The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations

Author(s): K. J. Holsti
Source: Background, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Feb., 1964), pp. 179-194
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3013644
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THE CONCEPT OF POWER IN THE STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

K. J. Holsti
University of British Columbia

Students of international politics have for years argued that the concept
of power can be used as a fruitful approach in studying processes in inter?
national systems. Unfortunately, there has been little systematic examinatio
of the concept so that, like the balance of power, its meaning has remained
ambiguous. Some have claimed that the concept can be used to analyze ever
major phenomenon in international politics. Others have defined power
roughly as a means to an end. Some use the term to denote a country'
military forces, but when used in this way they are really discussing only
a country's military capability and not the amount of influence the country
wields in the system.
Hans Morgenthau (1960) is the foremost advocate of the concept of
power as the theoretical core of international politics. In his view, all politics
is a struggle for power. He derives this dictum from the assumption that
the desire to dominate is "a constitutive element of all human associations."
Thus, regardless of the goals and objectives of government, the immediate
aim of all state action is to obtain and to increase power. Since by definition
all states seek to maximize their power, international politics can be con-
ceived of and analyzed as a struggle between independent units seeking
to dominate others.

Professor Morgenthau unfortunately fails to submit the concept of power

to further examination so that some ambiguity remains.1 He implies, for
example, that power is also a major goal of policy or even a determining
motive of any political action. Elsewhere, however, he suggests that power
is a relationship and a means to an end. Because of this ambiguity, we do not
know what the concept explains or fails to explain in international politics.
Does the term "struggle for power" shed light on the many processes that
go on within an international system? The word "struggle" certainly does
not tell us much about the relations between Norway and Sweden or between
Canada and the United States. Does the term "power," defined as the
immediate goal of all governments, explain the major external objectives
of Nicaragua or Chad or Switzerland?
In contrast to the "struggle for power" concept is the "anti-power
theory" of international relations. The proponents of this theory (including
Woodrow Wilson) claim that there is a distinction between "power politics"

aOther noteworthy proponents of the "power" theory of international relations

are Kalijarvi (1953), and Strausz Hupe and Possony (1950).

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and some other kind of politics. Not pessimists regarding human nature,
they assume that man is essentially tolerant and pacific and that the human
community is united through many bonds. Statesmen, they claim, have a
choice between practicing "power politics" and conducting foreign relations
by some other means. Wilson and others made the further assumption that
there is a correlation between a nation's social and political institutions and
the way it conducts its foreign relations. To them, autocracies which did not
consult "the people" usually engaged in deception, duplicity, and saber-
rattling. Democracies, on the other hand, displayed tolerance, morality, and
justice, and sought only peace and stability. In the new order which they
envisaged for the post World War I period, negotiations would replace
threats of war, and world-wide consensus on the desirability of peace would
sustain democratic statesmen. In other words, power politics was synonymous
with autocracy. But how democratic governments were supposed to achieve
their objectives is left unexplained.2 This view is also of limited use because
it is mostly prescriptive: it enunciates how international processes should
be carried on, but it fails to help us understand what actually occurs.

A third view of power is found in past and contemporary texts on

international relations. Authors present the student with a brief and formal
definition of power, often equating power with the physical assets a nation
possesses. Most texts, in fact, concentrate on the analysis of these assets
(often called the "elements of national power") without discussing the
actual relations between governments and the techniques by which these
assets are brought to bear on the pursuit of national objectives.

Should we not, however, define power in a way which best clarifies

what we observe and what we wish to know? A definition should suggest
areas of inquiry and reality, though no definition is likely to account for
the totality of the subject. Thus, one definition of the concept may be
useful for describing and analyzing social relations within a political party
or within a family, but it may not be useful for studying international
relations. Let us first describe an act which we conceive to be central to
the process of international politics; that is, the act or acts that A commits
toward B so that B pursues a course of behavior in accordance with A's
wishes. The act can be illustrated as follows:

*There is room for disagreement on this characterization of the Wilsonian theory

of power. Wilson was obviously aware of the role of power as military force and as
public opinion. His concept of collective security, where all peaceful nations would
band together to enforce the peace, implies that democracies no less than autocracies,
should use force when necessary.

