TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND SOCIAL CHANGE3, 1-22 (1971)

Counterintuitive Behavior of Social Systems

JAY W. F O R R E S T E R

Professor Forrester has based this paper on his testimony for the Subcommittee on
Urban Growth of the Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, on October 7, 1970. In view of the unusual significance of this work for
forecasting, the editors have asked, and received, permission of Professor Forrester to
reproduce it here. We believe most readers will agree that it is likely to have wide ranging
impact on research in this field.
The Editors

This paper addresses several issues of broad concern in the United States: population
trends; the quality of urban life; national policy for urban growth; and the unexpected,
ineffective, or detrimental results often generated by government programs in these
areas.
The nation exhibits a growing sense of futility as it repeatedly attacks deficiencies in
our social system while the symptoms continue to worsen. Legislation is debated and
passed with great promise and hope. But many programs prove to be ineffective.
Results often seem unrelated to those expected when the programs were planned. At
times programs cause exactly the reverse of desired results.
It is now possible to explain how such contrary results can happen. There are funda-
mental reasons why people misjudge the behavior of social systems. There are orderly
processes at work in the creation of human judgment and intuition that frequently lead
people to wrong decisions when faced with complex and highly interacting systems.
Until we come to a much better understanding of social systems, we should expect that
attempts to develop corrective programs will continue to disappoint us.
The purpose of this paper is to leave with its readers a sense of caution about con-
tinuing to depend on the same past approaches that have led to our present feeling of
frustration and to suggest an approach which can eventually lead to a better under-
standing of our social systems and thereby to more effective policies for guiding the
future.

A New Approach to Social Systems

It is my basic theme that the human mind is not adapted to interpreting how social
systems behave. Our social systems belong to the class called multi-loop nonlinear

DR. JAY W. FORRESTERis Professor of Management at the Alfred P. Sloan School of Management,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A. Dr. Forrester studied
electrical engineering at the University of Nebraska and Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
made outstanding contributions to digital computer technology in the Digital Computer and Lincoln
Laboratories at M.I.T. beforejoining the SIoan School of Management, where he has developed what
has become known as "industrial dynamics." In 1968 he received the Inventor of the Year Award from
George Washington University and in 1969 the Valdemar Poulsen Gold Medal from the Danish
Academy of Technical Sciences. His book hldustrial Dynamics received the Academy of Management
award in 1962, and his Urban Dynamics was chosen as best publication in 1969 by the Organization
Development Council.
(~) 1971 by Jay W. Forrester. t~) 1971 by the Alumni Association of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. This article is reprinted from Technology Review, 73 (January, 1971, No. 3).
2 JAY W. FORRESTER
feedback systems. In the long history of evolution it has not been necessary for man to
understand these systems until very recent historical times. Evolutionary processes have
not given us the mental skill needed to interpret properly the dynamic behavior of the
systems of which we have now become a part.
In addition, the social sciences have fallen into some mistaken "scientific" practices
which compound man's natural shortcomings. Computers are often being used for what
the computer does poorly and the human mind does well. At the same time the human
mind is being used for what the human mind does poorly and the computer does well.
Even worse, impossible tasks are attempted while achievable and important goals are
ignored.
Until recently there has been no way to estimate the behavior of social systems
except by contemplation, discussion, argument, and guesswork. To point a way out of
our present dilemma about social systems, I will sketch an approach that combines the
strength of the human mind and the strength of today's computers. The approach is an
outgrowth of developments over the last forty years, in which much of the research has
been at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The concepts of feedback system
behavior apply sweepingly from physical systems through social systems. The ideas
were first developed and applied to engineering systems. They have now reached
practical usefulness in major aspects of our social systems.
I am speaking of what has come to be called industrial dynamics. The name is a
misnomer because the methods apply to complex systems regardless of the field in
which they are located. A more appropriate name would be system dynamics. In our
own work, applications have been made to corporate policy, to the dynamics of
diabetes as a medical system, to the growth and stagnation of an urban area, and most
recently to world dynamics representing the interactions of population, pollution,
industrialization, natural resources, and food. System dynamics, as an extension of the
earlier design of physical systems, has been under development at M.I.T. since 1956.
The approach is easy to understand but difficult to practice. Few people have a high
level of skill; but preliminary work is developing all over the world. Some European
countries and especially Japan have begun centers of education and research.

