Compromise with Colonialism

The successful suppression of the various revolutionary outbreaks or disturbances following the formal
end of the Filipino-American War was enough reason for the Filipino elite to pursue the alternative of
peaceful struggle. This prospect became quite clear when American colonial authorities repeatedly offered
opportunities for Filipino cooperation and participation in the colonial government. In fact, the
encouragement from the colonial officials was irresistible to the Filipino elite, especially the ilustrados,
whose role in the 19th century revolutionary movement throughout the archipelago, had been marked by
readiness to compromise with colonialism. They did not find it consistent at all to extend cooperation,
first, to Spanish rule, and, now, to American colonial venture. The extent and nature of Filipino
involvement in the pursuit of American colonialism can be categorized under several headings.
Involvement during the military Phase, 1899-1913
In 1899, the Schurman Commission, the first significant body created by President Mckinley, with Jacob
Schurman, president of Cornell University, as head, initiated the non-military approach of American
colonialism and succeeded, after several months, in laying down the foundation of a subtle conquest of
the Philippines through the cooperation of the Filipino elite. There was really no difficulty in winning
over elite, as Schurman readily recognized, judging from the enthusiastic response of those who would
later figure prominently in the electoral process as well as in executive appointments. Even the
revolutionary leaders who had been active in the last anti-Spanish revolution were easily persuaded to
serve under American rule.
The Christian Filipinos
 In the Local level
A notable example of this readiness of the Filipino elite to collaborate was the case of Negros
Island which had witnessed as early as 1898, towards Spanish rule, the division of inhabitants between
the political and economic elite and the peasants and workers. The landowning class and the ilustrados
decided, upon the entry of the United States in the islands, to cooperate with the American colonialist.
Prominent among the Negros elite who eventually became the stalwart supporters of American rule
were Juan Araneta, Jose Luzuriaga, Leandro Locsin, Demetrio Larena, and Agustin Montilla. As early
as November 1898, they organized themselves into a provisional government clearly opposed to the
Aguinaldo revolutionary government, hoping that by this step they would be able to get the American
authorities to accept their offer of loyalty to American rule. Efforts were exerted to contact the
American authorities in the Visayas in order that they could consider the desire of the Negros elite to
make the island under effective American control. But it was not until late in February 1899 that a
committee of prominent landowners from Negros were welcomed by the military government under
Gen. E. Otis who subsequently, on March 1, 1899, created the Visayan military district with Gen.
James F. Smith as Governor of Negros.
With the American government now established in Negros, the Negrense provincial junta
became its usefull ally in the American countermeasures against Malolos government, represent in
Negros by Aguinaldo-appointed emissaries, Quintin Salas and Zoilo Mauricio, and the masses led
by their charismatic leader, “Papa Isio” or Dionisio Magbuela in real life. Attempts by Aguinaldo
to win the elite failed and open conflict between the colonial forces and the Malolos government
erupted. As noted earlier, the armed disturbances in the Visayas, including Negros, were now
definitely led by those who came from below, and the colonial government and the Filipino elite
found the suppression of the disturbances not only costly but also difficult. The elite were
 particularly plagued by attacks on their properties and lands. But the conflict inly drew the elite
closer to colonialism.

The same pattern of collaboration and compromises was also evident in Luzon. The
Schurman Commission organized municipal governments, starting with the first in Baliwag,
Bulacan. Even with the outbreak of Filipino-American hostilities in February 1899, the peaceful
process of pacification was focused on the formation of the local governments as fast as the areas
were pacified and placed under American control. In fact, the penetration of towns by American
“peace feelers and agents’ followed in the heels of Aguinaldo’s gradual retreat northward from
Manila until his capture in 1901 in Isabela. Thus, by 1901, the American colonial government
could disclose the pacification of the islands and the establishment of the civil government except
in the Muslim South where civil rule would not be formed until the abolition of the military-
governed Moro province in 1913. The pattern of the municipal organization was guided by a plan
formulated by a committee headed by Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano of the Supreme Court.

