Catalan vs.

CA
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,

Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America
and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas
and Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando
married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Contending that said marriage was
bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against
Orlando and Merope. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause
of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied. Trial on the
merits ensued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has legal personality to file the petition for nullity of marriage between
Orlando and Merope

RULING:

Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of
the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the
same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and
the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio. On the contrary, if it is proved that
a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court
must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner
Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same. The case was remanded to the trial
court for its proper disposition.

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married,
or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare
the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate “proper interest” can file the
same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interestand must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in
Niñal v. Bayadog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition
to declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights. Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now
specifically provides: a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.
 LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 112019. January 4, 1995

Facts:

Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986. A year after the marriage, the
couple when quarreling over a number of things including the interference of Julia’s
parents into their marital affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia finally left for the United States.
Leouel was then unable to communicate with her for a period of five years and she had
then virtually abandoned their family. Leouel filed a case for nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the grounds of psychological incapacity in this case should be appreciated.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. The psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated and must be incurable. Mere abandonment cannot therefore qualify as
psychological incapacity on the part of Julia.
 CHI MING TSOI, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 119190. January 16, 1997

Facts:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were married as evidence by their
marriage contract. From May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there
was no sexual contact between them. Gina made attempts for sexual activity to no avails.
Medical examinations showed that both Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were capaple of sexual
conduct. Gina was still a virgin at the time of the medical examination. Gina filed a motion
for declaration of nullity and the Trial Court declared their marriage as void. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi subsequently filed a
motion to the Supreme Court citing that it was she and not he that had the problem
regarding sexual intimacy.

Issue:

Whether or not non-desire of sexual consumation be an indicator of psychological

incapacity?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court found the petition to be bereft of merit. Since the action to declare
the marriage void may be filed by either party, the question of who refuses to have sex
with the other becomes immaterial. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply
refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Aligned with this is the essential marital obligation, “the
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.

After ten months of marriage, the reluctance to perform the sexual act was indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the
Family Code.
Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got
married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both
as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his
money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their
relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio
City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned
them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet
the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s
action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise
grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she
and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as
psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in
this case:
 burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
 root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the
essentials of marital obligations of marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be
respected
 court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of
the state.
Case Digest: Marcos v. Marcos (GR No. 136490)

Facts:

Petitioner and respondent were married and were both members of the Philippine Army. After the
EDSA revolution, they requested for separation from service. From the time they got separated
from service, Wilson never engaged in any gainful employment. He would beat her up whenever he
is told to look for some. He would also force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also beat their children. They lived separately since 1992.

On October 16, 1994, they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not
want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so
angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on
her mother who came to her aid.

On August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in
Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the
reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even beat her driver.

Brenda filed a petition for nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity. Only her underwent a
psychological evaluation. During the trial, the petitioner presented the psychological report, the
testimonies of their children, her sister and social worker.

Brenda‘s petition was granted by the RTC but was reversed by the Court of Appeals, saying that
respondent‘s incapacity was not medically and clinically established. Hence, this petition.

In this petition, petitioner contends that the personal medical or psychological examination of
respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.

Issue:

Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough o sustain a finding of respondent‘s
psychological incapacity.

Ruling:

No. The totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity. The guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition.
REPUBLIC v. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, GR No. 149498, 2004-05-20

Facts:

On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan.
They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for
half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their... child.

On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married

Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities,
which incapacity became manifest only after the... marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After
sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him
several times but he never... responded.

respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her
and their child.

Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons
by publication.

On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero- Hamano and
Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to
the Court of Appeals but the same was denied

Issues:

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of
Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations,

Ruling:

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[11] Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the... marriage.

Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He
abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he
never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to... see his family.

We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio's act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of... psychological illness. After
respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that
his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
LEONILO ANTONIO v. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, GR NO. 155800, 2006-03-10

Facts:

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent
was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married

Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,[7] petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null
and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the... essential obligations of
marriage. He asserted that respondent's incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present.[8]

As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that

respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things,... (1) She concealed the fact that she
previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,[10] and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as
the adopted child of her family.

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her
when in fact, no such incident occurred.

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician... and told some of her friends
that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.[13]

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording
Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group.

