CRIMPROC

RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

ARMILYN MORILLO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
RICHARD NATIVIDAD, RESPONDENTS.
777 SCRA 207
G.R. No. 198270
December 09, 2015

Facts:
In July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil,
introducing themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the
name and style of RB Custodio Construction, purchased construction materials for their
project inside the Subic Freeport Zone from petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea
General Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The parties agreed that twenty
percent (20%) of the purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first
delivery and the remaining eighty percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days
after the last delivery, all of which shall be via postdated checks.

Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction materials amounting

to a total of P500,054.00 at the construction site where respondent and his partners
were undertaking their project. After the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00 in
cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch,
in the amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity, petitioner attempted to
deposit the checks in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati
City. They were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank. Immediately thereafter,
petitioner communicated the dishonor to respondent and his partners and demanded for
payment. Again, respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured
petitioner that they will be honored upon maturity.

Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch, the
checks were once again dishonored for the reason that the account from which they
were drawn was already a closed account. Consequently, petitioner made several
demands from respondent and his partners, but to no avail, prompting her to file a
complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City. Thus, on August 12, 2004, two
(2) Informations were filed against respondent and Milo Malong.

Issue:
Whether or not MeTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:
YES. It is well settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in
one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein
any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains
jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of
the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense
was in part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22
CRIMPROC
RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred – in particular, the
place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.

Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the

court of the place where the check was deposited or presented for encashment; can be
vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the
check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga does
not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed
that the subject check was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati
Branch of Equitable PC IBank. The MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took
cognizance of the instant case and rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its
jurisdiction.

First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court’s dismissal of the case is
not an acquittal of respondent. Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different
from an acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to
Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy
trial, the dismissal of a criminal case against the accused will not result in his acquittal.
In the oft-cited People v. Salico, the Court explained: This argument or reasoning is
predicated on a confusion of the legal concepts of dismissal and acquittal. Acquittal is
always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence
does not show that defendant’s guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does
not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal
terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient
in form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but
not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution
has presented all its: evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the court
dismisses the ease on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal
because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the
offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is
dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant
could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is
elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same
offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.

Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground
that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged, it did not decide the same
on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of respondent’s guilt or innocence based on
the evidence proffered by the prosecution. The appellate court merely dismissed the
case on the erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was committed
within the lower court’s jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence
failed to show respondent’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such
dismissal did not operate as an acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may be
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RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
repudiated only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, showing
a grave abuse of discretion. Thus, petitioner’s resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
cannot be struck down as improper. In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
the parties raise only questions of law because the Court, in its exercise of its power of
review, is not a trier of facts. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an
existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.

In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely “whether the
Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did
not have jurisdiction over the case despite clear showing that the offense was
committed within the jurisdiction of said court.” Evidently, therefore, the instant petition
was filed within the bounds of our procedural rules for the issue herein rests solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances insofar as the commission of
the crime of BP 22 is concerned. In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law
prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty
provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case
involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the
jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question of
law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision

dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution dated August 9, 2011 of the Court Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 32723 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February
23, 2009 and Order dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case
Nos. 08-1876-77, which affirmed the Joint Decision dated September 3, 2008 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03 are hereby REINSTATED.
CRIMPROC
RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
WILFRED N. CHIOK, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
RUFINA CHUA, RESPONDENTS.
776 SCRA 120
G.R. No. 180021
December 07, 2021

Facts:
In June, 1995 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Wilfred Chiok, received in trust from
Rufina Chua the amount of P9,563,900.00 for him to buy complainant shares of stocks,
under the express obligation on the part of the accused to deliver the documents
thereon or to return the whole amount if the purchase did not materialize, but the
accused once in possession of the said amount, far from complying will his obligation as
aforesaid, with intent to defraud the complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert to his own personal use and
benefit the said amount of P9,563,900.00, and despite repeated demands failed and
reclused and still fails and refuses to return the said amount or to account for the same,
to the damage and prejudice of the complainant Rufina Chua in the aforementioned
amount of P9,563,900.00.Chiok was charged with estafa, defined and penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue:
I. Whether or not Chua has a legal personality to file and prosecute this petition.
II. Whether or not the case is an exception to the rule on finality of acquittal and the
doctrine of double jeopardy.

