Realism in International Relations Theory

Plan
1. The basics of realism
2. Realism and the Islamic State Group
3. Introducing Realism in International Relations Theory
In the discipline of International Relations (IR), realism is a school of
thought that emphasises the competitive and conflictual side of international
relations. Realism’s roots are often said to be found in some of humankind’s
earliest historical writings, particularly Thucydides’ history of the
Peloponnesian War, which raged between 431 and 404 BCE. Thucydides,
writing over two thousand years ago, was not a ‘realist’ because IR theory did
not exist in named form until the twentieth century. However, when looking
back from a contemporary vantage point, theorists detected many similarities in
the thought patterns and behaviours of the ancient world and the modern world.
They then drew on his writings, and that of others, to lend weight to the idea
that there was a timeless theory spanning all recorded human history. That
theory was named ‘realism’.
The basics of realism

The first assumption of realism is that the nation-state (usually abbreviated to

‘state’) is the principle actor in international relations. Other bodies exist, such
as individuals and organisations, but their power is limited. Second, the state is
a unitary actor. National interests, especially in times of war, lead the state to
speak and act with one voice. Third, decision-makers are rational actors in the
sense that rational decision-making leads to the pursuit of the national interest.
Here, taking actions that would make your state weak or vulnerable would not
be rational. Realism suggests that all leaders, no matter what their political
persuasion, recognise this as they attempt to manage their state’s affairs in order
to survive in a competitive environment. Finally, states live in a context of
anarchy – that is, in the absence of anyone being in charge internationally. The
often-used analogy of there being ‘no one to call’ in an international emergency
helps to underline this point. Within our own states we typically have police
forces, militaries, courts and so on. In an emergency, there is an expectation that
these institutions will ‘do something’ in response. Internationally, there is no
clear expectation of anyone or anything ‘doing something’ as there is no
established hierarchy. Therefore, states can ultimately only rely on themselves.

As realism frequently draws on examples from the past, there is a great deal of
emphasis on the idea that humans are essentially held hostage to repetitive
patterns of behaviour determined by their nature. Central to that assumption is
the view that human beings are egoistic and desire power. Realists believe that
our selfishness, our appetite for power and our inability to trust others leads to
predictable outcomes. Perhaps this is why war has been so common throughout
recorded history. Since individuals are organised into states, human nature
impacts on state behaviour. In that respect, Niccolò Machiavelli focused on how
the basic human characteristics influence the security of the state. And in his
time, leaders were usually male, which also influences the realist account of
politics. In The Prince (1532), Machiavelli stressed that a leader’s primary
concern is to promote national security. In order to successfully perform this
task, the leader needs to be alert and cope effectively with internal as well as
external threats to his rule; he needs to be a lion and a fox. Power (the Lion) and
deception (the Fox) are crucial tools for the conduct of foreign policy. In
Machiavelli’s view, rulers obey the ‘ethics of responsibility’ rather than the
conventional religious morality that guides the average citizen – that is, they
should be good when they can, but they must also be willing to use violence
when necessary to guarantee the survival of the state.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Hans Morgenthau (1948) sought to
develop a comprehensive international theory as he believed that politics, like
society in general, is governed by laws that have roots in human nature. His
concern was to clarify the relationship between interests and morality in
international politics, and his work drew heavily on the insights of historical
figures such as Thucydides and Machiavelli. In contrast to more optimistically
minded idealists who expected international tensions to be resolved through
open negotiations marked by goodwill, Morgenthau set out an approach that
emphasised power over morality. Indeed, morality was portrayed as some- thing
that should be avoided in policymaking. In Morgenthau’s account, every
political action is directed towards keeping, increasing or demonstrating power.
The thinking is that policies based on morality or idealism can lead to weakness
– and possibly the destruction or domination of a state by a competitor. In this
sense pursuing the national interest is ‘amoral’ – meaning that it is not subject to
calculations of morality.

In Theory of International Politics (1979), Kenneth Waltz modernised IR

theory by moving realism away from its unprovable (albeit persuasive)
assumptions about human nature. His theoretical contribution was termed
‘neorealism’ or ‘structural realism’ because he emphasised the notion of
‘structure’ in his explanation. Rather than a state’s decisions and actions being
based on human nature, they are arrived at via a simple formula. First, all states
are constrained by existing in an international anarchic system (this is the
structure). Second, any course of action they pursue is based on their relative
power when measured against other states. So, Waltz offered a version of
realism that recommended that theorists examine the characteristics of the
international system for answers rather than delve into flaws in human nature.
In doing so, he sparked a new era in IR theory that attempted to use social
scientific methods rather than political theory (or philosophical) methods. The
difference is that Waltz’s variables (international anarchy, how much power a
state has, etc.) can be empirically/physically measured. Ideas like human nature
are assumptions based on certain philosophical views that cannot be measured
in the same way.