 In the Central Government

The most important manifestation of the American cooperation of the elite was in the
national level of administration. Being a highly centralized government, those few occupying the
top executive, legislative, an judicial positions exercised vast powers and influence in national
affairs. The involvement of the Filipino elite in this level was represented by those who were
appointed as members of the Philippine Commission which performed executive and legislative
powers and functions. Examples were Gregorio Araneta and Benito Legarda. It was in the
judiciary where the Filipino elite was given substantial role in the person of Cayetano Arellano
who was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Justice Arellano, a professor of law at the
University of Santo Tomas and top practicing lawyer, was clear about his inclination and
conviction. He believed in the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines.
 Why the Elite?

The question that often recurs is why the Americans easily coopted the elite for colonial
purposes and why the elite had no difficulty in shifting loyalty from Filipino to American rule.
These were two basic reasons for the elite’s readiness to accept colonialism. First was the natural
fear of losing the security of their interest because of the growing demand of the masses for the
redistribution of benefits and resources. There was still the reluctance to part with elite privileges
in a feudal set-up where those of mixed blood had advantages over the natives. It was clear that
American colonial interest would be ready to accommodate, in the total scheme of things, the
elite’s desire preserve their privileges. In fact, comparatively speaking, the prospects under
American rule where much better than under the previous Spanish regime. The second reason is
the basic orientation of the elite, which felt distrust in the integrity and character of the masses
whom the elite regarded as potential troublemakers, bandits, and enemies of what they represented
in society. Added to this low regard for the integrity of the masses was the contempt of the elite for
what appeared as their general lack of knowledge, low intellectual capacity, and questionable
moral standard. In brief, the elite could not trust their interest and future in the hands of the
masses. The remarks and opinions of Cayetano Arellano and Trinidad Pardo de Tavera were
examples of their condescending attitude toward the Filipino masses similar to the way the
 Spanish colonizers looked at the natives. Pardo de Tavera was particularly notorious in his
contempt for those below his class. The pro-Americanism of the elite was, to the Americans, not
only encouraging but also remarkable for colonial purposes. It would not be long before the
ilustrados would find the founding of the Federal Party not only a logical expression of their
sentiment but also a political mechanism for helping the colonial administration in the intellectual
redirection of the Filipino people.
 The Cultural Communities
In the cultural communities, the Americans were also successful in coopting the ruling elite
at the start of American rule. In the tribal communities, American teachers and missionaries opened
the path to an understanding of American benevolent policy though schools, religious missions, and
especially, medical work.
 In Mindanao
It was part of the American strategy to make use of local datus and leaders to promote the
need for social services. The building of schools was undertaken with American supervision of
native’s workers using existing local materials. This was, for instance, illustrated by Datu Santiago
of Cotabato and his men. The same was true of the campaign against unsanitary living conditions
and diseases especially those that frequently led to epidemics like cholera, dysentery, smallpox,
and malaria. Local leaders, with only a few exceptions, helped by setting personal examples of
hygiene and proper sanitation. Education of children was very much emphasized, especially those
of the ruling class. The schools of Subanuns, the Tausugs in Sulu,a and even a proposed Datu
school in Zamboanga were meant to prepare the ruling class for the active involvement in their
own local areas.
The critical role of American teachers was underlined by the Governor of the Moro
province, Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing. He remarked: “The school system depends for its success
entirely upon the American teachers, and although Filipino teachers do excellent work under
proper supervision, educational direction must for some time remain in the hands of the American
teachers.” One of the most effective instruments of the American educational policies was Dr.
Najeeb M. Saleeby, a medical practitioner turned educator. His background as Christian Arab, with
education obtained from the American University in Beirut and a medical degree from New York’s
Belleve Medical School, gave him the kind of advantage to deal with the education of the Muslims
in the Moro province. His knowledge of Arabic and Islam provided him a personal touch that
