Ten Issues To Watch in 2021

ISSN 2600-268X
Ten issues to
watch in 2021
IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service
Author: Étienne Bassot
Members' Research Service
PE 659.436 – January 2021 EN
This EPRS publication seeks to offer insights and put into context ten key issues and policy areas that
are likely to feature prominently on the political agenda of the European Union in 2021. It has been
compiled and edited by Isabelle Gaudeul-Ehrhart of the Members' Research Service, based on
contributions from the following policy analysts: Marie-Laure Augère and Anna Caprile (Food for all?
Food for thought), Denise Chircop and Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass (Culture in crisis?),
Costica Dumbrava (A new procedure to manage Europe's borders), Gregor Erbach (A digital boost
for the circular economy), Silvia Kotanidis (Conference on the Future of Europe, in the introduction),
Elena Lazarou (A new US President in the White House), Marianna Pari (The EU recovery plan:
Turning crisis into opportunity?), Jakub Przetacznik and Nicole Scholz (The vaccine race for health
safety), Ros Shreeves and Martina Prpic (Re-invigorating the fight against inequality?),
Branislav Staniček (Turkey and stormy waters in the eastern Mediterranean) and Marcin Szczepanski
(Critical raw materials for Europe). The cover image was produced by Samy Chahri.
Further details of the progress of on-going EU legislative proposals, including all those mentioned
in this document, are available in the European Parliament's Legislative Train Schedule, at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/
LINGUISTIC VERSIONS
Original: EN
Translations: DE, FR
Manuscript completed in January 2021.
DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT

This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European Parliament as
background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole
responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official
position of the Parliament.
Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is
acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy.
Brussels © European Union, 2021.
Photo credits: © Daniel Schludi on Unsplash; JFL Photography, 1STunningART, gustavofrazao, stasnds, Inna,
Björn Wylezich, Olena, muratart, Premium Collection, and max dallocco on ©Adobe Stock; Wikimedia
Commons | US Embassy Tel Aviv Creative Commons license.
PE 659.436
ISBN: 978-92-846-7689-7
ISSN: 2600-268X
DOI:10.2861/851756
QA-BR-21-001-EN-N
[email protected]
http://www.eprs.ep.parl.union.eu (intranet)
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank (internet)
http://epthinktank.eu (blog)
Ten issues to watch in 2021
Table of contents
Introduction __________________________________________________________________ 1
1. The vaccine race for health safety ________________________________________________ 2
2. The EU recovery plan: Turning crisis into opportunity? _______________________________ 4
3. Food for all? Food for thought __________________________________________________ 6
4. Re-invigorating the fight against inequality? _______________________________________ 8
5. Culture in crisis? _____________________________________________________________ 10
6. A digital boost for the circular economy__________________________________________ 12
7. Critical raw materials for Europe ________________________________________________ 14
8. A new procedure to manage Europe's borders ____________________________________ 16
9. Turkey and stormy waters in the eastern Mediterranean _____________________________ 18
10. A new US President in the White House _________________________________________ 20
Further reading _______________________________________________________________ 22
I
Introduction
The year ahead of us is critical in many ways: 2021 is the first year of recovery after the coronavirus
pandemic hit the world in 2020. In the five-year European political cycle, it is a year in which progress
towards significant action and implementation are expected, after a first year generally more
focused on declarations and planning. And global events and geopolitical tensions make it no less
critical at international level.
To help us to understand Europe and the world at such a critical time, the European Parliamentary
Research Service (EPRS) has asked a dozen of its policy analysts to identify ten issues to watch in
2021, explaining why they matter and what we might expect in the year to come. With so many
burning issues at stake in Europe and in the world, a selection of just ten is by definition subjective.
Yet, it is the opportunity to place the spotlight on a series of topics selected for their obvious
importance or original relevance.
This publication covers a broad spectrum of areas, most of which are affected directly or indirectly
by the current coronavirus pandemic, reflecting how the crisis has impacted our lives and societies
in nearly all their economic, social and cultural dimensions. The ten topics chosen include both
issues that are at the very heart of the crisis – the vaccine race and economic recovery – and those
that are starkly highlighted by it – such as access to food, discrimination, and the state of the
performing arts – as well as some of the big background changes shaping the world we live in
today – the digital, environmental and geo-political challenges ahead, from Europe's borders to its
transatlantic relationship. These ten issues echo some of the ten opportunities spotted for Europe
post-coronavirus in our July 2020 publication exploring potential opportunities that the crisis might
offer to improve policy for the future.
The central nature of the coronavirus crisis and its overall impact in terms of global responsibility,
from vaccines for all to the climate objective, have logically inspired the written contributions as
well as the visual representation of the ten issues on the cover of this publication.
In parallel with these issues, 2021 is also likely to be a year of profound reflection on the EU's future
through the Conference on the Future of Europe. The President of the European Commission
launched the idea of a structured discussion through such a conference in her pre-election
statement to the European Parliament in July 2019, encouraging the involvement of both European
citizens and their elected representatives as part of a broader renewed impulse of European
democracy. This idea was promptly endorsed by the Parliament, which made very precise and
ambitious suggestions on the purpose, scope and composition of the conference in its resolution of
15 January 2020. The Commission went on to present its own somewhat less 'ambitious' vision,
nevertheless largely converging with that of the Parliament. The Council too, while stressing the
importance of the implementation of its Strategic Agenda and the respect of the institutions'
prerogatives, later joined the Parliament and the Commission in endorsing the involvement of
national parliaments, citizens and civil society. Whilst the coronavirus crisis has delayed the signing
of a joint declaration by the three institutions − after which the Conference may start − agreement
seems to be close, even if the sensitive question of the Conference's chair remains open.
At the start of this critical year, we hope that you will enjoy reading this latest edition of 'Ten Issues
to Watch' and that it will stimulate you to reflection, and ignite your curiosity as you explore the
challenges and opportunities of 2021.
Étienne Bassot
Director, Members' Research Service,
European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS)
1
1. The vaccine race for health safety

The vaccine race launched at the outbreak of the global coronavirus pandemic
is entering a new phase. As 2020 drew to a close, more and more research teams
were announcing successful results of their phase III clinical trials, with
thousands of people participating in them. This has allowed vaccine producers
to introduce requests for approval and brought hope that it will help to curb
the pandemic. The vaccines will work as life protectors, as well as social and
economic life enablers. What is at stake is not only health, but also the way in
which future pandemics will be dealt with, long-term public trust in science, and gradual
improvement of the otherwise deteriorating welfare level. Alongside the positive dimension, we
might see disinformation campaigns, often led by anti-vaccine movements, and supported by
foreign powers interested in undermining others' positions. Some state actors may try to lead a kind
of propaganda campaign to promote themselves and their global agenda. The ultimate goal,
however, is to stop the pandemic through efficient and equitable global vaccine distribution, with
a vaccine being shared as a public good.
EU action on Covid-19 vaccines

What is the EU's competence in the area of public health?
According to Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), while responsibility
for healthcare lies primarily with the EU Member States, the EU complements national policies. It facilitates
coordination and generates economies of scale by pooling resources to tackle common challenges. In the
coronavirus pandemic's wake, the EU has been moving towards a European Health Union.
The European Commission presented a strategy on 17 June 2020, to accelerate the development,
manufacturing and deployment of vaccines against Covid-19. The strategy aims to secure high
quality, safe, effective and affordable vaccines for all in the EU within 12 to 18 months, if not earlier.
As different vaccines will accomplish different things − one vaccine might be better for older or
vulnerable populations, while another might be better for the young; one might prevent the spread
of the virus, while another might prevent severe illness − the Commission has sought to diversify its
vaccine candidate portfolio with different technologies and different companies. To this end, it has
entered into advance purchase agreements with vaccine producers on behalf of the EU Member
States. In 2020, it concluded contracts with AstraZeneca, Sanofi/GSK, Janssen Pharmaceutica NV,
BioNTech/Pfizer, CureVac, and Moderna. All potential vaccines are assessed by the European
Medicines Agency (EMA) before the Commission grants approval. On 21 December, the BioNTech/Pfizer
vaccine, and on 6 January the Moderna vaccine, were given one-year conditional marketing
authorisations. These vaccines will be available to all EU Member States at the same time. A joint,
coordinated EU-wide vaccine roll-out started officially on 27 December in most countries.
Next steps to be taken

