Remedial Law Case Digests Full Set

2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases
CARANDANG vs. DESIERTO

G.R. No. 148076; January 12, 2011
Facts: RPN-9 is a private corporation duly registered with the SEC. Benedicto, a
stockholder thereof, entered into a compromise agreement with the Philippine
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) whereby he ceded to the government his
shares of stock in RPN with an outstanding capital of 72.4%, which was later
discovered to be only 32.4%
Meanwhile, President Estrada appointed Carandang as general manager and

chief operating officer of RPN. He was charged with grave misconduct before the
Ombudsman on the ground of conflict of interest as he entered into a contract with
AF Broadcasting, Inc, despite his being an incorporator, director and stockholder of
the said corporation.
Carandang sought the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against

him on the ground that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over him because RPN
was not a government-owned or –controlled corporation. Consequently he insists
that he is not a public official hence he is not subject to the administrative authority
of the Ombudsman and the criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Issue: Whether or not RPN is a GOCC, which in turn renders Carandang subject to
the administrative authority of the Ombudsman and the criminal jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Ruling: No, RPN is not a GOCC.
Section 2 of PD 2029 states that a GOCC is a stock or a non-stock corporation,

whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, which is directly
chartered by a special law, or if organized under the general corporation law is
owned or controlled by the government directly or indirectly through a parent
coerporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majority of its
outstanding capital stock or of its outstanding voting capital stock.
Due to the inability to resolve the issue regarding the actual shares owned by
the PCGG, the conclusion that the government held majority shares finds no factual
basis.
Thus Carandang is not subject to the administrative authority of the

Ombudsman and the criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
1 Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor!  - GMDC06062017
CAPALLA vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 201112; June 13, 2012
Facts: On July 10, 2009, the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract
for the Provision of an Automated Election System for the May 10, 2010
Synchronized National and Local Elections,(AES Contract). The contract between
the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM was one of “lease of the AES with option to
purchase (OTP) the goods listed in the contract.” In said contract, the Comelec was
given until December 31, 2010 within which to exercise the option. In September
2010, the Comelec partially exercised its OTP 920 units of PCOS machines with
corresponding canvassing/consolidation system (CCS) for the special elections in
certain areas in the provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Bulacan. In a letter dated
December 18, 2010, Smartmatic-TIM, through its Chairman Flores, proposed a
temporary extension of the option period on the remaining PCOS machines until
March 31, 2011, waiving the storage costs and covering the maintenance costs. The
Comelec did not exercise the option within the extended period. Several extensions
were given for the Comelec to exercise the OTP until its final extension on March 31,
2012.
On March 29, 2012, the Comelec issued a Resolution resolving to accept

Smartmatic-TIM’s offer to extend the period to exercise the OTP until March 31,
2012 and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign for and on behalf of the Comelec
the Agreement on the Extension of the OTP Under the AES Contract (Extension
Agreement). Comelec again issued a Resolution resolving to approve the Deed of
Sale between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latter’s PCOS
machines to be used in the upcoming May 2013 elections and to authorize Chairman
Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of the Comelec. The Deed of Sale
was forthwith executed.
Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Comelec in issuing the assailed Resolutions
and in executing the assailed Extension Agreement and Deed.
Ruling: No, Comelec did not abuse its discretion when it issued the resolutions and
excecuted the Extension Agreement and Deed
A reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that the
parties are given the right to amend the contract which may include the period
within which to exercise the option. There is, likewise, no prohibition on the
extension of the period, provided that the contract is still effective. The Comelec still
retains P50M of the amount due Smartmatic-TIM as performance security, which
indicates that the AES contract is still effective and not yet terminated.
Consequently, pursuant to Article 19 of the contract, the provisions thereof

may still be amended by mutual agreement of the parties provided said amendment
is in writing and signed by the parties. Considering, however, that the AES contract
is not an ordinary contract as it involves procurement by a government agency, the
rights and obligations of the parties are governed not only by the Civil Code but also
by RA 9184.
Smartmatic-TIM was not granted additional right that was not previously
available to the other bidders. The bidders were apprised that aside from the lease
of goods and purchase of services, their proposals should include an OTP the subject
goods. The amendment of the AES contract is not substantial. The approved budget
for the contract was P11,223,618,400.00 charged against the supplemental
appropriations for election modernization. Bids were, therefore, accepted provided
that they did not exceed said amount. The competitive public bidding conducted for
the AES contract was sufficient. A new public bidding would be a superfluity. The
amendment of the AES contract is more advantageous to the Comelec and the public
because the P7,191,484,739.48 rentals paid for the lease of goods and purchase of
services under the AES contract was considered part of the purchase price. For the
Comelec to own the subject goods, it was required to pay only P2,130,635,048.15. If
the Comelec did not exercise the option, the rentals already paid would just be one
of the government expenses for the past election and would be of no use to future
elections.
CALLO-CLARIDAD vs. ESTEBAN

G.R. No. 191567; March 20, 2013
Facts: Petitioner is the mother of Cheasare Armani “Chase” Callo Claridad, whose
lifeless and bloodied body was discovered in the evening of February 27, 2007
between vehicles parked at the carport of a residential house located inside
Ferndale Homes, Quezon City. It was alleged that Chase had been last seen alive
with respondent Philip Ronald P. Esteban less than an hour before the discovery of
his lifeless body
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for murder against respondents Philip

and Teodora on the strength of the several pieces of circumstantial evidence.
The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint based on the
observation that there was lack of evidence, motive and circumstantial evidence
sufficient to charge respondent with homicide, much less murder. On petition
for review, the Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal of the complaint stating
that the confluence of lack of an eyewitness, lack of motive, insufficient
circumstantial evidence, and the doubt as to the proper identification of Philip by
the witness resulted in the lack of probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with
the crime alleged. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review and the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner resorted to the correct remedy when she filed a
petition for review before the Court of Appeals to review the Secretary of Justice’s
resolution on the determination of probable cause.
Ruling: No, the petitioner did not resort to the correct remedy.
A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to

review the decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicia;l officers, agencies
or bodies, particularly those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43.
Here, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer performing a quasi-judicial

function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of
probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially Executive function
to determine whether the crime alleged against the respondents was committed and
whether there was probable cause to believe that the respondents were guilty
thereof. The courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice’s determination of
probable cause only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when
the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the
Executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the
requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly
that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention
is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers.
AIR ADS vs. TADECO

G.R. No. 160736; March 23, 2011
Facts: A civil case for damages entitled Elva O. Pamento vs. Tagum Agricultual
Development Corporation (TADECO) and Edwin Yap was filed in RTC Davao City
Branch 15. Respondent, through counsel ACCRA Law Office, filed an answer with
compulsory counterclaims and motion for leave to file third party complaint,
impleading petitioner Air Ads, Inc and Pioneer Insurance Surety Corporation as
third-party defendants. The same was admitted however upon realizing that
Pioneer was a client of its Makati Office, ACCRA Law filed a notice of dismissal
without prejudice to third party complaint only against Pioneer. Consequently,
TADECO filed through another counsel Dominguez Law Office, a motion to withdraw
notice of dismissal without prejudice of third party complaint only against Pioneer
or motion for reconsideration, alleging that the notice of dismissal filed by ACCRA
had been made without its consent.
The RTC granted the notice of dismissal filed by ACCRA. A month later, RTC
also granted the motion to withdraw notice of dismissal filed by TADECO through its
new counsel and set aside the dismissal of the third party complaint against Pioneer.
Tadeco, through Dominguez Law Office, filed a motion to admit third party
complaint in substitution of the third party complaint filed by the third party
plaintiff’s former counsel. The third party complaint, however, contained allegations
pertaining only to Pioneer as third party defendant. Notwithstanding this, the RTC
granted said motion.
Air Ads filed a motion to dismiss against the third party complaint averring
that it had been dropped as third party defendant under TADECO’s substitute third
party complaint. TADECO, now represented by ACCEA, countered that it had never
been the intention of Dominguez Law to file a new third party complaint against Air
Ads because the latter represented TADECO only in regards to the third party
complaint against Pioneer. The RTC denied Air Ads motion to dismiss holding tthat
the notice of dismissal filed by ACCRA did not have the effect of dropping Air Ads as
a third party defendant due to the notice being expressly restrictive.
Air Ads filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. A
subsequent petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Air Ads before the Court
of Appeals was also denied for failure to attach the board resolution designating the
petitioner’s duly authorized representative to sign the verification and certification
against forum shopping. Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration, Air Ads filed
a new petition for certiorari and prohibition already including the proper board
certificate.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of an identical petition following the dismissal of
the first petition on the ground of defective and insufficient verification and
certification constitute forum shopping.
Ruling: No, the filing of an identical petition following the dismissal of the first
petition on the ground of defective and insufficient verification and certification
does not constitute forum shopping.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines the effect of the
failure to comply with the requirements for the certification against forum
shopping. Said section expressly provides that the dismissal of a petition due to
failure to comply with the requirements therein is withpout prejudice unless
otherwise provided by the court. Accordingly, the plaintiff or petitioner is not
precluded from filing a similar action in order to rectify the defect in the
certification where the court states in its order that the action is dismissed due to
such defect, unless the court directs that the dismissal is with prejudice, in which
case the plaintiff is barred from filing a similar action by res judicata.
In the context of the aforementioned rule, the dismissal, being without any
qualification, was a dismissal without prejudice, plainly indicating that Air Ads could
not be barred from filing the second petition.
ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB

G.R. No. 188471; April 20, 2010
Facts: Sometime in 1992, petitioner discovered documents showing that his father
acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government of the
Philippine Islands in or about the year 1911 in accordance with the Friar Lands Act.
Upon investigation of the status of the land, petitioner found out from the office of
the Registrar of Deeds of Cebu City that title to Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate had been "administratively reconstituted from the owner’s duplicate"
in the name of United Service Country Club, Inc., predecessor of Cebu Country Club,
Inc. After Cebu Country Club refused to heed to the demand of the petitioner to to
restore to him the ownership and possession of said lot within fifteen (15) days
from receipt thereof, he filed with the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City. RTC decided
in favor of Cebu Country Club. Both parties appealed to the CA which affirmed the
RTC. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Such
denial prompted petitioner to appeal to the Supreme Court. On January 31, 2002,
the Supreme Court denied the petition for review and ruled that the disputed lot
belonged to the Government of the Philippines. Petitioners sought a reconsideration
which was denied, thus making the decision final and executory.
In 2004, the Government, filed in the RTC a motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution which was opposed by Cebu Country Club. The RTC denied the OSG’s
motion. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the denial of the
OSG’s motion. The RTC denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration citing
that the party who had a direct interest in the execution of the decision and the
reconsideration of the denial of the motion for execution was the Government
represented only by the OSG; hence the petitioners had no legal standing to file the
motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners were the real parties-in-interest to question the
denial by the RTC of the OSG’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
Ruling: No, petitioners are not the real parties-in-interest to question the
denial by the RTC of the OSC’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
In an earlier case, the Supreme Court found that petitioners did not validly
acquire ownership of Lot No 727-D-2 and that the same belonged to the
Government. This pronouncement renders beyond dispute that the non-execution of
the judgment would not adversely affect the petitioners, who now hold no right
whatsoever in said lot. Otherwise put, they are not the proper parties to assail the
questioned orders of the RTC because they stand to derive nothing from the
execution of the judgment against Cebu Country Club, Inc.
A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the

judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest within the
meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected
by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest. One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.
AMPATUAN vs DE LIMA
G.R. No. 197291; April 3, 2013
Facts: Fifty seven innocent civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality
of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was petitioner,
then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest
proceedings were conducted against petitioner at the General Santos (Tambler)
Airport Lounge, before he was flown to Manila and detained at the main office of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The NBI and the Philippine National Police (PNP) charged other suspects,
for what became aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre. Secretary of Justice
Agnes Devanadera constituted a Special Panel of Prosecutors to conduct the
preliminary investigation. DOJ resolved to file the corresponding informations for
murder against petitioner, and to issue subpoenas to several persons. Twenty-five
informations for murder were also filed against petitioner in the Regional Trial
Court, 12th Judicial Region, in Cotabato City.
A panel of Prosecutors charged one hundred ninety six individuals with
multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. It appears that in issuing
the joint resolution the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of
one Kenny Dalandag.
Petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De
Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion
of Dalandag in the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already
confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations.
Petitioner reiterated the request twice. Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s
request. Petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila, seeking to
compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder
cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC. Respondents questioned the propriety of the
conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed. RTC of Manila
issued the assailed order dismissing the petition for mandamus.
Issue: Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge

Dalandag, as an accused for multiple murder despite his admission to the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ.
Ruling: No, respondents may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge

Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder despite his admission to the WPP.
The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the
amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of
appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court.
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the

Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the
conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department,
through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed
offenders.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or

person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act
against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or
officer. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus
may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the
particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal
of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the

letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to
grant or deny such letter-request.
CHU vs. SPOUSES CUNANAN

G.R. No. 156185; September 12, 2011
Facts: Spouses Chu executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage involving their
five parcels of land, in favour of Trinidad N. Cunanan. The parties stipulated that the
ownership of lots would remain with the spouses as the vendors and would be
transferred to Cunanan only upon complete payment of the total consideration and
compliance with the terms of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage.
Thereafter, the Chus executed an SPA authorizing Cunanan to borrow the amount of
consideration from any banking institution and to mortgage the lots as security, and
then to deliver the proceeds to the Chus. Cunanan was able to transfer the title of
the lots to her name without the knowledge of the Chus, and was able to borrow
money with the lots as security without paying the balance and the purchase price
to the Chus. She later transferred two of the lots to Spouses Garcia. As a result, the
Chus caused the annotation of an unpaid vendor’s lien on three of the lots.
Nonteheless, Cunanan still assigned the remaining lots to Cool Town Realty.
The Chus commenced Civil Case No. G-1936 in the RTC to recover the unpaid
balance from Spouses Fernando and Trinidad Cunanan (Cunanans), which
complaint was later on amended to seek the annulment of the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage and of the TCTs issued pursuant to the deed, and to recover
damages. They impleaded Cool Town Realty and the Office of the Registry of Deeds
of Pampanga as defendants. By virtue of the sale by the spouses Carlos of the two
lots to Benelda Estate, the Chus further amended the complaint to Benelda Estate as
additional defendant.
Benelda Estate filed its answer with a motion to dismiss, claiming, among
others, that the amended complaint stated no cause of action. The same was denied
by the RTC which prompted the former to assail the denial on certiorari in the CA.
The CA annulled RTC’s denial and dismissed the civil case as against Benelda Estate.
Said dismissal of the case was later on upheld by the Supreme Court in a subsequent
case involving the same parties. Subsequently, the Chus, Cunanans and Cool Town
Realty entered into a compromise agreement whereby the Cunanans transferred to
the Chus their 50% share in all the parcels of land registered in the name of Cool
Town Realty for an in consideration of the full settlement of the case, which the RTC
approved.
Thereafter, the Chus brought another suit against the Carloses and Benelda
Estate seeking the cancellation of the titles in Benelda Estate’s names. The
petitioners then amended their complaint to implead the Cunanans as additional
defendants. The Cunanans and the Carloses moved for the dismissal of the case on
several grounds including res judicata. The RTC denied both motions holding that
the action was not barred by res judicata because there was no identity of parties
and subject matter between the present case and the first case. Reconsideration was
sought by the Cunanans but the same was denied, prompting them to file a petition
for certiorari in the CA which was granted.
Issue: Whether or not Civil Case No. 12251 is barred by res judicata although the
compromise agreement did not expressly include Benelda Estate as a party and
although the compromise agreement made no reference to the lots registered in the
name of Benelda Estates.
Ruling: Yes, Civil Case No. 12251 is barred by res judicata although the compromise
agreement did not expressly include Benelda Estate as a party and although the
compromise agreement made no reference to the lots registered in the name of
Benelda Estates.
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making

reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It
encompasses the objects specifically stated therein, although it may include other
objects by necessary implication, and is binding on the contracting parties, being
expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement between them. It has the effect and
authority of res judicata upon the parties. The intent of the parties to settle all their
claims against each other is expressed in the phrase “any and all their respective
claims against each other as alleged in the pleading they respectively filed in
connection with this case, which was broad enough to cover whatever claims the
petitioners might asset based on the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage
covered all the five lots.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in
the previous suit.
The first requisite of res judicata – that the former judgment must be final –is
attendant in the case. Civil Case No. 6-1936 was already terminated under the
compromise agreement, for the judgment, being upon a compromise, was
immediately final and unappealable. As to the second requisite, the RTC had
jurisdiction over the cause of action in the first case, the action being incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Lastly, that the compromise agreement explicitly settled the
entirety of the first case by resolving all claims of the parties against each other,
indicated that the third requisite was also satisfied. Hence all three requisites
concur. Thus Civil Case No. 12251 is barred by res judicata
CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION vs. CRUZ

G.R. No. 157049; August 11, 2010
Facts: Respondent Carlo Romulo Cruz maintained a savings and checking account at
petitioner’s Loyola Heights Branch. The account was closed due to the negligence of
one of the latter’s tellers. Due to the closure, the respondent sustained extreme
embarrassment for the checks he issued would not be honoured although his
savings account was sufficiently funded and the accounts were maintained under
the petitioner’s check-o-matic. The respondent sued in the RTC to claim for damages
from the petitioner. After the trial, the RTC ruled in favour of the respondent, and
ordered the petitioner to pay him P 100,000.00 as moral damages, P 20,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P 20,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The RTC found that the
petitioner failed to properly supervise its teller in which the respondent sustained
embarrassment and humiliation, entitling him to damages. The petitioner appealed
to the CA, arguing that the RTC erred in ordering it to pay moral and exemplary
damages. The CA affirmed the RTC. The petitioner sought for reconsideration but CA
denied it for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable to respondent for moral and
exemplary damages.
Ruling: Yes, the petitioner is liable to respondent for moral and exemplary damages.
In several decisions of the Court, the banks, defendants therein, were made
liable for negligence, even without sufficient proof of malice or bad faith on their
part, and the Court awarded moral damages of P 100,000.00 each time to the suing
depositors in proper consideration of their reputation and their social standing. The
respondent should be similarly awarded for the damage to his reputation as an
architect and businessman.
It is never overemphasized that the public always relies on a bank’s

profession of diligence and meticulousness in rendering irreproachable service. Its
failure to exercise diligence and meticulousness warranted its liability for
exemplary damages and for reasonable attorney’s fees.
CONSING vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 161075; July 15, 2013
Facts: Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia, various
loans totalling 18 Million pesos from Unicapital, secured by real estate mortgage
constituted on a parcel of land registered under the name of Cecilia. In accordance
with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase
one-half of the property for a total consideration of P 21, 221,500.00. Payment was
effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory notes ofe
Cecilia and petitioner in the amount of 18 million pesos and paying an additional
amount of P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus
Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital. Before Unicapital
and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to the
property was really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan
Teng, the parties from whom the property had been allegedly acquired by Cecilia.
TCT No. 687599 held by Cecilia appeared to be spurious. On its part, Unicapital
demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 that had been paid to
and received by Cecilia and Petitioner, but the latter ignored the demands.
Petitioner filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City RTC for injunctive relief,
thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection
of the P41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his
mother. On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa
through falsification of public document against petitioner and Cecilia in the Makati
City Prosecutor’s Office. Unicapital sued petitioner in the RTC in Makati City (Civil
Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an
application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Petitioner and
Cecilia an information for estafa through falsification of public document in the RTC
in Makati City. Petitioner moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case
on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig
and Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001, petitioner reiterated his motion for
deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency of CA-G.R.
SP No. 63712 in the CA. On November 19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed the
motion. A week later, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the
Makati criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question and
subsequently denied the Prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the Makati
criminal case via petition for certiorari. The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 71252, dismissing the petition for certiorari and upholding the RTC’s
questioned orders. Subsequently, the CA amended its decision, reversing itself.
Petitoner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion through
the second assailed resolution.
Issue: Whether or not an independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the
defrauded party raises a prejudicial question.
Ruling: No, an independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded
party does not raise a prejudicial question.
Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, it is well-settled that a civil action

based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted
and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a
criminal case.
Here, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the
alleged fraud committed by Consing and Cecilia in selling the disputed lot to Plus
Builders is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it
will not operate as a prejudicial question. The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the
Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not Consing merely acted as an
agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila
civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his
mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the
purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his
mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be
adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for
conspiring to falsify public documents.
The determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for
Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the
criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.
DISINI vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 169823-24; September 11, 2013
Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004
charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized
under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case
No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No.
3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No.
28002). In this two actions it alleged his confederations with the late President
Marcos and His family.
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses

charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.He contends that:
(1) the informations did not allege that the charges were being filed pursuant to and
in connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses
charged were not of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because
the allegations in the informations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth, nor involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG; and (4) being a private individual not charged
as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he should be
prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No.
8249; and that both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints initially filed by
the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate
and file the appropriate civil or criminal cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only
of the Marcoses and their immediately family but also of their relatives,
subordinates and close associates.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the offenses charged
Ruling: Yes, Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the offenses
charged.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the
Sandiganbayan and defined its jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975
and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan was vested
with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving: (a) Violations of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense; (b) Other offenses or felonies
whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office;
and (c) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged
from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked the
PCGG with assisting the President in "the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their
powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship," expressly granted the
authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction
as to their private or public status.
Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of

R.A. No. 8249 applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b of
R.A. No. 8249. Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as
Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only in Subsection 4a and Subsection
4b,signifying the plain legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to such
public officials. To include within the ambit of the qualifying clause the persons
covered by Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to
bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A.
In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of Criminal Case

No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disini’s being a private individual,
and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal, accomplice or
accessory of a public official in the commission of the offenses charged.
FDC vs. AGCAOILI

G.R. No. 165025; August 31, 2011
Facts: Interchem Laboratories Incorporated (Interchem) purchased Fedman Suites

Buildings Unit 411 under a contract to sell. FDC executed a Master Deed with
Declaration of Restrictions, and formed the Fedman Suite Condominium Corporation
(FSCC) to manage FSB and hold title over its common areas. Interchem, with FDCs
consent, transferred all its rights in Unit 411 to respondent Federico Agcaoili. The
centralized air-conditioning unit of FSBs fourth floor broke down. Being thereby
adversely affected, Agcaoili wrote to Eduardo X. Genato (Genato, demanding the
repair of the air-conditioning unit. Not getting any immediate response, Agcaoili
sent follow-up letters to FSCC reiterating the demand, but the letters went
unheeded. He then informed FDC and FSCC that he was suspending the payment of
his condominium dues and monthly amortizations. FDC cancelled the contract to
sell involving Unit 411 and cut off the electric supply to the unit. Agcaoili was thus
prompted to sue FDC and FSCC in the RTC, Makati City, Branch 144 for injunction
and damages. The parties later executed a compromise agreement that the RTC
approved. Immediately thereafter, FDC again disconnected the electric supply of
Unit 411. Agcaoili thus moved for the execution of the RTC decision dated August
26, 1985. On July 17, 1986, the RTC issued an order temporarily allowing Agcaoili to
obtain his electric supply from the other units in the fourth floor of FSB until the
main meter was restored.
Agcaoili lodged a complaint for damages against FDC and FSCC in the RTC,
which was raffled to Branch 150 in Makati City. FDC claims that there was a failure
to pay the correct amount of docket fee herein because the complaint did not specify
the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees; that the
payment of the prescribed docket fee by Agcaoili was necessary for the RTC to
acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case despite failure by
Agcaoili to pay the correct amount of docket fee.
Ruling: Yes, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case despite failure by Agcaoili to
pay the correct amount of docket fee.
The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of docket fees are not paid at
the time of filing, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the
fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription. The
prescriptive period that bars the payment of the docket fees refers to the period in
which a specific action must be filed, so that in every case the docket fees must be
paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period, as provided in the applicable laws,
particularly Chapter 3, Title V, Book III, of the Civil Code, the principal law on
prescription of actions. Even where the clerk of court fails to make a deficiency
assessment, and the deficiency is not paid as a result, the trial court nonetheless
continues to have jurisdiction over the complaint, unless the party liable is guilty of a
fraud in that regard, considering that the deficiency will be collected as a fee in lien
within the contemplation of Section 2, Rule 141 (as revised by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC.
The reason is that to penalize the party for the omission of the clerk of court is not
fair if the party has acted in good faith.
Here, the docket fees paid by Agcaoili were insufficient considering that the
complaint did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. Nonetheless, it is not disputed that Agcaoili paid the assessed docket
fees. Such payment negated bad faith or intent to defraud the Government.
Nonetheless, Agcaoili must remit any docket fee deficiency to the RTCs clerk of
court.
GALVEZ vs CA
G.R. No. 157445; April 3, 2013
Facts: Spouses Eustacio and Segundina used to own a property located in Barangay
District II, Babatngon, Leyte. After their marital relationship turned sour, Eustacio
and Segundina separated and cohabited with other partners. Eustacio sold the
property to their daughter Jovita without the knowledge or consent of Segundina.
After the sale, Jovita constituted a mortgage on the property on March 9, 1981 to
secure her loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Jovita failed to pay her
obligation. Hence, PNB had the property extrajudicially foreclosed. In the ensuing
foreclosure sale, PNB was the highest bidder. There being no redemption, the
property became PNB’s acquired asset. Respondents Spouses Honorio and Susana
Montaño purchased the property from PNB. Thereafter, the Montaños tried to get
the actual possession of the property, but Segundina refused to vacate. Accordingly,
the Montaños sued Segundina for recovery of ownership and possession, and
damages in the Municipal Trial Court of Babatngon, Leyte (MTC). Segundina
countered that the sale of the property by Eustacio to Jovita was null and void for
having been done without her knowledge and consent; that the sale to PNB as well
as to the Montaños were consequently void; and that the Montaños were also
buyers in bad faith.
The MTC ruled in favor of the Montaños. Segundina appealed to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Tacloban City. The RTC affirmed the MTC’s decision. Segundina
filed a motion for reconsideration against the RTC’s decision but the RTC denied the
same. Thereafter, Segundina appealed to the CA by petition for review. The CA
promulgated its first assailed resolution dismissing outright the petition, stating
thus: “A cursory perusal of the instant petition for review shows that no copies of
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations
thereof were attached as annexes in violation of Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure”. Segundina moved for the reconsideration of the resolution,
arguing that it was within her judgment as petitioner to decide what documents,
pleadings or portions of the records would support her petition; that her exercise of
judgment was not a technical error that warranted the outright dismissal of her
petition; that the rule requiring all pleadings and material portions of the records to
be attached to the petition was an “absurd requirement”; and that attaching the
pleadings and other portions of the record was not an indispensable requirement
the non-compliance with which would cause the denial of the petition. CA denied
Segundina’s motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the mere failure to attach copies of pleadins and other
material portions of the recored as would support the allegations causes the
outright dismissal of a petition for review.
Ruling: No, the mere failure to attach copies of pleadings and other material portions
of the record as would support the allegations should not cause the outright
dismissal of a petition for review.
The Court has laid down three guideposts in determining the necessity of
attaching the pleadings and portions of the records to the petition. First, not all
pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only
those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is
whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the
petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of
discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition. Second, even if
a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is
shown that the contents thereof can also found in another document already
attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are
summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy
of the judgment is attached. Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of
the case record may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed)
upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will
serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.
The Court considers the attachments of Segundina’s petition for review (i.e.,
the certified true copies of the MTC decision dated February 4, 2000, the RTC
decision dated November 29, 2000, and the RTC order dated April 22, 2002) already
sufficient to enable the CA to pass upon her assigned errors and to resolve her
appeal even without the pleadings and other portions of the records. To still deny
due course to her petition for not attaching the complaint and the answer despite
the MTC decision having substantially summarized their contents was to ignore the
spirit and purpose of the requirement to give sufficient information to the CA.
GOLANGCO vs. FUNG