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 infl uences

A seeks to influence B because it has established certain

be achieved (it is perceived) unless B (and perhaps
as well) does X. If this is an important act in inter
processes, we can see that it contains several elements:

1. Influence (an aspect of power) is essentially a me

governments or statesmen may seek influence for i
most it is instrumental, just like money. They use it p
goals, which may include prestige, territory, souls, raw
or alliances.

2. The act also implies a base of capabilities which the actor uses or
mobilizes to use in his efforts to influence the behavior of B. A capability
is any physical or mental object or quality available as an instrument of
inducement. The concept of capability may be illustrated in the following
example. Suppose an armed man walks into a bank and asks the clerk to
give him all her money. The clerk observes clearly that the man has no
weapons and refuses to comply with his order. The man has sought to
influence the behavior of the clerk, but has failed. The next time, however,
he walks in armed with a pistol and threatens to shoot if the clerk does not
give him the money. This time, the clerk complies. In this instance the
man has mobilized certain resources or capabilities (the gun) and has
succeeded in influencing the clerk to do as he wished. The gun, just like
a nation's military forces, is not synonymous with the act of influencing,
but it is the instrument that was used to induce the clerk to change her
behavior to comply with the robber's objectives.
3. The act of influencing B obviously involves a relationship between A
and B, though as we will see later, the relationship may not even involve
communication. If the relationship covers any period of time, we can also
say that it is a process.

4. If A can get B to do something, but B cannot get A to do a similar

thing, then we can say that A has more power than B vis a vis that action.
Power, therefore, is also a quantity. But as a quantity it is only meaningful
when compared to the power of others. Power is therefore relative.

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To summarize, then, power may be viewed from several aspects: it is a
means, it is based on capabilities, it is & relationship, and a process, and it
can also be a quantity.
But for purposes of analyzing international politics, we can break down
the concept of power into three separate elements: power is (1) the act
(process, relationship) of influencing other factors; (2) it includes the
capabilities used to make the wielding of influence successful; and (3) the
responses to the act. The three elements must be kept distinct.8 However,
since this definition may seem too abstract, we can define the concept also
in the more operational terms of policy makers. In formulating policy and
the strategy to achieve certain goals, they would explicitly or implicitly
ask the four following questions:
1. Given our goals, what do we wish B to do or not to do? (X)
2. How shall we get B to do or not to do X? (implies a relationship
and process)
3. What capabilities are at our disposal so that we can induce B to
do or not to do X?
4. What is B's probable response to our attempts to influence its
behavior?

Before discussing the problem of capabilities and responses we have to

fill out our model of the influence act to account for the many patterns
of behavior that may be involved in an international relationship. First,
as Singer (1963) points out, the exercise of influence implies more than
merely A's ability to change the behavior of B. Influence may also be seen
where A attempts to get B to continue a course of action or policy which
is useful to, or in the interests of, A. The exercise of influence does not
always cease, therefore, after B does X. It is often a continuing process
of reinforcing B's behavior. Nevertheless, power is "situational" to the
extent that it is exercised within a framework of goals.4
Second, it is almost impossible to find a situation where B does not
also have some influence over A. Our model has suggested that influence
is exercised only in one direction, by A over B. In reality, however, influence
is multilateral. State A, for example, would seldom seek a particular goal
unless it had been influenced in a particular direction by the actions of
other states in the system. At a minimum, there is the problem of feedback
in any relationship: if B complies with A's wishes and does X, that behavior
may subsequently prompt A to change its behavior, perhaps in the interest

aThe recent texts of Stoessinger (1961) and Schleicher (1962) distinguish

between the act and the capabilities involved in the act.

4State A might also wish state B to do w, y, and z, which may be incompatible

with the achievement of X.

