(Nugent, 2010) The Member States

Nugent, N. (2010) The Member states.
Chapter 15. In, The Government and politics

of the European Union - 7th ed
\ jbaJ)ter 15 (pp.255-276). New York: Palgrave
Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-241183.
1
I e Member States
i
\ he EU exists first and foremost to further the interests of its member
T states. It is, therefore, hardly snrprising that, as previous chapters of this

book have shown, the member states are core EU actors. This chapter
examines the ways in which member states behave and act in the EU
A useful starting point for the examination is to recognise that states pay a
price for EU membership. The nature of the price varies between states but
usually has two main aspects. The first and most obvious is that there is a
substantial loss of national decision-making powers. In a few policy spheres-
such as agriculture and external trade - most key decisions are now taken at the
EU level, whilst in many other spheres - such as environmental policy and
competition policy - decision-making responsibilities are shared between the
EU and the member states. There is, in short, a loss - or at least a pooling - of
national sovereignty. The second aspect, which is a consequence of the first, is
. that states are obliged to participate in and apply some policies that their repre-
sentatives believe are not, at least in certain respects, in the national interests.
For example, some governments with coastal waters believe they are not fairly
treated under the Common Fisheries Policy. Several governments believe the
Common Agricultural Policy has outlived its time, distorts EU budgetary
expenditure to their disadvantage, and should be fundamentally reformed.
And virtually all governments at some time have been unhappy about compe-
tition decisions - most commonly concerning state aid or proposed company
mergers - that have been issued by the Commission.
Given this seeming heavy price of membership, why are states members of
the EU? Why are they willing to participate in collective decision-making in
important policy areas? Essentially they are so because their national decision-
makers, supported by, or at least with the acquiescence of, large sections of
their populations have believed it to be in their national interests to do so.
National decision-makers have judged that there is more to be gained from
being inside the EU than from being outside. Perceptions of the particular
balance of advantages and disadvantages arising from EU membership have
varied from state to state, but all have judged that the net balance sheet is in the
black.
-A consequence of being a member state is that national political, economic
and legal systems are increasingly being 'Europeanised'. As part of this, national
political structures, political actors, policy processes, and policies are progres-
sively orientating, or are being orientated, in Ii European direction. The extent
of the orientating, and of the associated national adaptations, varies both
between and within states. But no states are exempt from the need to accom-
modate many aspects of national systems to EU rules and requirements.
Because it is mainly concerned with the impact of the EU on the member
255
256 I The Institutions and Political Actors
states, Europeanisation - or 'EU-ization' as Bulmer fact that the member states just are different
and Lequesne (2005a:ll) suggest it may be better another in numerous respects. Table 15.1
termed - is normally thought of as being a top-down of the more obvious size and economic
process. (There is now an extensive academic literature that exist, but a fully comprehensive table of
on Europeanisation. See, for example: Ladrech, 2010j cant differences between member states would
Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Goetz and Hix, 2001; many pages,
Green Cowles et ai" 2001; Olsen, 2002,) However, As in Chapters 1 and 4, the states are
Europeanisation has an important bottom-up element according to when they assumed membership,
too in that a key reason national political actors, agen-
cies and sectors have adjusted to the EU is so as to
enhance their ability to communicate with and influ-
ence decision-making at the EU level, It is with this
The founding member states:
latter aspect of Europeanisation that this chapter is Belgium, France, Germany, Ita
mostly concerned. That is to say, whilst top-down Luxembourg, and the Netherla·.
Europeanisation is not ignored, the main focus is on
national inputs into EU policy and decision-making Since helping to create the EC in the 1950s, four
processes and how they have been designed and founding states - Belgium, Luxembourg,
adjusted in attempts to enable them to feed into the Netherlands and Italy - have remained firm.
processes in an effective manner. consistent supporters of the integration process.
The precise I nature of these inputs varies between have almost invariably backed, and sometimes
states, reflecting such factors as different national been prominent in the initiation of, the m'lnv· mei
political systems, traditions, and cultures. In broad als put forward over the years for further intpur,tin
terms, however, they can be seen as being directed advance. The only significant exception to this
through seven principal channels: governments, rejection by the Dutch people in a referendum in
parliaments, courts, subnatiopallevels of government, 2005 of the proposed Constitutional Treaty,
citizens' views, political parties, and interests. This reasons for, and the significance of, this vote
chapter is mainly taken up with examining each of considered in Chapter 6,
these channels. However, it is useful to begin by plac- Germany - Of, to be strictly accurate,
ing the inputs that have been and are being made Germany up to 1990 and united Germany since-
through the particular channels into a wider context also been a reasonably dependable member of
of general national orientations and approaches integrationist camp. (German unification took
towards European integration and EU membership, It form of the German Democratic Republic -
is also useful to have towards the end of the chapter a Germany - integrating into the Federal RelJut.lici
section that considers the relative influence exercised Germany, so there was no question of a new state
by states in the ED. ing the Community and therefore no
normal enlargement procedures applying,)
in recent years. the enthusiasm for integration
National Orientations and wobbled a little, with a reluctance to continue
the EU's main 'paymaster' being displayed and
Approaches reservations about continuing enlargements of
EU, especially to Turkey, being expressed,
The circumstances in which the EU's 27 member states In the early years of the EC, France assumed a
founded or became members of the EC/EU were wary attitude towards the integration process. . of
outlined in Chapters 1 and 4, Their general stances a consequence of President de Gaulle's hostility to
towards and behaviour within the EU will now be international organisation that assumed su]pranalior
outlined, It will be shown that whilst there are some characteristics and, thereby, undermined
similarities in the stances and behaviour of member national sovereignty. The economic benefits
states, there are also many very significant differences. Community membership for France were re(;ogniSf
These differences reflect more than anything else the and welcomed, but they were not to be paid for
The Member states I 257
Key information on EU member states
Population I Surface area Size of GDpl GDP per capita