G.R. No. 157952; September 8, 2009
Facts: In 1995, petitioner Golangco, as complainant, initiated a prosecution for libel

against the respondent Fung in the Regional Trial Court. Allegedly, the respondent
had issued an office memorandum maliciously imputing against the petitioner the
commission of bribery and had sent copies of the mrmorandum to the petitioner’s
superiors in the POEA and to other public officers and personalities not connecter
with the POEA, causing damage and prejudice to the petitioner. On hearing day, the
prosecution still failed to present its witness because no subpoena had been issued
to and served on him for the purpose. The RTC judge issued an order terminating
the prosecution’s presentation of evidence.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari to assail the order and
claimed that the RTC judge committed grave buse of discretion for not issuing the
subpoena to require the witness to appear and testify in the hearing. He contended
that his prior request for the subpoena for an earlier hearing date should have been
treated as a continuing request for the subpoena considering that the Rules of Court
did not require a party to apply for a subpoena again should it not be served in the
first time. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the petition for
certiorari of the petitioner.
Ruling: Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled when it dismissed the petition for
certiorari
The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party in his
action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. He thereby ignored that the People of
the Philippines were indispensable parties due to his objective being to set aside the
trial court’s order. The omission was fatal and already enough cause for the
summary rejection of his petition for certiorari. The petitioner did not also obtain
the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to his petition for certiorari.
At the very least, he should ave furnished a copy of the petition for certiorari to the
OSG prior to the filing thereof, but even that he did not do.
The petitioner now needs to be reminded that certiorari is an extraordinary

remedy to correct a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when an appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law is not available. In this regard, grave abuse of discretion
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction whenever the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
HEIRS OF SIMON vs CHAN

G.R. No. 157547; February 23, 2011
Facts: On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the MeTC
of Manila an information charging the late Eduardo Simon with a violation of BP
22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon.
More than three years later, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in
Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00,
coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil
Case No. 915-00).
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary

attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff
attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon. Eight days thereafter, Simon filed an urgent
motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for
damages. Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge
plaintiffs attachment bond for damages.
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon the urgent
motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for
damages. The MTC cites the grounds of litis pendentia and that the case for sum of
money is one based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still
prior reservation is required. Chans motion for reconsideration was denied as well
as his appeal with the RTC. On the CA, Chan's appeal was granted.
Issue: Whether or not Chan’s civil action (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an
independent civil action.
Ruling: No, Chan’s civil action was not an independent civil action.
There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from
the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP 22). This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which relevantly
provides: "The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed."
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 also provides that: "1. The criminal action for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed or recognized."
HEIRS OF GARCIA vs. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, ZAMBALES

G.R. No. 162217; July 22, 2015
Facts: Melecio R. Bueno brought an ejectment suit in the MTC of Iba against the
Municipality of Iba, Zambales claiming that the municipality constructed the public
market on his lands without his consent. After due proceedings, the MTC ruled in
favor of Bueno. Then the municipality of Iba filed its notice of appeal, but the MTC
denied due course to the notice of appeal. The Municipality of Iba filed its petition
for certiorari in the RTC assailing MTC’s denial. The petition for certiorari was
granted.
Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review under

Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA dismissed the petition for review for not being
the proper mode of appeal observing that the assailed orders had been issued by the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Although admitting that their petition
for review under Rule 42 was inappropriate, the petitioners pray that the Court
exercise its equity jurisdiction because a stringent application of the Rules of Court
would not serve the demands of substantial justice.
Issue: Whether or not the Court should exercise its equity jurisdiction and give due
course to the petition.
Ruling: No. The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be taken
for granted, or easily dismissed, or lightly treated. The appeal by notice of appeal
under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition for review under Rule
42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right
to seek the review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court,
exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast, the discretionary appeal, which
is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its
primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its
discretion. Verily, the CA has the discretion whether to due course to the petition
for review or not.
The plea for liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from the Court. Appeal is
not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege. As the parties invoking the
privilege, the petitioners should have faithfully complied with the requirements of
the Rules of Court. Their failure to do so forfeited their privilege to appeal. Indeed,
any liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may be properly invoked
only in cases of some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but
definitely not in cases like now where a liberal application would directly subvert
the essence of the proceedings or results in the utter disregard of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the petitioners did not give any good reason or cause that could warrant
the relaxation of the rules in their favor. Their bare plea for substantial justice was
not enough ground to suspend the rules. Acceding to their plea would conceal their
shortcomings in procedure, and thereby belittle the lofty objectives of instituting
rules of procedure.
HEIRS OF SOTTO vs PALICTE

G.R. No. 159691; January 13, 2013
Facts: In June 1967, Pilar Teves (Pilar) and other heirs of Carmen Rallos (Carmen),
the deceased wife of Filemon, filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City a
complaint against the Estate of Sotto ( Civil Case No. R-10027 ) seeking to recover
certain properties that Filemon had inherited from Carmen, and damages. The CFI
rendered judgment awarding to Pilar and other heirs of Carmen damages of P
233,963.65, among other reliefs . On July 24, 1980, Matilde filed in Civil Case No. R-
10027, a motion to transfer to her name the title to the four properties. However,
the CFI denied her motion, and instead declared the deed of redemption issued in
her favor null and void, holding that Matilde, although declared in Special
Proceedings No. 2706-R as one of the heirs of Filemon, did not qualify as a
successor-in-interest with the right to redeem the four properties. The other heirs of
Filemon failed to exercise their option granted in the decision of September 21,
1987 to join Matilde as co-redemptioners within the six-month period. Accordingly,
on October 5, 1989, the trial court issued an order in Civil Case No. R-10027
approving Matilde’s motion to transfer the title of the four lots to her name, and
directing the Register of Deeds of Cebu to register the deed of redemption and issue
new certificates of title covering the four properties in Matilde’s name.
Pascuala who earlier executed a document expressly waiving her rights to

the properties changed her mind and decided to file on September 23, 1996 in the
RTC in Cebu City a complaint to seek the nullification of her waiver of rights, and to
have herself be declared as a co-redemptioner of the four properties (Civil Case No.
CEB-19338). However, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. CEB-19338 on the ground
of its being barred by laches.
In November 1998, the heirs of Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration in

Civil Case No. R-10027 of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16, praying that the order
issued on October 5, 1989 be set aside, and that they be included as Matilde’s co-
redemptioners. After the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for its lack of
merit on April 25, 2000, they assailed the denial by petition for certiorari and
prohibition. On September 10, 1999, the heirs of Marcelo and the heirs of Miguel
instituted the present action for partition against Matilde in the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 20 (Civil Case No. CEB-24293), alleging in their complaint that despite the
redemption of the four properties having been made in the sole name of Matilde, the
four properties still rightfully belonged to the Estate of Sotto for having furnished
the funds used to redeem the properties, they prayed that the RTC declare the four
properties as the assets of the Estate of Sotto, and that the RTC direct their partition
among the heirs of Filemon. The heirs of Pascuala did not join the action for
partition whether as plaintiffs or defendants. Instead of filing her answer, Matilde
moved to dismiss the complaint, stating, among others, that a similar case entitled
Pahang v. Palicte (Civil Case No. 19338) had been dismissed with finality by Branch
8 of the RTC in Cebu City. The RTC granted Matilde’s motion to dismiss and
dismissed the complaint. Following the denial by the RTC of their motion for
reconsideration, petitioners appealed the dismissal of Civil Case No. CEB-24293 to
the CA, which affirmed the dismissal. After the CA denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, they brought this present appeal to the Court.
Issue: Whether or not the action for partition was already barred by prior
judgment.
Ruling: Yes, the action for partition was already barred by prior judgment
Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and
the other action these elements are present, namely: (1) the former judgment must
be final; (2) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and subsequenst
actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in
both actions, (ii) identity of subject matter or of the rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (iii) identity of caused of action
in both actions such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
The first three elements are present. What remains to be determined is

whether civil case no. CEB -24293 and the previous cases involved the same parties,
the same subject matter, the same causes of action an the same factual and legal
issues. Indeed, civil case no. CEB-24293 was no different from the previous cases. In
other words, it is an undisguised relitigation of the same settled matter concerning
Matilde’s ownership of the four properties.
In all the five cases, an identity of parties existed because the parties were
the same or there was privity among them or some of the parties were successors in
interest litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity. An absolute identity of the parties was not necessary because a shared
identity of interest sufficed for res judicata to apply. Moreover, mere substantial
identity of parties, oven community of interests between parties in the prior and
subsequent cases, even if the latter were not impleaded in the first case could be
sufficient. Secondly, the subject matter of all the actions was the same, that is,
Matilde’s right to the four properties. On the one hand, Matilde insisted that she had
the exclusive right to them while, on the other hand, the other declared heirs of
Filemon, like petitioners’ predecessors in interest maintained that the properties
belonged to the estate of Sotto. And, lastly, a judgment rendered in the other cases,
regardless of which part was successful could amount to res judicata in relation to
civil case no. CEB-24293.
Hi, in the same case forum shopping was discussed. Thus, please be guided by this SC
pronouncement on forum shopping:
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways:
1. Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer,
the previous case not having been resolved yet (LITIS PENDENTIA)
2. Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved (RES JUDICATA)
3. Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers
(SPLITTING OF CAUSES OF ACTION WHERE THE GROUND FOR DISMISSAL IS ALSO
EITHER LITIS PENDENTIA OR RES JUDICATA)
If the forum shopping is not considered wilful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be
dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. However, if the
forum shopping is wilful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions
shall be dismissed with prejudice.
HEIRS OF PRODON vs HEIRS OF ALVAREZ

