciphared m:ateorologieal
~stem~ messages was not the responsibility or the Ch1-
Stell0, but e~s uru.iert&ken to assist the ~eather
service (tha Signal Weather Monitoring service
or WENUEB).. The Chi-Stelle aolved tbs British
Main Weather Code in April_, 19'1·0 and turned the
ke7s over to l-JENUEB at Glind';\tf. ne&r Potsdam.
In April 1942. tha Signal \·r~e.ther Mon1tol'1Dg
Sex-vice rec~ived th.a solution ot a t1ve-figur"3
lU.tldle East uaatmr cipher .from W-!Jait Southeast o
Byswms in the Atlantic Area carrying tba in~
dicators "'t1b.1st 0 and "Tooth" veris '!:1orked on b7
the S1~6oweather Non1torillg Service ~ithout
succc&ss.
Miscel·· Lt. Ludu1g., of Cbi-Stells soct1on E, reoallsd
'Ia.naou;~ the solution afa British single transposition
----·- c1ph3r, involving a tan column rectangle. The
system ehangsd averry ThUrsdaJ at 2400 bA:>urs uhen
the net:r ke7 tford 'tt'e.s tra.nsmittetl in th.9 prGvious
syswm;
T~ Germans had no success uitb double
transposition despite notebooks captured at
li3ras and during the early days ot ths lVormsndy
1nva.s1on. Thay did not f'ind any ~ssagas of
the same length 1n th.0 same kay. 2
Many e.ttempte uare 1112.de to get into this
system, but ~ork ~as discontinuea as th3 Ga~me.ns
considerea tba TYPEX me.cb.ine unbr<aakableo262
46. ~tograp~ or Soviatt s;vstelll8-- Code in ve.r1oua
lra.nsm tted text appaaring as num~;rs tras
f'o:r.•ms 'ff 1ththe
usad almost exclusively by tb3 soviet Air Po~ce. j Each
Ai.l!' Al'my did its oun code compilation and mA its oun l'Ules
foF use.. Th9refore, tbs f"ollcruing cief'iDitions of 5ovia~
codes are axtreJJ1Sl7 ganeral amt attampt only to describe
ty~s of codes, not spacti"1e systems:

259r 119 pp 4~5, IF 175 p 21

2601 112. 4(0) p llp IF 175 p 23
2 61 IF
175 p 24
262IF 175 p 24~ I 119 p 5
2631 120 p 1
85
DOCID : 3560829

a. The table "18.S a. cryptographic device compriaieci of

letters and ~oms 1n a pradeterminad form, usually a sguare
or rectangle tJi th numbsr eoordinatss. securi tj 't18.S .enha.ncsd.
by Ufling va.1"1a.ble coorcU.na.tes that could bs cbB.nged by the
use or sliding str1~a or 'bJ' the usa or dig:raphic substitution
enciphering te.bleso2b4
b . The code table (Signaltaf'al)
The cOde t&b!e tfQS a higbl.J spsoializaci madium £or
use in air/grot.iiiir communication. The eoca.bular7 l:1&s highly
stereotyped and 11mi.ted to met reports, landing and ~-ort
data, QJtC a

c. Tm code book va.s tba principal cryptographic

111edium of tm"'1roi"iet Alr Force, espaci&lly in· tbs ground
organization. The Buas12.ns useci all var!Qtions from sell
oneQpe.rt books to tuo-part books ~ith up to 30,000 v~lues.
£xtra saourity could b9 gained uith a.n ad61t1v~ . encipharment
or tb9 basic code.265
47.. successes 'f!lith Soviet Systems-- Dul'ing the p:vriod
l937-1939p the Germans garh3a vaiuah!e e~r1ance during
Soviet maneuvers. The traffic passed vas mainlJ practice
~d dwmDJ, but foFm3d a f'ounciation tor later QD&lJ"Sis. Dur 0

1ng the soviet Occupation of Poland in Septembsr 1939 the

{)erms-~1J had almost. 100 percent success ~i th "OU-5," a cotle
aystam uith a digraphio substitution enc1p~rmant, the most
common Soviet Ai~ systsm. · · .
~.S-~ ~pnisb ca.mpn.igu. (1939 end 1940) tm Ger-
ll!9.na coneentra.ted their best cryptana.l7sts in Chi-Stelle
Section E 1 (Russian cryptanalysis) and u.nbJtoklan material
uant to the Chi-Stelle via tslsprinter - During this pariod I r
tll.2.,,,M~ th.Ne .figuNI $ru1iat tr&ff!jt_t1&S__CO~].GDt~l,y_bJ'-9~n,_ ,:
. "O!Xii" \18.S ~~cent read,, and eonsid<1sabl@ BUCCGSS "lf&S
~ tta St, on ad.di~-~~~!P.~!'Sd -~~~·- @i!Jt~m used._]?J~ _
~@~ -- -~~~!I.•.. :
The Sovi0ts ~Va.mp3d their Cl'JPtO~phic setup af'tar
the Finnish Campaign. The Germans captured -eorlcing directions :
to Soviet code and ciphsr o.f'.f'1cers that made only th.ta b!.riast ~
l'0:ferenee to codes anti ciphers being solved. Tbs ciiNct~g~s
call8d ~or a genera.1 incremsa 1D cryptographic security. ,.,

2611 I 120 p 10
2651 120 p 13
- 7
2661 120 p 38
2671 120 p 40
(' 86
 DOCID: 3560829

Ths "R1gh ComtI!:l.nd of Soviet Ceyptog:raphy" mt!Ay not have

admitted their compilation ex-~or.s to subordin9.tra code and
cipher officers, but they did take strong maasures to cor~ct
their mistakeso Regione.1 math.ads o~ distribution inste&d of
u1dely h2ld systems~ tha shortening of erzective psrio<1s,
the abol1tion of one-pa~t books~ and the complication of
enciphering technique ~e~e all illt7'0duced.
Theee changes did :noi bot~i' the Gel'mans too much.
They ~ere able to £ollcru stap by step the Russian mod1Tica-
tiona; ns th'3 cbangas uera not ·~oo radical theJ "ke:pt pac~ "tt268
1st Lt. W. 'Werth3r claims t1'...at s. captured Soviet cipbeit
machine ff&S exam1nad by the Sig.n..al Intelligence Att.enc7 in
19~1-42. He did not, ho~ever, expand upon this.259

48.. Standard ~rating Mocedura in deal~ 'e'lth .

Soviet Systemso--In~e case ()· Soviet Sf,Stems 'bS'.'sii<rOn eOD.'
f'orm or-the table, "stet.t.stical pictures ' ol' frequency counts
t1ere first ma.de o This procedure lTOUld usually reveal the
size of the cipher unit (2, 3, o~ 4 figuN?). The next step
was to deduce the number o~ tables involved and ~educe the
statistical picture d01:1n to the actual size of the tableo
This involved the elimination of indicator groups, "dwmny"
element~,· and any clear numbers t~.at appeared in the cipher
te:xt.
In the event a simple code table vith coordlna.tes ~as
used, a simple book reconstruction job ~as in oT-der.
The more compiiceted table systems, in ~hich use vas
made of several tables u1th coordinates that ~e~ cycl1cally
shifted or chosen .from a 10 by 10 square, unique in its roue
and columns (ls.tin square), through the use of indicators;
"Here solved bjt concentrat~.ng on eech table as a separate
entity. NaturallyJ tho3e thBt stood out 1n th.a original
frequency distributions ~ere a~tacked firsto Th.en, as so-
lution of th9 tablas p:rog!'esaad "a'ith relative page and rou
colwm:i designations, the designations ffel'3 equated and the
entire indicator, page and coord1nate system could bG recon-
structedo
Somq traffic could be read vith these relative coordill-
ates, but the reduction to prim~ v&luea vas very important .
The shifting coordinates ~ere often based on a lst1n BQU&re,
or upon the cyclic va.riation of the same sequence or sequenceso
r
268 120 p 40

( '
ti7
DOCID: 3560829

The sooner t~is pattern cQ~Od be isolated the sooner the

entire system fell apart.21
The Soviets used 5~f1gura_ additive systems on high
ech9lon circuits including some one time pads upon ~hich the
Germans did not ~aste any time. In the case of non-one
time additives ("universal bloclmots"), hooever, tm situa-
tion uas quite different. lat Lto Ve~ther•s account sho'e's
that the indicators uere not encipberedo Overlaps llere
easily thro~n together, rlags or di~~erences made up, col-
umns ~quated, additive stripped e.nd basic BQie
recovered
'tfhen.:.ver sufficient t:N.Tfic tre.s available o 1
49. Successes ~1th Itstems of other nationso--
a o. LfEhua.nlli: The L fiiiiiii&.Ds used a gri(l sys tam l:fhich
~as very 1.nsecureo Litln.ta.nie.n traffic uas read by Section E
of the Chi-Stelle rrom 1938 until the Red Army entered
Lithuania in the summar of 1939. ·
The Lithuanians used a ten by ten square 1.!rl uhlch the
text uas ~ritten out from le~t to right. A ten by ten gJ'id
ffith 25 cut-out cells uas supar1mpoaed and the letters in
the calls read off from left to right as cipher text. The
grid ~as shifted rour times to encompass the 100 letters 1n
the underlying sq\lare. In tha E!Vent a massage '0'8S less than
a hun~~d letters it H&S paddGd out by :re!)3at1ng the signa-
ture. ,
b. Ruma.nia.: (1) lat Lt. l:lcarther vorked on Rum!J.nie.n
Air Force Cipllsr material 1n Budapest in the Spring ot 19390
He descr1b3d it as a simple transposition systemo A ffn7
days after he submitted a report that the system uas about
to break, he vas recalled to tha Chi-Stelle. l1ert.hrar be-'
lieves that the interference ~as deliberate and polit1calb
It is significant that th:a Hungarians latsr bought tha sys-
tem.273 (2) Werther cla1.m3d that the Rumanian Polics Cipher
tfas so simple that the Gel'D!Bns considered it camouflaged
treason. Exact in.formation gn German troop moveniants °E'J'S.s
transmitted in this systemo2·fq
21°1 120 p 43
·271
I 120 p 53
--7
272
r 121 p 46
273
r 121 p 8
2711
I 121 p 9
DOCID: 3560829

c. Yugoslavia: The Germans ha.d no dii'f'iculty solving

the Yugoslav Air Cipher and :q.a.d currency on the system ~hen
the campaign against Yugoslavia started. The system was
composed of ·lexicographic tables ~1th 30 columns and 60 lines.
The line and cglwnn coordinates were at f'irst non-random and
later random. 2-, 5
·d. F~ance: Werther recalled a French code book enciphered
~1th short periodic additives. Though 1t xGelded very slcmly
to solution, the Germans read the system. 21 .
e. Carps.tho-Ukraine: Five letter monoa.lphabet1c sub-
stitution messS:.g§.§. were read in Budapest. The security of the
cipher 11a.s. nil. 2 .,.,
f. Poland: The German Air Fo?'ce started 11ork on _
Polish traffic a few veeks before Poland ~a.a invaded. A fe11
take-off and landing reports were the only mes3ages read.
lst Lt. Werther of LN Regt 353 sav a captured Polish
tvo-part code book, 11hi~n was made up of some 2000 values
and ~as non-alphabetic. 1 8 .
g. Czechoslovakia: Voegele began work on Czech material
in 1937. Five letter air messages, of which a good bit ~ere
practice traffic, were read. A few tactical transposition
messages were solved. Voegele belie~~d the bulk of unsolved
Czech material to be machine cipher. -,9
h. Spain: To the best of ·1st Lt. Werther's kno~ledge
the Spanish ,Red8 transmitted their traf'f'ic al.most. exclue1vel-y
in the clear. 2 e
2 751 121 p 9
276r 121 p 9 7
2 77I 121 p 8
278i 121 p 6
2791 121 p 7
2 s01 121 :p 110

Sy
DOCID : 356082 9

1" Turkish Air FO?'ce: Turkish systems fall in three

oategories: (1) Periodic ~ubetitution s1stem uhich c}'mngad
monthly and t1~s broken in tuo hours.. (2) Unenciphared
alphabetic code booko (3) Single transposition enciphered
ueather report;s.,
Voegele considered Turkish ~terial extremely s1Jllple. 81.
He never bothere<!! v1th it but turned it over to subordina~

2811 119 p 5
DOCID: 3560829

VOLUME 5
Chapte~ VI Liaison

Pare.graph
In troduc ti on . ............ a 0 v .,. .. D ••••••••• " •• 0 ••••••••• 0 0 50
Ralationa lfith Sunreme Command of the Armed
Force3J> O~\\ . ! ..... ~ 11'1 1111 0 ..... .,.,,, t:lo ...... G •• 0 •• a . . . . . 0" • • • • 0 . 51
- TI~la
t:l.ons ui. th tl1e Arcy Ii:Lgh Command .• OKH.......... 52
Ralat1ons ul (;'b the I•Ja.vy High Command, OKN.......... 53
Relations uith the Weather. Se:rv1ce, WENUEB ....•••.. 54
fielations ~1th Goering's Research Bureau ......•.... 55
Reletions vith other Axis Pouers .........•......... 56

50. Introduction.-- The liaison of the German Air

For·ce S1gnn1-1:ntell1ger.ce Se:rvice lli th other agencies engaged
in siena}_ inte~~J.igence act.tvi ties uas ef'f'ecti ve. The over-
all allocation cf problems and spi1eres of' activity was
divergen'~ FJ.nd each ee!"vice concentrated on its ot:.rn commit-
ments. At the h~_gh levels of com;nand, the Supreme Command
of tbe Armed Fo1.. ~~s, the OK1-J, exercised a control over
German sacuri ty mGnam·es ~ but p~rmi t tad each service of' the
'.fahrrnacht to \fork out i"ts mm teclmiques and policy ln its
tlgnai intelligence wor-k against Toreign countries .. Hhan-
ever p~oblemo ov~rlapped betw~en the services ~urthe~ down
the chain cf command, full technical infol°mation and intelli-
genCE· uB.B e1~changed.

51 Rel!.!ions ui~h the Supreme Command of the Armed

Fo1•ce:-::, O:K\-i. -- The relationship betueen OKW and the A1r
For9Ce High Commend., ths OKL, t!B.S deci<.led upon at a series
of conferences held in Berlin in October &nd November 1944,
preside& ove~ by the head of OKW/Chi and.attended by
rePJ!'esentc.tiv-as of the ?our servic.~s (mew, OKH, and OKL).285
The German Air Force 09e1•a ted independently of the Wahrmacht
in ma. tter!l of 1 ts 1ntell:i.gence B.cti vi ties a.gs.inst the Allies.

