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Libya: Birth or Death of a New Democracy

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Libya: Birth or Death of a New Democracy

Introduction:

In October last year, Libya's longstanding dictator colonel Muammar Gaddafi was

captured by rebel forces, and was subsequently killed in custody of the rebels. This conclusively set the

stage for a new era of Libyan politics. The nation's civil war in the heart of the Arab Spring culminated

in an euphoric celebration of a polity renewed from four decades of authoritarian rule. This essay

addresses the potential of a democratic transition in Libya, and by implication other nations of the Arab

Spring. As such, every nation's position is a unique concoction of many variables which possibly can't

all be accounted for, and the idea of democracy itself could be considered multi-faceted and complex.

This essay argues that democracy as defined in the works of Samuel Huntington, is a looming

possibility in the increasingly transforming political sphere of post-Gaddafi Libya. First, the essay

looks at a brief history of Libya since its inception, followed by an elaboration of Gaddafi's politics and

the objectives of the NTC in liberating the nation from his regime. It addresses the possibility of a

fourth wave of democratization, in succession of Huntington's third wave, and the three major factors

of democratic transition. The economics of Libya is discussed in comparison to other democratic and

democratizing nations, and how it is favorable to a state biased system. Secondly, the merits and

demerits of arguments against culture – in specific Islam – are considered in context of the Libyan

situation. Lastly, the important role of civil society in giving rise to a democratic transition is examined,

resulting in the conclusion that although economics plays a significant role in democratization, and to a

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lesser degree so do traditional values, it is ultimately a politicized civil society that effect a democratic

transition. The essay argues that such an optimistic conclusion is justified because of Libya's rapidly

transforming polity, with an increasingly rich social fabric and indications of secular debate in the

region.

History:

Modern Libya

The history of modern Libya, like most of its neighbors, is a post-colonial one. The

region was won over by Italian colonizers in the aftermath of Italo-Turkish war (1911-1912) between

the Kingdom of Italy and the collapsing Ottoman empire. The three former Ottoman provinces of

Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan were unified under the title of Libya, where the Italians maintained

control up to 1943, until their defeat by the Allied powers in World War II. Between 1943-1951, The

French claimed control of Fezzan, while the British established authority in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

Finally, in 1951.1 Libya claimed independence from colonial powers, under the title United Kingdom of

Libya, on 24 December under the leadership of King Idris I – the first and only monarch of the Libyan

nation. This marked the culmination of Idris I's efforts to retaliate to the Italian colonization following

World War I, and his co-operation with the Allied powers in bringing down the Axis threat in World

War II2. King Idris maintained control over the Libyan state until September 1 1969, when a group of

officers from the Libyan army staged a coup, led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Idris I was deposed,

and went into exile in Egypt, where he died in 1983 at the age of 94. Gaddafi himself ruled as the de
1 http://www.tecolahagos.com/part4.htm
2 Pg. 401, Zoubir, 2009

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facto head of the nation for 42 years, until the Libyan civil uprising starting 17 Febuary 2011

delegitimized his government, and eventually led to his capture and death under custody of rebel forces

near his hometown of Sirte at the northern coast of the country. The National Transitional Council

(NTC) was formed under the stewardship of Mustafa Abdul Jalil, Gaddafi's former justice minister. 3 in

the weeks following the uprising, and anti-Gaddafi forces were organized by the NTC which was in

turn given a de facto legitimacy by the participants in the uprising. The NTC is currently responsible

for overseeing the smooth transition of Libya to a new democratically elected government. It has faced

opposition as well as criticism in the last few month from Libyan activists, and as of now the future of

Libyan polity remains uncertain.

Gaddafi's Politics

Muammar Gaddafi was the youngest child born to peasant family in a Bedouin

settlement known as Qasr Abu Hadi in June 1942, just outside the coastal town of Sirte. He was given a

traditional religious primary education and attended the Sebha preparatory school in Fezzan from 1956

to 1961. Gaddafi and a small group of friends that he met in this school went on to form the core

leadership of a militant revolutionary group that would eventually seize control of the country in the lat

1960's.4It is widely accepted that as a child he admired the specific Arab nationalism advocated by the
5
then Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, and looked up to him as a hero. Nasser was a strong

proponent of this nationalist ideology – celebrating the glories of Arab civilization, the language and

literature of the Arabs, calling for rejuvenation and political union in the Arab world. 6 He graduated