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent
lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it
appear that she earned a higher income.

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates
to monitor his whereabouts.

In support of his petition, petitioner presented

, a psychiatrist

, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy and... conservative type of person.

On the other hand, they observed that respondent's persistent and constant lying to petitioner
was abnormal or pathological.
They further... asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological.

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held that respondent's
propensity to lying about almost anything-her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and
her income, among others-had been duly established. According to the trial court,...
respondent's fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live
in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.[36]

The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the
Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the... totality of the evidence presented was insufficient
to establish respondent's psychological incapacity.

Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this
Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent's psychological
incapacity.

Issues:

petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

Ruling:

he factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to
dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered... that respondent had
consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity,
consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina... guidelines.

the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of
his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his
allegations on his wife's behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and... the Philippine
Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent's claims pertinent to her alleged singing
career.

Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the
trial court's decision.

Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time
of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she... kept petitioner in the dark
about her natural child's real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the
truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had
shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the... exasperated petitioner left his wife.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual... help and support.
As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able
to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that
the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church.

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court,
but also by canonical bodies.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological
incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her,
desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive... jealousy.
From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent's condition is incurable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

JOCELYN M. SUAZO v. ANGELITO SUAZO, GR No. 164493, 2010-03-10

Facts:

Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met

After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends... gone for
three days... their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and... after finding them, brought
them back to Biñan, Laguna

Jocelyn and Angelito's marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a
ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Biñan

Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito's parents after their marriage

They had by this time stopped schooling.

Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelito's relatives as household help

Angelito... refused to work... and was most of the time drunk

Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyn's
efforts

Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987... found another woman with whom he has since
lived. They now have children.

Ten years after their separation... or on October 8, 1997

Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code

Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential... obligations of

marriage... from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987... relationship
had been marred with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains
on the part of the plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries... main reason for
their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or his indolence and his
excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the... psychological incapacity of
the defendant started from the time of their marriage and became very apparent as time
went and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable

Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a
psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag... case proceeded to trial on the
merits after the trial court found that no collusion existed between the parties

Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial.

The Office of the Solicitor General - representing the Republic of the Philippines - strongly
opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage... it argued that the
psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus,... what she said about him was purely
hearsay.

RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:... there is no particular instance
setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be considered as psychologically incapacitated,
there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a person to be unfit to comply with
his marital obligation... evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the
petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one thing - that the petitioner failed to establish a
harmonious family life with the respondent... respondent has not shown love and respect
to... the petitioner manifested by the former's being irresponsible, immature, jobless,
gambler, drunkard and worst of all - a wife beater... petitioner... decided, after one year and
four months of messy days,... to leave the respondent.

petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her married life with the respondent,
she already suffered from maltreatment... she is a battered wife coupled with the fact that
she served as a servant in his (sic) husband's... family.

Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] the RTC concluded:

The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist' testimony quoted
above] would only tend to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from
psychological incapacity which is not only grave but also incurable.

applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268
SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court held that

The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and

Nedy Tayag... ttesting that there is psychological incapacity on the part of the... respondent
to comply with the essential marital obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and,
therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.

The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that:

True, as stated in

Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and
Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated.

Supreme Court adopted... the totality of evidence approach which allows the fact of
psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that medically or clinically identify the
root causes of the illness

Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse, children,
relatives and the social worker were not found to be sufficient to prove psychological
incapacity, in... the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the person whose
mental and psychological capacity was in question.

In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was
psychologically incapable

Only the wife gave first-hand... testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is
inconclusive... n Marcos, the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the
family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were...
manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified

The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social
personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate
medical or... clinical investigation

Pesca vs Pesca 356

SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on
the part of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage... the respondent
was not under a permanent compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to...
engage in productive work and more stable relationships with another

The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the defining characteristic of

psychological incapacity is not present.

the married life of the petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage
cannot for this reason be extinguished

Issues:

whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyn's marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Ruling:

We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting
aside the RTC decision

The Law, Molina and Te

Article 36 of the Family Code... feature of this law is its intended open-ended application

We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological incapacity was
shaped and developed in jurisprudence

Santos v. Court of Appeals... psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity;

(b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability

The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the
law in Republic v. Court of Appeals[11] (Molina)
(1)

The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff

Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity

(2)

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision

(3)

The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must... also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist... under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical... antecedence, and incurability can
be duly established.