D 57 P 10 ~ J.5
DOCID: 3560829

Liaison was carried on at iover levels ~here necessaryo

Close cooperation egisted beti:reen Gen Na.f'ue II and secUl"ity
Group IV, Gen Ba.rue III of the Air Force and OIDI in regard\ .
to German security and cry-ptography. On the up~er leYel the
head or cryptographic development at the Chi-Stelle of O:Hll
worked in collaboration with the compilation depaiotments or
Army, Navy and Air Force. To test its own systems the Air
Force inainta1ned its own c~yptanalytic security section in
Gan Na~ue III~ but ~~gmitted its c~yptographic materials to
OKWAlh1 for review.
It is s1gn11'1cant that Lt. Col. Friedrich, head of the
Air Foree Chi-Stelle, sa.id during interrogation that he had
never read one "activity report or OKW/Chi." In regard to
any "very important signal mate1•ials" from OKW, . Fr~edr.ioh
sa1d ~' stopped reading them aa they were or no interest to
h~.
2 .
I
52. Relations vith the Army High Command. OKH.-- Rela- I
t1ons between OKL Signlil Inte!ligenae Service ana the Army
were on tae ~hole quite good. The actual. problems vorked I
on by the tvo organizations ~ere distinct, but results, raports
and 1nf ormnt1on were exchanged, and periodic meetings were
held 1n order to discuss techniques a.nd experience. Collabor- .
a. ti on before suspected large Al.lied moves tfas espeoia.ll.y close.'
The 3rd Battalion of LN Regt 353 on Southern seotor of
Russian front collaborated vith 81gna.l Intelligence Regiments
1 and 8 (KONA l and 8) or the Army. Liaison officers '1:1ere
exchanged and evaluation closely coordinated. Perman Air
Force Signal Intelligence SeFvice often helped f1ll in the
gape tlu•ough their work on the air arm:Les vhen the Soviet
land army obse~ved radio silence.
286m 57 PP 7-B
2 87I 13 p 6
2881 126 p 14

92
DOCID : 3560829

. The army employed a large number of seareh receivers.

Any air frequencies were imr:.edintely passed to the Air
ForceA thereby saving the Air Force time-wasting senroh
\fork.~ 8 9 rn·the West, LN Tiegt 351 .fed its results to
Commander-in-Chi~r or Army Group West.

53. Relations vith the ?la Hi Command O:XM.-- In

contrast to its re ations v the army, t e erman Air
Force Signal Intelligence Service had many actual problems
in common vith the signal intelligence service of the German
navy. Both services attached a liaison o~ricer to· the Wing
{Fliegerkorps) in Athens to coordinate the daily· situation
repol'ts ror the meetings of' the gen eral staf'f'. O't11ng to
his lack or experts, · the admiral commanding German Naval
Forces· in the area turned over to the Air Force personnel
and equipment ror radar mon1tor1ng.290
The Navy vas very much interested 1n the vork 3rd
Battalion or LN Regt 353 did on the air arm of the Soviet
Black Sea Fleet. Accordingly, the Battalion kept the
Navy 1nrormed on everything 11:. :received concerning the
Red Navy. The A1P Force Signal Intelligence was able to
give the navy intelligence on the disposition or the some
180 planes or the Black Sea seaplane force. or epecial
importance was Russian air recce trarric, vhich vhen inter-
c~pted, const1tuted a varnlng or impending Soviet action
against German convoys in the area. . ·
Much the same situation ex1sted in the northern sector.
The lst Battalion of LN Regt 353 put an n/T unit aboard the
Prin:, Eugen to mon1 tor Soviet air uni ts 01' the Baltic Fleet.
LN Abt 355 in Norway had direct wire lines to Naval
Headquarters in Oslo, over which intercept 1nrormation con-
cerning RAF Coastal Comraand and Atlantic convoys was
passed.291

289
I 130 p 15
290 I 126 p 14
291
I 187, /.f-410

. ~3
DOCID: 3560829

r
54 •. Relations ~1th Weather Service WENUEB .-- The
monitoring or a e ~eat er net~or s ~as no a primary
commitment or Geisman Air Foree Bignal Intell~gence Service
as the ~eather serviee (WENUEB} maintained its o~n 1nter-
cept and analytic racil1t1es. The German Air Foree was,
ho~ever~ able· to augment the weather service's coverage ·
and analysis, and Signal Intelligence sources or weather
information became increasingly important as Allied pressure
cut down the activities or German weather recce aircraft.
A liaison off1cer ( a technical sergeant) from th~
veather service ~as attached to Section B of the Chi-Stelle.
Th1s qQn-com mada.....regular trips to the intercept un1ts,
instructing them in the signiricance or ~eather messages •
.He reported to the Chief Weather Offi~er on all veather
~requenc1es not being covered by Signal Intelligence Service
and any incidental veather intelligenee.292
Relations ~ith Goeri 's Research Bll?'eau For ..
........
.,.......~
reviated
...........
-.-......-4--...,..----'-~
T e on y con et e veen
..:......-e---~
F an he erman .r ()rce Signal Intelligence Service
· seemed to be at periodic general meetings attended by
representatives of all branches, although there vas an _
occasional exchange o~ raw trarf1c between the t~o agenc1es.29J·
Friedrich said that Voegele met with representatives of other
agencies (FA included) to discuss cryptanalyt1es.
56. Relations ~1th other Axis po~ers.--
a. Japan.-- Voegele, principa.1 cryptanalyst or the
German Aiz. Force, v1si·ted Berlin twice 1n 1942 in an attempt
to meet w1th Japanese Colop.el Hayashi of the Japanese
Military Mission in Beilin and discuss cryptographic mattersr.
The meetings ~ere p~evented by Lt. Col. Kemp~, of OK.W/C"ht.29~
b. Finland.-- Lt. Col. Friedrich of German Air Force
Signal Intelligence Service said that there ~aa liaison v1th
the Finns on Russian traffic and T/A. There vae no liaison
on matters of cryptanalysis. Detachments from German Air
Force signal 1nt§ll1gence vorked vith the Filllls at M1kkel1
and 8ortavala.'°9~

2 92 IP 183 p 90
2931 29 p J
294
1 119 p 17
2 951 120 p 3

94
DOCID: 3560829

c. Italy.-- A very looee contact existed ~1th the

Italian Army Signal Intelligence Service. Unimportant
frequencies of allied and Turkish air forces ~ere ex-
changed. Personnel of German Air Force Signal Iutelligence
had a ve~y lo\! opinion of the Italian 3ervice.296
d. Hungary. - - Collaboration had existed with the
Hungarians since before the 'W'ar. The liaison consisted
mainly in the exchange of radio inte~cept. ~he Hungarians
had no capable cryptanalytic brains and lacked 11 reliability 11
in the eyes of the Germans.
The Hungarians attached an intercept company to the
Eastern front in the S""Oring o.f 1942, but this YB.s "11th-
dra~n after a year. In April 1944 a Hungarian intercept
company vas a.gain attached within the framework of Ill
)\bt LN R~gt 353- This com:,Jany lasted until 5 January 1945,
when it ~as vithdrawn to & Hwigarian collecting camp.
The Germans considered it a good intercept unit.297

296
I 126 p 14
297 I 130 p 15
OOCID: 3560829

VOWME 5
Chapter VII Critique of the Or;68.nizat1on s.nd rperat1ons
of the German Air Force Si~l Intell~~~llcd Serv1cP.
Para.graph
Subordination to Chief Signal Officer rather
tha.n to A-2 ................. o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 57
Centralization or operational and administrative
contro 1 •....••............. _, ...•....••.•...•• o • • • • • • • 58
Organization of tbe field units ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 59
Advantages of a separ&te Air Force signal Intelligence •• 60
Evaluation of German Air Force signal intelligence
o,pera t1ons. • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . 61
Recommendations ••••••••••••••• ~ ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 62

57. Subordination to Chief S1~1 Officer rather than

to A-2.-- The German Air Force gigo~Inte!llgenee Service
was confronted vith the same organization problems that the
USA faced in the formation of a cohesive, eff1c1ent organ1- (
zat1on. It took five years of war .. until Octo~Ll9!4~. , b~.f_ore fl
the fairly unified service discussed in this ~:ea~ _as the rr

norm emerged. ~
Both the A-2 and the Chief Signal Officer of the German
Air Force desired control over signal intelligence. The
Germa.n High Command subordinated the service to the Chief
Signal Ofricer for operational reasons, although the A-2 was
the chief ~acipient of its product. The High Command reasoned
that the ~1gnal Corps could better furnish personDel, equip-
ment, and signal communication, and thought the A-2 l4cked
the technical kncnJ-hov necessary to control the actual opera-
tions of signal intelligence units. Thus .. the A-2 advised on
intelligence matters but bad no control over Signal Illt~ll1-
gence 011erations. Signal Intelligence reports to the A-2
had evolved gradually from tecl:mical discussions of circuits,
ne~ call signs, and such techn1cal1t1es, to evaluated intelli-
gence • German Air Force A-2 • s did not understand the purely
Signal Corps technicalities, and this fact influenced the
final decision in subordinating the signal intelligence ser-
vice to the Chief Signal 0£f1cer. The decision to keep .the
signa.l intelligence service independent o~ the A-2 ~as a
good one for them. Good intercept 1s all-important for tne
operations ot &Dy signal 1ntel.1 1gence service. The effective-
ness of the 1nte1·\..ep~ service ls determined by whether the

)16
 DOCID: 3560829

r
enemy•s transmitters ca.n be heard, whether his operators are
careless, and by many othtl>r strictly technical factors. Since
all such technical questions of intercept are the province of
the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, it would appear v1pe
to subordinate the Sigaal Intelligence Service to that Office,
rather than to the A-2. Signs.I Intelligence produces what is
technically possible and not, except in a very general ~ay,
what the A-2 desires.
58. Centralization of operational and administrative
control.--The rfilai organIZatlon unlrled'()perationai ana ad-
miliistrative control vithin the signal intelligence structure
at all levels of commando Lt. Col. Friedrich's ·dual capacity
as head of Gen Nafue III and or the Signal Intelligence Agency
(LN Abt 350) vas the basis of this unification. Friedrich
could bargain for equipment and other necessities rrom the
Signal Corps while at the same time exercising operational
control over the entire signal intelligence organization, al-
though he did have a nominal superior in Gen. Klemma, Senio1•
Signal Intelligence Officer. Col. Forster~ Chief of the Ai~
Raid Waz•ning Service in Germany (FAF Re1chJ was head of tacti-
cal air raid warning operations, but he 'ffas subord~te to and
received his ol'ders through the Signal Intelligence Agency.
The experience or the German Air Force shovs that its
signal intelligence service had to be independent or outside
control, equal and not subordinated to other intelligence
agencies. This unity under Lt. Col. Friedrich, although not
specir1cally provided for on paper, did in fact exist and
was absolutely necessary for operating efficiency.
59- Or~1zat1on or
the Field Units.--In the final or-
ganization,~ £he tle!Crunits. vere Ullder the operational
control of tbe Signal Intelligence Agency, vhich did not
delegate its authority but moved its various sections to the
r1e1d. On the Rusaia.n Front the e:-•.se l:11th vhich the codes
could.be read, the large distances involved 1 and the dirfer-
ence in operating procedure within each Russian Air Arnq made
it more practical to control the Battalions of LN Regt 353
locallyo Sections E1 _and D split tip and moved out to the
headquarters or the tbree·battalions, leaving a very small
p&l'ty at Chi-Stelle. On the fronts operating against the
western allies the German Air Force decentralized T/A evalua-
tion by putting Section B•s evaluation personnel at the hea~­
quarters of the field units. A certain amount or centrality
wars maintained . in the cryptanal1s1s of higher grade allied
systems, due to the technical difficulties theJ presented.

91 .
DOCID :. 3560829

The Germans found tactical evaluation to be a lov echelon

pr oblem, to be attacked mainly by the field units. The indi-
~ ~dual intercept operator and field evaluator were in a posi-
tion to supply much short t11ile intelligence that would have
been l _o at had traffic been immediately passed to higher eche-
lons for evaluation. The production of strategic intelligence
and the coordination of the intercept missions of the field
units were performed by the personnel remaining at the Ohi-
Stelle at Potsdam, the tra.f'fic and operators' logs eventually
found their way to this agency.
The distribution of control discussed in the three para-
graph~ above was the German Air Force solution to the problem
of signal intelligence control, arrived at in the light of its
partieular experience. It vould be wrong, however, to apply
this organization unoritioally to our ovn setup. Each country
confronts different difriculties; each var presents a different
geographioal and communication problem.
60. Advantages of a separate Air Force 51~ Intell1-
~-- The advantages or a1sadvantages of a a{stiict Air
FOr09 Signal Intelligence Service must be reviewed in any
evaluation of the German Service. The organizations of the
Wehrmacht called for a separate air arm, so when the Air Force
found it needed signal intelligence 1t built up its ovn ser-
vice without bothering with th~ details of signal intelligence
control being centered in a single unit. It has been seen
(Chapter I) that in the formation of its organization the
Air Force fallo~ed the patternal.ready set by the Army.
There ~ere mood reasons for a separate Air Force service.
Some of the problems . of signal intelligence vere strictly
Air Force commitments. The most clear cut example of such a
commitment is found in the operations against Allied strategic
bombers. Hovever, a similarly clear cut line or demarcation
bet~een Air Force and Army commitments could not be drawn in
operations against tactical Air Forces ~hich operated in con-
junction with land forces. For example, in the oase of Russia,
the Air Armies vere subordinated to Army Groups with ~hich
they had common communications channels . Furthermore, ground
support units vere linkled with ground combat units by radio
circuits. Again, 1n the West, the land forces and tactical
Air Forces communicated on both air/ground and point-to-point
cirouits, and the commitments were not exclusively those ot
the Air Force.
These facts point to the ~isdom in establishing a separate
Air Foroe service to handle the problems which are of a