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of B. Suppose, for example, that state A, after making threats, persuades B
to lower its tariffs on the goods of state A. This would seem to be influence
travelling only in one direction. But where state B does lower its tariffs,
that action may prompt state A to reward state B in some manner. The
phenomenon of feedback may be illustrated as follows:

infl uences
6

toldo told
/nf/"ence5 I'
Third, the number of times a state becomes involved in acts of influence
depends upon the general level of involvement of that particular actor in
the system. The first requisite for attempting to wield influence is a percep-
tion that somehow state B (or any other) is related to the achievement
of state A's goals and that there isy or will be, some kind of relationship
of interdependence. If the relationship covers only inconsequential matters,
few acts of influence may be necessary; but the greater the involvement of
an actor in the system, the greater the necessity to wield influence over
other actors. For example, except for limited trade relations, there is little
perception of interdependence between Iceland and Uganda, hence little
need for the government of Iceland to attempt to influence the domestic
or external policies of the African country.
Fourth, there is the type of relationship which includes what Herbert
Simon (1953) has called "anticipated reaction." This is the situation, fre-
quently found in international relations, where A might wish B to do X,
but does not try to influence B for fear that B will do Y instead, which is
an unfavorable response from A's point of view. In a hypothetical situation,
the government of India might wish to obtain arms from the United States
to build up its own defenses, but it does not request such arms because it
fears that the United States would insist on certain conditions for the sale
of arms which might compromise India's neutrality. This "anticipated
reaction" may also be multilateral, where A wishes B to do X, but will not
try to get B to do it because it fears that C, a third actor, will do Y, which
is unfavorable to A's interests. India wants to purchase American arms,
but does not seek to influence the United States to sell them for fear that
Pakistan (C) will then build up its own armaments and thus start an arms
race. In this situation, Pakistan (C) has influence over the actions of the

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Indian government even though it has not deliberately sought to influence
India on this particular matter or even communicated its position in any
way. The Indian government has simply perceived that there is a relatively
high probability that if it seeks to influence the United States, Pakistan will
react in a manner that is contrary to India's interests.
Fifth, power and influence may be measured quite objectively by scholars
and statesmen, but what is important in international relations is the
perceptions of influence and capabilities that are held by policy-makers.
The reason that governments invest millions of dollars for the gathering of
intelligence is to develop or have available a relatively accurate picture of
other states* capabilities and intentions. Where there is a great discrepancy
between perceptions and reality, the results to a country's foreign policy
may be disastrous. To take our example of the bank robber again, suppose
that the man held a harmless toy pistol and threatened the clerk. The clerk
perceived the gun to be real and hence complied with his demand. In this
case the robber's influence was far greater than the "objective" character
of his capabilities, and the distorted perception by the clerk led her to act
in a manner that was unfavorable to her and her employers.
Finally, as our original model suggests, A may try to influence B not
to do X. Sometimes this is called "negative" power, where A acts in a
manner to prevent a certain action it deems undesirable to its interests. This
is a very typical relationship and process in international politics. By signing
the Munich treaty, for example, the British and French governments hoped
to prevent Germany from invading Czechoslovakia: the Soviet government
by using a variety of instruments of foreign policy, has sought to prevent
West Germany from obtaining nuclear weapons; by organizing the Marshall
Plan and NATO, the United States sought to prevent the growth of com?
munism in western Europe and/or a Soviet military invasion of this area.

Capabilities
The second element of the concept of power consists of those capabilities
that are mobilized in support of the act of influencing. It is difficult to
understand how much influence an actor is likely to wield unless we also
have some knowledge of the capabilities that are involved.8 Nevertheless,
It is clear that in political relationships not everyone possesses equal
influence. We frequently use the terms "great powers" and "small powers"
as a shorthand way of suggesting that some actors make commitments

5We might assess influence for historical situations solely on the basis of whether
A got B to do X, without having knowledge of either A's or B's capabilities.
it should be acknowledged that social scientists do not understand all the
reasons why some actors?whether people, groups, governments, or states?
wield influence successfully, while others do not.