Computer Models of Social Systems

People would never attempt to send a space ship to the moon without first testing the
equipment by constructing prototype models and by computer simulation of the
anticipated space trajectories. No company would put a new kind of household
appliance or electronic computer into production without first making laboratory tests.
Such models and laboratory tests do not guarantee against failure, but they do identify
many weaknesses which can then be corrected before they cause full-scale disasters.
Our social systems are far more complex and harder to understand than our techno-
logical systems. Why, then, do we not use the same approach of making models of
social systems and conducting laboratory experiments on those models before we try
new laws and government programs in real life ? The answer is often stated that our
knowledge of social systems is insufficient for constructing useful models. But what
justification can there be for the apparent assumption that we do not know enough to
construct models but believe we do know enough to directly design new social systems
by passing laws and starting new social programs ? I am suggesting that we now do
know enough to make useful models of social systems. Conversely, we do not know
enough to design the most effective social systems directly without first going through a
COUNTERINTUITIVE BEHAVIOR 3
model-building experimental phase. But I am confident, and substantial supporting
evidence is beginning to accumulate, that the proper use of models of social systems can
lead to far better systems, laws, and programs.
It is now possible to construct in the laboratory realistic models of social systems.
Such models are simplifications of the actual social system but can be far more compre-
hensive than the mental models that we otherwise use as the basis for debating govern-
mental action.
Before going further, I should emphasize that there is nothing new ih the use of
models to represent social systems. Each of us uses models constantly. Every person in
private life and in his business life instinctively uses models for decisionmaking. The
mental image of the world around you which you carry in your head is a model. One
does not have a city or a government or a country in his head. He has only selected
concepts and relationships which he uses to represent the real system. A mental image
is a model. All of our decisions are taken on the basis of models. All of our laws are
passed on the basis of models. All executive actions are taken on the basis of models.
The question is not to use or ignore models. The question is only a choice among
alternative models.
The mental model is fuzzy. It is incomplete. It is imprecisely stated. Furthermore,
within one individual, a mental model changes with time and even during the flow of a
single conversation. The human mind assembles a few relationships to fit the context of
a discussion. As the subject shifts, so does the model. When only a single topic is being
discussed, each participant in a conversation employs a different mental model to
interpret the subject. Fundamental assumptions differ but are never brought into the
open. Goals are different and are left unstated. It is little wonder that compromise
takes so long. And it is not surprising that consensus leads to laws and programs that
fail in their objectives or produce new difficulties greater than those that have been
relieved.
For these reasons we stress the importance of being explicit about assumptions and
interrelating them in a computer model. Any concept or assumption that can be clearly
described in words can be incorporated in a computer model. When done, the ideas
become clear. Assumptions are exposed so they may be discussed and debated.
But the most important difference between the properly conceived computer model
and the mental model is in the ability to determine the dynamic consequences when the
assumptions within the model interact with one another. The human mind is not
adapted to sensing correctly the consequences of a mental model. The mental model
may be correct in structure and assumptions, but, even so, the human mind--either
individually or as a group consensus--is most apt to draw the wrong conclusions.
There is no doubt about the digital computer routinely and accurately tracing through
the sequences of actions that result from following the statements of behavior for
individual points in the model system. This inability of the human mind to use its own
mental models is clearly shown when a computer model is constructed to reproduce the
assumptions held by a single person. In other words, the model is refined until it is fully
agreeable in all its assumptions to the perceptions and ideas of a particular person.
Then, it usually happens that the system that has been described does not act the way
the person anticipated. Usually there is an internal contradiction in mental models
between the assumed structure and the assumed future consequences. Ordinarily the
assumptions about structure and internal motivations are more nearly correct than are
the assumptions about the implied behavior.
4 JAY W. FORRESTER
The kind of computer models that I am discussing are strikingly similar to mental
models. They are derived from the same sources. They may be discussed in the same
terms. But computer models differ from mental models in important ways. The com-
puter models are stated explicitly. The "mathematical" notation that is used for
describing the model is unambiguous. It is a language that is clearer, simpler, and more
precise than such spoken languages as English or French. Its advantage is in the clarity
of meaning and the simplicity of the language syntax. The language of a computer
model can be understood by almost anyone, regardless of educational background.
Furthermore, any concept and relationship that can be clearly stated in ordinary
language can be translated into computer model language.
There are many approaches to computer models. Some are naive. Some are con-
ceptually and structurally inconsistent with the nature of actual systems. Some are
based on methodologies for obtaining input data that commit the models to omitting
major concepts and relationships in the psychological and human reaction areas that
we all know to be crucial. With so much activity in computer models and with the same
terminology having different meanings in the different approaches, the situation must
be confusing to the casual observer. The key to success is not in having a computer; the
important thing is how the computer is used. With respect to models, the key is not to
computerize a model but instead to have a model structure and relationships which
properly represent the system that is being considered.
I am speaking here of a kind of computer model that is very different from the models
that are now most common in the social sciences. Such a computer model is not derived
statistically from time-series data. Instead, the kind of computer model I am discussing
is a statement of system structure. It contains the assumptions being made about the
system. The model is only as good as the expertise which lies behind its formulation.
Great and correct theories in physics or in economics are few and far between. A great
computer model is distinguished from a poor one by the degree to which it captures
more of the essence of the social system that it presumes to represent. Many mathe-
matical models are limited because they are formulated by techniques and according to
a conceptual structure that will not accept the multiple-feedback-loop and nonlinear
nature of real systems. Other models are defective because of lack of knowledge or
deficiencies of perception on the part of the persons who have formulated them.
But a recently developed kind of computer modeling is now beginning to show the
characteristics of behavior of actual systems. These models explain why we are having
the present difficulties with our actual social systems and furthermore explain why so
many efforts to improve social systems have failed. In spite of their shortcomings,
models can now be constructed that are far superior to the intuitive models in our heads
on which we are now basing national social programs.
This approach to the dynamics of social systems differs in two important ways from
common practice in social sciences and government. There seems to be a common
attitude that the major difficulty is shortage of information and data. Once data is
collected, people then feel confident in interpreting the implications. I differ on both
of these attitudes. The problem is not shortage of data but, rather, our inability to
perceive the consequences of the information we already possess. The system dynamics
approach starts with the concepts and information on which people are already acting.
Generally these are sufficient. The available perceptions are then assembled in a
computer model which can show the consequences of the well-known and properly
perceived parts of the system. Generally, the consequences are unexpected.
COUNTERINTUITIVE BEHAVIOR 5
Counterintuitive Nature of Social Systems
Our first insights into complex social systems came from our corporate work. Time
after time we have gone into a corporation which is having severe and well-known
difficulties. The difficulties can be major and obvious such as a falling market share,
low profitability, or instability of employment. Such difficulties are known throughout
the company and by anyone outside who reads the management press. One can enter
such a company and discuss with people in key decision points what they are doing to
solve the problem. Generally speaking we find that people perceive correctly their
immediate environment. They know what they are trying to accomplish. They know the
crises which will force certain actions. They are sensitive to the power structure of the
organization, to traditions, and to their own personal goals and welfare. In general,
when circumstances are conducive to frank disclosure, people can state what they are
doing and can give rational reasons for their actions. In a troubled company, people are
usually trying in good conscience and to the best of their abilities to solve the major
difficulties. Policies are being followed at the various points in the organization on the
presumption that they will alleviate the difficulties. One can combine these policies into
a computer model to show the consequences of how the policies interact with one
another. In many instances it then emerges that the known policies describe a system
which actually causes the troubles. In other words, the known and intended practices
of the organization are fully sufficient to create the difficulty, regardless of what happens
outside the company or in the marketplace. In fact, a downward spiral develops in
which the presumed solution makes the difficulty worse and thereby causes redoubling
of the presumed solution.
The same downward spiral frequently develops in government. Judgment and debate
lead to a program that appears to be sound. Commitment increases to the apparent
solution. If the presumed solution actually makes matters worse, the process by which
this happens is not evident. So, when the troubles increase, the efforts are intensified
that are actually worsening the problem.