Pesca v. Pesca

Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending, under the reasoning that the
court's interpretation or construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of
the law
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.

Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that, following
Antonio v. Reyes

The need for the examination... of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist
and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the
pre-trial conference.

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals... emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony

to establish the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage.

Ting v. Velez-Ting... gravity and incurability requisites

The Present Case... a. The Expert Opinion Evidence

Both the psychologist's testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show
the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito's alleged psychological condition.

the psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological... condition only in an indirect manner -

she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her
cause cannot of course be doubted... finding is highly suspect, for it was based entirely on
Jocelyn's assumed knowledge of Angelito's family background and upbringing.

the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what extent was
Angelito's personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on
Angelito's awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of...
marriage.

b. Jocelyn's Testimony... we find Jocelyn's testimony to be insufficient

Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito's habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek

employment and the physical beatings she received from him - all of which occurred after
the marriage

This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially... affects her cause, as the law and its related
jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.

All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations
that, as the cited... jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of
psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.

violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity.

Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the
appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals
 CAMACHO- REYES V. REYES

G.R. No. 185286, [August 18, 2010]

FACTS:

Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the
Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. The casual
acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship.

At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s
good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not
even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.

Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology
from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and just continued
to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.

In 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and her father’s death, petitioner and
respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and
employed at the Population Center Foundation. Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the
respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by respondent’s
parents, and the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially,
respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary. When their first
child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses.
A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further,
respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough courage to
ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he had resigned due to
slow advancement within the family business. Respondent’s game plan was to venture into trading
seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant.
However, this new business took respondent away from his young family for days on end without
any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the situation will change. To
prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately
from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty.
While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of the household,
respondent’s business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro,
was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding the
family’s financial woes and further straining the parties’ relationship was the indifferent attitude
of respondent towards his family. That his business took him away from his family did not seem
to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in
Mindoro.

After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with
petitioner’s mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the
parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not
just financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that
time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner
or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing
with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.

In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond business stopped

operations. Although without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to
work for the family business. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair.
Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their family,
but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.

One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a surgical operation on
petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent
remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when
petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the
operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondent’s lack of concern, and asked her
mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.

Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage
encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled
counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the parties’
relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.

In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to
“determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning.” As with all other attempts to help
him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologist’s recommendation to
undergo psychotherapy. At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s
siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to
petitioner. With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did
respondent’s relationship with his children.

Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was psychologically
incapacitated. After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr.
Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC
granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of
their psychological incapacity. The CA reversed. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES/HELD:

Whether the respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. –YES.

Whether the marriage should be declared null and void under Art. 36. –YES.

RATIO:

Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity
in conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of
behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra.
Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court
finds that the marriage between the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed
“psychological incapacity” which pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function
emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential duties to
mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support, (Art. 68
Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of
respondent which created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest
doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.

The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that respondent is
suffering from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill
his basic duties to the marriage.

This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert
witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of
his structural constellation. It is beyond the respondent’s impulse control. In short, he is
weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply because he did
not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that nothing was
wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact,
with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to them by his original family
members to save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too insensitive to the reality of his marital
atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of petitioner who appeared to have been saturated
already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to
counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard position of the respondent finally constrained
her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the respondent were
unanimous that separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent
confirmed this stand of his siblings. As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in
diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder, to wit:

1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas

Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner] manifested
inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of
her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. [Respondent], on the other
hand, has manifested strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is suffering from a Personality
Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy along masculine
strivings and narcissistic features that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is characterized by his inability to conform to the
social norms that ordinarily govern many aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His being a
“free spirit” associated with no remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this
clinical condition. His prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are
external factors to boost his ego.

The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense mechanisms, or
the unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and closed
attachments to his mother encouraged cross identification and developed a severe

sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his
weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision making, aloofness
and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic supplies rendered by his
mother was not resolved (sic).