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abroad and have the capacity to mcet them that others lack. The distinction
between the "great powers" and the "small powers" is usually based on
some rough estimation of tangible and intangible factors which we have
called capabilities. In domestic politics it is possible to construct a lengthy
list of those capabilities and attributes which seemingly permit some to
wield influence over large numbers of people and over important public
decisions. Dahl (1961) lists such tangibles as money, wealth, information,
time, political allies, official position, and control over jobs, and such
intangibles as personality and leadership qualities. But not everyone who
possesses these capabilities can command the obedience or influence the
behavior of other people. What is crucial in relating capabilities to influence,
according to Dahl, is that the person mobilize these capabilities for his
political purposes, and that he possess skill in mobilizing them. A person
who uses his wealth, time, information, friends, and personality for political
purposes will likely be able to influence others on public issues. A person,
on the other hand, who possesses the same capabilities but uses them to
invent a new mousetrap is not likely to be important in politics.
The same propositions also hold true in international politics. Capa?
bilities may also be tangible or intangible. We can predict that a country
in possession of a high Gross National Product, a high level of industrial
development, sophisticated weapons systems, and a large population will
have more influence and prestige in the system than a state with a primitive
economy, small population, and old fashioned armaments. And yet, the
intangibles are also important. In addition to the physical resources of a
state, such factors as leadership and national morale have to be assessed.
We could not, for example, arrive at an estimation of India's influence in
world politics unless we regarded the prestige and stature of its leadership
abroad.
Moreover, the amount of influence a state wields over others can be
related, as in domestic politics, to the capabilities that are mobilized in
support of foreign policy objectives. Or, to put this proposition in another
way, we can argue that a capability does not itself determine the uses to
which it will be put. Nuclear power can be used to provide electricity or
to coerce and perhaps to destroy other nations. The use of capabilities
depends less on their quality and quantity than on the external objectives
that a government formulates for itself.
However, the variety of foreign policy instruments available to a nation
for influencing others is partly a function of the quantity and quality of
capabilities. What a government will seek to do, and how it attempts to
do it will depend at least partially on the resources it finds available. A
country such as Thailand which possesses relatively few and underdeveloped
resources cannot, even if it desired, construct nuclear weapons with which

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to intimidate others, or establish a world-wide propaganda network, or
dispense several billion dollars annually of foreign aid to try to influence
other countries. And in other international systems, such as in the ancient
Hindu interstate system, the level of technology limited the number of
capabilities that could be used for external purposes. Kautilya suggested
in the Arthasastra that only seven elements made up the capability of the
state: the excellence (quality) of the king and the ministers, and the
quality and quantity of the territory, fortresses, treasury, army, and allies
(Law, 1920; Ghoshal, 1947). In general, advanced industrial societies are
able to mobilize a wide variety of capabilities in support of their external
objectives. We can conclude, therefore, that how states use their capabilities
depends on their external objectives, but the choice of objectives and the
instruments to achieve those objectives are limited or influenced by the
quality and quantity of available capabilities.

The Measurement of Capabilities

For many years students of international politics have made meticulous

comparisons of the mobilized and potential capabilities of various nations.
Comparative data relating to the production of iron ore, coal, hydroelectricity,
economic growth rates, educational levels, population growth rates, military
resources, transportation systems, and sources of raw materials are presented
as indicators of a nation's power. Unfortunately, few have acknowledged
that in making these comparisons they are not measuring a state's power or
influence, but only its base. Our previous discussion would suggest that
such measurements and assessments are not particularly useful unless they
are related to the foreign policy objectives of the various states. Capability
is always the capability to do something; its assessment, therefore, is most
meaningful when carried on within a framework of certain goals and foreign
policy objectives.
The deduction of actual influence from the quantity and quality of
potential and mobilized capabilities may, in some cases, give an approxima-
tion of reality, but historically there have been too many discrepancies
between the basis of power and the amount of influence to warrant adopting
this practice as a useful approach to international relations. One could have
assumed, for example, on the basis of a comparative study of technological
and educational level, and general standard of living in the 1920's and
1930's that the United States would have been one of the most influential
actors in the international system. A careful comparison of certain resources,
called by Simonds and Emeny (1939) the "great essentials," revealed the
United States to be in an enviable position. In the period 1925 to 1930,
it was the only major country in the world that produced from its own
resources adequate supplies of food, power, iron, machinery, chemicals,