enabled him to win a lot of friends among the Muslim leaders, including those that were opposed
the American rule like Datu Ali of Cotabato, royalties of Sulu, and the datus of Lanao, His initial
work as a medical surgeon in Malabang, Lanao provided opportunities to win the Ilanuns, a
Muslim sub-ethnic group that had been associated with piratical attacks on trading vessels in the
southern seas. Consequently his appointment as School superintendent for the district of Mindanao
and Jolo on June 1, 1903, after a brief assignment as assistant chief in Bureau of Non-Christian
Tribes, led to vigorous implementation of American educational objectives in the Moro Province.
At the time of his tenure, there were 52 elementary schools in the province with a total enrollment
of 2,114 pupils, 240 of whom were Muslims. The schools were handled by 15 American teachers,
50 Christians and Muslims. By the time he resigned, on June 30, 1906 to become the new
Secretary of the Moro province under Governor Tasker H. Bliss, the school enrollment had
reached 4,231 pupils. The Muslim enrollees also grew to 570. But lack of sympathetic
 understanding from his superiors frustrated Saleeby’s efforts and his views on the approach to the
“Moro Probelem” were somehow diluted.
Other American teachers who contributed to the reorientation of Mindanao included both
military and non-military personnel. Charles R. Cameron, who succeeded Najeeb Saleeby as
Superintendent, continued the educational programs for Muslims. Private Albert L. Burleigh of the
2nd Infantry chose to teach Tausug children in Jolo. Unfortunately, his work was short-lived. He
was killed by four Moros on way his home from school. George kindy, a teacher with agricultural
inclination, introduced farm schools in Bukidnon as model for agricultural education in Mindanao.
One of the enduring contributions of American education in Mindanao were the subsequent
studies that emerged on various aspects of development such as Frances I. Batter’s Vocabulary
English-Samal (1921), Charles Cameron’s Sulu Writing (1917), Charles V. Elliot’s A Vocabulary
and Phrase Book of Lanao Moro Dialect (1913), Robert T. McCuthen’s Yakan-English, English-
Yakan Vocabulary (1918), and Najeeb Saleeby’s Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion
(1905) and A History of Sulu (1913).
 In the Coldilleras
In the Coldilleras, the Americans were confronted by the many problems of the Filipino-
American War which had brought the retreating forces of 200 Filipinos under Aguinaldo to the
traditionally hostile Ifugao country. To outside forces, the Ifugao head-hunting activities were
constant problems. But the pressure was not as difficult as Spanish and Aguinaldo forces. The
Americans had impressive firepowers which impressed Ifugaos, reinforced by a practice of
avoiding outright confiscation of food resources and valuables and readiness to assist in rendering
to assist in rendering speedy justice in disputes and conflict. These advantages were readily seen
when the American troops, in pursuit of Aguinaldo’s “retreating column,” found themselves
dealing with several Coldillera groups, especially those in the Ifugao region. They demonstrated
American firepower when the Ifugaos took the head of American soldier. They also paid prices for
the chickens, pigs, and food items made available by the ifugaos who had not anticipated such an
attitude, having experienced the opposite Spanish and Filipino forces earlier. Then, in the conflict
between two Ifugao groups (Sabangan and Hapao), American guns made the difference.
Consequently, Humiwat, the leader of an Ifugao band that beheaded an American soldier,
surrendered and offered his cooperation in the American effort to establish a presence in the
Coldilleras. By 1902, the ground was prepared for the American colonial government to study the
set-up in the Coldilleras through Dr. David P. Barrows who became the head of the Bureau of
Non-Christian tribes. By 1903 Secretary of the Interior Worcester had gotten Dominga Atandada
of Dullayan and Rafael Baluyunoan to accept American rule. Later, about 92 chiefs and headmen
of the Ifugao country answered the American call for a conference to organize a government in the
Ifugao area. Only the Nagacaran Ifugaos resisted the offer and boycotted the meeting.
The pacification efforts of the Americans found very encouraging prospects in the
pioneering activities of former military men like Samuel Kane and Al Hora whose Business
explorations and adventures provided later American officers and officials insights into Ifugao
character and psychology. Army officers, like Capt. Lewis Patstone in Nueva Vizcaya and Lt. Levi
case in Ifugao country, contributed a lot in preparing Ifugaos for the eventual establishment of
American political structures in the area, integrating not only Ifugaos but also the other Igorots
into the Constabulary as soldiers and into the local government as presidentes (mayors) or
cabacillas. By the beginning of 1906, the entry of Lt. Jeff D. Gallman into Ifugao country saw the
 beginning of an era of peace among Ifugaos and American rule set the pace and patterns for the
rest of Cordilleras.

