Rule 114

2. Allado vs. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192

DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO AND ROBERTO L. MENDOZA VS. HON. ROBERTO C.

DIOKNO, PRESIDING JUDGE, BR. 62, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MAKATI, METRO
MANILA, AND PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME COMMISSION.
G.R. No. 113630
May 5, 1994

FACTS:
Petitioners, Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, were both implicated as the
masterminds of the kidnapping and murder of Eugen Alexander Van Twist.

An information for the said crime was filed against the petitioners primarily on the
strength of a sworn statement by Escolastico Umbal, who admitted that he was among
those who kidnapped and killed the victim upon the orders of the petitioners. Thereafter,
respondent judge, Roberto C. Diokno, ordered the arrest of the petitioners and no bail
was recommended.

Petitioners, contending that their arrests was effected whimsically as there is no

probable cause, questioned their arrests.

ISSUE:
Whether or not probable cause is present to warrant the order of arrest against the
petitioners. (NO)

RULING:
A probable cause does not exist to merit the order of arrest against the petitioners.

Umbal's credibility has been severely harmed. Even if the State exercises its inherent
right to prosecute, his claims alone are inadequate to send two attorneys to prison, or
anybody else for that matter. More significantly, the PACC agents who requested for a
warrant to search Santiago's residences never named petitioners as suspects. In fact,
they alleged that Santiago, not petitioners, was the brains behind the whole thing,
according to Umbal. While there may be bits of evidence against petitioners' co-
accused, such as those recovered from Santiago residences, they do not establish
petitioners' involvement in the crime charged in the least. Based on the evidence thus
far submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate
petitioners. For them to stand trial and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty,
however brief, the law appropriately exacts much more to sustain a warrant for their
arrest — facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that
they are guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.
4. Lacson vs. ES, 301 SCRA 298

PANFILO M. LACSON, PETITIONER, VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE

SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO
MONTERO, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. ROMEO M.
ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., PETITIONER-INTERVENORS.
G.R. No. 128096
January 20, 1999

FACTS:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the
Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the
ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal
Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not
a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG,
Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said
incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a
review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple
murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal,
and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the
Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner
was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,

asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said
law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the
“principal accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP
officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under
said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved
amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the
phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7

which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which
trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due
process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions
 seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire
jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case. (NO)
2) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng
was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential
to the determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional
Trial Court’s jurisdiction. (YES)

RULING:
1) RIGHTS NOT VIOLATED.
Petitioner and intervenors’ contention that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate
their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No
concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a
declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the
party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must
rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain
public officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases
pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is
not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan
but also in “any court.”

2) RTC HAS JURISDICTION.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed
in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender
and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such
intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of
the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the
shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the
discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the
victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement
that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the
exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his
office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of

murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the
accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
Rule 115
Rights of Accused at the Trial

1. Jacob vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162206, 17 November 2010

MONICO V. JACOB AND CELSO L. LEGARDA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN FOURTH DIVISION AND THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 162206
November 17, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioners Jacob and Legarda were officila of Petron Corporation. Ombudsman
indicted several public officers and private individuals, including petitioners Monico V.
Jacob (Jacob), President, and Celso L. Legarda (Legarda), Vice-President and General
Manager for Marketing, both of Petron for perpetrating the so-called "tax credit scam."
Ombudsman filed a total of 62 Informations against them for the alleged violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Justice Nario, as the Chairman of the Sandiganbayan 4 th Division, ordered the dismissal
of all criminal cases because the accused had been deprived of their right to a speedy
trial and disposition of the cases against them. The Sandiganbayan Special Fourth
Division overruled Justice Nario's verbal order dismissing the criminal cases against the
accused in the alleged tax credit scam. The motion for reconsideration and motion to
quash/dismiss filed the accused were denied by the respondent court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in denying the petitioners' right to speedy trial.

RULING:
The test for determining whether an accused was indeed deprived of his right to a
speedy trial and disposition of the case against him:

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length
of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d)
prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of
the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent
oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to
trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most
serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case
skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses
are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not
imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living
under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility.His financial resources may be
drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

SC agree with the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division that Justice Nario's dismissal
of the criminal cases was unwarranted under the circumstances, since the State should
not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the criminal cases simply
because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman. 
 
An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in
criminal cases by Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution.  This right to a speedy trial
may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its
"salutary objective" being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the
anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined
within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of
whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.  Intimating historical perspective on
the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice
delayed is justice denied."  This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution
of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally
guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.
2. Crisostomo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152398, 14 April 2005

EDGAR CRISOSTOMO, PETITIONERS, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 152398
April 14, 2005

FACTS:
Crisostomo, a member of the Philippine National Police and a jail guard at the Solano
Municipal Jail was charged with the murder of Renato Suba, a detention prisoner at the
Solano Municipal Jail. he Information alleged that Crisostomo conspired with his co-
accused, Dela Cruz; Calingayan and others all inmates at the Solano Municipal Jail, in
murdering Renato.
The defense adduced that Renato (deceased) hung himself in his detention cell.
Sandiganbayan find the Petitioner guilty for the crime of murder because Crisostomo as
jail guard was in such a position that he could have seen or heard the killing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Crisostomo for the crime even there
is no direct evidence that will show the participation of Crisostomo on the alleged crime.
(YES)

RULING:
In this case, the prosecution had the burden to prove first, the conspiracy to murder
Renato, and second, Crisostomo's complicity in the conspiracy. The prosecution must
prove that Renato's death was not the result of suicide but was produced by a
deliberate intent to kill him with the attendant circumstances that would qualify the killing
to murder. Since Crisostomo had no direct hand in the killing of Renato, the conviction
could only be sustained if the murder was carried out through a conspiracy between
Crisostomo and his co-accused, the inmates. It must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt that Crisostomo's action and inaction were all part of a scheme to murder Renato.
The "deafening silence" of all of the accused does not necessarily point to a conspiracy.
In the first place, not all of the accused remained silent. Calingayan put himself on the
witness stand. Calingayan further claimed that the Solano police investigated him and
his handwritten statements were taken the morning following Renato's death. Secondly,
an accused has the constitutional right to remain silent and to be exempt from being
compelled to be a witness against himself.