ATP 1 Vol-1C
ATP 1 Vol-1C
ATP 1 Vol-1C
September 2000
2. Change 8 to ATP 1(C), Volume I, is NOT TO BE EFFECTED UNTIL THE NATO EFFECTIVE
DATE (NED) which will be published by the Military Agency for Standardization (MAS).
Pages to be entered in the basic AP: XXI thru LII; 1-13 , 1-14; 1-17 thru 1-20; 1-29 thru 1-32; 2-5, 2-6;
2-17, 2-18; 2-25 thru 2-27 (Reverse Blank); 3-1 thru 3-49 (Reverse Blank); 4-7 thru 4-14; 5-1, 5-2; 5-17,
5-18; 6-1 thru 6-4; 6-16c, 6-16d; 6-19, 6-20; 6-20a thru 6-20f; 6-21 thru 6-26; 6-31, 6-32; 6-35, 6-36; 6-41
thru 6-44; 6-47, 6-48; 6-53 thru 6-64; 6-67 thru 6-80; 7-5, 7-6; 7-9 thru 7-12; 8-1, 8-2; 8-9, 8-10; 8-19,
8-20; 8-29, 8-30; 9-3 thru 9-8; 9-19 thru 9-22; 9-35, 9-36; 9-36a (Reverse Blank); 9-77, 9-78; 10-9, 10-10;
10-17 thru 10-20; 13-1, 13-2; 13-11 thru 13-21 (Reverse Blank); 14-1 thru 14-4; A-1 thru A-3 (Reverse
Blank); Glossary-11, Glossary-12; Glossary-12a (Reverse Blank); Glossary-15, Glossary-16; Glos-
sary-16a (Reverse Blank);Glossary-21, Glossary-22; Index-1 thru Index-31 (Reverse Blank); LEP-1 (Re-
verse Blank); LEP-3 (Reverse Blank).
4. Prior to making the change, verify the attached pages against the list at paragraph 3.
5. Insert the new pages and destroy the superseded ones in accordance with the local procedures for the de-
struction of documents.
7. Amend the Record of Changes page to reflect the latest status of ATP 1(C), Volume I.
0410 LP7001028
1 of 2 CHANGE 8
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
(This Page is NATO-Unclassified)
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(C) Vol. I
September 2000
2. Summary of Change 8:
d. Amends ROE, aircraft emergency, controlled airspace, waterspace management, and submarine
safety information in Chapter 6.
e. Amends coordinated attack method information in Chapter 9 and reinserts Attack Methods 1A
and 2A.
f. Numerous changes have been made throughout the publication to correct errors or maintain
currency of information.
PART I — GENERAL
SECTION I — ORGANIZATION
1100 TASK, TYPE, AND WARFARE ORGANIZATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1D10
1101 Task Organization — Task Force Numbers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1D10
1102 Task Organization — Task Designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1D10
1103 Changes in Task Organization Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1D10
SECTION II — COMMAND
1200 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 1D12
1201 Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 1D12
1202 Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 1D12
1203 Delegation of Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 1D12
1204 Chain of Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 1D13
1205 Command System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 1D13
1206 Exercising Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 1D13
1210 STRUCTURE FOR THE COMMAND OF MARITIME FORCES . . . . . 1-4 1D13
1211 Full Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 1D13
1212 Operational Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 1D13
1213 Operational Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1D14
1214 Change of Operational Control (CHOP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1D14
1215 Tactical Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1D14
1216 Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1D14
1217 Tactical Control (TACON) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 1E1
1218 Command by Veto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 1E1
1219 Command of Allied Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 1E1
1220 COMMAND OF AIRCRAFT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 1E1
1230 COMMAND DURING REPLENISHMENT AT SEA . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7 1E2
1231 Method of Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7 1E2
1232 OPTASK RAS: The OTC Promulgating the Replenishment Program . . . . 1-7 1E2
1233 OPSTAT UNIT: Supplying Ship Providing Details of Rigs to
Customer Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8 1E3
1234 OPSTAT CARGO: Supplying Ship Reporting Cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8 1E3
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SECTION IV — READINESS
1400 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25 1F8
1410 READINESS TO GET UNDERWAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25 1F8
1411 Notice to Get Underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25 1F8
1412 Preparing for Sea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25 1F8
1413 Getting Underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25 1F8
1420 READINESS FOR ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 1F9
1421 Operational Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 1F9
1422 Inoperable Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 1F9
1423 Command Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 1F9
1424 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-27 1F10
1425 Joining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-27 1F10
1430 GENERAL DEGREES OF READINESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-27 1F10
1440 PARTICULAR DEGREES OF READINESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-28 1F11
1441 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Damage Degrees
of Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-28 1F11
1442 Engineering Degrees of Readiness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-28 1F11
1450 WEAPON ALERT STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-28 1F11
1460 AIRCRAFT ALERT STATES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-28 1F11
1470 THREAT WARNINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-29 1F12
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SECTION I — FORMATIONS
3100 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 2F10
3105 BASIC SYSTEM OF FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 2F10
3106 Forming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 2F10
3107 Maneuvering. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 2F10
3110 GENERAL TYPES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 2F11
3115 CIRCULAR FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 2F11
3120 OPERATIONAL FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4 2F13
3121 Broad Operational Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4 2F13
3125 TYPICAL OPERATIONAL FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7 2G2
3126 Destroyer Type Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7 2G2
3127 Transport/Logistic Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9 2G4
3128 Replenishment Formations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12 2G7
3130 CONVOY FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 3C11
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SECTION II — DISPOSITIONS
3200 GENERAL TYPES OF DISPOSITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 3C11
3201 Forming a Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 3C11
3202 Maneuvering a Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 3C11
3210 TYPICAL OPERATIONAL DISPOSITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 3C11
3211 Carrier Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 3C11
3212 Special Disposition 2W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-24 3C13
3213 Replenishment Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-27 3D2
3214 Antiair Warfare Disposition (Threatened Sector Protection) 2V . . . . . . . . 3-27 3D2
3215 Antiair Warfare Disposition (Including Missile Ships) 3V . . . . . . . . . 3-29 3D4
3216 Circular Dispositions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29 3D4
3217 Cartwheel Disposition/Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-31 3D6
3218 4W Disposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-33 3D8
3220 DISPOSITION PLANNING FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-36 3D11
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CHAPTER 4 — COMMUNICATIONS
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SECTION I — GENERAL
8100 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 6D14
8101 Command in Antisurface Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 6D14
8102 Force Track Coordinator (FTC) Surface and Subsurface . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 6D14
8103 Concept of Antisurface Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 6D14
8104 Surface Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2 6E1
8105 Surface Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2 6E1
8110 WEAPON STATE REPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7 6E6
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NATO-UNCLASSIFIED XL CHANGE 8
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I
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SECTION I — INTRODUCTION
11000 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1 8G2
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
PART I — GENERAL
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CHAPTER 4 — COMMUNICATIONS
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NATO-UNCLASSIFIED IL CHANGE 8
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I
LIST OF TABLES
PART I — GENERAL
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Table 2-1 Maneuvering Formation When Using Evasive Steering . . . . . . . 2-25 2F2
CHAPTER 4 — COMMUNICATIONS
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED L CHANGE 8
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I
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Table 6-1 List of Tracking Identification Methods and Criteria . . . . . . . . . 6-4a 4D10
Table 6-1A Link 11 Operational Employment Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16c 4E12
Table 6-2 Table of Aircraft Mission Designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20a 4F4
Table 6-3 Checklist of Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct
Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20b 4F5
Table 6-4 ASW Mission Designator Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20e 4F8
Table 6-4A Sonobuoy Turnover Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28d 4G7
Table 6-4B Operational Combinations of Terms Which Must Be
Used to Tactically Control Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30a 4G9
Table 6-4C IMC Vertical Separation Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34 5C9
Table 6-5 Night Lighting Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-40 5D3
Table 6-6 Signals From Aircraft in Distress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-49 5D12
Table 6-7 Signals From Rendezvous Destroyer or Other Ships . . . . . . . . . 6-49 5D12
Table 6-8 Signals From Ship to Aircraft in Distress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-50 5D13
Table 6-9 Rescue Destroyer Stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-53 5E2
Table 6-10 Night Rescue Stations (Helicopter Ship Operations) . . . . . . . . . 6-54 5E3
Table 9-1 ASW Airplans, Attack and Support Methods, and Search Plans . . . . 9-2 6G5
Table 9-2 Airplans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7 6G10
Table 9-2A Passive Acoustic Designation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-19 7D2
Table 9-3 ASW Search Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23 7D6
Table 9-4 Selecting the Approach Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27 7D10
Table 9-5 Coordinated Employment of ASW Units at Scene of Action . . . . . 9-30 7D13
Table 9-6 ASW Attack and Support Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36 7E5
Table 9-7 Deleted.
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED LI CHANGE 8
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I
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Table 9-8 SAC Courses of Action With Nuclear ASW Weapons . . . . . . . . 9-43 7E14
Table 9-9 Material Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-47 7F4
Table 9-10 Time Late or Offset — Probability of Success . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-48 7F5
Table 9-11 Helicopter Stand-off Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50 7F7
Table 9-12 Surface Ship Stand-off Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51 7F8
Table 9-13 Summary of Decisions and Actions for Nuclear ASW
Weapon Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-54 7F11
Table 9-14 Brevity Code Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-58 7G1
Table 10-1 Regional Naval Control of Shipping Transmission Guidance. . . . . 10-4 8E3
Table 10-2 ASW Surface Search Plans for Convoy Escorts . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14 8E13
Table 12-1 Blast Damage Ranges in Yards From Ground Zero . . . . . . . . . 12-3 9C10
Table 12-2 NBC Aide-Memoire (Nuclear) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-7 9C14
Table 12-3 Commander’s Guide on Radiation Exposure State, Dose Levels,
Probable Tactical Effects, and Risk of Exposure Criteria . . . . . . 12-10 9D3
Table 12-4 NBC Aide-Memoire (Chemical) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-14 9D7
Table 12-5 Graduated Levels of NBC Threat and Minimum Individual
Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-16 9D9
Table 13-1 Actions for Transiting Units in Mine Danger Areas . . . . . . . . . 13-16 9E13
1302 (NC) DELEGATION OF COMMAND c. The OTC delegates to more than one sub-
FUNCTIONS ordinate commander several warfare functions.
(1) Those functions of the OTC which may d. The Convoy Responsibilities of
be delegated to a CWC. the OTC. The OTC is responsible for the safe and
timely arrival of the convoy. Detailed responsi-
(2) Those functions which may be dele- bilities and functions are found in Table 1-9 and
gated to warfare commanders, coordinators, or are explained in Chapter 10.
others to control assets and take action neces-
sary to execute the promulgated policy. (1) Mercantile Convoy. The OTC of the
escorting ships is not altered when a more sen-
c. Coordination Responsibilities. ior naval officer is present in a naval ship desig-
nated as part of the convoy and not part of the
(1) Air Coordination. The OTC is re- escort.
sponsible for coordinating all friendly air move-
ment within his area of interest. As he will not (2) Military Convoy. The senior naval
always know the position and intention of all officer of the ships in convoy and escorting
friendly units, he must exercise coordination ships will designate the OTC of the combined
partly by procedural means. The detailed force in accordance with Article 1216.
functions of the OTC for air coordination are
to be found in Table 1-6 and are explained in (3) When a Support Force is in Situa-
Chapter 6, Section IV. They may be dele- tion A. (See Article 1282.) When the OTC of
gated to an Air Coordinator. the support force is senior to the OTC of a mer-
cantile convoy, he should consider allowing the
(2) Electronic and Acoustic Warfare OTC of the convoy to remain in tactical com-
(EAW) Coordination. The OTC is responsi- mand. This maintains continuity of command
ble for determining and promulgating force and the previous close liaison between the OTC
EAW policies. Details of responsibilities and of the convoy and the convoy commodore.
functions are to be found in Tables 1-1 and 1-8
and are explained in Chapters 5 and 9. EW func- (4) Unescorted Convoy. In the absence
tions may be delegated to the Electronic War- of a warship escort, the convoy commodore is
fare Coordinator (EWC). Guidance on the to command the convoy.
application of acoustic warfare is to be found in
ATP 28. e. OTC’s Functions for Departure
and Entry Operations. The functions of the
(3) Surveillance. The OTC is responsi- OTC are found in Table 1-10 and are explained in
ble for establishing the surveillance areas for Chapter 3.
each area of maritime warfare within the overall
guidelines of the general picture compilation 1307 —1309 SPARE
(1) The Electronic Warfare Coordi- responsiveness to the AAW, ASW, ASUW,
nator (EWC). The EWC is the principal advi- and EW information needs of the OTC.
sor to the OTC in all matters pertaining to the
employment and exploitation of the electro- (2) The Air Coordinator. The Air Coor-
magnetic and acoustic spectrum. Accordingly, dinator exercises coordination within the force
he has broad responsibilities, which impact air coordination area. The duty for air coordina-
upon task group planning as well as the man- tion should be assigned to the unit which has the
agement and control of all active and passive greatest number of electronic aids to aircraft
weapons, sensors, and electronic communica- navigation and control, the largest number of
tions equipment which operate in or target the experienced air control personnel, and the best
electromagnetic spectrum/environment to in- air picture facilities. This duty may be collo-
clude: ESM, ECM, EPM, EMCON, OPDEC, cated with the AAWC, AREC, HEC, or ASWC.
OPSEC, SIGINT (COMINT/ELINT), and
SIGSEC (COMSEC/ELSEC). The extent to (3) The Air Resource Element Coor-
which the EWC exercises actual control over dinator (AREC). The AREC is a resource
assets is scenario dependent and should be manager. He may, under certain circumstances,
clearly stated by the OTC and understood by exercise tactical control for particular aircraft
the principal warfare commanders. The EWC’s (i.e., for aircraft projecting power ashore), but
planning and management responsibilities en- his primary role remains that of asset allocation
compass several areas. The EWC’s functions and of informing the warfare commander of the
are found in Table 1-8. In addition: status of these assets, the results achieved by
them, and the information gained from their
(a) The EWC must ensure that force sensors. Particular functions of the AREC are de-
assets are employed to support the require- tailed in Table 1-7 and amplified in Chapter 6.
ments of the OTC and principal warfare
commanders. Coordination between the (4) The Helicopter Element Coordi-
EWC and the principal warfare command- nator (HEC). When two or more ships other
ers is vital to ensure that all assets with than a CV are helicopter equipped, a central
ESM, ECM, and EPM capabilities are man- scheduling authority for flight operations from
aged effectively. these ships is useful. In a multithreat environ-
ment, the assets controlled by this coordinator
(b) The EWC is the principal manager may be in demand by any of the principal war-
of the electromagnetic and acoustic spec- fare commanders. The HEC’s functions, there-
trums. The EWC will formulate, promul- fore, will in many ways parallel those of the
gate, control, and monitor the EMCON plan AREC, with whom he should coordinate, con-
based upon the OTC’s emission policy. The cerning helicopters. Additional functions found
ASWC must operate force acoustic emitters in Table 1-7 can be delegated to the HEC for
within the effective EMCON plan. The non-CV-based helicopter operations. HEC
ASWC has the authority to break acoustic functions will be delegated by the OTC, gener-
EMCON in defense of the force. He must, ally to the senior commanding officer of
however, notify the EWC of his actions. helicopter-equipped ships. These coordinating
functions will normally not apply to amphibi-
(c) The EWC must ensure that the ous force and logistic helicopters. Requests for
force deception plan and assets are em- helicopters embarked in other than the CV and
ployed in a manner which facilitates the amphibious and logistic ships will be direct to
mission and policy of the OTC. the HEC. The OTC must be made aware of heli-
copter scheduling, tasking, and flight opera-
(d) The EWC must ensure that cryp- tions in order to be able to resolve potential
tologic assets, both organic and nonorganic, requirement conflicts. The HEC should prom-
are employed in a manner which facilitates ulgate a daily flight schedule.