 Treaty Traps

In southern Philippines, Muslim leadership was already divided into those who opposed
and those who accepted American presence in 1899. But the latter group, which was represented
by those in Sulu, allowed American presence without necessarily accepting American sovereignty.
In fact, the Bates Treaty signed by Sultan Jamalul Kiram and Gen. John C. Bates on August 10,
1899, clearly expressed this sort of political compromise. The Sulu signatories to the treaty
revealed the extent to which local Sulu leadership was involved in the American peace initiative.
With Datu Kalbi and Datu Julkanain signing the document, the Patikul political leadership had
been added to those who supported American rule. This was a significant accomplishment of
American diplomacy because it represented, at the close of the 19th century, the only meaningful
opposition Sultanate whose political center was in Maimbung, the flourishing trading point in the
southern part of Jolo. In the same manner, Patikul was the center of activities in the northern part.
The treaty, therefore, put behind American rule the entire political leadership of Sulu, leaving
opposition to colonialism to lesser known leaders not connected with the ruling elite.

The Bates Treaty guaranteed peace between the Americans and Muslims in Sulu, but it
should be noted that from perspective of the Sulu leadership, their relations with the new colonial
government was one of political coexistence characterized by mutual respect for personal property
and other rights. Under the treaty, the local leaders agreed to allow the Americans the freedom to
trade and engage in commerce as well as the right to fly their own flag. Likewise, the Americans
agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of the people, and in case of disputes and conflicts, to
act in consultation with the local leaders, especially the Sultan. These were the general
understanding and agreement guaranteed by the treaty as perceived by the local signatories. The
Tausug version of the treaty clearly substantiates this view.

But the English version of the Bates Treaty clearly provides for the establishment of
American rule in Sulu and the acceptance of American sovereignty by the Sultan and the datus.
The version allowed the Americans to interfere even in resolution of disputes concerning matters
related to slavery, taxes, peace and order, trade, commerce, foreign relations, except in matters
pertaining to religious practices and customs. The treaty provisions clearly gave to the United
States the rights, prerogatives, and privileges of sovereignty. Consequently, the pursuit of activities
by the Sulu people and the American authorities would eventually come to conflict, creating the
adverse situation that presaged the unilateral abrogation of the treaty in March 1904 by the
colonial government as expressed through Governor-General William Howard Taft and Moro
Province Governor Leonard Wood.

The reaction of the Sultan and the datus to the unilateral termination was a mixture of
surprise and irritation. The treaty abrogration terminated the financial annuities the Sultan and
other signatories had been receiving from the Americans since the conclusion of the agreement.
But perhaps, more felt was dishonor and the shame the American action had brought on the Sulu
leadership. Such an insult was bound to further erode the popular regard for the Sultanate as
political entity, especially after the demonstrations of American military technology in Lanao and
 Cotabato where Moro armed disturbances were effectively suppressed. The eruption of uprisings
after 1904, particularly the Hassan Revolt, was partly attributed by the Americans to the
encouragement given by the Sultan. The latter’s denial did not erode the American suspicion of the
Sultan’s active and clandestine involvement in the series of disturbances which culminated in the
bloody battle of Bud Bagsak in 1913.

 The Carpenter-Kiram Agreement, 1915

The effect of the persisting American belief in the Sultan’s involvement led to the further
emasculation of the sultanate through the Kiram-Carpenter Agreement on March 22, 1915. The
agreement devised the Sultan of all his political power and prerogative. He was only allowed to
exercise the rights and duties of a spiritual leader. Since under Islam there is no separation of
power, the agreement created problems for the Sultan. It would be difficult to truly exercise
spiritual influence without the political authority the Sultan previously enjoyed. Hence, the
Sultanate itself was seriously affected by the emasculation of the powers of the Sultan from which
recovery would subsequently prove extremely difficult.

