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The first phase of the conflict between the Muslims and the Spaniards in the Moro Community.
That was described by by the Spanish Colonizer as a fight against Moro pirates, and I think this
is one of the memorable happenings in the Moro Community because it happens that the
Muslims and the Spaniards in the archipelago began around the time of Legazpi’s arrival in
1565, and ended with Spanish invasions of Bornei in 1578 and 1581, so as you can see, it is a
very long day, and the reason of this conflict is because they captured a bornean trading vessel in
the vicinity of Bohol, In 1569. In second stages of a war the conflict is when Spaniards trying to
establish forts and colonies in Muslim lands. The third stage when the Maguindanao launched an
offensive against the Spanish forces in the Bisayas to the extent of competing Spain. A few
initial Spanish counter offensive utterly failed. The fourth stages of the war called fortress war
because of the determination of the Spanish to conquer Sulu and Sultanatas. The five stages of a
war states that the attack of the Sulu and Iranun to dislodge the Spaniards from the fort failed in
Spite of the use of Hundreds of war vessels and thousands of warriors. The Phase six the main
reason of the conflict is was the British and the Dutch were extending in the Island of Southeast
Asia.
2. Explain how the American succeeded in defeating the Moros. Highlights the techniques
used by the American in order to pacify MINDANAO (30 points)
The Moro War is both a good exposition of the major battles of the war between the Moros of
the South Philippines and the US, 1902 - 1913 and a discussion of the tactics, strategy and
leadership by both the US and the Moros.
Much is made of the various leaders, especially Pershing and Wood and various Moro datu's
with good discussions of their effectiveness and weaknesses. The essential part that US politics
and presidential elections played i discusses.
The Moro War was actually a counterinsurgency by the US against the inferiorly armed and
rather disorganized Moro’s. That the war took over 10 years is tribute to the Moro People, their
customs, and the changing leadership and styles of the US military.
The Islamic Moros are still an issue in the Philippines and this book helps to understand their
culture and why they are still an issue in the area. As Gen Scott pointed out to President Wilson
later, the Philippines are more of a large group of islands with several unrelated and warring
tribes scattered over the islands. Both the Spanish and later the US attempted to rule them as a
unit instead of separate nationalities.
The book is well written, easily read. The battles are well explained with diagrams of the fields
of battle. The first half of the book is a discussion of the battles. The second half of the book is a
discussion of the leadership, the historical significance, and the current situation. The book is not
a pedantic recitation, nor a boring rendition. Recommended for persons interested in early days
of counterinsurgency, in early days of General Pershing, and in US military leadership issues.
At the conclusion of the Spanish American War the U.S. came into possession of the Philippines.
In Mindanao and surrounding smaller islands the population was largely made up of Islamic
natives given the name Moros who had been converted by Arab traders in the 15th Century and
against whom Spain had fought unsuccessfully prior to U.S, intervention. While Moro
armaments were primative, their tactics and strategy proved quite effective against superior force
resulting in over a decade of constant warfare.
This little known episode in American history is given excellent treatment by the author resulting
in an absorbing story of cruelty and valor with attention given to the unifying aspects of Islam as
a substitute for civil government. History buffs will not be dissappointed in this much
overlooked period of our past.
3. Explain the evolution of American policies towards the Moros. Highlights each of the
important feature of each policy. What are the impacts of these policies towards Moros (20
points)
The Philippines are not ours to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in
the science of self-government. This is the path we must follow or be recreant to a mighty trust
committed to us.l This policy was, as a matter of fact, a kind of self-assumed mandate (though
many Americans at the time would have insisted that it was bestowed by Divine Providence!)
and it came to occupy, for quite different reasons, an important place in the thinking and rhetoric
of both Americans and Filipinos. The general "mandate" for the Philippines was also the
particular mandate for Moroland. "To develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of
self-government" - these words, and the attitude they represented, established the character of
Muslim-American relations - at least from the American point of view. This paper focuses on the
development of American governmental policy toward Muslim Filipinos between the years 1899
and 1920.2 These years are especially important in the general story of Muslim-American
relations because they cover the period of direct American administration of Moroland. During
this time Moroland (and its inhabitants) became effectively a part of the Philippine national
concept, and it became integrated into the Philippine governmental framework as well. An
understanding of the policies pursued and problems encountered in this period yields some
important insights with respect to the relations between Muslim and Christian Filipinos today.