Vaccines will be distributed based on population size according to a distribution key agreed
between the Commission and Member States. It is up to the latter to decide who will be vaccinated
first − a much debated ethical conundrum, both on a global scale and for Europe. In an October
communication that complements the June strategy, the Commission presented the key elements
to be taken into account by EU Member States for their Covid-19 vaccination strategies. The
Commission encouraged countries to put everything in place to be able to deliver and distribute
vaccines 'in an ordered manner'. Given the anticipated initial shortage of vaccine doses, it urged
Member States to define priority groups for vaccination, based on the need to protect the most
vulnerable, and to slow down or stop the spread of the disease. It mentions health and care workers,
people over 60, vulnerable populations (such as people with chronic diseases), essential workers
outside the health sector, communities unable to physically distance, workers unable to physically
2
distance, and vulnerable socio-economic groups. The Commission underlined that Covid-19
vaccination should be made easily accessible and affordable, encouraging countries to consider
providing vaccines for free. It asked the Member States to strengthen their vaccination services,
including workforce and supplies, and to take into account the logistical challenges linked to
specific storage and transport requirements, especially as regards temperature (in some cases as
low as -70 to -80 °C), which would also entail economic costs in terms of specialist equipment and
running costs to maintain the cold-chain. It insisted that Member States ensure clear
communication on the benefits, risks and importance of Covid-19 vaccines to build public
trust. Vaccine hesitancy is an important aspect not to be overlooked, as the European Parliament
underlined in an April 2018 resolution. This is all the more valid in the current context: in an April
2020 survey on the willingness to be vaccinated against Covid-19 in seven European countries, 74 %
of respondents said they would want to have a jab if a vaccine were available, 19 % were not sure,
and 7 % stated they did not want to get vaccinated. Monitoring vaccine acceptability, behavioural
research, as well as communication plans are also key components of the European Centre for
Disease Prevention and Control's supporting guidance for Covid-19 vaccination. Finally, there is the
'for and against' in the controversy as to whether vaccination should be made mandatory in order
to obtain the Covid-19 vaccination coverage needed for herd immunity, estimated at up to 70 % of
the population.
Not just those companies with which the Commission negotiated contracts developed vaccines.
Among the most discussed are four Chinese vaccines and the Russian Sputnik V. Their development
processes were heavily criticised, as they received approval or were widely distributed before
ending phase III clinical trials. The lack of transparency, and previous national vaccine scandals, have
led to the vaccines' claimed safety and efficacy results being questioned. Despite that, Hungary
initially declared its willingness to use Chinese and Sputnik V vaccines. While this is compatible with
EU law under certain conditions, the Commission stresses the importance of having the vaccines'
efficacy, safety and quality assessed by the EMA, to build citizens' trust.
Global action against Covid-19

Internationally, the EU is positioning itself as a leader of global solidarity efforts to speed up universal
access to vaccines against the coronavirus disease. Under the Coronavirus Global Response − the
global action for universal access to affordable coronavirus vaccination, treatment and testing,
launched by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen − almost €16 billion has been raised. The
EU and its Member States have also provided more than €850 million to COVAX, which aims to get
wealthier countries to sign up to help finance Covid-19 vaccines for low- and middle-income
countries. This is to provide equitable access for people, regardless of their purchasing power. This
approach is considered both morally justified, as well as leading to optimal medical and economic
results. It is important to remember that no-one is safe until everyone is safe, as our world is hugely
interconnected. It is also estimated that high-income countries will receive back €4.80 for each euro
spent on vaccines supplied to low-income countries. At the same time, the entire global economy
would avoid US$153 billion of annual loss resulting from the pandemic, including US$40 billion in
the EU alone, should low-income countries receive equitable access to the vaccine.
Challenges ahead
The global operation to distribute vaccines is an unprecedented challenge. The vaccine doses have
to be produced without undermining other vaccine production capabilities. The vaccine transport
and distribution security is the next issue to watch. Once vaccinations start, extra measures will be
taken to monitor possible side-effects. Some scientists advise to expect the unexpected. Not only
can production or transport lines temporarily fail, but people may behave less cautiously too early,
or the virus may mutate and become resistant to vaccine. Also, insufficient numbers of vaccinations
may delay any herd immunity effect. The world should be prepared for different scenarios.
3
2. The EU recovery plan: Turning crisis into opportunity?

The EU recovery plan is based on the €750 billion temporary European recovery
instrument for 2021-2023, Next Generation EU, and on the €1.1 trillion
EU budget for 2021-2027. This financial package is the EU's response to
mitigate the socio-economic impact of the coronavirus crisis. The year 2021 will
be crucial for the launch of the recovery plan. It is time to see it being
implemented. Yet, some essential steps remain before it can unfold.
The EU's largest and most innovative recovery plan

Financed through the EU budget, Next Generation EU (NGEU) is the largest and most innovative
instrument the EU has ever proposed to redress its economy, not only because of the size of the
financial support, but also because of the way it will be financed and the link it creates between the
recovery measures and the EU's objectives and values.
It is the largest, as it corresponds to almost five times the EU annual budget. It will provide financial
support to Member States in the form of both grants (€390 billion) and loans (€360 billion). It is
attached to the EU's €1.1 trillion seven-year budget, bringing the total financial 'package' to €1.8
trillion. Overall, the EU's economy will be supported with 60 % additional funds over the next seven-
year financial period (2021-2027) compared to the current one (2014-2020). This makes the EU
recovery plan an extraordinary response to an unprecedented situation.
It is the most innovative, since its financing is based on a new approach. The Commission will have
a new role and, going beyond the 'principle of budgetary balance', it will be exceptionally
empowered to borrow on the capital markets on behalf of the Member States, only for actions to
mitigate the Covid-19 impact. To enable the borrowing, the ceiling for financing EU budget
expenditure, set out in the own resources decision, will be increased and serve as a guarantee for
the borrowing operations. This legislative act requires ratification by all Member States.
Overall, this ambitious recovery instrument aims well beyond giving relief to the Member States
damaged by the coronavirus pandemic. It is designed to put the EU's economy back on its feet
through investments and reforms and to improve its resilience, while building a greener and more
digital EU. It interlinks the financial support to the progress made towards these objectives set by
the EU for the coming years. To receive financial support, Member States must submit national
recovery and resilience plans that both address the country-specific recommendations and set
milestones towards climate neutrality and digitalisation. Overall, considering both NGEU and the
long-term budget, as agreed with the European Parliament, at least 30 % of the expenditure will
contribute to fight climate change, while in addition, the EU's budget will progressively dedicate up
to 10 % of annual spending to biodiversity action. Moreover, the new mechanism on the rule of law,
means that funding from the EU budget is now also linked to the respect by Member States of the
EU's fundamental values (Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union), thus protecting the Union's
budget in case of deficiencies.
What to expect from the recovery plan?

The EU recovery plan is expected to relaunch EU economies while laying the foundations for a better
future; and EU citizens expect noticeable results too. The innovative way in which the recovery plan
has been constructed might also transform the foundations of the financing of EU policies and the
EU budget, if there is the political will to do so.
The Commission estimates that NGEU can contribute by increasing the EU's gross domestic product
(GDP) by around 2 % on average and by creating up to 2 million additional jobs by 2024. For some
Member States, NGEU alone could contribute up to 5 % of domestic GDP. The challenge is to absorb
4
these funds and achieve the full potential the plan can offer to support recovery and modernisation.
It is an opportunity not to be missed.
Another opportunity the recovery plan brings relates to the reform of the EU's own resources. The
agreed package, in line with the European Parliament's long-standing request for new own
resources, envisages the gradual introduction of new own resources to facilitate the repayment of
the NGEU borrowing. The new own resources decision provides, from 2021 already, for a new
contribution to the EU budget based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste. Moreover, further
resources should be gradually introduced on the basis of a roadmap. These new sources aim to
progressively diminish the GNI-based own resource and thus open a new approach to financing the
EU budget.
According to some experts, this innovative recovery instrument gives another dimension to the EU's
financing. If the EU recovery instrument is implemented with success, it could become a new way
of financing EU policies and a permanent facility to help the EU face any other potential deep crisis.
However, for this approach to become the new way to react to crisis situations, further political
debate will be necessary, as there are still diverging views.
The remaining challenges

The elements of the EU recovery plan, objectives and mechanisms, are now sketched out. But the
launch of this innovative engine still lacks two essential moves.
First, the recent agreement on all the elements of the financial 'package', including the rule of law
provisions, means that ratification by national parliaments of the revised Own Resources Decision
can start. Given the current extraordinary circumstances, it is hoped that all 27 Member States
accelerate and complete this process within six months instead of the more than two years it would
usually take. This is a necessary step to enable the Commission to borrow, for the first time, the
necessary funds on the capital markets and finance the recovery instrument.
Second, Member States are preparing reliable national recovery plans, on how they intend to spend
the funds, to be submitted by the end of April 2021 for the Commission's assessment and Council's
approval. Governments have started to draw up these proposals around seven flagship areas, on
the basis of the guidelines presented by the Commission. It is about mobilising the necessary
investments and introducing structural reforms under six European priorities. These are the just and
green transitions, digitalisation, economic and social cohesion, competitiveness, and increased
resilience to crisis. Member States will then be able to launch the investment projects with 13 %
pre-financing upon the approval of the recovery and resilience plans, and commit 70 % of the grants
at the latest by end-2022. Actual disbursement is conditional upon the fulfilment of the pre-agreed
milestones and targets.
Will the EU succeed in turning the crisis of this pandemic into an opportunity by supporting the
recovery but also by investing in our future, as European Commission President Ursula von der
Leyen has stated? All this is to watch out for in 2021 and in the years to come.
Data source: author's compilation.
5
3. Food for all? Food for thought

Access to food is a fundamental human right, enshrined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and further protected under international and
national law. In the EU, it has been a core objective of the common agricultural
policy (CAP) since it entered into force in 1962. The fight against hunger is a
prominent objective of the UN Sustainable Development Agenda, and food
security is instrumental to achieving 14 of its 17 Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs). The coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent economic crisis
have impacted food chains throughout the world, creating disruption and revealing inherent
vulnerabilities and distortions, including in the EU. The crisis could almost double the number of
people suffering from acute hunger in the world, and threaten access to quality and nutritional food
for millions of vulnerable EU citizens. It has also underlined the urgency of rethinking the way we
produce, trade and consume food, creating the opportunity to raise the level of ambition to reform
global food systems. A number of international initiatives will converge in 2021, mustering
consensus towards more robust governance in the field. Awarding the 2020 Nobel Peace Prize to
the World Food Programme (WFP) is seen as a sign of the times: food really matters.
The need to reform the EU food system

