Goodwin, Shepard & Sloan, Police Brutality

POLICE
BRUTALITY
BONDS
How Wall Street Profits
from Police Violence
ALYXANDRA GOODWIN, WHITNEY SHEPARD, CARRIE SLOAN
The Action Center on Race & the Economy (ACRE) is a campaign
hub for organizations working at the intersection of racial
justice and Wall Street accountability. We provide research
and communications infrastructure and strategic support for
organizations working on campaigns to win structural change
by directly taking on the financial elite that are responsible
for pillaging communities of color, devastating working class communities, and harming our
environment. We partner with local organizations from across the United States that are working
on racial, economic, environmental, and educational justice campaigns and help them connect
the dots between their issues and Wall Street so that each of the local efforts feeds into a broad
national movement to hold the financial sector accountable.
We’d like to thank Leslie Lowe for her essential contributions to this report.
Leslie was our program officer at the Rockefeller Family Foundation and
also the key strategic thought partner whose support and brilliance made
this work possible. We miss her dearly.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A
cross the country, city and county budgets reflect an investment in criminalization
and a divestment in the services that actually contribute to public safety. Especially
egregious is that as the cost of police misconduct increases, the communities that
police brutalize are going into debt to pay for it. Often this debt is in the form of bond
borrowing, meaning that when cities or counties issue bonds to pay these costs, banks and
other firms collect fees for the services they provide and investors collect interest.
We call the bonds used to cover police-related settlement and judgment costs “police brutality
bonds”, because they quite literally allow banks and wealthy investors to profit from police
violence. This is a transfer of wealth from communities—especially over-policed communities of
color—to Wall Street and wealthy investors. The companies profiting from police brutality bonds
include well known institutions like Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America, as well as
smaller regional banks and other firms.
While municipalities across the country spend up to 50% of their general funds on policing,
the use of police brutality bonds to pay out settlements and judgments only increases the cost
burden on taxpayers - all while turning a profit for banks and investors. The use of these bonds
can nearly double the costs of the original settlement.
This report focuses on just one aspect of the cost and profits of policing—the use of borrowing
to pay for police-related settlements and judgments. Of course, addressing police brutality is
not just a budgeting issue, it is a moral one. What this report serves to do is uncover the lengths
that municipalities have gone to hide both how the costs of police violence and who profits
from it. The system of policing exists to protect capital. A society built on white supremacy and
racial capitalism will always target Black, Indigenous, and People of Color. There is no economic
solution that can prevent this. As we work to dismantle and disband the system of policing,
we must hold the government, banks, and investors accountable for the financial, physical, and
emotional costs to our communities.
In our research, we found that cities and counties across the United States issue bonds to
pay for police brutality settlements and judgments. The cities range from giant metropolises
such as Los Angeles to smaller cities like Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Our report includes details
on police brutality bonds in twelve cities and counties, including five in-depth case studies:
Chicago, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Lake County, Indiana. Police violence should
never be a source of profit for banks or investors, or a reason we do not have the resources
we need to invest in the infrastructure and services that make our communities safer and more
livable. We need to dismantle this system of policing and build a truly just system that prioritizes
the needs and well-being of all people. While we work toward that together, here are our key
recommendations:
POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 3

KEY FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS:
In the twelve cities and counties included here, we found a total of nearly $878 million in bond
borrowing to cover police related settlements and judgments. This number does not include the
additional cost of interest paid to investors.
In our five case study cities and county, we estimate a total of $1.73 billion in costs related to
these police brutality bonds, including more than $891 million in profit for the investors who buy
the bonds.
Police Brutality Bonds in Twelve Cities and Counties1

City/County Police Brutality Bonds
Bethlehem, PA $7.39 million
Canton, OH $1.8 million
Chicago, IL $709.3 million
Cleveland, OH $12.9 million
Fullerton ,CA $1 million
Hammond, IN $4.8 million
Lake County, IN $18.1 million
Los Angeles, CA $71.4 million
Milwaukee, WI $26.1 million
Nassau County, NY $23 million
New Haven, CT $9.5 million
South Tucson, AZ $2.1 million
TOTAL BOND AMOUNT $877.9 million
The table above includes the bonds we identified as paying or likely paying for police related
settlements or judgments. It does not include interest costs or issuance fees.
Police Brutality Bonds and Investor Profits: Five Case Studies2

Total Estimated Police Interest Paid to Total Cost to
City/County
Brutality Bonds 2008-2017 Investors Taxpayers
Chicago (2010-2017) $709.3 million $860 million $1.57 billion
Cleveland $12.9 million $7.4 million $20.3 million
Lake County $18.1 million $1.8 million $19.9 million
Los Angeles $71.4 million $18 million $89.4 million
Milwaukee $26.1 million $3.7 million $29.8 million
TOTAL $837.8 million $891 million $1.73 billion
The table above illustrates police brutality bond and interest costs in our five case study cities
and county.
4 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

WHY CITIES AND COUNTIES BORROW TO PAY FOR POLICE
MISCONDUCT SETTLEMENTS AND JUDGMENTS
We found a range of circumstances leading cities and counties to resort to borrowing to pay
settlement and judgment costs, and a range of consequences. For example:
⊲⊲ Some cities and counties use police brutality bonds habitually as part of their budget
plan, and police departments regularly exceed their allotted budget for settlements and
judgments, knowing they will get the additional money from local elected leaders when
they ask for it. Chicago, Milwaukee and Nassau County, NY all regularly rely on borrowing to
cover these costs.
⊲⊲ Some cities use police brutality bonds as an emergency option when facing an
unexpected big increase in payouts. Hammond, IN issued $4.8 million in bonds to pay for
the wrongful conviction settlement awarded to Larry Mayes,3 a Black man who served two
decades in prison for rape, a crime for which he was eventually exonerated.4
⊲⊲ Cities may move money around to cover settlements and then borrow to replenish the
funds that were raided. New Haven, CT’s city council voted to fund a $9.5 million settlement
by raiding city funds,5 including bond funds intended for a bridge renovation project. The
city plans to issue new bonds in 2018 to replenish the raided funds.6 The settlement went to
Scott Lewis, a Black man who spent 18 years in prison for murder after a corrupt New Haven
detective fabricated evidence against him.7
⊲⊲ Cities with liability insurance may issue bonds when they face costs beyond what their
insurance will pay. The small Pennsylvania city of Bethlehem settled a wrongful death
lawsuit for $7.89 million in 2004. Its insurance paid for only $500,000, and the city issued
$7.39 million in bonds to pay for the rest.
⊲⊲ Cities have raised taxes to cover costs of police settlements and judgments. Bethlehem
PA, Inkster MI, South Tucson AZ, and Cleveland OH have all instituted taxes to cover the
costs of police related settlements and judgments, or other costs associated with the
consequences of violent policing.
THE ROLE OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE PROBLEM OF POLICE

BRUTALITY
While the legal system assumes that hefty financial consequences for police violence serve as
a deterrent to abusive policing, this does not appear to be the case. Instead, settlements and
judgments—including those a city or county can’t pay without going into debt—appear to be an
acceptable cost of the business of policing for cities and counties across the country. We have
identified several factors contributing to this broken system.
⊲⊲ Violent Police Officers and Their Departments Are Shielded from Financial
Consequences. Research has found that police officers are “virtually always” indemnified
by their employers, meaning that the cities will cover the costs of defending officers in court
cases, and will pay for any judgments or settlements that result from actions officers take in
the course of their employment.8 Furthermore, most police departments are also insulated
from the financial consequences of excessive settlement and judgment costs and are not
subject to budget cuts when their settlement and judgment costs rise.9 Those cuts come
from elsewhere in the city budget.

⊲⊲ Settlements can function as a kind of predatory silencing of victims and families, working
to prevent accountability for violent officers and their departments. Settlements and
judgments can provide a measure of restitution to victims of police violence and/or their
families, but the non disparagement clauses in settlements also function as predatory
silencing, or “gag orders” in cases where survivors or their families, in exchange for the
settlement award, sign away their rights to discuss the case or the officers involved.
⊲⊲ There is a striking lack of transparency and disclosure around cities’ reliance on
borrowing, and in each of our case studies, there is a lack of full, accessible accounting of
the costs. Most cities in our sample were unable, or unwilling, to provide a full accounting of
how much they are spending on borrowing for settlements and judgments. Accountability
and change are impossible without transparency.
As we work to address the system of policing and hold governments accountable for the
financial, physical and emotional costs to our communities, we must also work to hold banks and
investors accountable for their role in perpetuating and profiting from our existing system. Police
violence should never be a source of profit for banks or investors, or a reason we do not have
the resources we need to invest in the infrastructure and services that make our communities
safer and more livable. We need to dismantle this system of policing and build a truly just system
that prioritizes the needs and well-being of all people. While we work toward that together, here
are our key recommendations:
1. Defund police departments and invest in community safety.
2. If cities must borrow to pay for settlements and judgments, the Federal Reserve should
lend them that money without charging interest or fees.
3. Governmental bodies at the local, state, and federal levels must account for and provide
full transparency about the total costs of policing.

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS:
HOW WALL STREET PROFITS FROM
OUR ABUSIVE POLICING SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
I
n 2015, the Wall Street Journal published a story headlined “Cost of Police Misconduct Soars
in Big Cities.”10 The story reported that the U.S. cities with the biggest police departments
had collectively paid out more than $1.02 billion between 2010 and 2015 for settlements
and judgments in cases involving violence committed by officers; $1.4 billion when the total
includes cases involving incidents like officer-involved crashes. The story explained that the
costs of these settlements and judgments are almost entirely borne by taxpayers, not officers or
their home police departments. But what the article did not mention is that by enabling loans to
local cities and counties, Wall Street banks and wealthy investors are able to profit off the money
municipalities spend to compensate victims of police violence.
As the costs of police misconduct rise, cities and counties across the United States are going
into debt to pay for it. Often, this debt is in the form of bond borrowing. When cities or counties
issue bonds to pay these costs, banks and other firms
collect fees for the services they provide, and investors
collect interest. The use of bonds to pay for settlements
and judgments greatly increases the burden of policing
The use of bonds to pay for costs on taxpayers, while producing a profit for banks
and investors. Using bonds to pay for settlements or
settlements and judgments judgments can nearly double the costs of the original
greatly increases the burden settlement. All of this is paid by taxpayers.
of policing costs on taxpayers, We call the bonds used to cover police related
while producing a profit for settlement and judgment costs “police brutality bonds”,
because they quite literally allow banks and wealthy
banks and investors. investors to profit from police violence. This is a transfer
of wealth from communities to Wall Street, but it is in
particular a transfer of wealth from over-policed communities of color to Wall Street and wealthy
investors. The companies profiting from police brutality bonds include well known institutions
like Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America, as well as smaller regional banks and
other financial firms.
A 2017 Chicago GO bond allocated $225 million for settlements and judgments.
Banks and other companies—including lead underwriter Goldman Sachs—collected
approximately $1.8 million in fees on the portion of that 2017 issuance that was allotted
to settlements and judgments.

THE WIDESPREAD USE OF POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS
In our research into the use of police brutality bonds, we found that cities and counties across
the United States issue bonds to pay for police brutality settlements and judgments. The
cities range from giant metropolises such as Los Angeles to smaller cities like Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania.
This study is not comprehensive. We looked at a limited sample of cities and counties
and focused almost entirely on settlements and judgments from the past decade. A more
comprehensive examination of the problem would almost certainly find many more examples.
This report discusses police brutality bonds in ten cities and two counties, including five case
studies for which we did extensive research. The case studies, which can be found near the end
of the report, include Chicago, Milwaukee, Los Angeles, Cleveland and Lake County, Indiana.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Police Brutality Bonds and Investor Profits: Five Case Studies15
Total Estimated Police Interest Paid to Total Cost to

City/County Brutality Bonds 2008-2017 Investors Taxpayers
Chicago (2010-2017) $709.3 million $860 million $1.57 billion
Cleveland $12.9 million $7.4 million $20.3 million
Lake County $18.1 million $1.8 million $19.9 million
Los Angeles $71.4 million $18 million $89.4 million
Milwaukee $26.1 million $3.7 million $29.8 million
TOTAL $837.8 million $891 million $1.73 billion
The table above illustrates police brutality bond and interest costs in our five case study cities
and county.
WHY CITIES AND COUNTIES BORROW TO PAY FOR POLICE