(millions) (1,000 sq.km) (billion euro) in PPS'
82.2 357.0 2,238,507 116.1

re grc,up,,~ 63.8 544.0 1,678,544 107.4
;hip. 61.2 243.8 1,705,659 117.7
59.6 295.1 1,404,270 100.6
45.2 506.0 1,132,591 103.4
38.1 312.7 535,737 57.6
21.5 230.0 219,909 45.8
16.4 33.8 515,016 135.0
11.2 130.,7 261,400 93.9
10.7 30.3 302,651 114
10.6 91.9 192,775 75.5
10.4 77.3 198,933 80.1
10.0 93.0 145,698 62.8
9.2 410.3 262,149 121.0
8.3 82.5 248,889 123.1
7.6 111.0 70,426 40.5
5.5 43.1 152,151 118.7
5.4 49.0 89,139 71.8
5.3 304.5 141,811 115.1
4.4 68.4 143,746 136.6
3.4 62.7 41,802 61.2
2.3 62.3 25,368 55.8
2.0 20.1 42,596 90.7
1.4 43.4 19,109 68.2
0.8 9.3 18,029 96.2
0.5 2.6 31,309 271.5
0.4 0.3 7,813 75.5
497.4 4,215.1 11,826,027
Ministers (2008).
December 2009.
= purchasing power standards, Eurostat, December 2009.
information on the member states is available on the book's website at www.palgrave.com/politics/nugent.
of national sovereignty to the likes of the stance than the other five founding states with respect
nmlssi,on, the European Parliament or a Council of to the powers of the EU institutions. Notwithstanding
llsterstltiQnlg Its decisions by majority vote. Since de this tendency, however, French Presidents have sought
resignation in 1969, France's concerns about to be prominent in moving integration ahead and have
sovereignty have been less to the fore, though linked up with others, especially German Chancellors,
have never quite disappeared and even today for this purpose. It thus came as a considerable set-
still tends to take a more intergovernmentalist back to President Chirac when the French people
Photo J 5.1 Charles de Gaulle. President of single currency. As for the political dirnellsiclt
France. 1958-69. Community/Union membership, the g011ennment
by Margaret Thatcher and John Major were "bershlP is co
support the development of intergovernmental fac
eration when that seemed useful - as, for
the field of foreign policy and aspects of internal
rity policy - but they almost invariably sought to
supranational developments and any loss of
sovereignty.
With the election of a Labour government in
the British stance in the EU became more COI)P''',
as was exemplified by the willingness of the
ments led by Tony Blair and then Gordon
incorporate extensions to supranational
making in the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon
to provide a lead in the development of EU
policy, and to strike a generally positive stance to reject fa
forums. However, overall under Labour, 'the implerr
remained in the slow integration stream, as it was app
demonstrated by the unwillingness not to 2002.
singl.e currency system and by the insistence Treaty,
negotiations that led to the Nice and Lisbon the imp
that Britain be given opt-outs from certain on hold Ul
designed to strengthen the EU's justice and try' ref
affairs policies. refer,
rejected the Constitutional Treaty in a referendum
held in May 2005 - a matter which, like the Dutch Denmark's record since joining the Cc.mlmun
referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, was consid- has been not wholly dissimilar from that of the
ered in Chapter 6. that, aware of domestic scepticism about
supposed benefits of EC/EU membership,
governments have tended to be cat.:ttious in
approach to integration. The most dramatic
The first enlargement round tation of Danish concern with the integration
acceding states: Denmark, Ireland, occurred in 1992 when, in a national refe,,:nclurn, ~
and the UK Danish people rejected Denmark's ratification of
Maastricht Treaty. This rejection, which was
Since joining the Community, the UK has been some- in a second referendum in 1993) upset the
thing of an awkward partner and has played an impor- for applying the Treaty, took much wind out of
tant role in slowing aspects of the integration process. sails of those who wished to press ahead quickly
This was especially so during the Conservative Party's further integration) and resulted in Denmark
term of office between 1979 and 1997, for it took a ing itself from certain future integrationist
largely minimalist view of what the EC/EU should be As part of this distancing, Denmark, like the UK,
doing and what organisational shape it should take. not become a member of the common
The strong preference was for the EC/EU to be system when it was launched in 1999) and then,
concerned primarily with market-related matters, and referendum held in September 2000, the
more particularly for it to direct most of its efforts people rejected a recommendation made by
towards creating an integrated and largely deregulated government to join.
European market. The proper and efficient operation For the most part, Ireland has been a strongly
of this market was not seen to require common integrationist member state. One reason for this
economic, financial, and social policies, let alone a been that it has been afforded generous treatrne!
The Member States I 259
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the but not gone - and its complicated web of friendships
:ruc:tur·al Funds. Another, related, reason is that EU and hostilities with parts of the former Yugoslavia
lernlbe:rshlp is commonly viewed as having been a key have presented diffiCUlties in the way of EU attempts
factor behind the so-called 'Irish to develop united and effective policies in South-East
~onornllC miracle' that saw rapid economic growth in Europe; and Greece's special links with Cyprus led to it
1990s and early 2000s and the transformation of making threatening noises in the early 2000s about EU
from being one of the EU's poorest member enlargement to CEECs shoUld Cyprus's application be
to one of the richest. blocked. .
notwithstanding its generally strong pro- Since their accession both Spain and Portugal have
tegratiarlist stance, Ireland has created two major broadly gone along with integrationist developments,
for the EU, both of them involving deci- with the former perhaps being a little more integra-
not to ratify EU treaties. In both instances the tionist than the latter. The fear expressed in some
fficulties arose because the Irish Government is quarters before their accession that they would come
to seek popular approval of major EU treaties to constitute a disruptive Iberian bloc has not been
":relen,nciuDO. The first rejection involved the deci- realised. As would be expected, they do frequently
of the Irish people in a referendum held in June adopt similar positions on issues of common concern
to reject ratification of the Nice Treaty. The vote but, as with other member states, their preferences on
the implementation of the Nice Treaty on hold specific policy matters often diverge. The single great-
it was approved in another referendum held in est difficulty they, and more especially Spain, have
2002. The second rejection was of the created for the EU is the tough position they have
Treaty, in a referendum held in June 2008. (understandably) adopted in seeking to protect them-
the implementation of the Treaty had to be selves when - most notably in the context of enlarge-
on hold until the vote was reversed in another ment to CEECs - it has been suggested that the
try' referendum in October 2009. Unlike the support they receive from the Structural Funds should
referendum votes in Denmark) the Irish be reduced.
were explained primarily not in terms of
sentiments but rather a variety of
political circumstances.
The EFTAN round acceding states:
Austria, Finland, and Sweden
Mediterranean round
Since their accession, none of the 1995 entrants has
ng states: Greece, Spain, created any major problems for the EU, although there
Portugal was disappointment in 'integrationist quarters' when
the Swedish people decided in a referendum held in
becoming a member state, Greece has generally September 2003 not to join the single currency system.
the advancement of the integration process. In terms of distinctive contributions in particular
said, particular Greek policies) concerns, and policy areas, Sweden, working closely with Finland
needs have sometimes created difficulties: and the EU's third Scandinavian member state _
relative poverty (it is the poorest EU-lS state) Denmark - has been to the fore in advancing EU envi-
:ontnbuted to pressures on the EU's redistributive ronmental policy and in pressing the case for greater
and funds; the somewhat unstable and debt- openness and transparency in the ED. The three
nature of the Greek economy has meant that it . Scandinavian states have also led the way, working in
lonletimes had to seek special economic assistance cooperation with the Baltic states that acceded in 2004
partners; although it wished to join the single (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), in developing the
from its launch, it was the only EU member EU's 'Northern Dimension' and Arctic policies, which
was unable to meet the qualifYing conver- are policies designed to promote and protect EU and
criteria for entry into the first wave; Greece's national policy interests in the Baltic and Arctic seas
l;standirLg hostility towards Turkey - now fading, regions.
The 10+2 round acceding states: 2008). The Visegrad Group member states
experiences and information across a
Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech policy fields and seek to act cooperatively in
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Their greatest cooperative activity since access.i6
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, been in respect of strongly supporting,
leading, the development of an Eastern
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia within the European Neighbourhood Policy
was launched in 2003 to provide an overall
Prior to the accession of the 10+2 states, concerns for channelling the EU's relation with its
were expressed in some EU quarters that the CEECs in the Mediterranean and to the East. (The
would act together on EU policy matters and would Partnership was formally launched in May
virtually constitute a voting bloc in the Council of part as a counterpart to the Mediterranean
Ministers. Such concerns have not been realised. They was launched in 2008.)
have not been so because, apart from generally Regarding individual CEECs having a
supporting increased cohesion funding (that is, fund- impact on the EU, the two clearest instances
ing that is primarily designed to help economically institutional matters. The first involved Poland
less prosperous parts of the EU) and also generally even before it assumed membership, -joined
pressing for the EU to adopt a robust stance in its rela- with (the similarly sized) Spain at the December '.
tions with Russia, the CEECs have no more consti- European Council meeting to block agreement
tuted a cohesive group than have the EU-IS. Post the Constitutional Treaty until both states had been
2004-7 enlargement, the nature of divisions along more votes under the Councirs revised QMV
national lines within the Council and other EU insti- The second instance involved the Czech ReDul>lic
tutions remain, as they have always been, more cross- Poland, both of which - because they had
cutting than cumulative. That is to say, on issues Eurosceptic Presidents whose approvals were
where there are divisions between member states, - were very laggardly in ratifying the Lisbon
more often than not states ally with one another in Indeed, the signature of the Czech President,
different combinations rather than consistently ally in Klaus, was the very last act in the Lisbon Treaty
the same combinations. cation process.
But, though the CEECs as a whole have not consti- Bulgaria and Romania have created problems
tuted a bloc within the enlarged EU, groups of CEECs different kind for the EU, with the col:rul,ticm:
do seek to coordinate their activities in some policy public life that raised questions about their
areas. So, the Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia, and ness for membership in 2007 continuing to
Lithuania - frequently liaise with one another before rife. The EU-2S were well aware of these
Council meetings, induding by holding ministerial- when they decided to let the 2007 enlarg,em.,nt
level breakfast meetings. Prior to meetings of the ahead, but hopes that membership would lead to
General Affairs, and more especially of the FOreign being more robustly and effectively tackled have
Affairs, Councils these breakfast meetings often also over-optimistic.
include the Foreign Ministers of the three. As for the two non-CEECs that were part of
Scandinavian states - Denmark Finland and Sweden. 2004-7 enlargement round - Cyprus and Malta -
A more structured form of liaison is attempted by the latter has created no particular problems for the
Visegrad Group, which is made up of the Czech since it became a member in 2004 but, pn,di,eta;bly'
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and which is the absence of a resolution to the Cyprus Problem,
named after the Hungarian town where the group was former has. Like the representatives of all
launched in 1991. The Group 'is best described as a states, Cypriot representatives in EU forums
framework for both internally and externally oriented particularly active in respect of matters that
subregional cooperation between its four Central and directly on national interests. In Cyprus's case,
European member states ... (it) can be considered a J)1atters include corporate law and taxation
permanent feature of the European political land- international companies have bases in CvpnlS),
scape' (Dangerfield, 2009: 3; see also, Dangerfield, regulation of maritime transport (the Cypriot
flag of convenience for international shipping), the Permanent Representations, cultivate a broad
the regulation of and assistance for service indus- range of contacts in the Commission),
(tourism accounts for approximately one third of As well as the use of national contacts, there are
GDP). But, looming over Cyprus's 'routine' many other ways in which governments try to
vol',enleLlt in such 'normal' policy areas has always persuade, influence or bring pressure to bear on the
the Cyprus Problem, with Cypriot representa- Commission. Use is made of the many formal chan-
constantly having to address it one way or nels on which governments are represented, sllch as
- most particularly by ensuring that EU poli- the groups of experts who. advise the Commission on
do not involve the EU officially dealing directly all sorts of matters, the comitology committees
authorities in northern Cyprus and by ensuring through which the Commission exercises many of its
pressure is maintained on Turkey to assist with a executive functions, and the numerous decision-
of the Problem. On the particular issue of ,making meetings that take place within the Council
Turkish EU membership application, Cyprus has system from working party level upwards - meetings
to the fore in pressing for the pace of the acces- that the Commission virtually always attends.
negotiations to be slow until Turkey has given full Informal methods range from a minister ringing up a
:oglaiti.on to Cyprus and the Cyprus Problem has Commissioner, to a working party representative
resolved. This pressing has been sliccessful, meeting a Commission official for lunch.
it has been greatly assisted by the fact that It should be emphasised that government influence
other member states - especially Austria, France on Commission thinking is not necessarily a bad
Germany - have, for their own reasons, also thing. On the contrary, it can be positively helpful by,
to see the negotiations with Turkey be dragged for example, improving the prospect of legislative
proposals being adopted. However, it can become
unhealthy if governments try to lean too heavily on
their fellow nationals in the Commission, or if clusters
of nationals have a disproportionate influence on
policy development in a key sector (as, for example,
I
has frequently been alleged of the French in respect of
yernrrlents are naturally in the strongest position of agriculture) .
actors to control or influence ED
. This is most obviously seen in their rela-
with the Comrrlission and the Council of Influencing the Council
The potential for any government to influence what
happens in the Council depends on a number of
uencing the Commission factors.
shown in Chapter 8, the system of appoint-

