4 Modelling Environmental Behaviour: Socio-Psychological Simulation
4 Modelling Environmental Behaviour: Socio-Psychological Simulation
4 Modelling Environmental Behaviour: Socio-Psychological Simulation
4 Modelling environmental
behaviour
Socio-psychological simulation
Hans-Joachim Mosler
Introduction
In economically highly developed countries, many of the conditions that would
allow people to behave in environmentally responsible ways are already in place.
We have a lot of knowledge; for years now, surveys have shown that people give
top priority to the need to act on environmental issues. The necessary technical
and economical resources are also available. But there is little sign of a real about-
face except in limited areas. We believe that the much-cited discrepancy between
cognition and behaviour, between lip service and a person’s own contribution to
conserving the environment, can be better understood if we also take people’s
perceptions of the social surround into consideration. To view human beings as
Homo economicus (Diekmann 1996; Harsanyi 1977) falls short, because the economic
man approach does not explicitly take into account inner psychological factors,
such as motives, values, norms and attitudes, nor does it consider social influences
on a person’s behaviour. The present research conceives a model of behaviour
that in addition to economic factors includes personal and social factors. Environ-
mental consciousness is determined to a significant degree by social systems, or
that is to say, by people’s corresponding social representations. An individual’s
personal contribution seems insignificant in the face of massive destruction of the
environment caused by many. This perception – that there is nothing we can do
personally, that each one of us is powerless – as well as a reluctance to be the
‘sucker’, are important causal factors in behaviours that overuse environmental
resources. It does not seem rational to exercise personal restraint (for example, by
not driving), because not only will we suffer from the harm caused by the general
public’s overuse (the consequences of air pollution), but from a reduction in our
own direct return as well (time saved, comfort). However, as this state of affairs
applies equally to all individuals in a society overusing environmental resources,
people mutually trap each other in patterns of actions that harm the environment.
It is for this reason that we are particularly interested in examining the psychological
conditions that would form the basis of a collective reorientation towards environ-
mentally sustainable behaviour. Starting out from new, environmentally friendly
behaviours of some ‘pioneer’ individuals, we wish to discover the social psycholog-
ical conditions that would ensure that the number of persons joining ranks with
70 Hans-Joachim Mosler
such pioneers would continue to automatically increase and result in a true, large-
scale ‘turn-around’ of previous, environmentally harmful patterns of behaviour.
The focal question of our research can thus be framed as follows: what are the
conditions that foster widespread, effective inner dynamics that change collective
environmental overuse (in thinking and action) to collective, environmentally
responsible thinking and acting? Findings generated by this research will lend
scientific support to the planning of environmental protection campaigns.
Method
Procedure
If we start from the assumption that environmental problems originate in the
overusing behaviours of very many individuals, we need to consider how new
solutions might be tested in a problem area of this magnitude. The instrument of
the questionnaire, based upon imaginary situations or conditions, seems ill-suited
(‘How expensive would gasoline have to be for you to change to public
transportation?’). Massive field experiments that translate the issue directly in real
social systems can also be eliminated; given our present state of scientific knowledge,
such experiments would be both financially and ethically irresponsible. Laboratory
experiments, which would not require intervention in existing social systems, cannot
be carried out with large groups of persons (1000 and more). Computer simulation
provides a possible solution. Simulation aims to reconstruct the relevant cause-
and-effect relationships in a problem area in the form of a model. With the aid of
empirical data, the relationships can then be validated. In this way, we can test
‘experimentally’ the most various and unconventional ideas of ways to spread
environmentally responsible thinking without incurring the risk of intervention in
real social systems.
It is important to remember, however, that simulation results are not empirical
results found in reality. Simulation results can generate fruitful hypotheses that
must be tested in reality. The great advantage is that the hypotheses are derived
consistently using a clearly defined procedure. Another important point to consider
is that findings gained through the simulation method allow only comparative
conclusions, for example that under the conditions studied, Measure A produced
better results than Measure B. The simulation method, furthermore, does not
allow statements to be made about the means to be used to implement certain
measures. For this, real experiments with real people are required. Despite all of
this, computer simulation is the only method available for investigating, by means
of many systematically varied experiments, how environmentally responsible
changes can be instituted in large populations.
Our simulation procedure consisted of the following steps.
Following a preliminary selection of the most important, empirically well-
founded theoretical approaches within the field of social influence, the theories’
most relevant and significant core statements were formulated, according to content
criteria.
Modelling environmental behaviour 71
In the ensuing modelling, the core statements of the theories were described
with the existing variables and set in relation to one another according to certain
systems-theoretical rules (see ‘Modelling of the theoretical concepts’). For lack of
space, we here dispense with discussion of programming/technical implement-
ations of the theories (but see Mosler 2000 for details).