Dynamics of Urban Systems

Our first major excursion outside of corporate policy began in February, 1968, when
John F. Collins, former mayor of Boston, became Professor of Urban Affairs at M.I.T.
He and I discussed my work in industrial dynamics and his experience with urban
difficulties. A close collaboration led to applying to the dynamics of the city the same
methods that had been created for understanding the social and policy structure of the
corporation. A model structure was developed to represent the fundamental urban
processes. The proposed structure shows how industry, housing, and people interact
with each other as a city grows and decays. The results are described in my book Urban
Dynamics, and some were summarized in Technology Review (April, 1969, pp. 21-31).
I had not previously been involved with urban behavior or urban policies. But the
emerging story was strikingly similar to what we had seen in the corporation. Actions
taken to alleviate the difficulties of a city can actually make matters worse. We examined
four common programs for improving the depressed nature of the central city. One was
the creation of jobs, as by bussing the unemployed to the suburbs or through govern-
mental jobs as employer of last resort. Second was a training program to increase the
skills of the lowest-income group. Third was financial aid to the depressed city as by
federal subsidy. Fourth was the construction of low-cost housing. All of these are
shown to lie between neutral and detrimental almost irrespective of the criteria used for
 6 JAY W. FORRESTER
judgment. They range from ineffective to harmful judged either by their effect on the
economic health of the city or by their long-range effect on the low-income population
of the city.
The results both confirm and explain much of what has been happening over the last
several decades in our cities.
In fact, it emerges that the fundamental cause of depressed areas in the cities comes
from e x c e s s housing in the low-income category rather than the commonly presumed
housing shortage. The legal and tax structures have combined to give incentives for
keeping old buildings in place. As industrial buildings age, the employment oppor-
tunities decline. As residential buildings age, they are used by lower-income groups who
are forced to use them at a higher population density. Therefore, jobs decline and
population rises while buildings age. Housing, at the higher population densities,
accommodates more low-income urban population than can find jobs. A social trap is
created where excess low-cost housing beckons low-income people inward because of
the available housing. They continue coming to the city until their numbers so far
exceed the available income opportunities that the standard of living declines far
enough to stop further inflow. Income to the area is then too low to maintain all of the
housing. Excess housing falls into disrepair and is abandoned. One can simultaneously
have extreme crowding in those buildings that are occupied, while other buildings
become excess and are abandoned because the economy of the area cannot support all
of the residential structures. But the excess residential buildings threaten the area in two
ways--they occupy the land so that it cannot be used for job-creating buildings, and
they stand ready to accept a rise in population if the area should start to improve
economically.
Any change which would otherwise raise the standard of living only takes off the
economic pressure momentarily and causes the population to rise enough that the
standard of living again falls to the barely tolerable level. A self-regulating system is
thereby at work which drives the condition of the depressed area down far enough to
stop the increase in people.
At any time, a near-equilibrium exists affecting population mobility between the
different areas of the country. To the extent that there is disequilibrium, it means that
some area is slightly more attractive than others, and population begins to move in the
direction of the more attractive area. This movement continues until the rising popu-
lation drives the more attractive area down in attractiveness until the area is again in
equilibrium with its surroundings. Other things being equal, an increase in population
of a city crowds housing, overloads job opportunities, causes congestion, increases
pollution, encourages crime, and reduces almost every component of the quality of life.
This powerful dynamic force to re-establish an equilibrium in total attractiveness
means that any social program must take into account the eventual shifts that will
occur in the many components of attractiveness. As used here, attractiveness is the
composite effect of all factors that cause population movement toward or away from an
area. Most areas in a country have nearly equal attractiveness most of the time, with
only sufficient disequilibrium in attractiveness to account for the shifts in population.
But areas can have the same composite attractiveness with different mixes in the
components of attractiveness. In one area component A could be high and B low, while
the reverse could be true in another area that nevertheless had the same total composite
attractiveness. If a program makes some aspect of an area more attractive than its
neighbor's, and thereby makes total attractiveness higher momentarily, population of
COUNTERINTUITIVE BEHAVIOR 7
that area rises until other components of attractiveness are driven down far enough to
again establish an equilibrium. This means that efforts to improve the condition of our
cities will result primarily in increasing the population of the cities and causing the
population of the country to concentrate in the cities. The overall condition of urban
life, for any particular economic class of population, cannot be appreciably better or
worse than that of the remainder of the country to and from which people may come.
Programs aimed at improving the city can succeed only if they result in eventually
raising the average quality of life for the country as a whole.

On Raising the Quality of Life

But there is substantial doubt that our urban programs have been contributing to the
national quality of life. By concentrating total population, and especially low-income
population, in urban locations, undermining the strength and cohesiveness of the
community, and making government and bureaucracy so big that the individual feels
powerless to influence the system within which he is increasingly constrained, the quality
of life is being reduced. In fact, if they have any effect, our efforts to improve our urban
areas will in the long run tend to delay the concern about rising total population and
thereby contribute directly to the eventual overcrowding of the country and the world.
Any proposed program must deal with both the quality of life and the factors affecting
population. "Raising the quality of life" means releasing stress and pressures, reducing
crowding, reducing pollution, alleviating hunger, and treating ill health. But these
pressures are exactly the sources of concern and action aimed at controlling total
population to keep it within the bounds of the fixed world within which we live. If the
pressures are relaxed, so is the concern about how we impinge on the environment.
Population will then rise further until the pressures reappear with an intensity that can
no longer be relieved. To try to raise quality of life without intentionally creating
compensating pressures to prevent a rise in population density will be self-defeating.
Consider the meaning of these interacting attractiveness components as they affect a
depressed ghetto area of a city. First we must be clear on the way population density is,
in fact, now being controlled. There is some set of forces determining that the density
is not far higher or lower than it is. But there are many possible combinations of forces
that an urban area can exert. The particular combination will determine the population
mix of the area and the economic health of the city. I suggest that the depressed areas
of most American cities are created by a combination of forces in which there is a job
shortage and a housing excess. The availability of housing draws the lowest-income
group until they so far exceed the opportunities of the area that the low standard of
living, the frustration, and the crime rate counterbalance the housing availability.
Until the pool of excess housing is reduced, little can be done to improve the economic
condition of the city. A low-cost housing program alone moves exactly in the wrong
direction. It draws more low-income people. It makes the area differentially more
attractive to the poor who need jobs and less attractive to those who create jobs. In the
new population equilibrium that develops, some characteristic of the social system
must compensate for the additional attractiveness created by the low-cost housing. The
counterbalance is a further decline of the economic condition for the area. But as the
area becomes more destitute, pressures rise for more low-cost housing. The consequence
is a downward spiral that draws in the low-income population, depresses their con-
dition, prevents escape, and reduces hope. All of this is done with the best of
intentions.
8 JAY W. FORRESTER
My paper, "Systems Analysis as a Tool for Urban Planning" from a symposium in
October, 1969, at the National Academy of Engineering, suggests a reversal of present
practice in order simultaneously to reduce the aging housing in our cities and to allocate
land to income-earning opportunities. The land shifted to industry permits the "balance
of trade" of the area to be corrected by allowing labor to create and export a product to
generate an income stream with which to buy the necessities of modern life from the
outside. But the concurrent reduction of excess housing is absolutely essential. It
supplies the land for new jobs. Equally important, the resulting housing shortage
creates the population-stabilizing pressure that allows economic revival to proceed
without being inundated by rising population. This can all be done without driving the
present low-income residents out of the area. It can create upward economic mobility to
convert the low-income population to a self-supporting basis.
The first reaction of many people to these ideas is to believe that they will never be
accepted by elected officials or by residents of depressed urban areas. But some of our
strongest support and encouragement is coming from those very groups who are
closest to the problems, who see the symptoms first-hand, who have lived through the
failures of the past, and who must live with the present conditions until enduring
solutions are found.
Over the last several decades the country has slipped into a set of attitudes about our
cities that are leading to actions that have become an integral part of the system that is
generating greater troubles. If we were malicious and wanted to create urban slums,
trap low-income people in ghetto areas, and increase the number of people on welfare,
we could do little better than follow the present policies. The trend toward stressing
income and sales taxes and away from the real estate tax encourages old buildings to
remain in place and block self-renewal. The concessions in the income tax laws to
encourage low-income housing will in the long run actually increase the total low-
income population of the country. The highway expenditures and the government
loans for suburban housing have made it easier for higher-income groups to abandon
urban areas than to revive them. The pressures to expand the areas incorporated by
urban government, in an effort to expand the revenue base, have been more than offset
by lowered administrative efficiency, more citizen frustration, and the accelerated
decline that is triggered in the annexed areas. The belief that more money will solve
urban problems has taken attention away from correcting the underlying causes and
has instead allowed the problems to grow to the limit of the available money, whatever
that amount might be. ~