G.R. No. 170604; September 2, 2013
Facts: The heirs of Spouses Maximo S. Alvarez Sr. and Vzalentina have claimed that
they could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797 pertaining to the
land they inherited from their parents, that the entry of the Deed of sale with Right
to Repurchase on the original TCT did not exist and that the entry had been
maliciously done by Prodon. Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Sr had executed
the deed of sale with right to repurchase on September 9, 1975 and this had been
registered with the Register of Deeds and duly annotated on the title. She had then
become the absolute owner of the property due to its non-repurchase within the
given 6-month period. The custodian of the recored of the property attested
that the copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the
files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Prodon. It opined that the contents of

the Deed of Sale could be proven by secondary evidence in accordance with Section
5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its execution or existence and of the
cause of its unavailability being without bad faith when defendant Prodon swore
that she purchased the land and her testimony has been confirmed by the Notarial
Register of Notary Public Eliseo Razon and by the Primary Entry Book of the
Register of Deeds of Manila. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling, saying
that: “A party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary
evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its discretion may
change this order if necessary. The CA also found circumstances that put doubt on
the existence of the alleged deed of sale as evidence on record showed that Maximo
Sr. was hospitalized between August 23 to September 3, 1975 and suffered from
palaysis on half of his body and blindness due to cataract., and then was again later
hospitalized and subsequently died on October of 1975 without having left the
hospital
Issue: Whether or not the Best Evidence Rule applies in an action for quieting of
title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase.
Ruling: No, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply in an action for quieting of title
based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase.
This action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of sale with
right to repurchase. The principal issue was whether or not the deed of sale with
right to repurchase, duly executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really
existed. The Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase were not the issue . The lower court should have
simply addressed and determined whether or not the "existence" and "execution" of
the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by preponderance of evidence.
The presentation of evidence other than the original document, like the
testimonies of Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo
Razon, and the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed
even without first proving the loss or unavailability of the original of the deed. The
foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to establish and
explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to
establish the genuineness and due execution of the deed. This was because the deed,
although a collateral document, was the foundation of her defense in this action for
quieting of title.
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written
document, the original of the document must be reproduced in court. The rule
excludes an evidence other than the original writing to prove the contents thereof,
unled the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the
loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court;
and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability
of the original can be attributed. The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is
to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought before court.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES RETERTA vs. SPOUSES LOPEZ

G.R. No. 159941; August 17, 2011
Facts: The Petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance
in the RTC in Trece Martires City averring that they were the true and real owners
of the parcel of land (the land) situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, having
inherited the same from their father who had died on July 11, 1983; that their late
father had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and cultivation;
that their late father and his predecessors in interest had been in open, exclusive,
notorious, and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years; that they
had discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had
purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation
in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued
in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later
issued to the respondents. Respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss,
insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to the
land being friar land, and that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence
the same.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss, holding that considering that the land is
a friar land and not land of the public domain, consequently Act No. 1120 is the law
prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of Lands the exclusive
administration and disposition of Friar Lands, and that the determination whether or
not fraud had been committed in the procurement of the sales certificate rests to the
exclusive power of the Director of Lands. Hence this Court is of the opinion that it has
no jurisdiction over the nature of this action. On the second ground relied upon by the
defendants in their Motion To Dismiss, suffice it to state that the Court deemed not to
discuss the same.
The petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the
same. Petitioners assailed the dismissal via petition for certiorari, but the CA
dismissed the petition. Petitioners filed a motion for but the same was denied by the
CA. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. However the
same was dismissed as it cannot be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
Finally, the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration
Issue: Whether or not it is the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction over the
action for quieting of title.
Ruling: No, the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over the action for quieting of
title.
The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of Batas Pa,bansa Plg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No, 7691, which provides: Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil
Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (2)In
all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts;
Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance or to

remove a cloud on one’s title involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over such action pertained to the
RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not exceed P20,000.00 (in which
instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original
jurisdiction). Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the
allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and the
principal relief thereby sought.
The respondents reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to

sustain their position that the Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) instead had
exclusive jurisdiction was without basis. the authority of LMB under Act No. 1120,
being limited to the administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the
petitioners action for reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar
land is disposed of in favor of a private person and title duly issues in the latter’s
name. By ignoring the petitioners showing of its plain error in dismissing Civil Case
No. TM-983 and by disregarding the allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted
whimsically and capriciously.
JOSE vs JAVELLANA
G.R. No. 158239; January 25, 2012
Facts: Margarita sold for a consideration of P160,000.00 to Ramon Javellana by

deed of conditional sale, two parcels of land in Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that
Javellana would pay P 80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of
P 80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System,
and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact,
Juvenal, and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the
payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration. After
Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita, Priscilla did not
comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the
Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling
materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a
residential or industrial subdivision.
Javellana commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and

damages against her in the RTC in Malolos, Bulacan, averring that he had paid the
full consideration and that in 1996, Priscilla had called to inquire about the
mortgage constituted on the parcels of land and that he had told her then that the
parcels of land had not been mortgaged but had been sold to him. He prayed for the
issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from
dumping filling materials and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration
proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor. Priscilla filed a
motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription
and that the complaint did not state a cause of action
The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion. However upon her motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and granted the same. Javellana moved for
reconsideration, contending that the presentation of evidence of full payment was
not necessary at that stage of the proceedings and that in resolving a motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, the facts alleged in the
complaint were hypothetically admitted and only the allegation in the complaint
should be considered. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any
reason to disturb the order. Javellana filed a notice of appeal which the RTC gave
due course to, and the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals.
Priscilla countered that the order was not appealable, that the appeal was not
perfected on time and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping as it appears that
pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail
orders dimissing his complaint. The dismissed the petition for certiorari. CA
reversed and set aside the dismissal of the civil case and remanded the records to
the RTC for further proceedings in accordance with law. CA denied the motion for
reconsideration
Issue: Whether or not the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order
granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss was an interlocutory order.
Ruling: No, the denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the
defendant’s motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory order but a final order which
puts an end to the particular matter involved.
First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing
more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-
M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one.
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well

known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce
by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely
dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory
order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and
the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a
judgment is interlocutory of final is: does the order or judgment leave something to
be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does the order
or judgment leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits
of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether

appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the
final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the
effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be appealable;” but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a
special civil action for certiorari. The remedy against an interlocutory order not
subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided
that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Then it is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted
to.
LORENO SHIPPING vs. DMAP

G.R. No. 155849; August 11, 2011
Facts: MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to Executive Order No. 213 (EO 213)
entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates promulgated by President Fidel V.
Ramos on November 24, 1994. Seven years later, the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA) issued a Letter-Resolution advising respondent Distribution
Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a computation of the
required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight
rates officially considered or declared deregulated in accordance with MARINA
Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC 153).
In order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-

Resolution, DMAP commenced in the Court of Appeals a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or
temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. SP No. 65463). The CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari and prohibition and upheld the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153,
and the Letter-Resolution. Later, the CA denied DMAPs motion for reconsideration.
DMAP appealed to the Supreme Court but the Court denied DMAPs petition for
review on certiorari. The Supreme Court also denied with finality DMAPs motion for
reconsideration.
DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the occasion of which

DMAP, acting through its co-respondents Lorenzo Cinco, its President, and Cora
Curay, a consultant/adviser to Cinco, publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update.
Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt against the
respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted
indirect contempt of court for patently, unjustly and baselessly insinuating that the
petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and, worse, that the publication unfairly
debased the Supreme Court by making scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless
innuendo to the effect that the Supreme Court had allowed itself to be influenced by
the petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update
constituted or amounted to indirect contempt of court.
Ruling: No, the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update did not constitute
or amount to indirect contempt of court.
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of

a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to,
the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its
proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near
thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In
its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the
authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic,
embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.
Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is

committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the
administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of
willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court. The punishment for
the first is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence is

necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. In contrast, the second
usually requires proceedings less summary than the first. The proceedings for the
punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personal knowledge of
the judge generally need the observance of all the elements of due process of law,
that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such
charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed.
Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may be
resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and independently of any action. They
are of two classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial. A criminal
contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the authority and dignity of a
court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the
authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. A civil
contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or
judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing party therein. It is at times
difficult to determine whether the proceedings are civil or criminal. In general, the
character of the contempt of whether it is criminal or civil is determined by the
nature of the contempt involved, regardless of the cause in which the contempt
arose, and by the relief sought or dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be
regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the
purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.
The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the
criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea Transport
Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of indirect
contempt of court.
MANALANG vs BACANI
G.R. No. 156995; January 12, 2015
Facts: Petitioners were co-owners for lot in question and caused a relocation and
verification survey which showed that respondents had encroached on a portion of
said lot. When the respondents refused to vacate the encroached portion and to
surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the petitioners commenced
this action for unlawful detainer.
MTC dismissed the action on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. RTC reversed
the decision of the MTC and remanded case on appeal. MTC ultimately dismissed
case. Another appeal to RTC was made. RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a
relocation survey to determine their allegation of encroachment, and also heard the
testimony of the surveyor. The RTC then reversed the MTC’s decision.
Issue Whether or not RTC shall conduct a rehearing or trial de novo.
Ruling: No, the The RTC shall not conduct a rehearing or trial de novo.
Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Courtclearly provides: Sec. 18. Judgment
conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or
ownership. The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate
Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of
the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as
may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.
The RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation
and verification survey “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by hearing the
testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de
novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the
appeal based on the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin.
MACASLANG vs. ZAMORA

G.R. No. 156375; May 30, 2011
Facts: Respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the MTCC, alleging
that the petitioner sold to them a residential land located in Sabang, Danao City and
that the former requested to be allowed to live in the house with a promise to vacate
as soon as she would be able to find a new residence. They further alleged that
despite their demand after a year, the petitioner failed or refused to vacate the
premises. Despite the due service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the
petitioner did not file her answer. The MTCC declared her in default upon the
respondents’ motion to declare her in default, and proceeded to receive the
respondents’ oral testimony and documentary evidence.
The MTCC rendered judgment against petitioner ordering her to vacate the
properties in question, to pay to respondents Attorneys Fees in the sum of
P10,000.00 and monthly rental of P5,000.00 starting December, 1997 until the time
the defendant shall have vacated the properties in question. Petitioner appealed to
the RTC, averring that extrinsic fraud was practiced upon her which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which she has been
impaired of her rights; and that she has a meritorious defense in that there was no
actual sale considering that the absolute deed of sale relied upon by respondents is
a patent-nullity as her signature therein was procured through fraud and trickery.
The RTC rendered judgment in favour of petitioner and dismissed the

complaint filed by respondents, for failure to state cause of action without prejudice
to the refilling of the same. The respondents appealed to the CA, assailing the RTCs
decision for disregarding the allegations in the complaint in determining the
existence or non-existence of a cause of action. The CA reversed and set aside the
RTCs decision and reinstated the MTCCs decision in favor of the respondents. The
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its Appellate
Jurisdiction is limited to the assigned errors in the Memorandum or brief filed
before it
Ruling: No, the Regional Trial Court is not limited in its review of the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court to the issues assigned by the appellant, but can decide on the
basis of the entire records of the proceedings of the trial court and such memoranda
or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC.
The petitioner’s appeal being taken from the decision of the MTCC to the
RTC, was governed by a different rule, specifically Section 18 of Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:
Section 18. xxx

xxx
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional
Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)
As such,the RTC, in exercising appellate jurisdiction, was not limited to the

errors assigned in the petitioners appeal memorandum, but could decide on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the trial court and such
memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the
RTC.
The difference between the procedures for deciding on review is traceable to

Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. As its compliance with the requirement of
Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to adopt special rules or procedures
applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination thereof without regard to technical rules, the Court promulgated the
1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, whereby it institutionalized the
summary procedure for all the first level courts. Later on, the Court promulgated the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, effective on July 1, 1997, and incorporated in Section 7
of Rule 40 thereof the directive to the RTC to decide appealed cases on the basis of
the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
as are filed. As a result, the RTC presently decides all appeals from the MTC based on
the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
or briefs as are filed in the RTC.
Yet, even without the differentiation in the procedures of deciding appeals,

the limitation of the review to only the errors assigned and properly argued in the
appeal brief or memorandum and the errors necessarily related to such assigned
error sought not to have obstructed the CA from resolving the unassigned issues by
virtue of their coming under one or several of the following recognized exceptions
to the limitation, namely: (a) When the question affects jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (b) Matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation
of law; (c) Matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision
and complete resolution of the case or in serving the interests of justice or avoiding
dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) Matters raised in the trial court and are of record
having some bearing on the issue submitted that the parties failed to raise or that
the lower court ignored; (e) Matters closely related to an error assigned; and (f)
Matters upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is
dependent.
Consequently, the CA improperly disallowed the consideration and

resolution of the two errors despite their being: (a)necessary in arriving at a just
decision and acomplete resolution of the case; and (b) matters of record having
some bearing on the issues submitted that the lower court ignored.
MAHOGANY GROVE HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION vs. SPOUSES TORNO