3 Ex Libyan minister forms interim govt-report". LSE. 26 February 2011. Retrieved 2011-02-27.
4 Muammar Gaddafi". jewishvirtuallibrary.org. Retrieved 24 April 2011.
5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12488278
6 "Requiem for Arab Nationalism" by Adeed Dawisha, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2003

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military academy in Benghazi in 1966, after which he joined the the Engineers Corps. as a

commissioned officer. 7 The coup orchestrated by Gaddafi 3 years later succeeded in undermining King

Idris I's abdication of the Libyan throne to be replaced by his nephew. Crown prince Sayyid Hasan ar-

Rida al-Mahdi as-Sanussi, who was formally deposed by the revolutionary fudi da gadaffi officers and

put under house arrest; they abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the Libyan Arab Republic. 8

Gaddafi's political ideology was his own unique concoction of wide-ranging ideas

including pan-arabism, nationalism, Islam, democracy – although he vehemently rejected capitalism

and western liberal democracy. Gaddafi based his new regime on a blend of Arab nationalism, aspects

of the welfare state and what Gaddafi termed “direct, popular democracy.” He called this system

“Islamic socialism” and while he permitted private control over small companies, the government

controlled the larger ones. Welfare, 'liberation', and education were emphasized. He also imposed a

system of Islamic morals, outlawing alcohol and gambling. To reinforce the ideals of this socialist-

Islamic state, Gaddafi outlined his political philosophy in his Green Book, published in three volumes

between 1975 and 1979.9 The book was first published in 1975. It was "intended to be required reading

for all Libyans."10 Justifying his ideology of 'direct democracy' he says in the book, “After the

successful establishment of the age of the republics and the beginning of the era of the masses, it is

unthinkable that democracy should mean the electing of only a few representatives to act on behalf of

great masses. This is an obsolete structure. Authority must be in the hands of all of the people.”11

Gaddafi used oil funds during the 1970s and 1980s to promote his ideology outside

Libya, supporting subversives and terrorists abroad to hasten the end of Marxism and capitalism.

Beginning in 1973, he also engaged in military operations in northern Chad's Aozou Strip - to gain

7 "Muammar Gaddafi". jewishvirtuallibrary.org. Retrieved 24 April 2011.

8 ^ "Bloodless coup in Libya". London: BBC News. 20 December 2003.
9 Muammar Gaddafi". jewishvirtuallibrary.org. Retrieved 24 April 2011.
10 Vandewalle, 2011
11 Gaddafi, Green Book

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access to minerals and to use as a base of influence in Chadian politics - but was forced to retreat in

1987. UN sanctions in 1992 isolated Gaddafi politically, following the downing of Pan Am Flight 103

over Lockerbie, Scotland. During the 1990s, Gaddafi began to rebuild his relationships with Europe.

UN sanctions were suspended in April 1999 and finally lifted in September 2003 after Libya accepted

responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing. In December 2003, Libya announced that it had agreed to

reveal and end its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and to renounce terrorism. Gaddafi

subsequently made significant strides in normalizing relations with Western nations. The US rescinded

Libya's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in June 2006. In October 2008, the US Government

received $1.5 billion pursuant to the agreement to distribute to US national claimants, and as a result

effectively normalized its bilateral relationship with Libya. The two countries then exchanged

ambassadors for the first time since 1973 in January 2009. Libya in May 2010 was elected to its first

three-year seat on the UN Human Rights Council.12

Civil War and the NTC

The Libyan revolution occurred in the wake of uprisings in the neighboring countries of

Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011. News sources indicate that the uprising itself was sparked by the

arrest of human rights activist Fethi Tarbel on 15/16 Febuary 13 As riots and demonstrations flared up in

eastern Libya, the movement began to gain force and struck out against Gaddafi's four-decade long

rule. The National Transitional Council was officially formed in Benghazi, Libya's major city in the

east, on March 5 2011 when it declared itself the sole representative of the Libyan people. 14 The official

website of the NTC posted, “The Council notes that it is the only legitimate body representing the

12 The World Factbook, CIA. tps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html

13 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/19/timeline-libya-civil-war
14 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/19/timeline-libya-civil-war

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people of Libya and the Libyan state and calls on all the countries of the world to recognise it and deal

with it on the basis of international legitimacy. The Council also notes that it will honour and respect all

international and regional agreements signed by the former Libyan government, emphasizing its

aspirations in seeing Libya play a significant role in the establishing international peace and security.” 15