It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital demands
and stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in his psychological
development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It is
considered as severe in degree, because it hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal
functioning related to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied)

2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan

In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached
attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to a
low self-esteem, he tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association with others. He
feels that he is “different” and as a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of the discomfort
produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid personal and social involvement, which increases his
preoccupation with himself and accentuates his tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact.
[Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant partner. He feels better when he has to follow than
when he has to take the lead. A self-contained

person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in order to enjoy life and to be able to move
on. He has a small need of companionship and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels
uncomfortable in expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe
very angry within but he may choose to repress this feeling. [Respondent’s] strong need for social
approval, which could have stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes him submissive
and over [compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he]
already feels victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of
interpersonal conflicts. Despite his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of
indifference and disapproval [of] others. Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in
anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be repressed.

There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable tension
and anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining
feelings of hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air
but with no sound foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he will never be able to
attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and focusing on things
which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but he can’t accomplish anything because he is
unable to see which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is further aggravated by the lack of
support from significant others.

Diagnostic Impression

Axis I : Drug Dependence

Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder

[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]

Axis III : None

Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:

Severe He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to accomplish
anything; unable to give priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships.

Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning – Fair (Emphasis supplied)

3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno

Diagnosis for [petitioner]:

Axis I Partner Relational Problem

Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features

Axis III No diagnosis

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouse’s immaturity, drug abuse, and
infidelity)

Severity: 4-severe

Diagnosis for [respondent]

Axis I Partner Relational Problem

Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and dependent
features

Axis III No diagnosis

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)

Severity: 4 (severe)

[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic features
and aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render support for his spouse and children.
A personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over time.

From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and
[respondent is] null and void from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)

The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV), instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria for personality
disorders:

A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the
expectations of the individual’s culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the
following areas:

(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)

(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional response)

(3) interpersonal functioning

(4) impulse control

B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social
situations.

C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational
or other important areas of functioning.

D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to adolescence
or early adulthood.

E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of another
mental disorder.

F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of
abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of
a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a
personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering
that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent
consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke
credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.

In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents
(narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable
conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations.

In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his:

(1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the
family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.

In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we
find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.

OR
CASE DIGEST: SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, VS RAMON REYES
(EXPERT OPINION; HEARSAY EVIDENCE)

March 26, 2015

G.R. NO. 185286, AUGUST 18, 2010
SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, VS. RAMON REYES,
FACTS:
Marital difficulties, which mostly is due to the respondent’s actions, caused the petitioner to file a
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with the respondent alleging psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was psychologically
incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his
family—both as a spouse to petitioner and father to their children.

[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically

incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from
Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further,
clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality
Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be
suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.

The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the
ground of their psychological incapacity.
The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the RTC decision
and declared the parties’ marriage valid and subsisting. It held that the petitioner failed to
sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. It
held:

“In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quo’s findings regarding the [respondent’s] alleged
mixed personality disorder, his “come and go” attitude, failed business ventures,
inadequate/delayed financial support to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioner’s]
feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits, unfulfilled
promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed business activities, taking of
drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital
difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. [Respondent’s] “defects” were not present at the inception of marriage. They were even
able to live in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In
fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably and
[respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino households, but
the situation changed when [respondent] resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant
and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent]
has been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated
upon by the [petitioner].”
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct when it rejected the testimonies of Doctors
Magno and Villegas.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held:

Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors
Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and interviewed the
respondent.

We do not agree with the CA.

The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed
with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their
findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the
behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed
mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present
state of the parties’ marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly,
petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience, respondent’s
pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the
psychiatrist.

For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely on the
narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son,
siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of
respondent’s behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him.
These were also used as the basis of the doctors’ assessments.
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a
person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a
personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering
that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent
consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke
credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.

In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective
testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2)
these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing
the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid
money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has personality
disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages.
Indeed, a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a
finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties’ or both parties’
psychological incapacity.

In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual
antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to
the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations.

The respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to

perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-
marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6)
inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges
of estafa.
PETITION GRANTED.
 VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

Read the 2011 Kalaw v. Fernandez case digest HERE.