Access to food is not generally considered to be an issue in the EU. Most Europeans enjoy sufficient
access to a large supply of varied and good-quality food. The CAP has been instrumental in ensuring
food security in Europe by restructuring and modernising agriculture, and increasing its
competitiveness. Yet, while the food supply is abundant, before the coronavirus crisis 7.4 % of EU
citizens were unable to afford a meal with meat or fish every second day. In some EU countries, large
parts of the population have to rely on food assistance.
In 2020, the coronavirus crisis sent shockwaves through the EU food supply chain. National and EU
measures taken to contain the spread of the disease, such as lockdowns and the closure of borders,
caused an acute shortage of seasonal labour, bottlenecks in the food chain and many other
disruptions. The EU food system proved resilient, supported by a host of sectoral, national and EU
policy measures. It adapted quickly to address bottlenecks, and the food supply has generally been
maintained. However, the disruption has put the spotlight on some structural weaknesses. Food
supply chains are mainly long and complex, partly dependent on the global trade environment.
Food waste and loss along the chain represent 20 % of total EU food production. Moreover, EU
farming is heavily reliant on cross-border seasonal workers – whose frequently appalling working
and living conditions were exposed by the crisis. The pandemic highlighted the issue of food
insecurity for the most vulnerable in the EU, with food banks raising alarm about a sharp increase in
demand. The economic recession may push millions of EU citizens into poverty, leading to
malnutrition – as cheaper food is often less healthy – and health issues such as obesity and diabetes.
Finally, ensuring food security in the future means tackling the profound environmental impact of
the EU food system, in particular agriculture, which is currently unsustainable.
Food security in the world: A goal still far away

The UN report 'The state of food security and nutrition in the world 2020' offers a gloomy picture of
international achievements in fighting global hunger. Current estimates are that, today, nearly
690 million people (almost 9 % of the world population) are hungry. Some 135 million people across
55 countries experienced acute (i.e. life-threatening) food insecurity in 2019. A majority of those
were women in Africa. The pandemic and the subsequent global economic recession are having
disproportionate effects in vulnerable countries. The number of people experiencing acute food
insecurity could reach 265 million in 2021 unless urgent action is taken.
6
The conclusion of the UN 2020 report leaves no doubt: the world is currently not on track to achieve
zero hunger by 2030, and if recent trends continue, the number of people affected by chronic
hunger would surpass 840 million by 2030. Although exacerbated by the pandemic, the profound
imbalances and distortions inherent to the current global food systems were present well before.
Data source: Food and Agriculture Organization, In brief to the state of food security and nutrition in the world 2020; World
Health Organization, Essential nutrition actions: mainstreaming nutrition through the life-course, 2019; Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, Special report climate change and land, 2020; Employment in agriculture, The World Bank, June
2020; Delivering sustainable food and land use systems: The role of international trade, Chatham House, 2019.
Towards sustainable food systems

The coronavirus crisis and the shocks sustained by food supply chains in the EU are a wake-up call.
It is now urgent to achieve the transition to a more resilient agri-food system, providing affordable
and healthy food to all EU citizens. This means making it sustainable in social, economic and
environmental terms. It should also be fair for all stakeholders, from farmers and farm workers to
consumers. As part of the European Green Deal, the Farm to Fork strategy aims to accelerate this
shift. It envisages future legislation on a framework for a sustainable food system that will
mainstream sustainability in all food-related policies. A contingency plan for ensuring food supply
and food security will also be developed by the end of 2021. The reformed CAP, to be adopted in
2021, has the potential to deliver on the Farm to Fork strategy. But beyond the agri-food system,
ensuring food security for all requires addressing the issue of poverty and malnutrition that the
economic crisis will exacerbate. The recovery plan designed to repair the economic and social
damage caused by the crisis could help Member States strengthen social safety nets and protect
livelihoods for the most vulnerable. At the global scale, the international community needs to take
urgent action to avoid an unprecedented famine crisis in the most affected countries. The Food
Coalition, convened in May 2020 and led by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), aims for
unified global action in response to the world food crises in the aftermath of the pandemic.
Crisis interventions will not, however, address the profound distortions and imbalances in the way
we produce, trade and consume food. These are hampering the achievement of the zero hunger
objective by 2030 and condemning millions of people to chronic hunger in the years to come. The
coronavirus crisis has created the opportunity to raise the level of reform ambitions for global food
systems necessary to tackle the triple challenge: to feed a growing population, to protect agri-food
related livelihoods, and to preserve the natural resources at the base of food production. A number
of international initiatives are on-going, galvanising efforts to reinforce global governance in the
field. The UN 2021 food systems summit, scheduled for September 2021, is setting a bold agenda
with a view to transforming food systems as a crucial step for delivering all the SDGs. The summit
will bring together governments, corporate business, academia and stakeholders, and aims to
promote systemic changes in areas such as land-planning, digital economy, positive trade
incentives, innovative farming and changes in diets. The EU is well positioned to take a prominent
role in the debate, turning into action the international cooperation aspects of the European Green
Deal and the Farm to Fork strategy. The Council, which has called for an ambitious set of goals for
the summit, will put forward its key political priorities in conclusions to be adopted in spring 2021.
7
4. Re-invigorating the fight against inequality?

The question is not 'do inequality and discrimination exist in Europe?', but
rather how can we, as individuals and societies, recognise and fight them more
effectively? Research by the European Union's Gender Equality Institute (EIGE)
and Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) shows that, despite efforts to reduce
them, discrimination and inequalities on multiple grounds, including sex, age,
ethnic origin and skin colour, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity,
religion and belief, and migration status, remain pervasive. A large percentage
of the EU population feel and are discriminated against in their everyday life, in education and
employment, as well as in access to housing, healthcare and justice, public and private services,
neighbourhoods and private relationships, because of who they are. Many experience overlapping
'intersectional' forms of discrimination. For instance, a black woman with disabilities may face a
combination of racism and discrimination based on her gender and disability. Many even fear for
their lives and safety as they are at disproportionate risk of falling victim to harassment and hate
crime. Discrimination and attacks often go unreported and many of those that do report have low
levels of satisfaction with how their complaints were handled. A 2019 Eurobarometer shows that
public awareness of this situation and positive attitudes towards the groups at particular risk of
discrimination have increased since 2015, but with significant variations between countries and for
particular groups. Only a quarter of respondents felt that their country's efforts to fight all forms of
discrimination were effective.
Why discrimination and inequality matter, especially now

The rights to equal treatment and non-discrimination are enshrined in the Treaties, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, and EU legislation, which are binding on all EU Member States, making them
core values and a matter of social and economic justice. The EU and its Member States have also
committed to reduce inequalities in income and those based on protected grounds, and to promote
social, economic and political inclusion for all. Failure to protect these fundamental rights and
commitments has corrosive impacts for individuals and societies. Discrimination affects individual
safety, wellbeing, mental health, earnings and potential, drives inequality and erodes social
cohesion and trust in political institutions. Recent EPRS research also estimates that in economic
terms, ineffective national implementation of EU equality law and gaps in current EU legislation are
costing billions of euros in lost gross domestic product (GDP) and tax revenue.
The pandemic and related events have exposed the inequalities and discrimination already faced
by some groups in society. Measures introduced during the pandemic have led to strong public
protests in countries already experiencing an erosion of women's rights and LGBTI equality. Police
brutality in the USA has sparked Black Lives Matter movements spotlighting structural racism in
Europe. The pandemic is also exacerbating the risk and incidence of gender-based violence, racism
and xenophobia, vulnerability of LGBTI and homeless people, migrants and prisoners in the EU.
Evidence that risks of transmission and severe illness are correlated with existing inequalities such
as higher levels of deprivation, poor housing, underlying health conditions, barriers to health care,
and occupational inequality, makes the stakes even higher. A lack of disaggregated data makes it
difficult to assess how this intersects with protected grounds, but data from the UK show that groups
at greatest risk of contracting and dying from Covid-19 include black and ethnic minority groups
and people with disabilities. Looking to the immediate future, there are considerable risks of
progress towards equality going into reverse due to the economic and social fallout from the
pandemic. There is also a risk that economic insecurity could lead to further populist backlashes and
rises in hate crime. In the long-term, digitalisation, the development of artificial intelligence, the
green transition and other emerging trends bring potential for more inclusion but also for
exacerbating or generating new forms of inequality.
8
A renewed impetus for the EU response to inequality

At EU level, extensive action has been taken to fight discrimination and promote equality, but more
remains to be done. Current EU legislation does not provide the same level of protection against
discrimination to all vulnerable groups in all spheres. There are no common standards for combating
violence against women and hate crime. Existing legislation and broader efforts to fight discrimination
have also been criticised for failing to address some forms of discrimination. While protections are
largely based on separate grounds, such as gender, race, age, ethnicity, or disability, they do not take
account of concurrent forms of discrimination, which require a different, intersectional approach.
Taking better account of multiple and intersectional discrimination could help to achieve substantive
equality at a systemic level by addressing the structural mechanisms that reproduce inequalities.
The von der Leyen Commission has placed the issues of equality and inclusion high on its political
agenda. For the first time, there is a Commissioner for Equality, Helena Dalli, whose brief is to
strengthen Europe's commitment to equality for all, by ensuring full implementation of the existing
EU anti-discrimination legislation and proposing new legislation and policies. The commissioner
also coordinates a new internal task force, intended to ensure a joined-up approach to equality
across the Commission and mainstreaming in all EU policies. The Commission has begun to adopt a
series of multiannual equality strategies and action plans, including strategies for gender equality,
LGBTIQ equality, victims' rights, and application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; action plans
on integration and inclusion and combating racism and a framework for Roma inclusion. A new
strategy on the rights of persons with disabilities is scheduled for 2021. The adoption of these
policies, which are to be interconnected, and the attention within them to the needs of specific
groups, signals a shift towards the new 'intersectional' approach to tackling discrimination and
inequalities at EU level, supported by the European Parliament.
2021: The year for putting plans into action?