By March 17, the UN had authorized a no-fly zone over the country, as well as military

intervention aimed at neutralizing Gaddafi's forces and protecting civilian populations from the dangers

of armed conflict. After about five months of armed conflict, Libyan rebel forces finally overran

Gaddafi's capital city of Tripoli on August 21, whilst on state television Gaddafi urged his supporters to

continue fighting off the incoming rebels.16 Gaddafi, who escaped to his hometown of Sirte, retained

his hold over it for another two months, and meanwhile leaders from the NTC met with world leaders

to discuss the future of Libyan politics. On October 20, Muammar Gaddafi was captured by rebels
17
outside Sirte, following a NATO airstrike on his convoy. Although the exact events surrounding his

death are hazy, videos and pictures of Gaddafi being roughed up and tortured taken on cellphones were

posted on the internet, leading to criticisms of how the situation was handled hypocritically by the west,

as well as assertions that the Libyan and African leaders allowed for the undermining of Libya's

position in its internal and external politics18 especially considering that the International Criminal

Court issued a warrant of arrest for Gaddafi as far back as June 27, 2011 – months before he was

captured. However, Gaddafi's death brought as much optimism as it did otherwise, British prime

minister David Cameron quoted, “People in Libya today have an even greater chance after this news of

building themselves a strong and democratic future” while UN Secretrary General Ban Ki-moon

cautioned, “The road ahead for Libya will be difficult and full of challenges. Libyans can only realise

15 http://www.ntclibya.org/english/about/
16 ttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/19/timeline-libya-civil-war
17 ttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/19/timeline-libya-civil-war
18 http://thecitizen.co.tz/component/content/article/37-tanzania-top-news-story/16334-dar-condemns-gaddafi-killing.html

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the promise of the future ...through reconciliation...This is a time for healing... not for revenge…

Inclusion and pluralism must be the watchwords. All Libyans must be able to recognise themselves in

the nation's government and leadership ...” 19

The NTC objectives as put forth in its constitutional declaration issued on August 3,

2011 reflect the ideals of a democratic transition, as well as secularization and liberalization of the

nation. Article 1 of the declaration states, “Libya is an independent Democratic State wherein the

people are the source of powers. The city of Tripoli shall be the capital of the State. Islam is the

Religion of the State and the principal source of legislation is Islamic Jurisprudence (Shari'a). The State

shall guarantee for non-Moslems the freedom of practicing religious rituals .Arabic is its official

language. The State shall guarantee the cultural rights for all components of the Libyan society and its

languages shall be deemed national ones.” 20 Given the NTC's democratic ideals, it is pertinent to

observe the case of Libya in the framework of Culture, Politics and Economics put forth by Samuel

Huntington in The Third Wave (1993), as well as in the light of criticisms offered to Huntington's work.

The following sections of the essay explores the case of Libya on the basis of theoretical foundations

provided by scholarly works.

A Wave of Democracy?

What are the salient features of a democratic state? Can they be identified as common to

all democratic countries, or does each country's democracy have to be defined by its own unique brand

of politics? Even all the varied manifestations of democracy in the world today certainly share the same

roots? Indeed, there are many problems that arise with the attempt to define 'democracy' as such.

Samuel Huntington, in The Third Wave, points to a distinction between rationalistic, utopian, idealistic

definitions of democracy, on the one hand, and empirical, descriptive, institutional and procedural

definitions on the other. Huntington himself adheres to to the latter kind of definition for democracy,

19 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/middle-east-live/2011/oct/20/syria-libya-middle-east-unrest-live
20 The Constitutional Declaration, Libyan Interim NTC, 2011.

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claiming that a procedural definition provides empirical referents and analytical precision, making it

suitable for the purposes of study. 21 Accordingly, Huntington defines a political system as democratic

“to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and

periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult

population is able to vote.”22

Huntington Points out that a critical point in the process of democratization is the

replacement of an undemocratically elected government, by a government that was elected legitimately

under the conditions that he describes in his definition. Democratization involves three stages – first is
bringing about the end of an undemocratic regime, second comes the inauguration of a new democratic

regime, followed lastly by the lengthiest and most difficult consolidation of the democratic system. In

contrast, liberalization leadss only to a partial opening of an authoritarian regime towards reform in the

direction of democracy, and doesn't mean it leads to full-scale democratization. 23 That Democratic

consolidation is hardest is evidenced by the emergence of 'reverse waves' following each wave of

democratization – only four of the seventeen countries that adopted democratic institutions between