Characteristics of Social Systems

I turn now to some characteristics of social systems that mislead people. These have
been identified in our work with corporate and urban systems and in more recent work
that I will describe concerning the worldwide pressures that are now enveloping our
planet.
First, social systems are inherently insensitive to most policy changes that people
select in an effort to alter the behavior of the system. In fact, a social system tends to
draw our attention to the very points at which an attempt to intervene will fail. Our
experience, which has been developed from contact with simple systems, leads us to
look close to the symptoms of trouble for a cause. When we look, we discover that the
Our continuing examination of urban behavior has been made possible through a grant to M.I.T.
from the Independence Foundation of Philadelphia.
COUNTERINTUITIVE BEHAVIOR 9
social system presents us with an apparent cause that is plausible according to what we
have learned from simple systems. But this apparent cause is usually a coincident
occurrence that, like the trouble symptom itself, is being produced by the feedback-loop
dynamics of a larger system. For example, as already discussed, we see human suffering
in the cities; we observe that it is accompanied (some think caused) by inadequate
housing. We increase the housing, and the population rises to compensate for the effort.
More people are drawn into and trapped in the depressed social system. As another
example, the symptoms of excess population are beginning to overshadow the country.
These symptoms appear as urban crowding and social pressure. Rather than face the
population problem squarely we try to relieve the immediate pressure by planning
industry in rural areas and by discussing new towns. If additional urban area is pro-
vided, it will temporarily reduce the pressures and defer the need to face the underlying
population question. The consequence, as it will be seen twenty-five years hence, will
have been to contribute to increasing the population so much that even today's quality
of life will be impossible.
A second characteristic of social systems is that all of them seem to have a few
sensitive influence points through which the behavior of the system can be changed.
These influence points are not in the locations where most people expect. Furthermore,
if one identifies in a model of a social system a sensitive point where influence can be
exerted, the chances are still that a person guided by intuition and judgment will alter
the system in the wrong direction. For example in the urban system, housing is a
sensitive control point, but, if one wishes to revive the economy of a city and make it a
better place for low-income as well as other people, it appears that the amount of
low-income housing must be reduced rather than increased. Another example is the
worldwide problem of rising population and the disparity between the standards of
living in the developed and the underdeveloped countries, an issue arising in the world
system to be discussed in the following paragraphs. But it is beginning to appear that a
sensitive control point is the rate of generation of capital investment.
And how should one change the rate of capital accumulation ? The common answer
has been to increase industrialization, but recent examination suggests that hope lies
only in reducing the rate of industrialization. This may actually help raise quality of
life and contribute to stabilizing population.
As a third characteristic of social systems, there is usually a fundamental conflict
between the short-term and long-term consequences of a policy change. A policy which
produces improvement in the short run, within five to ten years, is usually one which
degrades the system in the long run, beyond ten years. Likewise, those policies and
programs which produce long-run improvement may initially depress the behavior of
the system. This is especially treacherous. The short run is more visible and more
compelling. It speaks loudly for immediate attention. But a series of actions all aimed
at short-run improvement can eventually burden a system with long-run depressants so
severe that even heroic short-run measures no longer suffice. Many of the problems
which we face today are the eventual result of short-run measures taken as long as two
or three decades ago.

A Global Perspective
I have mentioned social organizations at the corporate level and then touched on
work which has been done on the dynamics of the city. Now we are beginning to
examine issues of even broader scope.
 10 JAY W. FORRESTER
In July, 1970, we held a two-week international conference on world dynamics. It
was a meeting organized for the Club of Rome, a private group of about fifty individuals
drawn from many countries who have joined together to attempt a better understanding
of social systems at the world level. Their interest lies in the same problems of popu-
lation, resources, industrialization, pollution, and worldwide disparities of standard
of living on which many groups now focus. But the Club of Rome is devoted to taking
actions that will lead to a better understanding of world trends and to influencing world
leaders and governments. The July meeting at M.I.T. included the general theory and
behavior of complex systems and talks on the behavior of specific social systems
ranging from corporations through commodity markets to biological systems, drug
addiction in the community, and growth and decline of a city. Especially prepared for
this conference was a dynamic model of the interactions between world population,
industralization, depletion of natural resources, agriculture, and pollution. A detailed
discussion of this world system has now appeared in my book World Dynamics, and its
further development is the purpose of the "Project on the Predicament of Mankind"
being sponsored by the Club of Rome at M.I.T. for a year under the guidance of
Professor Dennis Meadows. The plan is to develop a research group of men from many
countries who will eventually base their continuing efforts in a neutral country such as
Switzerland. The immediate project will re-examine, verify, alter, and extend the
preliminary dynamic study of the world system and will relate it to the present worldwide
concern about trends in civilization. 2
The simple model of world interactions as thus far developed shows several different
alternative futures depending on whether population growth is eventually suppressed
by shortage of natural resources, by pollution, by crowding and consequent social
strife, or by insufficient food. Malthus dealt only with the latter, but it is possible for
civilization to encounter other controlling pressures before a food shortage occurs.
It is certain that resource shortage, pollution, crowding, food failure, or some other
equally powerful force will limit population and industrialization if persuasion and
psychological factors do not. Exponential growth cannot continue forever. Our
greatest immediate challenge is how we guide the transition from growth to equilibrium.
There are many possible mechanisms of growth suppression. That some one or combi-
nation will occur is inevitable. Unless we come to understand and to choose, the social
system by its internal processes will choose for us. The natural mechanisms for termi-
nating exponential growth appear to be the least desirable. Unless we understand and
begin to act soon, we may be overwhelmed by a social and economic system we have
created but can't control.
Figure 1 shows the structure that has been assumed) It interrelates the mutual
effects of population, capital investment, natural resources, pollution, and the fraction
of capital devoted to agriculture. These five system "levels" are shown in the rectangles.
Each level is caused to change by the rates of flow in and out, such as the birth rate and
death rate that increase and decrease population. As shown by the dotted lines, the five
system levels, through intermediate concepts shown at the circles, control the rates of
flow. As an example, the death rate at Symbol l0 depends on population P and the
" n o r m a l " lifetime as stated by death rate normal DRN. But death rate depends also on

2 The continuing project was made possible by financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation
(Stiftung-Volkswagenwerk) of West Germany.
3 All figures are taken from the manuscript for WorldDynamics by Jay W. Forrester, Wright-Allen
Press, 238 Main Street, Cambridge, Mass. 02142.
 I=

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ill il iill V ~--. __ ..2~. _~

12 JAY W. FORRESTER
conditions in other parts of the system. From Circle 12 comes the influence of pollution
that here assumes death rate to double if pollution becomes 20 times as severe as in 1970;
and, progressively, that death rate would increase by a factor of 10 if pollution became
60 times as much as now. Likewise from Circle 13 the effect of food per capita is to
increase death rate as food becomes less available. The detailed definition of the model
states how each rate of flow is assumed to depend on the levels of population, natural
resources, capital investment, capital devoted to food, and pollution.
Individually the assumptions in the model are plausible, create little disagreement,
and reflect common discussions and assertions about the individual responses within
the world system. But each is explicit and can be subjected to scrutiny. From one
viewpoint, the system of Fig. l is very simplified. It focuses on a few major factors and
omits most of the substructure of world social and economic activity. But from another
viewpoint, Fig. l is comprehensive and complex. The system is far more complete and
the theory described by the accompanying computer model is much more explicit
than the mental models that are now being used as a basis for world and governmental
planning. It incorporates dozens of nonlinear relationships. The world system shown
here exhibits provocative and even frightening possibilities.