G.R. No. 206243; December 10, 2014
SC Pronouncement on Motion to Dismiss based on Lack of Jurisdiction
It is well-settled that in a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, the

movant hypothetically admits the veracity of the allegations in the complaint and
accordingly, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or theories set forth in an
answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, it would become almost entirely
dependent upon the whims and caprices of the defendant or movant. Verily, the
allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for determine the nature of the
action and of which court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Note: Full text of the case is not available. The only available reference was the
notice signed by AJ Bersamin relative to the case.
MANGILA vs. PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 160739; July 17, 2013
Facts: Seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others
with syndicated estafa and illegal recruitment were filed in the MTCC of Puerto
Princesa City. A preliminary investigation was conducted by Judge Heriberto
Pangilinan (respondent), presiding judge of the MTCC. Thereafter a warrant for the
arrest of petitioner was issued. Mangila was then arrested and detained at the NBI
headquarters in Taft Avenue, Manila.
Claiming that respondent judge did not have the authority to conduct the
preliminary investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not
yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the
warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of
probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to
obtain her release from detention, averring that the remedy of habeas corpus was
available to her because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to
recall the warrant of arrest considering that respondent judge had already
forwarded the entire records of the case to the City Prosecutor who had no
authority to lift or recall the warrant.
Tha CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit, explainaing
that as a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may
be had or could have been procured by resort to another general remedy. Mangila
moved for the reconsideration of the denial of her petition for habeas corpus, but
the CA denied the same.
Issue: Whether or not habeas corpus was the proper remedy to obtain the release of
Mangila from detention.
Ruling: No, habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release of
Mangila from detention
Habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the

enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal
act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the
act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule
applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom.
When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit
and prosecutes a case in that court.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as

substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari
or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of
error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a
habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings
and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily
granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the
absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be
granted in advance of trial.
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the
detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the
detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the
person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record. With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention
being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas
corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her
liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process,
could not be inquired into through habeas corpus.
SPOUSES MENDIOLA vs CA
G.R. No. 159746; July 18, 2012
Facts: Shell entered into an agreement for the distribution of Shell petroleum
products by a single proprietorship belonging to petitioner Ramon G. Mendiola. To
secure Pacific’s performance of its obligations under the agreement, petitioners
executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Shell covering their real estate and its
improvements, located in the then Municipality of Paraanaque, Rizal. Pacific
ultimately defaulted on its obligations, impelling Shell to commence extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings.. Having received a notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure
scheduled to be held at the main entrance of the Paranaque Municipal Hall,
petitioners proceeded to the announced venue on the scheduled date and time but
did not witness any auction being conducted and did not meet the sheriff supposed
to conduct the auction despite their being at the lobby. They later learned that the
auction had been held as scheduled by Deputy Sheriff Bernardo San Juan of the
Regional Trial Court in Makati, and that their mortgaged realty had been sold to
Tabangao Realty, Inc. (Tabangao), as the corresponding certificate of sale bears out.
They further learned that Tabangao s winning bidder bid of P670,000.00 had
topped Shell s bid of P660,000.00.
After application of the proceeds of the sale to the obligation of Pacific, a

deficiency remained. The deficiency was not paid by Ramon. Thus, Shell sued in the
RTC in Manila to recover the deficiency. In his answer with counterclaim Ramon
asserted that the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage had been devoid of basis
in fact and in law; and that the foreclosure and the filing of the action were made in
bad faith, with malice, fraudulently and in gross and wanton violation of his rights.
Pending the Manila case, petitioners commenced in the RTC in Makati an

action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure which was assigned to Branch 134
(Makati case). As defendants in the Makati case, Shell and Tabangao separately
moved for dismissal, stating similar grounds, namely: (a) that the Makati RTC had
no jurisdiction due to the pendency of the Manila case; (b) that the complaint stated
no cause of action, the Makati case having been filed more than a year after the
registration of the certificate of sale; (c) that another action (Manila case) involving
the same subject matter was pending; (d) that the venue was improperly laid; and
(e) that the Makati case was already barred by petitioners failure to raise its cause
of action as a compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case. After the Makati RTC
denied both motions Shell filed its answer ad cautelam, whereby it denied
petitioners allegation that no auction had been held; insisted that there had been
proper accounting of the deliveries made to Pacific and its clients; and averred that
petitioners failure to file their compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case already
barred the action.
Pending the trial of the Makati case, the Manila RTC rendered its judgment in
favor of Shell. As sole defendant in the Manila case, Ramon appealed, but his appeal
was decided adversely to him, with the CA affirming the Manila RTC s decision and
finding that he was guilty of forum shopping for instituting the Makati case.
Undaunted, he next appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied his Petition for
Review and upheld the foreclosure of the mortgage. The decision of the Court
became final and executor.
Nonetheless, the Makati RTC resolved the Makati case, finding that there had
been no auction actually conducted on the scheduled date; that had such auction
taken place, petitioners could have actively participated and enabled to raise their
objections against the amount of their supposed obligation; and that they had been
consequently deprived of notice and hearing as to their liability. Shell sought the
reconsideration of the decision while Tabango adopted Shell’s motion for
reconsideration. The Makati RTC denied Shell s motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Makati RTC, Shell and Tabangao filed a joint notice
of appeal. Instead of filing their appellees brief, petitioners submitted a motion to
dismiss appeal, mainly positing that Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
prohibited an appeal of the order denying a motion for reconsideration. The CA
denied petitioners motion to dismiss appeal through the first assailed resolution.
The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration through the second assailed
resolution.½ll
Issue: Whether or not the Makati case was barred in view of litis pendentia or res
judicata.
Ruling: Yes, the Makati case was barred in view of res judicata.
Bar by res judicata avails if the following elements are present, to wit: (a) the
former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the
merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (d) there must be, between the first and the second
action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.
The Manila RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide on the merits Shell s
complaint to recover the deficiency, and its decision rendered on May 31, 1990 on
the merits already became final and executory. Hence, the first, second and third
elements were present. Anent the fourth element, the Makati RTC concluded that
the Manila case and the Makati case had no identity as to their causes of action. The
foregoing conclusion of the Makati RTC on lack of identity between the causes of
action was patently unsound.
The identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity; otherwise, a
party may easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the
action or the relief sought. The test to determine whether the causes of action are
identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain the actions, or
whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the actions.
If the same facts or evidence will sustain the actions, then they are considered
identical, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.42
Petitioners Makati case and Shell s Manila case undeniably required the production
of the same evidence. In fact, Shell s counsel faced a dilemma upon being required
by the Makati RTC to present the original copies of certain documents because the
documents had been made part of the records of the Manila case elevated to the CA
in connection with the appeal of the Manila RTC s judgment. 43 Also, both cases arose
from the same transaction (i.e., the foreclosure of the mortgage), such that the
success of Ramon in invalidating the extrajudicial foreclosure would have
necessarily negated Shell s right to recover the deficiency.
Hi, in relation to res judicata and because the facts mentioned something about the
petitioner filing an Answer with compulsory counterclaim being filed, please refer to
the SC pronouncement on compulsory counterclaim:
Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a compulsory counterclaim as one
which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with
the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party s claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction.
The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the following,
to wit: (a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the
same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant s claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff s claim as well as the defendant s counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical
relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of
the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time
by the parties and the court? Of the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness is the
logical relation between the claim alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim.
Such relationship exists when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court;
when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are
offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties. If these tests result in
affirmative answers, the counterclaim is compulsory.
METROBANK vs. TOBIAS

G.R. No. 177780; January 25, 2012
Facts: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon charged Tobias with estafa
through falsification of public documents in relation to his loan with petitioner. He
filed a motion for re-investigation but the City Prosecutor of Malabon still found
probable cause against him and recommended that he be charged. Tobias appealed
to the Department of Justice which issued a resolution directing the withdrawal of
the information filed against Tobias.
Metrobank moved to reconsider but the same was denied. Metrobank

challenged the adverse resolutions through certiorari with the Court of Appeals
which denied the same. It stressed that the determination of probable cause was an
executive function within the discretion of the public prosecutor and, ultimately, of
the Secretary of Justice, and the courts of law could not interfere with such
determination; that the private complainant in a criminal action was only
concerned with its civil aspect; that should the State choose not to file the criminal
action, the private complainant might initiate a civil action based on Article 35 of the
Civil Code. Metrobank sought reconsideration, but the CA denied its motion for that
purpose, emphasizing that the presumption that metrobank firmly relied upon was
overcome by Tobias sufficiently establishing his good faith and lack of criminal
intent
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Justice has the prerogative to review the
resolutions of the public prosecutor in terms of determining the existence of
probable cause.
Ruling: Yes, the Secretary of Justice has the prerogative to review the resolutions of
the public prosecutor in terms of determining the existence of probable cause.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to

directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments
for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of
Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive
determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.
METROBANK vs. JUDGE SANDOVAL

G.R. No. 169677; February 18,2013
Facts: In 1987, the Republic brought a complaint for reversion, reconveyance,

restitution, accounting and damages in the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito,
Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and other defendants. Fourteen years
later or in 2001, the Republic moved for the amendment of the complaint in order to
implead Asian Bank as an additional defendant. The Sandiganbayan granted the
motion. When the Republic was about to terminate its presentation of evidence
against the original defendants in Civil Case No. 0004, it moved to hold a separate
trial against Asian Bank.
Commenting on the motion, Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action
on the motion until it was first given the opportunity to test and assail the
testimonial and documentary evidence the Republic had already presented against
the original defendants, and contended that it would be deprived of its day in court
if a separate trial were to be held against it without having been sufficiently
apprised about the evidence the Republic had adduced before it was brought in as
an additional defendant. The Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian
Bank was proper because its cause of action against Asian Bank was entirely distinct
and independent from its cause of action against the original defendants
The Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution granting the

Republic’s motion for separate trial. Asian Bank moved for the reconsideration of
the resolution, but the Sandiganbayan denied its motion through its second assailed
resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the Republic was entitled to a separate trial against Asian
Bank ( or its successor-in-interest, Metrobank)
Ruling: No, the Republic was not entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank.
The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the
Rules of Court, which reads: Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-
claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.
The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a
separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of
any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-
party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of such
discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party.
In actions at law, the general practice is to try all the issues in a case at one
time; and it is only in exceptional instances where there are special and persuasive
reasons for departing from this practice that distinct causes of action asserted in the
same case may be made the subjects of separate trials. Whether this reasonably may
be done in any particular instance rests largely in the court’s discretion.
The Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of having all the
issues in every case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting aside the dictum that
a "single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and inconvenience to the
parties and the courts." Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when
there are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues
raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or
when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials
of the issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair
trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply.
The justification of the Sandiganbayan for allowing the separate trial did not
constitute a special or compelling reason like any of the exceptions. To begin with,
the issue relevant to Asian Bank was not complicated. In that context, the separate
trial would not be in furtherance of convenience. And, secondly, the cause of action
against Asian Bank was necessarily connected with the cause of action against the
original defendants.
NERWIN INDUSTRIES vs. PNOC-EDC

G.R. No. 167057; April 11, 2012
Facts: In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an

invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80,
for the supply and delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles
and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of cross-arms needed in the country’s Rural
Electrification Project. The qualified bidder submitted their financial bids where
Nerwin emerged as the lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the contract.
NEA then conducted a pre-award inspection of Nerwin’s manufacturing plants and
facilities, including its identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to
supply and deliver NEA’s requirements.
Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW
Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, alleging that Requisition No.
FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80
to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to enjoin respondents’ proposed
bidding for the wooden poles. Respondents sought the dismissal of the case, stating
that the complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that government
infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs, contravened the
mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the corporate president
had no authority to sign and file the complaint. The RTC granted the TRO.
Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order and also to set aside
the order of default and to admit their answer to the complaint. The RTC denied re
spondents motions for reconsideration, to set aside
order of default, and to admit answer
Respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action

for certiorari, alleging that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin had been entitled
to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction despite the express prohibition
from the law and from the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of
the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in
default; and in disqualifying respondents’ counsel from representing them. The CA
granted the petition. Nerwin moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Issue: Whether or not it was proper for the RTC to grant the TRO despite the
express prohibition in RA 8975 on the issuance of the same and preliminary
injunctions, on government project.
Ruling : No, it was not proper for the RTC to grant the TRO despite the express
prohibition in RA 8975 on the issuance of the same, and preliminary injunctions, on
government project.
Ruling: Sections 3 and 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 expressly prohibits any court,
except the Supreme Court, from issuing any TRO, preliminary injunction, or
preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the Government,
or any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, whether public or
private, acting under the Government’s direction from (a) acquiring, clearing and
developing the right-of-way, site or location of any National Government project;
(b) bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the National Government; (c)
commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such contract

or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such contract or project; and (e)
undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for such contract or
project.
The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing
was left to the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon nerwin
obedience to them.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or

proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency
or person, to refrain from a particular act/s. It is an ancillary or preventive remedy
resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests during the
pendency of the case. As such, it is issued only when it is established that: (a) The
applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance or non-performance of the at
or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or (c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act/s probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
It is never the function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the

merits of a case, or to decide controverted facts. It is but a preventive remedy whose
only mission is to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or
injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled. A Regional Trial Court that
ignores the statutory prohibition and issues a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction
or preliminary mandatory injunction against a government contract or project acts
contrary to law.
NHA vs. JUDGE ROXAS

