Kautilyas Arthashastra Law
Kautilyas Arthashastra Law
Kautilyas Arthashastra Law
Preethi Sundararajan
BBA LLB (Hons.), National Law University, Jodhpur
Student, MA (Public Policy & Governance), Azim Premji University
KAUTILYA’S ARTHASHASTRA AND THE LAW 2
Abstract
Keywords: Kautilya, legal jurisprudence, ancient Indian texts, Indian history, law,
Arthashastra
KAUTILYA’S ARTHASHASTRA AND THE LAW 3
The graph below is taken from Manupatra2, and shows the frequency of usage of the word
‘Arthashastra’ and/or ‘Kautilya’ in judgments of different Courts over different time periods. An
interesting fact to note here is that though there are ample references to Kautilya or Koutilya
from as early as 1913 to as late as 2019, there are only two references to ‘Chanakya’ (along with
Kautilya, and none in isolation). Also, barring a brief lull in the 1920s-1940s, the invocation of
Kautilya’s Arthashastra appears to be on an upward trajectory as evinced from the graph below.
1
“Arthashastra” and/or “Kautilya” and/or “Chanakya” were the keywords used to search the
database. https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_assembly_debates
2
Manupatra is an Indian Legal database. “Arthashastra” and/or “Kautilya” and/or “Chanakya”
were the keywords used to search the database for judgments pronounced by the Supreme Court
and the High Courts. https://www.manupatrafast.com/
KAUTILYA’S ARTHASHASTRA AND THE LAW 4
A total of three cases from the pre-independence era refer to Arthashastra. As the number is
low, I look at all three cases. The case of Hiralal Singha v. Tripura Charan Ray (1913 [17] CLJ
438) before the Calcutta High Court appears to be the first recorded case available that mentions
the Arthashastra /Kautilya. This is one of two cases that mention both Kautilya and
Arthashastra. It is also the only judgment to refer to the ‘Vatsyayan Sutra’ and place substantial
reliance on both these ancient texts to determine whether property could be inherited from a
widow who had turned to prostitution.
The judgment in the Seshachala Chetty and Ors. v. Para Chinnasami and Ors. ([1917] ILR
40 Mad 410) case of 1916 was pronounced by a three-judge bench of the Madras High Court. Of
the Bench consisting of only one Indian judge, the British Chief Justice’s written judgment was
the sole judgment drawing upon the Arthashastra to trace ownership of unoccupied lands, which
was one of the issues framed in this case. The judgment mentioned the ‘Arthashastra of
Kautilya’ as having been published recently and dates it to 300 B.C. The judge relied on the
Arthashastra to reinforce the right of the State to provide uncultivated land to cultivators to
realise its true revenue potential, as a practise recognised and supposedly followed in India. He
refers to ‘Bk. 2, C. 1’ which stipulates, inter alia, t hat land may be confiscated from those who
KAUTILYA’S ARTHASHASTRA AND THE LAW 5
do not cultivate it, and that lands prepared for cultivation may be given only for life, and that
unprepared lands may not be taken away from those who are preparing them for cultivation
(Shamasastry, 1915).
The third judgment (Muthukrishna Naicken v. Ramachandra Naicken and Ors. [ 1919] 37
MLJ 489) is also of the Madras High Court and was pronounced by a two-judge bench in 1918.
In this matter pertaining to property law, the Judge terms the second adhyaya3 of the fifth
adhikarana4 as Chanakya’s ‘Machiavellian’ and ‘disingenuous’ advice. He relies on the same to
make a case that even in ancient sovereigns, revenues from temples were used on occasion for
general administration of the land. This is substantiated by the sutras which empower the King or
the Superintendent of Religious Institutions (acting on behalf of the King) to accept properties
(Shamasastry, 1915). The Judge refers to the Arthashastra and then the practices of the East
India Company to frame the action as a continued practise/custom.
I continue to trace the trajectory with a search of the Constituent Assembly debates as this
gives us insight into the thinking of the framers of our Constitution, which is the supreme law of
the land. Interesting observations from the search are as follows:
● That nowhere is the term Chanakya used; references are made only to Kautilya and
Arthashastra by the members of the Constituent Assembly.
● Reliance is placed by Shri Seth Govind Das on Kautilya’s Arthashastra to substantiate
his claim that India is a ‘very ancient country’ where villages held a very important place.
He states that there are references to villages in the Arthashastra, and that modern
historians also admit its truth.5 Making a point that the Constitution must be in Hindi and
not English, Shri Algu Rai Shastri said that we have ‘inherited our language from our
3
Chapters contained in the Arthashastra
4
Books or topics of heads in the Arthashastra. The Arthashastra is split into different books.
Under each book there are multiple chapters, and each chapter has multiple
sections/topics/heads.
5
Constituent Assembly Debates of 22nd November 1948, Volume 7, Document No.57,
Paragraph No. 167. https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_ assembly_debates/volume/
7/1948-11-22
KAUTILYA’S ARTHASHASTRA AND THE LAW 6
ancient sages and from Kautilya’s Arthashastra’6 . Though the first reference is
technically true and the second is a case of overreaching, these two references show how
the Arthashastra was used as validation by members to further their own opinion on a
particular issue.