Transition from Growth to Equilibrium

With the model specified, a computer can be used to show how the system, as
described for each of its parts, would behave. Given a set of beginning conditions, the
computer can calculate and plot the results that unfold through time.
The world today seems to be entering a condition in which pressures are rising
simultaneously from every one of the influences that can suppress growth--depleted
resources, pollution, crowding, and insufficient food. It is still unclear which will
dominate if mankind continues along the present path. Figure 2 shows the mode of
behavior of this world system given the assumption that population reaches a peak and
then declines because industrialization is suppressed by falling natural resources. The
model system starts with estimates of conditions in 1900. Adjustments have been made
so that the generated paths pass through the conditions of 1970.
In Fig. 2 the quality of life peaks in the 1950s and by 2020 has fallen far enough to halt
further rise in population. Declining resources and the consequent fall in capital
investment then exert further pressure to gradually reduce world population.
But we may not be fortunate enough to run gradually out of natural resources.
Science and technology may very well find ways to use the more plentiful metals and
atomic energy so that resource depletion does not intervene. If so, the way then remains
open for some other pressure to arise within the system. Figure 3 shows what happens
within this system if the resource shortage is foreseen and avoided. Here the only change
from Fig. 2 is in the usage rate of natural resources after the year 1970. In Fig. 3,
resources are used after 1970 at a rate 75 percent less than assumed in Fig. 2. In other
words, the standard of living is sustained with a lower drain on the expendable and
irreplaceable resources. But the picture is even less attractive! By not running out of
resources, population and capital investment are allowed to rise until a pollution crisis
is created. Pollution then acts directly to reduce birth rate, increase death rate, and to
depress food production. Population which, according to this simple model, peaks at
the year 2030 has fallen to one-sixth of the peak population within an interval of 20
years--a worldwide catastrophe of a magnitude never before experienced. Should it
 =.. . . . . ~ .~ ~ ~= ==
~.~ • • • • • • • • ,! • • • • • • i • ,i , • • • • • • • ,i • • • • • . • • J

' ' Natural ' '

~ s o u r c e s _ :

~r'~"~"~l~l " * . . . . . . . i " " " ° " " " " "i " " " " " " " " °1 ° ° " " ° ° " ° °1 ° ° " ° ° " ° ° "

~' , ~.. , Population ,

i i i -- i

Quality
=..~..~. : ', of,f~ ,'/~ -,~.. ',-...._

I ~t i (J i i

= . . = . ~=.,, ~ , ,~-- , ,
~_. oou~ .o i I i i ~ i
~. : ~ =, • • -. ~ - - ~ - • • : cap.~ ..... o~" ....... , ..................
" ~ - ; investment , ~ , , ',

,~ , - - u ~ , Pollution',., " ~'

• "~ . . . . I o I 1 i

._i . . . . . .

°
cn
~ ~ ~' ~ Years

Fig. 2. Basic world model behavior showing the mode in which industrialization and population arc
suppressed by falling natural resources.
W~-5

o. ~ o c' = NRUN1
PRESENT .25
-~ . . . . ORIGINAL 1. ~ ~ :=(J
° ~ ° ~ : I . . . . . "" ''J . . . . . . . . . = : V ,0
~ . 7 ~ o , • , , ° • ° • • • • • • • • ° • • ,~ • • • • •

i i
PI
'i ' Natural
I I /
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resources ' / ' '
, ~,
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== A =.
= PopulatioR . . .
~ . . . . .
"=" • " ~
.

~ ' oflife ',/ ' "

~ ,-' • .... ~ . . . . . . . .

/° ,~ °/" , ~ /,, - -

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~, , inves|ment ,,~' , Pollution/ ~.k_ ~ r /

~- % ' "~ ' o~P~,' (~ ,, ~/ , ',

, v,~,~,y ,.-
o _-....=..=., . ,~o,~=,,e , ~ , ,
,~ ~.,~?:::?:?:..:: . . . . . . . . . • . . .1 ° • . . • • • • .l • ° . . . . . . • • • ° - • • • ° •

.-i . . . . .

• = ~ o Years =

Fig. 3. Pollution crisis precipitated by lower usage rate or" natural resources. I n ]970 natuJra] resource
usage is reduced 75 percent by more cft'cctJvc technology without affecting material standard of living.
14 JAY W. FORRESTER
occur, one can speculate on which sectors of the world population will suffer most. It
is quite possible that the more industrialized countries (which are the ones which have
caused such a disaster) would be the least able to survive such a disruption to environ-
ment and food supply. They might be the ones to take the brunt of the collapse.
Figure 3 shows how a technological success (reducing our dependence on natural
resources) can merely save us from one fate only to fall victim to something worse (a
pollution catastrophe). There is now developing throughout the world a strong under-
current of doubt about technology as the savior of mankind. There is a basis for such
doubt. Of course, the source of trouble is not technology as such but is instead the
management of the entire technological-political-economic-natural complex.
Figure 3 is a dramatic example of the general process discussed earlier wherein a
program aimed at one trouble symptom results in creating a new set of troubles in some
other part of the system. Here the success in alleviating a natural resource shortage
throws the system over into the mode of stopping population caused by industrialization
which has been freed from natural resource restraint. This process of a solution creating
a new problem has defeated many of our past governmental programs and will continue
to do so unless we devote more effort to understanding the dynamic behavior of our
social systems.

Alternatives to Decline or Catastrophe

Suppose in the basic world system of Figs. 1 and 2 we ask how to sustain the quality
of life which is beginning to decline after 1950. One way to attempt this, and it is the way
the world is now choosing, might be to increase the rate of industrialization by raising
the rate of capital investment. Models of the kind we are here using make such hypo-
thetical questions answerable in a few minutes and at negligible cost. Figure 4 shows
what happens if the " n o r m a l " rate of capital accumulation is increased by 20 percent in
1970. The pollution crisis reappears. This time the cause is not the more efficient use of
natural resources but the upsurge of industrialization which overtaxes the environment
before resource depletion has a chance to depress industrialization. Again, an "obvious"
desirable change in policy has caused troubles worse than the ones that were originally
being corrected.
This is important, not only for its own message, but because it demonstrates how an
apparently desirable change in a social system can have unexpected and even disastrous
results.
Figure 4 should make us cautious about rushing into programs on the basis of short-
term humanitarian impulses. The eventual result can be antihumanitarian. Emotionally
inspired efforts often fall into one of three traps set for us by the nature of social
systems: the programs are apt to address symptoms rather than causes and attempt to
operate through points in the system that have little leverage for change; the charac-
teristic of systems whereby a policy change has the opposite effect in the short run from
the effect in the long run can eventually cause deepening difficulties after a sequence of
short-term actions; and the effect of a program can be along an entirely different
direction from what was originally expected, so that suppressing one symptom only
causes trouble to burst forth at another point.
Figure 5 retains the 20 percent additional capital investment rate after 1970 from
Fig. 4 but in addition explores birth reduction as a way of avoiding crisis. Here the
" n o r m a l " birth rate has been cut in half in 1970. (Changes in normal rates refer to
coefficients which have the specified effect if all other things remain the same. But other
 W~-I
o. ~ ~J c>'== ClGN1
m m PRESENT 60,A zo'
.... 0RIGIIeAL 50.A =ca ~ ~. u° "

i i )

' ' Natural

~ resources I :

= . . . R ~ =. , , -= ,:, ~,
i ~ £ '' ........ ' ......... ' ....... :','"r'" ', .... i .... ;
,,, ~ ~ ' ~ P o p u l a t , o n , t , , ,

=..,,
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. . . . . . .. . ~. . . I. . . ..'
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.J . . . . .