G.R. No. 161204; April 6, 2011
Facts: PHHC (NHA’s predecessor) was the registered owner of two large parcels of
land which was later subdivided into 17,387 lots, more or less, under several survey
plans. The subdivided lots were sold and disposed off to NHAs beneficiaries/lot
buyers. NHA delivered its owner’s copy of TCT No. 1356 to the QCRD to facilitate the
numerous partial cancellations of TCT No. 1356 on account of the deeds of sale
executed by NHA in favor of the beneficiaries. However, fire razed the entire
premises of QCRD and destroyed the original and the owners duplicate copies of
TCT No. 1356, along with many other records and documents then in the possession
and custody of QCRD.
NHA filed a petition for the reconstitution of TCT No. 1356 in the Regional
Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC). Its petition was raffled to Branch 227 of the RTC,
presided by respondent Judge Vicente Q. Roxas. NHA attached to its petition
documents to prove its ownership and the identity of the lands involved. The RTC
set the petition for initial hearing and directed NHA to submit twelve copies of the
petition, certified true copies or originals of the annexes, certified true copies of tax
declarations and tax receipts, and other jurisdictional requirements as provided by
law. NHA failed to comply with the directive and to appear at the initial hearing.
Thus, the RTC issued an order archiving said case until compliance by NHA with the
jurisdictional requirements. Subsequently, RTC issued a resolution denying the
NHAs petition for reconstitution for lack of merit.
NHA sought reconsideration. The RTC set NHAs motion for reconsideration
for hearing and directed NHA to comply with the legal requirements in order to
show its good faith. However, despite compliance on the part of NHA, the RTC issued
two orders denying NHAs motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
NHA filed a notice of appeal seeking to elevate the dismissal for review by the
CA. However, the RTC dismissed the appeal, pointing out that NHA had only a day
left within which to file its notice of appeal due to NHAs having filed its motion for
reconsideration that interrupted the running of the period for appeal on the
fourteenth day; and that the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the
appellate court docket fees were made way past the deadline to perfect its appeal.
Aggrieved, NHA filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. The CA summarily dismissed
the petition for certiorari because of the failure of NHA to attach to the petition the
certified true copies of all the relevant pleadings and documents. After NHAs motion
for reconsideration was denied upon the additional ground that NHAs notice of
appeal had been filed out of time in the RTC, NHA now appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed NHA’s petition for
certiorari.
Ruling: Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed NHA’s petition for certiorari.
NHA, as the petitioner, had the obligation to comply with the basic requirements for
the filing of a petition for certiorari prescribed in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
specifically to accompany the petition with a certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided
in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
At the time the RTC issued its resolution denying due course to NHAs notice
of appeal, the applicable rule was Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which
stated that the period for taking an ordinary appeal is within 15 days from notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from. The filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration interrupted the running of the period of appeal, which began to run
again from the movants receipt of notice of the order denying the motion. Thus,
NHA had only the balance of the period within which to perfect an appeal, the
balance being the number of days remaining in its reglementary period after
deducting the time during which the motion was pending, that is, from the date it
filed the motion for reconsideration to the date it received the notice of denial of its
motion for reconsideration. Considering that NHA filed its motion for
reconsideration on the last day of the reglementary period, its appeal must be
brought within the day following the service to it of the order denying its motion for
reconsideration. Under the circumstances, NHAs notice of appeal was undeniably
filed out of time. NHAs stance might be correct under the Neypes Rule where the
Court has allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which an aggrieved party may file
the notice of appeal in the RTC, reckoned from the receipt of the order denying said
partys motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Although Neypes has been
intended to standardize the appeal periods under the Rules of Court, and has been
applied retroactively in some cases due to its being a dictum on remedial law, the
pronouncement could not now benefit NHA considering that the issue of whether or
not the RTC had been guilty of grave abuse of discretion the precise subject matter
of its petition for certiorari should be determined on the basis of the rules and
jurisprudence then prevailing.
PAHILA-GARRIDO vs. TORTOGO

G.R. No. 156358; August 17, 2011
Facts: Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC in Bacolod City an action for
ejectment with prayer for preliminary and restraining order to evict several
defendants, including the respondents herein, from his properties. He amended the
complaint to implead the spouses of some of the defendants. However, he died
during the pendency of the action, and his surviving spouse, herein petitioner
Angelina Pahila-Garrido, was substituted for him.
The defendants in Civil Case No. 23671 were divided into two groups. The
MTCC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff. All the defendants appealed. The
RTC in Bacolod City affirmed the decision of the MTCC. Only the second group,
which includes respondents herein, appealed the RTCs decision to the Court of
Appeals, insisting that the land was foreshore land and that the petitioner’s title
was not valid. Considering that the first group did not appeal, the RTCs decision
became final and executory as to them. The CA dismissed the second groups appeal,
and later denied their motion for reconsideration. The respondents appealed the
dismissal to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari , but the Court rejected
their recourse and issued an entry of judgment. In the meantime, the MTCC
amended its decision to correct typographical errors in the description of the
properties involved. None of the parties objected to or challenged the corrections.
The MTCC issued the writ of execution upon the petitioners motion, which
writ was duly served upon all the defendants. The respondents filed a motion to
quash against the writ of execution and its aliases, and a motion to stay the
execution of both the first and the amended decision, anchoring their motions on
the supposedly supervening finding that the lot covered by the writ of execution
was foreshore land belonging to the State. The MTCC denied the respondents
motion to quash, observing that the cancellation of the petitioners TCT No. T-55630
was an event that might or might not happen, and was not the supervening event
that could stay the execution. The MTCC also denied their motion for
reconsideration.
More than a year after the writ of execution was served upon the defendants,
the respondents, led by respondent Elisa M. Tortogo filed a petition for certiorari
with a prayer that a TRO and a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction be issued.
The RTC granted the respondents prayer for a TRO. The petitioner sought a
clarificatory order, moving that the TRO be vacated due to its being effective for
only twenty days and because such effectivity could neither be extended nor be
made indefinite. The RTC issued the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction
Issue: Whether or not the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction despite the already final and executor nature of the decision
of the MTCC.
Ruling: No, the RTC did not lawfully issue the TRO and the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction
The respondents elevated to the Supreme Court the CA decision dated

December 6, 1999 and resolution dated April 17, 2000 via a petition for certiorari.
The Court dismissed the petition on July 19, 2000, and the dismissal became final
and executory because the respondents did not timely file a motion for
reconsideration. Consequently, the MTCC rightly issued the writ of execution on
April 5, 2000. Based on the sheriffs return of service, the writ of execution was duly
served upon all the defendants.
Under the circumstances, the principle of immutability of a final

judgment must now be absolutely and unconditionally applied against the
respondents. Even as their right to initiate an action in court ought to be fully
respected, their commencing SCA Case No. 01-11522 in the hope of securing a
favorable ruling despite their case having been already fully and finally adjudicated
should not be tolerated. Their move should not frustrate the enforcement of the
judgment, the fruit and the end of the suit itself. Their right as the losing parties to
appeal within the prescribed period could not defeat the correlative right of the
winning party to enjoy at last the finality of the resolution of her case through
execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which would be the life of the law. To
frustrate the winning party’s right through dilatory schemes is to frustrate all the
efforts, time and expenditure of the courts, which thereby increases the costs of
litigation.
It is true that nnotwithstanding the principle of immutability of final

judgments, equity still accords some recourse to a party adversely affected by a final
and executory judgment, specifically, the remedy of a petition to annul the judgment
based on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, or the remedy of a
petition for relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
He may also have a competent court stay the execution or prevent the enforcement
of a final judgment when facts and circumstances that render execution inequitable
or unjust meanwhile transpire; or when a change in the situation of the parties can
warrant an injunctive relief. Neither of such remaining equitable remedies is
available anymore to the respondents, however, for the time for such remedies is
now past. Indeed, it is now high time for the respondents to bow to the judgment,
and to accept their fate under it.
PATULA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 164457; April 11, 2012
Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa under an information filed in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Dumaguete City. Petitioner pled not guilty to the offense
charged in the information. At pre-trial, no stipulation of facts was had, and
petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
During its presentation of evidence, the prosecution called to the witness

stand, Karen Guivencan, whom Footluckers employed as its store auditor. She
submitted to Go a written report denominated as List of Customers Covered by
Saleswoman Lerima Patula w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified
March 16-20, 1997. The Prosecution marked the ledgers of petitioners various
customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives,
inclusive.
Petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the

figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay
because the persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in
court. With that, petitioners counsel did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan,
apparently regarding her testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby tended to
prove falsification, an offense not alleged in the information. Petitioner also
contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as evidence Exhibits B to YY, and
their derivatives, inclusive, despite their being private documents that were not
duly authenticated as required by Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive) were admissible as evidence of petitioner’s guilt for estafa as
charged despite their not being duly authenticated.
Ruling: No, the ledgers and receipts were not admissible as evidence of petitioner’s
guilt for estafa.
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court distinguishes between a public
document and a private document for the purpose of their presentation in evidence.
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents
may be presented as evidence in court.
A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because

it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a
competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a
public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and
requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In
contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a
private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally
authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking
the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner
allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The
requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four
instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context
of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and
authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath
by the adverse party; c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document
have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private

documents because private individuals executed or generated them for private or
business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of
the four exceptions, they could not be presented and admitted as evidence against
petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the
manner provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
PEOPLE vs. CRISTOBAL

G.R. No. 159450; March 30, 2011
Facts: Accused was charged of the offense qualified theft. After the accused pleaded
not guilty at arraignment, the Stated presented its witnesses. When the State rested
its case against the accused, her counsel filed a Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to
Defer Defense Evidence, praying for the dismissal of the charge on the ground that
the evidence of the State did not suffice to establish her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The RTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense
Evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis that her filing her
demurrer to evidence without express leave of court as required by Section 15, Rule
119, of the Rules of Court had waived her right to present evidence.
The RTC rendered its decision finding and pronouncing the accused guilty of
qualified. The accused appealed, but the CA affirmed her conviction, albeit
modifying the penalty.
Issue: Whether or not Cristobal waived the presentation of her evidence when she
filed her "Demurrer To Evidence and Motion to Defer Evidence" without prior leave
of court.
Ruling: Yes, Cristobal waived the presentation of her evidence when she filed her
“Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Evidence”, without prior leave of court.
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides: xxx If the court denies
the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When
the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he
waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
Under the rule, the RTC properly declared the accused to have waived her
right to present evidence because she did not obtain the express leave of court for
her demurrer to evidence, thereby reflecting her voluntary and knowing waiver of
her right to present evidence. The RTC did not need to inquire into the voluntariness
and intelligence of the waiver, for her opting to file her demurrer to evidence
without first obtaining express leave of court effectively waived her right to present
her evidence.
The accused and her counsel should not have ignored the potentially
prejudicial consequence of the filing of a demurrer to evidence without the leave of
court required in Section 15, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules of Court. They were well
aware of the risk of a denial of the demurrer being high, for by demurring the
accused impliedly admitted the facts adduced by the State and the proper inferences
therefrom.
PEOPLE vs. GONZALES