MISCONDUCT SETTLEMENTS AND JUDGMENTS
Cities and counties in our sample have used bond borrowing to cover settlements and
judgments in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons:
Some cities and counties use police brutality bonds habitually as part of their budget plans
Many cities—particularly smaller cities—buy insurance policies to cover the costs of police
related settlements and judgments. Cities without such liability insurance generally pay these
costs out of a dedicated fund. This is commonly known as “self-insurance”. Some self-insured
cities regularly issue bonds to pay for settlements and judgments when the amount allotted
for these expenses in their city or police department budgets is insufficient. In some cities, this
happens often enough that it is fair to say cities are knowingly not setting aside enough money
to pay these costs and anticipating that they will move money from other areas of the budget,
borrow the money, or both.
Cities and counties with structural revenue and budget problems are more likely to borrow
because they don’t have enough revenues to cover all of their expenses. Chicago, Milwaukee
and Nassau County, NY are the most consistent users of borrowed money for settlement costs in
our sample. They are consistently relying on large amounts of debt to close budget gaps caused
by underlying revenue crises. The borrowing allows leaders to push the reckoning with those
crises into the future. Meanwhile, banks and investors have their paydays. These places are also

facing funding crises for essential services and infrastructure, like education, mental health care,
and fire safety.
⊲⊲ Chicago used money from bonds every year between 2010-2015 to pay for judgments and
settlements, and again in 2017. Although the city doesn’t provide details on how much of its
borrowing is for police related settlements and judgments specifically, the total that the city
borrowed in those years to pay for all of its judgment and settlements was $484.3 million, an
amount roughly equivalent to what Chicago paid for police related settlements and judgments
for the period. Each year the city borrowed, it exceeded its line item budget for police torts.
(See Chicago case study for more details)
⊲⊲ Since 2008, Milwaukee has authorized about $26.1 million in borrowing to pay for police
settlements and judgments,16 at interest rates of up to 5 percent. Milwaukee authorized
borrowing for settlements or judgments in eight of the ten years between 2008 and 2017.17 (See
Milwaukee case study for more detail)
⊲⊲ In February of 2018, New York’s Nassau County approved $23 million in borrowing towards a
$45 million court judgment for two men who served time for a rape and murder for which they
were later exonerated.18 Nassau County has a long history of borrowing to pay legal costs.
According to a report in a local paper, Nassau County pays for about 30 percent of its legal
settlements and judgments with borrowed funds, including for “almost all of the major ones.”19
Some cities use police brutality bonds as an emergency option when facing large, unexpected increases
in payouts
⊲⊲ In 2013, Fullerton, CA issued $7.25 million in judgment obligation bonds (JOBs), a type of bond
dedicated to paying for settlements and judgments. $1 million of this went to cover a settlement
paid to the family of Kelly Thomas,20 a mentally ill man who was beaten to death by two
Fullerton police officers.21
⊲⊲ Hammond, IN issued $4.8 million in bonds to pay for the wrongful conviction settlement
awarded to Larry Mayes,22 a Black man who served two decades in prison for rape, a crime for
which he was eventually exonerated.23
⊲⊲ In 2010, the City of Canton, OH issued $1.8 million in notes to pay a jury judgment in a federal
case after a man died following a beating by police. The city refinanced this borrowing with new
bonds in 2015, lowering interest costs but creating another payday for underwriting banks.24
Cities sometimes move money around to cover settlements and then borrow to replenish the funds that
were raided
In late 2017, New Haven, CT’s city council voted to fund a $9.5 million settlement by raiding city
funds,25 including bond funds intended for a bridge renovation project. The city plans to issue new
bonds in 2018 to replenish the raided funds.26 The settlement went to Scott Lewis, a Black man
who spent 18 years in prison for murder after a corrupt New Haven detective fabricated evidence
against him.27
Cities sometimes issue bonds when they face costs beyond what their insurance will pay
The small Pennsylvania city of Bethlehem settled a lawsuit for $7.89 million in 2004. Its insurance
paid for only $500,000, and the city issued $7.39 million in bonds to pay for the rest. Bethlehem
later passed a law requiring it to hold policies with at least $10 million in coverage,28 which
presumably raised the cost of the policy considerably.
Cities sometimes resort to borrowing to cover costs related to “reforms” necessitated by public pressure
or agreements with the United States Department of Justice (DOJ)

The U.S. Department of Justice has investigated many police departments for civil rights
violations, and some of these departments have then entered into agreements with the DOJ
–known as consent decrees—which lay out specific changes the Police Department must
make in order to reduce civil rights violations by officers. These reforms can be costly. (See our
discussion of DOJ consent decrees below)
Cleveland budgeted $800,000 from a 2015 bond issuance for body-worn cameras. Many of
the DOJ consent decrees require cities to spend tens of millions of dollars, and it’s likely some
of them are borrowing to do it. (See the Cleveland case study for more details on Cleveland’s
consent decree)
Police misconduct costs can contribute to a devastating debt cycle
The City of South Tucson, AZ entered bankruptcy in 1983 due to a $3 million judgment awarded
to the victim in a police shooting. The city issued $2.1 million in bonds to help pay off the
settlement. Since then, the city has done a seemingly endless series of new bonds to pay off
previous bonds.29 This is similar to a homeowner refinancing a mortgage. Each time the city
takes out a new loan to pay off an old loan, it provides another opportunity for banks to collect
underwriting fees. At the same time, it also pushes the final payoff further and further into the
future. South Tucson is a small city, so the $600,000 annual debt service on the borrowing
makes up 12 percent of the city’s general fund. That annual debt service cost is about the same
as the city’s recent budget deficit of $624,000, which had city officials considering eliminating
their fire department.30
Cities have raised taxes to cover costs of police settlements and judgments
Bethlehem, the Pennsylvania city discussed above, instituted a special tax to pay off the bond,
which was issued to cover $7.39 million in settlement costs. The tax became known as the
“Hirko tax”, after the victim John Hirko Jr., a man killed by police during a botched raid. This is a
small town of 75,000, and that nearly $8 million is a significant chunk of its budget.31
Bethlehem, PA’s so-called “Hirko Tax” is named after John Hirko, a man who police
officer Joseph Riedy shot 11 times during a house raid in which SWAT officers also
burned the house down using two flash grenades, burning Hirko’s body beyond
recognition. The city enacted the tax to pay off a bond used to fund a settlement to
Hirko’s family, referring to it in budget documents as the “Hirko settlement debt”.
The following year, Riedy was named “Officer of the Year”.32 The fact that this tax is
referred to popularly as the “Hirko Tax”, while the officer who is actually responsible
for the conduct that led to the settlement is celebrated as a local hero, is an egregious
example of victim blaming.
Inkster, MI instituted a one-time property tax hike to pay for $1.4 million settlement33 in a case in
which a Black motorist was beaten by an Inkster police officer during a traffic stop.34
South Tucson, AZ instituted a “secondary property tax” that it used to pay down debt, until a city
attorney decided the tax was illegal as it had never been put to a vote.35
Cleveland, OH in 2016 faced costs relating to the police department’s consent decree with the
DOJ. Hoping to plug a huge budget hole and restore services that had been eviscerated by
budget cuts, residents voted in 2016 to impose a tax increase on themselves.36 (See Cleveland
case study for more detail)

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS AND THE FINANCIALIZATION OF
POLICE VIOLENCE
At the root of borrowing for police related settlements and judgments is a one-two punch of
inadequate revenues to cover a city’s expenses, and the escalating costs of police violence.
In some of the cases that we researched, there were one or two particularly large settlements
that caused a fiscal emergency for the city. In other instances, cities are habitually relying on
borrowing to pay settlement and judgment costs that predictably exceed the city’s dedicated
funding year after year. In some cases, the borrowing happened in the aftermath of the 2008
financial crisis, when many cities struggled with greatly diminished revenues.
This wealth transfer is a feature of a financialized economy, in which the financial sector—or
Wall Street—finds a way to extract profit from every facet of our lives. This process is known as
financialization—the expansive control of the financial sector over our economy, our political
system, and our lives.37 Financialization manifests itself as banks, hedge funds, private equity
firms, and other financial institutions finding ways to profit from every possible aspect of our
lives and using debt and wealth extraction as key ways in which to do so. Economist Mike
Konczal at the Roosevelt Institute writes, “At its core, financialization is about reworking the real
economy, the government and ourselves to serve financial needs.”38 Financialization works to
concentrate wealth and power at the very top of a racialized social and economic hierarchy.
Wealth extraction in a financialized economy is not color blind, but targets communities of color
in particular.
The financial crisis of 2008 was a consequence of a highly financialized economy. The
deregulation of financial markets, including the Bill Clinton era decision to shield what’s known
as “over the counter” (OTC) derivatives from regulation,39 ultimately led to the banking crisis and
subsequent bank bailout.40 The recession that followed ravaged public tax bases, leading to
revenue crises for our cities, counties and states, along with austerity policies as governments
struggled to balance budgets. Though the overall economy has recovered from the recession,
many governments still face structural revenue deficits. Revenue crises and austerity policies
lead to deteriorating infrastructure, a shriveling social safety net, and massive cuts to essential
public services—particularly in poor communities of color. Governments facing revenue crises
must resort to borrowing money to close budget gaps and can become vulnerable to predatory
lending schemes that banks may offer.41 Police brutality bonds are one way that Wall Street
offers “solutions” to public revenue shortages that not only leave the root causes of the revenue
shortage unaddressed, but also create room for investor profit.
Police brutality bonds: What they are, and why they are bad
A municipal bond is a type of loan a government takes out with the help of a bank. The bank
serves as the underwriter of the bond, which essentially means it will serve as the middle-man
between the city that is selling, or issuing the bond, and the investors—the bond buyers, or
bondholders—who are purchasing the bond. The investors are loaning the government money
by buying the bonds. Bondholders are usually people and institutions with a lot of money to
invest, such as wealthy individuals and money market funds. When they buy the bonds, the city
gets a large sum of money to spend on its needs. The city will pay the bondholders back, with
interest, over a period of time that is typically thirty years (though it can be longer or shorter).
Banks profit by providing underwriting services, and other financial and legal firms collect fees
for other services, ranging from legal services to printing costs. Together, the cost of services
these banks and other companies provide are called “issuance fees”. The average issuance fees
on a municipal bond is about 1.02 percent of the initial principal of the bond—in other words,

a tiny bit more than 1 percent of the total amount being borrowed.42 On a $200 million bond
issuance, Wall Street banks and other firms can collect $2 million or more in fees.
A city using municipal bonds can be similar to a home buyer taking out a mortgage, spreading
the cost of the purchase out over a long period of time and paying the debt down gradually. Just
as getting a mortgage can make sense for home buyers, municipal bonds are often a reasonable
way for cities to raise money for expensive, necessary longer-term investments, such as to
build a school or modernize water infrastructure. But in times of Wall Street-driven austerity and
shrinking revenues, many cities also issue bonds when they need to fill budget gaps. Borrowing
to fill budget holes is like a person paying the rent with a credit card. It’s an emergency measure
that obscures the underlying problem, which is that there is not enough money coming in to
cover the bills. It creates more debt, which then has to be paid off with the already limited funds
available.
Cities and counties pay bondholders back with funds they have available. Paying back bond
debt takes priority over other possible uses of these funds. Unlike funding for schools, mental
health services, or street repair, for example, bond debt is not considered “discretionary
spending”. This means that if a city is low on funds, it will prioritize paying back the bondholders
over funding public services like schools. For example, Chicago has closed schools43 and mental
health clinics,44 but the city and school district continue to make their bond payments on time.
In some cases, cities use what is called a general
obligation (GO) bond to raise money to pay for police
brutality settlements, alongside other projects. In other
cases, they issue a special bond, called a judgment
With most cases we obligation bond (JOB) or a final judgment bond, that
researched, there is a striking is specifically used to raise money to pay for legal
lack of transparency and settlements and judgments. We consider both of these
to be forms of police brutality bonds.
disclosure around cities’
When a government issues a bond, it provides a
reliance on borrowing, and document known as an Official Statement, or OS, which
in every case study, there is intended to provide potential bondholders with the
information they need to decide whether or not to
is a lack of full, accessible
invest in a given bond. The OS provides a wealth of
accounting of the costs. Most information about the bonds, including what the bonds
cities in our sample were will be paying for. However, we found that the Official
Statements for most police brutality bonds do not
unable, or unwilling, to provide
disclose which police misconduct cases the bond will
a full accounting of how be used to pay. While a few JOB Official Statements do
much they are spending on provide case numbers, names, and defscriptions, most
police brutality bonds we looked at did not provide
borrowing for settlements and enough detail on their own for us to link the bonds to
judgments. specific cases. With most cases we researched, there
is a striking lack of transparency and disclosure around
cities’ reliance on borrowing, and in every case study,
there is a lack of full, accessible accounting of the costs. Most cities in our sample were unable,
or unwilling, to provide a full accounting of how much they are spending on borrowing for
settlements and judgments. (See our section on transparency for a fuller discussion of this issue)

THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENT POLICING
Abusive policing is a persistent problem, and most violent officers are not held accountable for
their abuses. Human Rights Watch, which investigates human rights abuses around the globe,
issued a report on abuses in the American system of policing in 1998. They found that:
Police brutality is one of the most serious, enduring, and divisive human rights violations
in the United States. The problem is nationwide, and its nature is institutionalized…
The excessive use of force by police officers, including unjustified shootings, severe
beatings, fatal chokings, and rough treatment, persists because overwhelming barriers
to accountability make it possible for officers who commit human rights violations to
escape due punishment and often to repeat their offenses.45
Police officers disproportionately target communities of color with abusive behavior. For
example, numerous studies have found racial bias in how police determine who to stop, and
in whether a person who is stopped will be searched. A 2016 Chicago Police Accountability
Task Force investigation found that “black and Hispanic drivers were searched approximately
four times as often as white drivers, yet [the Chicago Police Department’s] own data show that
contraband was found on white drivers twice as often as black and Hispanic drivers.”46 A New
York Times Investigation found that in the 14 cities they examined, Black drivers were much more
likely to be searched than whites; even though in all but one of those jurisdictions, white drivers
were actually more likely to be carrying contraband.47 Other investigations looking at Ferguson
MO, New York City, San Francisco, Oakland, and Maricopa County AZ, have found serious racial
disparities in stop and search practices, with Black and Brown people subjected more often to
vehicle searches even though they are less likely to have contraband.48
Black and Brown people are also much more likely that white people to be shot to death
by police. Native American men and Black men are the most frequent victims of fatal police
violence.49 An academic study utilizing 2015 Washington Post data found that police shot and
killed unarmed Black men at disproportionately high rates, likely due to implicit bias. Justin
Nix, one of the researchers on the project, told the Post, “The only thing that was significant in
predicting whether someone shot and killed by police was unarmed was whether or not they
were black... Officers are perceiving a greater threat when encountered by unarmed black
citizens.”50
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INTERVENTIONS IN ABUSIVE