In the “Note” preliminary to the main part of the Agreement, reference was made to certain
political facts and realities as grounds for the unquestionable assumption by the United States of
sovereignty over all that pertained to the Sultanate. These are: (1) recognition of the independent
sovereignty of the Sultanate prior to American occupation; (2) the recognition of the partial
exercise of the sovereignty of the Sultanate by Spain during the latter part of the Spanish
occupation of the Philippines but only in relation to foreign affairs and, to a lesser degree, only on
port of Jolo and four other points occupied by “Spanish military garrisons’; and (3) the recognition
of a partial but de facto temporal sovereignty of the United States under the Bates Treaty, whose
provisions in Article IX allowed the United States to deal with cases of crimes and offenses
“committed by Moros against Moros.” What was underlined in the note was that the abrogation of
the Bates Treaty by the United States was premised on “other matters than the de jure sovereignty
by conquest or otherwise until the signing of the agreement by Sultan Jamalul Kiram and
Governor Frank W. Carpenter.

The stipulations of the Agreement, expressed in no uncertain terms in five paragraphs,

emphasized the total sovereignty of the United States over all the territory of the Sultanate in all
aspects, except in matters of religion in which Sultan, as titular spiritual head of his people, was
allowed to exercise ecclesiastical authority. But even this exercise of spiritual or religious
authority and its attendant enjoyment of religious freedom must not be a violation of the basic
principles of laws of the United States. There is, therefore, no doubt that, with the comprehensive
provisions of the Agreement, the beginning of the end of Sultanate was initiated. At the same time
also, the gradual rise of the Filipino power over the Moros would become reality in subsequent
political developments in Moroland.

Increase in Filipino Participation

 Political Change in the United States

 In 1912, the political climate in United States had changed. Not only was a new president
coming in-Woodrow Wilson-but a new political orientation was expected to emerge from the
changed to Democratic rule. Since the turn of the century, the Republican leadership had kept the
conservative tradition of American policies unaltered, particularly in relation to colonial
expansion. The Republican Administration had been associated with the acquisition of overseas
colonies and the maintenance of those colonies for the business or economic interests of American
society. In a sense, the establishment of the American colonies, including Philippines, was part of
the expansionist inertia that came from the vigorous, westward expansion of the American
colonists to the cast frontiers of Indian territories looking for new opportunities and lands until the
Pacific coast of California was reached. It was here at littoral of west coast that the American spirit
of the conquest was literally challenged by the vast ocean that lay before it.

The inertia of the westward movement was there. It only needed the mitigation of other
pressures that had transformed America from a rural to urban technological society. The need of
raw materials and markets added an economic dimension to American territorial expansion just as
the influence of the Great Commission brought in the religious vision of the fundamentalist of
America to see the gospel message preached to the “religious beyond.” All these political,
economic and socio-cultural motivations were ideals the Republican Party had sought to uphold.

 Effects on Colony
The Democratic Party administration, which differed to some extent from the Republican,
was expected to bring some changes in American expansionist policy and direction. It had been
associated with the populist interests of American society, with the working men and farmers.
Therefore, the acquisition and maintenance of overseas colonies were not paramount. But the
policy adopted did not altogether lead to the abandonment of the acquired territories. Possessions
like the Philippines were maintained but the measure of control was somewhat modified to allow
greater native participation in government and the realistic preparation for eventual independence.

What, therefore, followed the Republican defeat in the presidential election of 1912 was
the appointment, in 1913, of Francis burton Harrison as the first Democratic Governor-General for
the Philippines. As subsequent developments would show, American rule in the Philippines under
Harrison saw the realistic implementation of American policies, the change from mere theoretical
to actual grant of substantial participation in the government to Filipinos. In the executive branch,
there was a change from an American to a Filipino majority in the Philippine Commission in 1913
and in the Council of the State and the Board of Control in 1918. The Council of State was the
advisory body of the Chief executive while the Board of Control regulated government
participation in business corporations and firms. Furthermore, the Civil Service had become, by
1913, seventy percent Filipino. By the end of Harrison’s term in 1921, the Civil Service had only
about six percent Americans.