98
DOCID : 3560829

peculiarly Air Force nature and indicate the necesaitJ ror

signal intelligence units tailor-made for the intelli~nce
needs of the Air Fo~ce. On the other hand, all the evidence
underlines the necessity tor a central, coordinating agency
hs.ving overall control ot signal intelligence matters, and
ma.kin~ clear cut assignments on problems ~h1ch inevitably
overJuPO The Germana 1n fact had machinery set up in OIGI to
ansver this very need, but they did not use it, &nd cooperation
betveen the branches of tha Vehrme.cht ~as difficult to achieveo
Instead of overall control the Germans relied upon liaison
at various llorking levels bet'tfeen the signal intelligence ·
services of the Army, Navy, and Air ForcEi' • OKW, · instead of
functioning as an agency of overall coordl.Jlation 1 restricted
itself to the s~perv1e1on of Wehrma.cht cryptographic security
and the ideal of the separate Air Force Signal Intelligence
service, subordinate to a central Signe.1 Intelligence Agency
controlling all the branches was never achieved.
61. Evaluation; of German Ai~ Fores signal intelligence
o~rations.--The s!gna-r InteTiigence servlce oY the Air 'orce ·
acnleved marked success 1n its operations in epite·ot the
difficulties of organiza.t1ono In the exploitation of every
signal manirestation, the scrutiny of evexay phenomenon, the
members of the service shcroed their advanced conception of
signal intelligence.
On the Russian Front, mathods remained rather elementaey
due to poor Soviet code and cipher security and primitive
radio methods. In the uest advanced cipher, communication,
radio navigational and radar technique .forced the Germans to
rely on advanced T/A methods instaai.of cryptanalysis, and
these they develoP3d brilliantly.
The Germans exploited American mistakes to the utmosto
Our heavy bomber raids vere compromised by the tremendous
volume of radio traffic that started before the raid and con-
tinued through taka orr and assembly, by ths regularity t:rith
uh1cb routine reports "ffere sent, and by the ~ax R/T discipline \
of the flying units. Even rad1o silence ffas s1gn1.ficant, for
if units remained abi>lutely q~let the Germans ffere alerted r
for an impending operation. Furthermore, American laxity 1n · I
failing to svitch orr IFF over German territor1 made route ~
tracking possible even t:Ihen radio silence lf&S observed, and \: ,
Allied r&dar, both fixed and airborne, ~as carefully monitored. '\l.
It is not surprising that the German estimate ot u. s. security
vae that Americans relied too mu.c.h_on_gQ.Q.(l_ciplie.r_and_d1d._.not
practice soun~ radio discipline_. ~
 ------- -- ---- --·--- -·----------
DOCID: 3560829

62. Recommendat.lons-• Tl1e most import.ant lesson to be

:learned. from a study (J£ the Oer111a.n .Ail• Foroe Sie;rial InteJ..li-
gence Sel"vice is tJla. t; we in t.ha USA h8.ve beu~n ec;nfronted tfi th
;;;aela.tively simple s1gna.l intelligenc1} yroblems ~ Cryptanalysis
and T/A a.s '\Ile have knowh th•mn.; a:f•e not· suf't'in.tent :i.n tactical
1Jpera.tions a.gai11st a.n oppom·>nt ·as ad\ra.n·~ed &,.t. 01• more advanced
than the USA in. radio and crypt.ogra.ph;\-c tech:o.ique. 'l'he oper~­
tionaJ. use by ;foreign cowitrie.'l oi' batter ct:>des ancl ciphers ..
bettex- l'a.dio method.a, and 11lect!'on:tc devices of all 1c1nds ·
will make necessary our rev1s111g our conoe.ption of e 1gna.J.
intelligence. ~
.American secUl'ity ll"ould benefi.t .from an intense study
of German Air Force ~ignal tntelli~ence operat:f.cms .. which
have been reviewed or.u.y' in outl:Lne.f :f.n this· volunie. The sue-.
oesses cle.1med by i'OW' s shouJ.d l)e ctllec~ked against our SOI~ s
and operational Z'ecorda. \.f~JCisiQI.1 '::thould be mEl.cie to incor- \
po:ra te the l~ssons lea1•ned fr.om thes~ studies into the tra1.n-
:Lr.tg progJ."1:uns of all 1.lllits u:~iµs ra.rl:to and elcct1•onio equip-
1nent •_,.1 From the e:i:::amtna tton of the mater 1a.l a upon . which this
volume is based, \.Q!te facj;_a.ta.nds Ol..l'C ab ova a.lJ. others: The
German .Ai~ Fo~ce Signal Intelligence Service co~U.d not have
been so successful in the we~t hBd American personnel been
more security conscious.

' 100
(1-·
DOCID: 3560829

APPENDIX

EAirLY WAIUJING

Technical Serg.3al!lt Gel'd. W~~tk1nson,

Duty Of.flea!",, 1~ldekop.f 1, Lt.·~ftw·:lffc SIS
[Fro1•·. n·-133 pp 1.2 ~32]

The problem or ~~arly unrn1ng bec&nE' t •.c:mte when the RAF

began it~ heav:y raids on Ge~msny pi•ope:t>. It. b€:-car:1:? even mor·e
urgent vh~n the 8th USAAF joine<l th~ PJtli' Ftnml1er Go~r.d i;:i
un1~eet:r1ct.ed aer.1al v~:rf;~l'e against Ch~ :r·~i.ny, and t:hr! Luft\1e.ffe
limited 1·cae1r· f'o!' the most pal't to ~~ d·& .J~f.!f.ls:i.we rol-~ . Re-
liable tmc1 tl.mely ea,:-ly 77;1rning ~1R3 t0 be one of t;ha most
hlporta.nt ta.<Jk3 of th-a Luftvaf:.:'e SIS.
The first attempts to obtt.tin ~lu ·:l3 'I'.oX' adv_.'3.DC·~ -wa1"ningD ·
from enemy radio tral~ic hark csck to tomber fi/T tr-sf~ie on
6~~.l;O kcs. ( ;iD&rky" .frequencl'). F;roru t.1.::-ni.Lg traf'f la between·
g~ound st.ntlons and ail craft, and fro!];, -early ~ssi!l.g·es, t.he
7

strength of RAF :night intruo.er .fo1·mat.ic1ns ha.rl been determined.

In those c1ays the number of bombers lnvolt7ed was no iuoi~e than
80 ...100. Evslua.t.ion of th1.s tr-s.ff:J.c we~ mt..c.e ee.s1e:r- by the
separation of' opere,t:i.Oila.l a.tr1"if1 lds a.nc. O~t'U bl! .es. After
1943 the HF R/T t:ttaf.f"ic or combat -;.i11it::; c<'nt.tnue.12y deer•e&aed,
while that, o:r the OTUo s i:acreased. f<"or "GhJ.s reR..sm1,, :monitor-
ing C•f the RAF Bombe~· Co:.mria.nd R/T t:re.f:~·:._,.~ ;yir~ldad :no fruitful
results.
On the other ban<!" :aver since 19143 the mon1to.ring of
Af1~7.'iean b .:>moer RlT o:n HF f'reguencle5 g:tve VC'!:'"J lu~ :i;-at1ve
indications of' impending a.1r activity. Dn~ing a 1.1 ter period,
ad·vn:&lc~d ._.,a.rn!ng had bs2n g1v011 as early as the ev:!:uing be-
fore daylight attacks of the 8th US.AAF', a imply on the basis
of this R/T tr-ar:fic • If, af'ter nc~!'.'mc.l da.ytili:ie R/T t:r·a:ffic
had. come to ·!t.n end. tuning &nd res.jab111t;:r traf'.fic, and W/T
a.c t1v1 t;y uera remr11ed:. then these obse!•va.t.ions wer·2' sent
out by Meldekopf l as an early· war·ning.
This type of adwancad ve.rning wes t.'&cllitated by the
fact that ~ at the end of 1943, the 8th USP.AF introduced the
use · of special ~.lr:field frequencies in addition to tbs regu-·
la~ HF frequency of 6440 kcs. It remainedp therero~. to
determine tbs call-signs o~ the g!?Ound stations~ the inter-
cept operator needed only to have his receiver properly
calibrated 1~ order to identity tha airfield in quention.
In tbs final ·pe~iod the etro~ts of. tr12 combat u1ngs to give
DOCID: 3560829

instructions to their formations on HF' instead of VIIF ver·e

re.s.11.zed. Perhapo it Yt·.E due to reception conditions oviar· Eng-
land, which changed daily; at Ei.ny ratf;, it 11as sur-!'.rrising
hov open and ~oluminous the RF traffic ove~ Englana ~as, both
during the &sserably,, and the approach f'lights to t:he target.
In tha beg1nn1ng of 1943, th.£ rir.·~t bnslc uttF1mpta were
made to f'lud posa1b1l!.t1as for eaz•ly 1~t:.1•n5_ng in the air-to··
ground W/T tr·a.r.t·1c. At that til.".!O m. scrutiny of tM radio
traf'Tic f'1:=mn the 11 Regiona.l Control Stat~.onr1 waa bl3gun. Eng-
11

111nd Yas div !ded into f'i:i:ed safety are&.!!; "~he ;.:•ad lo traf1"ic
?or ea.ch .zone va.s handled b:v a spc::li:r~~ed :i:>.:i.d io ~1 tat.ion, vhioh
vas of"ten a bomber airi'ield radio station <:rn Yell. During
the early -~.fternoon hours & large numbs!~ o~ unidenti.fied ea.11-
signs voulll be heard 1n tuning tra?flc 1~ith tt-.ose Regional
Control Stations serving southern Engls.11d; this would be fol-
lolied, at .nlght, by a. l'atber· large-sea le r'.'1.id on France, or
over France into Gerlti8.ny. Uowever.11 tl:.e" e:n:p9;r1ment was a
failure in the sense that the st.rength of e.a e.r.pected night
attack could not be prod1eted i"rom tht; nun:be~ of' call-signs
hearcl CODUmlD1cat;1ng vith these Reg.:tonr;.l Control ste.tions.
On th~ othe:-i., band, around th.h~ t~.Jnei a opecial pr.enomenon
vae noted by good SIS operators enc;ageo. :'.t..n monl toring the
enemy airfield D/F sections. Appr0.xin:s.tal;r one hour be.fore
the first enemy aircraft va.s plotted over ~~he $e&, certain,
short whist.ling tones uere bee.rd, :i.n w~.:~-yi:n~ lxr~ensity. In
the case of a :raid by appro.xima tG l~· 250 bol'.:fae~:·s, 12-25 of
the::J°e vhistling -cones uere he&rd iri sho1•1;, ch1:•onologica.l
sequence. Specl.&.list~ explained this plllinrn::.ienoxi as the tuning
or a.1reraft transmitte:ros to zero be.s.t. Thnnks to thase ·
~histling signals, reIDS.rkable good ,!ldva.XJc~ ·.rarn.1.ng3 could
be ziven f~om Ap:ril to June' 1943 Accordi.ng to tre D/F
D

section, not only the strength,, but also th-s probable area of
attack could be prsdicted.
In addition short-interval early verning ~as guaranteed
a.t nll tinms through the 1ntereeptj.on of' Britlah E2S. The
period in llhich the Meldekopf' tf£~9 ~blE1 rJost accuratelJ to
predict reids vas the summsr ana ~all of 19~3 ~ ~hun the
whistling nigna.la no lo!lger occurred f·requ~mtly enough to be
reliable, monito~ing of' the radio ~tation at '"'xia.velsy Air·-4
field (8.:?nthfinder G:>oup) f'urniahod aci::u'i"nte c:J.ue!3. Gravely,
one of the ne~~r· satellites of Wyton,, ~as s0ldom hBard by
day. The radio station at every other bombar airfield sent
1ts call-sign a!ld the tlme,, every 15 minutes for check pur-
p:Bas. Gravely- vas the. onl1 bomber ·'i1r.f1elcl 'tlhich sent its
cbaek signals only until noon, and then ~ent of? tba air.
If a mission ~ere to be floun in the evening, tbs radio_ sta-
tion vould renev its checking transmissions 1n the late
afternnoon, or at least long bsfore taloo-o?f time.

102
DOCID: 3560829

ltesearch conducted by the f ina.1 ev.s.lua.t1o.n section of

Meldekopf 1 1nd1catec1 that aircraft frcm Gr•a.veley took part
in every enemy rn1d. There.fore, v~.thout iI'lcurring a.ny risk,
or considering the daily signal intelligence picture, an
advance wa.rn:tng could be g1.ven on the bE£t1fa of the resumption
or qua.rta1'-hourly procedure st GJ:oat"eltiy.
In the sum:mar, nev pogs.tb:tlit.tes 1~or early va.r:aing were
-axplored., since it tua.s Jmovn that the ei.1e~ \ian fond of
cb&ngi11g his tactics suddenly. In add!tlon to the continuous
seal"ch for tra..f~ic on IIJ'!.idium r1~P-qmmcy, a.a aff ort mis made
to ob~in s sign.al intalligenco picture of all Active squad-
rons, and to ar~.ange th.a information acco~d1ng to the tollow-
1.og pattern., in ordeio to decide vh.ethe:;; night attacks lfere
1mpand1ns or not:
Numbel" of' aircraft Fiumbsr of' tw:ii.r.g ls.:adings and
heard mass~gee inter- peculiar
Cf}ptad messages

Tiovevar tho ~valuation ox these tablen ma.s pvrf'ormed

JI

too superf'j.cislly, and us a rt1sul t no V"alu&.ble intelligence

vas really gleaned fr~m them. For thlo r~~son a sLnll~ se-
lect group of sp~cinlists vns contin~al~y on tha lookout ror
nev methods of obtaining early ~arning.
First ot all thoy p~oposed exsmining ~11 the d&ytime
radio traffic of the Pathfinder Group ~8 Group). The reason
for this -ea.s that no la!"ge-scale missions c1ve>:? Germany or the
vestern occupied areas \fere flo"t:Jn vithout Pa.th.finders, vhich
rept'esenterl the brain of such 11n s.tta.ck. If t.be radio
traffic or this group yielded hint[\ of' a.n op8ra.t!on_. then th,a
ruetlmd developed could be applied :tn the s1.:.me lf&J' to the ma.in
body o:f the bombs:ra ~ It so happened tbn.t the entl:re s1gonl
inteilligence picture oJ" 8 Group over the porlod of a month
could be reconstructed rels.tlvely quickly,, and hence the
real vork of evaluation could bo started~ The res~arch p~o~
ceedad on \:.he ttwory that daytime radio t:'S.ffio on non-opore.-
tionsl ciay:i must be noticeably dif:Cerant 1.n certain cha.racter-
is t!es rrom trarr1c on days vhen no attack~ followed. Thus,
the radio t:.ra~fic of all &irrields of 8 Group uas separated
into d1J"ferent periods of the day, and subjected to a de-
tailed examination. From this the foll<>liing ~as determined:
On non 7 op<9rational days, daytime radio -~:r-affic betveen
a.ircraf't and their airfields bad no spacial r·a.k. During
the foranoon there was .i;uostly ideDtif'ieat1on and tuning
trarric~ ~ith no special indication of haste on tr.ta part of