The design of the simulation model was validated through the aid of experts’
evaluations and replication of findings from the fields of environmental and social
psychology. Again, due to space considerations, the validation process is not
reported here (but see Mosler 2000 for details).
Experiments with various strategies for the spread of behaviours were then
conducted. The following will report on the most important and meaningful
experiments.
From the findings of the simulations, conclusions were drawn pertinent to both
environmental practice and basic research. The most well known forms of inter-
vention stemming from environmental research receive a new interpretation; well-
founded recommendations for the field of intervention are derived.
The reader may wish to note that the following deals intensively with psycho-
logical concepts (to psychologists, however, the descriptions will appear somewhat
superficial). The author sees the present chapter as a contribution that takes a
perspective that differs greatly from the economic viewpoint, although some
relevant connections are pointed out. This becomes clear in the next section. The
reader interested in the exact derivation of the findings should read all sections,
while others may wish to read only the sections on the simulation experiments and
results. The most important findings are reported and discussed in the concluding
section.
Volition
re
sp S
on elf Processing of
si - resistance
Behavioural Intention
bi
lit
y Cost-bene-
Status, contact fit analysis
Processing of
s M collective use
rs or ot
to ct ive
ac fa s s
l f es nal tive
na tiv io n Sustaina-
tio en
a c at ce Processing of bility motive
tu in tu in
Si nd Si nd social influen-
a a ces with know-
ledge and
concern
External and internal input variables are processed in different sub-models (see
Figure 4.1) according to the theory being applied. The output values of the sub-
models have either a direct outward effect on other persons with whom the
individual has contact (attitude, persuasiveness), or they affect variables leading
up to behaviour and decisions on the use of resources and consequent actions.
The following sub-models were designed and simulated (simulations of sub-models
II and IV will not be presented):
All of these variables are conceptualized at a general level, thus according with
Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1977) correspondence hypothesis, which states that there is
a high correlation between behaviour and the determining variables if they have
been operationalized with the same degree of specification.
As a fundamental extension of the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen and
Madden 1986), we have added an additional factor, cost-benefit analysis. Although
the theory of planned behaviour does contain a kind of cost-benefit analysis, in
that its components are broken down in ‘expectation ´ evaluation products,’ we
conceptualise this factor as an independent component. With this we expect to
achieve better explanation of the variance for intention, but more importantly, to
gain added starting points for intervention measures. Cost-benefit analysis models
people’s ‘economic’ considerations, as they determine whether it will pay for them
to act in certain ways. The model is thus the first to integrate economic and social
psychological components (see also Mosler and Tobias 2000).
These components all influence behavioural intention, which leads to behaviour
towards the environment. Additionally, we introduce volition into the model, which
76 Hans-Joachim Mosler
is closer to actual behaviour than behavioural intention. Psychological research
(Frey et al. 1993b) has shown that the act of making a decision commits a person to
the when and where of attempting to realise an intention. As the entire model is
deterministic in construction, random variables play absolutely no role in deter-
mining individual behaviour towards the environment.
INDIVIDUAL
Status of contact
persons Attractiveness of group
50
Attitude of the population
45
40
35
Not 0 5 10 15 20 25
environmentally
Runs
responsible
Intervention
A. In each group there is an isolated pioneer whose susceptibility to influence is the same in degree
as that of the members of the group majority.
B. In each group there is an isolated pioneer whose susceptibility is lower than that of the members
of the group majority.
C. In each group there is a pioneer whose susceptibiity is the same in degree to that oo group
members; in addition, the pioneer is in contact with 10 other ‘pioneers’ in other groups. They
thus no longer experience themselves to be a minority.
D. As in C above, but here pioneers have a lower degree of susceptibility.
E. All pioneers are concentrated within their own core groups and show low susceptibility
toinfluence. Each pioneer is inn contact with another person outside of the core group.
F. As in E above, whereby here pioneer group members are in contact with 10 other persons
outside of the core group.
The multiplicative relation of the three variables expresses the fact that the effect
of one of the variables is greater, the greater the value of the other variables.
There is no effect at all if one of the variables equals zero. According to the
theory, moreover, the effect of the variable N (number) is not linear, but rather is
an exponential function: I = sN t, where I is impact, s is a constant, and the exponent
t is a value less than 1. The parameters s and t are different for each situation and
have to be determined empirically. The factor ‘number’ thus has the effect that
the first person has the greatest impact and each person thereafter has ever less of
an impact. With an increasing number of influencing source persons, the social
impact on a person rapidly decreases.