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coal, iron ore, and petroleum. If actual influence had been deduced from
the quantities of "great essentials" possessed by the major actors the following
ranking of states would have resulted: (1) United States, (2) Germany,
(3) Great Britain, (4) France, (5) Russia, (6) Italy, (7) Japan. However,
the diplomatic history of the world from 1925 to 1930 would suggest that
there was little correlation between the capabilities of these countries and
their actual influence. If we measure influence by the impact these actors
made on the system and by the responses they could invoke when they sought
to change the behavior of other states, we would find for this period quite
a different ranking, such as the following: (1) France, (2) Great Britain,
(3) Italy, (4) Germany, (5) Russia, (6) Japan, (7) United States.
Other historical discrepancies can also be cited. How, for example, can
we explain the ability of the French after their defeat in the Napoleonic
wars to become, within a short period of time, one of the most influential
members in the Concert of Europe? More recently, how could such figures
as Dr. Castro, Colonel Nasser and Marshal Tito successfully defy the pressure
of the great powers? The answer to these questions lies not solely in the
physical capabilities of states, but partly in the personalities and diplomacy
of political leaders, the reactions of the major powers, and other special
circumstances. Hence, the ability of A to change the behavior of B is
enhanced if it possesses physical capabilities which it can use in the influence
act; but B is by no means defenseless because it fails to own a large army,
raw materials, and money for foreign aid. Persuasiveness is often related to
such intangibles as personality, perceptions, friendships, traditions, and
customs, all of which are almost impossible to measure accurately.
The discrepancy between physical capabilities and actual influence can
also be related to credibility. A nuclear capability, for example, is often
thought to increase radically the diplomatic influence of those who develop
it. Yet, the important aspect of a nuclear capability is not its possession,
but the willingness to use it if necessary. Other actors must know that the
capability is not of mere symbolic significance. Thus, a leader like Dr.
Castro possesses a particular psychological advantage over the United States
(hence, influence) because he knows that in almost all circumstances the
American government would not use strategic nuclear weapons against his
country. He has, therefore, effectively broken through the significance of
the American nuclear capability as far as Cuban-American relations are
concerned.

Finally, discrepancies between actors' physical capabilities and their

actual influence can be traced to the habit of analyzing capabilities only in
terms of a single state. The wielding of influence in modern international
politics is, however, seldom a bilateral process. In a system where all

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 states perceive some involvement and relationship with all other actors,
governments seek to use the capabilities and diplomatic influence of other
actors by forming diplomatic or military coalitions. Indeed, modern diplo?
macy is largely concerned with eliciting support of friends and neutrals,
presumably because widespread diplomatic support for an actor's policies
increases the legitimacy of those objections, thereby increasing the in?
fluence of the actor. "Small" states in particular can increase their influence
if they can gain commitments of support from other members of the system.8
physical capabilities and actual influence, how do we proceed to measure
influence? Assessment of physical capabilities may be adequate for rough
estimations of influence or war potential and in some circumstances it may
suffice to rely on reputations of power. But for precise knowledge, we
have to refer to the actual processes of international politics and not to
charts or indices of raw materials. We can best measure influence, according
to Dahl (1957), by studying the responses of those who are in the influence
relationship. If A can get B to do X, but C cannot get B to do the same
thing, then in reference to that particular action, A has more influence.
Or, if B does X despite the protestations of A, then we can assume that
A, in this circumstance, did not enjoy much influence over B. It is mean-
ingless to argue that the Soviet Union is more powerful than the United
States unless we cite how, for what purposes, and in relation to whom, the
Soviet Union and the United States are exerting influence. We may con-
clude, then, that capabilities themselves do not always lead to the successful
wielding of influence and that other variables have to be considered as
well. In general, influence varies with (1) the type of goals an actor
pursues, (2) the quality and quantity of capabilities (including allies and
intangibles) at its disposal, (3) the skill in mobilizing these capabilities in
support of the goals, and (4) the credibility of threats and rewards.
How Influence is Exercised
Social scientists have noted several fundamental techniques that indi-
viduals and groups use to influence each other. In a political system which
contains no one legitimate center of authority (such as a government, or a
father in a family) that can command the members of the group or society,
bargaining has to be used among the sovereign entities. A. F. K. Organski
(1958), Charles Schleicher (1962), and Quincy Wright (1951) suggest