103
DOCID : 3560829

the ground ::ttation. During th~ noon hours tha?'e ua.s almost
a eomplete lull in activity; the British partook generously
or their noo!'>day ea:Je.. In the. at'ternoon tuning t1~1·r1c be-
ga.n aga.1n:i and nov and then D/P. t:r.nf1"1e us.~ hq,f:.i.rd ~ In scru-
tinizing the tz>a.f1'1c of the a.b.~fiold D/F s<ections, specinl
attention uas paid to those ai~cr!l.f't parfor~ing c~oss-country
flights. Moreover, the W/T 1ntercap·i; compruii0s Hhieh vei.--e
entrusted vith the monitoring of Bombor Command ~oported
those Pathfinder air-era.rt call-signrJ uhich appea.1•ed in the
traffic cf" othe1~ groups. After the t:r>~if'f ie of the C.onvers ion
Unit at Wyton, which ~as quite voluminous~ h~d been eltm.
1nated, there re.m81ned a·good p!cturG of t'he activity of the
Pathfinders. The s,.grml intelligGince picture of t.W.s unit,
on a da7 ~.:, edio!:'.tely pl'f'Jceding & night 1"&1d, lookf)d a.pproxi-
m~tely ms follo~s:
ItJ the morning the1-e va.s 11vE'ly tuni.ng e.nd . rne~e..ult.ton
trs.ff":to, the peak bei.ne; raa.ehed b~'tween 1000 and 1.130 hours.
Tbc small &Llount o.f D/F trnf"fic, c.ppee.:i"1ng du1 1ng the noc ;· -
11

d&y houra 11as a:.;icribed to ferry .flights to and from the

repe.ir·- shops.. At noon cams the "brloting-pauEle" s and there-
rore very .fev Patbf'tnder .s.irc:r.e.rt Ye:::>o hea.:rd.. To properly
evaluate the noonday radio s11Elnc~~, u11 e:xn.et lmovl~dge of
~eathe!." conditions ov<!r the tak0-of't' e.;:aes.s U-'.1-i.1 1.r.iip~rt.ant.
Tberetoro ei veat.mr m.:'l.p lJ&s ID!lt1e, and uo '><>urea ot' 1n1"orma.-
t1on v11s ignored in building up tbe irueat possible picture
of the ~eathsr - over the 8 Bomber Group bases (radio traffic
bet11een thia ground stations of' 8 Group and aircraft from
other &1rt'1elds; "Ye&ther report3 .trom trs.1n1ng units .flying
ov-ar Engltl.nd, rrom deciphered bombar- code messages, and from
na\•al radio stations). The recall of Bl'U~1sh tre.1n1.ng unite
around noontime lfOuld be a.n un<;iuestionaole 1ndics.t1.on of an
expected deter1or&t1on in the weather* Vary frequently the
signal intelligence picture vould dsfiultely indlc:ete a rs.id,
and tbsn the sudden s.ppea.re.noe of s. ood-·'t1eatlwr front uould
cause the mission to be·cancelled.
In December pract1c&l ut111.za.t1c.m of the intelligence
gained from the stud? of Pathf'1nder tr&ffic uas begun.
Ever7 evening an air situ~tion report~ such as tlw rollowing,
vaa broadcast:
Am?reciation of' the Air Situatton,. 17~0 hours
In the forenoon, there vas tun1ng ·activlt1 on the p&rt
of al~ groups (both bomber ru~d Patht'inde:r), but vi th no
noticeable paa.k period. Fro·< noon on, el'oss-eountry flights
by ~its ot the Halifu Groups verG ob .orved, over the middle
and western sectors or England, and over the Irish Sea.

104
 DOCI D: 1n3;>~8f£~tances flights or Pa.thfintl:.'1r a.il•c:ra.i'·c over the ,
norther ba.3ss ( 6 Bomber G1•oup) Ye re obse:MTsd. Pa th.finder ,
tuning trarr1c also crune to a stop at noouu Training opera-
1"""""'-. tions by thG OTui g vere ca.rr1ed out all da.y long, in all
\ areas. Tuning trs~~1c on nmdium f~eQuency !s normal, and shows
no point or concentration~
Conclusion: No large-sc~le ~aid is intended.
This resss.rch vas the impetus ~o!' a reorganization of
the W/T 1ntereept coii?pQuiesu In the s&me vay as uith the
Pn.thrinders ~ a study va.s begun of tm :r:<?..dJ.o ~tarscteristiee
or the othnr groups. Dayti.me radio trG.ff1c liSS visually
presented on largo, g::"..n.os b;."l.ck1:.:. ;.:·ds by the us0 o.f G,ppro-
p!'ia. te symbols, and "tre.s posted hou1~1y. On tbtrne blackboards
vera shmtn: ,
Air &ctivity at a given s.iz.•.fi~ld;
Tuning trarf ic ~rom this atr~ield;
Volume of radio trafr1c ~1th i1ircra.rt from other
a1ri"ieldn.
When later the RAF also tlev dsylight mlsslous, there
llB.S also included in~orlllation as to v~ch units bad completed
·their m1sa1oDs.
A digest of this information, together Yith a record
of th~ missions vh!ch followed, vas kept in a dlary, in order
that every radio characteristic ~hl.ch se&~d 1mporta.nt to
certain intercept problems could be ~erer~erl to. This saved
loas or,_ ti.ma in tJiumbing through log sheets~ To the black-
board picture vns added a nev boa.l'C. on ".!bi.eh 1.'as noted those
radio characteristica vhieh could only be obaeJ?Ved by the
lntercept opers.tor (change of' tra.n:;imitter, i.1.icress1ng of
signal s.txiength, tunlng to zero beat, ch~m&~ o.f i•a.clio opera-
to~e, continuou~ not0s, sending o~ voo~ ~tc.)~ These cbar-
act~risticg vere also tabulated nnd compa.1""ed vith those on
the other blackboards.
T1'11s tiresome llork vas not done ln vain. Tlle1..e emerged
the facts tha.t the Pathfinders of the mi~tor-y 5 Group tuned
to the ze.,..o beat oT their frequency long before their r&dio
traffic O'•er the target va.s bes.rd, and tllat the same whistling
tones could be hea~ from Jamming aircraft or 100 c. ·(°lup
~fr·itJ·-:·i~ 1.y after they took off. f"rom Fc>Ul~ham. Also that the
radio operators of 5 Bomber Group trGra cba.ngetj frequently
on non-operational davs~ vh1le during a mission the same
operator rsma1oed on the key.
The ever more rrequent daylight rcids or ths RAF ~ere
pred1ct9d ~1thout ~1f~1culty. rr, ro~ exampl~, 3 eomber
Group vas to fly at noon, thsre was no ~uning trarric during
the morning.. In short, an alerted group 1ns.1ntained radio
silence.

105
DOCID : 3560829

~n1ng traf'f!c probably Ol'ig:1.DStmj l11th the groUD.d

poraonnel rather tball lfith tbs aiJ:bO".\'IlP. r.&d:to ope!"ators.
Pe1"'he.ps it trBs aJ.~o sent dtll'ing r f1pair·.. ,~hop .flights over an
air.fleld 9 but th.t:J uas not absolutely n.om~ssary, Pat-haps
it r.epresented a ce:eta.in pl&yf'ulness on the part o.f radio
repa.ir serge~"'!.nt3 ~ho also ~ished to s~nd a little radio
t1~1.l!'fic. The non-appearance of' this tm11ng traffic becall!e
one of' . the most 1mport.'l:llt cluaa .for th1? Luft\f.g,ffe SIS in pre-
dietlng a ~or.alng attack.
The follmti.!lg depicts the 3equen~~ of. events in a ..,,! ght
raid . . shmring hot1 1 in the ls.tter yea.re of' the ua;r, it eould
be 1dent1T1ad b~ SIS . . and advance ~a?ni~g given:
1700 hours: LG.nca.ste1• units rave been ~lerted fOX' operations
during the first half of the night. l"lhetlwr
Halifax sQuedrona are to te u~ed also is not yet
kucn;n. 5 Group oo~ds ~pe~1cl nttantion.
1800 bout-a: 100 Group ha.3 &lread:1 t9.J.reU art:.
1825 hOU~3: The fi~st airers.rt o~ 100 Group hB.s been plotted;
it :!."leport~d damage. By L!i:iC.na of man:']' bearings
its collrst'! is learned; lt ia f'lying ovett Dunklrk
on n aoutheast cou:i."s~'1 tomn'<i the Clnl"leville
area.
1825 hOUJ'.':l: A bombor code messag~ in th3 ne~ setting, ~h1cb
is only valid f'o?> onfJ nigb.·~ , 13 ssnt by an air-
f la ld of 1 Group; this ~eans ti!!J.t the atrcraft
of 1 Group are ~lioeady airborne, but their
course 1s still unkncnm.
Tho monitoring of Allied a1rcrart reporting
netlforks, cs.rr1ed out by !ileldekopr 2, 1.ndie&tee
4 largF,- ene~ (Britleb) rorma.tion in- the Somme~
Muendung area. · At tUis poiI\t an advaneo irarn-
ing is broadcast to ell pt~rties concerned.
1910 hOUl"S: An OTU s.U-el'&ft a ttq,mpt3 t.o hon.-e on an airfield
or 5 Group and is tu~ned ~~ay by tha airfield
D/F sect:ton (certain "Q 0 ..signa.la). ~t'bel'efore,
the participation or 5 G~oup must be l~ckoned
vith. The IlF and VHF D/F' ;aetvorks are alerted
to monito? the rrequencies or 5 Group.
1920 bOUl'~: An tllircra.f"t vith a knmr:a oparatio.na.l call-sign
requests a check bea~illg from the ai~f1eld D/F
section of the Halifax units. There.fore, tbs
RB.lifQX units also varrant attention.
1935 hout>s: The Allied Air Raid-Reporting Service reporta
a. second vave o.f a1rcr&f't. It is probable that
on this night all groups ai~ taking pa.rt . in the
raid.

106
Joocro: 3560829
J

•'" --
1945 hours: Tho f'iI"st line bearing on t-! "Mag1e Be:.?:" (H2S)
il! ~po!'tad a ~i:ace :i"'~~
i.ntercept is D0\1
bringing results, the cour:1e of the enemy units
. can n011 be ebecked, dep:)nd.lng on the number of'
bearings. Once the eour3e is &eeu.ratol~ deter-
mined, night-fightera can be brought into play.
1950 hou:rs: A "N&gic Box 11 is :plotts1 0'17car th.a Deutsche Ducht.
Since no Jamming aircraft fly into this area,
it can only bs a Mosquito flight or a mine-lay-
1.Dg aircra.rt.
2000 hours: The control stations or 4 and 6 Groups transmit
"vlnds aloft" JDGnsagas on s. CQ call-up. Prom
this it ts lcnovn that 't~ .f:f.rst uave conslsts
of Hs.lif'll'X squadrons or 4 and 6 G~oups, led by
P&.thf'inder3 or 8 Group. Tha bomb .. ~laa.se sig-
nal can b3 ~xpected ~ithin 20-30 minutes or the
"vinda &loft" messages, and thGref'oM tbe t r.r::s.-
t1on ~111 probQbly not intrude dee~ in~o Germany
proper. Attention must nmr be given to too
Boomerang-controlled Mosquitos or 100 GroupG
2010 hou:rs: The first vBve 13 plotted by radar intercept;
course 1s tovard tbs Rbine-WGstpballa 1Ddus-
tr1al district. 1"'.ac!' seeo~d ~ave ls plotted
to~ tha f'iret timtt 1n too Rheims area.
2020 b.oura: A 11'Sinds ·aloft" messag'f) is has.rd on tm l
Group . ·i"rogusncy; this timn it la srant b7 th1:!
ail-era.i't to the control station. 1 Group,
tlHtrefore has peuetrated deepel.4 than tbs Hs.l1-
1'rut foroot1on.. This information &.llcras 1dent1-
f1ea.tion to be g1v4:m to previous •i fAgic Box"
plots on this unit.
note: 100 Group usually ~lies in a uide rorms-
t1on, veiling the movomenta or other
groups, a.nd ma.king it diJ'f'icult to deter-
mine tbs eoUI"sa of individual units.
2025 hOU.\"'S: Th9 identification of sll jG.xtm11nS a1rcM.f't vh1ch
have been plotted is succaesfullJ completed,
&nd their relative positions "'1.th 1•e&pect to tbs
individual units clarif'ied; poi.Dts ot" co!lCen-
tration o!" the ja:mni ng e.i.:rorQ.f't can nou bG
reportad • ·
zero bent tuning on tha iwadqU&i-tel"s .fHqueney
of 5 Group is beard. Accol"dingly. fresh lfe.rning
is given of activity on the part or this d~nger­
ous grou.g whose coursG le ~ill unkD0\\7.D.

107

- - - - ---------
---- -
DOCID: 3560829

2035 hours: Ttw Boomar&ng-controlled target-markers ror

the H&l11'e.x f'ormatic•n e.:r.e plotted. Special
local lfaz>ning io given to tba s.reo. in ~hicb
the ~ttack is expseted.
2037 hours: Inte1•cept1on of Pa thf1mle1~ R/T tra.if'ic (VHF)
on the "C~ f'requ~ney o.i' 8 Gl'oup; the &1rcre.i"'t
are 1dantlt'1ad ~s Boomer&ng-controll~d RosQuitosp
A report to 'tlw ZAF stc·\ias: Bs.lif's.x rorma-
tion ~111 releAne bombo f.ew m1nut0s.
~u
2039 hoUl':S: nl:finds aloft" mDasa.ges a:r•3 ii~H
sent by Patb-
.f':!ndera o~ 8 Group also u Tm co.ntenta are
ldontical with those 3~llt bi 1 Group; thus~
l1 Group are the Pathfil:!ders for l Group. To
uba t e:J2t~mt 8 Group is 6. :pe.r·t or tlre main
bomber stream is, for the pras®nt, still not
cl~a.r.
~he r~port OD thf'l strenr~th Of' thG 1Dtrud1.ng
.formst1oras ntates:
LM.} 1Ie.11f'e.x formation s.pprtiximatel;y 380-450
a1rcra1't ·(L!!ineaste~s or 6 Group have pro-
bt~bl~· not accompanied twm) .• led by Noa-
Quitos.
' bb) 1.anceetGl' .fo?mation mil.ding tovs.1'1Ci Sout.h..
tiGstern Gersn7 ~1th about 300 aircraft
(to what 0xtent 8 Group, excopt for lts
Pm.thfinders. is rapros0.n ted ill tba rorma.-
tion ~m&ins uncertain).
ce) 5 Group ia active in und0t9rmill0d strength;
Qrea ot operQttons ror the pres~nt u:nknatfn.
dd) Jk>squito rorma.tion of 60.80 &irel'3.ft to-
lf~l'dBerl.in (target is only pret11uned, eince
Hosq~itos regul.nrly attack Berlin at this
t tma or night) •
2040 hours: 3 Group v111 p~obably not oper~te, sS.nee trn.1n-
.tng &et1v1ty is taking pl.a.ca on thelr al.r.fields.
2050 hours: A &m!!lll amount of' tr11.1ntDg f'light activity oo-

- 2055 hoU1'8:
gins on two a11'rields o~ 5 Group. It 1s there-
rore p~eaUID9d th&t spaeinliz~d aquadroim are
ca.rryi.Dg out a special mission.
OTU aircraft of' 93 a-roup i~re rooollac1 to their
ba.aes. Consflquently thsr-a ls probab1J & l>At'i-
tr@atheJ:t front moving toea?d their '2.1rf1.elds.
Tbs i!/T companies ar<a inotructed to pa7 S,P3c.1al
attention to l'"!arouting ord0r~ from the control
stations or this group.