~ ~, ~, ~ o Years
m
o.
Fig.4. In 1970 the rate of capital accumulation is increased 20 percent in an e f f o r t t o reverse the
beginning decline in quality o f l i f e . The pollution crisis occurs before natural resources are depicted.
~lk-k

~-~uc= ClGN1 BRN1

PRESENT 60.A 20.A
.... ORIGINAL 50.A k0.A o.c~
. . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . .
o=oo,~=o . . /.. ~ . . \..
o o

'=,.=-~ Natural /~ T ~' ~',

I
.~souroes ,~ / ~l \~:
l i - - = ~" c-

-.::. ~.: ', ~ _ t '~ ~' ~1 ,,

~,
II
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~ l ~ l ~:~n-av,elFent/:
{ J ........ i : ~ , ,
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o-- , / :
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; ~ = =' o~,,..~o~ '~,~ , , ,
• ": .... _L. ~ ' ~ ' ' '
e,) o o ( ~ ) o 1 , i i ~ o - - _.. e w ~ .
e,) . . . . . . . . . . ~:7:::::; . . . . . . . . . . ) . . . . . . . . . i . . . . . . . . . ) . . . . . . . . . )

=.l . . . . . .
o c) o o (=) o
. ~ ~ ~, e,l
,~ o

~- ,. .~ ,~ 7 ,~ Years ,~
c
Fig. 5. In 1970 the 20 percent increase in capital accumulation of Fig. 4 is retained and "normal" birth
rate is reduced 50 percent. Capital investment continues to grow until the pollution crisis develops.
After a~ initial decline, population is again pushed up by the rapid rise in quality of life that precedes
the collapse.
 16 JAY W. F O R R E S T E R
things in the system change and also exert their effect on the actual system rates.) The
result shows interesting behavior. Quality of life surges upward for thirty years for the
reasons that are customarily asserted. Food-per-capita grows, material standard of
living rises, and crowding does not become as great. But the more affluent world
population continues to use natural resources and to accumulate capital plant at about
the same rate as in Fig. 4. Load on the environment is more closely related to industriali-
zation than to population, and the pollution crisis occurs at about the same point in
time as in Fig. 4.
Figure 5 shows that the 50 percent reduction in "normal" birth rate in 1970 was
sufficient to start a decline in total population. But the rising quality of life and the
reduction of pressures act to start the population curve upward again. This is especially
evident in other computer runs where the reduction in " n o r m a l " birth rate is not so
drastic. Serious questions are raised by this investigation about the effectiveness of
birth control as a means of controlling population. The secondary consequence of
starting a birth control program will be to increase the influences that raise birth rate
and reduce the apparent pressures that require population control. A birth control
program which would be effective, all other things being equal, may largely fail because
other things will not remain equal. Its very incipient success can set in motion forces to
defeat the program.
Figure 6 combines the reduced resource usage rate and the increased capital invest-
ment rate of Figs. 3 and 4. The result is to make the population collapse occur slightly
sooner and more severely. Based on the modified system of Fig. 6, Fig. 7 then examines
Nh-6

Q. ~ ~J c ~ ClGN1 NRUN1
PRESENT 60.A .25
m u~ ~u
. . . . ORIGINAL 50.A 1. °"
m ~ ~ o'z ~. =z

.,, ............................... , t'l ........ "',;.',

, , ,
.... Natura
sources

| i i

:' 7 :' 1 1 : ""?°l

, ,~, , ~ ~

~ g~,~ .~, " ~ ' , ......... j' ........ /

~, , Capita ~ ,
c, , investment o ' ~ , Polluti

• . . . . . ! rJ l I i
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• + + , .
p. o o o # ,+° oO
~- -, ,~ ,~ ~, ,, Y e a r s ~,

F i g . 6. T h e 20 p e r c e n t increase o f c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t f r o m F i g . 4 a n d the 75 p e r c e n t r e d u c t i o n o f n a t u r a l
r e s o u r c e usage f r o m F i g . 3 are c o m b i n e d .
COUNTERINTUITIVE BEHAVIOR 17

the result if technology finds ways to reduce the pollution generated by a given degre6
of industrialization. Here in Fig. 7, the pollution rate, other things being the same, is
reduced by 50 percent from that in Fig. 6. The result is to postpone the day of reckoning
by twenty years and to allow the world population to grow 25 percent greater before
the population collapse occurs. The "solution" of reduced pollution has, in effect,
caused more people to suffer the eventual consequences. Again we seethe dangers of
partial solutions. Actions at one point in a system that attempt to relieve one kind of
distress produce an unexpected result in some other part of the system. If the interactions
are not sufficiently understood, the consequences can be as bad as or worse than those
that led to the initial action.
~There are no utopias in our social systems. There appear to be no sustainable modes
of behavior that are free of pressures and stresses. But there are many possible modes
and some are more desirable than others. Usually, the more attractive kinds of behavior
in our social systems seem to be possible only if we have a good understanding of the
system dynamics and are willing to endure the self-discipline and pressures that must
accompany the desirable mode. The world system of Fig. l can exhibit modes that are
more hopeful than the crises of Fig. 2 through 7. But to develop the more promising
modes will require restraint and dedication to a long-range future that man may not be
capable of sustaining.
Figure 8 shows the world system if several policy changes are adopted together in the
year 1970. Population is stabilized. Quality of life rises about 50 percent. Pollution
W~-7

a. N~J c'= CIGtll tlRUN1 POLN1

PRESENT 60.A .25 S
=o ~ " ctz

.
. .

.
. . . . . . .

.
. . . . . . . .

.
. . .

.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

,,,
. . . . . . . . .

! Natural , , ~ i ~ ~
'resources , g P ~ ' I '
= - ~ -~--- i i

~,..:o ......... , . . ~ , - ~ - ,- , .....~

!
!

=..=..=. , -= _

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

= ~-
"~ ° (" , ~ _, . . ~ l ~ ' C a p. i .t a.l . . . . . . . . . ~.~ . . . . . . . .

, ,investme~,ff :
T~. , , ~ - ,

~
_ ', ,., , e ~ (" Pc I l u t i o J '
o~;oo~, ¢~.. iJ
~
.... J~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . i • • • • • • o o . , . . . . . . . . .

_J . . . .
o o o o o o o°
=-
= ,~ .. ~ ~ ~ Years
o.