POLICING
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has attempted to address abusive policing by launching
deep investigations into police departments exhibiting particularly high levels of dysfunctional
violence. The DOJ has investigated civil rights violations of various sorts in at least 67
departments in the past two decades.51 A common civil rights violation involves use of force by
officers. In the cities with the worst abuses of use of force, the DOJ has forced cities to enter
into binding agreements that provide steps those cities must take to remedy their police-related
problems. Some of these agreements, called consent decrees, are managed by federal courts,
and cities must comply with them under threat of legal action by the DOJ. These agreements are
often extremely costly for the cities to implement.
The DOJ’s approach has had mixed results.52 “A May 2017 study by researchers at the University
of Texas at Dallas found that although DOJ consent decrees “may contribute to a modest
reduction” in police misconduct lawsuits, that the moderating effect usually only lasts while the
consent decree is actually in effect [emphasis in the original]. Lawsuits start to trend back up

once the decree is lifted. This suggests that DOJ consent decrees do not adequately address
the structural causes of police brutality, as there does not appear to be a lasting impact.”53
After Jeff Sessions took office as U.S. Attorney General in 2017, he ordered a review of
all the DOJ’s police reform agreements and said consent decrees can “reduce morale” of
police officers.54 Sessions also requested a delay in a consent decree for Baltimore, which
was negotiated during the Obama administration, saying he had “grave concerns that some
provisions of this decree will reduce the lawful powers of the police department”. While many
cities have resisted the DOJ’s intervention, Baltimore wanted federal assistance with its police
department, and appealed to a federal court, where a judge ruled against the delay.55 Attorney
Jonathan Smith, who for five years was the DOJ’s chief of special litigation, said that Sessions’
actions “raises the question of whether, under the current attorney general, the Department
of Justice is going to walk away from its obligation to ensure that law enforcement across the
country is following the Constitution.”56 Under the Sessions DOJ, city leaders and police officers
are likely to feel that they have a reprieve from federal scrutiny of law enforcements’ civil rights
violations.
VIOLENT POLICE OFFICERS AND THEIR DEPARTMENTS ARE

SHIELDED FROM FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES
UCLA School of Law professor Joanna Schwartz has extensively researched how governments
pay for police settlements and judgments. She has found that police officers are “virtually
always” indemnified by their employers, meaning that cities will cover the costs of defending
officers in court cases, and will pay for any judgments or settlements that result from actions
officers take in the course of their employment. When plaintiffs bring a case against police
officers and win financial awards, those officers almost never have to contribute to their legal
defense costs nor to the payment of the award. Instead,
taxpayers pay. In her six-year sample of cases involving
$735 million in awards to plaintiffs, Schwartz found
that officers personally satisfied just 0.02 percent of
When plaintiffs bring a awards.57
case against police officers Schwartz has also found that most police departments
are insulated from the financial consequences of
and win financial awards, excessive settlement and judgment costs. Smaller
those officers almost never cities often have liability insurance that covers payouts
have to contribute to their related to police misconduct cases, while larger cities
are generally “self-insured”, meaning that they pay costs
legal defense costs nor to out of a dedicated fund. Sometimes that fund is part of
the payment of the award. the police budget, but often the money comes out of
the general budget with no contribution from the police
Instead, taxpayers pay.
department. However, Schwartz found that even when
the police department itself is required to contribute
to settlements and judgments out of its own budget, this does not generally impose a financial
burden on the department. Many police departments routinely go significantly over their budget
for settlements and judgments, with no financial consequences for the department. Often a
police department simply asks the city for more money and gets it from the city without a fight.58
For example, Chicago allocated an average of $16.2 million a year in its budget for police lawsuit
payouts between 2012 and 2014, but actually paid an average of $52 million for police-related
payouts in each of those years.59 Another example Schwartz cites is Boston, which had allocated

about $1.3 million a year but had actual litigation payouts an average of three times that amount,
with the difference coming from the city’s overall budget, not the police department’s budget.60
(See our Chicago case study for more details on Chicago’s police costs)
The huge costs of settlements add to the already high costs of policing. Even without fully
accounting for the costs of police misconduct settlements and judgments that are paid from
cities’ general operating budgets rather than just the police budgets61—the costs of mounting
a legal defense for accused officers and the interest and fees on police brutality bonds—police
departments are costing cities and counties huge amounts of money. Freedom to Thrive, a
carefully researched report put out in 2017 by the Center for Popular Democracy, Black Youth
Project 100 and Law for Black Lives, looked at the budgets of ten cities and two counties62
and found that police departments accounted for up to 41.2 percent of the cities’ and counties’
budgets.63 Since the costs of police-related settlements and judgments are often not fully
captured by the official police budget, the true burden of policing costs can be even higher
than that. This is all money that we could be investing in the things that actually do make our
communities safer and more livable, such as public education and mental health services.64
Instead what we see is an overinvestment in policing and underinvestment in services,
infrastructure, and the social safety net.
SETTLEMENTS OFTEN FUNCTION AS PREDATORY SILENCING

AND PREVENT REAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Settlements and judgments can provide a measure of restitution to victims of police violence
and/or their families, but settlements can also function as predatory silencing in cases where
survivors or their families, in exchange for the settlement award, sign away their rights to
discuss the case or the officers involved. Baltimore, for example, was sued by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) for its use of what’s known as a non-disparagement clause (also known
as a “gag order”).65 The ACLU got involved after the City of Baltimore withheld half of a woman’s
settlement after she responded to comments in an online news story about her case. Such non-
disparagement agreements protect a city and its police force from scrutiny and accountability
and are unfair to victims of police violence and their families. Victims should not be forced to
cooperate in shielding law enforcement and cities from malfeasance.
TRUE TRANSPARENCY IS NONEXISTENT

We found that it can be very difficult to determine whether or not a city is borrowing for police
related settlements and judgments, and it is even harder to identify which cases they’re
borrowing to pay for and what their total costs are (See methodology section for details on how
we did the research). While some cities make information more available than others, most cities
we looked at either could not or would not provide us with a list of cases covered by borrowing
and information about which bond paid for which case. A Chicago spokesperson, for example,
told us that the city does not keep track of which settlements and judgments are financed by
bonds. (See Chicago case study for more detail)
As we mentioned above, some cities issue judgment obligation bonds (JOBs), which are
dedicated entirely to paying for settlements and judgments against the city. This makes it much
easier to at least determine whether the city has borrowed to cover any kind of settlement or
judgment. However, many JOB Official Statements do not mention which cases they cover, or
if they do provide a list of cases, it is not clear how many or which of these cases are related to
police misconduct. Other cities include money for settlement and judgments in a larger General
Obligation bond issuance, where they may indicate that some portion of the bond revenues will

be used for settlements or judgments and may or may not specify how much money that is.
Many cities ignored portions of our Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests or gave us
information that only partly answered our questions. But nobody should have to send an official
request to access information about the costs and the sources of money for settlements and
judgments. This information should be readily accessible to anyone who wants it, whether it’s a
city councilmember representing the interests of their constituents, or a member of a community
interested in the stewardship of their community’s tax dollars. Accountability is impossible
without transparency. While transparency alone cannot solve our police violence problems, it is a
necessary first step in the right direction. We cannot act effectively solve problems we don’t fully
understand. (See Recommendations section)

LOCAL CASE STUDIES
CHICAGO
C
hicago is habitually relying on bond borrowing to fund its legal settlements and
judgments, as well as other litigation costs. The city of Chicago provides detailed
information about its use of bond financing for these purposes. However, Chicago’s
use of bond borrowing to cover police claims specifically is difficult to parse, because
the city fails to track exactly which of its settlements and judgments are covered by bond money.
In addition to police related settlements and judgments, the City of Chicago settles numerous
other types of cases every year, including property damage, “slip and fall”, and labor related
suits, among many others. This means that while we have concrete figures for Chicago’s overall
use of borrowing for settlement and judgment costs, and we have separate reliable data for
Chicago’s police related settlements, we had to extrapolate from these two data sets to reach
our conclusions about Chicago’s use of police brutality bonds.
Some of Chicago’s bond official statements mention that some of the money may or will be
used for settlements and judgments, but there is no mention of any specific cases. This makes it
virtually impossible to connect individual settlements
or judgments with specific cases of misconduct. A
member of the city’s law department explained that the
city doesn’t track the information “because it serves us
no purpose”. This person also told us that settlements
Because Chicago’s credit
may be paid for with money from a particular city fund,
rating was low at the time of which would later be replenished with bond proceeds.
the 2017 issuance, investors As this person pointed out, those settlements were in
effect paid for with borrowed money.66
are receiving a high interest
Based on the data the City of Chicago does make
rate on these bonds—more available, we estimate that the total dollar amount
than 7 percent. Though these of the settlements and judgments related to cases
bonds mature relatively against the Chicago Police Department (CPD) or CPD
officers is less than or roughly equivalent to what
quickly, investors will take Chicago is borrowing to pay for all of its settlements
home approximately $92.3 and judgments. For example, according to records
million in interest. available on the city’s law department website, Chicago
spent $360 million on police-related settlements and
judgments between 2010 and 2016. During this same
period, the city used $484.3 million in bond proceeds to pay for settlements and judgments. The
larger figure includes legal costs beyond the settlement amounts. Essentially, this means that it
is fair to say that most of the city’s police related settlement and judgments cost are covered by
bond borrowing. (See methodology section for more details on our sources and figures)
This report focuses on Chicago’s police-related settlement and judgment costs since 2010,
but we know that since 2004, Chicago has spent more than $800 million on such cases.
In early 2017, Chicago borrowed another $225 million for settlements and judgments,68 bringing
the 2010-2017 total to $709.3 million. We estimate that this borrowing will cost taxpayers

about $860 million in interest that the city will pay to investors over the life of these bonds.69
(See methodology section for more detail)
We estimate that since 2010, big banks and law firms have made approximately $7.1 million in
fees for underwriting the bonds authorized to pay for Chicago’s lawsuits.70 In recent years, some
of the banks that have profited from these particular deals, and Chicago’s growing number of
lawsuits, are Goldman, Sachs, Wells Fargo, Mesirow Financial, Inc., and the Bank of Montreal
(which is the parent company of Chicago’s BMO Harris Bank).71
According to the City of Chicago’s Office of Budget and Management, the city set aside just over
$19 million a year to cover police brutality settlements in 2015 and 2016. 72 However, Chicago has
exceeded this budget consistently. The city’s practice of allocating tens of millions less a year for
police settlements than it actually spends obscures the true cost of these cases.
CHICAGO’S POLICE BRUTALITY PROBLEM

In 2015, a court ordered the city to release video footage of a white officer, Jason Van Dyke,
fatally shooting Laquan McDonald, a young Black man.73 The video showed Van Dyke shooting
McDonald 16 times; 15 times while McDonald was lying wounded on the ground, posing no
threat to the officer.74 Three officers were later indicted for allegedly engaging in a cover up
of the killing, while Van Dyke is currently awaiting trial on murder charges as of this writing.75
Following the release of the video, facing protests and demands for change, Mayor Emanuel
appointed the Police Accountability Task Force, whose mission was to “lay the foundation for
the rejuvenation of trust between the police and the communities that they serve by facing
hard truths and creating a roadmap for real and lasting transparency, respectful engagement,
accountability and change.”76 The Task Force released a report in 2016, in which it described a
deeply troubled relationship between the CPD and Black and Brown communities:
The civic outrage that followed [the release of the video] gave voice to long-simmering
anger not just about McDonald, but the deaths of others at the hands of the police,
including Rekia Boyd, Ronald Johnson and, more recently, Quintonio LeGrier, Betty
Jones and Philip Coleman. The deaths of numerous men and women of color whose
lives came to an end solely because of an encounter with CPD became an important
rallying cry. That outrage exposed deep and longstanding fault lines between black
and Latino communities on the one hand and the police on the other arising from police
shootings to be sure, but also about daily, pervasive transgressions that prevent people
of all ages, races, ethnicities and gender across Chicago from having basic freedom of
movement in their own neighborhoods.77
The Task Force found that 74 percent of those injured or killed by Chicago police shootings
were Black men and that police disproportionately used Tasers against Black people. The report
found that “CPD’s own data gives validity to the widely held belief the police have no regard for
the sanctity of life when it comes to people of color.”78
After the LaQuan McDonald shooting, the DOJ launched an investigation into the CPD. Its report,
released in January 2017, found that CPD’s “unreasonable force and systemic deficiencies fall
heaviest on the predominantly black and Latino neighborhoods… CPD has tolerated racially
discriminatory conduct that not only undermines police legitimacy, but also contributes to the
pattern of unreasonable force.”79 The DOJ named the department’s code of silence and lack
of accountability for officers that commit these offenses as institutional problems, specifically
saying that “discipline is haphazard, unpredictable and does not deter misconduct.”80 The DOJ
outlined a total of 99 recommendations to improve CPD practices.81