In 2021, the Commission intends to shift from strategy to delivery and the spotlight will fall on the
concrete challenges of implementing these measures and bringing about real change. Stakeholders
are watching with cautious optimism to see what can be achieved in the context of the pandemic and
its aftermath and the longstanding difficulties of legislating and enacting change in this policy area.
The Commission's 2021 work programme is explicit about the intention to use the crisis as a catalyst
for a transformative economic and social agenda, with the new equality strategies as a central plank.
It has also promised to ensure that the looming economic crisis will not become a social one. However,
past crises and experiences with gender mainstreaming illustrate that equality policy can be perceived
to clash with other priorities. An equality perspective can easily end up being marginalised or
overlooked if it is not factored in from the outset and monitored by means of clear targets, impact
assessments and dedicated funding. One obstacle is the lack of disaggregated equality data crucial to
design effective policy and track outcomes, particularly for racialised and ethnic minorities, since many
countries are reluctant to collect this data. Researchers have also raised questions about EU
institutions' capacity to ensure that equality is prioritised and mainstreamed.
Past experience has shown that progress in the area of equality and diversity is very slow. The level
of support for passing new legislation on pay transparency, hate crime and violence against women,
and unblocking stalled proposals, remains to be seen. Here, one key example is the anti-
discrimination directive, proposed in 2008 to close the existing gaps in protection from
discrimination. Despite numerous efforts, this directive has not yet been adopted, as it requires
unanimity in the Council, something that is challenging to achieve in this policy area, which has
become a focal point for disagreements over EU competence and values. Moreover, adopting
legislation at EU level is no guarantee of success in removing discrimination. In this sense, there is
only so much that the EU can do; successful implementation falls on the Member States and the
capacity of institutions and people to make changes in systems, attitudes and behaviour.
9
5. Culture in crisis?
Culture in general, and the arts in particular, create relationships and help us
interpret and give meaning to our lives and the world around us. As such, they
play an important role in our social relations, general wellbeing and health,
especially mental health, even underpinning certain therapies. While such
factors are not included in the calculation of gross domestic product (GDP),
Canada recently introduced culture into its wellbeing index. This covers time
and money spent on arts and culture, attendance at live performances, and
volunteering for culture, thus acknowledging the importance of an often under-valued area.
Artistic processes enrich our experiences but not necessarily the artists themselves, whose jobs are
precarious and often poorly paid. While cultural and creative sectors employ 3.7 % of workers across
the EU, cultural jobs, artistic ones in particular, account for twice as many freelancers as in the rest
of the economy and offer low levels of social protection. This, together with the tendency to have
to follow project-based career paths, means that many workers in the cultural sector have an
uncertain future.
Coronavirus and the cultural and creative sectors

The Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated this precarious situation in areas such as live performances
and art exhibitions, which are among the first events to close during lockdowns and the last to
re-open, even under very strict sanitary conditions.
The pandemic initially hit densely populated places, which is why urban areas were the first to have
to address the challenges, innovate and experiment to keep culture vibrant. Working with the EU,
national and regional authorities, cities also provided various support schemes to limit the harm to
artists, who can easily fall through the unemployment rescue nets.
Scientists warn that the current crisis will not be an isolated incident. Moreover, nobody can predict
how long the current situation will last. Artists and cultural operators, like so many, have little choice
but to adapt their activities to the new conditions. In particular, the cultural and creative sectors, and
especially those dealing with live performances, will need to make digital adaptations to enable and
promote remote participation, as well as practical adaptations to allow for safe physical attendance.
Coronavirus – Accelerator of change; Culture – Factor of recovery

Sanitary restrictions that limit occupation of cultural venues to between 25 % and 50 % of normal
capacity, mean a reduction in access to live performances and in the financial viability of cultural
activities. While cost was already a barrier to accessing culture before the pandemic, physical
participation is now likely to become even more expensive. Private spending on culture will also
drop significantly due to economic hardships resulting from the shocks to the economy. This could
lead to a downsizing of the sector, a reduced cultural offer, and an impoverishment of cultural
diversity, as venues, museums and galleries close, and creative professionals move to other sectors.
That said, access to culture over the internet has offered an important contact point during
lockdown periods. Although some artists may be unable or unwilling to digitalise their offer, many
others have been making their productions available online without charge, in order to provide
psychological comfort to their audiences and to keep their relationship with their public alive. Even
if the plethora of online offerings can lead to digital fatigue, and while artists and their audiences
may miss the magic of the physical encounter, and would like to see venues open again, costs and
sanitary concerns may be difficult barriers to overcome for many.
Hybrid events (combining a limited physical audience with paid for live streaming), as proposed by
some concert halls and theatres, are an alternative to online-only events and provide some
10
revenues. Beyond the pandemic, digital applications are now available to improve the experience
in certain seats with limited visibility. Digital technology also offers an opportunity to attract new or
younger audiences to theatres and other cultural venues.
The lockdowns have accelerated efforts and reflection on digital transitions in many spheres, even
in cultural activities. Recently, G20 culture ministers called for a new paradigm, forging more
sustainable societies and economies. On that occasion, Unesco's Director General, Audrey Azoulay,
stated that culture must be central to the recovery efforts, since it is an overarching need,
underpinning all aspects of our societies. She defines it as a purpose, not a cost.
EU perspective on cultural recovery

EU competence in cultural policy is limited to support, but this can take different forms and apply in
a variety of areas. For example, artists and performers can be supported by an EU-funded scheme
established to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE). Biological and technological
research and innovation funded by the European research programme could help to define safe
protocols for events and so gain public trust. In this respect, progress has already been made in
understanding the indoor airflow conditions necessary for live performances and big events, as was
done in the Leipzig Arena and Salzburgerfestspiele, for example.
Support for research and innovation projects, combining arts and technology or climate and energy
efficiency, could help projects to renovate old cultural venues, upgrading their ventilation and air
conditioning systems, for instance, and making them more sustainable. The new European Bauhaus
initiative could contribute to achieving this goal while creating synergies between arts and
technology and cooperation amongst artists. European Commission President, Ursula von der
Leyen, presented this project as a bridge between the world of science and technology and the
world of arts and culture. It focuses on environmental issues, with artists contributing to raising
public awareness about climate change.
In a resolution of 17 September 2020 on the cultural recovery of Europe, the European Parliament
called on the Commission and Member States to earmark at least 2 % of the Recovery and Resilience
Facility for the cultural and creative sectors and industries. The Parliament also wants to ensure that
EU support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE), intended to help fund short-
time working measures, also covers artists, freelancers, and micro-organisations, which are
predominant in the cultural and creative sectors.
Whatever 2021 will bring for the sector, recent data point not only to a drop in revenues from live
performance by musicians due to lockdowns, but also a reduction in the royalties generated through the
playing of 'background' music in public venues such as restaurants, bars and hotels. This is yet another
trend to watch for live performances, since such usage accounts for 19 % of royalties collected by
European authors’ societies, making it possible for musicians to go on stage.
Will performing arts just survive or is there a possibility to thrive?

In 2021, we will see how efficient the various measures have been: how many artists and performers
will quit, and how many state-supported and private venues and festivals will manage to survive
two or more lockdowns. State support and private donors, not just big single donors but also
crowdfunding of live performers and other artists, will be crucial and a gesture of recognition to all
the creative minds that brought some light into homes when cultural venues were closed. Among
the most important results we could see new talents that emerged online being able to engage
professionally on stage, and new models bringing in revenues for live performances and paid online
content that makes it possible for artists to develop their creativity and live from their art. Covid-19
related lockdowns may result in the longer term in new artistic projects and experimental social
engagement in cultural venues, building new connections between people.
11
6. A digital boost for the circular economy

Two key global transitions are on-going − a continuous digital revolution, and
an urgent transition towards climate neutrality and environmental
sustainability. The EU strives to lead in both. The political guidelines of
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen set out a programme for 'the
transition to a healthy planet and a new digital world'. This is confirmed in the
legislative priorities for 2021, with 'implementing the European Green Deal' and
'shaping Europe’s Digital Decade' listed among the six key priorities.
Circular economy
A circular economy is a key component of the European Green Deal. In a circular economy, products
stay in use longer (through sharing, repair and reuse), and materials are reused over and over. A
circular economy would reduce environmental damage from resource extraction and production of
materials, make Europe less dependent on imported materials and decouple economic growth from
the input of new material resources. There is growing recognition that a circular economy will help
to address the triple challenge of resource scarcity, environmental impacts and waste. The EU's new
circular economy action plan, adopted in March 2020, features a sustainable products initiative to
support the circular design of products, focused on resource-intensive sectors, including electronics
and information and communication technologies, as well as a new European data space for smart
circular applications with data on value chains and product information.
Digital technologies for sustainability

