De Ocampo vs.

Florenciano
107 Phil 35

FACTS: Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several
children who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that
his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he
sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again
plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952,
when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June
1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified
his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided
she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal
separation in 1955.

ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment
disallowed by the Family Code.

HELD: Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the
existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment
disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a
confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent
of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be
granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the
plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession. The
petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.

Fujiki v. Marinay, 2013

In 2004, Fujiki (Japanese) married Marinay in Pasay. Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides because the marriage did not sit well with his parents. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
In 2008, Marinay met Maekara (another Japanese). In that same year, without the first marriage
being dissolved, they got married in QC. Maekara brought her to Japan. She allegedly suffered
physical abuse because she concealed from him the fact that she was previously married. She left
him and started to contact Fujiki. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court
in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
In 2011, Fujiki filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (Decree of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage) in RTC QC which dismissed the same, grounded on lack of personality to sue and
improper venue.
On appeal via Rule 45, the SC held that:
1. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment. He
has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it.
2. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy.
3. The recognition of the foreign judgment before the RTC may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
SC reversed RTC QC and ordered it to reinstate the petition for further proceedings. #barops 10

Carlos vs Abelardo
Carlos vs. Abelardo
GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002

FACTS: Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the
$25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when
the petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life
independently. The seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July 1991, the
petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the spouses pleaded that they
were not yet in position to make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent
resistance to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a
formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation. The spouses were separated in
fact for more than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses filed separate answers.
Abelardo contended that the amount was never intended as a loan but his share of income on
contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted
the debt from his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA
reversed and set aside trial court’s decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a
check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal
dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did
not sign.

ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the conjugal
partnership.

HELD: Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served
as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally liable
in the payment of the loan. Abelardo’s contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the
construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will
entitle him to the profits and income of the company.

Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of
$25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

MALLILIN JR. V CASTILLO

G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000 [Article 148-Property Regime of Bigamous Marriage]

FACTS: Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective marriage still subsisted. During
their union, they set up Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. The business flourished and
the couple acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in Castillo's name. Due
to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Mallilin filed a complaint for partition and/or
payment of Co-ownership share, accounting and damages against Castillo. Castillo, in her answer,
alleged that co-ownership could not exist between them because according to Article 144 of the Civil
Code, rules on co-ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living
together as husband and wife but not married, they are not capacitated to marry each other because
of their valid subsisting marriage. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real and personal
properties involved in Mallilin's action of partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely out
of her own money and registered solely in her name.

ISSUE: Whether or not co-ownership exists between them.

RULING: Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are incapacitated
to marry each other. Article 144 of the Civil Code does not cover parties living in an adulterous
relationship. Their property regime falls under Article 148 of the Family Code where co-ownership is
limited, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof
to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.

Valdes vs RTC
260 SCRA 221

FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings
are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation
of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed
a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if
said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

PACETE vs. CARIAGA

231 SCRA 321

FACTS:The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the CFI of Cotabato, Branch I, gravely
abused its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file their answer and in
declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision of which, among other things, decreed
the legal separation of petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private respondent Concepcion Alanis and
held to be null and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita de la Concepcion.
Concepcion Alanis filed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband
Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation and accounting
and separation of property. She averred that she was married to Pacete on 30 April 1938 and they
had a child named Consuelo. She learned that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage
with Clarita de la Concepcion. She and Pacete acquired vast property that he fraudulently placed the
several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita
and other “dummies;”
After having been summoned, the defendants repeatedly asked the court for extension of filing for an
answer which eventually resulted to being declared in default. Five months after the petition was filed
the court granted the issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation and declared the properties in
question as conjugal properties of Alanis and Pacete which were ordered forfeited in favor of Alanis.
The court also nullified his marriage to Clarita.

ISSUE:Whether or not the court gravely abused its discretion in deciding the case.

HELD:No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. If the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if there is
no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for
legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the
petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court
should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The decision of the lower court was nullified.

JOHNSON AND JOHNSON vs. CA AND PINTUAN

G.R. No. 102692, 23 September 1996

FACTS:

Delilah Vinluan purchased products from petitioner for her retail business under the name of “Vinluan
Enterprises” incurring an obligation of P235,880.89 for which she issued seven checks of varying
amounts and due dates that bounced and were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient
funds. Partial payments were made after several demands. When no further payments were made
to settle the obligation, J&J filed a complaint against the spouses for collection of the principal
obligation plus interest with damages.
RTC rendered decision in favor of J&J and found that there was no “privity of contract between J&J
and defendant husband Alejo Vinluan regarding the obligations incurred by the wife”. Husband was
made a co-owner of the enterprise after the obligation involved in this action has been incurred. The
court then issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to execute judgment on the properties of the
wife.
The notices of levy on execution covered not only her exclusive paraphernal properties but also the
properties of the conjugal partnership of the spouses. This led the husband to file a third-party claim
seeking the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties. Trial court denied the third-party claim since
Alejo’s consent became evident when he did not seek the intervention of the Court to air his
objections in his wife’s engaging business coupled by the fact that he made several representations
for the settlement of his wife’s account. Thus, even his capital may be liable aside from the conjugal
and paraphernal property.