The City of Chicago has made attempts at implementing some of the DOJ’s recommendations.
This includes conducting a review of its use of force policy and providing refresher trainings for
officers.82 However, the problem of police violence in Chicago shows no sign of abating. In 2017
the city paid $46.3 million for police-related settlements,83 and settled or received judgments in
other cases that will have to be paid in the coming months and years. For example, in October
2017, a jury ordered Chicago to pay a record breaking $44.7 million to a man who is severely
disabled after being shot in the head by an off-duty officer.84
Other settlements and judgments in recent years include:
⊲⊲ $5 million dollars to the family of Laquan McDonald;85
⊲⊲ $31 million awarded to four men who were coerced into
confessing to a rape and murder they did not commit,
and spent 17 years in prison before being exonerated;86
and “[W]hen you had to budget
⊲⊲ $1 million settlement to Trevor Mitchell for an illegal more for [police] tort liability
search and seizure.87
you had less to do lead
In her study of indemnification, Joanna Schwartz quotes a
former City of Chicago Attorney on how the costs of police poisoning screening for the
lawsuits affects the people of the city: poor children of Chicago. We
“[W]hen you had to budget more for [police] tort liability you had a terrible lead poisoning
had less to do lead poisoning screening for the poor children
problem and there was a
of Chicago. We had a terrible lead poisoning problem and
there was a direct relationship between the two. Those kids direct relationship between
were paying those tort judgments, not the police officers.”88 the two. Those kids were
In 2012, Chicago closed half of its mental health clinics, paying those tort judgments,
including four of the eight clinics on the city’s heavily Black
South Side.89 Disinvestment from mental health services
not the police officers.”
pushes more people into the criminal justice system and
results in more contact between police and mentally ill people, sometimes with disastrous
consequences.90 Similarly, disinvestment in public education contributes to the “school to prison
pipeline”, resulting in more people getting caught up in the criminal justice system.91 A year
after the clinic closures, Chicago closed nearly 50 public elementary schools, the largest mass
school closure in the country’s history at the time. Eighty-eight percent of students affected were
Black, and more than 93 percent from poor families.92 Five years later, in early 2018, Chicago
Public Schools (CPS) decided to close four more South Side high schools.93 Although CPS is a
distinct legal entity from the City of Chicago and has a separate budget, it is normal for CPS to
request and receive funds from the city to fill budget gaps or pay for certain projects. However,
Chicago’s police misconduct settlements leave less money that could be used to help address
CPS’s budget problems and avoid school closings. Mental health clinics and schools are exactly
the community resources in which we need to be investing to keep our communities healthy,
safe, and thriving. Instead, Chicago is going deep into debt to subsidize its police department’s
violence.
CLEVELAND
Since 2008, Cleveland has issued $12.1 million in judgment obligation bonds with help from
banks like Wells Fargo, at interest rates of up to 6 percent.94 The city has also used bonds to

borrow $800,000 for body cameras for police.95 Cleveland is under a consent decree from the
Department of Justice after a DOJ investigation found rampant use of excessive force and a lack
of accountability, among other problems.96 The consent decree requires reforms that will also
cost the financially strapped city tens of millions of dollars, if implemented.
These bonds have provided investors with more than $4.4 million in profits thus far.97 The city
issued more than $4 million in new bonds in 2016 to refinance earlier borrowing, providing a
new opportunity for banks and other firms to get a cut. The city will be paying off these bonds
until 2033, providing investors with an additional $3.1 million in interest.98 That’s a total of $7.4
million for investors by the time the bonds are paid off.
The costs of police brutality in Cleveland, like in many other cities, are rising. Between 2004
and 2014 Cleveland shelled out $10.5 million for police settlements. But in just the two years
between 2015 and early 2017, Cleveland paid $13.2 million—a huge increase in a short period of
time. The police department is responsible for much more than its share of the city’s legal costs:
an ABC Channel 5 investigation found that 73 percent of cases filed against the city between
January 2013 and the end of 2017 were against the police department.99
CLEVELAND’S POLICE BRUTALITY PROBLEM

The Cleveland Division of Police (CDP) has been under a consent decree with the DOJ since
June 2015. The DOJ initiated an investigation after a “series of incidents of potential excessive
force revealed a rift between CDP and certain segments of the communities it serves.” This
included an incident that the Ohio Attorney General had investigated and concluded was an
example of “systemic failure” by the CDP.100 In its report following a 21-month-long investigation,
the DOJ identified the following problems:
⊲⊲ The unnecessary and excessive use of deadly force, including shootings and head strikes
with impact weapons;
⊲⊲ The unnecessary, excessive or retaliatory use of less lethal force including Tasers, chemical
spray and fists;
⊲⊲ Excessive force against persons who are mentally ill or in crisis, including in cases where the
officers were called exclusively for a welfare check; and
⊲⊲ The employment of poor and dangerous tactics that place officers in situations where
avoidable force becomes inevitable and places officers and civilians at unnecessary risk.101
The DOJ also noted problems with stop, search and seizure practices, and a lack of officer
accountability and training, among other issues.102 The DOJ called the Department’s
accountability systems regarding use of force “structurally flawed”. For example, during CDP’s
internal investigations, investigators would not find that an officer violated Department policy
unless the evidence proved “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the officer was guilty. This is a
standard appropriate for criminal prosecutions, not internal investigations, as the DOJ points out.
Because of this unreasonable standard, it is “exceedingly rare” that CDP issues a finding of use
of excessive force.103
Making matters worse, the DOJ had found many of the same “structural deficiencies” more than
a decade earlier. In 2004, the DOJ gave CDP a set of recommendations regarding its use of
force, recommendations that “were either not fully implemented or, if implemented, were not
maintained over time.”104 This highlights a weakness in the DOJ approach to policing reform.
A Cleveland Plain Dealer investigation reviewed 70 lawsuits filed against the CDP in the
previous decade that had resulted in taxpayer-funded payouts. The claims against the

department align with the DOJ findings, including allegations of excessive force, wrongful arrests
and needless escalation of violence.105
When the consent decree was announced in 2015, city officials estimated that meeting its
requirements would cost about $13.2 million in 2016, and a minimum of $32 million more over
the following four years.106 Cleveland City Council President Kevin Kelly said at the time that
spending this money would “have profound implications on other services… This is a large chunk
of our budget, and it will be all hands-on deck to figure out solutions to this.”107 Facing the costs
of addressing their police department’s problems, trying to plug a huge budget hole, and hoping
to restore services that had been “cut to the bone”, Cleveland residents voted in 2016 to impose
a tax increase on themselves.108
During the DOJ’s investigation, about six months before the consent decree announcement, a
white Cleveland police officer shot to death a Black 12-year-old boy, Tamir Rice. This happened
in a city park, mere seconds after the officer’s police car stopped near the boy. The officer,
Timothy Loehmann, had been hired by CDP despite a “damning” personnel file from a previous
police job.109 When an investigation and grand jury probe resulted in no indictment of Loehmann
or his partner, the community’s pain and outrage led to protests.110 A lawsuit filed by the child’s
family later resulted in a $6 million settlement, prompting the Cleveland Plain Dealer to write
in an editorial that Cleveland “can’t afford these kind of horrific deaths or these kind of eye-
popping financial payouts.”111
Cleveland has looked for ways to avoid having to pay for some settlements. Facing $18.7 million
in payouts for two cases—one a fatal police shooting, the other a “sloppy and malicious”112
wrongful conviction—the city got creative. As we explained above, most police officers are
indemnified by their employers against personal financial liability. This means that taxpayers foot
the bill for officers’ legal defense and any settlements or judgments. But in at least these two
cases in Cleveland, the city let the cases against the officers go to court without indemnifying
them, so that the officers themselves would be liable for any financial awards to victims or their
families. Then, the city paid for attorneys to provide assistance to the officers so that they could
file for bankruptcy and get the settlement debt discharged. Had it worked, this unethical scheme
could have saved the city millions while depriving the victims of their settlements.113 However, a
judge in one of the cases ruled that Ohio law requires cities to indemnify officers, and Cleveland
must pay for the settlement.114
Another way Cleveland may be reducing its police misconduct costs is by coercing some victims
of police brutality into dropping cases. An investigation by the Cleveland Plain Dealer and
Northeast Ohio Media Group found that the city has offered to drop or reduce charges against
some people in exchange for those people agreeing not to sue officers or the city.115 The Plain
Dealer and Northeast Ohio Media Group identified multiple cases in which people were charged
with crimes after they accused police of brutality.
The Cleveland Plain Dealer also reported that the city has paid millions in settlements that
were “hidden behind confidentiality agreements, never vetted in city meetings and were kept
quiet by plaintiffs themselves who feared reprisals and often faced criminal charges”. The paper
quoted Cleveland City Councilman Matt Zone, Public Safety Committee chair, saying that the City
Council is only informed of settlements during the budgeting process and that the Council needs
to “ask for more transparency in relation to lawsuits being paid out.”116
LAKE COUNTY, INDIANA

Lake County is in the northwest corner of Indiana and is part of the Chicago metropolitan area. It
is the second largest county in the state and includes cities like Hammond and Gary.
Lake County has a long history of issuing municipal bonds to pay for settlements and lawsuits
against the county and its offices, including the Lake County Sheriff’s Department and Lake
County Jail, since at least 1995.117 Since then, Lake County has issued nearly $24 million in
judgment obligation bonds, $18.1 million of which has been issued since 2008.118 At least $11.8
million of the borrowed money went to cover settlements and judgments in cases involving the
Lake County Jail and Sheriff’s Department. This is a conservative estimate and includes only
cases we were able to confirm were related to the Sheriff’s Department or the jail. By the time
the existing judgment obligation bonds reach maturity in the year 2025, investors will have
collected about $1.8 million in interest from taxpayers. Underwriters on Lake County’s judgment
obligation bonds include Fifth Third Bank, Piper Jaffray, and others. Underwriters and other
firms collected more than $1.13 million in issuance fees in connection with these bonds.119 (See
methodology section for more details on our numbers)
The settlements and judgments covered by Lake County’s police brutality bonds include cases
involving inadequate and negligent medical care in the Lake County Jail, brutal and at times
fatal use of force, inhumane living conditions, wrongful arrests, and other civil rights violations.120
These settlements include:
⊲⊲ $2.75 million in a wrongful death lawsuit filed on behalf of 39-year-old Gregory Smith.121
Smith was arrested in Hobart, Indiana for driving 35 miles per hour in a 30 miles per hour
zone. He died of cardiac arrest in Lake County Jail after officers used a stun gun on him.122
Allegations in the lawsuit included excessive force by jail officers, and “a custom or practice
of failing to provide adequately for the mental health needs of inmates and detainees.”123
⊲⊲ $2.2 million in the hanging death of 39-year old Adekunle Odumabo124 in jail. The suit
alleged that the jail failed to keep Odumabo on suicide watch despite a court order.125
⊲⊲ $4.2 million126 to settle a federal lawsuit involving the jailhouse death of 43-year-old
Kenneth Hobson.127 Hobson was arrested for a misdemeanor offense and transferred to
the Lake County Jail. Hobson was mentally ill and his symptoms prevented him from being
able to drink the tap water in the jail. In her lawsuit, Hobson’s mother Dorothy alleged that
the jail denied her son medical care and bottled water, which resulted in his death from
dehydration.128
⊲⊲ $310,000 total in settlement awards to family of Ricardo Diaz, who was shot to death by Lake
County and Hobart police officers responding to a distress call.129
⊲⊲ $635,000 total in two settlements involving two separate wrongful arrest cases.130
LAKE COUNTY’S POLICE BRUTALITY PROBLEM

In 2007, Lake County Jail inmates filed a class action lawsuit against the jail and the County,131
alleging that the County held people “for weeks or months” in overcrowded holding cells, and
that a shortage of beds forced inmates to sleep directly on concrete. The complaint included
stories about human waste on the jail’s concrete floor, and allegations that medical care was
“nearly nonexistent”.132
Lake County settled the inmates’ lawsuit for $7.2 million, but the allegations attracted the
attention of the U.S. Department of Justice. The DOJ investigated the jail and released a
summary of its findings in 2009. The DOJ wrote that the jail “subjects inmates to systemic

violations of federal constitutional rights, specifically in regard to: (1) suicide prevention, (2)
mental health care, (3) the medical care, and (4) sanitary and safe living conditions.” The report
cited civil rights violations such as inadequate fire safety, housing and maintenance deficiencies,
and inadequate housekeeping, laundry, food and janitorial services. The report also cited
instances of the unsupervised and unverified distribution of narcotics and prescription drugs,
undiagnosed or misdiagnosed mental illness, and understaffed and overworked medical
workers.133
Lake County and the DOJ reached a settlement agreement requiring the jail to make significant
and expensive changes, including hiring additional staff and renovating buildings.134 The County
has spent at least $25.2 million thus far to comply with the DOJ agreement. As of March 2018,
the jail remains under federal supervision.135 This is the second time in the jail’s history that it has
been subjected to federal intervention. A lawsuit filed in 1974 over health care, overcrowding
and violence in the jail resulted in federal oversight that was not lifted until 1997.136
LOS ANGELES
Los Angeles issued $71.4 million in judgment obligation bonds in 2009 and 2010, and came
close to issuing new JOBs in 2017. These bonds paid for settlements and judgments that
included, but were not limited to, police related cases. Banks and other private firms collected
more than $1 million in issuance fees on the 2009 and 2010 JOBs. The financial firms involved
included Merrill Lynch (Bank of America) and De La Rosa and Co.137 By the time the bonds are
paid off, taxpayers will have handed over more than $18 million to investors.138
Significant portions of the JOBs Los Angeles issued in 2009 and 2010 were police brutality
bonds. For example, the 2009 bonds covered a $20.5 million settlement related to the messy
Rampart Police corruption scandal of the 1990s and 2000s.139 The Rampart Scandal, as it is
commonly known, involved numerous officers in the city’s anti-gang Rampart Division engaging
in misconduct, including physical abuse of suspects, evidence tampering, and perjury.140 LAPD
officer Rafael Perez had been arrested on cocaine charges. As part of a plea bargain, he agreed
to help uncover corruption inside the LAPD, and the information he provided on misconduct
within the department led to the overturning of over 100 criminal convictions.141 The city had
to pay more than $95 million in police misconduct settlements in connection with the Rampart
Scandal, including the $20.5 million that was covered by the 2009 police brutality bond.142
The 2010 JOBs covered $12.8 million in settlements143 for people injured or mistreated by LAPD
in what the Los Angeles Times described as a “May Day melee”,144 when police used batons and
rubber bullets to disperse crowds that had gathered to participate in a pro-immigrant march.145
The aggressive police response resulted in over 300 claims against the city.146 The 2010 JOBs
also covered $5 million to settle two cases involving negligent driving by an LAPD officer that
resulted in personal injuries.147
In 2017, Los Angeles faced a huge spike in settlements and judgments, including about $8
million for several cases involving fatal police shootings.148 Concerned about a potential deficit of
$245 million, the Los Angeles’ City Administrative Officer (CAO), Miguel Santana, issued a memo
with recommendations for how Los Angeles should handle the deficit and “restore the reserve
fund level.”149 One of his recommendations was that the city issue between $50 million and $70
million in judgment obligation bonds to cover settlements and judgments.150 At the time, the city
had already used reserve funds for $28.5 million in settlements.151 The City Council authorized
the bond borrowing in April 2017. In November, however, a new Acting CAO, Richard H. Llewellyn
Jr, issued a memo in which he recommended that the City of Los Angeles not proceed with the
earlier plan to issue judgment obligation bonds. Llewellyn indicated that the city had eliminated

the need for the bonds in part by “requesting departments to reduce expenditures and generate
savings.”152
Often, a city’s attempts to reduce costs results in cuts to public service jobs and diminished
public services. For example, in 2009, in the midst of a recession and facing a $529 million
deficit, Los Angeles’ mayor declared a fiscal emergency and the city began looking for ways
to cut labor costs.153 One result of the budget tightening was a loss of thousands of city
jobs providing necessary services such as tree trimming, sidewalk repair, traffic control, and
emergency response services.154 A coalition of community organizations and labor unions
pushed the city to replace these jobs when the economy improved, and the city signed an
agreement to restore 5,000 jobs and create a targeted local hiring program to fill them. The
program is intended to “help under-served and under-employed populations find an alternative
pathway” in civil service careers.155 However, community groups involved in the process say that
the city has only filled 964 of the 5,000 promised positions.156
Los Angeles did not issue police brutality bonds in 2017, but in finding other ways to pay
settlement costs, the city also may have further delayed restoring service positions lost nearly
a decade ago. The November 2017 memo from the new Acting CAO also indicated that the city
had already spent $116,000 as it prepared to issue the judgment obligation bonds that had since
been canceled. That money could have funded city services.
LOS ANGELES’ POLICE BRUTALITY PROBLEM