Digital technologies have transformed all sectors of the economy and the daily lives of workers and
citizens. Physical goods, such as newspapers, are being replaced by online content. Digital equipment
is becoming cheaper, smaller, more powerful and more energy-efficient, with performance doubling
roughly every two years. This trend is expected to continue accelerating with the growth of artificial
intelligence, smart homes, and self-driving vehicles, to name just a few examples. The Digital with a
purpose roadmap of the industry-led Global Enabling Sustainability Initiative outlines the contribution
of digital solutions to the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Digital
technologies have already shown their value in the energy system: smart grids, smart meters and
smart appliances help to match electricity demand with supply, and integrate renewable energy
sources into the grid. In contrast to the good progress in applying digital tools in energy, the potential
of digital solutions to design and manage a circular economy is only now starting to be explored.
Digital solutions to support the circular economy

Digital technologies can play a key enabling role in the transformation towards a circular economy.
In the product design phase, they can help design products that can be repaired, upgraded, and
disassembled and recycled after their useful life. In the phase of product use, they can enable the
sharing of products ('product as a service'). The use of mobile apps for finding and accessing shared
vehicles is a typical example. In the phase after product use, digital technologies can help the reuse
of the product or its components and the recycling of materials. Digital technologies, such as
blockchain, can play a critical role in tracking the materials over the lifecycle of a product. The EU
circular economy action plan aims to introduce an electronic product passport with information on
composition, repair and dismantling possibilities. In addition, entirely new business models could
emerge where the raw materials, components and products remain in the ownership of the
producer, who collects a payment during their use, and they are returned to the owner thereafter.
12
Moreover, digital technologies can help design and manage complex circular industrial ecosystems,
in which the waste of one production process becomes a valuable input to another process, based
on the principle of industrial symbiosis, for example by using captured CO2 as a chemical feedstock.
Examples illustrating the potential of digital solutions

In the food system, mobile apps help retailers sell left-over food that would otherwise be wasted. Artificial
intelligence, sensors and robotics have been used to improve sorting and separation of waste for recycling.
Smart household appliances or industrial equipment connected to the Internet of Things can determine
when they need to be repaired or maintained, signal any problems and schedule their own maintenance.
Digital technologies: A challenge for circularity

Despite the great potential of digital technologies for enabling the circular economy, electronic and
digital products pose major challenges for the move towards a circular economy. Miniaturisation,
ever-growing complexity and an accelerating speed of innovation enable digital devices and
services with unprecedented capabilities, but at the same time make repair, upgrade, reuse and
recycling more difficult. For example, a smartphone contains a large number of valuable materials,
but at such tiny scales that the separation becomes extremely challenging. Although digital devices
have become more efficient, material use and energy consumption continue to grow because the
exponential growth of applications, computing power and bandwidth outpaces any efficiency
improvements; see, for example, the energy demand of data centres or bitcoin mining operations.
Faster lifecycles for consumer electronics lead to products becoming obsolete after a few years and
an ever-growing amount of e-waste in the EU, of which less than 40 % is currently recycled.
Consumer electronics in the circular economy

So far, there are only a few initiatives to design consumer electronic devices with circularity in mind. A
well-known example is the FairPhone, a smartphone made from sustainably sourced materials and
designed to be repairable and easy to upgrade by replacing components such as the camera.
Smart batteries with a built-in battery management system play an ever-increasing role in the digital
and green transition at all scales, from tiny batteries for smart watches to grid-scale batteries that
help integrate fluctuating renewable energy sources in a climate-neutral electricity system. Batteries
in electric vehicles enable zero-pollution mobility and can help to balance the electricity grid.
Boosting the production, reuse and recycling of batteries in the EU is seen as critical to the success
of the energy and clean mobility transitions. On 10 December 2020, the Commission proposed a
revision of the EU Batteries Directive, with the aim of introducing sustainability requirements and
improving collection, treatment and recycling of waste batteries and ensuring materials recovery.
The broader circular electronics initiative, to be launched in in the fourth quarter of 2021 as part of
the new Circular Economy Action Plan, aims to promote longer product lifetimes, establish a right
to repair, and improve the collection and treatment of e-waste. The European Parliament supported
the right to repair in its November 2020 resolution on a more sustainable single market.
The digital revolution – A model for moving to a circular economy?

Digital technologies have enabled a wave of industrial, economic and social innovation. They have
completely changed the way we work, consume and communicate over the course of just a few
years. This rapid development may serve as a model for accelerating the urgent transition towards
a sustainable circular economy and inform the design of policies to promote a circular economy,
without restricting the potential for innovation in circular and digital technologies. A speedy
transition towards a digital circular economy is vital for reducing the EU's dependence on imported
materials, achieving long-term sustainable prosperity while minimising climate impacts and
environmental damage. If successful, a digitally empowered circular economy can contribute to the
EU's strategic autonomy and help ensure a leadership role for European industries.
13
7. Critical raw materials for Europe

Lithium and cobalt (used in rechargeable batteries) or indium (used in touch
screens) are 'critical raw materials' (CRMs) for the EU. The 30 CRMs combine two
characteristics: they are strategically important for European industry and the
economy, and there are high risks associated with securing their supply. While
the challenges related to ensuring the availability of CRMs have been on the EU
agenda for many years, and the current Commission had made it one of its
priorities in 2019 already, it was the sudden disruption of global supply chains
by the coronavirus crisis that delivered a resonating wake-up call. With almost half of the world
under lockdown, many international logistics networks ground to a halt. This has brought to public
attention the issue of the European economy's heavy dependency on global suppliers and made
securing a sustainable supply of CRMs more important than ever.
Why they are critical

Firstly, these materials are widely used in key industries as well as in important and future-oriented
value chains, which are essential for ensuring long-term competitiveness and jobs in Europe. In
particular, they are fundamental to further progress in strategic sectors such as digital technologies,
renewable energy, electric mobility, defence and aerospace.
Secondly, the EU is highly dependent on importing these materials from third countries, where they
are often highly concentrated geographically. For example, 2020 figures showed that the EU
depends on China for 44 % of its supply of all CRMs, while in the case of the rare earth elements −
used in high-tech products, such as electric vehicles and wind turbines − this figure jumps to 98 %.
Only three CRMs are more than 50 % sourced from the EU. The risks are compounded by the fact
that some of the CRM sources are located in politically and/or economically unstable parts of the
world. For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo, one of the world's poorest and perpetually
conflict-torn countries, is the source of 68 % of the EU's cobalt. Sometimes, even if there is a source
in the EU, the processing takes place abroad. Building CRM value chains is complex and may take a
long time – creating such a chain for rare earth elements, for example, may take up to 15 years.
Furthermore, to a large extent, there are currently no viable substitutes for these materials.
The bigger picture

CRMs are becoming a fundamental prerequisite to achieving the main goals of the EU. An
increasingly challenging geopolitical environment is rightly being addressed by a strategic shift in
the EU policy towards autonomy. However, the EU will not become a stronger geopolitical player
on the global stage without safe and sufficient access to CRMs. This is because they are needed to
produce high-tech and high value-added products and develop key technologies fundamental to
achieving economic, digital, and defence sovereignty in Europe.
This strategic drive for the EU, often labelled as increasing 'resilience', does not mean protectionism
but rather, as Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton put it: 'having choice, alternatives,
competition. Avoiding unwanted dependencies, both economically and geopolitically'. In the
context of CRMs, this means 'open strategic autonomy'. On the one hand, the EU needs to
strengthen its domestic supply through both the development of mining for primary CRMs and
enhanced circularity to obtain secondary CRMs. There is a large potential here: Europe has
substantial and diversified CRM reserves to be explored and currently recovers less than 1 % of CRMs
from waste electrical and electronic equipment. On the other hand, given the vast scale of its
demand for CRMs, the EU must forge sustainable strategic partnership with resource-rich third
countries and integrate those which are interested more tightly into European value chains.
14
Another crucial goal of the EU, which depends on access to CRMs, is its twin − green and digital –
transition, which is one of the main ambitions of the current policy cycle. This was highlighted
before the coronavirus crisis in both the European Green Deal and in the new industrial strategy, for
instance. The European Parliament supports bolstering this dual transformation with a holistic
approach linking all elements of the value chain: mining, recycling, smelting, refining and
transformation, and the development of an integrated ecosystem for the whole range of materials,
metals, and minerals, which goes beyond CRMs. This means that the existing gaps and
vulnerabilities in raw material supply chains need to be thoroughly addressed. When the virus hit
Europe, the twin transition of economy and society gained even more importance, as it formed the
core of the long-term EU response. The CRMs play an enabling role in the planned recovery from
the pandemic. They are essential for successfully taking both paths out of the crisis: they underpin
all the digital technologies as well as those required for the green future of the EU such as solar
panels, wind turbines and electrical batteries. Indeed, Commission President von der Leyen's call for
'building a resilient, green, and digital Europe' cannot be answered without systematically resolving
the issues of CRM supply. However, in its transition to a low-carbon economy, the EU should avoid
replacing its reliance on fossil fuels with reliance on CRMs.
2021: Putting ideas into practice