PONENTE: Bersamin, J.
TOPIC: Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
FACTS:
In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who
concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on
petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor,
going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity
of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form
of NPD.
However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint
for declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the
conclusion of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:
YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was
indeed psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with
regard to this case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in
this case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be
rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for
declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not
be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt
its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.”
Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that
no case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in
the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order
to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an
intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave,
antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be
considered
 We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection
can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void
ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be
personally examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that
adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence
showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in
the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in
interpreting such other evidence on the causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as
conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence
to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute
hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.

Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional

temperaments
The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it
was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the
psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and
respect.
The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a
merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as
inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said
experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent
within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the
two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and
should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s
factual premises.

The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the
psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of
marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having
the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties.”

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our
determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant
should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at
the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities,
she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong
sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral
fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely
impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children.
 The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did
not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them
to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every
occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs
for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental
development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on
November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the psychological incapacity of the
parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
TANI-DE LA FUENTE v. DE LA FUENTE
MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR.,respondent.
G.R. NO. 188400
March 08, 2017

Facts:
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got married in Mandaluyong
City after being in a relationship for five (5) years. They had two children.
While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and
was prone to jealousy. His attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. His jealousy became
so severe that he even poked a gun to his 15 year old cousin and he treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave
who made the latter feel maltreated and molested. Sometime in 1986, the couple quarreled because
Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a
gun at Maria Teresa's head. She left and never saw Rodolfo again after that, and supported their children
by herself.
On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. As support to her petitions,
clinical psychologist, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez was presented as an expert witness. However, Rodolfo did not
file any responsive pleading. The trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right
to present evidence.
Before the promulgation of its decision, on June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the
Solicitor General to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's formal offer of evidence. The Office of the
Solicitor General was also directed to submit its certification. The Office of the Solicitor General, however,
failed to comply with the trial court's orders; thus, the case was submitted for decision without the
certification and comment from the Office of the Solicitor General. On August 14, 2002, the trial court
promulgated its decision granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration. The
Office of the Solicitor General explained that it was unable to submit the required certification because it
had no copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes. It was also unable to inform the trial court of its
lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it was handling On September 13 2002, the trial court denied
the motion for reconsideration..
The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. It argued that the
trial court erred a) in deciding the case without the required certification from the Office of the Solicitor
General, 58 and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It
held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on insufficient data and did not follow the standards set forth in
the Molina case. Still, Rodolfo did not file any responsive pleading.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. In its resolution dated May 25, 2009, CA
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Maria Teresa.
On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. This time Rodolfo filed a
Comment 70 stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that there
is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as married."
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage.

Held:
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance
with Molina to warrant the nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to
discharge the burden of proof that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity. The Court of
Appeals is mistaken when it chided the lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez
since he had no chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental and
psychological condition.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not
automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist,
since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior
of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the
other.
Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent
may have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could not,
comply with the obligations expected of him as a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by
Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit that there
was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner when
she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a
doctor, and suggested couples counseling to respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts
at seeking professional help. Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.
Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner. He recommends that
the marriage be annulled.
Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his
wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his
depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost
cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she had
exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that there
was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and
perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that respondent's
mental illness is incurable.
The petition is granted.
REPUBLIC v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, GR No. 189538, 2014-02-10

Facts:

Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract... the assailed
Order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the

Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR)
as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married to a certain

Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know
the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing... officer; and, that the signature
appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before
Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly
celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical... distributor in Hansao Pharma.

she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she
was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House.

her name was... used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport.

Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who
confirmed that... the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the
alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent.

a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was... forged.
RTC granted petition

RTC rendered the assailed Decision

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there
was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall
within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and

(2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in
effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio

Issues:

whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the... marriage
may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Ruling:

We deny the petition.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects... the civil status, citizenship or nationality
of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.

Republic v. Valencia[19] in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial... errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the
parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.