Ruling:
I. NO. Chua lacks the legal personality to file this petition.

Chua argues that her petition should be allowed because the circumstances of
this case warrant leniency on her lack of personality to assail the criminal aspect of the
CA acquittal. She argues that "the OSG did not take any action to comment on the
position of Chua and that this case belongs to the realm of exceptions to the doctrine of
double jeopardy." The court disagrees with Chua. Chua lacks the personality or legal
standing to question the CA Decision because it is only the OSG, on behalf of the State,
which can bring actions in criminal proceedings before this Court and the CA as stated
in Section 35 (I), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.

Although there are instances when we adopt a liberal view and give due course
to a petition filed by an offended party, we direct the OSG to file its comment. In this
case, the OSG neither appealed the judgment of acquittal of the CA nor gave its
conformity to Chua's special civil action for certiorari and mandamus. In view of the
contrary position of the OSG, we do not subscribe to Chua's view that the
circumstances of this case warrant the relaxation on the rule. Even if we do relax this
procedural rule, we find that the merits of the case still call for the dismissal of Chua's
petition.
CRIMPROC
RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

II. NO. The appeal from the judgment of acquittal will place Chiok in double
jeopardy.

The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors, guarantees the right of the
accused against double jeopardy. Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double jeopardy to attach. For double
jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4)
the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express
consent.

Chua assails the acquittal of Chiok on two grounds. First, the first jeopardy did
not attach because the CA did not have jurisdiction over the appeal which fall under
element (2) of Section 7, Rule 117 on Rules of Criminal Procedure; Chiok having lost
his right to appeal when the CA found him to have jumped bail:

In which the court said that the CA had jurisdiction to entertain Chiok's appeal
because when an accused jumps bail during the pendency of his appeal, the appellate
court may exercise its discretion whether to proceed with the appeal or dismiss it
outright. In this case, the CA exercised this discretion when it found that Chiok jumped
bail because the order of arrest was not served. Subsequently, when Chiok moved for
its reconsideration, the CA again exercised its discretion, this time to entertain the
appeal.

Second assuming that the first jeopardy attached, the circumstances of this case
is an exception to the rule on double jeopardy:

Exceptions to the rate on finality-of-acquittal and double jeopardy doctrine

do not apply. Although we do not absolutely preclude the availment of the
remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly
and convincingly demonstrate that the appellate court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice. Chua failed to do so.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the court hereby absolves
the accused from criminal as well as civil liability and orders these cases DISMISSED
for lack of evidence to support the charges leveled against him.
CRIMPROC
RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
MARILOU S. LAUDE AND MESEHILDA S. LAUDE, PETITIONERS, VS. HON.
ROLINE M. GINEZ-JABALDE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 74, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF THE CITY OF OLONGAPO; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; HON. GEN. GREGORIO PIO P.
CATAPANG, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES;
HON. EMILIE FE DELOS SANTOS, CHIEF CITY PROSECUTOR OF OLONGAPO
CITY; AND L/CPL JOSEPH SCOTT PEMBERTON, RESPONDENT.
775 SCRA 408
G.R. No. 217456
November 24, 2015

Facts:
This involves the celebrated case of Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) killed at
the Celzone Lodge on Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-
old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). A Complaint for murder
was filed by Jennifer’s sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton before the Office of
the City Prosecutor which Information was later filed with the RTC in Olongapo City.