(c) SOCA and SEC/SAT functions and (d) Coordination with appropriate lo-
responsibilities are described in ATP 18. cal commanders for response to enemy min-
ing of choke points, safe havens, or operating
(6) Local Warfare Coordinator. When areas, and for the execution of MCM plans.
two or more units are in company, a local
warfare coordinator may be designated. Local (e) Maintaining and disseminating a
warfare coordinators have the following plot of relevant mine warfare information to
functions: the force.
a. The term “duty” is used to define war- j. Submarine tasking and coordination
fare commander/coordinator and other functional messages (see APP 4 and ATP 18).
assignments. ATP 1, Vol. II, Table D, lists all du-
ties. Certain duty assignments may be promul- 1321 (NR) MARITIME TACTICAL MES-
gated by appropriate commanders. SAGE SYSTEM (MTMS) — PUR-
POSE AND METHOD OF USE
b. The term “functions” refers to the ac-
tions and tasking listed in Tables 1-1 through 1-11. a. Purpose. The MTMS consists of stan-
These functions will be delegated by the OTC, dardized messages and may be used:
CWC, and other commanders as appropriate to the
command structure/force needs. (1) To convey operational instructions or
intentions.
c. Figure 1-2 depicts levels of command
and control within the OTC’s warfare organiza- (2) To pass operational information to tac-
tion. Figures 1-3 and 1-4 provide examples of the tical commanders at sea.
command structure incorporating duty and war-
fare function assignments. (3) To report operational information be-
tween commanders and from subordinate to
1314 — 1319 SPARE higher formations.
b. A deck alert requires more warning than a. Color Code. The color code applied to
an airborne alert. The OTC should bear in mind a threat warning denotes the severity of the evalu-
that the presence of aircraft on the flight deck may ated threat:
hamper freedom of maneuver and that deck alerts
on board small ships may restrict the use of other Color Code Evaluation
weapon systems. The OTC may use OPTASK
AIR (see APP 4) to order alert states for helicop- WARNING ATTACK IS UNLIKELY
ters on all ships in the formation. WHITE WITHOUT ADEQUATE
WARNING
-EXAMPLES-
WARNING ATTACK IS
YELLOW PROBABLE
2 fighter aircraft Alert 5 . . . Two
fighter aircraft ready to become air- WARNING ATTACK IS IMMINENT,
borne 5 minutes after the order to RED OR HAS ALREADY
launch has been given. COMMENCED
NBC
1470 (NC) THREAT WARNINGS
SURFACE
A threat warning is informative only. Force
or individual unit actions are not therefore linked SUBMARINES
to it automatically. An OTC may sometimes order
measures of a temporary nature (including those NOTE
for use with ASMD) when a threat warning is
promulgated (e.g., changing the EMCON plan). In For promulgation of mine threat, see
many cases, however, such actions are more ap- also AHP 1.
propriately linked to detections and enemy reports
(emergency signals). 1471 — 1479 SPARE
NO. RESPONSIBILITIES
OTC’S RESPONSIBILITIES
(Which cannot be delegated)
101 Promulgate policies and plans to accomplish the mission set forth by higher authority, providing a de-
scription of his intentions to his subordinate commanders.
103 Establish command, control and communications policy, promulgate warfare command assign-
ments, and establish the force task organization if not already established by higher authority.
104 Establish the degree of authority delegated, specifying command functions assigned to each Princi-
ple Warfare Commander (PWC).
105 Establish and (with the assistance of appropriate warfare commanders and coordinators) promul-
gate policies for force:
106 Promulgate a force Communications Plan, including alternate plans, designating circuits and fre-
quencies and establishing guard requirements and circuit priorities.
107 During periods of tension, request the Rules of Engagement (ROE) appropriate to his mission from
higher authority.
108 Formulate and promulgate plans for power projection and operations against land targets in conjunc-
tion with appropriate commanders.
111 Designate a Submarine Operations Coordinating Authority (SOCA) to coordinate with the Subma-
rine Operations Authority (SUBOPAUTH) and assigned submarines.
112 Provide for submarine tactical communication requirements in the overall communications plan (OP-
TASK COMMS). Ensure all aircraft and surface ship circuit operators are aware of GUERRILLA pro-
cedures.
113 When appropriate, ensure that a Submarine Element Coordinator (SEC) (or Submarine Advisory
Team (SAT) if additional personnel are required) is available to commanders serving as SOCA.
114 Specify procedures for consolidation of SOCA responsibilities when joining task groups with each
having submarines assigned.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
NO. FUNCTIONS
FUNCTIONS
(Which may be delegated to a warfare commander/coordinator)
122 Promulgating the policy for, and when authorized, directing the employment of nuclear weapons.
123 Formulating and promulgating general safety policy or assigned units including policy for air-
craft/units joining the force.
124 Providing air, surface, and subsurface units as available to appropriate PWCs, coordinating their re-
spective efforts and, when necessary, resolving conflicting requirements.
126 Designating position and intended movement (PIM), disposition and force surveillance areas, and
maneuvering the force.
127 With other appropriate commanders, arranging for coordination of air, surface, and subsurface sur-
veillance with other friendly forces operating within or adjacent to the force surveillance area.
128 Specifying desired search efforts outside the established force surveillance area, requesting addi-
tional assets as necessary.
130 From all information available obtained from external sources and/or PWCs, resolving any existing
conflict, and constructing, displaying, and passing to the force a composite picture of the tactical
situation.
131 Evaluating information to establish probability areas/sectors for air, surface, and subsurface threats.
134 Requesting support submarines as required. (Not applicable if submarines are permanently as-
signed to the task group.)
135 Coordinating submarine and task force/group Waterspace Management (WSM) requirements with
SUBOPAUTH.
136 Providing SUBOPAUTH long-term submarine employment requirements and coordinating information.
137 Promulgating communications procedures and protocols required for submarine operations applica-
ble to the specific scenario. (See ATP 18.)
138 Promulgating or otherwise ensuring all elements of the force, including nonorganic support units,
have the effective SUBOPAUTH WSM Allocation and Status message for the area in which they are
operating.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
NO. FUNCTIONS
139 Providing assigned submarines with tailored intelligence support by Force Summary message by
tactical communications or via the SUBOPAUTH for relay on the submarine broadcast.
140 As required, exchanging on-scene tactical coordination and intelligence information with assigned
submarines. Maintaining an updated Force Situation Report for immediate relay on tactical circuits.
142 Overseeing on-scene operations to ensure submarine safety from attack by friendly forces.
143 When delegated by the SUBOPAUTH, assuming tactical control (TACON) of designated submarines.
Note
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
a. Position: NOTE
2108 (NR) ALTITUDE OR DEPTH (4) Depth of all objects in water, in-
cluding bottom depth and thermal fea-
When reporting positions, it may be appro- tures, in meters with feet or fathoms
priate to include an altitude or depth report. (as appropriate) in brackets using con-
version of 1 meter = 3.28 feet and
a. Altitude. If an accurate altitude of any rounded off to the nearest meter when
air track cannot be determined, estimated altitude exact figures are required. When using
is to be reported using the appropriate APP 7 only approximate figures the conver-
brevity code words (i.e., VERY LOW, LOW, sion may be rounded off accordingly
MEDIUM, HIGH, VERY HIGH). (e.g.: 250 fm should be rounded off to
450 m rather than 457 m).
(1) Friendly Air Tracks. The altitude of
friendly aircraft can be reported using the (5) Thickness of ice — centimeters
words ANGELS (in thousands of feet; e.g., and/or meters.
ANGELS 1 DECIMAL 5 is 1,500 feet) or
HEIGHT (in feet, e.g., HEIGHT 400 is 400 (6) Temperatures — degrees Celsius.
feet) or using the International Civil Aeronauti-
cal Organization (ICAO) term FLIGHT · The standard units above are not to
LEVEL (e.g., FLIGHT LEVEL 250 is 25,000 be confused with the code words
feet). RANGE and ALTITUDE. For
safety purposes during the transi-
(2) Other Air Tracks. The altitude of tion period, the depth of all objects
other air tracks can be reported using the word will be in meters followed by feet or
ALTITUDE (in hundreds of feet; e.g., ALTI- fathoms in brackets.
CHANGE OF Yes No— Present Leg Yes 1. Combatant Yes Yes 1. Combatant
AXIS See Note of Zigzag Formation Formation
2. All Screens 2. All Screens
CHANGE OF Yes No— Present Leg Yes 1. Combatant Yes Yes 1. Combatant
FORMATION See Note of Zigzag Formation Formation
OR 2. All Screens 2. All Screens
DISPOSITION
SEARCH Yes Yes Base Yes Search Line No Yes Search Line
TURN Course
NOTE: If the signal “CEASE ZIGZAG, RESUME BASE COURSE” is ordered concurrently with either a change in formation
or disposition, or a rotation of axis, ships may proceed to their own station and resume base course when in station if it is
safe and quicker to do so.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(b) If possible, units should simultane- (c) In Both of the Above Cases, main-
ously change speed with the alteration of tain new course until the ship is at least
course by an increase or decrease of at least 3 1,000 yards clear of its original track when
knots. torpedoes were first detected. This will take
the ship clear of a possible torpedo pattern.
(c) Units should not be steady with the
contact within 15° of the bow if towed de- (2) Torpedo Reported by Other Units.
coys are streamed and activated.
(a) If the position of the firing subma-
(d) If towed decoys are not streamed, rine is not known, a single ship should nor-
they should be streamed and employed in mally turn stern towards the reporting unit
accordance with current employment doc- and increase to maximum speed to clear the
trine for the decoy in use. torpedo danger area; escorts should not ex-
ceed maximum sonar speed. If the position
d. Torpedo Countermeasures To Be of the firing submarine is known and it is
Executed When a Torpedo Is Detected. not clear whether or not the reporting unit is
the target, then a single ship should carry
(1) Torpedo Detected By Own Units. out torpedo countermeasures in accordance
On detecting a torpedo, units should increase with paragraph 2310d(1).
to maximum speed, except that escorts should
not exceed maximum sonar speed, and activate (b) The OTC of a multiship main body
decoys. is to maneuver the force clear of the threat.
CHAPTER 3
Disposition of Forces
SECTION I — FORMATIONS
3100 (NR) SCOPE way is in no way related to the block numbers pre-
scribed in subparagraph a. above.
This section describes types of formations
for operational use. Basic rules for ordering are in e. Signaling. An operational purpose
ATP 1, Vol. II. Where special rules and proce- formation is signaled by using the FORM pennant
dures are necessary (e.g., for replenishment), followed by the formation number and purpose
these are detailed in following articles. letter(s). The use of the purpose letter(s) simplifies
the procedure when reforming because of the rule
3105 (NC) BASIC SYSTEM OF that when shifting from a basic “ready” formation
FORMATIONS to an antiair warfare or nuclear defense formation
there is usually no change in the Guide, course,
a. In the interests of flexibility and simplic- speed, or axis. A signal is also available to facili-
ity, this section prescribes certain basic “ready” tate forming the type formations described in sub-
formations and provides tables with each that list paragraph c. Above.
station assignments for varying numbers and
types of ships. 3106 (NC) FORMING
b. Numbering. Operational purpose for- The OTC specifies the appropriate forma-
mations are allocated formation numbers from 20 tion for the existing tactical and operational situa-
to 99, with formations designed for similar pur- tion, the Guide, course, speed, axis, and ships’
poses allocated numbers from the same block (see station assignments. The OTC may direct subordi-
Table 3-1). The purpose of a formation is indi- nate commanders to assign stations to their re-
cated by appending the appropriate purpose and spective ships. Upon execution of the signal to
identification letter(s) as required to the formation form an operational formation, ships shall move to
number (see Table 3-1). Numbers not allocated in their new stations independently, hoisting station
this chapter may be used as desired by appropriate numbers by day when ordered (see ATP 1, Vol.
authority. II). Units already formed will be maneuvered by
order of their unit commanders when the forma-
c. Basic Types. Formations 50 and 51 tion ordered is linear in nature and the new forma-
are basic “ready” formations. They are designed tion can be achieved by a unit maneuver.
so that antiair warfare (except for 50) and nuclear
defense formations can be assumed with mini- 3107 (NC) MANEUVERING
mum delay. The appropriate antiair warfare and
nuclear defense formations are indicated by the a. Course and Axis Changes. Forma-
suffixes “V” and “Z” respectively. Other basic tion axis changes are indicated and illustrated in
formations (circular destroyer, replenishment, Article 3115. Disposition course and axis changes
amphibious group sector, and departure and entry should for simplicity ordinarily be given in multi-
formations) are also included in this chapter. ples of 5°. When the disposition axis is rotated, the
OTC of each formation is to maneuver his forma-
d. Additional Types. Additional type tion to resume the station relative to the old axis.
formations may be specified by type commanders Unless the rotation is a small one, the maneuver
for use by ship types not included in the main allo- will take a long time to complete.
cations above. These are indicated by prefixing
ship type indicator letters to the number of the for- b. Change in Organization or Com-
mation (see Table 3-1). The number used in this position of the Force. When any change in the
listed type or task organization is issued by the
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
by the number of the circle on which it lies fol- b. Ready (R) Formations. These pro-
lowed by its direction relative to the formation vide a compromise between optimum subsurface
axis measured clockwise from 000° to 359°. and optimum air protection. They may be readily
shifted to either a cruising or antiair warfare for-
c. Taking Station. Upon execution of mation. They retain acceptable protection against
the signal to form a circular formation, ships move all threats while permitting maximum offensive
to their new stations independently and, when or- operations.
dered, are to hoist station numbers by day.
c. Antiair Warfare (V) Formations.
d. Stationing Units of More Than These provide protection against medium-speed,
One Ship. A unit stationed in a circular forma- medium-altitude aircraft, when there is little like-
tion is normally a single ship, but exceptions will lihood that nuclear weapons will be employed;
occur when it becomes necessary for a unit con- defense against higher performance aircraft can
sisting of more than one ship to occupy a station. best be achieved by employing AAW dispositions
Unit(s) so stationed shall not be of such size as to (such as 2V) which combine the advantages of
hamper adjacent units(s) and shall take station dispersion (to reduce the effectiveness of nuclear
according to tactical requirements (see ATP 1, attack) with decentralization of control and
Vol. II). defense in depth (to obtain warning and time
in which to act with CAP and missiles). These
e. Rotating Formation Axis. The di- principles are covered in Chapter 7. Antiair war-
rection of a formation axis is rotated by signaling a fare formations are assumed when an air attack is
new direction; the axis then rotates by the shortest probable, but plans for assuming them should be
way to the new direction. A formation axis is not made in advance to ensure electromagnetic com-
to be rotated more than 60° in one step. Figure 3-2 patibility of ships with missile systems.
illustrates rotation of the axis when the Guide is in
station zero and Figure 3-3 illustrates rotation when d. Nuclear Defense (Z) Formations.
the Guide is not in station zero. (For ease of com- These are designed to minimize nuclear blast
parison, ships are in the same initial stations and damage by dispersion. The mutual support af-
the formation axis is rotated 30° in both figures.) forded by surface-to-air missiles replaces that
formerly afforded by antiaircraft guns in close
3120 (NC) OPERATIONAL FORMATIONS formations; random steering and higher speeds
compensate for the reduction in effectiveness of
Formations more complex than linear and close ASW measures. Nuclear defense formations
circular formations are used to fulfill operational are assumed when nuclear attack is probable and
purposes, such as carrier or amphibious opera- are ordered as a passive measure or as one of the
tions, surface action, and replenishment at sea, and antiair warfare (V) dispositions described in para-
must provide for effective action in a multithreat graph c.
environment. Because of the inherent element of
surprise, submarines, FPBs, guided missiles, and e. Formations Containing Surface-
aircraft are predominant threats. to-Surface Missile Capable Ships. Forma-
tions containing surface-to-surface missile capa-
3121 (NC) BROAD OPERATIONAL ble ships should optimize missile strike capability
CATEGORIES while minimizing mutual interference between
force AAW posture and antisurface ship missile
a. Cruising (C) ASW Formations. capabilities.