flThis is one reason why international conflicts seldom remain confined to the
original disputants. Recognising the dangers of increasing the number of parties to a
dispute, the United Nations has sought to "isolate" conflicts as much as possible.

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four typical bargaining techniques in international politics7: persuasion,
offering rewards, threatening punishments, and the use of force. These
categories are very useful for analyzing the wielding of influence in the
system, but they can be expanded and refined to account for slightly different
forms of behavior. Recalling that A seeks one of three courses of conduct
from B (e.g., B to do X in the future, B not to do X in the future, and B
to continue doing X) it may use six different tactics.

1. Persuasion. Persuasion may include threats, rewards and actual punish?

ments, but we will mean here those situations in which an actor simply
initiates or discusses a proposal or situation with another and elicits a
favorable response without explicitly holding out the possibility of
rewards or punishments. We cannot assume that the exercise of influence
is always against the wishes of others and that there are only two pos?
sible outcomes of the act, one favoring A, the other favoring B. For
example, state A asks B to support it at a coming international conference
on the control of narcotics. State B might not originally have any par?
ticular interest in the conference or its outcome, but decides, on the
basis of A's initiative, that something positive might be gained not only
by supporting A's proposals, but also by attending the conference. In
this case there might also be the expectation of gaining some type of
reward in the future, but not necessarily from A.
2. The offer of rewards. This is the situation where A promises to do some?
thing favorable to B if B complies with the wishes of A. Rewards may
be of almost any type in international relations. To gain the diplomatic
support of B at the narcotics conference, A may offer to increase foreign
aid payments, to lower tariffs on goods imported from B, to support B
at a later conference on communications facilities, or it may promise to
remove a previous punishment. The latter tactic is used often by Soviet
negotiators. After having created an unfavorable situation, they promise
to remove it in return for some concessions by their opponents.
3. The granting of rewards. In some instances, the credibility of an actor
is not very high and state B, before complying with A's wishes, may
insist that A actually give the reward in advance. Frequently in armistice
negotiations neither side will unilaterally take steps to demilitarize an
area or to demobilize troops until the other shows evidence of complying

If there are so many factors which distort the relationship between

7Francois de Callieres, a renowned French diplomat of the eighteenth century also
suggested these techniques when he wrote: "Every Christian prince must take as his
chief maxim not to employ arms to support or vindicate his rights until he has
employed and exhausted the way of reason and persuasion. It is to his interest also,
to add to reason and persuasion the influence of benefits conferred, which indeed
is one of the surest ways to make his own power secure, and to increase it. On The
Manner of Negotiating with Princes, trans. by A. F. Whyte, p. 7 (1919).

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 with the agreements. One of the cliches of cold war diplomacy holds
that deeds, not words, are required for the granting of rewards and
concessions.

4. The threat of punishment. Threats of punishment may be further sub-

divided into two types:
a) positive threats, where, for example, state A threatens to increase
tariffs, to cut off diplomatic relations, to institute a boycott or embargo
against trade with B, or to use force.
b) threats of deprivation, where A threatens to withdraw foreign aid
or in other ways to withhold rewards or other advantages that it
already grants to B.
5. The infiiction of non-violent punishment. In this situation, threats are
carried out in the hope of altering B's behavior which, in most cases, could
not be altered by other means. The problem with this tactic is that it
usually results in reciprocal measures by the other side, thus inflicting
damage on both, though not necessarily bringing about a desired state
of affairs. If, for example, A threatens to increase its military capabilities
if B does X and then proceeds to implement the threat, it is not often
that B will comply with A's wishes because it, too, can increase its
military capabilities easily enough. In this type of a situation, then, both
sides indulge in the application of punishments which may escalate
into more serious form unless the conflict is resolved.