108
DOCID: 3560829

2115 h<>m's: The cont~ol station ~f 8 Group ssnds a CQ

m3ssa.gc giving a report oi" ~J.Dds aloft ovcar
the tar~t.. This indicates that tlw IB.ncaster
format.i on vill drop its bombs ul.~hln tha next
half hour. Th0 target area. cQn tbfm ~ deter ...
mined by computing the diat&nca thllt tl:t9 Lan-
casters rly in t~ n~xt lm.l:? hour (tb:air course
baing alre.a dy lmovn), and advanc<a 'aa:rnilig gtve.n.
2135 hours: The control stQtion or 5 Group ~esun:;as its oero
beat tuning. It mig.l:lt be f'or D/F pur-po'sGs and ·
5 Gl"oup might ~ in the v1cillity of the target.
, 21110 houi•s: Report from Jagdd1viaion 7 tm~gGt-markars over
eltJ X ..
2140 hOUl"!J: Aircraf't. o~ l Group aend "'e':?.ntis a.loft 0 ~ss11ges
for a soction already floun t!P.ough (f'or !'$turn
flight purposes) .. 'rhe Nsul~ in a..n 8!5 DIDsse.ge
stating: LancastGr ro~im:.tio~ lms reac:mtd the
target; no .further penetratiori to tbs Q;r..st.
2145 hours: Tba control station ot 3 Grot'!' sends an order
to 1.1 squadron .from t1aterbea.ch 11 diverting it to
another a.tr.field. Eithal' th:'.i bad vei;.ther .front
bas alN&dy r0ach:ad tM 3 G·roup bases, Oi' Bater-
beseh must be lmpt o~n ~or mtreraft returning
rrom oparations.
trr/T Patbf'inder tra.f'f'ic f'rCin tbG control station
o.f 5 GI>oup is inter-et<?pte<l. Jiccordingly, thu
speeiD.l &Quad.rona of t~ Group are 1n an area
directly 1D front of tb.9 t£1.r~t. At tm Malde~
kopf great exeitem3nt pro"(Ta.ils; vbers a.ra th%;
aircra~t? '!'he possibility ths..t · the~ al'"0 over
Germany is slight, bocau3s no fligbta ~G~
reported ~bieh have not bean id0ntified by SIS.
Aftsr urueh telephoning to various tAct1cal
hasdguarte~s · it is flne.llJ learnGd tlat a
rather s~3ll bomber ~o~tio~ is approaching
Bs?gan. Immediately an 1dsnt1.f1ce.tio:n is nmde:
tbsse are tbla special squadrons of 5 Group.
The first plot OD & "master or CG~monies" Of
5 Group confirms tbia assumption; the spsc1~1
sguaciron .rrom Coningsby ls f'lyinr ·.over sout~rn
I\Jo~ay. ·
2150 hOUl"'S: 8 Bomber Group sGnds tm f'irst
An a.ircre..ft of
report of results; ·1t is plott<i>d o~ its return
flight f'rom tba area or city X 1n soutl:lf!estarn
GGrme.ny. 'l'b.& :Nitu.J'n f'light of' t~ main bomwr
stream bas thGNf"ON begun.

~09

-
 DOCID: 3560829

r /

2150 hours: The Halif"a.x airf':l.eldr; bagin ser!ding reports or

t!fe&tlwx- 011~:r tase lA:ud:!..ng conditlous 90em to
g

be !'s.vor&ble in their- s..r\?Q.

· 215 3 h0Ul"9 : Tha .foirot report o~ ~:,erml"i:.s ~- U in'tttI'C13pted on
tba Coningsby a1r:;'il~1d ?:i-oeq11ency; t t is il:1mt>d1-
at~ly repeated ou th;i Ur.,u.p frequency.
Note: The Patbf'iilde.::.• t;;,."'~:t.:?:i:"ic o.f thl3 group
l1as vspaciall~-r 1n·:;·3~~10nat5.ng. ~he 11 maaters
of ceremonirrn·' :.?·:Jr ·::.11~ most ua.X"t did not
ava.11 thamsel·J~::J o§: tbs t~c <#latter code,
and usGCl plal'.J t~:?lt. 5 Bombel~ GroupJ>
uhieh in othe.? n:..~:t·~Gr·a Yas gQnrarall:r ac -
kn<mledgaO tc b8 a ~all·t~ainod unit,
o.ft0n emplo~·e:d ng-u;· t;n~se of rnd1o pro-
ca;dure cal' lessly.. TbfJ introduction of
"~inds aloft:' m~sg~gor in Dec~>mber 1943
can be cited ~\S .~u- <ll~·~.mple. IDste&d o.f
using tm -ue1:·. -eoIDpiled code provided,
JOO:laages ueY.-~.i oon"(; p1·~.ctically unencodacl,
or at 10a.st thosr:P pat>tn tteN left unQn-
ccded wh!eh u ore moot import.a.n t to SIS •
.l After :J<ave2ml airc:w:>•~f't loo me~su~ the
vGJlocity o'i. ~~.nd9 i:t J.oft on .a certain
B$Ction of' th~; routs, and passed this
im"'ormatiou o·"l ·;:;o t'.19:.lr airfield" the
h3adgu~rta~s ~ba~ ~omputed tho probable
uind volocity for t~t sect!on o~ the
routa still to b~ ilo~n, ~nd transmitted
this intellig<>ncc to its a.ire:ro..ft in
flight. Sinco the code lettera used
f'o~ this purpose i~aria e~slly b:rokan.o the
tsa<iquarters c:~.ctu.ally r0vea.led the intene .. d
dapth of pvne~ration of its bom~rs, 4Dd
gave SIS ~ oppor~.un1 ty to cl.ot·e~e the
tai..,gaJt 1D adtt&~cia, to inf ox•& th£> Command
betu~en ~hich dBgSGGa of longitude the
~o;uly~z.s vould cmngia course 1 Uh()D they
i.Jould. drop t:h,..,ir ·~m:nl>s, hmJ 100.ny ms.in
~avsa th:e~i'OG uould ')a~ ~tc. It vas es-
pec:l.all~ easy in the cas~ or 6 Group
to (letGrmine lts rli'YiSiOD into VQ.l'iOUS
waves" becsusa t119 Group h3adqua~tera
sent a. "vinds &loi't" m~ssa~ to eaeh
separate ~ave.. l'b."9 P&th.fintl.ers of 5
Group also us0d plain 1.&Dguage when ~/T
tra.~Tic ~as rirst tntroiiuc~d; only
• later did tha~ go over to tha use of a
spacial three-letter coue vhich cbangad
daily.

l J.O
DOCID: 3560829

2155 hours: A bomber code message from the headquarters of l

Group is deciphered and is found to contain re-rout-
ing instructions.
Note: Several times it happened that the bombers
were called back by their control stationsJ
shortly after passing over the English coast;
in such a case certain aircraft receipted
f'or the message. It was not determined tcrj
~hat extent the British had to authenticate
unusual messages. Under certain circu~­
stances the Luftvarfe SIS might have been
.able to send decoy orders to the bomber
groups. However, such an attempt was for-
bidden by the Chi-Stelle, because it was
afraid, by such a practice, of causing all
Bomber Command W/T traffic to dry up.
Whateve~ further traffic vas intercepted rrom the bomber
formations on their outvard rlight could no longer be used tactic·
ally. Individual QDM•s and reports of weather over bases pointed
to landings; as a rule, flight-cont~ol tr~ffic from the air-
field D/F sections was of a minuawn. Emergency calls from dam-
aged aircraft served for purposes of statistics. Only if German
long-range night fighters pl1rsued the bombers on the :.r return
flight, did these messages have any tactical value.
By far the greater part of the effort w~s eonsc1ously
directed to producing possibilities ~· 0~ i;;~·.;.·lJ \iO.~"'i,ifl8 from the
traffic of• the RAF Bomber Command. All the possibilities un-
covered were similarly applied to the monitoring or the 8th
USAAF. However, in this case no such exertion, as follo~1ng the
British bombers required, was needed. The Americans were much
more massive and primitive in their tactics, and can scarcely
be said to have practiced restr~int in their voluminous W/T and
R/T traffic.
Long-interval advance. warnings of raids by American bomber
f ormat1ons could usually be given as early as 2300 hours on the
night before a daylight a·ttack. The first indication of the
raid proper vas the interception of traf£1c f ;·om ~eat~er recon-
naissance aircraft. The weather ships sent their reports to
their home bases, as well as to certain prescribed headquarters.
In this way they could be D/F'ed, and then it could be stated
quite definitely into which areas the 8th USAAF would fly.
Zero beat tuning vas heard on the bomber division frequencies
in the early morning hours preceding a raid. Next, the take-off

111
DOCID : 3560829

ot1 the individual units ~ras mon.ltored. During tlle assl9mbly,

which cont:lnued for as long as two hcurs, depending on the
s5.ze of the raid, an exact pictu.re of the co:npos1tion a.nd :
strength of the formations 't'las obtained. .from VHF R/T t:c-a.f:fic.
A certa.1.n code-word then indice.teo that the bomber division
m:-r.s setting 1 t.a course. Resear·ch wo1•k, as in t~1e case of the
RAf"', was really not necessary; tht. J\I::!er:tcans spoke of whatever
ttey were doing quJ. te openly.
Tht~ fol l o"wling is a desl}ription C)f th~1 cour3e of:. a. typical
.American heavy bomber I'o.id., and _. e.s in thc::1 case of the example
of an HAF raid,, rep1~esents t;a.ct:tc r:. <ln1.,ing the latter yc-::e.rs of
the var:
2300 hourJ: Since R/.l' and ll/T l;uning tr·aiTic Ls being sent
from 8th US.MF air~:'ieltl::i, a raid must be ln :.ended
.f o:t> the next day.
03)0 hoU1'3: A w~ather reconnaissance a.ircPaft trom Molesworth
sends a message. .\ fi.::c. cannot be obtaine!i from
this one message.
0430 hours: New weather ships of the 2nd and ~r.d Bomber Divi-
sions s -: md messages; they are plotted over the
assembly area in Englano.
0515 hours: A lig.ht jamming ··screen. &Pl)ea.rs over the southern
portion o:r the No1•th Sea, s.nd of"f the ea.stern
coast cf" England. At '..;he sam6 t1n1e the first
take-oi'f' messages A.re :;..ntei•cEJpted on W/T frequen·~
c:f.ea. The first cpez•at5.onal ca.11-signs a1.. e oent
on the airf ielLl w;rc i 'l"c:>quencies, an ind.ice. ti on
that no t1'a.ining flights but :r.•a.thor a 1..aid, is
taking pl~ce. ·
0520 hours: A second weather re·~ cn.nai!lsan~e ati-cl:'a.ft of the
3rd Bombe:r> ··.~ 1vision is pJ.otted while sending a
mea3a.ge tr.:.ili a pos i tion over Franc,3. Inf~rence:
the 3rd Bomber Division, at least in part _, 1-rill
assembl·3 over the co:n.t~.nent; (their assembly areas
are learned from J:i/W-i.ng the radio b~aclins, as
well a.s from captv.red d.ocume.nts}.
0600 hourg: Al though it is known f1•om the preceding W/T tl•af-
f1c, .as well as from HF R/T m~asages, that the
assembly is 1:-P..ki,ng place,, it is cu:eious th.at still
t. no VHF tr·affic is heard. .
0620 hours: Ind1 vid~al a1rcraf t a l•e hea.1~d in tuning tra.ff ic
':Tith their ground ll,tat ions (these tWl1ng met\sa.ges
are especially frequent in the case of the 2nd

112
DOCID: 3560829

a.n.d 3rd Bomber D:i.v islc.io :?). ::\e.1x·in,2s indicate

thEl.t they a.:f'e hec?.c·in.~~ to~ rnrc.i. t.h~~ 1..1cntinent. A
f·ew forma.tton l.e&.cer ~ cf thE' 2n6 Bomber Division
are now het-i.rd L)n vHF F/T, ~tiJ l O\'er the assembly
e,ret=1 in Er:gland, ~ .p!Jr•cz:i.iu·.t<::ly over Crcme:r. W1 tt\
ttie 0xeo1Jt:~on ot• :r ec o:i~nr.::.cse.nc-$ a:::...1 craft: there
1

is :;.t:ti.1 no s:'l.gn t•f ·c.he lr t BombeJ' Dtvision (the

:st Bo1.1ber Div:La ·ti:•n_, r..:ope(;if.J.J.y :";..rt the lf.st
per~.od of' the 1mr·: ..:.· ·· ~•!rcir; el-. excra~1la.:i... y restraint
in :i.-~~s use of' :;•ad.!.o) . ..... yi(··:~ur~J of the bl tue.tion
la now par.sed on ::.o t;10 ..:.J•~) 01J7.~ -:.wace:rned: the
2nd and )rd Bombe-. DJ:1ia :.. ons :.t:;."':.: w1sembling over
1

the con·.;inent in ·;on:=-J.i..1•3:;>9.ble 3t1..1:ngtb; cf the

1st Bo:r.iber Dlvisi.)n> '.T'lii.!'1:1 wll1 a.:.;"So probably
take part in ;~:i.1:1..s op3:;?a·Gion, .aoth:;.:::ig can yet be .
said as to when a .~ d Wlier~ it. lT1ll assemble.
Ci'lC>O hOUl'S: A j£cmlng scr~en t s :eepor t.eo. ov~r the Belgiwn-
Holl!'.nd border a.r<::a. . It is not a rel:'.. .:;.ble indica~­
tlon or e, four-ev; .inad ra:J.d:; lt can just as well
be a. screen ro'X' B M8.raudn:r- a.t t.a.ck .
At th.a same time i .he fir·~t VP.F trgff:tc fl'om the
assemb:'.l.y ares, oveL Ji'z•nnce is tntel'cepted. Ce.11-
signs oi' formn.tio~· ). c;ndl'};.;>s r,,nd sqniJ.drOn 0olo~s
are 1.e:J.1,ned. 1l'he :;A;:~ :i.s glven e-. jlreliminary pic-
tu:i:•e of' the expec :.ed :.:; i;:..•ength whl~.0 the division
is sti1.i asseinbJ.ing. Dur•J.Ilf.; t11e c-;.·;sembl:,·, answer~
to ql1estions conc :~rn1.n3 '.:.1.1.a sta.g~ of sssemThly are
betng given to 1~1'~er~3tt~d .tieadqu::t:'"Gers; at the ·sa.!1<
time, the signal :~nt3~Ui3e.nce: ptc·:;ure is being con·
pleted by calls t~ t~e SIS out-stations. .
07·30 hou.rs ! All the combat ''L~.g s ;J.:1ve now been D/F 'ed; while,
up to now, orcle:r:.? have bean giv-sn princi,,P.ally on
the wing frequ..::nc'Les, now the mescages are sent
on the d:i.vlsion f::-eq·r.lency. The1•ei"ore the assembly
is nearing its .f ir..a~ s te.ge. Meamrhile the 1st
BOii.'bEir D:J.vision l':u.• s ht;er: b.eHrd in 1 ts a.sf..embly
are:!.'. o'.rer France, 3 o th(?. t a cornprf;hens 1 ve pie ture
of i;he air si1;uat:lon e.!lr: nol:· be g~ .ven; only the
stage of assembly in ·t.he ca~e of ·:~hE.• lst Bomber
Div:tsion is st.ill not !t.:nown.
o·r~-o hours: The fir·!.:!'t R/T trai'f'ic on t.he f'r.equency of. the
fight.er escort is heal~d; the approach !'light must
begin tn the next re:f mlnu tes.