The American administration of Moroland developed in three successive stages between 1899
and 1920. First, there were the years of initial Muslim-American contact and military occupation
of Moroland, beginning in May of 1899 and ending with the inauguration of the Moro Province
in July of 1903. Next came the decade (1903-1913) of the existence of the Moro Province which
exercised poltico-military control over the region and prepared the Muslims for civil
government. And, finally, there folllowed a six-year period (1914-1920) wherein the process of
bringing Mindanao and Sulu into the general governmental framework of the Philippines was
accelerated. During this third stage, administrative control over Muslim affairs was rapidly
transferred from Americans to Filipinos
4. In your own understanding, what was the condition of the Moro under the Commonwealth
Government (10 points)
The remote causes of the Muslim separatist rebellion that engulfed much of the southern
Philippines in the 1970s and continues in parts of the South today may be found in the policies
and practices of the Philippine colonial and national states. Early American rule in the Muslim
Philippines followed a pattern quite similar to American governance of the rest of the colony--
pious paternalism punctuated by brutal pacification operations. In the Muslim South, however,
pacification took longer to achieve, requiring even harsher methods, while paternalism was also
more pronounced. By 1914, "Moroland", as it was most commonly termed by the Americans,
was considered fully pacified and civilian colonial rule was finally inaugurated 13 years after its
establishment in the rest of the colony. Moroland soon came under the primary administrative
supervision of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. Philippine Muslims were grouped together
with tribal Filipinos for administration because both were thought to need special attention to
advance to the level of civilization of Christian Filipinos.
There were at least two ways, however, in which Philippine Muslims were viewed as distinct
from tribal groups by American colonial administrators. For one, although regarded as barbaric,
Muslims were not considered savages as were tribal groups. This was due principally to their
possession of both a world religion and an aristocracy. In line with the popular orientalism of the
time and drawing on the experiences of earlier European colonizers in Muslim Southeast Asia,
American colonizers often exhibited a certain respect for the "Mohammedanism" they found in
the Philippines and did not encourage Christian proselytization among Philippine Muslims.
Tribal groups on the other hand became a principal target for American Protestant missionaries.
As one consequence of this attitude, American colonial administrators tended to conglomerate
various Muslim ethnolinguistic groups under the single label "Moro" rather than focusing on the
"tribal" divisions among them.
Secondly, unlike tribal Filipinos, Philippine Muslims were overwhelmingly lowlanders and were
not exempted from the land registration and individual land ownership policies of the American
colonial government. The Bureau of Lands conducted land surveys throughout Muslim areas and
processed homestead applications. While there is some evidence to suggest that American
colonial administrators believed that land registration would improve economic security for
Muslim commoners, the actual application of American land policy led to the loss of traditional
land rights for a great many Muslims
With the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, government policy toward
Philippine Muslims shifted significantly. The Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes was abolished in
1936 and with it the presumption that Muslims should be governed any differently, or afforded
more protections, than any other citizens of the Commonwealth. This change in attitude was
accompanied by a new policy priority: the economic development of Mindanao for the benefit of
the nation, especially by means of Christian migration into traditionally Muslim regions.
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5. Enumerate and explain each of the after effects of the Japanese Occupation in Mindanao
During the Japanese occupation of the islands in World War II, there was an extensive Philippine
resistance movement which opposed the Japanese and their collaborators with active
underground and guerrilla activity that increased over the years. Fighting the guerrillas apart
from the Japanese regular forces were a Japanese-formed Bureau of Constabulary (later taking
the name of the old Philippine Constabulary during the Second Republic), the Kenpeitai (the
Japanese military police), and the Makapili (Filipinos fighting for the Japanese). Postwar studies
estimate that around 260,000 persons were organized under guerrilla groups and that members of
anti-Japanese underground organizations were more numerous. Such was their effectiveness that
by the end of World War II, Japan controlled only twelve of the forty-eight provinces.
Select units of the resistance would go on to be reorganized and equipped as units of
the Philippine Army and Constabulary. The United States Government officially granted
payments and benefits to various ethnicites who have fought with the Allies by the war's end.
However, only the Filipinos were excluded from such benefits, and since then these veterans
have made efforts in finally being acknowledged by the United States. Some 277 separate
guerrilla units made up of 260,715 individuals were officially recognized as having fought in the
resistance movement.
The attack on Pearl Harbor (called Hawaii Operation or Operation AI by the Japanese Imperial
General Headquarters) was a surprise military strike conducted by the Imperial Japanese
Navy against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on the morning of December
7, 1941 (December 8 in Japan and the Philippines). The attack was intended as
a preventive action in order to keep the U.S. Pacific Fleet from interfering with military
actions Japan was planning in Southeast Asia against the overseas territories of the United States,
the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.
Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese operations to invade
the Commonwealth of the Philippines began. Forty-three planes bombed Tuguegarao and Baguio
in the first preemptive strike in Luzon. The Japanese forces then quickly conducted a landing at
Batan Island, and by December 17, General Masaharu Homma gave his estimate that the main
component of the United States Air Force in the archipelago was destroyed. By January
2, Manila was under Japanese control and by January 9, Homma had cornered the remaining
forces in Bataan. By April 9, the remaining of the combined American-Filipino force was forced
to retire from Bataan to Corregidor. Meanwhile, Japanese invasions of Cebu (April 19)
and Panay (April 20) were successful. By May 7, after the last of the Japanese attacks on
Corregidor, General Jonathan M. Wainwright announced through a radio broadcast in Manila the
surrender of the Philippines. Following Wainwright was General William F. Sharp, who
surrendered Visayas and Mindanao on May 10.