1910 and 1931 maintained them throughout the 1920s and 1930s.24

Democratization is therefore best identified along the procedural benchmarks that

provide a basis for electing a democratic state – namely contestation and participation. A democratized

state, by definition, would then allow for a plurality of contestants for positions of power, and also at

the same time allow for unrestricted participations in the process of voting. Huntington acknowledges

that such a definition of democracy is limited in that it does not allow for a deeper qualitative

understanding of the ideal virtues a democratic state is meant to represent; he also acknowledges that a

state classified as a democracy on the basis of his definition may not account for things such as

democratic facades of puppet governments, stability and institutionalization and ambiguous notions of

what it considers as non-democratic. However, he does justify himself by declaring “Governments

21 Pg. 6, Huntington, 1993

22 Pg. 7, Huntington, 1993
23 Pg. 9, Huntington, 1993
24 Pg. 17, Huntington, 1993

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produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special

interests and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. These qualities make such

governments undesirable, but they do not make them undemocratic.” 25 However, it may be useful to

question Huntington's desire to understand democracy as an isolated constituent of political systems –

isn't the legitimacy of a democratic system inextricably reliant on it's success or failure to live up to its

democratic ideals?

In Libya, for example, upon Gaddafi's ascendance to power the idea of 'direct

democracy' was legitimate in that it was widely accepted by the population of Libya, who in turn
wanted a direct solution to the economic and social stagnation under King Idris I's rule. Arguably, the

support and glorification that Gaddafi received following the coup indicates that although it was a

military coup, it was nevertheless supported by a majority of the Libyan population. However, it is at

the same time to hard to classify Gaddafi's oligarchic system as democratic by Huntington's definition,

although it was legitimately a 'direct democracy' until dissent began to emerge and Gaddafi began to

suppress it. Largely, it seems that Huntington's definition of democracy is very limited by the measures

he chooses to base it on. Is it, arguably, safe to label a political system as democratic, as long a majority

of it's subjects call it democratic. Clearly, there is more at hand in the workings of a democratic state

than merely contestation and participation – let us then examine three significant categories, of

economics, culture, and civil society that are essential to the making of a democratic state.

Economics

Huntington's study of the third wave of democratization led him to conclude on the

unmistakable correlations between economic development and democratic transitions. Not only is

economic growth pertinent to democratizing countries, it is intrinsically responsible for providing the

ingredients for social transformation. He argues that authoritarian regimes in the third wave were

ultimately undermined by their own economics; first, economic growth correlated strongly with the

25 Pg. 10, Huntington, 1993

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increase in literacy and political awareness in the populace, and second, values such as interpersonal

trust, competence and life-satisfaction that correlate strongly with democratic institutionalization were

encouraged.26 Kamrava points to this dilemma, by which economic growth in authoritarian regimes

allows social actors to empower themselves and seek autonomy from the regime leading to a

developmental paradox in authoritarian economics-- “In short, the very success of the state's strategy

leads to the demise of the state's capacity to dictate policy unilaterally” 27 However, on the other hand

Huntington argues that in specific cases authoritarian regimes accrue bureaucratic power through

economic profit and thereby retain a hold on their performance legitimacy by eliminating the need for
public taxation. 28

Referring to a successful economic strategy and the resultant profits enjoyed by three

oil-producing authoritarian regimes in the middle-east – namely Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya – with

a GNP of over $4000 per capita in 1976, Huntington illustrates examples in which states retained their

authoritarianism despite extraordinary economic success. Indeed, Libya was and still is in a unique

position as a result of its abundance in mineral wealth, which allowed Gaddafi to further his pan-arabic

anti-imperialist agenda internationally as a basis for his performance legitimacy. Kamarava points to an

interesting categorization of Libya in a study of state-civil society relations, which characterizes Libya

as a bunker state. Bunker states tend to have highly coercive relationships with their societies, overall,

allow for the least degree of financial autonomy to the forces of the market and the middle classes. 29

Economically, Libya was comfortably in a zone of political transition, but by intervening

in Chadian politics Gaddafi effectively used a strategy identified by Huntington to maintain legitimacy

– “to provoke foreign conflict and attempt to restore legitimacy through an appeal to nationalism.” 30 It

is useful to consider Gaddafi's support of anti-western terrorist acts, pan-arabism, anti-zionism etc.

using the resources provided by economic profit as an attempt to redefine his nationalist ideology and