These provide the best protection against the sub-
surface threat by making the most effective use of 3122 — 3124 SPARE
ASW units.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
Figure 3-3. (NU) Rotating Formation Axis, Guide Not in Station Zero
3125 (NU) TYPICAL OPERATIONAL one. Upon execution, the ship which will occupy
FORMATIONS station one will become the Guide. While the for-
mation is forming, the Guide maintains course and
3126 (NC) DESTROYER TYPE speed, unless otherwise directed, and indicates
FORMATIONS course and speed by information signal. Station
assignments are normally the same as the ship’s
a. The formations in this article are appro- allocated sequence number. The commander or-
priate for use by destroyer type ships when operat- dering the formation should assign stations when-
ing in separate formations. ever there is any question. Station coordinates are
read from Figure 3-4 opposite the station number
b. Formation 20 — Destroyer Type and under the number of ships in the formation.
Circular Formation is designed for use when
operating in an area where air attack is probable c. Formations 21 Through 24 Are
(for example, on picket station). The course and Special Formations. They are illustrated in
formation axis coincide upon forming, the axis Figure 3-5.
passing from formation center through station
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
3128 (NC) REPLENISHMENT the first ship to starboard of the center of the line
FORMATIONS on the replenishment course is the Guide.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(2) Fueling Destroyers. With good sea (3) If one side of the delivering/supplying
conditions, destroyers may be fueled from heavy ship is in use (Figure 3-11), escorts from the
ships or fast oilers at speeds up to 20 knots. wing station on the engaged side of the service
unit proceed to the lifeguard station, to the along-
(3) Transferring Mail And Person- side station, then to the wing station on the un-
nel. Under good sea conditions, light mail can engaged side of the delivering/supplying ship.
be transferred between ships at speeds up to 25
knots and heavy materials and personnel at (4) If both sides of the delivering/supply-
speeds up to 16 knots. ing ship are in use (Figure 3-12), escorts from
the port (even) side of the screen rotate in suc-
f. Ordering the Replenishment cession from the port wing station, to the life-
Formation. guard station, to the port alongside station, then
to station number 2 in the screen. Escorts from
(1) The OTC will inform the commander the starboard (odd) side of the screen rotate in
of the other force, in advance, of: succession from the starboard wing station,
then to station number 1 in the screen.
(a) The replenishment formation to be
adopted, and the direction of the formation (5) Refer to Figure 3-13 for example of re-
axis. plenishment procedures when two delivering
ships are used.
(b) The replenishment course and
speed. (6) Screen units are to rig the appropriate
side before commencing the approach. They
(2) Even though the force commander may must be alert to the progress of the units en-
be junior to the RAS force commander, the gaged in replenishment. They should also be
former’s desires should determine the course prepared in advance for rapid rigging of the op-
and speed of the formation under normal posite side of the ship to preclude any delays
circumstances. due to rerigging should the receiving side be
changed immediately prior to going alongside.
g. Underway Replenishment of Es-
corts. These procedures provide for the orderly (7) Ships alongside must be meticulous in
replenishment of ships, making optimum use of the use of PREP. All signals will be repeated by
the delivering/supplying ship, and maintaining flashing light or voice transmission addressed
maximum antisubmarine protection of the replen- to the next ship to follow alongside.
ishment formation.
(8) Screen ships are to proceed when
(1) Normal replenishment speeds are in relieved at screen stations unless otherwise
the range of 12 to 15 knots. When a sufficient ordered.
number of escorts are available, it is desirable
to employ pickets to provide defense in depth. (9) In some tactical situations, it may be
Usually, however, when all round coverage is advantageous to assign one ship as lifeguard for
required, the scarcity of escorts permits only the replenishment. If so, the procedures shown
the establishment and maintenance of a main in Figure 3-14 will be used when only one side
screen. of the delivering/supplying ship is rigged.
When both sides of the delivering/supplying
(2) The first approach units and an initial ship are rigged, procedures shown in Figure
lifeguard are to be designated. 3-15 are used.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
Figure 3-11. (NU) Replenishment of Escorts — One Side of Delivery/Supplying Ship in Use
(Lifeguard Next Alongside)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
Figure 3-12. (NU) Replenishment of Escorts — Both Sides of Delivering/Supplying Ship in Use
(Lifeguard Next Alongside to Port)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
Figure 3-14. (NU) Replenishment of Escorts — One Side of Delivering/Supplying Ship in Use
(Lifeguard Not Replenishing)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
Figure 3-15. (NU) Replenishment of Escorts — Both Sides of Delivering/Supplying Ship in Use
(Lifeguard Not Replenishing)
SECTION II — DISPOSITIONS
The disposition OTC specifies the disposi- Instructions for maneuvering dispositions
tion, guide group, course, speed, axis, and group are in relevant articles.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
3212 (NC) SPECIAL DISPOSITION 2W compromise may result in escorts being sta-
tioned at ranges other than the optimum for an-
a. Description. Special Disposition 2W tiair warfare.)
is a multi-purpose disposition which may be used
during the run-in or strike phase of carrier task (4) Types of gun or missile systems fitted
group operations. It is designed to satisfy the fol- in the forces.
lowing requirements:
(5) Types of air attack expected.
(1) Dispersal of forces to protect against air
attack. (6) Degree of deception required.
(2) Disguise of the exact positions of valu- (7) Electronic emission policy desired.
able heavy units.
(8) For close-in stationing, consideration
(3) Use of random courses or speeds by should be given to electromagnetic compatibil-
units of the disposition in order to confuse at- ity of the missile ships.
tack aircraft, search and submarines.
(9) Predicted sensor performance under
(4) Mutual support. existing or expected environmental conditions.
(3) Relative subsurface, air, and surface (4) Keeping the missile ships clear of the
threats. (As a submarine threat normally exists, position of maximum friendly air activity.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(5) Keeping the missile ships in good data (4) Station assignments.
transmission or voice communication with the
major units. (5) Radius of particular stations (if not
equal to disposition circle spacing).
h. Stationing of Radar Pickets. These
ships are to be stationed an appropriate distance k. Maneuvering Instructions.
from disposition center at predetermined rather
than randomly selected positions. (1) Scheduled changes of course and speed
(according to the PIM) are to be executed
i. Stationing of Other ASW Ships. without further signal by all units at the time
These ships may be stationed as SAUs to provide indicated.
ASW support. These stations may be changed by
the ASWC or screen commander as appropriate (2) The disposition may be maneuvered as
and as necessary to combat the submarine threat, a whole or individual units may maneuver as
advising the OTC as practicable. desired to avoid known submarine positions.
j. Disposition Orders. The following (3) Carriers, SAUs, and plane guards turn
instructions are to be included when ordering Dis- toward or away from each attack as appropriate
position 2W: at high speed to expedite change of station be-
tween SAU stations and plane guard station.
(1) Disposition circle spacing (in miles).
(4) Station-keeping is by own dead reckon-
(2) Force PIM. ing, satellite, or other navigational techniques.
Accurate navigation is essential, especially in
(3) Disposition center if other than force dispersed formations.
PIM.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(5) ASW Units. Surface escorts and/or SAAWC’s ship. Possible arcs of missile fire are
fixed and rotary-wing ASW aircraft are provided shown to illustrate the desirability of close-in sta-
for carriers and antiair warfare ships commen- tioning to achieve mutual support. Stationing of
surate with the submarine threat and ASW force the missile hips is based on consideration of the
available. These units conform to the movements threat and types of missile ships available. In the
of the ship being screened. Although Disposition example shown, the missile ships are on the 20-
2V is based on the air threat being greater, all mile circle. Surface pickets, AEW pickets, and
ASW measures should be taken that do not con- ASW units are stationed using the principles set
flict with antiair warfare needs. forth and illustrated in Disposition 2V. In the ex-
ample shown, four medium range and four short
3215 (NC) ANTIAIR WARFARE range missile ships are used. In disposition 3V
DISPOSITION (INCLUDING (see Figure 3-20) station assignments are indi-
MISSILE SHIPS) 3V cated in positions relative to the disposition axis
(AAW axis). However, AAW stations assign-
a. Description. Disposition 3V features ments will be promulgated using TRUE bearings
defense in depth and decentralized control, similar in every case.
to Disposition 2V, but is designed for the use of
missile ships as well a CAP (see Figure 3-20). 3216 (NR) CIRCULAR DISPOSITIONS
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(3) Sector boundaries may be crossed to (4) Are responsible for immediate actions
prosecute submarine or surface contacts. to counter any threat in their sectors, calling for
assistance if required. They should also con-
(4) The OTC will pass joining information sider detaching HVUs to a disengaged sector.
to units including sector allocations and sector HVUs so detached are to report to the sector
commander. Sector commanders are then to al- commander of their new sector.
locate stations within their sector or formation.
j. Position and Intended Movement
(5) Replenishment units will normally (PIM). The OTC will signal the base course and
be moved between sectors for RAS(L)(A). speed, and any zigzag for a unit at the formation
Sequence will be ordered by the OTC or CTG. center. Sector commanders are to maneuver the
groups or units in their sector as required by the
h. Communications. Generally all units policies in force and as required to respond to a
should use the same tactical COMPLAN within a threat. Zigzags may be ordered for HVUs.
CARTWHEEL formation, or within a sector of
3218 (NC) 4W DISPOSITION axis, the letters I and O are omitted. Lettering is
A to Z (less I and O).
a. Description. Disposition 4W pro-
vides a framework for operating forces in widely (3) Larger segments are described by com-
dispersed groups. It can be used to assign Battle binations of the inclusive alphanumeric boxes
Group(s)/Task Group(s)/Task Unit(s)/Task Ele- which include that segment (e.g., segment
ment(s)/individual units to a specified dispersed PQ1516 defines a 20 nm X 20 nm segment con-
operating area relative to a Force PIM. It can be taining subsegments P15, P16, Q15, Q16).
used to define surveillance areas, execute inter-
cept of hostile units, prevent mutual interference (4) The disposition axis is oriented parallel
and execute operational deception (OPDEC). to the lettered lanes. Normally, the disposition
axis is parallel to PIM track to allow efficient
b. Terminology. positioning of screen forces in the van of the
disposition. However, if the PIM course changes
(1) Disposition 4W. This refers to the frequently, or the nature of the threat does not
entire Grid as illustrated in Figure 3-21. require positioning of screen forces in the van,
or the type of friendly forces assigned (e.g.,
(2) Segment. Any square within the merchant convoy) precludes changing the axis
Grid. The term segment is used to avoid confu- with PIM course changes, then it may be sim-
sion with AAW Sectors or formation/screen pler to orient the axis to an appropriate bearing
stations. Large segments can be identified by and keep it constant regardless of PIM.
specifying the borders of the segment.
(5) The geometric center of the grid is
(3) Line. The boundaries dividing the seg- Point N13. Unless otherwise designated this
ments in either direction (e.g., Line AB or Line will also be disposition center and PIM origin.
0405).
d. Execution. Disposition 4W will nor-
(4) Lane. The area between two specified mally be ordered by instructions in the OPGEN/
lines (e.g., Lane C or Lane 04). A number of OPTASKs or other appropriate messages. The OTC
lanes can be grouped together (e.g., Lane LN). or designated warfare commander will specify
Included lanes need not be designated. segment assignments for all groups/units. These
assignments must be made in close coordination
(5) Point. Intersection of Grid lines. A with other warfare commanders/coordinators.
point is described as the southwest corner of a Segment assignments may be executed by tactical
single square segment with the Grid oriented voice signal using the “STATION S” signal.
north, (e.g., Point C19 is at the intersection of
Line BC and Line 18-19). e. Group Formation. The commander
of each group in the disposition is responsible for
c. Grid Construction. his group’s formation/screen within his assigned
segment whenever more than one ship is assigned.
(1) The 4W Disposition Grid, as shown in Unless otherwise directed, a group may maneuver
Figure 3-21, is 240 nm X 240 nm and is divided anywhere within its assigned segment.
into 10 nm X 10 nm square segments. If a larger
or smaller disposition is required the OTC/ f. Disposition Guide. Normally, there
CWC can use a portion of Disposition 4W, will not be a “Disposition Guide.” The disposition
change the size of the squares, or add new lanes moves with PIM. Therefore, all formations in Dis-
in ascending alphanumeric order. position 4W maneuver with PIM within their as-
signed segment. The OTC/CWC will designate a
(2) The 10 nm X 10 nm segments are de- disposition center (normally Point N13) and a dis-
scribed by the letter and number which include position axis which establishes the position and
that segment (e.g., H24). In labeling the lettered orientation of the Grid to PIM.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
g. Communications. The OTC must be The following procedures apply to grid reorien-
capable of communicating with each group at any tation with planned PIM changes.
time. If EMCON precludes HF communications,
the OTC must establish alternate communication (a) Large Axis Changes. A large
links. The following communications considera- axis change is any change in which rotation
tions pertain: results in different segment locations for a
unit or group. In this event, the following
(1) Common HF/SATCOM circuits should procedures may be used:
be designated for intergroup communications.
Each group may be assigned separate UHF i. Reassign Grid Squares. This
frequencies for intragroup communications. is done by overlaying the new Grid ori-
entation over the old and determining
(2) Warfare commanders should be able what the new segment assignments
to communicate with all units (regardless of should be. Such reassignments should
groups) having primary capability in their war- be included in the signal executing the
fare function. axis change. This procedure eliminates
any requirements to maneuver. How-
h. Maneuvering Procedures. ever, units may not be correctly aligned
to threat axis.
(1) Segment Changes. Periodically, it
will be necessary to change segment assignments. ii. Retain Original Grid Seg-
To minimize mutual interference or possible ment Assignments. This procedure
hostile action against friendly forces, intra-grid will require most units to maneuver to
maneuvers should be ordered by tactical signal. new Grid locations. The time required
This signal may be transmitted initially over a to perform this maneuver will vary and
voice circuit, and should be followed up by record may be considerable.
traffic. It is essential that all commanders/warfare
commanders and the SOCA be made aware of the (b) Small Axis Changes. When
details of the change. the disposition axis is rotated, the com-
mander of each group is to maneuver his
(2) Shadowing and Marking. Units formation to remain in its assigned seg-
will frequently be tasked to conduct surveillance ment. If the before and after position of the
or shadowing in a particular segment of the Grid. segments is such that all ships remain
Units conducting such missions should avoid within their original segment, no additional
entering segments assigned to other groups or procedures are required. A larger course
units. After arrival in a specified segment, the change can be accommodated using this
movement of a unit will be largely determined method by dividing it into a series of smaller
by the target of interest it is following. Hence, course changes over a period of time.
these units should notify their warfare com-
mander of their entry into unassigned segments (4) Immediate Course Changes.
as soon as it can be forecast.