This “rapid Filipinization” of the government, as Harrison’s colonial policy was called,
was also evident in the legislative branch of the government. Before 1916, legislation was still
under the dominant control of the Americans. Only the Philippine Assembly, which was created in
1907, was Filipino. But, by virtue of its function as the “lower house,” it was subordinate to the
Philippine Commission which serve as the “upper house” and, at the same time, as the Cabinet of
the Governor-General. It was not until the Jones Law was passed in 1916 that the legislative
 power in the islands was given to the Filipinos. Only the veto power of the Chief Executive in a
presidential system remained as the source of American control over legislation. Under the Jones
Law a bicameral legislature was created composed of a 24-member Senate as the upper house and
a House of Representatives as the house chamber. All the members of the legislature were elected
except the two senators from the non-Christian sector, who were appointed by the Governor-
General.

While the national structure was opening up to Filipino participation, the local government
continued to strengthen the Filipino role in local administration from the provincial to the
municipal level. The American influence was in the position of the provincial treasurer which was
held by Americans. Except for the general power of supervision, the municipal government was
under Filipino control.

The judiciary had already seen substantial Filipino participation since the creation of the
Supreme Court in 1899. In 1901 Cayetano Arellano became Chief Justice. The lower courts had
both American and Filipino judges, with the latter increasingly growing number.

 Limits to Filipinization
While Filipinization gained momentum under the Harrison administration, there was a
fundamental limitation to extent to its enjoyment in Filipino society. It was obvious that from the
list of those who represented the Filipinos in the various levels of bureaucracy, Filipinization
involved only the upper crust of Filipino society, those who belonged to the national and local
elite. Without exception, the Filipino members of the Philippine Commission were from the
landlord and capitalist families; so were those in the choice positions in the Civil Service. Even the
municipal level of the government was manned by elective officials who came from the local elite.
This was insured by the limitation of the electoral choice to only qualified residents. Under the
law, those who could run for office must be able to read and write, and must be property owners,
or have been government employees during the Spanish period. In effect, the election law already
limited participation to the elite.

This confinement of Filipino participation to the elite guaranteed the success of American
colonial administration, notwithstanding the numerical dominance of the Filipinos in government.
The elite had already demonstrated the positive role they could play and the Americans clearly
saw the natural inclination of the elite to meaningful practical collaboration with the colonial
power. The interests of the elite were compatible with those of colonialism and the Americans
were ready to give them a significant share of power, wealth, and status in the islands. Not only
their traditional rights and privileges were recognized but also their right to a new access to
external power which they could have not acquired without compromising with the colonial
power. There were, therefore, a lot of practical advantages the elite could get from the American
colonial government compared to the almost nil offerings under Spanish rule. Consequently, the
American liberal approach to compromise with Filipino leadership earned for the United States the
cooperation and loyalty of the Filipino elite. This was, perhaps, the underlying basis of American
readiness to give more and more to Filipinos the administration of the bureaucracy except the
highest executive post in the islands, the position of Secretary of Public Instruction, and the
positions controlling the finances of the islands such as the National Treasury, the Bureau of
Customs, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the local treasuries. The control of the sources of
revenues and their use was enough to neutralize any adverse effects of Filipinization on American
 control in the colony. The American authorities knew that aside from a superior military forc,
economic control is basic to political control.

Thus, Filipinization, as implemented by the Democratic administration, fitted into the

overall scheme of colonial rule. It was an aid, not hindrance, to colonial compromise for as long as
it could be kept within the upper crust of Filipino society. But he moment it was extended to those
who came from below, such as would occur in the 1920s and 1930s, Filipinization would invite
the threat to American liberal democratic rule. What emerged, however, from the colonial version
of Filipinization was the dilemma of the Filipino elite, and the problems of Filipino values in the
bureaucracy.

 Economic Limitation
The dilemma of Filipino leadership was the best seen in the economic relations with the
United States during the Harrison era (1913-1920). Before this period, the economic policy of the
United States was anchored entirely on the ambiguities of the Paris Treaty of 1898 and later, on
the “free trade” provisions of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909. Until 1909, American
economic interest would be affected by the most-favored-nation treatment given to Spain for a
period of ten years under the Treaty of Paris, thus preventing the enactment of any trade policy
favorable to American economic interest. The end of ten year privilege in 1909 gave the united
states the opportunity to initiate what became popularity known as “free trade” this was a unique
kind of relation because the exercise of the freedom by the United States and the Philippines was
not equal. The freedom of Filipino interests was limited by a quota system while that of American
interests was absolutely free. The limitation to Filipino economic interests involved the volume
and kind of export, while no similar restriction was placed on American interests. Consequently,
the Philippines became almost an exclusive American market with American goods literally
moving into a colony without limitation. But Philippine exports to the American market were
governed by quotas and limited only to raw materials needed by American business. Thus, as
relations of economic dependency became the pattern of the Philippines relations with the United
States, conversely, American control of the Philippine economy, and consequently, Philippine
leadership, was firmly established by the time the Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act was enacted in
1913 abolishing the quotas on Philippine exports.