26 Pg. 64, Huntington, 1993

27 Pg. 198, Kamrava, 2007
28 Pg. 65, Huntington, 1993
29 Pg. 208-209, Kamrava, 2007
30 Pg. 56, Huntington, 1993

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consolidate and legitimize his performance as a leader, which was the very basis on which he had

seized power from Idris I in 1969, in which he envisioned Libya with a resurgent nationalism. Snyder

defines nationalism as such, “The doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture,

history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and

protects those distinctive characteristics.”31

Consequently, the aftermath of the Lockerbie (1988) and UTA (1989) bombings

provoked severe economic sanctions and international isolation for Libya. Around the same time,

collapse in oil revenues forced Gaddafi to pursue a tentative economic liberalization (infitah) which
simultaneously posed threats to Gaddafi's revolutionary politics abroad, and his performance legitimacy

back in Libya.32 However, it was arguably due to the heavy reliance of European states, especially

Germany, on oil-trade with Libya as well as other countries in the region that Libya was able to survive

the decade long isolation from the geopolitical arena. Under pressure to reform his politics, and regain

international legitimacy, the 2000 saw a normalization of Euro-Libyan as well as Libyan-American

relations; after Gaddafi was compelled to accept responsibility over the Lockerbie & UTA bombings

and provide compensation to the victims, support the US in the global war against terrorism, and

finally, abandon the country's nuclear program.33 The consequent lifting of UN sanctions was very

promising for the Libyan economy and geo-political status.

However, these rewards were only met through many compromises that Gaddafi made

in the political stance that he had so strongly adhered to since his ascendance to power, and thus the

basis on which he had established and maintained performance legitimacy over several decades.

Clearly enough, there is no denying the inevitable result of Gaddafi's political decisions over the last

decade, as the Libyan civil war has shown the geo-political community, The question is, however, how

does Libya's prior experience as a bunker state affect its political trajectory in the future; Is

democratization a viable alternative for Libya at this juncture of it's national history, or is economic

31 Pg. 23, Snyder, 2000

32 Pg. 405, Zoubir, 2009
33 Pg. 413-414, Zoubir, 2009

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growth simply one obstacle that the nation has overcome on the long and treacherous path to

democracy? It is presumable that external actors will play a significant role in shaping Libyan

economics in the future, as they have consistently done in the past. As Huntington suggests, foreign

actors can be thought to both encourage and slow down democratization, depending of their attitude

towards diplomatic and economic relations with the country in question, and when a country enters the

transition zone which equips it with democratic potential, its relations with its economic benefactors

lead to democratic transitions, or maintain authoritarian regimes as they see fit. 34 An economic

transaction, therefore, leads to a cultural transaction. Schlumberger mentions the importance of a

rentier economy in arab states in aiding legitimacy, whereby abundant mineral resources allow for a

greater pursuit of distributional policies and permanently finance neo-patrimonial networks, namely

important social actors, religious leaders and traditional holders of authority, 35 This successful retention

of legitimacy has long been an obstacle in the Middle-eastern prospects of democratization, since

patterns of economic development have neither fostered the emergence of an autonomous and

powerful private sector or middle class, nor have they resulted in significant levels of globalization,

both of which are of considerable importance to the process of democratization. 36

Culture

In the past few decades of scholarly opinion, the are many instances of academics placing the
blame of democracy deficit on the fundamental incongruency that Islam in particular and historical arab

traditionalism at a broader level display vis a vis democratic society. Referring to the arguments of Ellie

Kedourie, Kamrava speaks of the prevalent opinion that in the political traditions of the Arab world,

which are inextricably tied to the traditions of Islam, there is nothing which would allow for the ideas

of constitutional and representative government. This argument is taken further by the assertion that

democratic ideals such as governmental legitimacy, autonomous social institutions, an independent

34 Pg. 86, Huntington, 1993

35 Pg. 245, Schlumberger, 2010
36 Pg. 205, Kamrava, 2007

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judiciary etc. have failed to take root due to an unsuccessful clash with deeply held political traditions

and religious values.37 In The Third Wave, Huntington acknowledges that lslamic and Confucian

cultures pose insuperable obstacles to democratic development, but doesn't rule out the possibility of a

democratic Confucianism, even if it may be considered contradictory in terminology. it is not

improbable, he argues, that dominant beliefs and views in society change, considering that cultures are

historically dynamic rather than passive. 38 However, as Kamrava observes that in subsequent years