(a) Normally such changes should be
(3) Planned Course Changes. The made with a TURN signal. The 4W Dispo-
OTC’s OPGEN normally will specify task force sition axis is not changed and all units and
PIM. The disposition will move with PIM and groups maintain the same true bearing and
the disposition axis will be PIM track unless oth- range from disposition center as before.
erwise specified. The OTC or SOCA is responsi- Disposition center moves off PIM in direc-
ble for relaying appropriate information to tion of the turn at ordered speed.
support submarines and the SUBOPAUTH.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
b. Skeleton Screen. Screen units are (2) Characteristics of the area of operations:
disposed relative to a rectangular main body or
convoy and patrol stations or ordered lines. (a) Distances (to own and enemy
bases, to own and enemy supporting forces).
c. Helicopter Windline Screen. A
helicopter screen is provided for a carrier tempo- (b) Oceanographic factors (water
rarily during flight operations, relative to the carri- depth, marine life, wrecks, sonar conditions,
er’s track into the wind. and currents).
(b) Main body or convoy (composi- (2) Effective screen coordination is re-
tion, size and spacing, speed, maneuver- quired between the various warfare command-
ability, defensive capabilities). ers and the screen commander.
(c) Support forces (pickets, aircraft, (3) The requirement for early detection of
surface forces, submarines, auxiliaries). threats and the selection of the appropriate
response.
c. Opposing Courses of Action.
(4) Outer screen surface units should not
(1) Enemy’s overall specific objectives. be stationed too near the limit of the main
body’s radar cover. When these units are lost on
(2) Own courses of action. radar and reappear during a confused situation,
they run the risk of being engaged by friendly
3312 (NC) STATIONING SCREEN UNITS forces.
a. Inner Screen. In addition to its ASW (5) The stern sector must not be
advantages, particularly against diesel subma- forgotten.
rine torpedo attacks, an inner screen provides
the best concentration of defensive fire and may 3313 — 3319 SPARE
be the only possible formation with a small
number of screen units. The risk of confusion is 3320 (NU) DESCRIPTION OF SCREENS
reduced over that which is likely to be incurred
when friendly forces are dispersed. Screen units 3321 (NC) SECTOR SCREEN
stationed from 5 to 7 nm from the main body are
unlikely to detect FPBs on radar before they reach a. Description. The center is ZZ or QQ,
optimum firing range. The inherent disadvantages unless otherwise ordered. Sectors are allocated by
of the inner screen may be alleviated when air- indicating sector boundaries and sector depth
craft are used to provide radar early warning and (separated by a tack) followed by the call sign of
distant ASW forces are used to provide early the unit assigned to that sector (see Figure 3-23).
warning of submarine contacts.
(1) Sector Boundaries are ordered by a
b. Outer Screen. An outer screen may group of four numerals. First two numerals in-
provide a more effective defense against the an- dicate the true bearing of the left boundary in
ticipated threat than an inner screen would. The tens of degrees; the second two numerals indi-
long-range, passive detection capability of sup- cate the true bearing of the right boundary in
port submarines, sonobuoy-equipped ASW air- tens of degrees.
craft, and towed array surface ships provides a
reasonable ASW search coverage of a large area (2) Sector Depth is also ordered by a
and platform acoustic covertness inhibits the ene- group of four numerals. First two numerals in-
my’s ability to maneuver to avoid detection. These dicate the inner limit and the second two the
units may be stationed in the order of 25 to 100 nm outer limit of the sector in thousands of yards
from the main body as an outer screen to counter from the screen center.
the threat of the medium-range, missile-equipped
submarine and to provide an initial line for de- -EXAMPLE-
fense in depth against submarine torpedo attacks.
Note that submarines are assigned stationary areas SCREEN K–ZZ–0307–0510 c/s DD 4
and are never used in moving screens. The search
capability of these units is reduced when they are Meaning: DD 4 is allocated a sector
employed in inner screens. Other factors to con- 030° to 070° true, depth 5,000 to
sider with an outer screen are: 10,000 yards from ZZ.
(1) Coordination of the outer screen units (3) Increments of 5° or 500 yards are
may be complicated by a lack of communica- ordered by using ANS.
tions capability.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
Table 3-5. (NU) Determining Sector Size for ASW Unit in a Sector Screen
Main Escort AHEAD BOW ABEAM QUARTER ASTERN Factors are based
Body (335 to 025) (025 to 255) (065 to 115) (115 to 155) (155 to 205) on estimated sub-
or (295 to 335) (245 to 295) (205 to 245) marine approach
Convoy speeds (knots) of:
INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Enter table with speeds used and bearing of intended sector to find factor.
2. To find sector frontal width, multiply escort’s TSR by the factor.
3. Sector depth — for ships, multiply TSR by 4/3 using at least 3,000 yards; for helicopters, use 4,000 yards.
4. Use sector frontal width and sector depth to construct a sector as shown in Figure 3-30.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
3323 (NC) HELICOPTER WINDLINE the screen commander should order the cruising
SCREEN screen to be formed so that the screening units are
in their cruising stations as the Guide passes point
Available helicopters are ordered to sec- O. (See Chapter 2.) Sufficient time should be al-
tors, stations, or patrol lines ahead of a carrier lowed so that screening ships do not proceed at a
launching or recovering aircraft. The break-dip speed higher than optimum sonar speed and are
position is to be at least 5,000 yards from the car- able to employ tactical countermeasures while
rier at all times. A helicopter windline screen may taking up their cruising stations.
be ordered by using either the sector method or by
stationing the helicopter(s) relative to the carrier. b. The two methods of ordering departure/
entry screens are sector and grid. The choice between
3324 (NC) DEPARTURE AND ENTRY them depends only on convenience of ordering in
SCREENS their particular geographic location.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
3330 (NC) MANEUVERING WITH A and must not exceed 90°. Caution must be exer-
SECTOR SCREEN cised to ensure that large shifts do not result in
screen units hindering the main body and a re-
a. Conduct of Ship Screen Units. duction in screen protection for an excessive
Units are to patrol widely throughout their sectors period of time.
and when a subsurface threat exists, to choose that
speed which makes for the best use of sonar in the (2) Changing Depth of Sector. When
conditions prevailing. Units should take account the situation requires a rapid change of the screen,
of the movement of adjacent screen units in order units may be ordered to change the inner and
to avoid undue gaps. For safety reasons a unit is not outer limits of their sector in the direction of or
to close nearer than 500 yards to the boundary sepa- away from the screen center by a specified
rating its sector from one occupied by another number of thousand of yards. Such changes
unit. should not be less than 1,000 yards.
e. Adjusting the Screen. To adjust the General instructions for ordering and con-
screen, units may be ordered to shift their sector duct of screens are contained in earlier articles in
boundaries or to change the depth of their sector. If this section. Specific responsibilities of convoy
the tactical requirements are not met by adjusting, screen ships follow:
the screen must be reordered.
a. Maintaining Convoy Discipline.
(1) Shifting Sector Boundaries. Units Screen ships are to assist the convoy commodore
are ordered to shift their sector clockwise or in maintaining convoy discipline by reporting
counterclockwise by a specified number of tens ships that make smoke, show lights, lose station,
of degrees. Such shifts should be at least 10° make unauthorized use of radio, pump bilges, or
dump refuse. They are to use initiative and warn 3334 (NC) CONTROL OF SCREEN
merchant ships directly when immediate action is HELICOPTERS
necessary, informing the OTC and convoy com-
modore of the action taken. a. Helicopter Control Unit. The OTC
(or screen commander, if delegated) may assign
b. Maintaining Convoy Formation. the control of helicopters to one or more helicopter
Screen ships are to make every effort to keep ships control units (HCUs). The duties of the HCU are
in their proper stations. The OTC may order a the same as those of an ACU. In the case of a
screen ship to escort one or more scattered ships; windline screen, the OTC should order the number
he may also remedy poor station keeping by order- of helicopters required and designate the carrier as
ing screen ships to lead the flank columns of the HCU. Helicopters may also be ordered to operate
convoy until individual merchant ships have re- independently.
gained station. OTCs must report merchant ship
casualties by a MERCASREP. b. Procedure When Helicopters Are
Employed on Screening Duties.
c. Action When Ship Is Damaged. A
screen ship on observing that a ship has been dam- (1) The OTC (or screen commander, if
aged is immediately to report the occurrence and delegated) assigns helicopter screen stations.
the cause, if known, to the OTC, and at night, if
possible, is to fire two white rockets. It must not be (2) The OTC (or screen commander, if
assumed that the OTC is aware of a ship being delegated) normally allocates one or more heli-
damaged until the fact has been reported to him. copters to each HCU.
adjustment of the screen, and contacts obtained by 3340 (NU) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
other units, are all required by helicopters in the
screen. 3341 (NC) INSTRUCTIONS FOR
INDIVIDUAL SCREEN UNITS
3335 (NC) PICKETS
a. Report on Joining a Screen. On
a. Ordering. Picket stations are ordered joining, the commanding officer is to report to the
either by true bearing and distance from screen OTC and screen commander any defect that af-
center or by the sector method. When fixed-wing fects his operational capability and his fuel state.
aircraft are employed as pickets, airplans from
Chapter 8 may be used. b. Rejoining the Screen. Units rejoin-
ing a screen are to proceed to their previously as-
b. Maneuvering. The true bearings and signed station, unless otherwise ordered.
ranges of picket stations do not change with altera-
tions of course by the main body or convoy. If new c. Replenishment of Screen Units.
picket stations are desired, the OTC (or screen When screen units are to conduct replenishment,
commander, if delegated) should order them well the procedure will be as follows:
in advance of the alteration of course.
(1) Screen ships are to proceed when re-
c. AAW Pickets. For further details of lieved at screen station unless otherwise ordered.
tasking and maneuvering pickets in the AAW role,
see Chapter 7 and ATP 31. (2) Remaining screen units act in accor-
dance with subparagraph f below.
3336 (NC) TOWED ARRAY SHIPS IN THE
SCREEN (3) Screen units rejoining after replenish-
ment act in accordance with subparagraph b
The procedures for stationing surface ships above.
equipped with towed array systems are similar to
those for other surface ships with the following (4) Screen helicopters may be refueled by
additional considerations. surface units.
a. TAS Ship. The TAS ship may require d. Bad Weather Conditions. If, during
at least 2 hours to localize and attack passive con- bad weather, a screen unit is unable to maintain the
tacts. The dimensions of the patrol station as- speed necessary to accomplish the task without
signed should therefore include an allowance for damage or serious effects on its sensor perform-
at least 2 hours of force movement along the PIM. ance, the commanding officer is to report to the
In addition, a requirement to conduct Sprint and OTC (or screen commander, if delegated) the
Search Tactics may require elongation of a sector. maximum speed he can maintain.
b. TAS Ship Stations. TAS ship sta- e. Equipment Failure. Any sensor or
tions may be designated to include the ASW func- weapon system failure in a screen unit is to be re-
tion and for suitably equipped units those of EW, ported immediately to the OTC (or screen com-
or ASUW, or AAW pickets. mander, if delegated) and to adjacent units,
including the estimated time at which repairs will
(1) TAS equipped ships may also be em- be completed. A gap caused by this failure is to be
ployed in stationary patrol areas for operations covered, as far as possible, by adjacent units by ad-
such as entry/departure screens and defended justing their patrol without leaving their assigned
lanes. sectors, stations, or patrol lines, unless the screen
commander decides to adjust or reorder the
(2) More detailed explanations of TAS screen.
ship employment are found in Chapter 9 of
ATP 28. f. Filling a Gap. If a screen unit leaves
the screen, units in sectors, stations, or patrol lines
3337 — 3339 SPARE adjacent to it are to maneuver in their sector,
station, or patrol line so as to cover as much of the the carrier leave their sectors, stations, or patrol
gap as possible. They will leave their sector, sta- lines to screen the carrier.
tion, or patrol line only if ordered to do so.
j. Taking Up or Changing Sectors or
g. Right of Way. Ships of the main body Patrol Lines. Ships should proceed at maximum
or convoy have right of way over screen ships, un- sonar speed or operational speed as the tactical
less the latter are in contact with submarines. A situation dictates.
helicopter in the dip or hover is not to be ap-
proached by ships within 500 yards. k. Station Keeping by Helicopter. A
helicopter should be in its allocated station or sec-
h. Navigational Hazards. Individual tor at the moment of breaking dip for next jump.
ships are responsible for avoiding navigational
hazards. 3342 (NC) SCREEN ADJUSTMENT
i. Bulging the Screen. If, during ma- The OTC, or the screen commander when
neuvering a carrier by Method B (see Chapter 6), delegated this responsibility, will adjust the screen
the length of flight operations necessitates the car- whenever there is a change in the tactical situation
rier to proceed outside the screen, the screen is to or in the number of screen units available.
bulge. In this case, the two screen units ahead of
b. Promulgate threat warnings and ZIPPO e. CAP, AEW, and ASW aircraft launch
calls. and mission reports.
4147 (NC) SINGLE NET INFORMATION When lettered call signs are used, they will nor-
AND PLOTTING (SNIP) mally be assigned in the OPTASK AAW message.
Letter designators are assigned to AAW units as
This is the primary HF net used between follows:
SAAWCs to coordinate AAW measures. The
SNIP net is controlled by the AAWC. SAAWCs a. W — Collective call sign for all primary
will use other nets to affect tracking and weapon and secondary AAW units.
control functions within their respective sectors of
responsibility. b. _W — Antiair warfare commander
(AAWC) for a specific CWC organization.
4148 (NR) JOINT AAW SHORE COOR-
DINATION (JAAWSC) Remark: The first letter of this call sign is sig-
nificant and unique for the CWC organization
This net is used for selective reporting of to which the AAWC belongs. The first battle
the air picture between the air defense agency group will be allocated the letter “A,” the sec-
ashore and the AAWC and AEW aircraft, when ond “B,” etc.
appropriate. It may also be used to pass some
TASMO messages (see ATP 34) and intercontrol- c. _C — Alternate AAWC for a specific
ler and aircraft handover traffic. CWC organization. For first letter see remark
above.
4149 (NC) AAW DATA LINKS
d. D to P — Single letters for primary
a. Link 4A. Primary means of communi- AAW units.
cation between E-2C/E-3/TDS (Link 4) ships and
CAP, whether it is one-way close control, two- e. Q to R — Single letters for EW aircraft.
way close control, or one-way broadcast control.
f. S — For all ASUW units.
b. Link 11 (UHF/HF). Used to exchange
track data and weapons control information be- g. T to Z (except W) — Single letters for
tween AAW TDS equipped units and is the pri- AEW stations.
mary means by which IDZC and ODZC exchange
information. h. Dual letters for secondary reporting
units. First letter of call sign is that of primary
(1) This circuit is essential to AAW units AAW unit assigned as LAAWC. Second letter is
within a time-critical IDZ. A to Z (except I and O). Ensure call signs assigned
to secondary reporting units do not conflict with
(2) For purposes of the outer air battle those previously assigned to warfare commanders
(OAB), Link 11 net participants should be held to and coordinators.
a minimum with an AEW acting as NCS.
4151 — 4154 Spare
(3) Silent SAM units in the ODZ will receive
tactical AAW picture via Link 11 (receive only). 4155 (NC) SURFACE WARFARE
This operation permits units detecting new con- COMMUNICATIONS
tacts to get the information rapidly on the data link.
a. Surface Surveillance. Communi-
4150 (NC) AAW CALL SIGNS cation requirements for surface data compilation
are detailed below.
Encrypted or one- or two-letter call signs
may be used on AAW circuits. The OTC will b. Surface Action Group (SAG). SAG
promulgate which system will be used in his force. communications are described in Article 4157.