On 19 December 2014, Pemberton surrendered personally to the RTC Judge

and was later arraigned. On the same day of Arraignment petitioner Laude filed an
Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender the Custody
of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage. The
motion was scheduled on 22 December 2014, 2PM. According to petitioners, they were
only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s counsel through registered mail. In any
case, they claim to have also “furnished a copy of the [M]otion personally … at the
hearing of the [M]otion.  On 23 December 2014, the Urgent Motion was denied, as well
as its motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not the averments of the petitioner, that the 3-day notice rule should
be liberally applied due to the timing of the arrest and arraignment, tenable.

Held:
NO. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule
that the adverse party be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior.
Failure to comply with this notice requirement renders the motion defective consistent
with protecting the adverse party’s right to procedural due process.

While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements
of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still
be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other
party nor violate his or her due process rights. The adverse party must be given time to
study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the
arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton
CRIMPROC
RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
was not given sufficient time to study petitioners’ Motion, thereby depriving him of his
right to procedural due process.

Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent
Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused
to the Olongapo City Jail only during the hearing. They attempt to elude the
consequences of this belated notice by arguing that they also served a copy of the
Motion by registered mail on Pemberton’s counsel. They also attempt to underscore the
urgency of the Motion by making a reference to the Christmas season and the “series of
legal holidays” where courts would be closed. To compound their obfuscation,
petitioners claim that the hearing held on December 22, 2014, attended by Pemberton’s
counsel sufficiently satisfied the rationale of the three-day notice rule. These
circumstances taken together do not cure the Motion’s deficiencies. Even granting that
Pemberton’s counsel was able to comment on the motion orally during the hearing,
which incidentally was set for another incident, it cannot be said that Pemberton was
able to study and prepare for his counterarguments to the issues raised in the Motion.
Judge Ginez-J abalde was correct to deny the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail
based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to prejudice
Pemberton’s rights as an accused.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack

of grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of jurisdiction. The prayer for the
issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction is likewise DENIED for lack of merit.
CRIMPROC
RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
RICARDO L. ATIENZA AND ALFREDO A. CASTRO, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
716 SCRA 84
G.R. No. 188694
February 12, 2014

Facts:
Atienza and Castro (petitioners) are employees of the CA, particularly assigned
to its Budget Division and holding the positions of Budget Officer I and Utility Worker I,
respectively, at the time material to this case.

On March 20, 1995, at about past noon, Juanito Atibula (Atibula), Records
Officer I and Custodian of the CA Original Decisions in the CA Reporter's Division, was
invited by Castro to attend Atienza's birthday party somewhere along Bocobo Street,
Ermita, Manila. At the party, Atienza introduced Atibula to a certain Dario and asked him
to assist the latter in searching for the CA decision in the case entitled "Mateo Fernando
v. Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc." (Fernando), docketed as CA-G.R. No. 36808-R.

Thereafter, Atibula returned to the office followed a few minutes later by Dario
and searched for the aforementioned decision which was found compiled in Volume 260
of the CA Original Decisions. As Dario was scanning through the said volume, Atibula
observed that he was comparing its pages to the discolored papers he was holding.
Dario likewise scanned Volumes 265 and 267, and placed check marks on the papers
he was holding.

On March 24, 1995, after office hours, Atibula saw Dario outside the CA
compound along Maria Orosa Street. As they walked side by side towards the jeepney
stop, Dario requested Atibula to insert a Decision dated September 26, 1968 in one of
the volumes of the CA Original Decisions. However, Atibula refused and immediately
left.

On April 21, 1995, Atienza offered Atibula the amount of P50,000.00 in exchange
for Volume 260, which the latter turned down. Atienza then ridiculed him saying, "duwag
ka, pera na nga ito ayaw mo pa," to which Atibula retorted, "ikaw ang duwag dahil
nagpapakita ka ng kabuktutan." Disturbed by the situation, Atibula reported the incident
to Atty. Arnel Macapagal (Atty. Macapagal), the Assistant Chief of the CA Reporter's
Division, who then instructed him (Atibula) to hide Volumes 260, 265 and 267 in a safe
place.