Huntington's prognosis becomes increasingly bleak and unfavorable of democratization. Huntington, in

The Clash of Civilizations? points to the Middle-East as a cradle of civilization diametrically opposed
to western interests and values, including democracy. Culture and cultural identities are the cornerstone

of every civilization, , and religions are in turn the cornerstones of every culture and cultural identity.39

However, all of Huntington's claims cannot be seen as markedly valid, without an

inquiry into alternative explanations, and merits and demerits in his use of the notion of culture and its

larger consequence in the world of politics. There are three major criticisms that Kamrava offers

against Huntington's theories. It is argued that Huntington's assumptions have been invalidated by later

empirical evidence that Islamic values as such and democracy may not be as incongruous as he

proposes. Norris and Inglehart (2003) suggest that Huntington is mistaken in the assumption that the

core clash between civilizations concerns only, if at all, political values. A survey the conducted

revealed that in the recent decades “democracy became virtually the only political model with global

appeal, no matter what the culture. With the exception of Pakistan, most of the Muslim countries

surveyed think highly of democracy: In Albania, Egypt, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Morocco,

and Turkey, 92 to 99 percent of the public endorsed democratic institutions--a higher proportion than in

the United States (89 percent)40

Further, Kamrava (2003) argues that Islam has long been manipulated and twisted by

power wielders to suit their own political agendas, “The religion itself did not change; the context

37 Pg. 191-192, Kamrava, 2007

38 Pg. 310-311, Huntington, 1993
39 Pg. 193, Kamrava, 2007
40 Pg. 63, Norris and Inglehart, 2003

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within which it was put to political use and the priorities of its interpreters changed, with former

revolutionaries turning into an increasingly narrow circle of power elites.” 41 Indeed, it is clearly

evidenced in cases such as Iran, where the very islamic ideology that promised liberation in the 1970's

because a source of justified tyranny in later decades; or in the case of Libya, where Gaddafi's initial

use of Islamic ideals, amongst others, quickly receded once he had set an institutionalized ideological

framework in place, primarily through his enforcement of the 'green book' as a necessity for every

Libyan. Indeed, to overlook the subtle, often obvious differences in various factions of a dynamic,

constantly re-politicizing culture such as Islam – the inherent conflict in Islamic thought evidenced by
reformist ideas in intellectual Islam, the popular Islamic thought that prevails in the masses and

narrow-based literalist ideologies inclined towards political violence such as fundamentalist Islam, all

evolving and claiming legitimacy simultaneously – is to overlook the intricacies of a complex

phenomenon. 42 In the current political situation, there is in fact evidence that Islamist thought is not

uniformly undemocratic and confrontational: Tunisia, which is where the Arab Spring has its origins,

was also the first to liberate itself from authoritarian rule, in this case of Ben Ali who had maintained

power for 23 years. The new government of Tunisia, led by the Islamic party Ennahda, ruled on the 26 th

of March against including traditional Sharia – Islamic principles of jurisprudence in the new

constitution. 43Despite being a religious party, the fact that Ennahda has opted for a secular

liberalization of the governing principle of the nation's morality, indicates, if nothing else, that there is

a fundamental re-politicization of Islam that is happening as the countries involved in the Arab Spring

and its aftermath are beginning to rebuild the foundations of a national identity, and as these cultural

fault lines reorganize themselves, there is indeed potential for a democratic transition as a plurality of

social voices and opinions are recognized and accounted for in a reemerging polity.

Considering this, Kamrava argues for a modification of Huntington's assumption that a

democratic culture is not a necessary prerequisite for a democratic transition as such. Kamrava claims

41 Pg. 196, Kamrava, 2007

42 Pg. 196, Kamrava, 2007
43 http://mideastposts.com/2012/05/no-sharia-in-tunisia-is-it-a-game-changer/

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that while a pre-existent democratic culture may greatly aid the process of democratic transition, it can

nonetheless be sustained on the basis of institutional viability and economic force by themselves, on

which the pre-transition state – the NTC in the case of Libya – relies to exercise control over various

social classes. In fact, a democratic culture is not indispensable until the stage of democratic

consolidation, when the prevalence of democratic values and norms becomes key to the longevity and

resilience of newly democratized political systems. . 44 Kamrava whilst quoting Giussepe Di Palma

writes, ““The transfer of loyalties from dictatorship to democracy does not require exceptionally

favourable circumstances.Ultimately, the viability of a new democracy can rest on making the transfer
appealing, convenient or compelling. Ultimately, it can rest on its attractiveness relative to its

alternatives.”45 Conceivably, institutional viability and social cohesion would then imply much for the

prospects of democracy in Libya. Questions as to the probability of a democratic transition are thus

not sufficiently answered by the political implications of either economics or culture; a prominent

debate has thus emerged in the function of civil society in democratizing states.