(3) Each towed array ship should be capa- 4171 (NC) BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
ble of coordinating the localization process AND GUIDELINES
with assigned aircraft using secure voice UHF
communications. a. Tradeoffs between covertness and coor-
dination will be necessary when conducting coor-
(4) All towed array units must be capable dinated operations. Planning should recognize
of receiving the recognized surface and subsur- that communication delays are often a necessary
face picture transmitted by the force track coor- adjunct to submarine operations. Additionally, an
dinator or other authority out to the limits of the inverse relationship exists between the time a sub-
ASW area of interest. marine spends in a communications posture
(depth and speed limited) and mission effective-
(5) A single net may meet the requirements ness, when the submarine’s tasking requires it to
of items 1 and 2. In a small force, it may also in- operate at high speed or below communications
clude the subsurface raid reporting function. depth for extended periods of time. Historically,
the submarine operational broadcast controlled by
the SUBOPAUTH is the most reliable means of
4161 (NC) SEARCH AND ATTACK UNIT providing coordination, tasking, and intelligence
(SAU) COMMUNICATIONS information to submarines. This method is often
slower than tactical communications, however, and
On dispatch of a SAU, responsibility for its provision must be made for the rapid, on-scene
communication requirements is transferred from exchange of intelligence and coordinating infor-
the OTC to the SAU commander. In general, the mation as required by the tactical situation.
existing ASW circuits will continue to be manned
by the SAU, with the remainder shifting to an al- b. Brevity. As a rule, communications
ternative ASW control frequency (Procedure AL- with submarines should be brief. Structured mes-
PHA, see ACP 176) or screen tactical frequency sage formats in APP 4, Vol. I, Chapter 3, and ATP
(Procedure BRAVO). Careful thought must be 18 are designed to contain all information required
given to the emission policy adopted by the SAU by the SUBOPAUTH and individual submarines
commander to avoid alerting hostile units to the in a concise summarization. The SUBOPAUTH
existence, composition, or position of the SAU, may edit (or screen off the submarine broadcast al-
and to this end use should be made of standard together) lengthy messages that are not specifi-
tabulated messages, such as the ASW Action Table cally oriented to the submarine’s employment.
in ATP 1, Vol. II. Single-Letter Maneuvering Sig- The objective is to avoid overloading the subma-
nals may be used for SAU action. rine communication system with message traffic
not directly relevant to submarine/task group op-
erations. Extracts of operational messages with in-
4170 (NC) SUBMARINE COMMUNI- formation may be consolidated and included in
CATIONS Support Submarine Force Summary and Situation
Report messages contained in APP 4. OPTASK
Communications with submarines differ messages, because of their length, normally are
significantly from those with other force assets not relayed via the submarine broadcast. Never-
and present the most significant challenge in ef- theless, they are important, and efforts should be
fecting mission coordination and tasking. Keys to made to provide them by a means other than the
success are reliable long-range communications submarine broadcast (e.g., mail, courier, shore/
between the task group and the SUBOPAUTH guard ship communications, etc.).
and dependable, redundant, on-scene tactical cir-
cuits for the exchange of intelligence; command, 4172 (NC) SUBMARINE BROADCAST
control, and coordinating information; and target-
ing data with assigned submarines. Planners and a. Submarines receive message traffic on an
commanders must be familiar with the submarine accountable broadcast transmitted by the SUB-
communication procedures and capabilities that OPAUTH. How the broadcast is to be used for
are addressed in detail in ATP 18. command and control of units operating with a task
group should be coordinated with the SUBOPAUTH
prior to support operations. The information trans- Table 4-2. (NU) Typical Advance Notification
mitted on the broadcast must be prioritized and coor- Requirements for Submarine Operations
dinated with the SUBOPAUTH and SOCA.
Generally, those messages containing operational
ADVANCE NO-
level tasking (e.g., SUBNOTEs) will have first EVENT TICE
priority, and those for tactical level tasking and co- (Hours)
ordination will have second priority. Messages
generated by the task group may be edited to fit on Support Submarine Request 24 to 48
the broadcast. Use of communications ZPW (auto-
Mission Change 10 to 14
matic cancellation) procedures applicable to per-
ishable information will allow early removal of Waterspace Change Notification 12 to 30
these messages from the broadcast and signifi-
cantly reduce overall traffic loading. Further in- Final Over-the-Horizon Targeting 2 to 3
formation on submarine broadcasts is contained in
ATP 18.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
b. Lead-Time Requirements. De-
pending on its role and communication schedule, The objective is to ensure tactical communication
lead time required to ensure submarine receipt of paths and coordinating instructions are clear to all
tasking, coordinating instructions, intelligence, etc., participants and that necessary and timely intelli-
can be significant. Unless the submarine is main- gence information can be rapidly exchanged be-
taining a near continuous communications connec- tween the task group and submarine.
tivity with the SOCA, plans should be based on
worst-case message delivery time and maximize use b. GUERRILLA Procedures. The code
of scheduled submarine broadcast cycles. Table word, GUERRILLA, is used by a submarine to in-
4-2 contains examples of lead-time requirements dicate that it has HIGH PRECEDENCE traffic for
based on normal broadcast cycles of 8 to 12 hours. the SOCA or a designated commander/unit in the
task group. This code word identifies the transmit-
c. Maritime Rear Link (MRL). Estab- ting ship as a submarine and is intended to alert
lishing a MRL between the OTC/SOCA and other circuit operators to clear the net as soon as
SUBOPAUTH is essential for most operations and possible. Procedures are contained in ATP 18.
will greatly simplify coordination of submarine
tasking and waterspace management requirements. c. Tactical Circuits. Communications
planning should provide for primary and secon-
d . B ARNST ORM Pro c edures. dary voice and data circuits for use with the SOCA
BARNSTORM is a single, serialized message that as well as alternate circuits for urgent communica-
may be used by the SUBOPAUTH to transmit tion with any element of the task group. The intent
submarine tasking, area assignment, waterspace is to provide the submarine a “best bet” circuit
management application, intelligence, and other op- when time is of the essence, while limiting the
erational information on the submarine broadcast. need for frequent changes in the submarine’s basic
The objective is to ensure that submarines conduct- communications plan setup. First priority should
ing communications intensive operations receive be satellite communications (if fitted), followed
all required information without placing excessive by line-of-sight UHF, and HF. Changes that do oc-
traffic load demands on the submarine broadcast. cur should be reflected in periodic Force Sum-
mary message updates.
4173 (NC) TACTICAL COMMUNI-
CATIONS d. Special Communication Win-
dows. Depending on tasking, special communi-
a. Specific tactical circuits as well as spe- cation windows outside the submarine’s normal
cial communication procedures for submarine co- broadcast cycle are generally disruptive to subma-
ordination should be identified in the OPTASK rine operations and, where possible, should be
COMMS. This information should also be in- minimized. There are occasions, however, when use
cluded in the initial request for submarine support. is appropriate; e.g., to conduct initial rendezvous
with coordinating air or surface forces, to provide to line-of-sight range and may further be re-
updated over-the-horizon cruise missile targeting duced by sea state and low-power output.
information to the submarine, or to order/confirm
implementation of a contingency plan. Requests (2) DOWNLINK.
for special communication windows may be in-
cluded in the Support Submarine Request and sub- (a) Keyed Sonar. Depending on
sequent Force Summary/SITREP messages or environmental conditions, keyed sonar
discussed directly with the submarine on tactical provides a reasonably reliable DOWN-
coordination circuits. LINK for “Bellringer.” Under good condi-
tions, high-power, low-frequency sonars
e. UPLINK/DOWNLINK Considera- can be effective if the transmitting surface
tions. Frequently, tactical situations will require ship is within 40 to 70 nm of the submarine.
immediate communications outside established PROBE ALERT, a modification to certain
communication windows. Procedures for UPLINK US sonars, provides a coded pulse capability.
and DOWNLINK should be clearly specified in Arranging specific signals to be used and
the Support Submarine Request or appropriate keeping them simple and few in number,
OPTASK (if held by the submarine) and changes before the operation, will facilitate commu-
identified in the Force Summary message. nications on both the transmitting ship and
receiving submarine. Both collective and
(1) UPLINK. individual submarine callup codes should
be considered if multiple submarines are as-
(a) SATCOM Buoys. For subma- signed to a task group. ATP 18 contains fur-
rines so equipped, SATCOM buoys can be ther details on keyed sonar employment.
used to send messages via SSIXS to the
SUBOPAUTH for relay to the SOCA. Con- (b) Sound Underwater Signal
tact reports sent via SATCOM buoy are nor- (SUS). Two general types of SUS are
mally recorded in OTH GOLD format. This available. One employs explosive charges
permits target data to be entered directly into to produce an omnidirectional, broadband
the supported force’s intelligence data base. signal. The other is nonexplosive and uses a
battery-powered device that alternately
(b) ECB/SLOT Buoys. Submarine- transmits discrete preset frequencies. Pulse
launched expendable communications length and sequence may be varied on some
buoys (ECB) and one-way tactical (SLOT) systems. Keyed sonar (PROBE ALERT)
buoys are a reliable communications option and SUS are overt acoustic communication
if the submarine must remain at search methods that can reveal the presence of the
depth. ECB/SLOT buoy use requires that an transmitting unit as well as the possible
ASW aircraft be available for monitoring. presence of a friendly submarine. Depend-
If continuous aircraft coverage cannot be ing on the scenario, geographic location,
maintained, specific monitoring periods that and EMCON plan in effect, deception tac-
will be available should be made known to tics using routine, random transmissions
the submarine. The useful range of ECB/ from unit(s) of the force should be consid-
SLOT buoy radio transmissions is limited ered whether a submarine is assigned or not.
ATP 18 contains further details on SUS
codes and employment.
(a) Read-back procedures are not to (1) A MACA, when required, will commu-
be used. nicate with and control aircraft by the following
types of communication:
(b) Secure RATT may be used on UHF
circuits, if fitted, to achieve the communicat- (a) Point-to-point communication.
ion requirements listed in paragraph b(1).
(b) Air/ground/air communication.
(3) SITREPs to OCA. If the EP permits,
the aircraft is to transmit an encrypted encoded SI- (2) During area/surveillance operations,
TREP to the OCA on completion of an incident af- MPA will be under the control of the OCA/parent
ter informing the OTC of the shift of HF channel. MACA; however, other MACAs within the
If this is not permissible while on task, the report is area should also be information addressees on
to be transmitted during the transit back to base message traffic. During Direct Support opera-
when the aircraft is at least 100 nm from the force. tions, MPA will be under the tactical control of
Detailed communication procedures that are to be the OTC.
used on direct support operations are contained in
ACP 176 and ATP 28. 4185 (NC) HELICOPTER COMMUNI-
CATIONS
c. Air/Submarine Operations.
Communications with helicopters place
(1) Communications between MPA and primary reliance upon radio, but visual signals
submarines will be primarily by UHF in the fol- may be used for short-range communication (e.g.,
lowing preferred order: in launch and recovery operations) when a restric-
tive emission policy is in force. Helicopter com-
(a) Secure voice. munication fits are broadly detailed in ATP 29.
When more specific information is required, OP-
(b) Secure UHF RATT. STAT UNIT (see APP 4) may be used as a means
of promulgation. The aircraft’s communication
(c) Uncovered UHF voice, using low- capability must be carefully considered when the
level code. emission policy and communications plan are
formulated.
(2) HF communications will normally be
restricted to the interception of blind or indi- a. Circuits. These will normally be
rect read-back broadcasts by the submarine. specified in the OPTASK AIR (see APP 4) and de-
Messages for relay via the MPA to other units tailed in the COMPLAN. Circuits available for
or shore authorities are to be formatted in this function are described in ACP 176.
accordance with ACP 127 procedures. (See
ATP 28.) b. Communications Relay. Some
helicopters have a capability to monitor SLOT
d. Maritime Air Control Authorities buoys and may be used, subject to other screening
(MACA) (may be a cell within the MHQ). All commitments, to relay intercepted messages to the
MACAs will monitor circuits during MPA area OTC or SOCA (ASWC).
and Direct Support operations. Messages received
by a MACA from MPA will be relayed on to the c. Tactical Data Links. Some helicop-
aircraft’s parent MACA. ters have the capability to communicate with a
parent ship through a tactical data link.
4186 (NC) HELICOPTER CONTROL tions. To allow for required maintenance and
NETS — GENERAL emergent casualties, communications plans
should, as a goal, task no more than 90 percent of
a. Communication Circuits. Commu- the communications equipment in any unit. To ac-
nication nets for helicopter control are detailed in complish this, it may often be necessary to com-
ACP 176. Selection of a suitable circuit will nec- bine some circuit requirements and/or assign
essarily be a function of the helicopter’s employ- guard ships for some nets. Communications plans
ment, but the OTC must bear in mind the limited should include instructions for smooth transitions
communication facilities available in most aircraft through various EMCON conditions. UHF air-
and control units. Where interoperation with other borne relay planning must also be included to per-
types of aircraft is required (e.g., in ASW), it will mit a n uninte rrupte d flow of e sse nt i al
normally be prudent to use a common control cir- communications without violating RADHAZ re-
cuit for both — to aid information flow and to strictions or EMCON plans.
economize on communication equipment and
frequencies. c. Circuit Operation. Standard oper-
ating procedures apply to each circuit. The OTC
b. Emission Security (EMSEC). Care and coordinators will act as net control station
must be taken that transmissions between ships (NCS) on their respective warfare nets. Warfare
and aircraft are subject to the same EMSEC con- commanders or their FTCs will be NCS for their
straints as those between other force units. Details respective coordination and reporting nets. NCS
of EMSEC procedures are in Chapter 5. duties will be transferred from a primary com-
mander to an alternate commander when the war-
c. Voice Procedures. Voi ce proc e- fare commander role is transferred. NCS will be
dures for helicopter control are in APP 1. responsible for maintaining proper circuit disci-
pline and ensuring that proper security procedures
d. Brevity Code Words. Brevity code are followed. Authentication and encryption will
words used in helicopter control are in APP 7. be used as required on all uncovered circuits in ac-
cordance with the OTC’s and/or EWC’s instruc-
4190 (NC) COMMUNICATIONS FOR tions. Where possible, voice circuits should be
DECENTRALIZED COMMAND operated in a secure mode.
AND CONTROL
d. Merger of Communications Cir-
a. General. When the OTC delegates cuits in Combined TG Operations. The mer-
tactical control of units in a force or group as de- ger of two independent TGs into a combined TF
scribed in Chapter 1, there will be specific com- will require one set of warfare nets to be secured
munication requirements between the OTC and while additional units join the remaining nets.
appointed warfare commanders and coordinators, Having a number of units switching circuits can be
and between warfare commanders and coordina- complicated and, if not handled correctly, cause a
tors and their assigned units. To meet these re- considerable amount of confusion. A suggested
quirements, the OTC and warfare commanders procedure for shifting warfare coordination re-
and coordinators have certain circuits, described sponsibilities upon joinup of two major TGs might
in ACP 176, at their disposal. involve the following:
b. Plans. When drafting a communica- (1) The OTC of the force/group being
tions plan, the OTC and warfare commanders and joined specify 24 hours in advance the EMCON
coordinators must consider the communications plan in effect and tactical communications cir-
assets of units assigned. Smaller units can easily cuits currently in use.
become overburdened by too great a communica-
tion requirement. Requirements for manning the (2) Designated OTC issue a change to the
nets and the net priorities should take into account OPGEN to reflect new warfare commander and
each ship’s role as well as its abilities and limita- coordinator assignments (24 hours in advance).
CHAPTER 5
5100 (NR) INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE of the electromagnetic spectrum, through the use
of electromagnetic energy. There are three subdi-
This chapter covers the basic procedures visions of ECM — electronic jamming, electronic
and instructions for electronic and acoustic war- deception, and electronic neutralization.
fare together with emission policy and control.