On May 9, 1995, Atibula discovered that Volume 266 covering the period from
January 28 to February 12, 1969 was missing and, hence, immediately reported the
same to Atty. Macapagal. Two days after the discovery of the loss, Atibula encountered
Atienza near the canteen, shouting "[p]utang ina mo, Juaning, pinahirapan mo kami!"

On May 18, 1995, a certain Nelson de Castro, Clerk IV detailed at the CA

Reporter's Division, handed to Atibula a bag containing a gift-wrapped package which
CRIMPROC
RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
turned out to be the missing Volume 266. He claimed that it was Castro who asked him
to deliver the said package to Atibula.

Having been notified of Volume 266's return, Atty. Macapagal then directed
Atibula to ascertain who borrowed the volume. Records, however, disclosed no one.
Separately, Atibula compared the contents of Volume 266 with the index of the
decisions and noticed that there were two new documents inserted therein, namely: (a)
a Resolution dated February 11, 1969 (subject resolution), ostensibly penned by
Associate Justice Juan P. Enriquez (Justice Enriquez) and concurred in by Associate
Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan and Edilberto Soriano, recalling and setting aside the
Entry of Judgment earlier issued in the Fernando case; and (b) a Decision dated April
16, 1970 (subject decision), also ostensibly penned by Justice Enriquez and concurred
in by Associate Justices Jesus Y. Perez and Jose M. Mendoza, amending the original
decision dated September 26, 1968 in the aforementioned case. Consequently, Atibula
reported his findings to Atty. Macapagal who, in turn, informed Atty. Gemma Leticia F.
Tablate (Atty. Tablate), then Chief of the CA Reporter's Division, of the same. They tried
to verify the genuineness, authenticity and existence of the subject resolution and
decision, and found that the compilation of the duplicate original decisions/resolutions of
Justice Enriquez did not bear the said promulgations. Atty. Tablate reported the incident
to then CA Presiding Justice Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr. who immediately requested the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation on the matter.

Laboratory analysis and comparative examination of the subject resolution and

decision as well as of a decision in another case found in pages 906 to 922 of Volume
266 of the CA Original Decisions were conducted by the NBI. As a result, it issued its
Questioned Documents Report No. 937-1295, finding that: (a) Volume 266 had indeed
been altered; and (b) the signatures of the CA Justices in the subject resolution and
decision (questioned signatures) and their standard/sample signatures "were not written
by one and the same person," leading to the conclusion that the questioned signatures
were forgeries.

Meanwhile, sometime in the second week of July 1995, an inspection of the air-
conditioning units at the office of the CA Reporter's Division was conducted, whereby it
was discovered that the improvised angle bar supporting the air conditioning unit at the
right most end from the main door was corroded with rust and the portion of the wall
holding the same was broken ("may bak-bak na"). NBI Agents, Atty. Daniel D. Daganzo
(Atty. Daganzo) and Norman R. Decampong then conducted an ocular inspection of the
premises, and, in the course thereof, interviewed several personnel of the CA
Maintenance Division. Said investigation yielded the following findings: (a) there were
no signs of forcible entry; (b) the perpetrators gained entry to the office of the CA
Reporter's Division "by passing through the hole on the concrete wall after removing the
air conditioning unit" located on the right most [sic] end from the main door; (c) there
was conspiracy to commit the crime of Falsification of Public Document between
Atienza and Dario in view of their "concerted efforts through previous or simultaneous
acts and deeds;" and (d) Castro assisted Atienza and Dario "to profit from the effects of
the crime by returning safely the missing volume to the [CA Reporter's Division]."
CRIMPROC
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Consequently, a criminal complaint was filed by the NBI and the Fact-Finding and
Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman against Atienza, Castro, and Dario
before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the OMB, docketed as
OMB-0-97-2054, charging them for the following crimes: (a) Falsification of Public
Document; (b) violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, as amended;
and (c) violation of Section 8 of RA 6713.