In large part because of the Rampart Scandal, the DOJ launched an investigation of the LAPD.
In a May 2000 letter to the city announcing its findings, the DOJ identified various forms of
misconduct, which it said happened “on a regular basis”, including “unconstitutional use of force
by LAPD officers, including improper officer-involved shootings; improper seizures of persons,
including making police stops not based on reasonable suspicion and making arrests without
probable cause; seizures of property not based on probable cause; and improper searches of
persons and property with insufficient cause.”157
The investigation resulted in a consent decree with the city that lasted until 2013.158
Despite being under federal supervision, between 2002 and 2011, the City of Los Angeles
settled almost 1,000 lawsuits on behalf of the police department, at a cost to the city of over
$138 million—including the May Day Melee.159
MILWAUKEE
Since 2008 Milwaukee has authorized about $26.1 million in borrowing to pay for police
settlements and judgments, with $18.3 million of that since just 2015.160 Milwaukee’s borrowing
is habitual; the city authorized borrowing for settlements or judgments in eight of the ten years
between 2008 and 2017.161 We estimate that the use of borrowed money has added about $3.7
million in interest payments to the cost of settlements.162 We estimate that Bank of America,
Wells Fargo, and other firms have collected at least $261,000 for their services related to police
brutality bonds.163 Milwaukee’s police brutality bonds have been used to cover settlements that
include:

⊲⊲ A $6.5 million settlement for Chante Ott, a Black man who spent 13 years in prison for a
murder he didn’t commit after police pressured witnesses into making false testimony.164
⊲⊲ $5 million for a class section settlement of a suit filed by 74 men against several police
officers who for years imposed hundreds of illegal, dehumanizing body cavity searches on
Black male victims. The worst offending officer, a white man, was sentenced to 26 months in
prison.165
⊲⊲ $2.5 million for a woman who was strangled and raped by an officer after she called 911 for
help. Before the rape, the officer had been kept on the force without ever being disciplined
despite a long record of complaints, including sexual misconduct and an arrest for domestic
violence.166
Milwaukee budgets about $1.2 million per year to cover police settlements and judgments.167
But in 2017 alone, the city authorized more than $7.43 million in settlement payouts and related
expenses,168 and between 2014 and 2017, we found authorizations for nearly $28 million in
spending for settlements and other costs related to claims involving the police department.169
Those figures include funds to pay for the defense of Officers Zachary Thoms and David
Latteer,170 who were involved in the arrest and death of Derek Williams. Williams, a 22-year-old
Black man, died while in the officers’ custody, after repeatedly telling them that he could not
breathe.171
Milwaukee does not issue judgment obligation bonds. Instead, most of the police misconduct-
related borrowing is folded into larger bond issuances. For example, in early 2017 the city
included $2.5 million for claims embedded in a $104 million issuance underwritten by Wells
Fargo.
While Milwaukee borrows money to cover the costs of
its aggressive policing, the city in late 2017 passed a
budget that raises property taxes, closes six out of its 36
fire stations,172 and eliminates 75 firefighter positions.173
While Milwaukee borrows MILWAUKEE’S POLICE BRUTALITY

money to cover the costs of PROBLEM
its aggressive policing, the In 2015, Milwaukee’s Mayor and Chief of Police asked
city in late 2017 passed a for help from the U.S. Department of Justice, citing
budget that raises property “community concerns” about the police department.
They asked the DOJ to evaluate and assess the
taxes, closes six out of its 36 department. This request followed a 200 percent
fire stations, and eliminates 75 increase in officer-involved shootings between 2014
and 2015, and community outrage over the 2014 fatal
firefighter positions.
shooting of Dontre Hamilton.174 Hamilton was a young
Black man with a history of mental illness who had been
sleeping in a park shortly before a white officer shot him fourteen times. Officer Christopher
Manley was fired for violating department rules, but did not face criminal charges.175
Months later, while the DOJ worked on its assessment, the city erupted in protests after officer
Dominique Heaggan-Brown shot and killed 23-year-old Sylville Smith.176 Heaggan-Brown was
later arrested for sexual assaults he committed during the unrest and fired by the department
over those assaults. According to one of the sexual assault victims, Officer Heaggan-Brown had
“bragged about being able to do whatever [he] wanted without repercussions.”177
The DOJ’s report on the Milwaukee Police Department was expected to be released in
January 2017,178 but the new Jeff Sessions-led DOJ apparently scuttled it.179 In August 2017, the

Milwaukee Journal Sentinel obtained a draft of the DOJ report and made it available online.180
The draft report highlighted problems such as a significant weakness in the department’s
investigation of use of force, lax accountability, and stop and search practices that are
“inflammatory to the community ethos”.181 For example, the report states that “MPD command
does not routinely review the involved officers’ use of force, complaint, and discipline history”
during use of force investigations.182 Presumably, this could mean that a pattern of excessive
force or complaints against an officer could be missed during a new investigation. The report
also raised concerns about the use of video evidence in such investigations. For example, one
concern was that MPD policy seems to allow officers discretion as to when they should activate
their body cameras. Another concern was about inconsistencies in the actual practice of making
use of video evidence, “making it difficult to determine if those investigation steps occurred or
were just not documented.”183 The problems the DOJ identified are some of the same factors
underlying Milwaukee’s recent payouts for settlements and judgments, much of which has been
covered with borrowed money.
The concerns the DOJ draft report raised about stop and search surfaced again in February
2018 when the American Civil Liberties Union, which had sued MPD over its stop and search
policy in February 2017, released data from its lawsuit. According to the ACLU, between 2010
and 2017, Milwaukee police allegedly made more than 350,000 unconstitutional traffic and
pedestrian stops, disproportionately targeting people of color.184

CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
T
his report focuses on just one aspect of the cost and profits of policing—the use of
borrowing to pay for police related settlements and judgments. Of course, addressing
police brutality is not just a budgeting issue. However, this report helps to uncover the
lengths that municipalities are willing to go to pay for and to hide the costs of police
brutality. The truth is that as long as there are police in a society built on white supremacy and
structural racism, Black, Indigenous and people of color will be targeted for the brunt of police
abuse. There is no economic solution that can prevent this.
However, as we work to address the system of policing and hold governments accountable
for the financial, physical and emotional costs to our communities, we must also work to hold
banks and investors accountable for their role in perpetuating and profiting from our existing
system. Police violence should never be a source of profit for banks or investors, or a reason
we do not have the resources we need to invest in the infrastructure and services that make our
communities safer and more livable. We need to dismantle this system of policing and build a
truly just system that prioritizes the needs and well-being of all people. While we work toward
that together, here are our key recommendations:
1. Defund police departments and invest in community safety

This report focuses on just one aspect of the cost and profits of policing—the use of
borrowing to pay for police-related settlements and judgments. But borrowing to pay for
settlements and judgments is just one symptom of a larger problem. The truth is that
our policing system, which gives officers the right to use deadly force against civilians, is
inherently prone to abuse. In order to limit or eliminate the scale and presence of policing
in communities, police budgets must be reduced or eliminated. We endorse calls to
defund police departments as a step toward abolishing the existing system of policing.
This divestment from police budgets must coincide with public investment into necessary
community support and safety infrastructure in communities that have been harmed by
centuries of racist policing.
2. If cities must borrow to pay for settlements and judgments, the Federal
Reserve should lend them that money without charging interest or fees.
“Defund the police” does not mean that victims of police violence should not be
compensated. Cities must pay settlements and judgments when police have harmed
people. But neither banks and other firms, nor private investors, should be allowed
to continue to make a profit from police violence. If cities are unable to pay for their
settlements and judgments and have to resort to borrowing, the Federal Reserve Bank
should lend them that money without charging interest or fees. This would not directly
cost the federal government anything since the money will eventually be paid back, but
it will remove the profit from police brutality bonds. The Federal Reserve already has a
history of making cheap loans available to banks and other corporations. It must make

free loans available to cities as well to help address this issue. Police brutality is a national
civil rights crisis that is rooted in the dehumanization and devaluation of Black lives going
back to slavery. The federal government has a responsibility to help repair the harm
caused by police violence, and it can take a small step towards that by helping cities make
these payments to victims and their families.
3. Governmental bodies at the local, state, and federal levels must account for
and provide full transparency about the total costs of policing.
Police departments take up huge portions of public budgets, at the expense of the
services and infrastructure that communities need to thrive. But police department
budgets themselves do not give us the full picture of the cost of policing. Police brutality
bonds are just one of the many hidden costs of policing. Other costs, such as building,
maintaining, and operating police facilities, the costs of equipment such as surveillance
technologies and helicopters, or the legal costs of defending officers accused of
misconduct, may not be included in the official police budget. Contracts for school police
or transit police may also be listed in separate budgets. As we move to defund police, we
need government bodies to provide a full accounting and disclosure of all the money they
are allocating to policing of all kinds, whether that money comes from tax dollars, asset
forfeiture, revenue generated by traffic enforcement cameras, federal or state grants,
corporate donations, or any other source.

METHODOLOGY
HOW WE FOUND POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS
We looked for PBBs in several ways:
⊲⊲ We looked for judgment obligation bonds in the Municipal Securities Rule Making Board’s
(MSRB) Electronic Municipal Market Access database, or EMMA. https://emma.msrb.org
⊲⊲ We looked at press reports of cities and counties that either had paid out police misconduct
settlements or judgments or entered into DOJ consent decrees for police abuses and
checked to see whether they had borrowed to pay the costs. This means that we were
mostly looking at larger cities and counties, and this is reflected in our case studies. Since
we know that small cities also issue police brutality bonds, it is likely that an expanded
project focusing on smaller cities and counties would also be fruitful.
HOW WE GATHERED OUR DATA
Our data came from a variety of sources, depending on the city or county. Data sources we used
included:
⊲⊲ Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests;

⊲⊲ Conversations with city officials over the phone and via email;
⊲⊲ Bond Official Statements, which we accessed either via EMMA or on city websites;
⊲⊲ Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs) and other similar reports available on city
and county websites;
⊲⊲ City Council documents and settlement authorizations available on city websites (for
example, Milwaukee’s and Los Angeles’ settlement and borrowing authorizations are
available in searchable databases on city websites);
⊲⊲ Other information available on city websites, such as memos from the City Administrative
Officer of Los Angeles, and detailed spreadsheets with case and settlement information on
the Chicago Law Department website;
⊲⊲ News reports;
⊲⊲ U.S. Department of Justice memos and reports; and
⊲⊲ Lawsuit dockets.
HOW WE ESTIMATED INTEREST AND OTHER BOND COSTS

In a few of our case studies, we had to estimate costs without access to complete data sets. Our
methods in those cases are explained below.
Chicago
Chicago’s 2016185 and 2017186 Annual Financial Analysis reports both include tables with details
on how much bond revenue the city used for judgments and settlements each year from 2007
through 2015. We also used spreadsheets available for download on the city’s Law Department
website that provide dollar amounts, department, and other details pertaining to all of the city’s
settlement and judgment payments made in a given year.187 Using this data, we determined
that the police department accounted for an average of 42 percent of Chicago’s settlements

between 2010-2017.
We needed a way to estimate the interest costs of Chicago’s police brutality bonds between
2010 and 2017. The 2014 and 2017 bond OS indicate a specific amount of the proceeds that
would be used for settlements and judgments ($198 million in 2014188 and $225 million in
2017189), so we were able to calculate interest costs just using the information in the Official
Statements for those bonds. Chicago’s other bonds with language indicating that they
might be used for settlements or judgments do not indicate a particular amount of the bond
issuance dedicated to that purpose. To calculate an interest cost estimate for the bonds whose
proceeds were used between 2010 and 2016, we first subtracted the 2014 police brutality bond
amount—$198 million—from $484.3 million (the total of bonds proceeds used in those years as
indicated by the Annual Financial Analysis). That gave us a figure of $286.3 million.
We then calculated an average interest rate for the bonds issued between 2010 and 2016
with language in the OS indicating they might be used for settlements and judgments—5.84
percent—and an average time to maturity—334 months. We used those numbers to calculate an
interest payment estimate on the $286.3 million.
For the estimate of the issuance fees for the portion of the 2017B bonds allotted to settlements
and judgments, we used the issuance fees for the full amount of those bonds and calculated
a percentage of that full value that was used for settlements. The total par value for the 2017B
bonds is $274,260,000. The $225 million earmarked for settlements and judgments is about
82 percent of that total. The issuance fees were $2,192,556. 82 percent of that is about $1.8
million.190
We analyzed the following Chicago bonds:191
⊲⊲ General Obligation Bonds, Taxable Project Series 2017B
⊲⊲ General Obligation Bonds, Taxable Project and Refunding Series 2014B
⊲⊲ General Obligation Bonds, Project Series 2012A
⊲⊲ General Obligation Bonds, Taxable Project and Refunding Series 2012B
⊲⊲ General Obligation Bonds, Project Series 2011A
⊲⊲ General Obligation Bonds, Taxable Project Series 2011B
⊲⊲ General Obligation Bonds, Taxable Project Series 2010C-1
According to the City of Chicago Law Department spreadsheet the city paid out an additional
$46.3 million in police-related settlements in the last few months of 2017. The spreadsheet did
not include another $69,418,125 in the settlements for Jose Lopez, 192 the “Englewood Four”, 193
and Michael LaPorta.194 This $69.4 million was approved between September and December
2017 but was not actually paid out in 2017.
Cleveland
Cleveland’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports provided annual debt service information
for the JOBs. We used those figures and added to them our own estimates of the interest costs
for the 2016 JOB refunding, based on information available in the Official Statement.
We used CAFRs for the years 2008 through 2016.195 In response to two FOIA requests we sent,
Cleveland sent us bond documents and lists of police involved cases that resulted in settlements