There was, therefore, “free trade” literally between the Philippines and the United States
during Harrison’s term and beyond, until 1934 when the quotas where reimposed by the Tydings-
Mcduffie Law. It was during this liberal trade policy that the partnership between Filipino and
American economic interests was strengthened by the dependence of the Filipino landowning
class on lucrative American markets for their agricultural exports. This economic dependence
would continue to be reinforced through the years and the role of Filipino elite would also be
inextricably tied to the preservation of American rights and privileges, not only in the economic
area but also in the political, social, and cultural fields.

Social Effects of Filipinization

 Tradition Vs. Modernism
The establishment of American liberal democracy as the new pattern of the Filipino way of
life would bring the confrontation between Filipino traditional ways and the new system. The
basic differences in values would eventually create a dichotomy of systems in which a democratic
 form and a traditional essence were welded to create a “democracy Filipino style.” From the
outside, the world saw the American democratic structure in the Philippines largely manned by
“little brown Americans,” illustrating one of the most successful colonial experiments in the non-
western world. The three branches of the government, copied exactly from the American model
minus the “federal” aspect, discharged their roles as co-equal units of government, with the
Filipino elite showing their special role no longer as “collaborators” from their view point as
“partners” in the new democracy. The social system started to display the realignment of people
along the lines of perceptible American class consciousness which gave their attention to the elite
and encouragement to a new middle class professionals, with the masses relatively kept contended
with someone measure of socio-economic benefits from the new democratic system involving free
education, health and sanitation, public works and transportation, various employment
opportunities, and ready markets for agricultural products. Added to all democratic activities was
dynamic cultural process which involved the introduction and propagation of American popular
activities such as ball games, restaurants and eateries, movies, sports, and arts. In brief, the
American democratic style had found a distinct place in Filipino life.

 Democracy Filipino Style

But before the end of Harrison’s term, the American colonial administration would only
notice only the form of democracy was in evidence. The essence of democracy was yet to be
developed. The Filipino values, rooted in ancient traditions, continued to manifest their influence
in the actual operation of the new democracy. Even the elite, who had already been coopted with
colonialism, had not abandoned with their traditional values which keep their ties with Filipino
society unaffected. Consequently, American colonial officials who continued to occupy the top
level of bureaucracy began to see dichotomy of the western and traditional values creating the
“undergrowths’ of democracy. The Americans regarded the persistence of traditional values as
counterproductive to the new democracy. Reports of petty violations of law began to create a
concern. These violations were noted in such activities ranging from petty thieveries to bribery of
employees in government and shady financial deals. Even Filipino disregard for working time
noted so that the common perception of colonial officials was that rapid Filipinization was
disastrous to American colonial administration and that Harrison erred in giving to Filipinos more
and more responsibilities and powers. What the Americans failed to see was the fact that the
Filipinos saw no contradiction between the new democratic institutions and traditional practices.
The passion for the rule of law, which the Americans exemplified, was regarded by the Filipinos as
subordinates to the old system based on ritual kinship, pakikisama, utang na loob, and other
values which had preserved harmony in the native society.

Thus, toward the end of the Harrison era changes Filipino incompetence in the
bureaucracy, graft and corruption, and the unpreparedness of the Filipinos for independence, in
general, became the common basis of criticism against the administration of Governor Francis
Burton Harrison. But to the Filipinos, Harrison’s term was the best because it was a demonstration
of what trust could do to Filipino-American relations. Filipinos looked back to the time as the
emergence of a dynamic Filipino leadership trying to create its own democratic form.