G.R. No. 182417; April 3, 2013
Facts: Gonzales was formally charged in the RTC with a violation of Section 5,
Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165. At arraignment, Gonzales entered a plea of not
guilty. During trial, the prosecution presented PO1 Dimla as sole witness. PO1 Dimla
testified that before he acted as poseur buyer in the afternoon of June 13, 2013, he
marked with his own initials "ED" each of the two P100.00 bills to be used as the
buy-bust money, and then recorded the marked bills in the police blotter. He also
testified that Gonzales handed to him a plastic sachet containing white substances,
and in turn he handed the two marked P100.00 bills to Gonzales. Further, Dimla
testified that after arresting Gonzales, he immediately marked the plastic sachet
with his initials "ED." The Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office certified that
the contents the plastic sachet were 0.194 gram of shabu.
For the part of the defense, Gonzales denied the accusation and attested that
he was only resting in front of his house when five armed men approached and
forced him inside his house and that after searching his house, they brought him to
Camp General Alejo Santos. This testimony was corroborated to by her sister.
The RTC convicted Gonzales of the crime charged. Gonzales appealed, to the
Court of Appeals, insisting that the RTC erred in finding him guilty as charged
despite the Prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Finding
no error on the part of the RTC, however, the CA affirmed the conviction of Gonzales.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove Gonzales’ guilt for
violation of Section 5, Artile II of RA 9165, beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling: No, the prosecution was not able to prove Gonzales’ guilt for violation of
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, beyond reasonable doubt.
To secure a conviction of the accused charged with the illegal sale of

dangerous drugs as defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, the State must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely:
(a) that the transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur
buyer; and (b) that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is
presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
Anent the second element, it is indispensable for the State to establish that
the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale and subsequently examined
in the laboratory are the same dangerous drugs presented in court as evidence. The
identity of the dangerous drugs is essential to proving the corpus delicti. To achieve
that end, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 and Section 21(a) of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 (IRR) define the procedures to be
followed by the apprehending officers in the seizure and custody of the dangerous
drugs.
These provisions obviously demand strict compliance, for only by such strict
compliance may be eliminated the grave mischiefs of planting or substitution of
evidence and the unlawful and malicious prosecution of the weak and unwary that
they are intended to prevent. Such strict compliance is also consistent with the
doctrine that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the Government and
liberally in favor of the accused.13
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and

custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs
or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the
identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item,
the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition;
Given the high concern for the due recording of the authorized movements
and custody of the seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment, the presentation as evidence in court of
the dangerous drugs subject of and recovered during the illegal sale is material in
every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.17 Without such dangerous
drugs being presented as evidence, the State does not establish the corpus delicti,
which, literally translated from Latin, refers to the body of the crime, or the actual
commission by someone of the particular offense charged
Further review of the records underscores that poseur-buyer PO1Dimla

nowhere recalled in court that he and PO2 Chua had conducted the physical
inventory and photographing of the shabu subject of the sale by Gonzales. In fact, in
their joint affidavit of arrest,24 PO1 Dimla and PO2 Chua did not mention any
inventory and photographing. The omission can only mean that no such inventory
and photographing were done by them. The omission of the inventory and
photographing exposed another weakness of the evidence of guilt, considering that
the inventory and photographing to be made in the presence of the accused or his
representative, or within the presence of any representative from the media,
Department of Justice or any elected official, who must sign the inventory, or be
given a copy of the inventory, were really significant stages of the procedures
outlined by the law and its IRR.
MALLARI vs. GSIS

G.R. No. 157659; January 25, 2010
Facts: In 1968, the petitioner obtained two loans totaling P34,000.00 from
respondent GSIS. To secure the performance, he mortgaged two parcels of land
registered under his and his wife Marcelina Mallari’s names. However, he paid GSIS
about ten years after contracting the obligations only P10,000.00 and P20,000.00
Nearly three years later (1984), GSIS applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgage by reason of his failure to settle his account. He requested an
updated computation of his outstanding account. He persuaded the sheriff to hold
the publication of the foreclosure to await action on his pending request for final
accounting (that is, taking his payments of P30,000.00 made in 1978 into account).
GSIS responded to his request. It finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings against him because he had meanwhile made no further payments.
The petitioner sued GSIS for preliminary injunction. The RTC decided in his
favor, nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale. GSIS appealed to the
CA, which reversed the RTC. Petitioner elevated the CA decision to this Court via
petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court denied his petition for review
and motion for reconsideration. As a result, the CA decision became final and
executory, rendering unassailable both the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction
sale. GSIS acceded to petitioner’s request for an extension of time to vacate the
properties, yet, the petitioner did not voluntarily vacate the properties, but instead
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Quash the Writ of Execution and
Motion to Hold GSIS in Contempt of Court for painting the fence of the properties
during the pendency of his said motion.
To prevent the Presiding Judge of Branch 44 of the RTC from resolving the
pending incidents, GSIS moved to inhibit him for alleged partiality. The case was
then re-raffled to Brancg 48, whose presiding judge, on February 11, 2002, denied
his motion for reconsideration. By petition for certiorari dated March 15, 2002 filed
in the CA, the petitioner assailed the orders of February 11, 2002, July 30, 2001
(denying Motion to Hold in Contempt), October 21, 1999 (Grainting the Writ of
execution cum writ of possession), and October 8, 1999. The CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari before the CA was filed out of time.
Ruling: Yes, the petition for certiorari was filed out of time.
Considering that the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001
denied by the order dated February 11, 2002 was in reality and effect a prohibited
second motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the orders dated October 21, 1999
and October 8, 1999, the assailed orders dated July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999,
and October 8, 1999 could no longer be subject to attack by certiorari. Thus, the
petition for certiorari filed only in March 2002 was already improper and tardy for
being made beyond the 60-day limitation defined in Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, which requires a petition for certiorari to be filed “not
later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution,” or, in
case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, “the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial
of the said motion.” It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is

considered inextendible, because the limitation has been prescribed to avoid any
unreasonable delay that violates the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy
disposition of their cases.
PEOPLE vs. VILLAFLORES

G.R. No. 184926; April 11, 2012
Facts: Marita, a four years and eight month-old child was notice by her mother to
be missing on July 2, 1999. In her desperation to find her child who remained
missing the next day, Julia sought out a clairvoyant who hinted that Marita might be
found only five houses away from their own. Following the clairvoyants direction,
they found Maritas lifeless body covered with a blue and yellow sack inside the
comfort room of an abandoned house about five structures away from their own
house.
The ensuing police investigation led to two witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and
Jovy Solidum. Both witnesses narrated that they saw Villaflores leading Maria by
the hand. At noon, the three used shabu for a while, but the witnesses did not see
Marita in the vicinity of Villaflores’ house. It was only on 3:00PM that
they heard cries of a child. At about 7:00PM both witnesses saw Villaflores
carrying a yellow sack which appears heavy, the same sack that they saw when they
were still inside Villaflores’ house. The wife of the accused also gave a supporting
testimony that on the night of July 2, 1999 she saw his husband place some sack
sunder their house and then went closer and saw a protrud ing elbow
inside the sack, when she c o n f r o n t e d h i s h u s b a n d w h o w a s o n d r u g s ,
Villaflores said it was nothing.
The City Prosecutor of Caloocan City filed in the RTC the information
charging Villaflores with rape with homicide. The RTC convicted Villaflores, holding
that the circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion but that his guilt was
shown beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
Issue: Whether or not the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide was established
beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence.
Ruling: Yes, the guilt of Villaflores for rape with hokmicide was established beyond
reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence.
Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or

inferences being drawn on the part of the factfinder; in contrast, circumstantial
evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder must draw an
inference or reason from circumstantial evidence. To be clear, then, circumstantial
evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately
lead to setting a felon free
Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court specifies when circumstantial

evidence is sufficient for conviction, viz: (a) There is more than one
circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5)
In resolving to convict Villaflores, several circumstances, which when

appreciated together and not piece by piece, were seen as strands which create a
pattern when interwoven, and formed an unbroken chain that led to the reasonable
conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was guilty of rape with
homicide.
Firstly, the witnesses saw Villaflores holding Marita by the hand leading the
child through the alley going towards the direction of his house econdly, Marita
went missing after that and remained missing until the discovery of her lifeless body
on the following day. Thirdly, Solidum passed by Villaflores house and heard the
crying and moaning of a child coming from inside. Fourthly, Solidum saw Villaflores
coming from his house carrying a yellow sack that appeared to be heavy and going
towards the abandoned house where the childs lifeless body was later found. Fifthly,
the father of Marita, identified the yellow sack as the same yellow sack that covered
the head of his daughter at the time he discovered her body. Manito also mentioned
that a blue sack covered her body. Sixthly, a hidden pathway existed between the
abandoned house where Marita’s body was found and Villaflores house, because his
house had a rear exit that enabled access to the abandoned house without having to
pass any other houses. Seventhly, several pieces of evidence recovered from the
abandoned house, like the white rope around the victims neck and the yellow sack,
were traced to Villaflores. Eighthly, the medico-legal findings showed that Marita
had died from asphyxiation by strangulation, which cause of death was consistent
with the ligature marks on her neck and the multiple injuries including abrasions,
hematomas, contusions and punctured wounds. Ninthly, Marita sustained multiple
deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and had fresh blood from her genitalia. The vaginal
and periurethral smears taken from her body tested positive for spermatozoa. And,
tenthly, the body of Marita was already in the second stage of flaccidity at the time
of the autopsy of her cadaver, indicating that such stage of flaccidity confirmed that
she had been dead for more than 24 hours.
These circumstances were links in an unbroken chain whose totality has

brought a moral certainty of the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide.
PEOPLE vs. PO2 VALDEZ

G.R. No. 175602; January 18, 2012
Facts: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused in
the RTC with three counts of murder for the killing of Ferdinand Sayson, Moises
Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson.
On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella Sayson,

(Estrella) was at the canteen, preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her
second husband, Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later in the evening. Estrella’s
son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former policeman, and his wife, Susan Sayson
(Susan) owned the said canteen and managed the betting station. At about 9:00
o’clock in the evening, Estrella’s other sons Joselito Sayson (Joselito) and Ferdinand
Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at the canteen to greet their stepfather. Estrella’s family
and other visitors ate and enjoyed themselves at the party. At about 10:00 o’clock in
the evening, the celebration was interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin,
who alighted from a motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin
asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan was then
attending to customers who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises approached
Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with them. Estrella saw Eduardo and Edwin
armed with guns. She tried to prevent Moises from going near Edwin and Eduardo.
Moises did not heed his mother’s warning. He went out and advised Eduardo and
Edwin not to force Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the
accused-appellants threaten Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin na kita?”
Moises replied “huwag.” Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was
continuously fired upon even after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand
immediately approached the scene to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however
was shot on the left temporal portion of his head and fell. Somebody told Joselito to
run away, but he was hit at the back while running. Joselito fell on a burger machine.
After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped from the scene of
the crime.
The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and sentenced
them to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of murder. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the convictions. Accused, assails, in the appeal they filed before the
Supreme Court, the credibility of the State’s witnesses by pointing to
inconsistencies and weaknesses in their testimonies; challenges the finding of
conspiracy between the accused; and contends that the State did not establish the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution sufficiently established the qualifying

circumstance of treachery.
Ruling: No, the prosecution did not sufficiently establish the qualifying
circumstances of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of

any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its
execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. It encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant
circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed.
Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or
qualifying is also varied and dependent on each particular instance. Such variety
generates the actual need for the State to specifically aver the factual circumstances
or particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate
the liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to
defend himself.
For a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the

accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will
be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts
and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement
of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his
defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.
The averments of the information to the effect that the two accused “with
intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength did xxx “assault, attack and employ personal violence upon” the victims by
then and there shooting them with a gun, hitting them on various parts of their
bodies which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths” did not
sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended
each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of
a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution
of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the
defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to
kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the
same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient
averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an
averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting
treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the
information.
PEOPLE vs. TAPERE

G.R. No. 178065; February 20, 2013
Facts: At around 7:30 p.m. on September 2, 2002, elements of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) arrested Tapere for selling shabu to a poseur buyer
during a buy-bust operation conducted against him in Purok San Antonio, Iligan
City. Prior to the buy-bust operation, Tapere was already included in the PDEA’s
drug watch list as a drug pusher based on the frequent complaints made against him
by residents of Purok San Antonio, Iligan City. It appears that SPO2 Diosdado
Cabahug of the PDEA, a neighbor, had warned Tapere to stop his illegal activities,
but he apparently ignored the warning and continued to sell shabu in that locality.
Such continuing activity on the part of Tapere was the subject of the report of PDEA
informant Gabriel Salgado. An entrapment was executed in order to arrest Tapere in
the act of selling shabu while vending lanzones along side Tipanoy. Accused alleged
that he was just asked by Salgado to buy the shabu where disobeying him is not an
option for him. He further alleged that the way he was arrested was by instigation
which is absolutory in nature entitling him to acquittal.
Issue: Whether or not Tapere’s arrest resulted from a legitimate entrapment.
Ruling: Yes, Tapere’s arrest resulted from a legitimate entrapment.
Instigation takes place when a peace officer induces a person to commit a

crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not be committed. Hence, it is
exempting by reason of public policy; otherwise, the peace officer would be a co-
principal. It follows that the person instigating must not be a private person,
because he will be liable as a principal by inducement. On the other hand,
entrapment signifies the ways and means devised by a peace officer to entrap or
apprehend a person who has committed a crime. With or without the entrapment,
the crime has been committed already. Hence, entrapment is not mitigating.
Although entrapment is sanctioned by law, instigation is not. The difference
between the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent – in entrapment, the mens
rea originates from the mind of the criminal, but in instigation, the law officer
conceives the commission of the crime and suggests it to the accused, who adopts
the idea and carries it into execution.
Tapere was caught in flagrante delicto committing the illegal sale of shabu
during the buy-bust operation. In that operation, Salgado offered to buy from him a
definite quantity of shabu for P100.00. Even if, as he claims, he was unaware that
Salgado was then working as an undercover agent for the PDEA, he had no
justification for accepting the offer of Salgado to buy the shabu. His explanation that
he could not have refused Salgado's offer to buy for fear of displeasing the latter was
implausible. He did not show how Salgado could have influenced him at all into
doing something so blatantly illegal. What is clear to us, therefore, is that the
decision to peddle the shabu emanated from his own mind, such that he did not
need much prodding from Salgado or anyone else to engage in the sale of the shabu;
hence, he was not incited, induced, instigated or lured into committing an offense
that he did not have the intention of committing.
PEOPLE vs. SALAFRANCA