to the Commission ensures that all member
The size of the state it represents
are represented within it. This, however, does On most policy issues the EU's larger member states
that Commissioners or Commission offi- carry more weight than do smaller member states.
act as governmental representatives. Rather, for This is not just because the larger states have greater
part they look to the EU-wide interest and voting weight in the Council but also because· the
open to .instructions from national capitals. smaller states tend to defer to the size and resources of
may, quite naturally, be inclined to take a the larger states. The case should not, however, be
interest in the impact of proposals on their overstated for, as Thorhallsson (2000) and Archer and
country. And governments looking for sympa- Nugent (2002) have shown, the smaller states do -
ears in the Commission may well make fellow ironically because of their more limited administrative
their first port of call (though not necessar- capacities - often display characteristics that make it
coml,et,ent government officials, especially from possible for them to participate successfully in EU
decision-making processes. Amongst these character- of small states, for example, do not come to['ett,p,
istics are: more informal domestic lines of policy group, except on some treaty reform issues.
communication; more flexible internal decision- governments come together in different cOlnb,Illa'
makingj the issuing of guidelines rather than instruc- on different issues. Taking Irish governments
tions to Council negotiators; and a focus on a example, their positions have traditionally
narrower range of policy issues. to the positions of the governments of: Spain,
and Portugal on cohesion policy; Sweden and
The importance of the state to particular on defence; France on agriculture; the Benelux
on institutional questions; and the UK on taxatl(lJj
negotiations
some justice and home affairs matters.
YVhen an issue is important to a state, its government However, some governments do make
will be actively involved in Council process.es and it is conscious effort than others to seek general
likely to ensure that it is represented by senior figures standings and cooperation with one or more
in Council meetings. When, by contrast, a state is not EU partners. So, for example, in 2001 the prime
much affected by an issue it may send junior people to ters of the three Nordic member states -
represent it and its representatives may not engage Sweden and Finland - decided they would
actively in Council deliberations. For example,' in each European Council meeting to discuss
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) deliberations the common concern. The Benelux leaders also often
Spanish and Irish governments are likely to be much before summits. As was noted above, Baltic
more central actors than the Austrian or Slovak Visegrad leaders also often get together on a
governments. basis, with the latter even having institutionalised
meetings with a rotating presidency.
The desire of the government to play an The best known and most influential of
states having a close relationship is that
active role
France and Germany, which has been con,,:iot
Where governments have strong policy preferences they fostered and maintained by most French and
are likely to be to the fore in the preparation of position governments since the early 1960s. The
papers and to be highly active in relevant policy debates Franco-German axis is no longer as cOlmnlarldillg
and deliberations. This may result in them playing a it was when there were only six member
crucial role in helping to set policy agendas and estab- when Chancellor Schmidt and President
lish 'framework ideas: Examples of governments exer- d'Estaing and later Chancellor Kohl and
cising such a role include Germany in respect of the Mitterrand worked closely together, but it still
'sound money' principles of EMU and the UK in an important part in helping to shape and set
respect of the liberal principles of the internal market. pace of EU deVelopments.
An increasingly important aspect of go'vernnlOri'
The capacity of the government to play an strategies in the EU is multilateral bilateralism,
active role sees governments linking up with just one or
other governments on specific issues, often for
A government may have clear views on an ED initia- purpose of launching initiatives.
tive and may wish to play an active role in supporting
or opposing it, but be restrained by domestic political
considerations such as a finely balanced coalition
The procedures applying
government, opposition from key interest groups, or Of particular importance here is whether
possible electoral damage. majority voting is permissible under the
treaty article(s) and is politically acceptable in
circumstances applying. If it is, concessions
Relations with other governments
compromises might be preferable to being outvc,te(j.;
Cohesive and fIxed alliances within the EU between it is not, any government can cause indefinite
particular governments do not exist. The governments though by so doing it may weaken goodwill t01l"rc[s',
thus damage its long-term interests. An example country's negotiating pOSItIOn is doubtful.
g01reflom.en·ts forgoing the use of a veto they would Undoubtedly, the more that countries lean in this
liked to have exercised is Austria and Cyprus, direction; and all do at times, the more that negotia-
in 2004 and 2005 resisted vetoing the opening tions at the lower Council levels are limited to tech-
.- accession negotiations with Turkey. nical matters and the more the overall Council
process is protracted.
At the most senior Council level- ministerial meet-
competence ofgovernmental negotiators
ings - there is, of course, not such a problem of control
the extensive tactical manoeuvrings involved in from national capitals. It is important to ensure that
processes, and given that many negotiations are the minister is fully briefed on the national implica-
about the broad sweep of policy but are about tions of proposals and is accompanied by national
technical matters, the competence of individual officials who fully understand all aspects of agenda
'gol:iators can be crucial. Are they well-briefed and items, but the political weight of the participants
to master details? Can they judge how far their usually means that, if the will is there, commitments
'gu'.!d''''~ partners can be pushed? Can they avoid can be entered into without having to refer back for
isolated? Can they build coalitions? Can they clearance. This is not to say that those in attendance at
their interventions so as to clinch points? The ministerial meetings can do as they like. At a mini-
suggests that variations in such competencies mum they are obliged to operate within the general
so much between states as between individual guidelines of their government's policies. They may
also be subject to special national constraints: perhaps
occasioned by an inability of the minister to attend
arrangements for linking representatives personally; perhaps linked to domestic political diffi-
culties caused by the existence of a coalition govern-
Council with national capitals
ment; perhaps caused by a national parliamentary
. point is worth developing in a little detail because committee having indicated concerns; or perhaps a
are significant variations in the ways in which consequence of a particular national interest having
attempt to manage and control their resulted in the establishment of a rigid governmental
into the Council via their representatives. Two position in advance.
of this are particularly worth mentioning. Second, in all member states arrangements have
some countries - including Belgium, Italy, been established to enable governments to coordinate
the Netherlands - generally allow their represen- their policy towards and their participation in the EU.
to work within a relatively flex:ible framework. According to Peters and Wright (2001: 162) four
is demonstrated by the way in which representa- general observations can be made about these
are often able to negotiate on important policy arrangements: major political and constitutional EU
not just at the ministerial level but also at issues are handled by the Heads of Government,
levels. As well as assisting the functioning of assisted by their Foreign and Finance Ministers; the
. Council as a whole - by reducing the need for formal link between the domestic capital and Brussels
issues to be referred upwards - manoeuvra- is generally coordinated through the Foreign Ministry,
of this kind can be used to the national advan- the Finance/Economics Ministry, or both; most
by competent negotiators. At the same time, ministries in all member states have adjusted their
too much independence on the part of internal structures to meet EU requirements; and
!re'ientati:ves can lead to the need for awkward despite some convergence, the nature of the coordina-
at a later negotiating stage if a tion arrangements varies considerably between the
sju,dg"m,mt is made. In contrast, the representa- member states.
of some other states - including France and the Some flesh can be put on these general observations
- are generally reluctant and/or are not able to by comparing the arrangements made by three member
. on policy issues below ministerial level. states: Malta, which is a small member state with a very
as is sometimes claimed, this greater rigid- centralised coordinating system: the UK, which is a
. improves the consistency and effectiveness of a large state with a quite centralised coordinating system;
264 I The Institutions and Political Adors
and Germany, which is a large member state with a The mechanisms themselves are formalised,
more fragmented system. tured, and seemingly well integrated. At the
policy level, the Foreign and Commonwealth
* * * (FCO), the Cabinet Office, and the UK Permah,
In Malta a centralised governmental system and a Representation to the European Union (UKREP)
majority party political system have provided a the key bodies: the Fca frequently changes its
favourable base for t~ght coordinating mechanisms. isationa! arrangements for dealing with tbe EU,
At the heart of the system is the Permanent at the time of writing, a range of units located
Representation in Brussels and the ED Secretariat - an umbrella European and Globalisation Dilrec,tOTi
which is based in the Office of the Prime Minister the Cabiuet Office contains a European """CC"r
(OPM) - in Malta. Most matters that require attention which, amongst other things, convenes each
are channelled from the Permanent Representation to around 200 interdepartmental meetings
the EU Secretariat, which then hands on the matter to servants attended by representatives from apl,ropri:
the appropriate ministry to coordinate and prepare a ministries, including one regular weekly
response. The response is returned to the EU which is attended by the Permanent RelpreseLltatiJ!
Secretariat, which then normally refers it for clearance and UKREP - which is formally an FCO overseas
to the Inter-Ministerial Committee on EU Affairs - acts as the eyes and ears of the UK in
(IMCEU). Despite its name, the IMCEU is composed Working together, these three bodies attempt to
not of ministers but of civil servants. It is chaired by tor, coordinate and control overall EU developmen'
the Permanent Representative and composed of by giving general consideration to important
Permanent Secretaries (the most senior civil servants) due to corne up at forthcoming meetings; by
from all major ministries - though usually the latter are at whether a broadly consistent line is being
represented by their Directors for EU Affairs. (All across different policy areaSj by trying to ensure
ministries have such Directors, with support teams - ministries have issued sufficiently dear guidelines
the size of which naturally varies). lfthe matter is polit-representatives in Council meetings; and, in the
ically sensitive or especially important, it is referred toof the Feo and UKREP, giving briefings to
the Cabinet Committee on EU Affairs for finalisation. tatives when appropriate. 'Above' these three
The extent of the centralized arrangements in but not involved in such a continual manner,
Malta is seen in the very powerful position of the Cabinet Committee on European Issues chaired
Permanent Representative. He is head of the Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet itself, and the
Permanent Representation, which channels all official Minister. 'Below' them, each ministry has its
EU-Malta links. He chairs the IMCEU, which clears arraugements for examining proposals that fall
most national positions on routine issues. And he sits its competence and for ensuring that specialist
in the Cabinet, which ultimately approves all national tiators are weI! briefed and fully aware of delDar'lrn,el
positions - either by rubber-stamping non- tal thinking. Wben EU matters loom large
contentious issues agreed in the IMCEU or by ministry's work, special divisions or units exist
discussing and taking decisions on matters that 'coordination purposes.
necessitate a political input. Reflecting the high
degree of clientelism in Maltese politics - which has * * *
been exacerbated by the centre-right Christian In Germany a number of factors combine to
Democrats having been in power for all but two years coordination on EU matters more difficult than'
since 1987 - the Permanent Representative is not a the UK:
career civil servant.
@ The existence of a coalition gm"ernment and
* * * need to satisfy (though not on a consistent
Like Malta, the UK also has a centralised governmen- across policy areas) the different elements of
tal system and a majority party political system. As in coalition.
Malta these have contributed to the creation of ID The lelatlve autonomy of ministers and UUH"''''.'
centralised coordinating mechanisms. within the federal government.
The tack of an authoritative coordinating centre: I