113
 DOCID: 3560829

07 45 hours : The fU'et message during the flight to the target

is 1ntereapted. 1t reads as follows: on time
minu~ ei~~t 1 on courne, visibility three, too ·
(time or origin) 0740.
At this point the derense is alerted. By D/F-ing
these obligatory me3sages the exact position of
tb.0 format.ion 11'3 learned. In the case of the 3rd
BorubGr Division, each combat wing commander ha2
to send one of' t _hese messages; thus the Luftwaffe
SIS can detarmina the strength of this division.
Generally, its strength can be reported quite
aecurat~ly to German tactic:il headquarters during
the :fl:!.ght .from the assembly a.rea.
E ~!>ly :Ln 191~4, soi.1e unit commanders of t.he l: t
and 3rd Bomber Div1sion5 even avail.ed themselves
of the~~ D/F network, in· order to orient them-
selves ~hilc still over the sea on their out~ard
flight. It was quite obvious that practically
nothing wns being done to conceal the intentions
or an attack. · ·
Hencet•orth, continuous tracking is guaranteed by
D/F-ing the abundant R/'l' and \(/T tra.ff'ic. A third
prolific source 1~ bearing on the "Mickey" equip-
ment.
oSoo hours: The .fir-st veatheI> ships, reconnoitering the out-
ura.rd flte;ht. course, lU'e heard on R/'L', and appropl'i-
ate D/F stations ~~e deta'lled to monitor them con-
tinousJ.~y. By foll·:iwiXl.3 t~·, . ,m, the route of the
bombers ~un be accurately predicted.
There 1,.'$:C·e days on vhich these weather reconnais-
Sfl,ncq Bircre.f't co1lld be plotted en.route to the
t ·.:t1get., two hours he1~ore the bomber formations
left the assembly area. In the last period there
was un :J. r..crease in the number of cases where their
messages i~ere not · sent through relaying aircraft
on VHF_. but on 1-l/T. Special mention .should be
made of i·.hose we~1. ther ~hips of the 15th USAAF which
reveale~ targets to the Lurt~arre srs many hours
bef or~ t he raids a.c tuaJ.ly bel~a.n.
0900 hours: The first German fighters are mentioned in the
bomber R/T traffic. Large-scE=.le aerial battles
were not frequently l ..evealed ln the signal intelli-
genc~ picture; only in the case of several heavy
raids on Be:rl in t.ra.s there ~ plethora of reports

("' .
114
 DOCID: 3560829

oJ: att•3.C~c s, of comments on the aggressiveness of

Ge:.."man .fighters, of curaes f':t."om the unit commandez·s.s
and re_~rimands to their disorganized formations.
The s ignul 1.n tell 1gence pie ture was not a very
fruitful source of iutelligence on Allied losaeao
:. Jyju hours: The reconnaissance a1rcrs.ft 1'eport weather over the
target (~s a rule for several. targets), and advise
th~ bombe1• formation as to 't.-fl1ether the bombing
should be done visuaJ.ly, or by instrument.
us.i45 ho\;rs; ·rhe swi .t clling on of ~'Mickey" equipment indicates
that the bombers a.~e pivoting ~owa.rd the target.
• 09c-o
J
hours= The ·formu.tion leader ol the rirst wave gives the
orde~: 11
:,omb bays open'' (clea.r text or code~vord).
·~~53 hou.1•s ; Wing after '11ng gives its bomb-release signal. Code-
words occasionally used for this order varied ac-
cor·din.g to the div:tsion.
l<JOO h1J:ir.;; : 'The fiz•s t reports o:f results are intercepted.
1100 hours: The f irat reports of veather over base are heard.
Wote Deciphering of bombey• code me:rnages presented no
difficul t ies. They could be read With a depth of
- (' only thr,ee or f ou:r me3sa.ges. The deciphering was
facilitntP,d. by th ~~· fe.ct that the most of the enc:1 ·
phered messag03 had been previously heard in plain
language on R/'I.'. The:tte!'ore it was only a problem
of organization to collect this abundant material,
and to concentrate 1t in the hands of the duty
offic.c-r without any del&.y •

. 115
DOCID: 3560829
... !

VOLU!'1E 5
I
Tab A I

A Fu Luft (Au~klaerung Funk Lurt?). See Air Radio Reconnais-

::~a.nce (Air Force Journal).
Air Force Admin:l.atra.tive Aree..--Luftgou.
I
f

Air Prisoner of War Transit Cwnp.--Durchg~ala~~r Luft (Dulag).

Air Radio Reconnaiasa.nce (Air Force JournaJ.).--Aufk1aerung
I
J
I
Funk Lu.ft? (A Fu Luft).
Air :~~l Battalion.--Luftnachrichten AbteilUOS (L.n Abt).
Air Si~:.,_ Regiment. - -Luftnacbrichten Regiment ( Ln Regt) . f
Air Warning ~eportll\p; Centers.--.00.el.dekopf'. (
Albrecht, , 1 st )~ieutena.nt. Member of Group III, Divi-
sion ! I rof l;.t4°~f" Signal Off ice •
Anlagenba.nd B zu Xriegst~:~ouch Nr. 4 (l. Abte1lung) vom l.l.45
bis 15.3.45.--Supplemen~~~ Volume B of Wa.r Diary No. 4
(Division 1) .from l JfYl. !~5-J.:; ~A.rah 45.
Anti-Aircraft Command.--Flakkoxap3.
Aufklaarung Funk Lu.ft? (A Fu Lui't).--See Air ~~aio Reconnais-
sance (Air Force Journa.l)o .
Becker, # 1st Lieutena.nt. Chief of Section B of the Sign.al I
Intellrgence Agenoy (Chi Stella) which wa.s 1.n charge of I
evaluation on the Western Front.
Beulma.nn, Franz, Major. Chief of Group I, Piv1sion III ot the
Chief Signal Of'fice.
I
Bolich, ~' Specialist. Member of Group III, Division III of
Ch1.ef Signal Officeo
Bruehl,
Camerla.nder,
~ Colonel. Chief of W-Leit 3 1n Athens in July 1942
, Major. CO of LN Abto 355 in Mort-ray.
I
I
I
Central Air_~afd Warn1ng Un1t.-~zentrale~ Gefechtsatand fuer
Funkaus~e·l'tu.ng ( ZAF) • f
Che~ des Stabes# Genersl.na.chl'ichten Fueh~er. See Chie~ ot Sta.ft I
to the Chief Signal Officer. I
Chief of Sta.f'f to the Chief Signal Orficer.--Chef des Stabes,
Generalnachrichten Fuehrer.
I
Chief of the Air Raid Warning Service for Garmany.--Funk- I
I

I
a.ufklael'Un.gsf'uehrer Reich (FAF). I
Chier Signal Office, Divisions I, II, III.--Generalnachrichten I
I
Fuehrer, Abteilung I, II, III (Gen Na!Ue/I, II, III). I
Chief Signal Offioer of the Air Force.--GeneFalnacnriohten I
Fuehrer (Gen Na.Fue).
Chiffrier Stelle, Oberbefehlshaber der Lu.ftvai're (Chi-Stelle/
OBdL). See Signal Intelligence Agency of the Commander I
in Chief of the Ai~ Force. I
Chi-Stelle/OBdL (Chiffrier Stelle, Oberbefehlahabe~ der Luf't-
lTaffe). See Signal Intelligence Agency of" the Commander
1n Chief' of the Air Foiace. · II
r
116
I
I

f
 DOCID: 3560829

Chlubek, Gerd, lst Lieutenant. Member or LNR-353. Cryptana-

lyst on Russian traffic.
Commander in Chief' of the A1r .}orce.--Oberbe.fehlshaber der
. Luf'twa.ffe ( OBdL) •
D-8. Selected docwnents from war D1ary #2 on Division 3 of
Chief Signal orrice.
Direction-Finding Stations (cover name: weather research sta-
tions) .--Wetterforschungsstellen {'Wo-Stellen).
Dulag (Durchgangslager Luft). See Air P~isoner of War Transit
Camp.
Durchgangslager Lui"t (Dula.g). See Air ~r1soner of War Transit
Camp.
Du~r, , General . Inspector General ·of the German Air Force
Signal Equipment.
Eick, Hans, Colonel . CO of LN Regt 353.
Etzer, , Specialist. Membar of Group II, Division Ill of
cn1er Signal or rice • .
E·iTa.lua.tion Centers (cover name: Weather Control Stations). --
Wetterlei tstellen (W-Lei~).
FAF (Funkaufklaerungsfuehrer Reich). See Chief of the Air Raid
. Warning Service for Germany.
Feichtner, Ferdinand, Major. CO of LN Regt 352.
Fighter wing (in USAAF).--Jagdko~~~.
Fischer, , Captain. Air Intelligence ofricer on ~astern
Front. Specialist on Russian Air 0/8.
Flakkorps. see Anti-Aircraft Command (in USAAF).
Fl,_egerkorvs. see Wing (in USAAF).
Flight (in U~AAF).--Sta.f"fel.
FMBSt (Funkmessbeobachtung-und ~toerdienst). see Radar Obser-
vation and Jamming 3ervices.
Forste~, , Colonel. Chief of Radio Air Warning Service.
Franz, , Major. Chtef of Division I of the Chief Signal
Office .
Friedrich, , Lt. Col. Chief of' Division III of the Chief
Signal otr1ce (Signal Intelligence Service) _and of the
Chi-Stelle (Signal Intelligence Agency). ·
Friese, , 1st .Lieutenant. Member of LN Regt 351.
Funkaufklaerungsfuehrer Reich (FAF). see Chief of' the Air
Raid Warning Service ror Germany.
Funkbef ehlss tand. See Hadar Intercep1~ Center.
Funlcle1tstand . see Radar Control Post.
Funkmessbeobachtung-und 8toerdienst (FMBSt). See Radar Obser-
vation and Jamming Services.

(' ·
~17
DOCID: 3560829

1
GAF SIS . --Oberkonwiando der Luftwaffe, Generalnachrichtenfuehrer/
III Abteilung { <.ll<L/Gen Nafue/III).
Generalnachrichcan Fuehrer (Gen Nafue}. See Chief Signal Officer
of the Air Force.
Generalnachrichten Fuehrer, Aote1lung I, II, III (Gen Nafue/
I, II, III). See Chief Signal Office, Divisions I, II, III.
Gen Na.fue ( ·~)·~nera.lnachrichten Fuehrer). See Chief Signal O.fficer
of the Air Force.
Gen Nafue/I, II, III (Generalnachrichten Fuehrer I, II, III).
See Chief Signal Office, D1v1sions I, II, III.
German Air Force High Command.--Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL).
German Home Defense Air Force.--Lui't.flotte Reich.
Gesch~ader. See Group (in USAAF'). .
Goerner, , Corporal. Member of LN Hegt 550.
Gosewisc~- , Major General. Inspect:or General of the Luft-
vaffe Signa.l Corps .
Gromall, , Major , Worked on development of German Air Force
:-. tgnal eq uJ.pmen t.
Grouv in m-;AAF). --Geschwader.
Group of the Signal Intelligence Agency.--Gruppe.
Gruppe. See Grou~ of the Signal Intelligence Agency.
Gruppe. See Squadron (in USAAF).
Henschke, , Lt. qen. Director of Air Signal Re~lacement
and Training Units .
Herold, Wad1m: Captain. CO of III/LN Regt 35) . .
Hoeherer Kommandeur der Funlca.ufklaerung (Hoehr Kdr d Funkaufklrg) -·
~ee Senior Signal Intelligence Officer.
Hoehr· Kdr Jt"'unkaufklrg (Hoeherer Kommandeur der Funkaut'klaerung).
See Senior Signal Intelligence Qf'ficer.
Holetzke, , Captain. Member of I/LN Regt 353.
Horc.ha.bte1lung. See ~ignal Intelligence Battalion.
Huebner, Eri~h, Ca~tain. Chief of Section C of the Signal
Intelligence Agency.
I-13. Compoaite Report on ry.\: o Interrogations of Oberstlt.
Friedrich, Chief of the UAF Sigint Service. A TICOM pub-
lication.
I-41. Report on First Interrogation of Major Oeljeschlaeger .
Addendum: Interr-ogatian of Major Beulmann. A TICOM pub-
lication.
I-65. Interrogations of Capt. Herold. LN Regt 353; lst Lt.
Werther, LN Regt 353; Lt- Ludvig, Chi-Stelle; and lat Lt.
Le1chtle, LN Regt 351. A TICOM publication.
I-7u. Paper on the German Air Force Signe.l Intelligence Service
by Lt. Col. Friedrich, Chief or )rd Division of Chief Signal I

Office and Chief of Chi-Stelle.

118
.I
!
 DOCID: 35608.29

l-ltl7. P:r-eliminary interrogation of Obl tn. Chlubek and Lt.