Fig. 7. Increased capital investment rate and reduced natural resource usage from Fig. 6 are retained.
In addition in 1970 the " n o r m a l " rate of pollution generation is reduced 50 percent. The effect of
pollution control is to allow population to grow 25 percent further and to delay the pollution crisis by
20 years.
 18 JAY W. FORRESTER
remains at about the 1970 level. Would such a world be accepted? It implies an end to
population and economic growth.
In Fig. 8 the normal rate of capital accumulation is reduced 40 percent from its
previous value. The "normal" birth rate is reduced 50 percent from its earlier value.
The "normal" pollution generation is reduced 50 percent from the value before 1970.
The "normal" rate of food production is reduced 20 percent from its previous value.
(These changes in "normal" values are the changes for a specific set of system conditions.
Actual system rates continue to be affected by the varying conditions of the system.)
But reduction in investment rate and reduction in agricultural emphasis are counter-
intuitive and not likely to be discovered or accepted without extensive system studies
and years of argument--perhaps more years than are available. The changes in pollution
generation and natural resource usage may be easier to understand and to achieve. The
severe reduction in worldwide birth rate is the most doubtful. Even if technical and
biological methods existed, the improved condition of the world might remove the
incentive for sustaining the birth reduction emphasis and discipline.

Future Policy Issues

The dynamics of world behavior bear directly on the future of the United States.
American urbanization and industrialization are a major part of the world scene. The
United States is setting a pattern that other parts of the world are trying to follow. That
pattern is not sustainable. Our foreign policy and our overseas commercial activity

Wk-lk

o. ~ u o-z CIGN1 BRfll POLN1 f|RUt/1 FC1

m m PRESENT 30.A 20.A .S .25 .8
z z : ~ z = z z
. . . . ORIGINAL S0.A I*0.A 1. 1. 1. c" c c c c" c'c-'

: o

' ' Natura

~-'4~-J~
-- -- I
resources i

z m cot i i - ~ _ ~-
, . _ ~-= "~. i

' Quality
i
' .~
.m . m . . . of life ~"
. . . . . . " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

', ~~,,,iLP_o _pu_ia_tion

/° J ----=------- ............. .

= !<7:
g.
,
,
Ca_it.I
ea ......
investment u ~A'p
~:,. - - ' ' ; ' ' ; " ~ ' ~ ' " ~ ; ~ ' ~ ;,: '_

e,~ o o o o o&a.~
, ,.,,,,,.~ i . . . . . .
Pollution
- , - - --- - . . . . . . . . . . . / ....... ~ ....... N .................... -.-,
~. :. :.-~ . . . . . . . . ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,
.J . . . .
o o o o o o o
=C = = ° ° Years
o.

Fig. 8. O n e set o f c o n d i t i o n s that establishes a w o r l d e q u i l i b r i u m . I n 1970 capital i n v e s t m e n t r a t e is

r e d u c e d 4 0 percent, birth r a t e is reduced 50 percent, p o l l u t i o n g e n e r a t i o n is r e d u c e d 50 percent, n a t u r a l
resource usage r a t e is r e d u c e d 75 percent, a n d f o o d p r o d u c t i o n is r e d u c e d 2 0 percent.
COUNTERINTUITIVE BEHAVIOR 19
seem to be running contrary to overwhelming forces that are developing in the world
system. The following issues are raised by the preliminary investigations to date. They
must, of course, be examined more deeply and confirmed by more thorough research
into the assumptions about structure and detail of the world system.

• Industrialization may be a more fundamentally disturbing force in world ecology

than is population. In fact, the population explosion is perhaps best viewed as a result
of technology and industrialization. I include medicine and public health as a part of
industrialization.
• Within the next century, man may be facing choices from a four-pronged
dilemma--suppression of modern industrial society by a natural resource shortage,
collapse of world population from changes wrought by pollution, population limitation
by food shortage, or population control by war, disease, and social stresses caused by
physical and psychological crowding.
• We may now be living in a "golden age" where, in spite of the worldwide feeling of
malaise, the quality of life is, on the average, higher than ever before in history and
higher now than the future offers.
• Efforts for direct population control may be inherently self-defeating. If population
control begins to result as hoped in higher per-capita food supply and material standard
of living, these very improvements can generate forces to trigger a resurgence of
population growth.
• The high standard of living of modern industrial societies seems to result from a
production of food and material goods that has been able to outrun the rising popu-
lation. But, as agriculture reaches a space limit, as industrialization reaches a natural
resource limit, and as both reach a pollution limit, population tends to catch up.
Population then grows until the "quality of life" falls far enough to generate sufficiently
large pressures to stabilize population.
• There may be no realistic hope for the present underdeveloped countries reaching
the standard of living demonstrated by the present industrialized nations. The pollution
and natural resource load placed on the world environmental system by each person in
an advanced country is probably 10 to 20 times greater than the load now generated by
a person in an underdeveloped country. With four times as much population in under-
developed countries as in the present developed countries, their rising to the economic
level of the United States could mean an increase of 10 times in the natural resource and
pollution load on the world environment. Noting the destruction that has already
occurred on land, in the air, and especially in the oceans, no capability appears to exist
for handling such a rise in standard of living for the present total population of the
world.
• A society with a high level of industrialization may be nonsustainable. It may be
self-extinguishingif it exhausts the natural resources on which it depends. Or, if unending
substitution for declining natural resources is possible, the international strife over
"pollution and environmental rights" may pull the average worldwide standard of
living back to the level of a century ago.
• From the long view of a hundred years hence, the present efforts of underdeveloped
countries to industrialize along Western patterns may be unwise. They may now be
closer to the ultimate equilibrium with the environment than are the industrialized
nations. The present underdeveloped countries may be in a better condition for
surviving the forthcoming worldwide environmental and economic pressures than are
20 JAY W. FORRESTER
the advanced countries. When one of the several forces materializes that is strong
enough to cause a collapse in world population, the advanced countries may suffer far
more than their share of the decline.

A New Frontier
It is now possible to take hypotheses about the separate parts of a social system, to
combine them in a computer model, and to learn the consequences. The hypotheses
may at first be no more correct than the ones we are using in our intuitive thinking. But
the process of computer modeling and model testing requires these hypotheses to be
stated more explicitly. The model comes out of the hazy realm of the mental model into
an unambiguous model or statement to which all have access. Assumptions can then be
checked against all available information and can be rapidly improved. The great
uncertainty with mental models is the inability to anticipate the consequences of
interactions between the parts of a system. This uncertainty is totally eliminated in
computer models. Given a stated set of assumptions, the computer traces the resulting
consequences without doubt or error. This is a powerful procedure for clarifying
issues. It is not easy. Results will not be immediate.
We are on the threshold of a great new era in human pioneering. In the past there
have been periods characterized by geographical exploration. Other periods have dealt
with the formation of national governments. At other times the focus was on the
creation of great literature. Most recently we have been through the pioneering frontier
of science and technology. But science and technology are now a routine part of our
life. Science is no longer a frontier. The process of scientific discovery is orderly and
organized.
I suggest that the next frontier for human endeavor is to pioneer a better under-
standing of the nature of our social systems. The means are visible. The task will be no
easier than the development of science and technology. For the next thirty years we can
expect rapid advance in understanding the complex dynamics of our social systems. To
do so will require research, the development of teaching methods and materials, and the
creation of appropriate educational programs. The research results of today will in
one or two decades find their way into the secondary schools just as concepts of basic
physics moved from research to general education over the past three decades.
What we do today fundamentally affects our future two or three decades hence. I f
we follow intuition, the trends of the past will continue into deepening difficulty. If we
set up research and educational programs, which are now possible but which have not
yet been developed, we can expect a far sounder basis for action.