Following the September 2020 announcement of a series of measures designed to increase the
security and sustainability of CRM supply, 2021 will be the year when EU efforts kick in on many
fronts. Importantly, the European Raw Materials Alliance, established in October 2020 with the
purpose of addressing the gaps in existing supply chains and overcoming the shortages of
technologies, capabilities and skills, will start to make its mark. In a first phase, the Alliance will work
on stepping up urgently needed resilience in the rare earths and magnets value chains, as well as in
raw materials for energy storage and conversion. It will then move to other materials, identify
barriers, opportunities and investments, and bolster innovation and infrastructure. In 2021, the first
projects will be evaluated and the implementation phase will commence.
The EU will also launch research and innovation activities to improve circular and sustainable use of
resources, focusing on waste processing (to obtain secondary CRMs), substitution of CRMs with non-
critical materials, and developing advanced materials. This will be financed through EU multi-annual
funding programmes and national resources. Also in 2021, a mapping exercise will be launched to
identify possible supplies of secondary CRMs from European stocks and wastes.
In addition, the EU will step up its efforts to increase domestic sourcing of CRMs. This will be done
through identifying mining and processing projects, investment needs and financing opportunities,
while minimising their impact on climate and the environment. The aim is to make the first projects
operational by 2025. Coal-mining regions will be prioritised and the EU will support regional
development of CRMs, transfers of existing mining and engineering skills and, wherever possible,
changing from coal to CRM exploitation and recovery. Helpful EU instruments include the
Just Transition Mechanism, the InvestEU programme and the European skills agenda. To accelerate
the deployment of new projects, Horizon Europe will start in 2021 to research the processes for
exploitation and processing of CRMs with reduced environmental impacts. In parallel, the
Commission will help with facilitating national approval procedures while maintaining current high
environmental standards. Another interesting possibility comes with using the EU earth observation
programme, Copernicus, and the technology it offers, such as remote sensing, to find new CRM sites.
By the end of 2021, the Commission will also develop criteria for sustainable finance, guiding public
and private investments in the mining, extractive and processing sectors.
Since the demand for CRMs cannot be fully met using domestic sources, the EU will focus on
improving its access to global markets. In 2021, it will forge pilot strategic partnerships with Canada,
interested African countries and the EU's neighbourhood. This will go hand in hand with promoting
responsible mining abroad through new legislative proposals to be tabled in 2021.
15
8. A new procedure to manage Europe's borders

In September 2020, the European Commission presented a new pact on
migration and asylum, aiming to better integrate EU policies on migration,
asylum, border management, and external cooperation on migration, and to
finalise the reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). One key
proposal in this package concerns the establishment of a new border
procedure to swiftly identify third-country nationals who are not authorised to
enter the EU, and to channel them towards asylum or return procedures.
Long-overdue reforms
In 2016, the Commission put forward a package of proposals to reform the CEAS. Despite making
progress on several aspects, the Member States could not agree on a number of key issues, such as
the proposed corrective relocation mechanism, and mandatory asylum border procedures. In the
meantime, more progress was achieved on a series of measures aimed at strengthening the
management of external borders. Most of these measures, however, are still to be fully implemented
to produce notable effects.
The new pact builds on, revises, and expands previous proposals in an effort to break the deadlock
on the reform of the CEAS. Despite a significant drop in the number of people arriving at EU external
borders, as compared with 2015 figures, deficiencies continue to affect EU asylum and migration
policies. This is exemplified by the persistent backlogs in processing applications for international
protection, overcrowded reception facilities at the EU's external borders, recurrent allegations of
illegal border practices, including push-backs and fundamental rights violations, and consistently
low rates of return of rejected asylum applicants and irregular migrants. The coronavirus outbreak
in 2020, and the related containment measures adopted by Member States, have temporarily
reduced the flow of people across the external borders. However, this has exacerbated challenges
related to delivering protection to people in need and to securely managing the borders.
Deficiencies at external borders also affect the functioning of the Schengen area of free movement.
The promise and perils of border measures

The new pact proposes a comprehensive approach that links different aspects of asylum, migration
and border management. One key premise of this approach is that a sustainable migration and
asylum system requires the effective control of the external borders, and in particular measures to
fight irregular migration and improve returns. According to the Commission, the proposed
screening procedure at the external borders would ensure that persons who do not have a prima
facie right to enter the EU are dealt with quickly, effectively, uniformly, and locally.
The preliminary health check component of this procedure is a timely addition to the Schengen
rules on border checks. Equally commendable and timely is the proposed independent mechanism
to monitor human rights violations in the context of the external borders. Notwithstanding the
Commission's efforts to address the complex issues while keeping in mind major political
sensitivities, the pact has been generally greeted with scepticism. Members of civil society
organisations and academic commentators have broadly criticised the 'comprehensive' pact for
being biased towards restrictive measures and for blurring the distinction between asylum and
irregular migration. A first objection is that the proposed approach is not fully grounded in a
systematic assessment of existing shortcomings. It is argued that a managerial-style focus on more
efficient procedures and stricter rules ignores the reality on the ground. In the context of the asylum
procedures, for example, there is ample evidence that border procedures are generally ineffective
and conducive of lower protection standards. The lack of European Commission impact assessments
for any of the proposals fosters such criticism.
16
A second objection is that the proposed solutions are unlikely to improve the situation and that their
impacts on border management, asylum, and return will likely be limited if not adverse. Indeed,
despite being presented as 'a mere information-gathering stage', the border screening may have
unwarranted effects on asylum procedures. Moreover, the broad margin of discretion left to the
Member States on how to carry out checks, including preliminary medical and vulnerability checks,
and on the use of detention, could aggravate existing problems at the external borders.
The swift routing of pre-checked persons, who are not authorised to enter the EU and who do not
apply for international protection, towards the return procedure is intended to make the return
process more efficient. A number of other measures in the new pact (e.g. the joint issuance of return
decisions and of decisions rejecting applications for international protection, and sponsorship
return procedures) are expected to contribute to this. The problem with return measures is that their
effectiveness depends largely on cooperation with third countries. However, most third countries
have so far been reluctant to cooperate on returns, given the domestic political and economic costs
of such cooperation. Whereas the new pact would make a prominent point about cooperation with
third countries on migration and return, it seems to prioritise coercive measures while offering little
additional incentives (for example, no concrete proposals on legal migration pathways).
What to expect in 2021 and beyond?

In October 2020, the German Presidency of the Council prepared a discussion paper in view of
reaching a political understanding on the key aspects of the new pact by the end of the year. This
ambition seemed to have been toned down by mid-November, when it circulated a draft progress
report instead. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the pact reignited an old dispute between Member States
opposing mandatory solidarity schemes (especially relocation) and those requesting more solidarity
to alleviate the burden on frontline countries. The proposal for a new border procedure seems less
controversial and generally supported by Member States, although questions remain about its
details and practical benefits. Whereas the European Parliament has not yet adopted its position on
any of the proposals included in the pact, initial reactions from a number of Members have been
mixed. The Parliament has long demanded more structured solidarity and fair sharing of
responsibility in the area of asylum. It has also urged the provision of adequate technical and
financial resources to Member States of first arrival 'to enable the swift and effective registration and
referral to the competent authorities of all migrants arriving in the Union with full respect for their
fundamental rights'. The issues of fundamental rights safeguards and resources are likely to come
back onto the table when the Parliament discusses the proposal on border screening.
The Commission's package approach may be instrumental for facilitating compromise, although, as
the experience of the 2016 CEAS package shows, success is not guaranteed. The negotiations on the
pact will be complex and may be further delayed by new linkages with future proposals. Progress
may also be affected by the pace of the implementation of other measures on external borders, such
as the upgrade of Frontex's mandate and the roll-out of the European integrated border
management system. Finally, a consensus built around fighting irregular migration, improving
border management and boosting returns may help a move in the right direction, although it is not
clear if this would be enough to avert future crises. If current trends continue, the number of
refugees and migrants worldwide is likely to rise in the future (the number of refugees doubled in
the last decade, reaching 20.4 million in 2019). The profound economic impact of the coronavirus
pandemic, which it is feared could undo the gains made against poverty in the past two decades,
may create another source of instability that could trigger large migration, including onward
movements of refugees from developing to developed countries.
A future-proof migration policy for Europe would require both taking stock of past experiences, and
anticipating broader challenges and long-term needs, such as further tackling interdependencies
between migration and public health, and addressing demographic challenges in Europe.
17
9. Turkey and stormy waters in the eastern Mediterranean

Since the discovery of offshore natural gas reserves in the eastern
Mediterranean in the early 2000s, Turkey has challenged its neighbours with
regard to the delimitation of their exclusive economic zones and destabilised
the whole region through its illegal exploration and military interventions, in
violation of international law. Ankara has used military force and intimidation,
including repeated violations of the territorial waters and airspaces of
neighbouring countries, as well as bilateral deals, such as its November 2019
memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA),
which purports to determine new maritime boundaries. The international community has strongly
condemned Turkey's behaviour. Taking into account Turkey's poor track record in upholding human
rights and the rule of law, the European Union has suspended accession negotiations and
pre-accession funds under the multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027. If Turkey continues
its provocative behaviour, the EU has the option to suspend modernisation of the EU-Turkey
Customs Union − which has been under discussion since 2015 − and also to decide to widen
sanctions, including new tariffs on selected products such as steel.
Geopolitical and economic fragility of Turkey