After investigation, the charges involving the pertinent provisions of RAs 3019
and 6713 were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, but it was contrarily determined
that there existed probable cause to charge Atienza, Castro, and Dario for the crimes of
Robbery under Article 299(a)(1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, and of
Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(6) of the
same code. Thus, the corresponding Informations, respectively docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 01-197425 and 01-197426, were filed before the RTC. Petitioners posted
bail and, thereafter, pleaded "not guilty" to the charges during their arraignment, while
Dario remained at large.

In his defense, Atienza denied having anything to do with the questioned

incidents as he was not even summoned by the CA Clerk of Court or the Chief of the
Reporter's Division, and became aware of the incident only when he and Castro were
subpoenaed by the NBI Special Investigators. Further, he gave the alibi that he was out
of the office 4 days a week during the months of April to June 1995, reporting only on
Fridays, since he had to perform his duties as Budget Officer I of the CA Budget
Division and Liaison Officer to the Department of Budget and Management, the
Committee on Appropriation of the Congress, Committee on Appropriation of the lower
house, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the GSIS.

On the other hand, Castro did not endeavor to refute the allegations in the
Informations filed against him and the other accused.

Issue:
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not petitioners'
conviction for the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document should be
upheld on account of the circumstantial evidence in this case proving their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances

from which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common
experience. It is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To
uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one
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to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the
others, as the guilty person. Stated differently, the test to determine whether or not the
circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of
circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other and that each and every
circumstance must be consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent with his
innocence.

Applying these principles to the facts that appear on record, the Court finds that
no sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented in this case to establish the
elements of Robbery under Article 299(a)(1) of the RPC and Falsification of Public
Documents under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(6) of the same code, or of
petitioners' supposed conspiracy therefor. To this end, the Court examines the
participation of and evidence against each petitioner and forthwith explains its reasons
for reaching the foregoing conclusions.

A. The Participation of and Evidence Against Castro

Notwithstanding Castro's failure to refute the charges against him, the Court finds
no evidence to link him to the commission of the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of
Public Document, contrary to the conclusions reached by the RTC and concurred in by
the CA. To begin with, it is essential to note that Castro's purported possession and
eventual return of Volume 266 was only premised upon the statement of one Nelson de
Castro (Nelson), i.e., the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated August 9, 1995, who averred that
on May 18, 1995, at around 11:50 in the morning, Castro told him to pass by his office
and there handed him a bag which, as it turned out, contained the missing Volume 266,
viz.:
Noong Mayo 18, 1995 bandang 11:50 ng tanghali ay tumawag sa
telepono si ALFREDO CASTRO, ng Budget Division, at sinabihan ako na
dumaan sa kanyang opisina dahil mayroon daw siyang ibibigay para sa opisina
namin. Pumunta po naman ako kaagad kay ALFREDO CASTRO sa opisina at
iniabot sa akin ang isang bag na malaki kulay parang pink at may laman at
sinabihan pa niya ako na buksan ko na lang daw ang bag pagdating sa opisina.
Pagdating ko sa opisina ay tinawag ko si Mr. ATIBULA at doon ay binuksan
naming dalawa ang bag. Nakita ko sa loob ang isang bagay na nakabalot sa
isang gift wrap at ng buksan namin o alisin ang gift wrap ay ang Original
Decisions, Volume 266 na nawawala mga ilang linggo na ang nakakaraan.

Nelson was not, however, presented before the RTC during trial, hence, was not
subjected to any in-court examination. It is settled that while affidavits may be
considered as public documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public (here,
a public officer authorized to administer oaths), they are still classified as hearsay
evidence unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon and the adverse party is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine them. With
the prosecution's failure to present Nelson to affirm his statement that Castro caused
the return of Volume 266, the prosecution's evidence on the matter should be treated as
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hearsay and, thus, inadmissible to establish the truth or falsity of the relevant claims.
Consequently, there exists no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove Castro's guilt.