Expectations of efficacy can be represented approximately by behaviour control,
because we define behaviour control as a person’s conviction that they can indeed
execute the behaviour. In accordance with the framework model, behaviour control
affects the behavioural intention and, thus, behaviour. According to Latané’s theory
of social impact (1981), behaviour arises from observation of the using behaviour
of contact persons: social influence is a multiplicative function of the number,
strength, and immediacy of contact persons. In our model (see Figure 4.4), the
variable ‘number’ is determined by the number of the individual’s contact persons
who behave in an environmentally responsible, or irresponsible, way. The ‘strength’
of contact persons’ influence is defined by their status. ‘Immediacy’ is conceived
INDIVIDUAL
Using behaviour
Using
behaviour of Behaviour control
contact persons Intention
Values Self-confirmation
Volition
Self-responsibility
Using
behaviour
A. In this experiment, 500 persons of high status are selected and caused to
adopt a behaviour that is more eco-friendly for the duration of the intervention.
They are to demonstrate this behaviour to many others (15 contacts).
B. As in A above, but here only 300 persons are selected.
C. As in A, but here the behaviour is demonstrated to only 5 contacts.
D. Here we selected 500 persons showing very environmentally sustaining
behaviour patterns, which they demonstrate to 15 contacts. In this case, their
status is raised for the duration of the intervention.
It appears to be more effective to select persons having high status as role models
and to induce them to behave in a more environmentally friendly way for the
duration of the intervention than to temporarily raise the status of persons already
showing such behaviours. An increase in the number of contacts, that is, an increase
in the visibility of the environmentally sound behaviour, achieves relevant effects.
An increased number of role models also has a strong effect. The dissemination
process continues to progress automatically for some time after the intervention,
as the entire social system must again adapt to the changes.
82
Environmentally
responsible 56
A. 15 CP/500 P/Act+
54
B. 15 CP/300 P/Act +
52
Hans-Joachim Mosler
C. 5 CP/500 P/Act +
50
D. 15 CP/500 P/Status +
48
46
44
Control situation
42
Not 40
environmentally 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Runs
responsible
Intervention
CP: contacts per person; P: number of persons addressed (role models); Act+, Status+: more responsible acts towards environment.
Figure 4.5 Average population behav iour with differing interventions based on observational learning
Modelling environmental behaviour 83
In developing concepts for environmental campaigns, simulation can contribute
support with regards to the implementation of efficient means. It can answer
questions as to the number of role models required, how these should be selected,
and what changes they should show, the degree of visibility necessary, and so on.
In particular, simulation allows us to estimate the effects that can be achieved by
means of compensation in other values, which makes a direct contribution to an
increase in efficiency (for example, an increase in visibility at the expense of the
number of role models). However, the simulation method does not allow conclusions
about implementing the results, such as statements on how realistic it is to induce
high status people to behave in a more environmentally friendly way. As discussed
above, the simulation method permits only comparative conclusions.
Estimated proportion
Using behaviour of resource- Expectation of
of contact sustainable Sustainability
sustaining users
persons utilization motive
Values Using
behaviour
stemming from inner psychological biases or from external influences in the form
of media reports, disputes among the experts, and so on.
The expectation that one’s own way of using the environmental resource will
make a contribution towards preservation of the resource is formed from the required
proportion of resource-sustaining users in the population and the estimated
proportion of resource-sustaining users. In other words, the greater the proportion
of non-sustaining users of a resource as estimated by the person in comparison with
the required proportion of resource-sustaining users in the population, the lower
the person’s expectation that they themself can make an effective contribution to
sustainable use of the resource. This expectation rises in the degree to which the
proportion of estimated resource-sustaining contact persons exceeds the required
proportion of resource-sustaining users. Knowledge of the number of resource-
sustaining users required in order to preserve the resource comes from resource
knowledge and the perception of the state of the resource. The model presumes
people to have – at present not a very realistic assumption! – knowledge about the
regeneration rate, regeneration characteristics, and the maximal state of the resource.
From the discrepancy between the maximal state of the resource and the current
state of the resource, the person derives the required proportion of resource-sustaining
users. The greater the discrepancy between the current and the maximal state of
the resource, the greater must be the proportion of the population that uses the
resource in a sustainable way if the resource is to recover.
The estimated proportion of resource-sustaining users in the population is based
upon the behaviour of contact persons perceived by the person. According to the
ratio of contact persons using the resource sustainably and non-sustainably, the
person makes an estimate for the entire population. This factor is at present not
Modelling environmental behaviour 85
yet weighted by socially, or environmentally, oriented values. For example, people
who are not environmentally oriented overestimate the number of like-minded
people.