Civil Society

In questioning democracy deficit in the Middle-East, Kamrava looks several scholarly

definitions of of civil society. The first, as defined by Philip Oxhorn (1995) sees civil society as a riach

social fabric fromed by a multiplicity of territorially and functionally based units. The strength of civil
society is measured by a peaceful coexistence of these units given their capacity to 'demand inclusion

into political structures' and 'resist subordination.' Strong civil societies, thus, are capable of

maintaining a high level of 'institutionalized social pluralism', and since they are self-constituted, serve

as essential foundations of political democracy.46 On the other hand, Kamrava also points out that

althhough civil society might be tremendously helpful in aiding a democratic society, by itself it is

insufficient for democratic transitions. Kamrava argues that democratic transition, and subsequently

44 Pg. 197, Kamrava, 2007

45 Pg. 197, Kamrava, 2007
46 Pg. 206, Kamrava, 2007

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democratic consolidation invariably require that civil society should politicize and transform into a

'political society'. In Linz and Stepan's (1996) words: Political society may be defined as that arena in

which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over

public power and state apparatus.47 Nonetheless, in the Middle East civil society and its organization

have largely failed to manifest in the past primarily because of two reasons – the first has to do with

the nature and the agendas of the state, or more specifically, its aggressive paranoia at the slightest hint

of social autonomy; the second pattern of state-dependent economic growth which undermines

resources and opportunities available to social groups to promote social pluralism.48

Libya, in economic terms, had consistently promoted the existence of a monolithic,

omniscient state. However, subsequent liberalization in the decade preceding the civil conflict had

arguably undermined Gaddafi's performance legitimacy while simultaneously opening up political

space in the light of economic reform, and thus provided social actors a politicized sphere of action in

which to stake a claim in the rapidly transforming power-relations between the state and it subjects. It

is clear enough that social pluralism has started the process of consolidation in the post-Gaddafi Libya,

although a weak institutional viability and uncertain social cohesion calls for a monumental effort on

part of the Libyan people to establish a constitutional framework that will best suit the clearly

democratic needs of the future Libyan society. Libya being a pre-dominantly tribal society, the

transforming political sphere has left much free space for previously unheard or repressed voices to

express and reassert themselves, “Where before, few players and institutions seemed to matter outside

the opaque informal networks and security apparatus centered around Muammar al-Qadhafi and his

extended family, a multitude of social actors has emerged to lead the revolution.”49

Who these social actors are, and what their motivations will be can have significant

influence on whether Libya will successfully transform to a democratic government or lapse into

prolonged social instability. Following the rapid disintegration of already weak institutions in Libya,

47 Pg. 206, Kamrava, 2007

48 Pg. 208, Kamrava, 2007
49 Pg. 140, Lacher, 2011

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two dominant groups shared leadership of the NTC prior to the fall of Tripoli. It representatives abroad,

and local councils established in liberated areas. Defectors from the former regime played a leading

role in the NTC. Senior officers and diplomats from Gaddafi's government, members of Free Officers

who led the 1969 coup but were later arrested or exiled, as well as reformists and technocrats were

amongst a heterogenous group of previous regime elite that emerged to fill positions of political

authority and leadership. Also, a significant number of independent or opposition figures that joined the

NTC were successors of aristocratic and bourgeois families that had been in power under the pre-

Gaddafi monarchy, but were subsequently expropriated, disempowered or exiled under the new
regime.50 Another group strongly represented in the NTC were the educated elite, such as lawyers and

university professors have emerged to have their voices heard, such as the spokesman for the NTC,

Hafiz Ghoga. The NTC is not the only voice that is making itself heard collectively, there have been

many instances of dissent and criticism against the interim government. Ali al-Sallabi, an influential