or judgments.
We analyzed the following Cleveland judgment bonds:196
⊲⊲ Final Judgment Obligation Bonds, Series 2007B
⊲⊲ Final Judgment Obligation Bonds, Series 2008A
⊲⊲ Final Judgment General Obligation Refunding Bonds, Series 2016B
Lake County, Indiana
We analyzed the following Lake County bonds:197
⊲⊲ General Obligation Judgment Funding Bonds of 2018
⊲⊲ General Obligation Judgment Funding Bonds, Series 2015C
⊲⊲ General Obligation Judgment Funding Bonds, Series 2008B
⊲⊲ General Obligation Judgment Funding Bonds of 2008
Milwaukee
Milwaukee makes city government records –such as authorizations for settlements and for
borrowing to pay for them—available on its Legistar database.198 Some of the documents
authorizing borrowing for settlement payments included estimates for annual debt service costs
and interest rates. Many also included details on the type of borrowing the city expected to do,
which was usually a ten-year note at level principal terms and a 2 percent or 2.5 percent interest
rate. “Level principal terms” means that the borrowing would be paid off within ten years, with
principal payments being about the same each time. However, based on information in Official
Statements, it appears that at least some of the notes secured significantly higher interest rates
than the city estimated, up to 5 percent. For the cases where we didn’t have an interest cost
estimate from the City of Milwaukee, we assumed a ten year note at level principal terms and a
2.5 percent interest rate. Due to the higher interest costs on some of the bonds, we believe that
2.5 percent is a conservative estimate.

Endnotes
1 See case studies and methodology section for details on our numbers. Because some numbers in tables are rounded
up or down, rows or columns may not add up exactly.
2 See case studies and methodology section for details on our numbers.
3 Official Statement of City of Hammond, Indiana General Obligation Judgment Funding Bonds, Series 2008A. 3. https://
emma.msrb.org/MS272054-MS268750-MD532546.pdf.
4 “Larry Mayes.” Innocence Project. Accessed May 17, 2018. https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/larry-mayes.
5 City of New Haven Ordinance OR-2017-0022. Accessed May 17, 2018. https://newhaven-ct.legistar.com/LegislationDe-
tail.aspx?ID=3153390&GUID=78371ABD-9063-4791-925B-E37172CE3B80&Options=&Search.
6 Email Communication with Michael Gormany, New Haven Acting Budget Director. January 11, 2018.
7 Ricks, Markeshia. “City Finds $9.5M To Pay Dirty-Cop Bill.” New Haven Independent. September 26, 2017. Accessed
May 17, 2018. http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/alder_9.5m_payment_plan.
8 Schwartz, Joanna C. “Police Indemnification”. NYU Law Review. Volume 85, No 3. June 2014. http://www.nyulawreview.
org/issues/volume-89-number-3/police-indemnification.
9 Schwartz, Joanna. “How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform.” UCLA Law Review. 1144 (2016).
https://www.uclalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Schwartz-63-5.pdf.
10 Elinson, Zusha, and Dan Frosch. “Cost of Police-Misconduct Cases Soars in Big U.S. Cities.” The Wall Street Journal.
July 16, 2015. Accessed May 16, 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/cost-of-police-misconduct-cases-soars-in-big-u-s-
cities-1437013834.
11 Official Statement of General Obligation Bonds Taxable Project Series 2017B of the City of Chicago, Source and Uses
Table. 14. ttps://emma.msrb.org/EP975272-ER800979-ER1202127.pdf.
12 Official Statement of General Obligation Bonds Taxable Project Series 2017B of the City of Chicago. 2. https://emma.
msrb.org/EP975272-ER800979-ER1202127.pdf.
13 See methodology section for details on how we estimated interest costs.
14 See methodology section for details on how we estimated issuance fees.
15 See case studies and methodology section for details on our numbers.
16 See Milwaukee case study and methodology section for details on our data.
17 According to documents available in Milwaukee Legistar database authorizing contingent borrowing for settlements or
judgments in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. https://milwaukee.legistar.com/Legislation.aspx.
18 Eidler, Scott. “Lawmakers OK $23M in Borrowing for Judgment.” Newsday. February 06, 2018. Accessed May 16, 2018.
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/politics/nassau-settlement-fusco-restivo-halstead-1.16563043.
19 Larocc, Paul “$101M FOR LAWSUITS; Nassau’s payments for settlements, judgments far greater than Suffolk’s”. News-
day. February 15, 2015. Accessed via Lexis Nexis.
20 Official Statement Of 2013 Taxable Judgment Obligation Bonds of The City of Fullerton. 79. https://emma.msrb.org/
EA562114-EA437919-EA834031.pdf.
21 “City Pays $1 Million to Mother of Homeless Man Beaten to Death by Police.” CNN. May 16, 2012. Accessed May 16,
2018. https://www.cnn.com/2012/05/16/justice/california-police-beating/index.html.
22 Official Statement Of City Of Hammond, Indiana General Obligation Judgment Funding Bonds, Series 2008A. 3.
https://emma.msrb.org/MS272054-MS268750-MD532546.pdf.
23 “Larry Mayes.” Innocence Project. Accessed May 17, 2018. https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/larry-mayes.
24 Report, CantonRep.com Staff. “Canton Council to Vote on Funds for Police Brutality Suit.” The Repository. May 11, 2015.
Accessed May 17, 2018. http://www.cantonrep.com/article/20150511/NEWS/150519913.
25 City of New Haven Ordinance OR-2017-0022. Accessed May 17, 2018. https://newhaven-ct.legistar.com/LegislationDe-
tail.aspx?ID=3153390&GUID=78371ABD-9063-4791-925B-E37172CE3B80&Options=&Search.
26 Email Communication with Michael Gormany, New Haven Acting Budget Director. January 11, 2018.
27 Ricks, Markeshia. “City Finds $9.5M To Pay Dirty-Cop Bill.” New Haven Independent. September 26, 2017. Accessed
May 17, 2018. http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/alder_9.5m_payment_plan.
28 Radzievich, Nicole. “What Happened to the Hirko Tax in Bethlehem?” TheMorningCall.com. January 13, 2018. Ac-
cessed May 17, 2018. http://www.mcall.com/news/local/investigations/mc-bethlehem-hirko-tax-20151124-story.html.
29 Ferguson, Joe. “Bond Debt Has Steadily Grown for Financially Troubled South Tucson.” Arizona Daily Star. June 10,
2017. Accessed May 17, 2018. http://tucson.com/news/local/bond-debt-has-steadily-grown-for-financially-troubled-
south-tucson/article_66167503-0fe7-53e4-b462-0b527e6071dd.html.
30 Ibid.
31 Radzievich, Nicole. “Bethlehem City Council Weighs Ways to Pay Hirko Settlement.” TheMorningCall.com. July 12,
2008. Accessed May 17, 2018. http://www.mcall.com/news/all-b4-4hirko3apr01-story.html.
32 Radzievich, Nicole. “What Happened to the Hirko Tax in Bethlehem?” TheMorningCall.com. January 13, 2018. Ac-
cessed May 21, 2018. http://www.mcall.com/news/local/investigations/mc-bethlehem-hirko-tax-20151124-story.html.
33 Hicks, Mark. “Inkster Residents Face Tax Hike in Beating Settlement.” Detroit News. June 02, 2015. Accessed May 17,
2018. http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/2015/06/02/inkster-residents-face-tax-hike-beat-
ing-settlement/28339017.
34 Anderson, Elisha. “Ex-cop Sentenced to 13 Months to 10 Years in Dent Case.” Detroit Free Press. February 03, 2016.
Accessed May 17, 2018. https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/wayne/2016/02/02/ex-inkster-cop-sen-
tenced-police-brutality-case/79688876.
35 Ferguson, Joe. “Bond Debt Has Steadily Grown for Financially Troubled South Tucson.” Arizona Daily Star. June 10,
2017. Accessed May 17, 2018. http://tucson.com/news/local/bond-debt-has-steadily-grown-for-financially-troubled-
south-tucson/article_66167503-0fe7-53e4-b462-0b527e6071dd.html.
36 Atassi, Leila. “Cleveland Voters Pass Income Tax Increase by Narrow Margin.” The Plain Dealer. November 09, 2016.
Accessed May 17, 2018. http://www.cleveland.com/election-results/index.ssf/2016/11/cleveland_income_tax_increase.
html.
37 Konczal, Mike and Nell Abernathy. Defining Financialization. Roosevelt Institute. January 07, 2016. Accessed May 17,
2018. http://rooseveltinstitute.org/defining-financialization.
38 Konczal, Mike. “Opinion | How the Rise of Finance Has Warped Our Values.” The Washington Post. April 22, 2016.
Accessed May 17, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/04/22/how-the-rise-of-finance-has-

warped-our-values/?utm_term=.f3e4b2e7d995.
39 Chan, Sewell. “Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds.” The New York Times. January 25, 2011. Accessed May 21,
2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/business/economy/26inquiry.html.
40 “Forget About Housing, The Real Cause Of The Crisis Was OTC Derivatives.” Business Insider. May 11, 2010. Accessed
May 17, 2018. http://www.businessinsider.com/bubble-derivatives-otc-2010-5.
41 See, for example: Bhatti, Saqib. Dirty Deals: How Wall Street’s Predatory Deals Hurt Taxpayers and What We Can Do
About It. ReFund America Project. November 18, 2014. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58d8a1bb3a041137d463d
64f/t/5ab297728a922d0cb9f85bca/1521653630088/Dirty+Deals+-+Nov+2014.pdf
42 Joffe, Marc. Doubly Bound: The Costs of Issuing Municipal Bonds. Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society and
ReFund America Project. 2015. 9-10. http://haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files. haasinstituterefundamerica_
doublybound_cost_of_issuingbonds_publish.pdf.
43 Perez Jr, Juan. “After Emotional Testimony from Opponents, Chicago School Board OKs Closings and Consolidation.”
Chicago Tribune. March 01, 2018. Accessed May 17, 2018. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-
chicago-school-closings-vote-20180228-story.html.
44 “‘Devastating’ Closure of Mental Health Centers to Hit 10,000 Patients next Month.” Chicago Sun-Times. April 24, 2015.
Accessed May 18, 2018. https://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/devastating-closure-of-mental-health-centers-to-hit-
10000-patients-next-month.
45 Human Rights Watch. “SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: Police Brutality and Accountability in the United States”. June 1998.
26. https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/u/us/uspol986.pdf.
46 Makarechi, Kia. “What the Data Really Says About Police and Racial Bias.” The Hive. July 14, 2016. Accessed May 17,
2018. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/07/data-police-racial-bias.
47 Lafraniere, Sharon, and Andrew W. Lehren. “The Disproportionate Risks of Driving While Black.” The New York Times.
October 24, 2015. Accessed May 17, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-stops-driv-
ing-black.html.
48 Makarechi, Kia. “What the Data Really Says About Police and Racial Bias.” The Hive. July 14, 2016. Accessed May 17,
2018. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/07/data-police-racial-bias.
49 Hansen, Elise. “The Forgotten Minority in Police Shootings.” CNN. November 13, 2017. Accessed May 17, 2018. https://
www.cnn.com/2017/11/10/us/native-lives-matter/index.html.
50 Lowery, Wesley. “Aren’t more white people than black people killed by the police? Yes, but no.” The Washington Post.
July 11, 2016. Accessed May 27, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/07/11/arent-more-
white-people-than-black-people-killed-by-police-yes-but-no.
51 “What the Justice Department’s Decades-long Pursuit of Abusive Police Departments Has Actually Achieved.”
The Washington Post. November 13, 2015. Accessed May 17, 2018. http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investiga-
tive/2015/11/13/forced-reforms-mixed-results.
52 Ibid.
53 Jackman, Tom. “Do Federal Consent Decrees Improve Local Police Departments? This Study Says They Might.”
The Washington Post. May 24, 2017. Accessed May 17, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/
wp/2017/05/24/__trashed.
54 Kaczynski, Andrew. “Attorney General Jeff Sessions: Consent Decrees ‘can Reduce Morale of the Police Officers’.”
CNN. April 14, 2017. Accessed May 17, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/14/politics/kfile-sessions-consent-decrees/
index.html.
55 Cruel, Synclaire. “In Blow to DOJ, Federal Judge Approves Baltimore Police Reform Agreement.” PBS. April 07, 2017.
Accessed May 17, 2018. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/blow-doj-federal-judge-approves-baltimore-police-re-
form-agreement.
56 Horwitz, Sari, Mark Berman, and Wesley Lowery. “Sessions Orders Justice Department to Review All Police Reform
Agreements.” The Washington Post. April 03, 2017. Accessed May 17, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/sessions-orders-justice-department-to-review-all-police-reform-agreements/2017/04/03/ba934058-
18bd-11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html.
58 Schwartz, Joanna. “How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform.” UCLA Law Review. 1144 (2016).
https://www.uclalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Schwartz-63-5.pdf.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 There is some overlap between the cities and counties in the Freedom to Thrive report and in this one, but significant
differences as well.
63 Center for Popular Democracy, BYP100, and Law for Black Lives. Freedom to Thrive: Reimagining Safety and Security
in our Communities. July 04, 2017. https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Freedom%20To%20Thrive%2C%20
Higher%20Res%20Version.pdf.
64 Ibid.
65 Rector, Kevin. “Judge Dismisses ACLU Lawsuit Challenging Baltimore’s Use of Non-disparagement Clauses in Police
Settlements.” Baltimore Sun. October 05, 2017. Accessed May 17, 2018. http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/
crime/bs-md-ci-aclu-police-lawsuit-20171005-story.html.
66 Phone conversation, September 19, 2017. By request of the source, we are not naming this person.
67 Matuszak, Peter. “Emanuel’s Short-term Budget Solutions Will Cost $1 Billion in Interest.” Chicago Tribune. March 17,
2017. Accessed May 22, 2018. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-chicago-borrowing-to-balance-bud-
get-20170315-story.html.
Table. 14. https://emma.msrb.org/EP975272-ER800979-ER1202127.pdf.
69 See methodology section for details on how we estimated interest costs.
70 See methodology section for details on how we estimated issuance fees.
71 Underwriter information is generally on the first page of bond Official Statements. See methodology section for details
on the bonds we analyzed.
72 City of Chicago Office of Budget and Management website, Budet-2015 Budget Ordinance-Appropriations. https://
www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/obm/dataset/budget---2015-budget-ordinance---appropriations.html; City of