ISSUE:Can the husband be held liable for the debts incurred by his wife?

HELD:SC held that respondent court correctly ruled that the trial court cannot, in the guise of deciding
the third-party claim, reverse its final decision. Only the wife and her paraphernal property can be
held liable. And since the power of the execution of judgment extends only to properties belonging to
the judgment debtor alone, the conjugal property and the capital of the husband cannot be levied
upon. In any event that Delilah’s paraphernal properties are insufficient, in order to bind the conjugal
partnership properties, the debts and obligations contracted by either the husband or the wife must be
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and that the husband must consent to his wife’s engaging in
business.
The respondent court already found that the husband did not give his consent neither did the
obligation incurred by the wife redound to the benefit of the family. Therefore, the conjugal property
cannot be held liable for the debts

BPI vs. POSADAS

56 Phil 215

FACTS:BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased Adolphe Schuetze, appealed to CFI Manila
absolving defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from the complaint filed against him in recovering
the inheritance tax amounting to P1209 paid by the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda de Schuetze, under
protest, and sum of P20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance policy of the deceased.
Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The wife was actually residing and living in
Germany when Adolphe died in December 1927. The latter while in Germany, executed a will in
March 1926, pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir. The deceased
possessed not only real property situated in the Philippines but also personal property consisting of
shares of stocks in 19 domestic corporations. Included in the personal property is a life insurance
policy issued at Manila on January 1913 for the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life Assurance Company
of Canada, Manila Branch. In the insurance policy, the estate of the deceased was named the
beneficiary without any qualification. Rosario is the sole and only heir of the deceased. BPI, as
administrator of the decedent’s estate and attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having been demanded by
Posadas to pay the inheritance tax, paid under protest. Notwithstanding various demands made by
plaintiff, Posadas refused to refund such amount.

ISSUE:Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance.

HELD:SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured’s estate, on
which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and
belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the premiums were
paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion
paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the
insured’s estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as part
of the assets of said estate under probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according
to the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured
was domiciled in these Islands or outside.
Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff one-half of the tax collected upon the
amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium.

WONG vs IAC
200 SCRA 792

FACTS:Romarico Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even
during the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living separately.
During the marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from
his father using the money borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an
agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at
P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the same within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded
payment of their value. Katrina issued in September 1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored
due to lack of funds.
The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against
Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina.
Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in
Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold
at public auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such
redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of
execution.

ISSUE:Could the debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband be satisfied through the
conjugal property?

HELD:The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with
Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to
enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof
where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the
conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the husband and even
though they had been living separately.
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support of
the family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution of judgments
extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot
answer for Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her
husband nor they did redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that
the administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said
obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as Romarico and the
conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina, personally
and exclusively.

JUANIZA vs. JOSE

89 SCRA 306, 30 March 1979

FACTS:Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an
accident of collision with a freight train of the PNR that took place in November 1969 resulted in the 7
deaths and 5 physical injuries of its passengers. That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but had
been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband and wife. Trial
court decision rendered them jointly and severally liable to pay damages to the heir of the deceased,
Victor Juaniza. A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for the decision to be reconsidered.

ISSUE:Are Eugenio and Rosalia co-owners of the jeepney?

HELD:The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when the parties are not incapacitated to
marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership with the lawful wife.
The common-law wife not being the registered owner cannot be held liable for the damages caused
by its operation. There is therefore no basis for her liability in the damages arising from the death of
and physical injuries suffered by the passengers.

TUMLOS vs FERNANDEZ
GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000

FACTS: Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against
Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the
absolute owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to
occupy the apartment for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma
will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not
complied with. Demand was made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they
are in need of the property for the construction of a new building.
Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they
acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived together in
the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered
the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to
the annulment of their marriage.

ISSUE:Is Guillerma a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.

HELD:SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property. The
claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence presented to
validate it except for the said affidavit.
Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two children were true,
the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence
Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other.
The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code.
Actual contribution is required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in
the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the
acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not
included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.