6. Force. In previous eras when governments did not possess the variety of
foreign policy instruments that are available today, they had to rely
frequently in the bargaining process upon the use of force. Force and
violence were not only the most efficient tactics, but in many cases they
were the only means possible for influencing. Today, the situation is
different. As technological levels rise, other means of inducement be?
come available and can serve as substitutes for force.8

Patterns of Influence in the International System

Most governments at one time or another use all of these techniques for
influencing others, but probably over ninety per cent of all relations between
states are based on simple persuasion and deal with relatively unimportant
technical matters. Since such interactions seldom make the headlines, how?
ever, we often assume that most relations between states involve the making
or carrying out of threats. But whether a government is communicating with
another over an unimportant technical matter or over a subject of great
consequence, it is likely to use a particular type of tactic in its attempts to

8Presumably, therefore, disarmament and arms control would become more feasible
because other instruments of policy can be used in the influence act. In previous
eras, to disarm would have led to the collapse of the most important?if not only?
capability that could be mobilized for foreign policy purposes.

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influence, depending on the general climate of relations between those two
governments. Allies, for example, seldom threaten each other with force or
even make blatant threats of punishment. Similarly, governments which
disagree over a wide range of policy objectives are more likely to resort to
threats and to the imposition of punishments. We can suggest, therefore,
that just as there are observable patterns of relations between states in terms
of their foreign policy strategies (alliances, isolation, neutrality, etc), there
are also general patterns of relations between actors with reference to the
methods used to influence each other. The methods of exerting influence
between Great Britain and the United States are typically those of persuasion
and rewards, while the methods of exerting influence between the Soviet
Union and the United States in the early post World War II era were
typically those of threatening and inflicting punishments of various types.
Since such typical patterns exist, we can then construct rough typologies
of international relationships as identified by the typical techniques used in
the act of influence.
1. Relations of consensus. Relations of consensus would be typical between
actors that had few disagreements over foreign policy objectives, and/or
had a very low level of interaction and involvement in each other's affairs.
An example of the former would be Anglo-American relations, and of the
latter, the relations between Thailand and Bolivia. In the relations of
consensus, moreover, influence is exercised primarily by the technique
of persuasion and through the subtle offering of rewards. Finally, since
violence as a form of punishment is almost inconceivable between two
countries, the military capabilities of neither actor are organized, mobi?
lized, and "targeted" toward the other.
2. Relations of overt manipulation. Here, there may be some disagreement
or conflict over foreign policy objectives, or state A might undertake
some domestic policy which was disapproved by state B, such as a form
of racial discrimination. Since there is some conflict, there will also be at
least a modest degree of involvement between the two actors, or a
perception that A and B are in some kind of a relationship of interde?
pendence. The techniques used to influence will include, if normal
persuasion fails, (a) offers of rewards, (b) the granting of rewards,
(c) threats to withhold rewards (e.g., not to give foreign aid in the
future), or (d) threats of non-violent punishment, including, for ex?
ample, the raising of tariffs against B's products. Militarily, in relations
of overt manipulation, there is still no mobilization or targeting of military
capabilities toward state B. Examples of overt manipulation would
include the relations between China and the Soviet Union, 1960-1963,
and the relations between France and the United States during this same
period.

191

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3. Relations of coercion. In relations of coercion, there are fundamental
disagreements over foreign policy objectives. Almost all actions that A
takes externally are perceived by B to be a threat to its own interests.
Involvement is, therefore, high. A seeks to influence B's behavior typically
by (a) threatening punishments, (b) by inflicting non-violent punish-
ments and under extreme provocation, (c) by the selective and limited
use of force as, for example, in a peace-time blockade. Military capabili?
ties, finally, are likely to be targeted towards each other. Examples would
include the Soviet Union and the western coalition for most of the
period since 1947, Cuba and the United States between 1960 and 1963,
Nazi Germany and Czechoslovakia between 1937 and 1939, and Egypt
and Israel since 1948.