● In a bid to convince his peers that the ‘republican tradition’ was not alien to India, Shri
S.Radhakrishnan states that Megasthenes and Kautilya refer to the Republics of ancient
India7
● Shri Kamlapati Tiwari draws a comparison between the Constitution of India and the
Arthashastra by terming the work of the Constituent Assembly the second
constitution-making process, with the first having happened 2500 years back. This
‘Kautilyan Constitution’ has apparently remained a ‘brand product of the Indian mind
over all these centuries’.8
As there have been multiple judgments post 1947, I shall be focusing on a few judgments
pronounced between 2010 to 2019 as being reflective of the contemporary take of the Judiciary
on the Arthashastra.
The 2019 matter of Vijay Namdeorao Wadettiwar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra &
Ors.9 p ertains to anti-defection law and involves interpretation of constitutional provisions. This
judgment refers to Chapter IX of the Arthashastra to understand the ‘background history of India
and its Constitution’, and specifically the qualities that a minister must ideally possess. We see
here a continuation of the parallel drawn between the Arthashastra and the Constitution which
6
Constituent Assembly Debates o f 4th November 1948, Volume 7, Document No.48, Paragraph
No. 161. https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_ assembly_debates/ volume/7/1948-
11-04
7
Constituent Assembly Debates of 20th January 1947, Volume 2, Document No.12, Paragraph
Nos. 27 and 28. https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_ assembly_debates/volume/
2/1947-01-20
8
Constituent Assembly Debates of 23rd November 1949, Volume 11, Document No.163,
Paragraph No. 173. https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_ assembly_debates/
volume/11/1949-11-23
9
2019 (6) ABR 205 - Two-judge bench of the Bombay High Court
KAUTILYA’S ARTHASHASTRA AND THE LAW 7
was observed in the Assembly debates. Further, the judgment calls Kautilya an ‘exponent of the
art of government’ and states that it was compiled (not written) between 321-296 BC.10
m
The case of Riyaz Ahmad Bhat v. State of J&K and Ors.11 akes a passing reference to
Arthashastra while stating that the rule of law has included principles of natural justice from the
‘legendary days of Adam and of Kautilya's Arthashastra’. The similarity between Adam and
Kautilya and their relevance to a property dispute in a country suffering from multiplicity of laws
governing property matters is puzzling. A potential justification for this is found in other
judgments12 which specify that the Adam-Kautilya reference is being invoked to indicate that
natural justice is a venerable, established, noble concept and not a new-fangled, passing fad.
Another slew of judgments13 proceed a step further and state (while reiterating all of the above)
that reliance must not be placed only on legend and history, but current legislation must evolve
to sustain these principles.
Conclusion
10
Also finds mention in Manoj Narula v. Union of India (UOI) 2014 (8) SCJ 425
11
MANU/JK/0085/2018 - Single judge bench of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court
12
Pruthweeraj Patnaik v. State of Odisha and Ors 2 018 (II) ILR-CUT 71; Maneka Gandhi v.
UOI AIR 1978 SC 597; Avinash v. Ganpat and Ors. MANU/MH/0250/2014
13
Committee of Management, Islamiya Inter College v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2 017 2 AWC
1534 All - High Court of Allahabad at Lucknow; Tarsem Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Ors.
2016 (4) AJR 242 - High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi
14
MANU/UC/0567/2018 - Two judge bench of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital
15
Ramesh Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh MANU/HP/0934/2014
16
Neera Yadav v. Central Bureau of Investigation AIR 2017 SC 3791 - Two judge bench of the
Supreme Court
KAUTILYA’S ARTHASHASTRA AND THE LAW 8
The Arthashastra is the only ancient text that most of the judgments referring to the
Arthashastra rely on, and they all seem to accept it as the authoritative account of
conditions/life/practices in ancient India. In the pre-independence era, the Arthashastra appears
to be used as a tool to build a version of history wherein large phases of Indian history are
glossed over and the Arthashastra is seemingly the sole representative of ancient India. In the
Constituent Assembly Debates, we see reliance being placed on the Arthashastra to trace India’s
rich and ancient history. Jumping to contemporary times, we see that the judges have a slightly
more historically accurate understanding of the Arthashastra, notwithstanding the equal footing
that Adam and Kautilya are put on. Further, the judges do not rely solely on the Arthashastra but
also refer to other ancient texts and sources to understand the issue at hand. Also, there is
reference to the gist of the Arthashastra ’s take on a specific prakaran17
instead of a meticulous
reference to the book, chapter, and ‘section’ of the text as was observed in the earlier cases. The
Courts also appear to be relying on the Arthashastra to develop legal jurisprudence shaped by
our unique history, and not solely to drive an agenda. At the same time, we also see the
Arthashastra being invoked (along with other texts) for deeply politicised issues such as
slaughtering of cows. That said, the Courts do attempt to perform a balancing act and not show
bias. To conclude, it may be said that the trend indicates that inferences are being increasingly
drawn from Kautilya’s Arthashastra by the Courts in their efforts to interpret statutes, and that
despite the passage of time, it shall continue to stay relevant and help Indian legal jurisprudence
evolve.
References