the Chancellor's Office and the Foreign Ministry
both have a responsibility for major EU issues,
whilst the Economics Ministry also has a responsi-
Reasons why national governments
bility for many coordination matters. are finding it difficult to control
The considerable powers of the federal states (the their 'inputs' to the EU
in certain policy areas.
strong sectoral specialisation allied with loya!- • The EU's policy .portfolio continues to grow, I
-ties to different federal ministries amongst the staff with decisions bemg taken in almost all areas of
the German Permanent Representation in public policy This applies both to major and
long-term decisions, on the likes of EMU and
enlargement, and to more specific and technical
arise from these decisions on such matters as the internal market
was seen during the 2005-9 Government, and environmental standards.
much of the coordination of Germany's input • Not only are more decisions bemgmade,but
EU policy process was undertaken by the Social many are being made much more quickly. The
hllocrat (SPD)-led Foreign Ministry whilst much greater use of QMV means that governments
was undertaken by the Christian Democrat can no longer always delay progress on a
-led Economics Ministry. After the proposal until they are ready and satisfied.
2009 election, this situation continued, • The increased scope of EU policy interests
with the end of the grand CDU/CSU-SPD means that thete are no longer just a few
the Foreign Office was now led by the Free dome&tic ministries -' such as Agriculture,
lmo(;rats (FDP). Trade, and Finance - which are directly inVolved
German system is still able to arrange the sort with the ED. The 'Europeanisation' of domestic
'co,orilim,tDlg activities that take place in some form politics and admmistration has resulted in 1110st
member states - with, for example, regular meet- ministries in most states being affected by, and
being held of representatives from relevant becoming actively involved in, EU affairs. So, for
at (normally junior) mmisterial and senior example, Wessels (2001) has estimated that
levels. But, m consequence of the particular approximately one-third of all. senior (A-level)
it faces) Germany's European policies are German Federal Ministry officials are involved
netimes less than consistent and Germany's posi- directly in different phases of the Brussels policy
EU negotiations often emerges much later than cycle, whilst nearly two-thirds are in contact
positions of governments in more centra.lized with the EU system in some way as part of their
such as the UK. normal administrative work.
c~ortuna1:ejy for Germany, having strong and effec-
domestic arrangements for coordinating inputs
EU processes is not the only factor m determining
influence in the EU. Its position as the strongest Parliaments
EU state seemingly enables it to avoid being too
damaged by this internal weakness. Parliaments have much less influence than govern_
ments over ED developments. Of course, governments
* * * normally retlect the political composition of their
~ Whatever the particulars of their arrangements for national legislatures and must retain their confidence,
cntr'Olli'r,. and influencing their EU policy activities, so - in an indirect sense - government activity in rela_
governnlent, have found the task mcreasingly diffi- tion to the EU could be said to retlect the parliamen_
in recent years. The reasons for this are set out in tary will. But that is a quite different matter fro111
15.1. direct parliamentary control.
One of the main reasons for the comparative lack
of direct parliamentary control has been that until the I
Lisbon Treaty entered into force national parliaments step; and QMV in the Council means that a
had no formal EU treaty powers, so governments were ment whose government has been outvoted
in a strong position to choose what to consult their way at all of caIling the real
parliaments about. All governments consulted their account.
parliaments on fundamental matters when the treaties But notwithstanding these problems and
referred to ratification in accordance with 'respective ties, all national parliaments have established
constitutional requirements' (enlargements, treaty sort of specialised arrangements for attemptin:
amendments, and the EU's budgetary base carry this deal with EU affairs. In different ways and with
provision), but otherwise there were great variations ent degrees of effectiveness, these arrangements
between the states. The Lisbon Treaty should serve to on examining proposed EU legislation,
narrow these variations and generally increase the role ministerial positions and performances,
of national parliaments in the EU system by its inclu- reports on EU-related matters, and generally
sion - most particularly in a new Article 12 TEU and toring EU developments. Amongst the many
in new protocols - of a number of provisions specifi- ences that exist between· the national arr'an,geno,
cally designed to increase the role of national parlia- three are particularly worth noting. They are
ments. The IllDst important of these provisions are in Box 15.2
new rights to examine policy documents and draft Despite the changes and adjustments
legislative acts and a new power to require that draft parliaments in recognition of the importance
legislation be reconsidered. The Commission has long
forwarded appropriate documentation to national
parliaments, and indeed since 2006 has forwarded
draft legislative proposals to them at the same time as
doing so to the EP and Council, but the parliaments
had no formal powers to directly input into EU ran~~ements t(
processes. Under Article 12 TEU, it is now the case that parliamentary arrangements
if one-third of national parliaments object to a new monitoring and controlling ED
legislative proposal on the grounds that it breaches the matters
ED's subsidiarity principle the Commission must istn:ngth. Fir!
reconsider the proposal. If the Commission then
• All parliaments have established an EU
decides to continue with the proposal the matter must committee or committees ,of some sort.
be referred to the Council and the EP for a final deci- However, whereas in some cases these
sion if a majority of national parliaments continue to the main forum for dealing with EU m"tteis
object. co;;
others they serve more 'as coordinating
In addition to the pre-Lisbon lack of treaty-based committees with the detailed work being
powers, a number of logistical difficulties arising in undertaken by appropriate 'subject' cOlnrrtitj:E 0\
relation to advising on EU legislation have also
• The regularity with which and the )mmittees - t
contributed to the weakness of national parliaments. circumstances in which ministers -with EU
The difficulties include: much EU legislation is so policy responsibilities appear before apl?ropti
technical that it is almost incomprehensible to the parliamentary bodies to explain and be
average legislator; there is little opportunity to questioned about these policies varies
consider even the most important legislation at the considerably.
formative and crucial pre-proposal stage; proposed • Some parliaments have established close
legislation has often been well-advanced in the working relationships with their national
Council system before being examined by parlia- whilst others have not. In a few parliaments .....
ments (the new Lisbon provisions should reduce this including the Belghm, German, and .
practice); legislative proposals can change in nature as specialised EU committees include MEPs,
they make their way through EU decision-making '.~blultiOllS
to pl
in a growing number of parliaments negotiation
procedures, but it is usually just not practical for used as experts when appropriate.
national parliaments to track every change at every
it is stilt, however, inevitably the case that parlia-
are, as compared with governments, confined to
Courts
role, though one that is generally increasing.
position of the Irish Parliament is fairly typical. National courts might be thought t h .,
0 ave a slgmficant
changed its arrangements on a number of occa- ro1e to p Iay as th e guarantors d d £ d
over the years, with the situation now being that . al· h " an e en ers of
natlOn ng ts agamst EU encroa h b.
work on EU affairs is channelled mainly via two tice they do not. c ment, ut m prac-