An appropriate adversary suit or... proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed
and... considered.

as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the... appropriate adversary
proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not
the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In... other words, she claims that no such
marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be
recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was
married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She... then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the
marriage certificate.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage.
Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she
was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary... evidence clearly established
that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery.

in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the
trial court did not, in any way, declare... the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

Principles:

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects... the civil status, citizenship or nationality
of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.

Republic v. Valencia[19] in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial... errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the
parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.
TERRE v. TERRE
July 3, 1992 (A.M. No. 2349)

PARTIES:
Complainant: DOROTHY B. TERRE
Respondent: ATTY. JORDAN TERRE

FACTS:
On December 24, 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the
Philippine Bar with “grossly immoral conduct,” consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with
another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting No
judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior
marriage of respondent with complainant.

Respondent was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy by complainant. Dorothy Terre was then
married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo her first cousin, with this fact, Atty. Jordan Terre succesfully
convinced complainant that her marriage was void ab initio and they are free to contract marriage. In their
marriage license, despite her objection, he wrote “single” as her status. After getting the complainant
pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem
believing again that her previous marriage was also void ab initio.

ISSUE:
(1) WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent marriage

HELD:
Yes. The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the
first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant’s evidence as to the basic fact which underscores
that bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, the pretended defense is the same argument by
which he inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage or Merlito A. Bercenilla being
incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was
free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or
should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of the supreme Court
which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage , a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
ATIENZA v. BRILLANTES, Jr.

March 29, 1995 (A.M. No. MTJ-92-706)

PARTIES:

Complainant: LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA

Respondent: JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila

FACTS:

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge

Francisco Brillantes, Jr.

Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro with whom respondent Judge was

cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he

has 5 children. Respondent alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony (1965)

before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon

request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in

Manila. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Respondent claims that when he married De

Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents

and purposes that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Respondent

also argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his

first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second

marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

ISSUE:

WON Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.

HELD:

Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August

3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said

Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in

accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of

procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40

to his case.
CASE DIGEST: OFELIA P. TY v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES. G.R.
No. 127406; November 27, 2000.

This ruling may be compared with Montañes v. CA. Go to the following link for the case brief:
http://lawphils.blogspot.com/2017/05/montanes-vs-cipriano-gr-no-181089.html.

FACTS: In 1977, Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony. They had a church
wedding in the same year as well. In 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC
declared their marriage as null and void; the civil one for lack of marriage license and the
subsequent church wedding due to the lack of consent of the parties. In 1979, prior to the JDRC
of QC decision, Reyes married Ofelia. Then in 1991, Reyes filed for an action for declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Ofelia. He averred that they lack a marriage license at the time of the
celebration and that there was no judicial declaration yet as to the nullity of his previous
marriage with Anna. Ofelia presented evidence proving the existence of a valid marriage license
including the specific license number designated. The lower court however ruled that Ofelia’s
marriage with Reyes is null and void. The same was affirmed by the CA applying the provisions
of the Article 40 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Can the absolute nullity of the previous of marriage of Reyes be invoked
in the case at bar?

HELD: Article 40 of the Family Code provides, “The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”

This means that before one can enter into a second marriage he must first acquire
a judicial declaration of the nullity of the previous marriage and such declaration
may be invoked on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage as void. For purposes other than remarriage, other evidences may be
presented and the declaration can be passed upon by the courts. In the case at bar,
the lower court and the CA cannot apply the provision of the Family Code. Both
marriages entered by Reyes were solemnized prior to the Family Code. The old
Civil Code did not have any provision that states that there must be such a
declaration before remarriage can be done hence Ofelia’s marriage with Reyes is
valid. The provisions of the Family Code (which took effect in 1987) cannot be
applied retroactively especially because they would impair the vested rights of
Ofelia under the Civil Code which was operational during her marriage with
Reyes. GRANTED.
 SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts:

During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with
Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with
Susan Yee Carino with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In
1988, Santiago passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and
burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao
was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed
an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of
the latter with Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was solemnized without
the required marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay
Yee half of acquired death benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of
marriage license.

Ruling:

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino
was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at
bar, the marriage does not fall within any of those exceptions and a marriage license
therefore was indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is certified by the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the presumed
validity of the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot
stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree
of nullity of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The marriages
are bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. The decision of
the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.