If no particular interventions take place, there is a danger that dynamics such
as those shown in Figure 4.7a will develop. With an optimistic starting value with
regard to average use within a population (over 50 = environmentally friendly
use), the state of the resource briefly improves. Due to its improved state, its value
declines (only goods in short supply are valuable), and the individuals in our
simulated population resume stronger exploitation of the resource. From the fifth
step onwards, this tendency results in clear over-utilization (average use under 50).
This increases the discrepancy between actual and sustainable use patterns, and
expectations of sustainable use correspondingly decrease. The individual is less
motivated to make a personal contribution to sustainable patterns of utilization
(‘… personal restraint on my own part would not make any difference; no one else
is showing restraint, so it is better for me to help myself to the resource so long as
it is still up for grabs …’). And so the state of the resource deteriorates. Its value
rises, which does not, however, lead to a marked reduction in utilization. There is
no stopping the course of these ‘downhill’ dynamics, and the resource is destroyed.
To counteract these negative dynamics, we ran a campaign in the fifth step that
aimed to (a) lead persons, in their own use behaviour, to orient themselves less to
other persons’ patterns of use and (b) lend heavier weighting to the importance of
the resource. Through this, the common property becomes more highly esteemed.
We found that the utilization behaviour of the population becomes more
environmentally sustaining (see Figure 4.7b). If individuals use a resource in an
environmentally sustainable fashion on the average, the state of the resource
improves. This line of development continues until the resource has regenerated.
At this time, the resource is available in over-abundance so to speak, whereby its
value again declines, and intensity of use increases. Downhill dynamics develop
until that crucial point where they are again brought under control. A dynamic-
stable balance has emerged, in which utilization continually adapts to the state of
the resource by means of inner personal factors. The resource will never be
completely destroyed.
Through the interaction of the social system and the resource, the resulting
system behaviour shows large fluctuations. Following Forrester (1972: 48ff.),
fluctuating system behaviour results when in a system of interlocking feedback
loops two or more temporal delays occur. In the present simulation model, there
are delays both within the social system and between the social system and the
resource system. The average expectation that one can make an effective
contribution to sustainable use of a resource reacts with a delay to the average
resource use behaviour of the social surround. The rise and fall of the average
value of the common good reacts with a delay to the development of the resource.
Our simulation approach is not directly comparable to Forrester’s approach.
Forrester observes only one macrosystem, while the simulation builds upon
numerous microsystems (individual persons) which join to form the macrosystem
(the social system).
86 Hans-Joachim Mosler
Environmentally
responsible/
resource maximal
100
80
60
40
20
0
Not 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
environmentally Runs
Resource in %
responsible/ Intervention
resource minimal Average use
Average value of common resource
Average expectation of sustainable use
Environmentally
`´ ýP
responsible/
resource maximal
100
80
60
40
20
0
Not 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
environmentally
responsible/ resource in % Runs
resource minimal average use
average value of common resource
average expectation of sustainable use
Note: Also illustrates the course of significant inner variables. 4.7a (top): Control situation, 4.7b
(bottom) with intervention.
Communicator's persuasiveness
Communicator's attitude
Communicator's status
Self-responsibility
Processing
Status
motivation
Perception of state Concern
of environment
Processing intensity Attitude
Values
Persuasiveness
Processing ability
Knowledge
how strongly the person experiences a sense of responsibility for the state of the
environment – and environmental concern. Processing intensity (elaboration
likelihood) arises in multiplicative fashion from processing motivation and
processing ability. In addition, it is influenced by the status of the communicator
(but only where neither processing motivation nor processing ability equals zero).
A communicator’s positive status raises processing intensity, while negative status
lowers processing intensity.
The difference between the attitude position of the individual and the position
advocated by the communicator determines attitude change – in dependency,
however, upon the influences from central and peripheral processing. If processing
intensity is low, peripheral processing will predominate, and the status of the
communicator is the main determinant of attitude change. High status of the
communicator leads to a change of attitude to the position advocated. Low status
of the communicator leads to change of attitude opposing the advocated position.
If processing intensity is high, however, central processing takes over, and the
persuasiveness of the communicator is the main determinant of attitude change.
High persuasiveness is expressed by high quality arguments, and the result is a
change of attitude in the desired direction. Low persuasiveness, accompanied by
weak arguments, leads to a change of attitude in the opposing direction.
Biased processing, moreover, modifies central processing. The individual’s
environmental values are compared with the attitude position advocated by the
communicator. If they agree (when both are environmentally friendly or
environmentally unfriendly), the communicator will successfully influence the
Modelling environmental behaviour 89
person in the desired direction. If there is a discrepancy, however, the person’s
attitude will change in the opposing direction.