lhll10itteesmade up of representatives of both houses The reason for this, as Was expl' d' Ch
,the Irish Parlianoent, the Dail and the Senate. The . th th .. ame m apter 12
lS at e prmclple of primacy of ED I . '
Committee on European Affairs meets regularly ' I
by nationa courts. There Were "Om .aw lS accepted
I
~, .,I
-~ ' • Qe ffilha teethin
Parliament is sitting to consider broad issues problems m thIS regard, but it is g
C • al now extremely rare
hcerning Ireland and the ED. One a month there is lor natIon courts to question th I I·
. .. e egOlty of ED
[nc"w'~ with the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the proceedmgs and declSJons. The treaties, ED Ie ·sla '
of State for European Affairs prior to Council and the case law of the ED COurts gJ tlOn
are seen as takin
The work of the other committee, the joint precedence when they clash with t' al 1 g
. na IOn aw The
,mTnittee on European Scrutiny, is guided by two frequent practIce of national COurts t k 'I·'
1: 0 s~e pre Iml-
principles: to scrutinise all legislative proposals nary tuungs from the COurt of justl'C ' h
, . e m cases were
could have significatlt implications for Ireland there lS uncertamty over an aspect of ED 1 . .
, aw IS testI-
to undertake the scrutiny in time so as to in flu- mony to the general deSIre of natl·onal t
, coursnottob
the Government's negotiating position in the out of step Wlth EU law. e
of Ministers. That said, national courts have accas· II
.. lOna y sought
three Scandinavian EU member states - to assert natIOnal nghts and interests a ·
.. gamst th e ED
Finland, and Sweden - have similar For example, m a few mstances natI·ona1courts h·
ave
'anlgernellts to each other and are the major excep- refused to acknowledge the legality of direct·Ives that
.
to the general pattern of legislative weakness. Of have not been mcorporated into national law by the
three, the Danish Parliament - the Folketing - is due date, even though the Court of just'c h 1
. , Ie as rued
the strongest. There are rna main sources of that m such Clrcumstances they may b d d
, . e eeme as
stn,ng,th. First, there has been a powerful anti-inte- havmg direct effect. Constitutional law ' 1I
. ., " , especla y as
sentiment among the people of Denmark applied to mdivldual nghts, has been an th
. a er area
accession in 1973. No Danish government has wher,e some assertlOn of national indep d
. en ence has
able to ignore the articulation of this in the been attempted by natlOnal courts, thou h I ft
especially since Danish governments are smc,e . h ··If gessoen
, t e pnnClp
.. e 0 EU law haviog preced
ellce over
coalitions or minorities. Second, the natlOnal cons!JtutlOnallaw Was confirmed by C f
has a committee system - formerly based on justlce . r ul·mgs m . th e ear1y 1970s, ourto
influential European Committee, since 2004 In recent years the most important inst f
. I . I ances 0
out to include 'mainstream' policy natlOna court mvo vements have been in co t·
inrrlittees - that includes amongst its activities close WIt.h .h ·fi· f h nnec lOn
Ins ratI,lcatlOn 0 t e SEAl German'ratification
relationships between Danish parliamentari- of the Maastncht Treaty, and Gennan and Cz h .
. . ec rab-
ministers in advance of the latter attending ficatlOns of the Llsbon Treaty. The Irish involvement
meetings. The principal advaNtage of the occurred in December 1986 when the Irl'sh S
. upreme
is that it helps to ensure that agreements Court, by a margm of three to two, found in favour of
by Danish ministers in the Council are not a Raymond Crotty, who had challenged the consft _
11e(lu"nfly queried or endangered at home. The tional validity of the SEA. The judges ruled that ;,~
disadvantage is that it can make it difficult III of the Ad, which put foreign policy cooperation 'o~
Danish representatives to be flexible in the a legal ba~l~, ~ould restnct Ireland's sovereignty and
and can result in them being isolated if new mlght mhlblt It from pursumg ltS traditionally neutral
to problems are advanced during the course foreign policy. The SEA must therefore, they indicated,
be endorsed by a referendum. As a result, the SEA was
unable to come into effect in any of the twelve
Community states in January 1987, as had been Subnational levels of government have
intended, and was delayed until after the Irish had importance within the ED system in recent
given their approval in the duly held referendum. least as a result of decentralisation and re!;ionalisa
Since the 1986 SEA ruling, Irish ratification of the in several member states. A consequence of
EU's major reforming treaties - those of Maastricht, been that national authorities, especially go',enoni,
Alpsterdam, Nice and Lisbon - has always been have lost some of their power to
deemed to require approval by national referendum: advance 'the national position' in ED de,:isi,on"m,
which, as was shown earlier in the chapter, resulted in forums. The extent to which national authorities'
the entry into force of the Nice and. Lisbon Treaties keeping roles have been undermined naturally
being considerably delayed. according to a number of factors, most palrti,:ull,rll
The first German national court involvement national constitutional status of subnational
occurred when several people - including four Green government, but even in countries where
Party MEPs - appealed to the country's Constitutional powers remain strong - for example
Court to declare that the Maastricht Treaty was in Denmark - by no means all EU-national
breach of the German constitution, the Basic Law. The communications are channelled through the
appeal was made shordy after the Bundestag and the authorities.
Bundesrat had ratified the Treaty by huge majorities in Channels of communication between
December 1992, with the consequence that, instead of and subnational levels of government i',lclude·
being one of the first countries to ratify the Treaty, following:
Germany became the very last as the Constitutional
Court did not issue its judgment until October 1993. o Most EU states have sub national levels of
In its judgment the Court declared that the TEU did ment of some kind that have offices or 1'e"1'e,,.,
not infringe Germany's constitution, but made it clear tions in Brussels. For example, -all of
that certain conditions would have to be satisfied in lander and Spain's autonomia have offices,
respect of further integration. most of Fl'ance's regions. The tasks of these
The second German CQurt involvement and the include lobbying, information gathering,
Czech court involvement both concerned cases taken establishing contacts and 'keeping in touch'
before the national Constitutional Courts claiming appropriate officials and
that the Lisbon Treaty was in breach of national acting as intermediaries be-rnreen the EU
constitutional law. Both cases resulted in delays to regions/localities.
national ratificatioris of the Treaty. In Germany, the €I Many of the sl1bnationallevels of government
Court ruled, in July 2009, that the Treaty would be do not have their own offices in Brussels
compatible with German law as long as German law of Brussels-based consultancies and/or
on parliamentary oversight of EU business was domestically-based EU oftices and officers .
strengthened. This was duly done. In the Czech ., The Committee of the Regions exists for the
Republic, the Constitutional Court ruled, in purpose of enabling ED decision-makers to
November 2009, that there was no conflict between the views of regional representativc;s on
the Treaty and national constitutional law. lssues.
@ A few governments - including the Belgian,
German end the British - are sometimes
sen ted in the Council of Ministers by
Subnational levels of ministers when agenda items are the respolosil)"
Government of regional governments.
The parts played and the influence exercised by subna- The EU may be a long way from the Europe of
tionallevels of government in the ED were considered Regions that some advocate and others
in Chapter 13 (in the section on the Committee of the detect, but clearly the national dimension
Regions) and in Chapter 14. Therefore, only a few affairs has an increasingly powerful
observations will be made here on kq points. element attached to it.
doubted whether the referendums listed in Table 15,2