Realists believe that their theory most closely describes the image of world
politics held by practitioners of statecraft. For this reason, realism, perhaps more
than any other IR theory, is often utilised in the world of policymaking –
echoing Machiavelli’s desire to write a manual to guide leaders. However,
realism’s critics argue that realists can help perpetuate the violent and
confrontational world that they describe. By assuming the uncooperative and
egoistic nature of humankind and the absence of hierarchy in the state system,
realists encourage leaders to act in ways based on suspicion, power and force.
Realism can thus be seen as a self-fulfilling prophecy. More directly, realism is
often criticised as excessively pessimistic, since it sees the confrontational
nature of the international system as inevitable. However, according to realists,
leaders are faced with endless constraints and few opportunities for cooperation.
Thus, they can do little to escape the reality of power politics. For a realist,
facing the reality of one’s predicament is not pessimism – it is prudence. The
realist account of international relations stresses that the possibility of peaceful
change, or in fact any type of change, is limited. For a leader to rely on such an
idealistic outcome would be folly.

Realism and the Islamic State Group

The Islamic State group (also known as IS, Daesh, ISIS or ISIL) is a militant
group that follows a fundamentalist doctrine of Sunni Islam. In June 2014, the
group published a document where it claimed to have traced the lineage of its
leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, back to the prophet Muhammad. The group then
appointed al-Baghdadi its ‘caliph’. As caliph, al-Baghdadi demanded the
allegiance of devout Muslims worldwide and the group and its supporters set
about conducting a range of extreme and barbaric acts. Many of these were
targeted at cities in Western nations such as Melbourne, Manchester and Paris –
which has led to the issue becoming a global one. Ultimately, the intent is to
create an Islamic State (or Caliphate) in geopolitical, cultural and political terms
and to deter (via the use of terrorism and extreme actions) Western or regional
powers from interfering with this process. Of course, this means that existing
states’ territory is under threat. Although the Islamic State group considers itself
a state, due to its actions it has been defined as a terrorist organisation by
virtually all of the world’s states and international organisations. Islamic
religious leaders have also condemned the group’s ideology and actions.

Despite it not being an officially recognised state, by taking and holding

territory in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State group clearly possessed aspects of
statehood. The major part of efforts to fight the Islamic State group has
comprised airstrikes against its positions, combined with other military
strategies such as using allied local forces to retake territory (most notably in
Iraq). This suggests that war is considered the most effective method of
counterbalancing the increasing power of terrorism in the Middle East and
neutralising the threat that the Islamic State group poses not only to Western
states but also to states in the region. So, while transnational terrorism, such as
that practised by the Islamic State group, is a relatively new threat in
international relations, states have relied on old strategies consistent with
realism to deal with it. States ultimately count on self-help for guaranteeing
their own security. Within this context, realists have two main strategies for
managing insecurity: the balance of power and deterrence. The balance of
power relies on strategic, flexible alliances, while deterrence relies on the threat
(or the use) of significant force. Both are in evidence in this case. First, the
loose coalition of states that attacked the Islamic State group – states such as the
US, Russia and France – relied on various fair-weather alliances with regional
powers such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran. At the same time, they
downplayed the role of international organisations because agreeing action in
places such as the United Nations is difficult due to state rivalry. Second,
deterring an enemy with overwhelming, superior force (or the threat of it) was
perceived as the quickest method to regain control over the territories under
Islamic State’s rule. The obvious disproportionality of Islamic State’s military
forces when compared with the military forces of the US, France or Russia
seems to confirm the rationality of the decision – which again harks back to
realism’s emphasis on the importance of concepts like deterrence, but also on
viewing states as rational actors. However, the rational actor approach
presupposes that the enemy – even if a terrorist group – is also a rational actor
who would choose a course of action in which the benefits outweigh the risks.

Via this point, we can see that while the actions of a terrorist group might
appear irrational, they can be interpreted otherwise. From a realist perspective,
the Islamic State group, by spreading terror, is using the limited means at its
disposal to counterbalance Western influence in Iraq and Syria. The substantial
collateral damage of a full military offensive is evidently not a concern for the
group’s commanders for two main reasons, both of which may serve to enhance
their power. First, it would contribute to fuelling anti-Western sentiment
throughout the Middle East as local populations become the target of foreign
aggression. Second, the feeling of injustice prompted by these attacks creates an
opportunity for the spontaneous recruitment of fighters who would be willing to
die to validate the group’s aims – this is equally true for those within the
immediate region and those internationally who fall prey to Islamic State
propaganda on the internet.

It is for reasons such as those unpacked in this case, in regions that are as
complex as the Middle East, that realists recommend extreme caution regarding
when and where a state uses its military power. It is easy when viewing realism
to see it as a warmongering theory. For example, on reading the first half of the
paragraph above you might feel that realism would support an attack on the
Islamic State group. But when you read the second half of the paragraph you
will find that the same theory recommends extreme caution.