Chicago Office of Budget and Management website, Budet-2016 Budget Ordinance-Appropriations. https://data.cityof-
chicago.org/Administration-Finance/Budget-2016-Budget-Ordinance-Appropriations/36y7-5nnf.
73 Madhani, Aamer. “Prosecutor: No Further Charges against Chicago Cops in Laquan McDonald Investigation.” USA
Today. November 14, 2017. Accessed May 17, 2018. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/11/14/chicago-po-
lice-laquan-mcdonald-grand-jury-coverup-discharged/862644001.
74 Police Accountability Taskforce. Recommendations for Reform: Restoring Trust Between the Chicago Police and the
Communities They Serve: Executive Summary. April 2016. https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_
Final_Report_Executive_Summary_4_13_16-1.pdf.
75 Crepeau, Megan, Dan Hinkel, Jason Meisner, and Jeremy Gorner. “Three Chicago Cops Indicted in Alleged Cover-up
of Laquan McDonald Shooting Details.” Chicago Tribune. June 28, 2017. Accessed May 17, 2018. http://www.chicagotri-
bune.com/news/laquanmcdonald/ct-laquan-mcdonald-shooting-charges-20170627-story.html.
76 Chicago Police Accountability Task Force website. Accessed May 27, 2018. https://chicagopatf.org.
77 Police Accountability Taskforce. Recommendations for Reform: Restoring Trust Between the Chicago Police and
the Communities They Serve. April 2016. 4. https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Re-
port_4_13_16-1.pdf.
78 Ibid., 8.
79 United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney’s Office Northern District of
Illinois. Investigation of the Chicago Police Department. 15. January 13, 2017. https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/
download.
80 Fact Sheet: The Department of Justice Pattern or Practice Investigation of the Chicago Police Department. January 13,
2017 https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925851/download.
81 United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney’s Office Northern District of
Illinois. Investigation of the Chicago Police Department. 150. January 13, 2017. https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/
download.
82 Newman, Jonah and Geoff Hing. “Monitor Chicago’s police reforms“. Chicago Reporter. September 13, 2017. Accessed
May 27, 2018. http://chicagoreporter.com/99reforms.
83 We arrived at this number by adding figures from City of Chicago Law Department 2017 Settlements and Judgments
spreadsheet through October 2017 and settlements approved later in 2017 that were not included in the spreadsheet.
See methodology section for more detail.
84 Clair, Stacy St., Jeff Coen, and Jason Meisner. “Chicago Cop Shot Friend, Jury Finds, Ordering City to Pay $44.7 Million:
‘I Feel Whole Again’.” Chicago Tribune. October 27, 2017. Accessed May 17, 2018. http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/local/breaking/ct-met-chicago-police-shooting-trial-verdict-20171025-story.html.
85 Crepeau, Megan, Dan Hinkel, Jason Meisner, and Jeremy Gorner. “Three Chicago Cops Indicted in Alleged Cover-up
of Laquan McDonald Shooting Details.” Chicago Tribune. June 28, 2017. Accessed May 17, 2018. http://www.chicagotri-
bune.com/news/laquanmcdonald/ct-laquan-mcdonald-shooting-charges-20170627-story.html.
86 Spielman, Fran. “‘Englewood Four,’ Coerced into Confessions, to Get $31M Settlement.” Chicago Sun-Times. Decem-
ber 08, 2017. Accessed May 17, 2018. https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/englewood-four-31-million-settlement-tor-
tured-false-confession-exonerated.
87 2017 Judgment and Settlement Spreadsheet. City of Chicago Law Department website: https://www.cityofchicago.org/
city/en/depts/dol.html.
89 “Chicago’s Mental Health Clinic Closings: 20 Months Later.” Al Jazeera America. December 26, 2013. Accessed May
17, 2018. http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/the-stream/multimedia/chicago-mental-healthclosings20month-
safter.html.
90 “Criminalization of Mental Illness.” Treatment Advocacy Center. Accessed May 21, 2018. http://www.treatmentadvoca-
cycenter.org/key-issues/criminalization-of-mental-illness.
91 “The School-to-Prison Pipeline’s Role in Criminal Justice Reform.” National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy.
Accessed May 21, 2018. https://www.ncrp.org/publication/responsive-philanthropy-fall-2015/the-school-to-prison-pipe-
lines-role-in-criminal-justice-reform.
92 Lee, Trymaine. “Thousands of Black and Latino Kids Lost Their Schools in 2013.” MSNBC. January 04, 2014. Accessed
May 17, 2018. http://www.msnbc.com/melissa-harris-perry/what-happens-when-kids-lose-their-schools.
93 Holmes, Evelyn. “CPS to close 4 Englewood schools, convert South Loop elementary to HS.” ABC 7 Eyewitness News.
March 01, 2018. Accessed May 27, 2018. http://abc7chicago.com/education/cps-to-close-4-englewood-schools-con-
vert-south-loop-elementary-to-hs/3155799.
94 See methodology section for Cleveland bond information.
95 Atassi, Leila. “Cleveland City Council Approves $100 Million Bond Issue, Almost None to Address Problems in Police
Department.” The Plain Dealer. January 13, 2015. Accessed May 18, 2018. http://www.cleveland.com/cityhall/index.
ssf/2015/01/cleveland_city_council_approve_9.html.
96 U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and United States Attorneys Office Northern District of Ohio. Inves-
tigation of the Cleveland Division of Police. December 4, 2014. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/lega-
cy/2014/12/04/cleveland_findings_12-4-14.pdf.
97 Based on figures provided by Cleveland’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports. See methodology section for
details.
98 See methodology section.
99 Buduson, Sarah, and Samah Assad. “Settling for Less: Why the City of Cleveland Spends Millions of Taxpayer Dollars
Settling Lawsuits.” News 5 Cleveland. February 27, 2018. Accessed May 18, 2018. https://www.news5cleveland.com/
longform/settling-for-less-why-the-city-of-cleveland-spends-millions-of-taxpayer-dollars-settling-lawsuits.
100 U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and United States Attorneys Office Northern District of Ohio. Investiga-
tion of the Clevelend Division of Police. December 4, 2014.
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/12/04/cleveland_findings_12-4-14.pdf.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Dissell, Rachel. “Some Police Settlements Confidential; Criminal Charges Deter Some from Calling out Brutality, Law-

suits Say: Forcing Change.” The Plain Dealer. January 28, 2015. Accessed May 18, 2018. http://www.cleveland.com/
forcing-change/index.ssf/2015/01/city_wanted_some_police_settle.html.
106 Atassi, Leila. “Cleveland to Pay $13.2 Million next Year for Police Reforms.” The Plain Dealer. September 29, 2015.
Accessed May 18, 2018. http://www.cleveland.com/cityhall/index.ssf/2015/09/cleveland_to_pay_132_million_n.html.
107 Ibid.
108 Atassi, Leila. “Cleveland Voters Pass Income Tax Increase by Narrow Margin.” The Plain Dealer. November 09, 2016.
Accessed May 18, 2018. http://www.cleveland.com/election-results/index.ssf/2016/11/cleveland_income_tax_increase.
html.
109 Editorial Board. “After the Tamir Rice Settlement, Six Million New Reasons to Mend the Cleveland Police: Editorial.” The
Plain Dealer. April 27, 2016. Accessed May 18, 2018. http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2016/04/after_the_
tamir_rice_settlemen.html.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Swenson, Kyle. “How Cleveland’s Trying to Get Out of Paying $18.7 Million in Judgments Against Two Cleveland Police
Officers.” Cleveland Scene. May 18, 2018. Accessed May 18, 2018. https://www.clevescene.com/cleveland/how-cleve-
lands-trying-to-get-out-of-paying-187-million-in-judgments-against-two-cleveland-police-officers/Content?oid=4692049.
113 Ibid.
114 Heisig, Eric. “Cleveland Ordered to Pay $13.2 Million Judgment for Police Officer in Wrongful Conviction Suit.” The
Plain Dealer. October 13, 2016. Accessed May 18, 2018. http://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2016/10/
cleveland_ordered_to_pay_132_m_1.html.
115 Dissell, Rachel. “Some Police Settlements Confidential; Criminal Charges Deter Some from Calling out Brutality, Law-
suits Say: Forcing Change.” The Plain Dealer. January 28, 2015. Accessed May 18, 2018. http://www.cleveland.com/
forcing-change/index.ssf/2015/01/city_wanted_some_police_settle.html.
116 Ibid.
117 See methodology section for information on Lake County’s bonds.
118 Lake County issued JOBs in 2018, 2015, and twice in 2008. See methodology section for more information.
119 See methodology section for more information about Lake County’s bonds and links to official statements.
120 Napoleon, Carrie. “Lake County to OK up to $6.3 Million in Lawsuit Settlements.” Chicago Tribune. October 09, 2015.
Accessed May 18, 2018. http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/news/ct-ptb-lake-county-settlement-st-
1012-20151009-story.html.
121 Official Statement of General Obligation Judgment Funding Bonds 2018 of Lake County, Indiana. C-20. https://emma.
msrb.org/ES1095954-ES856304-ES1257443.pdf.
122 Schultz, Teresa Auch. “Second Lawsuit Filed in Lake County Jail Inmate Death.” Chicago Tribune. April 06, 2015.
Accessed May 18, 2018. http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/news/ct-ptb-lake-county-jail-fatal-lawsuit-
st-0407-20150406-story.html.
123 William C. Smith v. Lake County. 2:15-CV-123. United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division. 2017. Lea-
gle.
Accessed May 18, 2018. https://www.leagle.com/decision/infdco20170213e66.
124 Official Statement of General Obligation Judgment Funding Bonds 2018 of Lake County, Indiana. C-20. https://emma.
msrb.org/ES1095954-ES856304-ES1257443.pdf.
125 Tamarra Sowell v. Roy Dominguez. 2:09 cv 47. United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division. 2010.
Leagle. Accessed May 18, 2018. https://www.leagle.com/decision/infdco20101202903.
126 Official Statement Of General Obligation Judgment Funding Bonds 2015C Of Lake County, Indiana. “Exhibit A”. A-1.
https://emma.msrb.org/EP893113-EP691488-EP1093192.pdf.
127 Bierschenk, Ed. “Settlement Reached in Case Involving Inmate Death.” The Times of Northwest Indiana. August 18,
2015. Accessed May 21, 2018. http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/lake/settlement-reached-in-case-involving-inmate-
death/article_9c29daec-8621-5ac4-99f6-c5990285ac6a.html.
128 Dorothy Hobson v. John Buncich. 2:10-CV-429-TLS-PRC. United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division.
2013. Leagle. Accessed May 18, 2018. https://www.leagle.com/decision/infdco20130118972.
129 Dolan, Bill. “Lawsuits Tax Lake County Government.” The Times of Northwest Indiana. November 02, 2015. Accessed
May 18, 2018. http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/lake/lawsuits-tax-lake-county-government/article_5d57136b-0f08-
5a86-89be-d78ff200effe.html.
130 Lyons, Craig. “Lake County, Ind., May Issue $8M Bond for Legal Settlements, including for Families of Dead Inmates.”
Chicago Tribune. November 10, 2017. Accessed May 18, 2018. http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/
news/ct-ptb-lake-county-judgment-bond-st-1110-20171109-story.html.
131 Napoleon, Carrie. “Lake Jail Staffing Problems Lead to Continued Federal Oversight.” Chicago Tribune. June 10, 2017.
Accessed May 18, 2018. http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/news/ct-ptb-lake-county-justice-st-0612-
20170611-story.html.
132 Kwiatkowski, Marisa. “Lake County to Pay $7.2 Million to Jail Inmates in Settlement.” The Times of Northwest Indiana.
August 15, 2012. Accessed May 18, 2018. http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/lake/crown-point/lake-county-to-pay-
million-to-jail-inmates-in-settlement/article_e1e8f888-7c8b-55d2-98e1-78cffd9cd9e8.html.
133 U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division , “Investigation of the Lake County Jail; Letter to Lake County Commis-
sioners Allen, Scheub, and DuPey”. December 7, 2009. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/15/
Lake_County_Jail_findlet_12-07-09.pdf.
134 “Sheriff: Federal Oversight Could End Soon at Indiana Jail.” The Indiana Lawyer. May 8, 2015 Accessed May 18, 2018.
https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/37128-sheriff-federal-oversight-could-end-soon-at-indiana-jail.
135 Dolan, Bill. “New Lake County Jail Warden Will Inherit Pending Lawsuits, Shortcomings and Continuing DOJ Oversight.”
The Times of Northwest Indiana. March 04, 2018. Accessed May 18, 2018. http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/lake/
lake-newsletter/lake-news/new-lake-county-jail-warden-will-inherit-pending-lawsuits-shortcomings/article_d256cb8d-
d865-546b-8632-a2ee5aea7a14.html.
136 Ibid.
137 Official Statement of Judgment Obligation Bond Series 2009A of the City of Los Angeles. 3. https://emma.msrb.org/
EA285408-EA3982-EA626353.pdf; Official Statement of Judgment Obligation Bond Series 2010A of the City of Los
Angeles. 4. https://emma.msrb.org/EP446741-EP349598-EP746457.pdf.
EA285408-EA3982-EA626353.pdf; Official Statement of Judgment Obligation Bond Series 2010A of the City of Los