have really done much to deal with the much-publi_
cised and debated problem of the EU's so-called
'democratic deficit', For a number of reasons:
way in which citizens can have their say on issues e Twenty one is not very many give the time periOd
referendums. Leaving aside the special case of involved and the large number of member states.
'cessio:n'referendums which most, though not all, e Of the twenty one, twelve - Dver fifty per cent _
)st-tOllllClalJ.on states have held prior to their EC/EU have been held, in just two states: Denmark (five)
:cessiDlas (Cyprus was the only 10+2 state not to hold and Ireland (seven).
up to the end of 2009 twenty-one referendums o IVIany of the referendums have been, or have
been held in member states on EC/EU related become, tangled up with national politics and have
, As can be seen from Table 15.2, most of these not been primarily about, or focused 011, the EU.
fen,ndlunls have been concerned with the ratification For example, the 1972 French referendum Was
really designed to boost the legitimacy and status of
referendums do inject an element of direct President Pompidoll, whilst the 200 1 and 2008
,m()Cf<'cv into public decision-making, it must be Irish referendums focused largely around 'non-EU'
15.1 Referendums in member states on EC/EU issues·
country Subject of referend um Referendum

decision
France Ratification of EU enlargement Yes

UK Continued EC membership Yes
Denmark Ratification of SEA Yes
Ireland Ratification of SEA Yes
Italy Transformation of the EC into an 'effective union' Yes
Denmark Ratification of Maastricht Treaty No
Ireland Ratification of Maastricht Treaty Yes
France Ratification of Maastricht Treaty Yes
Denmark Ratification of Maastricht Treaty Yes
Ireland Ratification of Amsterdam Treaty Yes
Denmark Ratification of Amsterdam Treaty Yes
Denmark Whether to join the euro No
Ireland Ratification of Nice Treaty No
Ireland Ratification of Nice Treaty Yes
Sweden Whether to join the euro No
Spain Ratification of Consiitutional Treaty Yes
France Ratification of Constitutional Treaty No
Netherlands Ratification of Constitutional Treaty No
Luxembourg Ratification of Constitutional Treaty Yes
Ireland Ratification of Lisbon Treaty No
Ireland Ratification of Lisbon Treaty Yes
to December 2009. Voting figures in the referendums are given in the Chronology.
issues - including dissatisfaction with the govern- referendums on the Maastricht Treaty drew
ment and the protection of'family values', to how European integration was essenl:iaIly
@ Fe,,,,-' referendums have been on issues that citizens driven process and emphasised that it is
red1ly understand in terms of hOlY the referendum for decision-makers not to get too out of
outcome v,rill imp8ct on them. For example, surveys public opinion. In recognition of this, the
during the 2005 French and Dutch referendum supporters of European integration
campaigns showed that citizens had little knowJ- tempered for a while and the importance
edge of the contents of the treaties on which they decentralising subsidiarity principle, which
had voted, briefly referred to in the Treaty, was given a
€I 110st referendums have not been on issues that ,enhanced status by decision-makers, The
engage citizens - with the referendums in Sweden 2008 Irish referendums might also be placed'
and Denmark all euro membership being the dear- category in that they drew attention to the
est exceptions. in an ever-larger EU of permitting national '.•
torates a decisive influence on EU-wide issues.
The fact is that on major ED issues to which citizens Rees and Holmes (2002: 49) have observed
can relate and have an opinion (albeit, often, an ill- 2001 referendum: 'A country of less than four
informed opinion), few referendums have been held, people, an electorate of less than three
This is, of course, primarily because the political turnout of less than a million and a No
systems of the member states are based on representa- slightly over half a million derailed a
tive rather than on direct democracy. But, it is alsQ designed to allow the EU to enlarge to
partly because when there have been pressures on million',
member state governments to hold referendums on Fourth, a few referendums have had a very
EU-related issues they have usually not taken the 'risk' and specific policy consequence, Amongst the
for fear of citizens giving the 'wrong' answer. It is of the 1992 Danish referendum was that DellID;lrk
significant, for example, that not one referendum on given, as an inducement to approve the
euro membership has been held in the member states Treaty, 'opt-outs' from EMU and from the
that have become euro members, even though - or common defence policy, The 2000 Danish
more precisely because - there was evidence of Swedish referendums resulted in those cmmt,eies
substantial opposition in several of the states, includ- joining the single currency system,
ing Germany, In the two states where euro member-
ship referendums have been held - Denmark and * * *
Sweden - the people voted 'no', Of course, there is one way in which refer<,ndm
This is not, however, to say that there have not been could potentially act as a direct and effective
referendums that have not bad a significant impact on for citizen's views on ED issues and that is to
the integration process. Four categories of referen- EU-wide referendums on matters of major
dums have been especially important. tance, Such was suggested by many 'pro-illlt,e~r
First, the 2005 referendums in France and the tionists' in the context of the ratification
Netherlands produced negative majorities that Constitutional Treaty. There was, however, never
resulted in the (eventual) abandonment of attempts to realistic prospect of an EU-wide referendum
ratify the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty's held on the Treaty and nor is there any prospect
replacement by the Lisbon Treaty, the foreseeable future of such a referendum
Second, some referendums have delayed treaty rati- held on any other matter, The main reason for
fications: th~ 1992 Danish referendum on the that EU-wide referendums - especially if
Maastricht Treaty, the 2001 Irish referendum on the outcomes were to be binding - would involve
Nice Treaty, and the 2008 Irish referendum on the for most EU governments would be an unacc:eptab
Lisbon Treaty, 'transfer' of sovereignty from the national to the
Third, there have been the referendums that have level.
affected public, and especially elite, thinking about
the integration process, The 1992 Danish and French
y drew attenticln
entiallyan
ropean Parliament elections Public opinion
itis im'DOl·ta,,,,' contrast with the only occasional and localised Public opinion towards the EU and its policies is closely
,ut of step pptJrtuniti"s for participation offered by referen- and extensively monitored, both at the EU level through
,the rhetoric of elections to the EP provide citizens with regu- regular Commission-sponsored Eurobarometer polls
became and direct opportunities to participate in the and at national levels through countless polls
process on an EU-wide basis. (See Chapter II conducted on behalf of governments, research agen-
details of EP elections.) As such, the elections are des, and the media. In broad terms it can be said that
by some observers as providing the EU with a this ongoing trawling of public opinion reveals three
'!1lc,wltic base. This view, however, must be coun- main sets of findings. First, across the EU as a whole
'ballanced by a recognition that EU issues do not just over SO per cent of citizens are strongly or moder-
feature much in the election campaigns and ately supportive of European integration, about 30 per
elections aTe not in practice contested by cent are ambivalent, around 15 per cent are opposed,
lfoirean parties standing on European issues. In and the remainder do not know. Second, there are
inSf'qu,ence, the elections can hardly be regarded as large variations between countries in their support for
when the populace indicate their European the integration process. In recent years Latvia, the UK
preferences. The fact that voter turnout is, in and Hungary have displayed the loviest levels of
member states, low by national standards, and support on most indicators, whist Luxembourg, the
!thernOOl'e has declined across the EU in every set of Netherlands, Spain and Ireland have displayed the
elections since they were first held in 1979 - to highest. Third, there are considerable variations also in
extent that the overall levels in 1999,2004 and terms of the support for EU policy activity between
were below SO per cent - raises further questions issue areas. Areas with the highest levels of support are
the democratic legitimacy given to the EU by those that are either dearly cross-national in nature or
elections. that seem to offer the greatest benefits from cross-
national policy action. Included amongst these areas
are fighting terrorism, protecting the environment,
I elections scientific and technological research, and foreign and
defence policies. Areas with the lowest levels of
way in which citizens can exert an influence support are those that seem to be more naturally
EU affairs via the ballot box is through national national and/or where the implications ofEU involve-
since most important EU decisions are ment can seem to be threatening. Prominent here are
or are co-taken by elected national representa- pensions, taxation, social welfare, education and
in the European Council and the Council of health.
. This influence, however, is indirect in that The extent to which governments respond to public
elections afe two or three stages removed opinion depends very much on their own ideological
the EU: voters elect legislatures, from which and policy preferences, their perception of the impor-