B. The Participation of and Evidence Against Atienza

In similar regard, the prosecution's evidence on the circumstances in this case do

not sufficiently establish Atienza's guilt for the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of
Public Document.

While records show that Atienza was positively identified by Atibula as having
attempted to bribe him to take out Volume 260 of the CA Original Decisions from the
Reporter's Division, the fact is that the alleged intercalation actually occurred in a
different document, that is Volume 266. The discrepancy of accounts on the very
subject matter of the crimes charged dilutes the strength of the evidence required to
produce a conviction. At best, the bribery attempt may be deemed as a demonstration
of interest on the part of Atienza over said subject matter and in this regard, constitutes
proof of motive. However, it is well-established that mere proof of motive, no matter how
strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction, most especially if there is no other
reliable evidence from which it may reasonably be deduced that the accused was the
malefactor.

In fact, even if Atienza's bribery attempt is taken together with the other
circumstance couched as a relevant link by the prosecution in this case i.e., his averred
encounter with Atibula, on May 11, 1995, or two (2) days after the discovery of the loss
of Volume 266, wherein the latter uttered "[p]utang ina mo, Juaning, pinahirapan mo
kami" the Court still finds the evidence to be lacking. This allegation, even if proven as
true, does not indicate that Atienza howsoever affirmed the taking or even the
falsification of Volume 266. Clearly, the utterance was made by Atibula who did not
bother to state Atienza's response thereto or any other subsequent action connected
therewith so as to bolster a finding of guilt. Neither can this circumstance be properly
linked to the act of Castro inviting Atibula to Atienza's party. It would be a stretch to
conclude that this mere invitation, without any other proof of Castro's participation, was
instrumental or, at the very least, reasonably connected to Atienza and his own alleged
participation in the above-stated crimes.

In this relation, it may not be amiss to debunk the claim that petitioners conspired
in this case. While direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy as it may be
inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission
of the crime which point to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of
interests, records are, however, bereft of any showing as to how the particular acts of
petitioners figured into the common design of taking out the subject volume and
inserting the falsified documents therein. Hence, the prosecution's theory of conspiracy
does not deserve any merit.

All told, the prosecution has failed to show that the circumstances invoked
constitute an unbroken chain of events which lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion
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that petitioners are, to the exclusion of the others, indeed the culprits. As such, their
conviction, tested under the threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt, was not
warranted. To be sure, proof beyond reasonable doubt is the degree of proof that, after
investigation of the whole record, produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind of
the accused's culpability. Such moral certainty is, however, lacking in this case due to
the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented.

C. Jurisdictional Defect: Falsification Case

Also, it bears mentioning that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Criminal Case No. 01-197426 (i.e., the falsification case) since
Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1) of the RPC, which is punishable
by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (or imprisonment for 2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts pursuant to Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang
129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," as amended by
RA 7691. While petitioners raised this jurisdictional defect for the first time in the present
petition, they are not precluded from questioning the same. Indeed, jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law and cannot be acquired
through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the
acquiescence of the court. The rule is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Hence, questions of
jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to
overcome such presumption of innocence, failing which, the presumption of innocence
prevails and the accused should be acquitted. This, despite the fact that his innocence
may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness or even absence of defense. If the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt,
then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction, as in this case. Courts should be guided by the principle that it
would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged
than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.  Accordingly, there
being no circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a conviction, the Court hereby
acquits petitioners, without prejudice, however, to any subsequent finding on their
administrative liability in connection with the incidents in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30650 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners Ricardo L. Atienza and Alfredo A. Castro are hereby ACQUITTED of the
crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document on the ground of reasonable
doubt, without prejudice to any subsequent finding on their administrative liability in
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connection with the incidents in this case. The bail bonds posted for their provisional
liberty are consequently cancelled and released.