Rasel both Of III/LN Regt 353.
I-lu9. Translation l)f a Report by Lt. Ludwig of Chi Stelle
Ob.d.L. (Bef .B) based on questions set for him at AD I (K)
A TICOM .~-'uhlicution. ~ • • •
I-112. PrelLaina.ry Interrogation of Specialist Dr. Ferdinand
Voegele (Uh1 Stelle, Ob.d.L} and Major Ferdinand Feichtner
(o.c. of LN Regt :;52, etc.). A TICOM publ1ca.t1on.
I-119. Fu~the~ Inte~ro~ation ot Reg. Rat. Voegele and Major
Feichtner of vP.l S1gint. A TICOM publication.
I-120. Transln.tion of Hvmevork by Oblt~. W. Werther, Company
Commander or 7/J"'N Hgt • .353, written on l2tb August 1945
at A.D.I.(K). A TICOM publication.
I-121. Transl1I.tion of Homework by Obl tn .. w. Werther, Cotnpany
Commander or 7/i.1N Hgt .. .353 1 wr1 tten on 12th Ausust 1945
at A.D.I. (K). A TICOM publication.
I-126. ttomewc:•.'k by Major Feichtner, c.o. LN Regt. 352. A
TICOM pul1lioation.
. (--. I-130. Home't-r·:.i~k by i~au_ptmann Herold, OC of LN Hegt III/353 •
A TICOM )Ublioa-1~ion.
I-133. Home\lorlt by Lt. Rasch of III/LN Regt-353. A TICOM
publica•,ion.
I-134. Hom<1;o1ork by lst Lt. Chlubek of III/LN Regt ~53. ·A
TICOM !JU~l1cat1011. .
I-135. Hom~work by Lt. Ludwig of* the Chi Stelle Ob.D.L. A
TICOM publication.
IF-175. ~·..Ha.bourne report, Vol. XIII. "Crypta.rialysis within
the J. uf twa.ffe SIS." Fror:: Commanding General, 9th Air
Forc.1.:.
IF-176. ~ee.bourne report, Vol.. III. "operations and Techniques
of ':.he Radio Def'ense Corps, German Wehrmacht. 11 From
Cor1Hianding General,, 9th .h.1r Foree.
IF-J.77. Seabourne report, Vol~ I. "Introduction and Report."
Fron Commanding General, 9th Air Force.
IF-1'{8. Seabourne report, Vol. II, 11 Biogra.phies of Cont:r1~
11
bi4 .;ors. From Commandilllr General, 9th Air Force.
IF-17~~· . Sea.bourne rej:•ort, Vol. IV. ''Biography of Major Ferdi-
1.and Feichtner." From Comma.nd1ng General, 9th Air Force.
IF-1 '.'J. Ses.bourne :report, Vol. V. "The Chi-Stelle." From
Commanqing General, 9th /lir Force.
IF-i.dl. Seabourne repc1rt, Vol. VI. 0or1g1ns of the Luf'tva.ffe
SIS and History of Opera~ions in the West.tt From Command·
1ng· General, ~th Air Forbe.

ll~
DOCID :· 3560829

IF-182. Seabourne rel-lort, Vol. VII. "Technical Operations

in the West." From Commanding General, 9th Air Force.
IF-183. Seabourne report, Vol. VIII.· 11 Miscellaneous Studies."
F:r>om Comma.nding General, 9th Air Force.
IF-184. Seab0urne report, Vol. IX. "History of Operations in
the South." From Commanding General, ~th Air Foroe.
IF-185. Seabourne report, Vol. x·. · "Technical Operations in
the South.Luftwaffe SIS. 11 From.Commanding General, 9th
Air Force.
IF-186. Seabourne report, Vol. XI. "HistoI'y of Operations
in the East LUftwa.!'fe SIS. 11 From Commanding General, 9th·
Air Force.
IF-187. Seabourne report, Vol. XII. "Technical Operations in
the East. 11 From Comm.anding General, 9th Air Force.
IF-189.. "GAF. Si&!la.ls Intelligence in the War." ADI (K).
Report #402/1945.
Jagdkorps. See Fighter Wing (in OS~).
Jering, Karl, T/Sgt. Member of Section C of the Signal Intelli-
gence Agency.
Jordens, , Ca.Jltain. Adm1nstrat1ve co of LN ABT 350 (Chi-
Stelle as of the 1~44 reorganization).
Kienitz, .•.. , Colonel. Air Force Intelligence Of~icer. No
other information available through TICOM.
Kleuune, , General. Senior Signal Intelligence o:fficer.
Klocke, , Dr. German Air Force Intelligence expert on
Russian Air O.B.
Kr1e1'$~tagebuch (KTB). See W.1.r Diary.
KTB (Kr1egstagebttch}. See War Diary.
·Kupffer, , Major. Liaison officer to German Air Force
Headquarters from Section D of the Signal Intelligence
Agency. outstanding authority on Russian Air O.B.
Kullman, , Major. Chief of Group III, Division III Chief
· Signal Off ice ( radru~ moni taring and jamming. )
Leichtle, Georg, 1st Lieutenant. Member of section A of the
Signel Intelligence Agency.
Lier, Guenther, Lt. Member of LN Regt 352.
Ln Abt (Luftnachr1chten Abteilung). see Air Signal Battalion.
Ln Helf (Luftnachr1chten Helferin). see women's Auxiliary
(WA) (technical).
Ln Regt (Luftnachrichten Regiment). See Air Signal Regiment.
Loebell, , Major General. CO of Air Service Area (Luf'tgou) I.
Local Al~ Force.--Luf'tflotte.

120
 DOCID: 3560829

l
Ludwig, Martin, Lt. Member of Section B of the Signal. Intelli-
gence Agency.
Luftlotte. See Local Air Force.
Luftflotte Reich.--German Home Defense Air Force.
Luftgau.--Air Force Administrative Area.
Luftnachrichten Abteilung (Ln Abt). See Air- Sign.al Batta.lion.
l..ut'tnachrichtan Helrer1n (Ln Helt'). See Women• s Auxiliary {WA)
(technical).
L~tnachrichten Regiment (Ln Regt). See Ail" Signal Regiment.
MaJer, Karl 1 • Member of LR Regt 352.
Marks, _, Lt. Once e.ssigned to Signal Intelligence Agency.
Martinr,- , General.. Chie:f Signal Officer of the Oel'DlB.n
f,ir Force.
MeldeJ..:op.r.--Air Warning RFJ_porting Center.
Moosh~ke, Otto, Lt. Member of LN Regt 351.
Morgenstern, , Colo11el. Chier of' Staff 'to the Chief Signal
Ofrioer or the German Air Force.
Mucke, Helmut, Lt. Member of Regt. 353.
Naumann, , Senior 3pecia11st. Chie.f of German Air Foros
Weather Service.
Nonnast, , Specialist. Chier or Group V, Division III of
the Chief Sign~l Office (personnel).
Eovopashni, , Prof. Member ot 31gnal Intelligence Agency.
oeljeschJ.aeger, FFanz, Major. Chier of Group II, Division III
of' the Chief Signal Office.
OBdL (Oberbefebishaber der Luf't~affe). See Commander in Ch1ef
of the Air Force.
Oberbefehl.sb.aber der Luftwaffe ( OBdL). See Commander 1n Chief
of the Air Force.
Oberkommando der Luf'tvaff'e (Ol<L). See H~ . gh Command of the Air
Fol'ce.
Oberkomma.ndo der Luftwaffe, Generalna.chrichtenfuehrer, Abte1lung
Ill (OKL/Gen Nafue/III). See GAF SIS (German Air Foroe
High Command, Signal. Intelligence Service.
O:KL (Oberkomruando·der Luftwaffe). see German Air Force High
Co;xunand.
OKL/Gen Nafue/III ( Oberkommando der Luft~-l'affe, Genera.lnachr1chten-
f·t.re.hrer Abteilung III) • See ]AF SIS (German A1r Force
1

E1gh Comm.and, Sign.al. Intelligence Service).

Obel'kolDD18.ndo de?' Wehrmacht Chiffr1e~abteUung ( OKW/Chi). See
Signal Intelligence Agency of' the Supreme Command, Armed
Forces.
OKW/Chi ( Oberkomma.ndo der Wehrma.c.ht Chirfrlerabtellung). See
Signal Intelligence Agency o!' the Supreme Command, Armed
(' - Forces.

121
 DOCID: 3560829

Pick, Berthold, Lt. As3t~ Chief, Section E of the Signal In-

telligence Agency.
Porth, , Captain. Chier o£ Group IV, Division III ot Chief
slgna.I Office ( cryptogra¢11c security),
Radar Control Post.--Funkle1tstand.
Radar Intercept Center.--Funkbefehlsstand.
Radar Observation and Jamming 3erv1ces.-~Funkmessbeobachtung­
und Stoerdienst {FMB8t).
Radio Intercept Stations (cover name: Weather Radio Rece1v1ng
Stations) .--Wetter.funker11p.fa.I@tellen {W.;..Stel1en).
Rasch, Werner, Lt. Attnched to 3rd Batta.lion, LN Regt 35}.
Reterat. See Section .or the Signal Intelligence Agency.
Ristau, , Major, CO .of LN Regt. 351.
Rueckheim, , Captain. GO of LN Abt 357.
Ruhling, , Captain. GErman Air Force Intelligence Specialist
on Russian A1~. O. B.
Sann, , Lt. Attached to LN Regt 35}.
Schatz, , Corporal. Attached to LN Abt 350.
Seheidl, , Capt~1u. CO of Ist Battalion of LN Regt 353.
Sohep!Jelmann, / Co1·~oral. Attached to LN Abt 350.
Schenerle, Enrin, ~t. Attached to LN Regt }51.
Sch1eferdecker, , S~ecia.l.ist. Member of Group IV, Division
III of Chief' S'rgxia.l Office.
Sch1eran, , spac1a.:l1et. Member of Group II, Division III
of Chief Signal Office.
Schlottman .. Gert., ~f!/Sgt. Attached to LNR 352. ,
Schnippering, _ , Majqr. In charge o'£ research on allied
methods oreontmun1cation.
Schulz, , Lt. Member of Group III, Division III of Chief
Sign&l Office ,.
Schulz, Heinz, Lt. Attached to LN Hegt 352.
Schulze, , Dz'.: Lt. Col. Chief of Division II of Chief
Signal (j:ffice ('communications and cryptography).
Section of the S~gna.l Intelligenc~ Agency.--Referat.
Senior Signal Intelli~ence Off1cer.--Hoeherer Kommandeur der
Funka.Uf'kle.~rung (Hoehr KDR d Funkaufklrg).
S!ess, , Chptain. Atteched to LN 'Abt ~50.
Signal Intelligence Agency of the Commander 1n Chief of the
Air Forc~ . -rCh1.f.fr1er Stelle, Oberbefehlshaber der Luft-
va.ff e ( C'!1i-Stelle/OBdL) •
Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Comm.and, Armed Forces.--
Oborkoml7~do der Wehrmacht Ch1ffr1erabteilun.g ( OKW/Ch1).

r-- 122
DOCID: 3560829

Signal Intelligence 118.·t tallon. --Hor~ha.btellung.

Squadron (in USAAF).--Gruppe.
Sta.ffel. See Flight (in USAAF).
Stamm, Werner, T/Sgt. Attached to LN Hegt 352.
Supplementary Volume P. of War Diary No. 4 (Division I) from
l Jan. -l5 Mal' 45. --Anln.genband B zu Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4
(1. Abt·31lung) vom l.l.45 bis 15.3.45.
Trattner, , Captain. CO of LN Abt 356.
Truemena,--Wr.rhelm, ~gt. Attached to LN Regt 353.
Voegele, F:il'dinand, Specialist. Chief of Section F.: ~ of the
Signal 1ntell ·~gence Agency and Principal cryptanalyst of
the GAF.
Von Laokum, , Lt. Attached to LN Regt 353.
Von Linge~, , Lt. Cryptanalyst in Seot1on E of the Signal
Intelligence Agency.
War D1ary.--Kr1ee--atagebuch (KTB).
WatkinsQn, Oerd T/5gt. Attached to LN Regt 351.
Werther, w~ldema.r, lst Lt. Attached to the 7th Company, 2nd
Battaliou, LN Regt. 353. The most capable cryptanalyst
on Russian Air Jt'orce cryptogra.tihic systems on the Eaotern
Front. .
Wetter.forscil~·a:; t:allen· {Wo-Stellen). See D1rect1on-F1n1. 1ng
Stat1Gns (cover name: weather research stations).
Wetterleitstellen (W-Le1t). See ·Evaluation Centers (cover name:
Weather Cont~ol Stations). .
Wetterfunkempr.anscellen (W-S~ellen). See Radio Intercept Sta-
tio:l.1s (cove;· name: )leather Radio Receiving Stations).
W1ndels , Ha.ntJ, Major. CO of 2nd .Battt1lion, LN Regt 353.
Wing (ii~ U3AAF) .--Fliegerkorps. ~
WianU:ov, • Lt. Attached to Section E of the Signal Intelli-
gence AgG'ncy.
W-Leit (Wetterleitstellen). See ·Evaluation Oente~s (oover name:
Weather Control Stations).
Women.' s Auxiliary (WA) (technical) . --Luf'tnachrichtan (Ln Helf).
Wo-~.tell 13n (Wetterforschungsstellen). See Dir ·.,c t1on-F1nd1ng
Sta.t1ons (cover name: weather. . research stations).
W-Stell i~n(Wetterfunkempfa.ngstellen). See Radio ·1nter~ept
Stations (cover name: Weather Had1o Receiving Stations.
ZAF (Zentru.ler Gefechtsstand fuer Funkaus~ertung). See central.
A1r R~id Warning Unit.
Zont.raler Gefechtsstand fuer Funkauswertung (ZAF). St.•e Cent-i:·al
Atr Raid Warning Unit.
zuerr, , Major General. Inspector General of Gernwn Air
Force Signal Equ:>ment.
.- -
123
DOCID: 3560829 ·-------· --· - . - -

\,

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(CHART No. 5-2. From IF-180)

 --
D.OCID:
·~-......
~· ·r GERMAN AIR FORCE SIGNAL INT:ELLIGENCE s·ERVICE
-- .
. ' CHAIN OF COMMAND - ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL
JANUARY
1945 . . "

~IR FORCE HIGH CCM'v1AND

[QKL l
CHIEF SIGNAL OFFiCER-
p--...
GEN
l UC.I"
.MARTINI
... -· ._. .
lVJoo{IOC:J
.. 0 .