G.R. No. 173476; February 22, 2012
Facts: Johnny Bolanon (Bolanon) was stabbed by Rodrigo Salafranca (Salafranca)

on the night of July 31, 1993, after the said incident, the assailant ran away. Bolanon
still being able to walk, went to his uncle, Rodolfo B. Estaño to seek help. After
having known of the incident, Estaño then brought Bolanon to PGH. On their way to
the hospital on board a taxi, Bolanon confided to Estaño about the incident and told
him that it was Salafranca who stabbed him and a certain Augusto Mendoza
witnessed the said incident. At around 2:30am, despite receiving medical attention,
Bolanon succumbed to death.
Issue: Whether or not the utterance made by Balanon can be considered a dying
declaration.
Ruling: Yes, the utterance made by Balanon is not only considered as a dying
declaration but also as part of the res gestae.
The statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the
hacking incident borel all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the
res gestae, either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its

hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites
concur: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made,
the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant
is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case
for homicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. All the
requisites were met.
Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estao, identifying

Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon
was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest
and, according to Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathin. Bolanon
succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which
occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view
that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the
declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of
his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician.
Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had
he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution
for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus

admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (c) the statgements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
Here, the requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae
concur. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was
referring to a startling occurrence, i.e. his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then
on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital; and thus had no time to
contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about
Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as
the perpetrator.
The term res gestae has been defined as those circumstances which are the
undersigned’s incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when
illustrative of such act. In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts
and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character
and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the
idea of deliberation and fabrication.
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made
by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances
are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of
evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.
PEOPLE vs. TAGUIBUYA

G.R. No. 180497
Facts: The accused was charged with two counts of rape and a violation of Republic
Act No. 7610, committed against his own minor daughter. The RTC accorded
credence to the testimony of the minor victim and found the accused guilty of two
counts of qualified rape due to the minority of the victim at the time of the
commission of the rapes and because he had admitted being her father. The RTC
acquitted him of the violation of Republic Act No. 7610 on the ground that the
information did not allege that the victim had been been a child below eighteen
years of age but over twelve years. Consequently the accused was ordered to pay
seventy five thousand and fifty thousand pesos in each case as civil indemnity and
by way of moral damages, respectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings
of the RTC but it however reduced the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no
possibility of parole for each of the two (2) counts of consummated rape and
ordered the accused to indemnify the victim for each of the two counts of
consummated rape the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals ordered the correct civil indemnities for the
two counts of rape.
Ruling: No, the Court of Appeald did not order the correct civil indemnities for the two
counts of rape.
Civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct

from and should not be denominated as moral damages, which are based on
different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of its discretion.
In contrast, moral damages are granted to the victim in rape in such amount as the
court shall deem just and reasonable without the necessity of pleading or proof.
Indeed, the fact that the victim suffered the trauma of mental, physical and
psychological sufferings that constituted the bases for moral damages is too obvious
to still require the recital of such sufferings by the victim at the trial; the trial court
itself assumes and acknowledges her agony as a gauge of her credibility. To expect
and to require her to still provide the proof of her pains and sufferings is to demand
that she render a very superfluous testimonial charade.
Exemplary damages, which are intended to serve as deterrents to serious

wrongdoings and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the
rights of an injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct, are
awarded under Article 2230 of the Civil Code when the crime is committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances. The term aggravating circumstances as used by
the Civil Code should be understood in its broad or generic sense, not in the sense of
prescribing a heavier punishment on the offender; hence, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance should be a distinction that was of
consequence only to the criminal, as contrasted from the civil, liability, thereby
entitling the offended party or victim to an award of exemplary damages regardless
of whether the aggravating circumstance was ordinary or qualifying.
Being the victim of two counts of qualified rape, the minor daughter, was
entitled to recover for each count of rape the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
PEOPLE vs. TEODORO

G.R. No. 175876; February 20, 2013
Facts: Two informations, both dated March 25, 1998, charged Teodoro with
statutory rape for allegedly having carnal knowledge over his eight-year-old step-
daughter, AAA, on December 18, 1997 and February 8, 1998. At his arraignment,
Teodoro pleaded not guilty. Although he subsequently manifested a willingness to
change the pleas to guilty, he balked when he was re-arraigned by qualifying that he
had only "fingered" AAA. Accordingly, the RTC reinstated his pleas of not guilty.
During the trial, AAA and her mother, BBB, testified for the Prosecution, but
two years later recanted and turned hostile towards the Prosecution, now telling the
RTC that Teodoro had only touched AAA’s vagina on the nights of the alleged rape.
The RTC rendered its judgment convicting Teodoro on both counts of

statutory rape notwithstanding the recantations by AAA and BBB. The RTC rejected
AAA’s recantation of her accusation for being inconsistent with the testimony of Dr.
Abrenillo showing that the redness on the edges of the protective structure of her
vaginal opening had been caused by friction from the forceful introduction of an
erect penis; and that such forceful introduction of an erect penis had led to the
gaping of the labia minora and labia majora of AAA. On appeal, the CA sustained the
RTC, and ignored AAA’s recantation for being dictated by her family’s financial
difficulties. It agreed with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General to the
effect that AAA’s recantation should not be considered because it came about after
she had returned home from the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
Issue: Whether or not the recantation made by AAA should be accepted by the court.
Ruling: No, the recantation made by AAA should not be accepted by the court.
As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly because the recantation

of her testimony by a vital witness of the State like AAA is exceedingly unreliable,
and secondly because there is always the possibility that such recantation may later
be repudiated. Indeed, to disregard testimony solemnly given in court simply
because the witness recants it ignores the possibility that intimidation or monetary
considerations may have caused the recantation.
Court proceedings, in which testimony upon oath or affirmation is required

to be truthful under all circumstances, are trivialized by the recantation. The trial in
which the recanted testimony was given is made a mockery, and the investigation is
placed at the mercy of an unscrupulous witness. Before allowing the recantation,
therefore, the court must not be too willing to accept it, but must test its value in a
public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected to
cross-examine the recanting witness both upon the substance of the recantation and
the motivations for it.
The recantation, like any other testimony, is subject to the test of credibility
based on the relevant circumstances, including the demeanor of the recanting
witness on the stand. In that respect, the finding of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons necessitate
its re-examination, the reason being that the trial court is in a better position to hear
first-hand and observe the deportment, conduct and attitude of the witnesses.
PEOPLE vs. ZAKARIA

G.R. No. 181042; November 26, 2012
Facts: A confidential informant went to the CALABARZON Regional Office of the

Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) in Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba,
Laguna and informed Chief Supt. Abe Lemos that he had entered into a drug deal
with alias Danny and alias Joana to take place at 287 Tamayo Compound on Caliraya
Drive, in Taguig City. Thereafter, Chief Supt. Lemos tasked Insp. Julius Ceasar Ablang
to form a team for a buy-bust operation, made up of PO2 Aninias as poseur-buyer,
and SPO2 Gerry Abalos, SPO1 Miguel Lapitan, SPO1 Norman Jesus Platon, PO3
Ronald Valdez, PO3 Sherwin Bulan, and PO3 Danilo Leona as the other team
members. Insp. Ablang gave a P500.00 bill to PO2 Aninias to serve as the buy-bust
money. PO2 Aninias wrote his initials “LLA” on the P500.00 bill, and then placed the
marked bill on the bundle of boodle money that seemingly amounted to P98,000.00.
He put the boodle money in a white window envelope.
PO2 Aninias, PO3 Valdez and the confidential informant surveyed the target
area in order to confirm if drug activities were taking place there. PO2 Aninias
observed there about ten persons going in and out of the target area. About 30
minutes later, PO2 Aninias and his companions left the target area and returned to
the Regional Office to report their observations. The next day, the confidential
informant contacted Danny to tell him that he had a buyer. They agreed to have the
deal at the target area. Insp. Ablang prepared a pre-operation report, and
coordinated with the PDEA National Office.
Using a Toyota Revo and a Mitsubishi Adventure, the buy-bust team arrived
at the target area. PO2 Aninias parked the Revo some 10 meters away from the
target area, while the other driver parked the Adventure about 50 meters from the
Revo. The confidential informant then called Danny and told him that he and the
buyer were already in the vicinity, but Danny advised them to wait for the shabu to
be prepared. PO2 Aninias moved the Revo closer to the target area. Not long after,
Danny arrived. The confidential informant, whom Danny personally knew, motioned
to Danny to get on board the Revo. Once Danny got in the Revo, the confidential
informant introduced PO2 Aninias to Danny as the buyer of shabu.
Danny asked PO2 Aninias about the money. PO2 Aninias showed to Danny
the white window envelope containing the P500.00 bill and boodle money. Saying
that the shabu was with his wife, Danny then got out of the Revo to fetch her. After
nearly 15 minutes, Danny returned with a woman. The confidential informant
requested the two to board the Revo. Danny introduced the woman to PO2 Aninias
as his wife Joana. Danny again asked for the money. PO2 Aninias once more flashed
the white window envelope to Danny and asked to see the shabu. Danny pulled
three sachets containing white crystalline substance from his pocket and handed the
sachets to PO2 Aninias, who turned over the white window envelope to Joana and
forthwith made a missed call to PO3 Valdez.
The missed call was the pre-arranged signal indicating that the transaction
was consummated. As Danny was about to count the money in the envelope, PO2
Aninias drew and pointed his gun at Danny and Joana. The rest of the team, who had
meanwhile rushed towards the Revo as soon as PO3 Valdez received PO2 Aninias’
missed call, quickly arrested the two suspects.
Issue: Whether or not the chain of custody have been observed.
Ruling: No, the chain of custody has not been observed.
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized

dangerous drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the
accused, for the marking upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that
succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value
of marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all
other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until
disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, “planting” or
contamination of evidence.48 A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial
custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires.
The records show that the buy-bust team did not observe the mandatory
procedures under Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR. Although PO2 Aninias
supposedly marked the confiscated shabu with his initials immediately upon
seizure, he did not do so in the presence of the accused or of their representatives
and any representative from the media and Department of Justice (DOJ), or any
elected public official. If he had, he would have readily stated so in court. In fact,
both PO2 Aninias and PO3 Valdez themselves revealed that no media or DOJ
representative, or elected public official was present during the buy-bust operation
and at the time of the recovery of the evidence at the target area. Instead, the media
were only around in the PDEA regional headquarters.
The certificate of inventory, although signed by a media representative and a

barangay official, was nonetheless discredited by PO2 Aninias’ admission that only
the confidential informant and the members of the buy-bust team were present at
the time of the recovery of the sachets of shabu from Samin. Verily, although PO2
Aninias declared having personally seen the media representative and the barangay
official affixing their signatures on the certificate of inventory, he gave no indication
at all that the certificate had been signed in the presence of the accused or of their
representative. Another serious lapse committed was that the buy-bust team did
not take any photographs of the sachets of shabu upon their seizure. The
photographs were intended by the law as another means to confirm the chain of
custody of the dangerous drugs.
The last paragraph of Section 21 (a) of the IRR, supra, contains a saving
proviso to the effect that “non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.” But in order for the saving
proviso to apply, the Prosecution must first recognize and explain the lapse or
lapses in procedure committed by the arresting lawmen. That did not happen here,
because the Prosecution neither recognized nor explained the lapses.

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2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

CARANDANG vs. DESIERTO

Meanwhile, President Estrada appointed Carandang as general manager and

Carandang sought the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against

Ruling: No, RPN is not a GOCC.

Section 2 of PD 2029 states that a GOCC is a stock or a non-stock corporation,

Thus Carandang is not subject to the administrative authority of the

CAPALLA vs. COMELEC

On March 29, 2012, the Comelec issued a Resolution resolving to accept

Consequently, pursuant to Article 19 of the contract, the provisions thereof

CALLO-CLARIDAD vs. ESTEBAN

Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for murder against respondents Philip

A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to

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AIR ADS vs. TADECO

ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB

A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the

Issue: Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge

Ruling: No, respondents may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge

Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or

As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the

CHU vs. SPOUSES CUNANAN

A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making

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DISINI vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

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In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of Criminal Case

FDC vs. AGCAOILI

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Facts: In 1995, petitioner Golangco, as complainant, initiated a prosecution for libel

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On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary

HEIRS OF GARCIA vs. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, ZAMBALES

Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review under

HEIRS OF SOTTO vs PALICTE

Pascuala who earlier executed a document expressly waiving her rights to

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Forum shopping can be committed in three ways:

HEIRS OF PRODON vs HEIRS OF ALVAREZ

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HEIRS OF SPOUSES RETERTA vs. SPOUSES LOPEZ

Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance or to

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Javellana commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and

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