,efl}menl:s are formed, which send representatives tance ahd durability of issues, and the time remaining
summits and Council meetings. The influence until the next election. The existence of, for example,
somewhat tangential in that voters in national less than enthusiastic support for European integra-
usually are not much concerned with tion amongst a sizeable proportion of national elec-
jWpealn issues' or with the competence of candi- torates may both restrain and encourage politicians
deal with European matters. Beyond some depending on their viewpoint, but there certainly is no
attention by far-right and nationalist parties- automatic relationship between what the people think
:asi,om,d by their generally 'anti-Europe' stance - about EU matters and what governments do. The UK
does not normally feature much in national Conservative government, for example) made no move
to withdraw from the Community in the early 19805
even though a majority of the British population
thought it should, and it did not weaken its opposition
in the 1990s to the Social Charter even though polls
suggested that the Charter was supported by about they may well still find themselves with strclno no<
two-thirds of the British people. Similarly, in the late ating hands.
19905 the German government did not weaken in its Of course, the precise extent to which
resolve to take Germany into the single currency even on the one hand, reflecting and ch,mnielling
though polls showed that a majority of Germans were on particular issues and, on the other, are
opposed to the Deutschmark being subsumed within determining them is very difficult to judge
the euro. most instances, the processes are two-way and'
That said, public opinion does exercise an influence lated. But whatever the exact balance may be
in at least setting the boundaries in which national the processes, both are very much in operation'
leaders must operate. For example, anti-Turkish senti- tion to the EU. The experiences of Denmark,
ments in France and Germany and very low levels of and the UK in the 1980s and early 1990s illLlstrate'
support for EU enlargement to include Turkey are one In each of these countries there was wi,de';pr,eacl po
reason why French and Geiman leaders have been very lar scepticism in the early to mid-1980s
wary about the prospect of Turkey eventually acceding Community membership and this found both
to the EU. sion and encouragement at the party political
Public opinion can also be important in that if an with some parties advocating a complete
issue is generally accepted as constituting a national from Community membership and others
interest, or at least commands strong domestic . considerable concern about aspects of the
support, then governments of whatever political tions of membership - especially in relation to
persuasion are likely to pursue it in the Council. Even eignty. As the 'realities' of membership began to
if they themselves do not wish to be too rigid, they through, however, both public opinion and party
may well be forced, by electoral considerations and tudes began to change. So much so that by the
domestic pressures, to strike postures and make a 1990s Greece had become one of the more
public display of not being pushed around. For exam- tic member states in terms of public opinion
ple, Irish and French governments invariably favour 'typical' one in terms of the attitudes of its
generous settlements for farmers, Danish and German parties, whilst Denmark and the UK,
governments press for strict environmental controls, the slow stream, were not lagging as far
and CEEC governments argue for increased cohesion formerly they had been.
operations to enable them to modernise their Apart from their interactive relationship
economies. attitudinal climate in which EU processes work,
ical parties also feed directly into EU de<:ision··m;,kiJ
First, by providing much of the ideological base
policies of governments and most, if not all,
Political Parties leading personnel of governments, they do
determine and shape the attitudes, priorities
Political parties normally wish to exercise power, stances of the member states in the Council. While
which in liberal democratic states means they must be true that many policy positions are barely altered
able to command popular support. This in turn means changes of government, shifts of emphasis do
they must be able to articulate and aggregate national and these can be significant, as was delmonstratedl
opinions and interests. At the same time, parties are Poland after the November 2007 election when
not normally content simply to act as mirror images of Law and Justice party headed government led by
the popular will. Drawing on their traditions, and somewhat Eurosceptic Prime Minister,
guided by leaders and activists, they also seek to direct Kaczyriski was defeated by the Civic Platform
society by mobilising support behind preferred ideo- headed coalition led by the more Euro-friendly,
logical/policy positions. Judgements thus have to be predictable, Donald Tusk. Second, even when
made about the balance to be struck between 'reflect- domestic opposition political parties can . seemin
ing' society and 'leading' it. Those parties which lean government behaviour in the Council because larger'
too much towards the latter have little chance of rnents do not wish to be accused of being weak or
winning elections, although in multi-party systems strongly defending national interests. Third,
-~

\I
,
-1 ,, parties are the main contestants in the greater desire to be active, across the policy spectrum
elections and their successful candidates than do smaller states. Another reason is that the
\,
i
the national representatives in the EP. larger states have greater power resources to display
and deploy in policy-making processes. Some of these
resources emanate from the EU's institutional struc-
ture, with larger states having greater voting weight
than smaller states in a number of institutions, notably
the Council of Ministers, and the EP. Other power
';mreith,,, by themselves or through an appropriate resources stem from the larger states having greater
rogr0l1p, national sectional and promotional international political, economic, administrative and other
a number of possible avenues available to resources to bring to and employ in ED policy deliber-
to try to influence ED policies and decisions. ations and negotiations. To take just administrative
avenues are at the domestic leVel, such as resources, larger states have many more officials avail-
lrmlCh,es through fellow national MEPs, govern- able to sit on expert committees adVising the
officials, and ministers. Others are at the EU Commission, to attend Council working partles, and
such as using contacts in the Commission and to prepare for COREPER and ministerial meetings.
These avenues were discussed in some detail in The reform of the Stability and Growth Pact
14, so will not be repeated here. between 2003 and 2005, which is described in Chapter
very general terms, the most successful national 19, provides an example of large state power. In
tend to fulfil at least one of two conditions. essence what happened was that when a number of
are able to persuade their government that small states, incll1ding Ireland and Portugal, began to
is little distinction between the interests' aims experience difficulties in the early 2000s in meeting
nal,jOloaL aims. Or they have sufficient power and the budgetary terms of the Pact they were successfully
,rrrLatJ,on resources to persuade at least some EU pressurised by the Commission to initiate reforms to
siOJ1-tJ"kers that they ought to be listened to. A bring them 'back in line'. But when, from 2003, France
reason why farmers have been so influential is and Germany began to experience similar problems,
of these conditions have applied to them in the Commission ms less successful and France and
countries. In France, Portugal, Ireland, and e!se- Germany were able to drive through, against the
this has resulted in Ministries of Agriculture Commission's wishes, a revision of the SGP rules.
that a major part of their responsibility in Foreign and defence policies provide another illus-
~0;un':i1 is to act virtually as a spokesman for the tration of large state power. These are policy areas
where operational capabilities - of various forms, but
especially, diplomatic, economic and military - are
crucial if policy is to be effective, so it is no surprise
that the key member state actors in these areas have
, ich States Exercise Most been France, Germany, and the UK: the member states
nee? with the greatest range of overseas interests, contacts
and missions, and the largest military dispositions.
above sections of the chapter have shown, However, although it is certainly true that in
states have many opportunities to feed into general terms the larger states exercise more influ-
processes and playa part in influencing ence in the EU than do the smaller states, the gener-
roLotcom,es.This is so at virtually all policy stages: alisation requires some important clarifications and
setting, policy formulation, decision negotiat- qualifications.
Qe':lSHJil-ta>Jll!;, and implementation. First, EU politics have never assumed a large states
which states exercise most influence? The versus small states character, except when institutional
obvious answer to this question "is that the issues have been the subject under consideration in
do. One reason for the seemingly obvious recent IGCs. As was intimated in the discussion of
of this answer is that the larger states have a national orientations and approaches at the beginning
range of policy interests, and therefore also a of this chapter, policy cleavages between ED member
274 I The Institutions and Political Adors
The positions of France, Germany and the UK on key EU issues