Detailed electronic and acoustic warfare (EAW) (3) Electronic Protective Measures
information is contained in ATP 31 and ATP 28, (EPM). That division of EW involving actions
respectively. The ability of a military force, as part taken to ensure friendly effective use of the
of the overall C2W plan (see AJP-1), to make ef- electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy’s
fective use of the electromagnetic and acoustic use of the electromagnetic energy. There are
spectrum while, at the same time, preventing or re- two subdivisions of EPM — active EPM and
ducing the enemy use thereof, will play an impor- passive EPM.
tant part in deciding the outcome of any future
conflict. A comprehensive and viable emission (a) Active EPM. Detectable
plan together with capable electronic and acoustic measures, such as altering transmitter parame-
warfare systems are as important as any other plan ters as necessary, to ensure friendly effective
or weapon system in a commander’s arsenal, and use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
must be fully integrated into all military operations.
For the purpose of this chapter, EAW means elec- (b) Passive EPM. Undetectable
tronic and/or acoustic warfare. measures, such as operating procedures and
technical features of equipment, which are
5101 (NR) DEFINITIONS meant to ensure friendly effective use of the
electromagnetic spectrum.
a. Electronic Warfare (EW). Military
action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum, b. Acoustic Warfare (AW). Military
which encompasses the interception and identifi- action to use the underwater acoustic spectrum to
cation of the electromagnetic emissions, the em- the advantage of friendly forces by exploiting en-
ployment of the electromagnetic energy, emy emissions and controlling friendly emissions.
including directed energy, to reduce or prevent
hostile use of electromagnetic spectrum, and ac- There are three divisions within AW:
tions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.
(1) Acoustic Warfare Support Meas-
EW comprises three divisions: ures (AWSM). That division of AW involving
actions to search for, intercept, and identify ra-
(1) Electronic Warfare Support diated underwater acoustic energy for the pur-
Measures (ESM). That division of EW in- pose of exploiting such radiations. The use of
volving action taken to search for, intercept, AWSM involves no intentional underwater
and identify electromagnetic emissions and acoustic emissions and is generally not detect-
locate their sources for the purpose of immedi- able by the enemy.
ate threat recognition. It provides a source of in-
formation required for immediate decisions in- (2) Acoustic Countermeasures
volving ECM, EPM, and other tactical actions. (ACM). That division of AW involving actions
taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective
(2) Electronic Countermeasures use of the underwater acoustic spectrum. ACM
(ECM). That division of EW involving actions involves intentional underwater acoustic emis-
taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use sions for deception or jamming.
(3) Acoustic Protective Measures (1) Issue the list of threat and target emit-
(APM). That division of AW involving actions ters (Electronic Order of Battle (EOB)) .
taken to ensure friendly effective use of the under-
water acoustic spectrum, despite the enemy’s use (2) Assign the ESM/AWSM duties and
of acoustic energy. APM involves anti-AWSM ESM/AWSM guards as appropriate.
and anti-ACM, and may not involve underwa-
ter acoustic emissions. (3) Coordinate with the AC/AREC/HEC
for aircraft support, the OTC/CWC/SOCA for
(4) The three divisions of electronic submarine support, and/or the OTC/CWC for
and acoustic warfare are parallel and surface support.
complementary.
(4) Coordinate and control ESM/AWSM
c. Frequency Management. Ensure activities on the appropriate net.
frequency deconfliction and coordination, with
particular concern that safety frequencies are (5) Collect, evaluate, recognize/classify
adequately assigned, throughout the force. intercepts, and disseminate data.
f. Discreet identification.
5723 (NC) REDUCING THE EFFEC- destination. The term “meaconing” can also be ap-
TIVENESS OF ELECTRONIC plied to the seduction of mobile SATCOM aerials
NEUTRALIZATION by an airborne platform. In both cases, meaconing
is achieved by transmitting an alternative signal.
Measures to protect against electronic neu- In intrusion, an enemy gains access to a communi-
tralization include: cation system (voice or data link) and manages to
insert false data or instructions. Jamming and in-
a. Physical protection. terference normally involve the use of electro-
magnetic energy to degrade communication and
b. Technical EPM features. radar/weapon systems to varying degrees.
5800 (NC) ELECTRONIC WARFARE those of all other forces in the commander’s AOR
COORDINATION CELL (EWCC) to achieve overall control of the electromagnetic
spectrum. These coordination actions executed by
a. EW impacts on all warfare activities. the EWCC will serve to support the commander’s
This impact has necessitated the creation of an at- overall operational plan.
sea EW coordinator (EWC). The EWC, acting on
behalf of the OTC/CWC, coordinates the activi- 5801 (NC) EWCC RESPONSIBILITIES
ties of EW assets within the force. It is essential
that both at-sea and shore-based commanders at Consistent with the resources available,
all levels have experienced EW staffs to coordi- EWCC responsibilities include, but are not neces-
nate areawide EW assets and activities. To pro- sarily limited to:
vide this intercommand coordination function, an
electronic warfare coordination cell (EWCC) a. Planning.
should be established by a commander in his area
of responsibility (AOR) when a joint force or (1) Prepare EW aspects of operations
more than one force are employed, thereby maxi- plans, orders, and data bases, including recom-
mizing the impact of limited EW resources. mendations on Rules of Engagement (ROE) for
EW and NATO Precautionary System (NPS)
b. The EWCC is the commander’s mecha- measures.
nism for coordinating EW assets within his AOR.
It will be established as an integral part of the oper- (2) Make recommendations to the com-
ations staff at the level(s) deemed appropriate to mander on tasking component commanders to
support the operation, and will provide the means provide EW support as required.
of coordinating all EW activities.
(3) Identify requirements for intelligence
c. EW efforts of the force managed by the support to EW operations.
EWC will be coordinated by the EWCC with
CHAPTER 6
ROE are directives to military forces (in- (2) Promulgated so as to permit rapid
cluding individuals) that define the circum- updating.
stances, conditions, degree, and manner in which
force, or action which might be construed as pro- (3) As simple as possible.
vocative, may, or may not, be applied. ROE are
not to assign tasks or give tactical instructions. b. Promulgation. Unless otherwise di-
With the exception of self-defense, during peace- rected in planned responses, the implementation
time and operations prior to a declaration of coun- of such a plan carries with it the automatic upgrad-
ter aggression, ROE provide the sole authority to ing of the appropriate threat warning to RED.
6200 (NU) INTRODUCTION The process of all actions and activities aimed
at compiling a plot is called picture compilation.
This section describes the process of pic-
ture compilation, which is fundamental to mari- In maritime operations, picture compilation
time operations, and scouting, which is the will normally be executed to support decision
observation of the surrounding environment. making in relation to the mission. The nature of
More detail of the methods for gathering informa- the mission will dictate the importance of the plot
tion and exploitation of the recognized picture are and what information is to be derived from it.
contained in the relevant warfare publications:
ATP 18, ATP 28, ATP 31, and ATP 34. In support of the overall plan, the OTC
and/or delegated authorities are to develop, for-
6201 (NR) PICTURE COMPILATION mulate, and implement the picture compilation
plan.
In all maritime operations, ranging from
peacetime through increasing tension to hostili- 6210 (NU) THE PICTURE COMPILATION
ties, it is necessary to compile a plot of surface, air, PLAN
and subsurface contacts.
The picture compilation plan should take
into account the following three items:
There are three basic elements of the envi- (1) Environmental descriptors (surface,
ronment which should be considered: subsurface, land, air and space).
a. Geographic location of the area of op- (2) Identity (hostile, suspect, unknown,
erations (e.g., open ocean, inshore). neutral, assumed friend, friend).
In maritime operations, the operational sit- All elements should be amplified if possi-
uation will significantly affect the production and ble or required (e.g., type, class, nationality, Dop-
implementation of the picture compilation plan. pler, behaviour, time late, etc.).
Important elements are:
6240 (NR) THE PROCESS OF PICTURE ficult to determine. However, broad values for
COMPILATION both coverage factor and frequency of cover may
be required in planning. In such cases, the follow-
Picture compilation can be subdivided into ing values of sweep width may be used:
five processes:
(1) Sonar — Surface ships — twice tacti-
a. Detection. cal sonar range.
(2) A contact viewed by imaging radar (h) A contact viewed by imaging ra-
whose image quality provides strong cumula- dar whose image quality provides indica-
tive evidence with positive indicators that are tors that are consistent with a type of enemy
consistent with a type of enemy unit, or unit.
(3) Strong, cumulative information based c. Possible Target. A contact that has a
on any two of the following: lower degree of recognition than that required for
probable. The confidence of the recognition must
(a) A contact with an electronic emis- be amplified as follows:
sion unique to a type of enemy unit.
(1) High Confidence — A contact which
(b) A contact with acoustic emissions satisfies only one of the criteria required for
unique to a type of enemy unit. probable.
(e) Radar target with tracking and/or The identification process includes the as-
formation consistent with that expected of signment of one of the six standard identities to a de-
the enemy. tected contact (hostile, suspect, unknown, neutral,
assumed friend, friend). The assignment of a stan-
(f) Active sonar contact with tracking dard identity will be executed by the appropriate or
and/or formation consistent with that ex- designated authority, based upon the available data
pected of the enemy. (mostly localization and/or recognition data) and a
set of rules (identification criteria), laid down by the
(g) Missile release by target. appropriate authority. Table 6-1 provides examples
of identification methods and criteria.
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
RSI Mode Advantage Disadvantage Mode Descriptor
U FULL ROLL 1. Optimum update rate 1. Net cycle time (NCT) may Permanent
(Unrestricted CALL 2. Complete exchange of be long
Transmission) data/information between PUs 2. Risk of participating units
being intercepted and
detected
U PARTIAL ROLL 1. Call-up is directed 1. Repetitive call-up of par- Full report by designated
(Unrestricted CALL 2. Exposed units may stay silent ticipants prolongs NCT PU during PARTIAL ROLL
6361 (NC) DATA NET CONTROL 6364 (NC) GRID REFERENCE UNIT
STATION (DNCS) (GRU)
The DNCS is the participating unit in a link The GRU is the unit designated by the OTC
organization for air, surface, and subsurface data to maintain the OTC’s geographical reference
compilation who performs the technical manage- point.
ment of the net.
a. The GRU is responsible for:
a. The responsibilities are:
(1) Carrying out general grid locks as or-
(1) Advise the FTC-A on the use of fre- dered by the AAWC/FTC-A.
quencies and link parameters.
(2) Acting as reference for individual grid
(2) Initiate and terminate the data net, un- locks where possible.
der the overall directives of the OTC.
(3) Monitoring the positional accuracy of
(3) Control the order in which units are transmitted data by link participating units.
called in Roll Call mode of operation (Link 11).
(4) Ensuring his data systems’ naviga-
(4) Monitor and analyze the data nets from tional input is both up-to-date and accurate.
link establishment to link termination (techni-
cal performance). b. The GRU should be chosen by the OTC
on the basis of:
b. The DNCS is chosen on the basis of:
(1) Position in the force, ensuring:
(1) Central location relative to other link-
fitted units, which it must interrogate. (a) Good link communications.
In groups working with more than one TDS (4) Reliability of link participating unit.
system (i.e., Link 11) a gateway unit is assigned. A
gateway unit is a participating unit that is operat- 6365 — 6369 SPARE
ing on both links and is responsible for transfer
of selected track data between the two link sys- 6370 (NU) PROCEDURES
tems. The transfer can be manual or automatic.
6371 (NC) GRID LOCK PROCEDURE
6363 (NC) LINK BROADCAST UNIT
a. Grid Locks. The GRU executes grid
For Link 11 and Link 14, a broadcast unit locks on completion of the insertion of the DLRP
may be assigned. This unit will transmit data from into the various TDS, or after changing the DLRP.
his TDS system to other units, who will only re- Grid locks are also executed periodically to reduce
ceive this data but not answer or retransmit. The errors in grid reporting.
receiving units will either plot this data manually
or automatically.
Maritime aircraft under the operational The OTC is to inform the tasking authority
control of a maritime commander may be tasked of the dimensions of his surveillance area and of
by a shore authority if land-based, or by the OTC if subsequent changes, emission policy permitting.
shipborne on a force at sea. When tasking mari-
time aircraft, the tasking authority, MHQ, or OTC b. Associated Support. In specific
should: cases of communications or other control difficul-
ties, associated support may be provided. Aircraft
1. Employ the appropriate aircraft in a safe tasked on associated support will operate inde-
manner to accomplish the assigned task. pendently of other forces at sea; however, their
tasking is in support of a specific force. They may
2. Inform all units of all friendly aircraft be tasked to support that force by providing con-
operating in the vicinity. tact information and to receive intelligence from
the OTC who is being supported. The aircraft may
3. Disseminate pertinent information to all be tasked to establish communications with the
units in the area in a timely manner. supported force to prevent mutual interference.
The OTC of the supported force cannot take tacti-
4. Liaise with air defense authorities and cal control of the aircraft unless authorized by the
civil air control authorities including NO- aircraft tasking authority. The aircraft commander
TAM actions. should be briefed on the degree of support it can
give to the OTC.
6402 (NC) AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS
c. Area Operations. Area operations
Maritime aircraft may be assigned to pro- are conducted in areas within which enemy forces
vide support to forces at sea in one of three forms. are known to be, through which enemy forces are
likely to pass, or within which it is desirable to
a. Direct Support. Aircraft assigned to deny the enemy freedom of action. In addition, op-
direct support of a force at sea will operate under erations may be related to the protection of mari-
the tactical control of the OTC who is being sup- time forces scheduled to enter the area in the future
ported. Operational control will remain with the or to provide defense in depth to distant forces.
Land-based aircraft on area operations are under 6407 (NR) SUPPORT OPERATIONS
the operational control of a shore-based authority. TASKED BY MARITIME
Tactical command and control of the aircraft con- AUTHORITIES
ducting the mission is normally delegated to the
aircraft commander by the tasking authority. Air- a. Air Operations Outside TASMO.
craft commanders should be briefed on the where- Air operations in support of forces at sea outside
abouts of friendly naval forces and as to whether TASMO, which are controlled by maritime
or not they may react to a request from these forces authorities, are normally tasked by standard
to assist in the protection of contacts within the air- MTMS or other messages such as the ATO. The
craft’s operating area. Notwithstanding such authori- tasking authority should stipulate in the FORM
zation, the original tasking authority has the right to GREEN both the form of support of each mission
resume control of the aircraft at his discretion. and the specific mission type by promulgating
mission designators from Table 6-2.
6403 (NR) INFORMING THE OTC OF
OPERATIONS IN HIS VICINITY (1) Mission Designators. The Table 6-2
mission designators can only be changed by the
OTCs are to be informed by the appropriate aircraft’s original tasking authority or the air-
coordinating authority of any aircraft employed craft commander if delegated tactical com-
on area operations in the vicinity of their force. mand. Therefore, if an OTC wishes an aircraft
to do more than one mission type, it must be re-
If a force at sea is to be supported by land- quested in the support request message, FORM
based aircraft in associated or direct support, the GREEN REQUEST. The ASW mission type is
OTC will be informed by the appropriate coordi- subdivided and once the tasking authority has
nating authority of the type and nature of support authorized an ASW operation, the supported
being provided in response to the direct support OTC can modify the ASW tasking during a
request, using the standard RAINFORM formats. mission by using the ASW mission designators
In the case of shipborne aircraft support, the OTC in Table 6-4.
of the force providing the support should keep the
OTC of the supported force, and, if possible, shore (2) Mission Type. Table 6-2 lists the
authorities, informed of the flying schedule and mission types which maritime aircraft may be
intentions using the standard MTMS formats. tasked. Details on the various scouting mis-
sions are in Section II of this chapter.