Tensions in the Aegean Sea and the eastern Mediterranean have not been conducive to good
neighbourly relations. The Turkey-Libya MoU on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the
Mediterranean effectively drew a dividing line between the eastern and western parts of the
Mediterranean, threatening maritime security, natural gas exploration and new infrastructure such as
the EastMed pipeline. Turkey's behaviour in the neighbourhood, beyond its geo-economic interests,
reflects internal political and economic fragility and a broader shift towards nationalistic policies. Some
observers suggest that the more ambitious 'neo-Ottoman' agenda is intent on remodelling the whole
region by spreading political Islam and the country's influence, from northern Iraq and Syria to Libya,
leaving behind the Kemalist tradition of secularism. However, as seen during the March 2019 local
elections, this move seems unable to stop falling support for the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan-led
religious-conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP), which lost several major municipalities in
the March 2019 local elections, including Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir.
Turkey remains weak economically. It is suffering from fallout from the coronavirus pandemic, a
broader balance of payments problem, inflation, and autocratic management of key monetary and
economic institutions. In 2020, the Turkish lira dropped to historic lows in relation to international
currencies. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) estimated in November 2020 that Turkish
lira depreciation during the first wave of the coronavirus pandemic (February-May 2020) was the
deepest among 17 emerging market economies, and twice as high as during the great financial crisis
of September to December 2008. In September 2020, citing a balance of payments crisis, Moody's
downgraded Turkey's sovereign debt to 'B2' with a negative outlook. The credit rating drop from
'B1' to 'B2' puts Turkey on a par with Egypt or Tunisia.
Analysts have warned that Turkey could experience an even worse balance of payments crisis than
it did in 2018. The interest rate increase by the Turkish central bank to 10.25 % in September was
still insufficient to stop rampant inflation of 11.75 %. The Turkish economy performed far below its
potential, resulting in the free fall of the Turkish lira, which lost 46 % against the euro in 2020 and
35 % against the US dollar, attaining a historic low against both currencies on 6 November 2020. On
that day, Erdoğan fired Turkish central bank governor Murat Uysal, only 16 months after he took
office, and appointed former Finance Minister Naci Agbal in his place. On 19 November, the Turkish
central bank decided to increase 'decisively' the one-week key rate to 15 %. The central bank took
this decision despite political pressure from Erdoğan, who had stated, just the day before, that
Turkey 'should not allow our investors to get crushed under high interest [rates]'.
18
Increasing international isolation

Turkey's policy decisions, despite the desired objective to defend the country's 'pivotal role' in the
region, have weakened it and isolated Erdoğan. The US government has criticised Turkey's unilateral
acts, including the Turkey-Libya MoU and its behaviour in Cyprus. The US State Department
Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Energy Resources, Francis Fannon, said that the US has
'been very consistent in calling [on Turkey] to stop all provocative actions that could undermine
investment confidence in the East Mediterranean region and affect political stability'. Senator Bob
Menendez (Democrat, New Jersey), a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and one of the
architects of the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act, called on 22 June 2020
for sanctions to be imposed on Turkey over its 'escalation in aggression in the eastern Mediterranean
in a way that threatens US interests'.
The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act, introduced by the US Congress in
April 2019 and signed by the US President on 20 December 2019, authorised new security assistance
for Cyprus and Greece and lifted the US arms embargo on Cyprus. It also authorised the establishment
of a US-Eastern Mediterranean energy centre to facilitate energy cooperation among the US, Israel,
Greece and Cyprus. Furthermore, the US warned Ankara that it risked sanctions under the Countering
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act if the S-400 air defence missile system that Turkey
bought from Russia was activated. The Trump administration imposed 25 % tariffs on Turkish steel in
March 2018 (these were increased to 50 % in August 2018). Tariffs, imposed amid tensions over the
since-freed American pastor Andrew Brunson, who was detained in Turkey on charges of links to the
Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ) and the PKK terrorist group, remained in place until May 2019.
Policy responses
In 2021, both the US and the EU are likely to continue their clear policy towards Turkey, which is
influenced more by Turkey's current provocative behaviour and several political disagreements than
by common economic interests. According to experts, for the US, 'the policy begun under the
Obama administration of building up Cyprus and Greece as strategic partners to replace Turkey is
likely to continue'. The position of the EU is also tilted towards a more sceptical and prudent view.
The European Commission announced in March 2020 that Turkey would not receive any pre-
accession funds during the 2021-2027 period, in contrast to the €3.2 billion allocated to the country
from the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance in 2014-2020. Furthermore, the much needed
modernisation of the EU-Turkey customs union, which came into force in 1995, could be suspended
despite the fact that the European Council of 1 October 2020 called for conditional modernisation
as part of an effort to 're-energise the EU-Turkey agenda'.
In case of renewed Turkish unilateral and provocative actions in breach of international law, such as
Erdoğan's visit to the northern Cyprus Varosha beach resort, and his support for a two-state solution
in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, the EU, as recalled by the European Council, 'will use
all the instruments and the options at its disposal, including in accordance with Article 29 TEU and
Article 215 TFEU, in order to defend its interests and those of its Member States'. This view was
echoed in the Commission's 2020 annual report on Turkey. The European Parliament shares this
opinion. It has called in the past for a conditional modernisation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union
(see resolution of March 2019 on the 2018 Commission report on Turkey), but has also opened the
door for new sanctions and suspension of the Customs Union (resolution of October 2019 on Turkish
military action in Syria and resolution of November 2020 on escalating tensions in Varosha). A
growing number of voices suggest that the EU could decide to apply new tariffs on selected goods,
such as Turkish steel. At the 10-11 December 2020 European Council meeting, EU leaders asked High
Representative/Vice-President of the Commission Josep Borrell to draw up a report on the state of
EU-Turkey political, economic and trade relations and to suggest how to proceed, including on
widening sanctions, and submit it to the leaders by the time they hold their meeting in March 2021.
19
10. A new US President in the White House

Having received 306 out of 538 Electoral College votes resulting from the US
presidential election on 3 November 2020 – and some seven million more
popular votes than his Republican rival, Donald Trump – the Democratic
candidate, former Vice-President Joseph (Joe) Biden will shortly become the
46th President of the United States. As is customary, the new President will be
sworn into office on 20 January (Inauguration Day), alongside Vice-President-
elect, Senator Kamala Harris, the first woman to occupy this office. The new
administration is likely to infuse renewed momentum into transatlantic relations, but experts
caution that not all areas will be ripe for EU-US cooperation.
Towards the end of last year, the Biden-Harris transition team nominated several members of the
future White House staff, as well as national security and economy nominees and appointees.
Notable among them are the nomination of Janet Yellen for Secretary of the Treasury, Anthony
Blinken for Secretary of State, Linda Thomas Greenfield for US Ambassador to the United Nations
and former Secretary of State John Kerry as special presidential envoy for the climate. Alejandro
Mayorkas, nominated for Secretary of Homeland Security, would be the first Latino to hold this
position, if confirmed. Yellen would be the first woman to lead the Treasury Department. The earliest
possible date for confirmations of presidential appointees by the Senate is Inauguration Day. The
President-elect has appealed to the Senate to give the nominees a 'prompt hearing', but analysts
suggest that a lot will depend on the final make-up of the Senate, which will only be determined
with the results of two closely fought run-off elections held in the state of Georgia on 5 January. So
far, the Republicans hold 50 seats and the Democrats 48. The composition of the Senate and the
relationship between the President and the Senate majority leader will significantly affect the
degree to which the new President's agenda can be accomplished.
Challenges for the Biden Administration

By all accounts, Joe Biden takes over the US Presidency at a challenging moment. The coronavirus
pandemic has severely affected the United States, both in health and economic terms. As of the end
of 2020, almost 350 000 US citizens had died of the Covid-19 virus and close to 21 million had been
infected. In April 2020, US unemployment rates peaked at levels not seen since the Great Recession.
High levels of political and social polarisation, including over racial and civil rights issues, have led
to what many term a 'divided America'. This has been exacerbated by the disproportionate way in
which the pandemic has affected different income and ethnic groups, with lower income Americans
hardest hit. Among other things, Biden also inherits his predecessor, Donald Trump's, controversial
immigration agenda, poor environmental record, and unconventional foreign policy that has led to
the United States' withdrawal (or announced intention to withdraw) from a range of multilateral
organisations that have been the hallmark of the liberal international order pioneered by the United
States.
The Biden plan's main components include:
• the 'made in all of America' future, which aims to use smart investments in
manufacturing and technology to create manufacturing and innovation jobs across
the US, including a US$400 billion 'Buy American' fund;
• building on the Affordable Care Act by giving Americans more choice, reducing
healthcare costs, and making the healthcare system less complex to navigate;
• tackling the climate emergency, including through a clean energy revolution,
ensuring that the US achieves a 100 % clean energy economy and reaches net-zero
emissions by 2050;
• improving racial economic equality, through a range of initiatives, including access
to affordable housing for black, brown, and native families.
20
The Biden-Harris team has also outlined a detailed approach to beating the Covid-19 pandemic and
an economic recovery plan, alongside plans in areas such as education, gun control, violence against
women, immigration, LGBTQ+, employment insurance and a range of others.
An opportunity for renewed transatlantic cooperation?