Issue France Germany UK
'Vision' Qf-the ,nature A strongly structured A strongly structured

o/the EU regional organisation of _ regional organisation of
states. , states.
spheres,
How should EU A mix of Amixof On an
decisions be made? intergovernmental and intergovernmental and
supra~atiOlia1 ptocesses supranationa! processes
is"'ac~epted. is aceepte<i.
How 'liberal' (non- Strong supporter ofEU Strong supporter of EU
interventioll;st) should policies bolstering-'the policies bolstering 'the
EU economic pnd European socia! model'. Europeansoeial model', on
social policy be? Direct Bta,te' is
subsidisation of
'national' -companies
acceptable in some
circumstances.
What should be the size AS -a net contributpt, As a il~f contributor,- Supports a
0/ the EU's budget? wants-to see a small wahts to see a small budget.
budget, but not so budget.
small as to endanger
cAP support for
French agriculture.
What should be the The CAP should The CAP should
EU's_spendillg prim-hies? remain a central plank contin!le:t9:b~_an- _
of the EU's budget. iinportant'coinp-oneh~
ofthe EU's blldget, but
could be. reduced.
Hmv illdepenae}1t should The AtlanticAlliance is MidCwaybetweeri the

EU foreign and defence importa)}t, but theEU French and British
policies be ofthe Atlantic should be moie .positions.
Alliance? independent from the
USAwithln it . . US.
811m ddtl1e BUcomintie Only cautiously, and Yes, but not to TurkeY. Yes, including to
to enlarge? not to Turkey. Turkey
have tended to be cross-cutting rather than

mulative. A consequence of this has been that
there have been differences within the EU over
matters, the larger member states have rarely
Reasons why smaller states are
to exercise a disproportionate.
!abl~~
nstituted a bloc: It is true that over the years France
\ Germany have worked closely with one another influence in EU policy processes
number of matters, but even during the heyday
ln internal so-called Franco-German axis in the 1980s and • Theyare over-represented in EU policy-making
with they sometimes parted company on policy institutions. This is most manifest in their being
mental . Moreover, they never brought the other two one Commissioner for each member state, the
in some member states of the 'big four' - Italy and the voting weights in the Council, and the national
alicy - into their mini-club. The simple fact is that, as representations in the EP.
all member states, there are significant policy • They are advantaged by the continuity of the
'erenc,,, between the large member states. Box availability of the veto in the Council in certain
illustrates this by outlining the general orienta- very importantpolicy areas,
of France, Germany and the UK on a number of • They are advantaged by the prevailing norm in
EU matters: these orientations shape the posi- the Council whereby, even when QMV is
taken by the member states in a wide range of available, the member states always try to
circumstances. accommodate national interests.
if attention is switched to the power exer- • They have fewer positions than large states on
by the 'big four' on an individual basis, there are which they wish to take strong stands. This
differences between them concerning both the enables them to focus their political and
they have exercised in' the EU as a whole and the administrative resources on a relatively limited
they have exercised in particular policy areas. number of issue areas and enables them also to
the power they have exercised as a whole, it argue more effectively that important national
np')sSJDle to be precise about this but almost what- interests really are at stake when strong stands
are taken it is clear that Italy has not are adopted.
as heavily as the other three. The reasons for
much debated, but certaiuly include the
of weak andlor unstable Italian govern- states exercising disproportionate influence are not
and the perceived lack of credibility of certain surprising given national policy interests and priori-
leaders. Regarding the varying power the big ties. So, Luxembourg has been an important policy
exercised in particular policy areas, France player in the field Qf financial services, Cyprus has
especially Germany have done much to set been so in respect of maritime transport (it has the
and direction of EMU from its first stages, third largest flagged fleet of all EU states), and Greece
has been to the fore in ensuring the CAP and Ireland have in the area of the cohesion funds,
to occupy a central policy position, and the Other examples are, however, a little more surprising, '
been very influential in pressing that the For example, Peter Viggo Jakobsen (2009) has shown
"C""~'H on opening-up the internal market is that Nordic states have exercised a major influence on
the 'civilian' aspect of ESDP. Jakobsen concedes that
smaller states are not without opportunities Nordic pressures to advance the civilian ESDP have
power and influence. Indeed, Javier Arregui been assisted by not being resisted by the 'big three'
Thomson (2009)) suggest they exercise an ESDP players - France, Germany, and the UK - but,
ili' EU negotiations that is disproportionate nonetheless, the fact is that the Nordics have been to
size. The reason suggested for this is that, as the fore in advancing, and participating in, this
shows, a number of factors in the EU's insti- increasingly important dimension of EU external
and policy-making systems work to the policy.
of small states. That smaller states are capable of exercising power
of the examples that can be cited of small and influence - be it by striking strong positions on
276 I The Institutions' and Political Actors
particular issues, by being part of 'winning coalitions: work it is vital that national views and re'juireI1
or by contributing to the creation of consensual agree- should be able to be articulated and i'rlwrpo,rat,ec
ments -, is crucial to the effectiveness and internal policy processes, for ultimately the EU exists to
harmony of the EU. For the EU is an organisation that the interests of those who live in the member
states join because they judge there is more to be the citizens of the states and, more Darti,;uLarh
gained than is lost from being a member, Were a political elites in governments and pairllalm"nts vi,
member state to find its interests constantly being feel that the EU was no longer serving that
denied and overridden, the rationale for membership then there would be no reason for continued
would come to be questioned, disillusionment would ship. The member states, in short, need to have
set in, and the state in question would likely come to dence in the EU. The EU must therefore be
be a very awkward and disruptive partner. 'Prizes for to its constituent parts.
everyone' is a key operational principle of the EU. There is an emerging body of evidence to '
that these constituent parts are becoming'
similar in the nature of their inputs into the
the way they handle EU business. Though, as has
Concluding Remarks shown in this and earlier chapters, there stilI are
significant differences between the member
This chapter has shown the many different sorts of both these counts, convergences are
inputs that are made into EU processes by the member apparent. This is particularly the case in
states, The existence of these different and hequently policy inputs, but there are also signs of some .
. conflicting inputs present potential obstacles in the tional fusiod. Such convergences can be exjJecte,
way of the realisation of a smooth, efficient and deci- increase as the ED and national levels become
sive EU policy-making machinery, But, if the EU is to more enmeshed.

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Nugent, N. (2010) The Member states.

Chapter 15. In, The Government and politics

\ he EU exists first and foremost to further the interests of its member

T states. It is, therefore, hardly snrprising that, as previous chapters of this

Key information on EU member states

Population I Surface area Size of GDpl GDP per capita

82.2 357.0 2,238,507 116.1

shown in Chapter 8, the system of appoint-

The tack of an authoritative coordinating centre: I

doubted whether the referendums listed in Table 15,2

15.1 Referendums in member states on EC/EU issues·

country Subject of referend um Referendum

France Ratification of EU enlargement Yes

The Member States I 273

The positions of France, Germany and the UK on key EU issues

'Vision' Qf-the ,nature A strongly structured A strongly structured

Hmv illdepenae}1t should The AtlanticAlliance is MidCwaybetweeri the

have tended to be cross-cutting rather than

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