I
CHIEF OF STAFF, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
SIGNAL OFFICER
L~r..9~~ . '11.,.<?,lfG ~~!a~~"N
I
..
I
I
• I DIVISION m
SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION II
DIVISION I ANO CRYPTANALYSIS COMMUNICATIONS AND
ASSIGNMENT OF AIR ,.--------- - ---------- -------- - ---- ADMINISTRATION CRYPTOGRAPHY
SIGNAL TROOPS
:--------T----- CHOEHRGEK~R D~L~~A~FKLR:J Lt COL SCHULZE
MAJ FRANZ
t GEN NAFUE/I l
:
:
:
:
OPERATIONS
LT. COL F.~)_gt)RICH
CGEN NAFUE /IIl .
...
tG~N NAFrn· imJ T
I I
I
T .
'
i
,
•
r
l
n
·1
m
.. .. I

I
I•
GROUP I GROUP GR_OUP' GROUP Ilr
GROUP I GROUP n GROUP m GROUP DZ
·-'i
! I I I 1---__._- I -· ~ COMMUNICATIONS:

PUBLISHED .DIRECTIVES RADIO NAVIGATION AIR-REPORTING

SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP I GROUP II GROUP m GROUP Dl GROUP ll'. COMM UNI CATI ON S: COMM UNICAT I 0 NS: ,_ COMMUN I c ·ATIONS•
RADIO, COMPILATION
6 DISTRIBUTION OF
AGENCY
a NAVY LIAISON . LT COL FRIEDRICH EQUIPMENT CRYPTANALYTIC PLANNING TELEPHONE TELETYPE CALL SIGNS 8
FOR USE OF TROOPS RADAR a FIGHTER ADMINISTRATION EQUIPMENT
PROCEDURE. KEY
•Al R SECURITY" OF SIGNAL. ~D TECHNICAL AND TE'.CHNICAL SECURITY STUDIES PERSONNHL
CONTROL ADMINISTRATION COMPILATION. DIS-
ANO EQUIPMENT
SERVICE COKL/LN ABT 350J INTELLIGENCE ADMINISTRATION
DIRECTIVES 8 TRIBUTION OF' CIPHER
a FOR INTERCEPT FOR ENEMY RADAR
MONITORING NEW SYSTEMS ·. .. ·....
_. MACHINES 6 SYSTEMS
FORMERLY"at-sTB.LEJOB d L." ... JAMMING ~CES CHORCH DIENST:!

·----------.,
REICH AIR RAID
I MAJ BEULMANN
---·
MAJ DELJESCH
LAEGER
AND
MAJ
JAMMINO
•• ~FuMBSt J
'""I UAU
CAPT
___ _
PORl'.f;tk <_: • M Re . NON NAST
...........
r-·-------,
SECRET WRITING 8
SIGNAL TABLES
r- -- - - · - ,
rAiR"'FciRcE-31 IAiR FoRcE51 fAiRFORCE-21 WARNING AGENCY fAiR FORCE~ !A"iR'"F·oH'cE-~ · AIR FORCE 4 ! j .A1R FORCE j
•
I I
WEST
• •
I NORWAY
.
11 MEDITERRANEAN
•
I
COL FORStER
CFUNKAUFKLRG FUE REICH~ I NORTH RUSSIA.
I I• CENTRAL Rus~1~ ..iI 1
.
SOUTH RUSSIA . _, RE I c H
icwFTFLDTTE·REtCHlj

~FTFLOP-~- »j r· ------- .• --·--------- '---~!~~::~ -~~~;'E.--~ -CENTRAL ;~f}'~ ""'NINl i_c LUF!FLor-:_Ej . . . [tLUF!FL~r~ .:3 . [_C_L~T!L!_T~:~ - . t _____ ___ .:::I
1

I f-------- -~--- --- -1-)-----·-.--..:.; - r :-;· ·--· --- -+---T······· ·----·· --····-····r-···-···-·--f:-··----·-·-"··--~-----------------······--;-··~-- -------·- -y-.----.- - ---·. · ·--.. -.+-.... ---_T _1___ .. ------- -----} I I ..
. AIR SIGNALS AIR SIGNALS AIR SIGNALS AIR SIGNALS . AIR SIGNALS · AIR SIGNALS I i AIR SIGNALS AIR SIGNALS
REGIMENT. 3 51 : BATTALION .356 BATTALION 357 BATTALION 355 REGIMENT 352 ! RE~~~NT . BAT{~~ION · BA~T~§ION
MAJ RISTOW CAPT TR4TTNER CAPT RUECKHEI M MAJ cAMERLANDER MAJ FEICHTNER . .. I coL EICK. j I· !TRAINING - PERSONNEL CR'1~i~ -0i:~~~G I
CLN REGT :551:J C LN ABT :556] CLN ABT H7l CLN ABT 355J CLN· REGT 352J . tLN REGT 353J • , c LN ABT 358] t LN ABT 3S9J

*I L l co.
REPORTING
CENTER - 3
*I L
.
1
REPORTING
CENTER - \
co.
*I L l
EVALUATION
co. . za co
" ·
EVALUATION
26.
REPORTING
co. I
I
25
EV~TION
co. I
iI
'
II
CENTER - 4
CVLN ABT 356J tl/LN ABT 357' Cl/LN ABT 355l
C251LN REGT ~l [25/LN REGT 352] I REPORTING
CENTER - 5
1
•

~-li-~-Ll-O-N BA~TALION A~~'.'1'>'.'li J

I

p-2_n_d-BA
...... 3rd ' I j - 'f ··-· bl\/LN
1
j
1st BATTALION
[ I ABT l 25thCO.
[ II ABT J c: m A BT l 1st BATTALION 2nd BATTALION 1st BATTALION
!N<?RTH RUSSIA! ..
1 2nd BAT-TAllON. ·-
l CENTRAL RUSSIA I .,;._ __ ,.J
! - ,. 3rd BATTALION
!SOUTH RUSSIA I
EVAL~ATION .....__ _ _ _ ___,

*I
. ABT J CAPT SCHEIDL MAJ WINDELS CAPT HEROLD .·
L [I C ll ABT l
REPORTING
CENTER·2
cI ABT J cn ABT J . [ m ABT J
I
I -·· - I
LEGEND
• OPERATIONAL CONTROL
* I
• .. J ·

· ·~
-r ..;:--· ·
I_,
. - -- =·=··=···=- =-.---~---.--

I
......... ·-
I I I I .· I
•ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL I CO. 2 co. 3 co. 4 . co. ·- 7 co. 0 co. g"co. II CO. 13 co. 14 co. 15 co. 16 co.
OPER~TING
cLQCAL AIR FORCE COMMANDER IN EVALUATION' INTERCEPT INTERCEPT EVALUATION EVALUATION
WHOSE AREA THE FIELD UNIT OPER4TED OUTSTATIONS
C131LN REGI' 3:13l
C4/LN REGT !53l - - T/LN AEGT 353l
* •SIMILAR TO .LN. REGT. 35:5 . OILN REGT 353l [2/LN liEGT 3531 [l/LN REGT 353l
.,. .·. I I I I
**
***
•SIMILAR TO 13/ LN REGl 353
; SIMILAR TO 2/ LN REGt 353
**
I I
**** )*
~-

-"~.·· ** ** *** tttUOf tHOOt

****
ABT
CHI - STELLE
•SIMILAR TO 4/ LN REGt :55:5
•ABTEILUNG l BATTALION I
•CHIFFRIER STELLE
I I ..
FUNKAUFKLRG. FUE REICH • FUNKAUFKLAERUNGS' FUEHRER REICH
GEN NAFUE •GENERAL NACHRICHTEN FUEHRER 1 PLATOON 2 PLATOON 3 PLATOON 1 PLATOON 2 "PLAT.DON 3. ..~LATOON
HOEHR KOR D. FUNKAUFICLRG • HOEHERER KOMMANOEUR DER FUNK - OPERATING OUTSTATIONS . OUTSTATIONS 12 .iNTERCEPT · ,~ . l~fERGEPT 12 INTERCEPT
AUFKLAERUNG
POSITIONS POSITIONS POSITIONS
Fu MB St •FUNKMESSBEOBACHTUNG UNO
.,'. STOERDIENST

!.
LN ABT • LUFTNACHRICHTEN ABTEILUNG
I -·,-
LN REGT • LUFTNACHRICHTEN REGIMENT
I . _J .· l . ____J____
J
OBdL • OBERBEFEHLSHABER DER LUFTWAFFE ~
OKL
ZAF
• OBERKOMMANDO OER LUFTWAFFE
• ZENTRALER GEFECHTSSTAND FUER
• FUNKAUSWERTUNG
...__ __ _ _ __ _ _ _.:.___ _ _ _ _ _ __ ____. OPERATING

TOTAL PERSONNEL -
RADIO

13,000 .
STATION
.I
TELEPHONE
OPERATING
STATION
TELETYPE
OPERATING
STATION
D/F
STATION
OUTS'V'TION

10
OUTSTATION

II
ioUTsTATION

12
~_.I.__~·
OUTSTATION

13
,')! . _ - - - ' --

. OUTSTATION

14
I
ourSTATION

., -=-=-r
.SEC

~A.TION
FINAl
I SEC
R/T
EVALUATION
2
SEC~
LONG RANGE
~-
BOMAF,1m
. .
SEC 4
TRAFFIC
ANALYSIS
I
S EC 5
DI F
EVALUATION..J
I
SEC 6
CRYPTANALYSIS
SEC I
WEATH E R
~L.UATl()N
l
l
Tnc e~ce£:..T.~·-----
---
-_-_
-_-_
-_-_-____-_-:_-:_-:_-:_==========-~~~----------------------Ct;ttHAA.HR~T~Nll.CLn~5~-~..L_l_~
-~'. -

---·· ·--
DOCID: 3560829
-
. I

.
;
,
f!r!..anizalion ilnrl Sill'n9/h of_HlP 8HI US Rir Force -'""'!!'~""-t-
- - -Rsof Nartlt -1945"--..._ :r.·i
f/g,ure No 3
11.Q.

---------
_______J __
8''1/F.
.
·..
.. (
-------
( "· 211<1 Bomb.Division ·1 __........,.,,_~ ·: . s-a811mb.fiiy1'Ji11n
..._..._.....,._..,.....,. CB-211~) · · I fB- 17 'sJ
:
.t
~

•
•

' ' "

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~
~('/W

"
. . '

Tola/ a/Jo'!I- S~OO Bombl'rsra-trsomlB-24:SJ t1ntl f250 Fig_hJer5 (P-51s<1n<lso"*P-lf7s)

I

*
{
..
C/W .. (omb81- Wing
'• . (.CJLl\RT .No.• .S:,-4... F.rom. IF-l..82)
... .. - ·-
 - --· ·--- ·-- - -·--· -- -- ··--- - -- - - - -- ·.-, ·-·. - - ---·- · - ----. ---- -··· ----·--- --- ·-·- - - ··---- · - ·· --- ·-· -·· - --- ·- -- -·- --- -- - ·-- ---- - - -- - ----- - -- ----- - --·- ------ -· ---- ·-··---- ·-- ... - ···· ··-- . ··- - - - ·- - ·-·· - ···- .. ·-- -- - ·- .
-- - -- -- - - - · -- - --· - ·- -----·- --·- -

g_~nirilli11n ~nil S.Jren1!!J.

( Frunj- Unils only, excluding 2"" TllF} .. ,
lls of Mt1rclt-191/.5 - - . ' "
. -- ·- ... -- -

-'
•
------- -· ·. - - - ---- -·------ -- ~ -
(CHART No. 5-3. From IF-182)
- ···- ·----------------- ----
HQ. llQ . HQ.. I
Bomb~r Commilnd Fi9h~r Command .i
Coasldl Command 1
l,
'

~~ / I \ ~ ---------- -.- --
~-~ \ ~ / I \ ~
'

, I
--( 80. u1oup ~Bo. lirOtJp . '180.uroup 5 Bo.firoup 6~o . liroup ·sso.Oroup 100 IJroup 91 lloJ,,nuµ !Ji! Bn lir1111p 93 80 6roup !J Ii (u Q4/p fOFi Gump 11 Fi fr ro11/) f 2 Fi. (noup 13 FJ:Group 8 2 Fi. v rc•·p 15 6. R. 6NIJ/J 16fr. R6-toup 1'T6.R.6roup f 8 <T. RJrroup 19~_/I, UlflUP

•
..
• .-
( o -DpH<1l1°"9 w;11r Day ·r<1itls Co -ope1<11ing willl Own Alllrfinders co·-0~1Jlin9 w1lh Pi1111finde1 Jntf C'ounfer ~('WsureJ
-.
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and 6 Sqds. <1rrd G svt1s. iiml <1ho11I ~ Eshmal-ed Slrmgllr IJ .Squadrons 17bouf SS"· 60 Squao'rons '

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DOCIJ:A 3560829

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11/hed 111; Tfc1nse.or/. Uni/as (CHART- No. 5-6. From IF-182)

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 .-
DOClo:
.·- . 3560829
\

... . ......--- .. - ·----·-·

(CHART No. 5-11. From I-182)
..... ' .-

Orpniaation of the Sigint Ullit "I/JSJ"

-- HQ .
I/353
o. c. J Ia - Intercept
l ·1
I
I
:svaluaticm 0ompnny Operating and ou' ·stations Intercept company
I 1/353 . couipe.ny . 2/353 J and 4/J53
' (J platoons each)
.
Se~tion I Final EValuation
content Evaluation ,__
Wireless Opar-
( . 1 Platoon t-- .J 1 Platoon
r
r
ating stati\Dl 12 Wirolesa Int'i-
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[~ipltl t- I
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I

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station r- I

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section

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LOQg range
~ua.tion. i-..
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tat ion J--iJ 12 Wireleaa
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Section. 'fre,ttio AJiaIYeia

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i se7tioa Evaluation of
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• ...
 DOCID: 3560829

ORGANISATION OF A LONG RAP.GE BO~::Bm EVALUJ,.TION SEDTION

7ft! r
Tel~.one ~eports
G
G~-
/_ .

\
Plot ting

~ ....
/Air forco staff
/~Fighter unit
f-el_ep_~_on_e_I __ '). A.A. -unit
positions ~Radar Stations
Receiving Station of J./o.
for D/F reports
1
( Head of Section
and
ered mess
Head Evaluator all messages_" Evaluator for
~ content of
messages

Head iionitor

eceivers for ground stations traffic

J

operator I (CHART No. 5-12. From I-183)

l
 ·.
-·
DOClo : 3560829 ·o
"':

'

SIS Organiralion (CHART No. 5-1}. From IF~l84)

...--
in Ille Soulh_:

fJ'Bn.RPgl: 352 2-Bn. RegI. "SS2

Cdn~rl'i fiJtJistlo1f

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ooe'fo: 3560829

Liaison anti Channels PQ. /.ll/ht•d,'f I' llppe: JIJ/y

(CHART No. 5-14. From IF-184)
IP );d1,. F1gliler t'ommnntf •
gl l'ommuniC'alions
gf_ lhe·SIS in lhl' Re/n.11 ('
Soulll-- 1.u#wc/ie
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 - ---·-------
DOCID: 3560829 _ _Te__IP!!._hone Lines of S/S·Regj Soul/!
..._-...·
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. I
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(CHART. No. 5-16. From IF-184)
I . -
DOCIP ~. 3560829
"\__

SIS Radio Ne-I-works in /.hl' Soulh

_......

ITPg/mPnlrll {'ommand NelwoTk SIS BtOdtfccJsf Cl!i-Slelll' f'omn1a11d NNwon..-

- - SIS Re9t St1v-0 - -

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(CHART N~-17. From _JF_~184)

 ..
OCID: 3560829
l I"
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FLORENCE
MATAF
11

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MB SO MB~
7-10 775
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Tilt"ital Air Command
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0

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300 95 SEF 3'0 3~0Trans.
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