Angeles. 4. https://emma.msrb.org/EP446741-EP349598-EP746457.pdf.
139 Reston, Maeve. “L.A. Council OKs $20.5-million Settlement in Rampart Suits.” Los Angeles Times. January 29, 2009.
Accessed May 18, 2018. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/29/local/me-rampart29.
140 Riccardi, Nicholas. “Bill Targets Evidence Tampering by Officers.” Los Angeles Times. February 26, 2000. Accessed
May 18, 2018. http://articles.latimes.com/2000/feb/26/local/me-2777.
141 Young, Rick. “Rafael Perez: In the Eye of the Storm”. Frontline PBS. Accessed May 21, 2018. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/lapd/scandal/eyeofstorm.html.
142 Reston, Maeve. “L.A. Council OKs $20.5-million Settlement in Rampart Suits.” Los Angeles Times. January 29, 2009.
Accessed May 18, 2018. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/29/local/me-rampart29.
EP446741-EP349598-EP746457.pdf.
144 Reston, Maeve, and Joel Rubin. “Los Angeles to Pay $13 Million to Settle May Day Melee Lawsuits.” Los Angeles Times.
February 05, 2009. Accessed May 18, 2018. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/05/local/me-lapd-settlement5.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
EP446741-EP349598-EP746457.pdf.
148 Chou, Elizabeth. “LA City Council Urged to Borrow up to $70M to Cover Lawsuit Payouts.” Daily News. August 28,
2017. Accessed May 18, 2018. https://www.dailynews.com/2017/01/09/la-city-council-urged-to-borrow-up-to-70m-to-
cover-lawsuit-payouts.
149 Miguel Santana. “Report from Office of the City Administrative Officer”. City of Los Angeles.
January 6, 2017. http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2016/16-0600-s169_rpt_CAO_01-06-2017.pdf.
150 Chou, Elizabeth. “LA City Council Urged to Borrow up to $70M to Cover Lawsuit Payouts.” Daily News. August 28,
2017. Accessed May 18, 2018. https://www.dailynews.com/2017/01/09/la-city-council-urged-to-borrow-up-to-70m-to-
cover-lawsuit-payouts.
151 Ibid.
152 Richard Llewellyn. “Report from Office of the City Administrative Officer”. City of Los Angeles. November 30, 2017.
http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2017/17-0600-s105_rpt_CAO_11-30-2017.pdf.
153 McDonnell, Patrick J. “Villaraigosa’s Deficit-reduction Plans Anger Labor.” Los Angeles Times. May 18, 2009. Accessed
May 18, 2018. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/18/local/me-unions18.
154 Murray, Bobbi. “Hire Power: Los Angeles Employment Program Breaks New Ground.” Salon. July 22, 2017. Accessed
May 18, 2018. https://www.salon.com/2017/07/22/hire-power-los-angeles-employment-program-breaks-new-ground_
partner.
155 City of Los Angeles Targeted Local Hire Program website: http://lalocalhire.lacity.org.
156 Fix LA Coalition website: http://fixla.org.
157 The United States Department of Justice. “LAPD Notice Of Investigation Letter.” May 8, 2000. Accessed May 18, 2018.
https://www.justice.gov/crt/lapd-notice-investigation-letter.
158 “U.S. V. City Of Los Angeles - Consent Decree -- Introduction.” The United States Department of Justice. Accessed
May 18, 2018. https://www.justice.gov/crt/us-v-city-los-angeles-consent-decree-introduction.
159 “Legal Payouts in LAPD Lawsuits.” Los Angeles Times. Accessed May 18, 2018. http://spreadsheets.latimes.com/
lapd-settlements.
160 Based on payment authorizations available in the Milwaukee Legistar database. For more details, see our discussion in
the methodology section. https://milwaukee.legistar.com.
161 According to documents available in Milwaukee Legistar database authorizing contingent borrowing for settlements or
judgments in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. https://milwaukee.legistar.com/Legislation.aspx.
162 Please see our discussion of Milwaukee in the methodology section for details on how we arrived at our numbers.
163 The Official Statement did not provide information on issuance fees. This estimate is based on our assumption of
issuance fees of 1 percent of par value. The figure here is based on the total par value of the following bonds: General
Obligation Promissory Notes, Series 2017 N4 https://emma.msrb.org/ER1055482-ER826312-ER1227334.pdf , General
Obligation Promissory Notes, Series 2016 N2; https://emma.msrb.org/EP930357-EP722221-EP1124065.pdf; General
Obligation Promissory Notes, Series 2015 N2 https://emma.msrb.org/EP860345-EP666504-EP1068297.pdf.
164 Vielmetti, Bruce. “Milwaukee to pay $6.5 million go man cleared after 13 years in prison.” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel.
March 31, 2015. Accessed May 25, 2018. http://archive.jsonline.com/news/crime/milwaukee-to-pay-65-million-to-man-
cleared-after-13-years-in-prison-b99472841z1-298216201.html.
165 Vielmetti, Bruce. “Ex-cop Gets 26 Months in Prison for Strip, Cavity Searches.” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. June 21,
2013. Accessed May 17, 2018. http://archive.jsonline.com/news/crime/ex-milwaukee-officer-gets-26-months-in-prison-
for-strip-cavity-searches-b9938948z1-212486141.html.
166 Barton, Gina. “$2.5 Million Payout Approved after Rape of 911 Caller by Milwaukee Cop.” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel.
February 07, 2017. Accessed May 17, 2018. https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/milwaukee/2017/02/07/25-mil-
lion-payout-approved-after-rape-911-caller-milwaukee-cop/97594956.
167 Crowe, Kevin and Ashley Luthern. “The cost of police misconduct in Milwaukee: $21 million – and growing.” Milwau-
kee Journal Sentinel. October 25, 2017. Accessed May 25, 2018. https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/investiga-
tions/2017/10/25/cost-police-misconduct-milwaukee-21-million-and-growing/792428001.
170 Records available here: https://milwaukee.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2973357&GUID=388CDF83-1E4B-44
E4-8C78-196CCB55B5EC&Options=ID|Text|&Search=zachary+thoms.
171 Zantow, Emily. “Milwaukee Cops Must Face Trial Over Arrestee’s Death.” Courthouse News Service. August 09, 2017.
Accessed May 18, 2018. https://www.courthousenews.com/milwaukee-cops-must-face-trial-arrestees-death.
172 Spicuzza, Mary. “Milwaukee Common Council Passes Budget That Eases Cuts to Cops, Funds Disparity Study.”
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. November 10, 2017. Accessed May 18, 2018. https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/
milwaukee/2017/11/10/milwaukee-common-council-debates-500-000-community-disparity-study/851882001.
173 Luthern, Ashley. “Six Milwaukee Fire Stations Are Slated to Close in 2018. Here’s What That Means for Residents.”
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. September 27, 2017. Accessed May 18, 2018. https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/

milwaukee/2017/09/27/six-milwaukee-fire-stations-slated-close-2018-heres-what-means-residents/706392001.
174 Lantigua-Williams, Juleyka. “The Milwaukee Police Department Knows It Needs Help.” The Atlantic. August 16, 2016.
Accessed May 18, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/why-milwaukee-police-are-on-volun-
tary-probation/496007.
175 Barton, Gina, and Ashley Luthern. “Family of Dontre Hamilton, Milwaukee Man Fatally Shot by Police, Prevails in Early
Legal round.” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. April 12, 2017. Accessed May 27, 2018. https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/
crime/2017/04/12/family-dontre-hamilton-milwaukee-man-fatally-shot-police-prevails-early-legal-round/100391404.
176 CBS/AP. “Call for Calm in Milwaukee after Violent Protests.” CBS News. August 14, 2016. Accessed May 18, 2018.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/call-for-calm-milwaukee-violent-protests-police-shooting.
177 Berman, Mark. “Milwaukee Police Officer Who Fatally Shot Sylville Smith Arrested, Charged with Sexual Assault.” The
Washington Post. October 20, 2016. Accessed May 25, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/
wp/2016/10/20/milwaukee-police-officer-who-fatally-shot-sylville-smith-arrested-after-sexual-assault-allegation/?utm_
term=.121349be18a6.
178 Luthern, Ashley. “DOJ Expected to Release Report on Milwaukee Police.” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. December 12,
2016. Accessed May 18, 2018. https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/crime/2016/12/12/doj-expected-release-report-mil-
waukee-police/95213698.
179 Barton, Gina, and Ashley Luther “Trust Damaged between Milwaukee Police and Community, Department of Justice
Draft Report Says.” - Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. August 30, 2017. Accessed May 25, 2018. https://projects.jsonline.
com/news/2017/8/30/trust-damaged-between-milwaukee-police-department-of-justice-draft-report-says.html.
180 Ibid.
181 U.S. Department of Justice. Collaborative Reform Initiative Milwaukee Police Department Assessment Report. 12.
https://graphics.jsonline.com/jsi_news/documents/doj_draftmpdreport.pdf.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 Dennis, LaToya. “ACLU Accuses Milwaukee Police of Targeting People of Color in Unconstitutional Stops.” WUWM.
February 21, 2018. Accessed May 18, 2018. http://wuwm.com/post/aclu-accuses-milwaukee-police-targeting-peo-
ple-color-unconstitutional-stops.
185 City of Chicago. “Corporate Fund Expenditures: Settlements and Judgments Table .” Annual Financial Analysis. Ac-
cessed May 18, 2018. http://chicago.github.io/annual-financial-analysis/Expenditure-History/Corporate.
186 City of Chicago “Corporate Fund Expenditures: Settlements and Judgments Table.” Annual Financial Analysis. Ac-
cessed May 18, 2018. https://chicago.github.io/afa-2017/Expenditure-History/Corporate.
187 City of Chicago Law Department website. https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/dol.html.
188 Official Statement of General Obligation Bonds Taxable Project and Refunding 2014B of the City of Chicago, Source
and Uses Table. 14. https://emma.msrb.org/EA590845-EA461808-EA857838.pdf
Table. 14. ttps://emma.msrb.org/EP975272-ER800979-ER1202127.pdf
190 Official Statement of General Obligation Bonds Taxable Project Series 2017B of the City of Chicago. https://emma.
msrb.org/EP975272-ER800979-ER1202127.pdf
191 City of Chicago bond official statements available here: https://emma.msrb.org/IssuerHomePage/Issuer?id=51EE59F-
85CD0774DE053151ED20A3D91&type=M.
192 Spielman, Fran. “Reluctant aldermen sign off on $9.5M settlement in Taser incident.” Chicago Sun Times. September
5, 2017. Accessed May 27, 2018. https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/reluctant-aldermen-sign-off-on-9-5m-settlement-
in-taser-incident.
193 Hinkel, Dan. “City proposes $31 million settlement for Englewood Four’s wrongful conviction.” Chicago Tribune.
December 8, 2017. Accessed May 27, 2018. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-engle-
wood-four-multimillion-settlement-20171208-story.html.
194 Siedel, Jon. “Jury rules Chicago cop fired disabling bullet, sends $44.7M message.” Chicago Sun Times. October 26,
2017. Accessed May 27, 2018. https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/jury-awards-man-shot-in-head-by-chicago-cops-gun-
44-7m.
195 City of Cleveland Comrephensive Annual Financial Reports available here: http://www.city.cleveland.oh.us/taxonomy/
term/53.
196 City of Cleveland bond official statements available here: https://emma.msrb.org/IssuerHomePage/Issuer?id=78349B-
180B17E65C82939DDB527731C9&type=G.
197 Lake County, Indiana bond official statements available here: https://emma.msrb.org/IssuerHomePage/Issu-
er?id=E2203B63D286E2C87C98F48953302BB2&type=G.
198 Milwaukee’s Legistar database can be found at https://milwaukee.legistar.com/Calendar.aspx.

Goodwin, Shepard & Sloan, Police Brutality

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Goodwin, Shepard & Sloan, Police Brutality

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Goodwin, Shepard & Sloan, Police Brutality

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

POLICE

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 3

Police Brutality Bonds in Twelve Cities and Counties1

Police Brutality Bonds and Investor Profits: Five Case Studies2

4 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

THE ROLE OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE PROBLEM OF POLICE

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 5

6 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 7

Total Estimated Police Interest Paid to Total Cost to

WHY CITIES AND COUNTIES BORROW TO PAY FOR POLICE

8 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 9

10 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 11

12 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INTERVENTIONS IN ABUSIVE

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 13

VIOLENT POLICE OFFICERS AND THEIR DEPARTMENTS ARE

14 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

SETTLEMENTS OFTEN FUNCTION AS PREDATORY SILENCING

TRUE TRANSPARENCY IS NONEXISTENT

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 15

16 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 17

CHICAGO’S POLICE BRUTALITY PROBLEM

18 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 19

CLEVELAND’S POLICE BRUTALITY PROBLEM

20 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

LAKE COUNTY, INDIANA

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 21

LAKE COUNTY’S POLICE BRUTALITY PROBLEM

22 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 23

LOS ANGELES’ POLICE BRUTALITY PROBLEM

24 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

While Milwaukee borrows MILWAUKEE’S POLICE BRUTALITY

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 25

26 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

1. Defund police departments and invest in community safety

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 27

28 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

HOW WE GATHERED OUR DATA

⊲⊲ Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests;

HOW WE ESTIMATED INTEREST AND OTHER BOND COSTS

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 29

30 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 31

32 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 33

34 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 35

36 POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS

POLICE BRUTALITY BONDS 37

You might also like