Aquilino Q. Pimentel, ., et al vs.

Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President

Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011

TOPIC: Inapplicability of the Doctrine

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order

FACTS:

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order filed by Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator Pimentel), Manuel B.
Villar (Senator Villar), Joker P. Arroyo, Francis N. Pangilinan, Pia S. Cayetano, and Alan Peter S.
Cayetano (petitioners).

Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole (respondent) from conducting
further hearings on the complaint filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal (Senator Madrigal)
against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 706 (P.S. Resolution 706) on the alleged double
insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act.

Antecedent

1. On 15 September 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege

speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!" In his privilege speech, Senator Lacson called
attention to the congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act, particularly
the P200 million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue
Extension from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City including Right-of-
Way (ROW), and another P200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5 road including
ROW. Senator Lacson stated that C-5 is what was formerly called President Carlos P. Garcia
Avenue and that the second appropriation covers the same stretch – from Sucat Luzon
Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City. Senator Lacson inquired from DBM Secretary
Rolando Andaya, Jr. about the double entry and was informed that it was on account of a
congressional insertion. Senator Lacson further stated that when he followed the narrow trail
leading to the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then the Senate President.

2. On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where he stated that he would
answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee.

3. On 27 April 2009, Senator Lacson delivered another privilege speech where he stated that
the Ethics Committee was not a kangaroo court. However, due to the accusation that the
Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villar’s case, Senator Lacson moved
that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a
Committee of the Whole. The motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none
against, and five abstentions.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

1. The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s constitutional right to equal protection;

2. The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation of the
complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar is violative of Senator Villar’s right to
 due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution;
and

3. The Senate Committee of the Whole likewise violated the due process clause of the
Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole in spite of
its own provision [which] require[s] its effectivity upon publication

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

1. The instant petition should be dismissed for failure to join or implead an indispensable party. In
the alternative, the instant petition should be archived until such time that the said indispensable
party has been joined or impleaded and afforded the opportunity to be heard;

2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee;

3. Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of prohibition for failure to prove grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent Committee of the Whole;

4. The principle of separation of powers must be upheld;

5. The instant petition must be dismissed for being premature. Petitioners failed to observe the
doctrine or primary jurisdiction or prior resort;

6. It is within the power of Congress to discipline its members for disorderly behavior;

7. The determination of what constitutes disorderly behavior is a political question which

exclusively pertains to Congress;

8. The Internal Rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion; [and]

9. The Rules of the Ethics Committee, which have been duly published and adopted[,] allow the
adoption of supplementary rules to govern adjudicatory hearings

ISSUES:

1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an indispensable
party in this petition;

2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or
prior resort;

3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the
Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s right to equal protection;

4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee
of the Whole is a violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and of the majority quorum
requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and

5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their
effectivity.
HELD:

[1] No. Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party.

[2] No. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort does not apply in this case.

[3] No. The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the
Senate Committee of the Whole is not violative of Senator Villar’s right to equal protection

[4] No. The adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of
the Whole is not violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement
under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution

[5] Yes. The publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because
the Rules expressly mandate their publication.

RATIO:

[1] Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 7 – Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without

whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or
defendants.

The test to determine if a party is an indispensable party is as follows:

An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a
final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who
has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature
that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has
also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a
determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete or equitable.
Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly go
forward.

A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject
matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or
injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an
indispensable party if his presence would merely permit a complete relief between him and those already
parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason
to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.

In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court.
While it may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution
706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee
of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal’s interest. The nature of Senator
Madrigal’s interest in this case is not of the nature that this case could not be resolved without her
participation.
[2] Respondent asserts that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction "simply calls for the determination of
administrative questions, which are ordinarily questions of fact, by administrative agencies rather than by
courts of justice."

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has ruled:

x x x It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case,
which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case
is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of
the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact
are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper
jurisdiction of the court. x x x

The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of
respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are
within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to
resolve.

As regards respondent’s invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates that "the
inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people."  Thus, it has been held that "the power of
judicial review is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we
would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the
principle of separation of powers." The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal issues
raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the
resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.

[3] The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that "all matters relating to the conduct, rights,
privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges."

However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee
stalled the investigation. In short, while ordinarily an investigation about one of its members’ alleged
irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively
prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics
Committee.

Even Senator Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would
answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. Given the
circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary
remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the
Senate.

[4] The referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is an
extraordinary remedy that does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process. In the same manner, the
adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate
Senator Villar’s right to due process.

The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been
recognized and affirmed by this Court. Thus:
 Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: "Each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings."

This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the
House of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise
of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.

x x x. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question which, under the Constitution, is to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to his
constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to
alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and
publication.

The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of
quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the
Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.

[5] The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since
rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such
rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the
rules can take effect.

In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of
the Senate since the proceedings involve the Senate’s exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its
members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate. However,
Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole provides:

Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide
that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not
required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is
required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. The majority of the members of the
Senate approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the publication requirement which
they adopted should be considered as the will of the majority. Respondent cannot dispense with the
publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been published in
the Official Gazette.