DOCENA vs. LAPESURA

GR No. 140153, March 28, 2001

FACTS:Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land
against his lessees, petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The spouses claimed
ownership of the land based on the occupation since time immemorial. The petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in
issuing orders and that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition. CA dismissed the petition on the
ground that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided in the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure and that the certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by only one
of the petitioners.

ISSUE:Whether or not it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only
one of the petitioners.

HELD:In view of the property involved which is a conjugal property, the petition questioning the writ of
demolition thereof originated from an action for recovery brought against the spouses and is clearly
intended for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and the wife as point out was in the province of
Samar whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the rules on forum
shopping that would disauthorize a husband’s signing the certification in his behalf and that of his wife
is too harsh.
In the previous court rulings, certificate of non-forum shopping should be sign by all the petitioners in
a case. However, in the case at bar, such certificate signed by Antonio Docena alone should be
deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the rules. The two petitioners in this case are
husband and wife and their residence is the subject property alleged to be a conjugal property.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and wife
jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
required, joint management or administration does not require that the husband and wife always act
together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the
intervention of the court in proper cases.
Hence, petition is granted and the case is remanded to CA for further proceedings.

HONTIVEROS vs. RTC

GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999

FACTS:Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against
private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros who is the brother of Augusto, and Teodora Ayson. The
petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of
income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case.
In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was a
widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and
income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the
property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession.
Trial court denied petitioner’s motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged that earnest
efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.

ISSUE:Can the court validly dismiss the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a
compromise as stated in Article 151?

HELD:The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant
and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151.
Under this provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife,
parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or half-
blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this
jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as strangers to the
Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.

MANALO vs CA
GR No. 129242, January 16, 2001

FACTS:Troadic Manalo who died intestate on February 1992, was survived by his wife Pilar and his
11 children. The deceased left several real properties in Manila and a business in Tarlac. In
November 1992, herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a petition with RTC Manila for
the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for appointment of their brother Romeo
Manalo as administrator thereof. Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and the herein petitioners
were granted 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
The only issue raised by petitioners is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the
outright and to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family
have been made prior to the filing of the petition but that the same have failed.

ISSUE:Is the case at bar covered by Article 151 where earnest efforts toward compromise should first
be made prior the filing of the petition?

HELD:It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments and the character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be controlling.
The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement and
distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary
civil action.
The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. It is clear from the term “suit”
that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in
which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or
enforcement of a right. It is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the Report of
the Code Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions.
The petition for issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a special
proceeding and as such a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right,
or a particular fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such
case for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was pronounced therein.

ALBANO VS. GAPUSAN

A.M. No. 1022-MJ, 7 May 1976

FACTS:Redentor Albano filed a case for malpractice against Judge Gapusan for having prepared and
notarized a document providing for the personal separation of Sps. Valentina Andres and Guillermo
Maligta and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership five years before his appointment
to the bench. It was stipulated in that document that if either spouse should commit adultery or
concubinage, as the case may be, then the other should refrain from filing an action against the other.
Respondent Judge denied that he drafted the said agreement and explained that the spouses had
been separated for a long time when they signed it and the wife had begotten children with her
paramour. He further added that there was a stipulation in the said agreement that the spouse would
live together in case of reconciliation. His belief was that the separation agreement forestalled the
occurrence of violent incidents between the spouses. Albano in filing the malpractice charge is in
effect asking the Court to take belated disciplinary action against Judge Gapusan as a member of the
bar or as a notary.
ISSUE:Whether or not Judge Gapusan should be disciplined for notarizing the void agreement
between the spouses.

Held:There is no question that the covenants contained in the said separation agreement are contrary
to law, morals and good customs. Those stipulations undermine the institutions of marriage and the
family. “Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. The family is a basic social
institution which public policy cherishes and protects.”
To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void any contract for
personal separation between husband and wife and every extrajudicial agreement, during the
marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership”.
A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership.
Gapusan as a member of the bar should be censured for having notarized the void separation
agreement already mentioned. However, his notarization of that document does not warrant any
disciplinary action against him as a municipal judge (he was appointed in 1946 as justice of the
peace) especially considering that his appointment to the judiciary was screened by the Commission
on Appointments.

MONDEQUILLO vs. BREVA

No. 86355, May 31, 1990

FACTS:The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur
on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A motion to quash
was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since
1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that
the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated.
With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in
his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The
residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.

ISSUE:Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

HELD:The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken.
Article 162 of the Family Code, provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing
family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153
shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of
the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded
to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment was
incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from
execution provided in the FC.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever
rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed.

MANACOP vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992

FACTS:Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a
bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a
deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz
& Co).
The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against the house of the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional
remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the
Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a
family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from
attachment.

ISSUE:Whether or not the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

HELD:The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under
Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is
therefore not exempt form attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.