6404 SPARE
b. Antisurface Operations. The aim
of antisurface operations by aircraft is to ensure
the detection, and early engagement of enemy sur-
6405 (NU) TYPES OF OPERATIONS face forces in order to deny their effective employ-
ment. Aircraft can effectively locate and shadow
6406 (NR) OPERATIONS INTEGRAL TO enemy naval surface forces. In war, aircraft should
A FORCE remain outside the effective envelope of ship-
borne missile and gun defense systems whenever
Helicopter and carrier borne aircraft which possible while searching for, identifying, shadow-
are an integral part of the force are under the tacti- ing, and subsequently attacking hostile forces. At
cal command of an OTC. They are assigned tasks times, it may be necessary to establish the iden-
as directed by the OTC or warfare commander as tity of contacts detected at ranges in excess of the
required. Although the employment of these air- identification/recognition capability of the aircraft
craft is not a support operation, the procedures in sensors. Ideally, this identification/recognition
this chapter sometimes apply. should be done by a small, high-speed, low-level,
maneuverable aircraft equipped with radar, ESM,
Notes:
2. To be used by tasking authority for all types of ASW operations (i.e., ASW
surveillance, air-sub operations, area, associated, or direct support opera-
tions).
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
Table 6-3. (NU) Checklist for Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct Support
2 MHQ Relay the joining instructions message to the aircraft. If for any
reason the MHQ is unable to relay the message to the aircraft, it
is to inform the OTC/ACU.
3 Aircraft Complete aircraft joining message and transmit it to MHQ for dis-
patch to ACU. (See Note 5 or Serial 8.)
4 Aircraft Transit under tactical control of sector operations center (SOC) or MHQ.
7 Force Marshaler/ Respond to aircraft (see Note 1); challenge aircraft IFF or pass
Nominated identity procedure to be done (if required). Pass:
Controller/OTC
a. Call sign and position of ACU
b. Direction and distance to patrol area
c. Altimeter setting (QNH)
d. Communications security protection aspects of EMCON plan
(see Note 6)
e. Inform aircraft if ACU has received FORM GREEN
f. Time check
g. Clearance to descend and proceed to patrol area, as required,
and
h. If required, new control RATT or voice frequency, and control
of aircraft to ACU
i. Gridlock.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
Table 6-3. (NU) Checklist for Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct Support (Cont.)
8 Aircraft Call ACU and ascertain if ACU has received aircraft joining mes-
sage. If not received, pass all items below; if received, update
appropriate items below:
a. Sortie number
b. Any restrictions to role (see Note 3)
c. Serial numbers of OPGEN and OPTASK received
d. ON/OFF task times
e. Serial number of the latest WSM message received
f. Aircraft data link coordination information.
Be prepared to pass following additional information if ACU
informs aircraft that no FORM GREEN was received:
g. Aircraft type
h. Weapon load
i. IFF mode setting.
9 ACU ACU pass following joining instructions message (See Note 4):
a. Identify maneuver if no previous voice communications estab-
lished. Pass ship’s position and clearance to close/descend.
b. Threat assessment, mission designator and
employment/airplan, gridlock (if not already completed by force
marshaller), controller grade, control rules in force
c. EMCON
d. EW task
e. PIM, if different
f. Update important data from OPGEN and OPTASK if different
g. Update important data from JTAA or SAA, if different; or pass
latest WSM serial number
h. Update air safety information not previously transmitted, in-
cluding other aircraft activity
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
Table 6-3. (NU) Checklist for Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct Support (Concl.)
Note
Only information required need be sent.
Notes:
1. Whenever joining an unsecure voice circuit, proper authentication must be used.
2. Helicopters are to close at altitudes that will allow early radar detection by the force being joined
and at speeds below 140 knots.
3. Restrictions should include any significant change in standard weapon load or any
unserviceabilities.
4. ACU should not duplicate any information already held by the aircraft.
5. Aircraft joining message is to be:
a. In accordance with MATELO Handbook
b. Of IMMEDIATE precedence
c. Addressed to the OTC/ACU
d. From the aircraft call sign.
6. The communications security protection (CSP) aspects of an EMCON plan are reflected by RSIs
A, D, and X.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
ZY Deter and All Radar - may be 1. Optimize radar operating for de-
Detect augmented by terrence
passive sono- 2. Patrol at best compromise
buoys altitude for radar and sonobuoy
detection
NL Detect and All Radar - may be 1. Optimize radar operating for de-
Deter (active augmented by tect
and passive) passive sono- 2. Patrol at best altitude for radar
buoys detection
FE Detect (pas- Nuclear Passive sono- Patrol at altitude for best sonobuoy
sive/active) (and/or buoys - may be monitoring
diesel- augmented by
electric) radar
Notes
(1) Tasking authorities are to use mission designators to promulgate the mission form and mission
type (Table 6-2). The OTC will order the specific ASW mission designator (Table 6-4).
(2) Specific requirements to “Report,” “Track,” and/or “Destroy” are to be ordered additionally by the
tasking authority, e.g., “ZY + Destroy,” “FE + Track + Report.”
(3) The tasking authority/OTC is to specify the type of threat, if known.
(4) If BLIND BROADCAST, POSTBOX, or AIRMAIL procedures are required, the FORM GREEN is
to be amplified accordingly.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
and ECM for self-protection. In some situations, it (1) Aided Intercept. A submarine is pro-
may be necessary for MPA/MRR aircraft or heli- vided with target location information by air-
copters to identify the contact, but before ordering craft or other forces.
such a mission the OTC/MHQ must consider all
the factors including the possibility of losing the (2) AIR/SUB Support Operations.
aircraft to enemy defenses. Cooperation between MPA and submarine when
both are on area operations. There are three levels
c. ASW Operations. Air ASW support of cooperation under these conditions:
operations can be conducted by helicopters or by
fixed-wing aircraft. Shore-based aircraft are (a) Mutual Cooperation. This is the
tasked by shore authorities to support forces at sea. highest level of cooperation. The air and
Shipborne aircraft can be tasked by their OTC to submarine patrol areas (APA and SPA)
provide direct support to support other OTCs. In overlap.
either case, standard aircraft tasking formats as de-
tailed in APP 4 should be used. (b) Indirect Cooperation. The APA
and SPA are within communication dis-
The tactical procedures to be used on ASW tance. Units operate independently unless
missions are in this publication, ATP 28, and ap- one requests support from the other.
propriate tactical instructions issued by the tasking
authority. The ASW mission designators in Table (c) Surveillance Cooperation. This is
6-4 should be used by the OTC to task aircraft on the lowest level of cooperation. Aircraft
ASW missions and in GREEN REQUESTs. carry out surveillance and make a blind
broadcast to assist the submarine.
There are many occasions when the long-
range detection capability of the submarine can be (3) ASW Operations Utilizing Sub-
exploited or complemented by the use of cooper- marines in Direct Support. Submarines
ating aircraft. The combination of effective detec- may be called on to protect surface forces by
tion by the submarine and subsequent rapid coordinating their operations with other ASW
response by the aircraft provides a valuable sys- units. Aircraft may assist the submarine in con-
tem of defense and surveillance against surface or tact prosecution and may also assist OTC/sub-
subsurface enemy forces. In this context, cooper- marine communications.
ating units must be aware of each other’s tactics
and limitations. The types of AIR/SUB operations 6408 — 6409 SPARE
are:
6410 (NC) PROCEDURES FOR AIRCAFT “Not found” message is to be made to the author-
IN TRANSIT ity ordering the mission. The aircraft may request
the OTC to use homing procedure; however, the
a. Enemy Contacts. Aircraft com- OTC may not wish to break radio silence to an-
manders are to be briefed before takeoff on action swer the request or to use homing procedure. The
to be taken on contacts gained while in transit. aircraft is to continue searching for the force.
Briefing shall take the form of transit instructions
as follows: (2) When Found. When the force is
found, an encrypted “Found” report is to be made
(1) Transit Instructions A (TRANS- only if a “Not found” report has been made previ-
ALFA). The aircraft is not to report or investi- ously or if the aircraft has been ordered to make
gate enemy contacts. Contacts gained are to be this report. The position of the force is only to be
logged and reported after flight. The aircraft is included in a “Found” report when the aircraft
to attempt to adhere to scheduled task times. commander considers that the estimated position
is in error to such an extent that any delay in trans-
(2) Transit Instructions B (TRANS- mitting this information would adversely affect
BRAVO). The aircraft is to report enemy con- subsequent operations. The “Found” report, if
tacts to its controlling authority and to the OTC made, is to be transmitted at least 50 miles from
of the supported force. It is not to investigate the force. However, once the aircraft is under the
such contacts and is to continue its briefed mis- tactical command of the OTC, it shall be the OTC’s
sion unless otherwise ordered. responsibility, considering his EMCON plan, to de-
termine the range from the force at which the
(3) Transit Instructions C (TRANS- “Found” report shall be sent.
CHARLIE). The aircraft is to attempt identi-
fication and report all enemy contacts. Con- 6415 (NR) IDENTIFICATION/RECOGNITION
currently with the report, the aircraft shall take OF SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
the following action:
It is important that all aircraft asked to sup-
1. Submarine — Destroy it whenever pos- port a force at sea, be positively identified as friendly
sible, unless in a subsurface restricted area. as they close the force. When the aircraft de-
In prehostility phase, track it in accordance parts from its base/force at sea, its identity is known
with Rules of Engagement. The time spent and the transfer of control and identification/
investigating an enemy contact shall be in recognition to the supported force can be done by
accordance with preflight briefing or fur- radar handover or nonradar handover procedures.
ther orders.
a. Radar Handover. This procedure is
2. Surface ships — Endeavor to shadow used when there is overlapping radar coverage at
until further orders are received. the transit altitude between the departure air con-
trol area and the air control area around the sup-
3. Aircraft — Endeavor to identify and as- ported force. The controllers effect a positive
certain course and speed. transfer of control of the aircraft after mutual self
identification.
b. Search for Friendly Force.
b. Nonradar Handover. This proce-
(1) Not Found. If the force is not found dure is used when there is a gap in radar coverage
within one hour of the expected time, an encrypted at the transit altitude or when EMCON denies the
use of radar and positive handover by controllers located to make the transit of the supporting air-
is not possible. Aircraft who are tasked to support craft as short as possible and clear of enemy units.
a force and are controlled by maritime authorities Gates can be promulgated as position geographic
are to use the appropriate self identification and or relative to a force. In either case, the aircraft
joining procedures listed in Article 6417 and Ta- must be capable of locating the gate by its own
ble 6-3. Aircraft who are controlled by other air navigation system or radar. There may be a
forces will use the procedures in ATP 34. number of gates. When the entry/exit gates are
promulgated relative to a force at sea, the gates are
6416 (NR) DEFINITIONS normally at least 150 nm from the force/disposi-
tion center. Since many aircraft radars cannot de-
The terms used by maritime aircraft during tect and identify a surface force at 150 nm, the gate
support operations are listed below and are illus- should be promulgated as a range and bearing
trated in Figure 6-2A. from PIM and not from ZZ or QQ.
identified to ensure that the force does not mistake which case, the routing must be included in the
the aircraft for hostile. It should not be confused OTC’s OPGEN/OPTASK updates or agreed to
with the various self-defense safety ranges that between the shore ADC and the OTC. When es-
aircraft are advised to use when approaching/in- tablishing approach corridors, the OTC must
vestigating unknown contacts. The ISR normally consider the communications that will be avail-
encompasses the force MEZ if zone AAW coordi- able for joining and marshalling, the direction of
nation is being used. In larger dispositions this the friendly bases from which aircraft might
may not always be possible. In any case, the ISR come, threat axis, areas in which support aircraft
must, as for entry/exit gates, be easily located by will be employed once on patrol, location of
aircraft supporting a force. As with entry/exit gates, TOMCAT and AEW pickets in a large disposi-
ISR relative to ZZ or QQ will be difficult to locate tion, and AAW coordination such as MEZ and
accurately when EMCON, large dispositions, and FEZ.
longer ranges are considered. Normally, ISRs
should be established relative to the promulgated h. Identification Safety Point (ISP).
PIM rather than the position of the force (ZZ or When the gate is not within the radar cover of the
QQ) whose disposition about the PIM is dynamic. ships or when two-way communications are not
established between the ACUs, the ISP is the point
g. Approach Corridor. The approach at which aircraft on joining the force will attempt
corridor is usually established on a line between to establish two-way communications with the
the entry/exit gate and the force/disposition cen- ships and commence identification procedures.
ter. If the force center cannot be determined by the Unless otherwise promulgated the ISP will be a
aircraft’s radar, the corridor will be on a line be- position at 150 nm from ZZ on a direct line be-
tween the entry/exit gate and the PIM position. tween the in-use gate and ZZ. There may be oc-
The inner boundary is determined by the ISR. The casions when tactical considerations dictate de-
approach corridor width is normally 5 nm either viation from the direct route from gate to ZZ. In
side of the line. Depending on the mode of prom- which case, an ISP may be included in the OTC’s
ulgation the corridor may be fixed geographically OPTASK AAW update or agreed between the
or move in the following manner (see Figure 6-2A): shore ADC and the OTC, otherwise the ISP need
not be promulgated.
1. If the entry/exit gate is fixed geographi-
cally and the ISR is relative to the force dis- 6417 (NC) IDENTIFICATION/RECOGNITION
position center, the approach corridor will PROCEDURES
pivot about the entry/exit gate as its inner
end moves with PIM and its length will Tentative initial identification/recognition
change. of friendly aircraft may be assumed when an air-
craft, showing the proper IFF/SIF code, enters and
2. If the entry/exit gate and ISR are estab- settles down on the heading of the designated ap-
lished relative to force/disposition center, proach cooridor or sector. Positive identificaiton/
the corridor orientation and dimensions recognition will be considered as established
will not change but the entry/exit gate and when an aircraft has been visually sighted and
the corridor will move with the force. recognized by CAP, other known friendly
aircraft, or a surface ship. If not sighted, positive
There may be occasions when tactical con- identification/recognition may be assumed if at
siderations dictate deviation from the direct route least one planned IFF/SIF change or identity
from entry/exit gate to the force/PIM position. In maneuver has been made. The following self
identification procedures are established:
a. IFF/SIF Identity. This may be ordered d. Informing aircraft under his control of
by the use of the term “Perform Identity movements of other friendly and enemy aircraft;
(designation).” keeping them informed of the tactical situation.
(1) Identity — Squawk IDENT. e. Assisting aircraft that are operating in-
ALFA dependently or are controlled by shore-based
authorities.
(2) Identity — Switch to STANDBY
BRAVO for 1 minute.
f. Relaying tactical information to and
(3) Identity — (Wartime Only) Shift from aircraft.