There is widespread expectation that, as president, Biden will restore diplomacy and liberal values
to US foreign policy, following his plan to 'restore US leadership abroad'. The new administration
will seek to rebuild tarnished relationships with democratic allies to achieve greater unity towards
adversaries. For the EU, the prospect of a new administration, as well as the President-elect's open
support of the EU, has spurred hopes of a renewed transatlantic agenda. However, geopolitical and
domestic pressures may still limit the space for cooperation on issues such as trade and digital
regulation. Following a period of change and uncertainty in transatlantic relations, the Biden
administration is likely to mark a departure from several of the trends observed in recent years,
which have disrupted long-held assumptions in transatlantic relations. Most analyses concur that in
areas such as multilateralism, the promotion of human rights and democracy, climate change, and
the approach towards authoritarian regimes, notably Russia, the EU and the Biden administration
will find fruitful common ground.
As a long-time supporter of NATO, Biden is certain to rebuild confidence in the US commitment to
the alliance. At the same time, EU-NATO cooperation advances alongside (and as part of) EU efforts
for strategic autonomy. The Secretary General of NATO has confirmed that the President elect has
been invited to the NATO summit due to take place in Brussels in early 2021. This comes at a moment
when the NATO 2030 group of wise persons report has recommended a more political role for NATO.
Biden has also emphasised the need for the alliance to safeguard its democratic nature. On trade,
the Biden administration is likely to take a slightly more constructive approach vis-à-vis the EU,
compared to that of the Trump administration. A central hope would be a shift away from the
transactional 'mini-deals' of the Trump administration and settlements on the tariff front. By
contrast, the blockage of nominations to the WTO Appellate Body may continue under the Biden
administration. There are also hopes that agreement will be reached with regard to the digital tax
dispute between France and the US once Biden takes office.
In 2018, the European Parliament recalled the longstanding EU-US partnership and alliance, and insisted
that it 'be based on jointly sharing and promoting together common values including freedom, rule of
law, peace, democracy, equality, rules-based multilateralism (and) sustainable development'. It
welcomed the work of the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue in fostering EU-US relations. EP President
David Sassoli congratulated Joe Biden on his victory on 7 November 2020, emphasising the need for a
relaunch of transatlantic relations. The Parliament has urged the US to re-join the Paris Agreement on
climate change and called for the removal of US tariffs imposed since 2017.
2021: The beginning of a renewed transatlantic relationship?

The European Commission and High Representative's communication on 'A new EU-US agenda for
global change', adopted on 2 December 2020, lists the fight against coronavirus, economic recovery,
climate change, technology, trade, multilateralism and shared values, and the promotion of
democracy, peace and security, as key areas. Concrete initiatives such as a new EU-US security and
defence dialogue, an EU-US Trade and Technology Council, transatlantic dialogue on the
responsibility of online platforms and big tech, an agreement on artificial intelligence (AI) and full
participation of the EU in the President-elect’s proposed summit for democracy, may create new
momentum for closer cooperation between the EU and 'Biden’s America'. On 10-11 December, the
European Council emphasized the strategic importance of a renewed relationship with the US. The
new US president's proposed visit to Brussels in early 2021will be a first chance to assess the change
in dynamics.
21
Further reading
Aguilar A. and Cantú C., 'Monetary policy response in emerging market economies: why was it different
this time?', Bank of International Settlements (BIS) Bulletin, November 2020.
Anghel S., Immenkamp B., Lazarou E., Saulnier J. and Wilson A., On the path to 'strategic autonomy' − The
EU in an evolving geopolitical environment, EPRS, European Parliament, September 2020.
Antikainena M., Uusitaloa T. and Kivikytö-Reponen P., Digitalisation as an Enabler of Circular Economy,
10th CIRP Conference on Industrial Product-Service Systems, May 2018.
Auersperger Matić A. and Parry M., The role of the Electoral College in US presidential elections, EPRS,
European Parliament, December 2020.
Bassot É., Ten opportunities for Europe post-coronavirus − Exploring potential for progress in EU policy-making,
EPRS, European Parliament, July 2020.
Bellmann B., Lee B. and Hepburn J., Delivering Sustainable Food and Land Use Systems: The Role of
International Trade, Hoffmann Centre for Sustainable Resource Economy, Chatham House, September 2019.
Bentzen B., The evolving consequences of the coronavirus 'infodemic': How viral false coronavirus-related
information affects people and societies across the world, EPRS, European Parliament, September 2020.
Blakeney M., Food loss and food waste: causes and solutions, Edward Elgar Publishing, January 2019.
CERES 2030, Final report: sustainable solutions to end hunger, October 2020.
D’Alfonso Alessandro, Next Generation EU: A European instrument to counter the impact of the
coronavirus pandemic, EPRS, European Parliament, July 2020.
Dumbrava C., Screening of third-country nationals at the EU external borders, EPRS, European
Parliament, November 2020.
EEAS Special Report update: Short assessment of narratives and disinformation around the Covid-19
pandemic (update May-November 2020), European External Action Service Strategic Communications
Task Forces and Information Analysis, Euvsdisinfo.eu, 2 December 2020.
Fundamental Rights Report 2020, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.
Gender equality: A review in progress, Topical Digest, EPRS, European Parliament, October 2020.
Hedberg A. and Šipka S., The circular economy: Going digital, European Policy Centre, March 2020
Johnson, H., International Agricultural Law and Policy: A Rights-Based Approach to Food Security,
Edward Elgar Publishing, October 2018.
Kotanidis S., Conference on the Future of Europe, EPRS, European Parliament, June 2020.
Kotanidis S., Preparing the Conference on the Future of Europe, EPRS, European Parliament, December 2019.
Lazarou E. and Titievskaia J. with Handeland C., US foreign policy after the 2020 Presidential election −
Issues for the European Union, EPRS, European Parliament, December 2020.
Lomba N. and Stjernquist A., Towards a joint European approach on vaccination, EPRS, European
Parliament, April 2020.
Makovsky A., Problematic Prospects for US‑Turkish Ties in the Biden Era. Human Rights, Sanctions Likely
among Early Tests, Stiftung Wissenchaft und Politik (SWP), December 2020.
Pasikowska-Schnass M., EU support for artists and the cultural and creative sector during the coronavirus
crisis, EPRS, European Parliament, May 2020.
Pasikowska-Schnass M., Performing arts: Emerging from confinement, EPRS, European Parliament, June 2020.
Rossi R., European Union food system, EPRS, European Parliament, September 2020.
Sapala M., Pari M. and Kresnichka-Nikolchova N., EU financing for 2021-2027 − Political agreement on the
2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument
and new own resources, EPRS, European Parliament, December 2020.
Shreeves R, The rights of LGBTI people in the European Union, EPRS, European Parliament, November 2020.
Shreeves R. and Prpic M., Violence against women in the EU − State of play, EPRS, European Parliament,
November 2020.
22
Stanicek B., Turkey: Remodelling the eastern Mediterranean Conflicting exploration of natural gas
reserves, briefing, EPRS, European Parliament, September 2020.
Szczepanski M., Critical raw materials for the EU: Enablers of the green and digital recovery, EPRS,
European Parliament, December 2020.
Szczepanski M., Important projects of common European interest: Boosting EU strategic value chains,
EPRS, European Parliament, November 2020.
The COVID vaccine challenges that lie ahead, Nature, 24 November 2020.
Zanotti J. and Clayton T., Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief, Congressional Research Service,
November 2020.
23
QA-BR-21-001-EN-N
This is the fifth edition of an annual EPRS publication
aimed at identifying and framing some of the key issues
and policy areas that are likely to feature prominently
on the political agenda of the European Union over the
coming year.
The topics analysed are: the Covid-19 race for a vaccine;
the recovery plan; access to food; inequality; challenges
for culture and the performing arts; a digital boost for
the circular economy; critical raw materials; border
controls; Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean; and the
new US administration.
This is a publication of the Members' Research Service

This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European
Parliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of
the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should
not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament.
PE 659.436
ISBN 978-92-846-7689-7
ISSN: 2600-268X
doi:10.2861/851756

Ten Issues To Watch in 2021

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Ten Issues To Watch in 2021

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Ten Issues To Watch in 2021

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ISSN 2600-268X

DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT

1. The vaccine race for health safety ________________________________________________ 2

2. The EU recovery plan: Turning crisis into opportunity? _______________________________ 4

3. Food for all? Food for thought __________________________________________________ 6

4. Re-invigorating the fight against inequality? _______________________________________ 8

5. Culture in crisis? _____________________________________________________________ 10

6. A digital boost for the circular economy__________________________________________ 12

7. Critical raw materials for Europe ________________________________________________ 14

8. A new procedure to manage Europe's borders ____________________________________ 16

9. Turkey and stormy waters in the eastern Mediterranean _____________________________ 18

10. A new US President in the White House _________________________________________ 20

Further reading _______________________________________________________________ 22

1. The vaccine race for health safety

EU action on Covid-19 vaccines

Next steps to be taken

Global action against Covid-19

2. The EU recovery plan: Turning crisis into opportunity?

The EU's largest and most innovative recovery plan

What to expect from the recovery plan?

The remaining challenges

Data source: author's compilation.

3. Food for all? Food for thought

The need to reform the EU food system

Food security in the world: A goal still far away

Towards sustainable food systems

4. Re-invigorating the fight against inequality?

Why discrimination and inequality matter, especially now

A renewed impetus for the EU response to inequality

2021: The year for putting plans into action?

Coronavirus and the cultural and creative sectors

Coronavirus – Accelerator of change; Culture – Factor of recovery

EU perspective on cultural recovery

Will performing arts just survive or is there a possibility to thrive?

6. A digital boost for the circular economy

Digital technologies for sustainability

Digital solutions to support the circular economy

Examples illustrating the potential of digital solutions

Digital technologies: A challenge for circularity

Consumer electronics in the circular economy

The digital revolution – A model for moving to a circular economy?

7. Critical raw materials for Europe

Why they are critical

The bigger picture

2021: Putting ideas into practice

8. A new procedure to manage Europe's borders

The promise and perils of border measures

What to expect in 2021 and beyond?

9. Turkey and stormy waters in the eastern Mediterranean

Geopolitical and economic fragility of Turkey

Increasing international isolation

10. A new US President in the White House

Challenges for the Biden Administration

An opportunity for renewed transatlantic cooperation?

2021: The beginning of a renewed transatlantic relationship?

This is a publication of the Members' Research Service

You might also like