4. Relations of force. Here, there is almost total disagreement on foreign

policy objectives and the areas of consensus are limited to a few neces-
sities such as communications. The degree of involvement is obviously
extremely high. The typical form of exercising influence is through the
infliction of violent punishment, though in some instances rewards (e.g.,
peace offers) might be offered. National capabilities are mobilized
primarily with a view to conducting the policy of punishment. However,
the quantity of military capabilities that is used will vary with the
geographic and force-level boundaries which the disputants place on the
conflict.

Though most relations between states could be placed in one of the

previous catagories, it should also be apparent that under changing circum-
stances, governments are required to resort to techniques of influence toward
others that they would normally avoid. However, the cold war represents a
curious phenomenon in the history of international politics because in the
relations between east and west all of the techniques of influence are being
used simultaneously. There are several areas of policy where consensus exists
between the Soviet Union and the leaders of the west and where agreements
?either in treaties or through "understandings"?can be reached without
making threats or imposing punishments.9 There are also areas of great con?
troversy where the antagonists commit military capabilities and seek to
influence each other's behavior most of the time by making threats and carry-
ing out various forms of punishment.
To summarize this analysis of power, we can suggest that power is an
integral part of all political relationships, but in international politics we

9Areas of agreement between the Soviet Union and the west which have resulted
either in treaties or "understandings" would include the cessation of nuclear tests,
the demilitarization of the Antarctic and, possibly, outer space, the renouncing of
nuclear war as an instrument of policy, and efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons.

192 Background, Vol. 7, No. 4

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are interested primarily in one process: how does one state influence the
behavior of another in its own interests. The act of influencing becomes,
therefore, a central focus for the study of international politics and it is
from this act that we can best deduce a definition of power. If we observe
the act of influencing, we can see that it is a process, a relationship, a means
to an end, and even a quantity. Moreover, we can make an analytical dis?
tinction between the act of influencing, the basis, or capabilities, upon which
the act relies, and the response to the act. Capabilities are an important
determinant of how successful the wielding of influence will be, but they
are by no means the only determinant. The nature of a country's foreign
policy objectives and the skill with which an actor mobilizes its capabilities
for foreign policy purposes are equally important.
The act of influencing may be carried out by a variety of means, the
most important of which are the offer and granting of rewards, the threat and
imposition of punishments, and the application of force. The choice of
means used to induce will depend, in turn, upon the general nature of
relations between two governments and on the degree of involvement among
actors in the system.
This formulation of the power concept will not, of course, be useful
for all aspects of the study of international relations. The categories are
mental constructs imposed upon reality for the purpose of clarifying certain
aspects of reality. They cannot be expected to cover all international relation?
ships, however. They fail to account for such questions as the determination
of national goals or governmental decision-making processes. They will not
alert the investigator or student to certain processes in bilateral or multi?
lateral systems that contain complex patterns of economic, technical, and
military relations. Questions dealing with trade relations, export credits, or
investment incentives?all areas of interest in the study?are often decided
on the basis of technical criteria by specialists who cannot mobilize na?
tional capabilities for bargaining purposes. Power, no matter how defined,
seems particularly inappropriate as a tool for analyzing relations in a highly
integrated international community, such as exists in Scandinavia or North
America. The concept of leadership might be more appropriate for these
relations. In addition, the state A-state B relationship does not seem to ac?
count for the activities of various international functional groups (technical,
scientific, and economic) which act in concert across traditional national
jurisdictions. In short, the concept of power cannot serve, as many have
argued, as the core of a theory of international relations. But it can indicate
areas of inquiry for further research in international processes and, if formu-
lated carefully, it may become for the first time an important teaching device
as well.

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