To the individual’s initial persuasiveness, a central and peripheral proportion is
added in proportion to processing intensity. Where processing intensity is high,
the individual’s persuasiveness increases if the persuasiveness of the communicator
is higher than the individual’s persuasiveness. Here the individual integrates the
communicator’s good arguments into his own argumentation schema. Where
processing intensity is low, the individual’s persuasiveness increases if the
persuasiveness of the communicator is higher than the individual’s persuasiveness.
In contrast, if the persuasiveness of the communicator is low, the individual’s
persuasiveness decreases. This assumption is our own and is not based upon the
Elaboration Likelihood Model. The idea is that unreflected acceptance of weak
arguments tends to weaken a person’s persuasiveness.
We assume to this purpose (as an exception) that the individuals do not influence
each other mutually, but that in five steps they are presented with information
campaigns (the individuals do not discuss the subject of the environment among
themselves, but they all stand under the influence of the campaigns). The campaigns
promote strong environmentally friendly attitudes by means of good arguments
(leading to high persuasiveness) and/or by means of strong peripheral cues
(communicators having high status, as for example esteemed public figures). In
addition, we assume that in the campaigns, an appeal can cause persons’ self-
responsibility to increase. Average attitudes and values are low on environmental
friendliness, the extent of the sense of self-responsibility is low, and the state of the
environment is poor. Persons having environmentally friendly values experience
high concern under the condition of poor state of the environment. The following
interventions were ‘tested’ (see Mosler et al. 1998):
Let us first examine results with individual persons selected from the population.
Person A – who is biased due to an environmentally non-friendly attitude – places
a negative value even on good arguments (curve Persuasiveness+). In contrast,
good arguments effect even more environmental consciousness in Person B, who
has environmentally responsible attitudes from the start, as information processing
is hardly biased here.
A campaign using esteemed public figures is effective with both Persons A and
B, if they tend to process information relatively superficially (curve Status+). But
90 Hans-Joachim Mosler
Environmentally
responsible
70 70
Person A Person B C C
60 60 B B
D D
A A
50 50
40 BC
40
DA
30 B B
C 30
C
20 20
BC
10 A A 10
DA
0 D D 0
Not 0 5 Intervention 10 15 0 5 Intervention 10 15
environmentally Runs
responsible Runs
Environmentally
responsible Campaigns with:
90
Population A Campaign: persuasiveness+
80 B Campaign status+
70 C Campaign: persuasiveness+/status+
C C
B B D
60 Campaign: self-responsibility+/status+
A A
50 D D Control situation
40
30
Not
environmentally 5 Intervention 10 15
responsible Runs
Note: Above individuals in the population. Below population values. The three graphs present
courses of attitude change in four different experiments and the control situation.
In Figure 4.10 we again see two selected individuals A and B, who both stand
under the influence of the action campaign. A glance shows that these graphs are
not as smooth as the information campaign graphs. The curves would be smoother
if, after a short levelling-off phase, there were only the influence of a constant
group of friends. But the ever-changing influence of strangers, upon Persons A
and B and also upon their friends, causes fluctuations in attitudes. We can still
recognize certain tendencies in the development of attitudes, however. Person A’s
attitude becomes less environmentally friendly relatively quickly. Later changes to
a more responsible attitude are only brief and are repeatedly destroyed by the
environmentally unfriendly social surround. Person B shows initial swings in
attitude, but then develops a tendency towards a less environmentally friendly
attitude. Both Persons A and B react to the introduction of multiplicators having
high status (curve Status+) with an increasingly environmentally friendly attitude.
This effect is even stronger if multiplicators in addition show high persuasiveness
(curve Persuasiveness+/Status+). But if multiplicators demonstrate only
persuasiveness (curve Persuasiveness+), they have no effect upon Person A. There
is an initial effect in this case upon Person B, but the influence of the rather
environmentally unfriendly social surround cannot be cancelled out. The same
effects find expression at the level of the population: multiplicators with raised
status are just as convincing as those who also show increased persuasiveness.
Multiplicators who have only high persuasiveness at their disposal have a counter-
productive effect.
Environmentally
responsible
80
Population
70
A Multiplicators: persuasiveness+
60
B Multiplicators: status+
50 C C C C C
B B C Multiplicators: persuasiveness+/status+
B B B
A D D D
40 D D D
A Control situation
A A A
30
20
Not
environmentally 10 20 30
responsible Runs
Intervention
Note: Individual graphs show the course of attitude change in three different experiments and the
control situation.
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