The Nation's Real Alternatives

The record to date implies that our people accept the future growth of United States
population as preordained, beyond the purview and influence of legislative control, and
as a ground rule which determines the nation's task to be finding cities in which the
future population can live. But I have been describing the circular processes of our social
systems in which there is no unidirectional cause and effect but, instead, a ring of actions
and consequences that close back on themselves. One could say, incompletely, that the
population will grow and that cities, space, and food must be provided. But one can
likewise say, also incompletely, that the provision of cities, space, and food will cause
the population to grow. Population generates pressure for urban growth, but urban
pressures help to limit population.
COUNTERINTUITIVE BEHAVIOR 21
Population grows until stresses rise far enough, which is to say that the quality of life
falls far enough, to stop further increase. Everything we do to reduce those pressures
causes the population to rise farther and faster and hastens the day when expediencies
will no longer suffice. The United States is in the position of a wild animal running from
its pursuers. We still have some space, natural resources, and agricultural land left. We
can avoid the question of rising population as long as we can flee into this bountiful
reservoir that nature provided. But it is obvious that the reservoirs are limited. The wild
animal usually flees until he is cornered, until he has no more space. Then he turns to
fight, but he no longer has room to maneuver. He is less able to forestall disaster than if
he had fought in the open while there was still room to yield and to dodge. The United
States is running away from its long-term threats by trying to relieve social pressures as
they arise. But if we persist in treating only the symptoms and not the causes, the result
will be to increase the magnitude of the ultimate threat and reduce our capability to
respond when we no longer have space to flee.
What does this mean ? Instead of automatically accepting the need for new towns and
the desirability of locating industry in rural areas, we should consider confining our
cities. If it were possible to prohibit the encroachment by housing and industry onto
even a single additional acre of farm and forest, the resulting social pressures would
hasten the day when we stabilize population. Some European countries are closer to
realizing the necessity of curtailing urban growth than we are. As I understand it, farm
land surrounding Copenhagen cannot be used for either residence or industry until
the severest of pressures forces the government to rezone small additional parcels.
When land is rezoned, the corresponding rise in land price is heavily taxed to remove the
incentive for land speculation. The waiting time for an empty apartment in Copenhagen
may be years. Such pressures certainly cause the Danes to face the population problem
more squarely than do we.
Our greatest challenge now is how to handle the transition from growth into equilib-
rium. Our society has behind it a thousand years of tradition that has encouraged and
rewarded growth. The folklore and the success stories praise growth and expansion.
But that is not the path of the future. Many of the present stresses in our society are
from the pressures that always accompany the conversion from growth into equilibrium.
In our studies of social systems, we have made a number of investigations of life
cycles that start with growth and merge into equilibrium. There are always severe
stresses in the transition. Pressures must rise far enough to suppress the forces that
produced growth. Not only do we face the pressure that will stop the population growth;
we also encounter pressures that will stop the rise of industrialization and standard of
living. The social stresses will rise. The economic forces will be ones for which we have
no precedent. The psychological forces will be beyond those for which we are prepared.
Our studies of urban systems demonstrated how the pressures from shortage of land
and rising unemployment accompany the usual transition from urban growth to
equilibrium. But the pressures we have seen in our cities are minor compared to those
which the nation is approaching. The population pressures and the economic forces in a
city that was reaching equilibrium have in the past been able to escape to new land areas.
But that escape is becoming less possible. Until now we have had, in effect, an
inexhaustible supply of farm land and food-growing potential. But now we are reaching
the critical point where, all at the same time, population is overrunning productive
land, agricultural land is almost fully employed for the first time, the rise in population
is putting more demand on the food supplies, and urbanization is pushing agriculture
 22 JAY W. FORRESTER
out of the fertile areas into the marginal lands. For the first time demand is rising into a
condition where supply will begin to fall while need increases. The crossover from plenty
to shortage can occur abruptly.
The fiscal and monetary system of the country is a complex social-economic-financial
system of the kind we have been discussing. It is clear the country is not agreed on
behavior of the interactions between government policy, growth, unemployment, and
inflation. An article by a writer for Finance magazine in July, 1970, suggests that the
approach I have been discussing be applied in fiscal and monetary policy and their
relationships to the economy, I estimate that such a task would be only a few times more
difficult than was the investigation of urban growth and stagnation. The need to
accomplish it becomes more urgent as the economy begins to move for the first time
from a history of growth into the turbulent pressures that will accompany the transition
from growth to one of the many possible kinds of equilibrium. We need to choose the
kind of equilibrium before we arrive.
In a hierarchy of systems, there is usually a conflict between the goals of a subsystem
and the welfare of the broader system. We see this in the urban system. The goal of the
city is to expand and to raise its quality of life. But this increases population, industriali-
zation, pollution, and demands on food supply. The broader social system of the
country and the world requires that the goals of the urban areas be curtailed and that
the pressures of such curtailment become high enough to keep the urban areas and
population within the bounds that are satisfactory to the larger system of which the city
is a part. If this nation chooses to continue to work for some of the traditional urban
goals, and if it succeeds, as it may well do, the result will be to deepen the distress of the
country as a whole and eventually to deepen the crisis in the cities themselves. We may
be at the point where higher pressures in the present are necessary if insurmountable
pressures are to be avoided in the future.
I have tried to give you a glimpse of the nature of multi-loop feedback systems, a class
to which our social systems belong. I have attempted to indicate how these systems
mislead us because our intuition and judgment have been formed to expect behavior
different from that actually possessed by such systems. I believe that we are still pursuing
national programs that will be at least as frustrating and futile as many of the past. But
there is hope. We can now begin to understand the dynamic behavior of our social
systems. Progress will be slow. There are many cross-currents in the social sciences
which will cause confusion and delay. The approach that I have been describing is very
different from the emphasis on data gathering and statistical analysis that occupies
much of the time of social research. But there have been breakthroughs in several areas.
I f we proceed expeditiously but thoughtfully, there is a basis for optimism.

Suggested Readings
Jay W. Forrester, h~dustrial Dynamics. Cambridge, Mass. : The M.I.T. Press, 1961.
Jay W. Forrester, Pr#lciples of Systems. Cambridge, Mass. (238 Main St.): Wright-Allen Press, 1968.
Jay W. Forrester, Urban Dynamics. Cambridge, Mass. : The M.I.T. Press, 1969.
Jay W. Forrester, Worm Dynamics. Cambridge, Mass. (238 Main St.): Wright-Allen Press, 1971.
Dennis L. Meadows, Dynamics of Commodity Production Cycles. Cambridge, Mass. (238 Main St.):
Wright-Allen Press, 1970.