Islamic scholar working closely with the Muslim Brotherhood, has directed media attacks against

leading NTC members, including the then interim prime minister Mahmoud Jibril. His brothers Ismail

and Usama al-Sallabi have both been involved in heavy activism in Benghazi, even to the extent of

resorting to violence.51

The rapidly diversifying social fabric of Libya is characterized by a number of struggles

along prominent political fault lines. In many cases, the decision of regime elites to defect reflected

their's tribes' decision of turning against Gaddafi. Gaddafi's economic policies had in the past

deliberately sought to prevent social differentiation into classes that would have posed a threat to tribal

loyalties.52 The increasing control over crucial oil fields as well as emerging tribal autonomy indicates

that Libyan transitional period will require fundamental questions about the nature of the state to be

negotiated, with particularly no expectation of going back to the previous system. Indeed, Power

struggles have emerged between the representatives of prominent families, tribes and cities dominating

50 Pg. 142, Lacher, 2011

51 Pg. 143, Lacher, 2011
52 Pg. 146, Lacher, 2011

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the political scene after the fall of Tripoli53, and is very much demonstrative of a civil society turned

political as various actors scramble for a claim in the future state. Prominent power-struggles are also

emerging between secularists and Islamists, as well as between former regime officials and members of

the imprisoned or exiled opposition. Also pertinent are issues of forming a centralized, decentralized or

federal system, and prosecution of security forces of the former Gaddafi regime. Lacher claims that

these power-struggles will be concealed in disputes over the foremost source of the Libyan economy,

its oil revenues. 54 Democracy in the Middle-East in general, and Libya in particular is finally a

question of the balance of power between state and society, and only when civil society has helped tip
the balance of power in the favor of society and away from the state does democratization stand a

chance.55 The localized and fragmented nature of the political and military players, as the manifested

during the Libyan revolution, indicates that the transition will be led by a loose and fragile coalition of

interests, rather than any single political force or institution. 56 Given such a rich emerging social fabric,

fundamental cultural debates such as between Islamism and Secularism and the comfort of a self-

sustaining economy prove to be significant aspects contributing to a trajectory of political

transformation that might potentially encourage a democratic transition in Libya.

Conclusion:

In the more than half a century of modern Libya's existence, it has been unreceptive to

democracy due to a number of unique political, social and economic circumstances. Economically,

53 Pg. 148, Lacher, 2011

54 Pg. 149-150, Lacher, 2011
55 Pg. 211, Kamrava, 2007
56 Pg. 151, Lacher, 2011

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Libya's position as a 'bunker' state makes it a primarily rentier economy, due to which it has historically

given the state high profits and bureaucratic autonomy, that has allowed the elites to retain power by

suppressing dissent and essentially buying the silence of its population. Politically, elites in Libya

promoted their own performance legitimacy by drawing , in the case of Gaddafi, using his pan-arabic

anti imperialist ideas of 'direct democracy' and further his own political agenda by supporting

aggression internationally using the state's wealth. Although there is a relatively long history of

scholars debating over whether Islam as a culture is diametrically opposed to the fundamental values of

democracy, statistical evidence shows that in fact there is a unanimous inclination towards democracy
all over the globe. With the forced liberalization of the economy and an influx of foreign and internal

actors that have emerged to claim their voices in Libyan political sphere, there has been a perceptible

transition of Libyan civil society, becoming increasingly politicized and active, and fighting for

representational rights in the state. The increasingly heterogenous scene in Libya may imply a

democratic transition. Along with a fledging constitution building on virtually non-existent institutional

bases, a largely tribal population, and examples set by present ruling parties in other Arab nations such

as Tunisia, it is possible that Libya will take a turn away from the authoritarian history it has had since

inception, and transition into a democratic transition.

Indeed, an “inherently” democratic culture is not a prerequisite for a democratic

transition, but rather a self-sufficient economy and freely emerging social pluralism. Libya, at this

stage, seems equipped with both. Since this essay is concerned with democratic transition, not

democratic consolidation, it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze what problems a democratic

transition may bring, it may be safely argued that indeed a democratic transition is imminent in Libya.

A lot depends, however, on how the present leaders of the transitional government react to voices of the

opposition striking out against them. In The Third Wave, Huntington warns, “The leaders of

authoritarian regimes can successfully use violence to sustain their rule; their radical opponents may

successfully use violence to overthrow the regimes. The former actions prevents democracy from

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coming into being; the latter kills it at birth.” 57 Does Gaddafi's unceremonious death at the hands NATO

and rebel forces then imply an undemocratic start for Libya? It doesn't, Libya's economically well-

endowed rich social fabric, plurality of social voices, and patterns of secularization in other Arab nation

point to the inevitability of a democratic transition. The birth of a democratic Libya is already

underway, whether it will live is another question altogether.

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