CHARLIE for 2 minutes to the
war-time mode/code as- g. Safety of all aircraft under his control.
sign- ments designated
for the next half hour
period, then return to 6419 (NC) SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
the current mode. JOINING A FORCE
aircraft attempting to join long before communi- made only if a “Not found” report has been
cations have been established or identification has made previously or if the aircraft has been
been completed. This is especially true when pick- ordered to make this report. The position of
ets or deception groups are used. Therefore, it is the force is only to be included in a “Found”
essential that aircraft remain in these corridors un- report when the aircraft commander consid-
til identified as friendly by the OTC. ers that the estimated position is in error to
such an extent that any delay in transmitting
(1) Aircraft at ISP. The aircraft should be this information would adversely affect
at the ISP (entry/exit gate if no ISP) at the prom- subsequent operations.
ulgated ON TASK time and if early it is to hold
there until ON TASK time. The aircraft then d. Use of Checklist.
flies down the approach corridor, attempting to
establish communications with the Force Mar- (1) The checklist in Table 6-3 is designed
shaler/Nominated Controller/OTC on the to be for both RATT and voice joining. When-
promulgated frequency when closing the force ever RATT is available, it should be used in
within the approach corridor. If the aircraft preference to voice as it is clearer, faster, and
reaches the ISR and has not established com- reduces traffic on busy voice circuits. The
munications with the OTC and has not been OTC’s EMCON plan will indicate which infor-
identified as friendly, it is to hold at the ISR mation must be encoded when voice is used.
within the corridor and continue to attempt
communications. If after 15 minutes at the ISR, (2) Whenever voice joining procedures are
no communications have been established, the used, the OTC should consider using the abbre-
aircraft is to transit towards the entry/exit gate viated format (paragraph e), thereby reducing
inside the corridor until the aircraft commander the time for establishing the aircraft on patrol.
considers it safe and:
e. Abbreviated Joining Procedure. It
(a) Unless otherwise directed, carry is sometimes necessary to expedite joining proce-
out an appropriate Airplan beyond the ISR dures; for example, when an action is in progress
and outside a safe range from unidentified during arrival of aircraft. Such a procedure should
or hostile contacts. include only the following items:
(a) Not found. If the force is not found The following additional information
within 1 hour of the expected time, an en- should be passed if different from the
crypted “Not found” message is to be made tasking signals:
to the authority ordering the mission.
Altitude
(b) When found. When the force is Weapon load
found, an encrypted “Found” report is to be Off task time.
(a) Nominating “slot times” at the ISR (4) Unless aircraft are cooperating and are
for returning helicopters. on the same frequency, or can see each
other, the following minimum lateral or
(b) Ordering specific approach alti- vertical separation is to be arranged:
tudes and speeds for returning helicopters.
(a) In the case of a fixed-wing aircraft
(c) Ordering briefed maneuvers and a helicopter: 1,500 yards lateral or
and/or IFF identifications to be performed 300 feet vertical.
every 10 minutes while closing, until
identified. (b) In the case of two fixed-wing air-
craft: 3 miles lateral or 500 feet vertical.
The procedures adopted should be stated in
the OPTASK AAW and OPTASK AIR. (c) In the case of two helicopters: 1,500
yards lateral or 300 feet vertical.
6473 (NC) LOW-ALTITUDE RULES
(FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT AND (5) Fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters con-
HELICOPTERS) ducting VECTAC or MADVEC proce-
dures may overfly a helicopter in the dip or
a. Flying of Helicopters. Aircraft ap- hover position, but are to maintain a mini-
proaching a force are to assume that helicopters mum vertical separation of 200 feet.
are flying unless otherwise informed. The appro-
priate ACU is to inform aircraft on joining, of the Notes
state of helicopter flying, and subsequently of any
changes. 1. When operating with an aircraft
towing MAD, the above limitations
b. Standard Rules. Unless otherwise shall be strictly obeyed. The towed
ordered, or overriding tactical considerations dic- MAD sensor body and cable can trail as
tate, the following rules apply when fixed-wing much as 120 feet below the aircraft.
aircraft and helicopters are operating in proximity
(in the order of 10 miles): 2. When aircraft or helicopters are
dropping sonobuoys, a lateral separa-
(1) Maximum altitude for ASW helicop- tion of 1,500 yards must always be en-
ters — 400 feet. forced to ensure the safety of aircraft
operating at lower altitudes.
(2) Minimum altitude for fixed-wing air-
craft at night or when visibility is 3 nm or 3. It is imperative that a force QNH be
less — 700 feet (except for aircraft in the established by the Air Coordinator
carrier approach and landing patterns). (AC) and updated regularly to ensure
aircraft separation within the force.
6500 (NR) SCOPE speed, using the delayed executive method when
EMCON conditions permit, or by flashing light
This section covers aircraft operations from if radio silence is in force. Minor changes should
carriers and other ships with aircraft embarked. be promulgated as information signals as time
The types and roles of aircraft are varied. Ordinar- permits.
ily, the employment and responsibility for such
aircraft remains with the task group commander, c. Ships Operating Vertical (VTOL)
who must exercise care when positioning these and Short Takeoff and Landing (VSTOL)
ships in the task group to facilitate coordinated Aircraft. Ships operating VTOL/VSTOL aircraft
flight operations. Detailed procedures are also are not normally subject to the same constraints as
found in ATP 28 and ATP 31. those imposed on a CV operating non-VSTOL
aircraft; however, they have to turn towards the
6501 (NC) SHIP MOVEMENTS DURING wind for takeoff and landing but are unlikely to
FLIGHT OPERATIONS require high speed. Operating method B (Article
6510) is preferred because of the flexibility of
a. Right of Way. Ships engaged in the VSTOL.
launching or recovery of aircraft have the right of
way, except over the ships and formations noted in d. Positioning of Ships Operating
Chapter 2. If a ship must pass a ship that is con- Helicopters. Large ships, such as LPH or LHA,
ducting flight operations, she should pass to star- will often need considerable sea room and free-
board when the ship is on the flight operations dom of maneuver when operating helicopters.
course or to leeward when the ship is not on the They should be positioned in sectors or areas of a
flight operations course. suitable size and shape to allow them to remain
protected while operating helicopters. They can, if
b. Adjustment of Movements. When necessary, operate in the same way as a carrier.
carriers are operating aircraft, ships in the forma- Commanding officers of such ships should advise
tion other than rescue destroyers are to adjust their the OTC of the size of the sector or area required
course and speed to maintain true bearing follow- and the preferred operating method whenever
ing minor adjustments made by the carrier. Rescue helicopter operations are likely to be prolonged.
destroyers shall maintain relative bearing and dis- Escorts will also need sea room, but can maneu-
tance from the carrier. Minor adjustments are de- ver, launch, and recover helicopters more quickly
fined as alterations of course of not more than 10° than larger ships. Their requirements for helicop-
and alterations of speed of not more than 2 knots ter operations are unlikely to be a major factor in
from the promulgated flight operations course and the tactical positioning of the ships.
speed (F CORPEN). During periods of darkness
or low visibility, the carrier shall signal impending e. Landing Circuit. Ships should keep
course or speed changes to her escorts and receive clear of the path normally followed by aircraft in
an acknowledgment before altering her course or the landing circuit.
Preparations can be made when it has been deter- b. Duties of Carrier With a Convoy.
mined in advance that the aircraft are to be The carrier will normally assume the following
launched and landed under known low visibility duties:
conditions. It is also necessary that standard pro-
cedures be established for use when aircraft must (1) Aircraft Control Unit and in
operate unexpectedly in unfavorable weather. addition:
When low visibility conditions are encountered or
appear imminent, an early decision must be 1. Provide and control carrier aircraft
reached as to how airborne aircraft are to be han- within the requirements laid down by the
dled. One or more of the following procedures OTC.
may be used depending on existing conditions.
2. Coordinate the homing of land-based
1. Aircraft orbit as directed until own ship aircraft conducting joining procedures.
has steamed into an area where visually
controlled landings can be made. 3. Control aircraft in search and rescue
duties.
2. Aircraft land ashore in friendly territory
if conditions permit. (2) AAW Commander. Except for those
duties relating to the control of emissions, and the
3. Aircraft land on other appropriate ships control of EW equipment, these particular duties
which are operating in an area where visu- remain the responsibility of the OTC unless spe-
ally controlled landing can be made. cifically delegated.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(2) Escort Leader. The escort leader is 6533 (NC) OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
designated by the task group commander and is
in command of all fighter aircraft assigned to The organization for offensive carrier air
escort the attack aircraft from the task group. operations depends on may factors: the nature of
The escort leader may also be the strike com- the targets, whether surface or air, the time within
mander if he is so designated by the task group which the required results will have to be
commander. Fighter aircraft from each ship as- achieved; the constraints of the defensive organi-
signed to the escort will be led by that ship’s zation of the force; and the availability of other air-
fighter leader to report to the escort leader for craft. Offensive air operations generally fall into
the strike. two categories, strike or sweep.
a. Strike Operations.
The OTC or AAWC may select any of the (1) Identification/recognition and self-
corridors for each day of a particular exercise or identification procedures are identical to those
operation. Corridors activated are normally prom- described in Article 6417 and 6556a except
ulgated indicating the corridor by number, the call that:
sign of the Tomcat, and its tacan channel.
(a) Aircraft must report initially at a
b. Approach Sectors. These sectors are specified tacan distance from the sector ta-
more flexible than fixed-approach corridors and can picket.
may be assigned in conjunction with tacan ap-
proach control pickets for each sector. Initial re- (b) Friendly aircraft will be desig-
porting distances from each approach control unit nated track numbers and shall be reported
will be promulgated by the OTC. The essential and plotted by all units.
difference between this system and fixed-friendly
approach corridors is that the aircraft may return (2) The use of approach sectors is particu-
from any bearing within the specified sector, the larly applicable to formations where dispersion
position of each aircraft being reported on AAW is minimized and aircraft normally return di-
nets. rectly to the force. Friendly aircraft may transit
missile engagement zones on direct return
routes when directed by the AAWC or SAAWC.
6600 (NR) AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY AND and integrated into the flight schedule (for heli-
RESCUE copter operations, use OPTASK AIR HELO,
paragraph H1). This allows maximum aircraft us-
The measures set forth in this section cover age from all ships in company with minimum in-
the more common problems encountered and the convenience to each.
procedures used for handling aircraft in distress.
b. Lost Aircraft Control. The OTC may
6601 (NR) GENERAL PROVISIONS detail one ship as lost aircraft control to coordinate
the homing of all lost aircraft. However, any ship
a. Emergency Landing Ship. When- that has lost an aircraft should begin to identify it
ever possible, the OTC should make specific pro- and home it, and the ship should immediately no-
vision for emergency landings by designating tify lost aircraft control of the steps that are being
another appropriate ship as the emergency landing taken.
ship. This assignment should be on a rotation basis
Station Bearing Relative to Distance from Operating Aircraft (yards) Station Limits When
Number* Flight Operations (yards) Stationed
Course
NORMAL RESCUE DESTROYER STATIONS
1 200° 1,000 to 1,500 Day/Night
2 270° 2,500 Night
2A 270° 1,500
3 330° 3,000 Night
3A 000° 2,000
SUPPLEMENTAL RESCUE DESTROYER STATIONS
1N 200° Distance (yards) = (ship speed x 100) - 300. Not less than 1,200 Day/Night
nor more than
2,500**
1SN Initial station bears Initial distance is 1,500 yards; the rescue destroyer steams Not less than 1,200 Day
325°; rescue at a speed less than signaled speed and the ship operating nor more than
destroyer slides aircraft overtakes her. During the slide-back, the rescue 2,500**
back to station destroyer maneuvers to maintain the 1,500 yard distance.
bearing 200° Time required to complete slide-back may be controlled by
using a speed of relative motion commensurate with the
estimated time required to complete the launch or recovery.
When the slide-back is completed, distance is determined
using the distance formula for station 1N.
2SNX 190° (relative to 1,500 (normally) 1,200 to 2,500 Day/Night
course of carrier)
3SNX 190° (relative to 3,000 (normally) 1,200 to 2,000 Day/Night
course of carrier) (from station 2SNX)
4SNX The rescue destroyer operates on a station which has an inner limit of 2,000 yards and an outer limit of not more
than 6 minutes from the ship. The destroyer gains the outer limit of its station upwind and drops back at such a
relative speed that the outer sownwind limit will not be exceeded, passing the ship not closer than 2,000 yards.
If the destroyer has not dropped back to the outer limit of station by the time the launch/recovery has been
completed, the destroyer turns ealier or faster to facilitate gaining the outer limit of station.
On downwind courses, the destroyer repeats the procedure in reverse (that is, sliding back from the outer limit
downwind of the ship to the outer limit upwind, passing the ship not closer than 2,000 yards).
When winds are light and variable and the ship turns toward the destroyer to hunt for the wind, the destroyer
maneuvers clear promptly.
When the ship’s sled is in use on courses out-of-the-wind, the destroyer maneuvers to clear the sled by at least
3,000 yards.
* Number and number-letter stations are not occupied simultaneously. ** OTC may specify maximum distance.
1. Circling the ship at least once at low 5. Dropping smoke flares in the direction
altitude. of the incident if possible.
2. Flying across the bow of the ship at low This procedure should be repeated until the
altitude and, at the same time, rocking the ship acknowledges by following the aircraft or by
aircraft. hoisting the international flag NOVEMBER to in-
dicate that it is unable to comply. In either case, the
3. Sending a message by visual signaling ship is to report her actions to the OTC. Crossing
or dropping a message if possible. the wake of the ship close astern at low altitude
and rocking the aircraft means that the assistance
4. Heading in the direction of the incident. of the surface ship is no longer required.
1. SUBNOTE procedures.
6710 (NU) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
2. Restricted areas.
The complexities of modern warfare neces-
3. Water space management (WSM) areas: sitate promulgation of certain basic doctrines ap-
plicable to all services and commands to prevent
(a) Submarine action areas (SAAs). or minimize mutual interference during opera-
tions. Measures to prevent or minimize mutual in-
(b) Joint action areas (JTAAs). terference are those coordinated actions required
of appropriate commanders to ensure that the op-
(c) ASW free areas (ASWFAs). erations of forces under their direction are coordi-
nated in such a manner as to prevent or minimize
4. Permanently and temporarily estab- the adverse effects of actions of any one unit upon
lished exercise areas. the operations of others.
4. Ground forces and surface forces are (1) Advise other commanders sufficiently
mutually responsible for establishing their in advance to permit dissemination of restric-
own friendly identity, except where special tions to all personnel concerned,
instructions for harbor entrance control are
effective, or when special orders are issued (2) Specify the geographic limits and, if
for specific operations. appropriate, the altitude limits of the restricted
areas, and
5. Submarines identify themselves to
friendly surface ships and aircraft, except in (3) Provide for the timely disestablishment
submarine action areas and submarine of a restricted area as soon as conditions no
safety lanes. longer require its existence.
6. When ships of different size encounter b. Safety zones are normally used for non-
each other, it is normally the responsibility combat operations.
of the smaller ship to establish its friendly
identity to the larger ship. c. Air and surface restricted areas include:
7. Within similar types, there is a mutual (1) Controlled airspace, air corridors, and
responsibility for establishing friendly safety sectors.
identity; that is, air-air, ship-ship,
submarine-submarine, and ground-ground. (2) Shore bombardment and bomb lines.
(2) Prevention of Mutual Interfer- (1) ASW Free Area. An ASW free area
ence. For submarine operations, PMI proce- (ASWFA) is one in which no friendly subma-
dures are specifically intended to prevent rines are operating. There are no restrictions on
submerged collisions between: the use of ASW weapons, except when operat-
ing in the vicinity of a boundary with a SAA,
(a) Friendly submarines. JTAA, SSL, or other activated submarine oper-
ating area when the necessary ASW weapon
(b) Submarines and friendly surface compensatory allowances must be applied (see
ships’ towed bodies. Article 6761).
(c) S ubmarines and any othe r (2) Submarine Action Area. A subma-
submarine hazards (e.g., detonations, sub- rine action area (SAA) is an area that contains
mersibles, oil drilling operations, etc.). one or more friendly submarines. Only subma-
rine ASW weapons are authorized within an
Note: PMI using STOVEPIPE procedures can SAA.
be found in Article 9139.
(a) Submarines are allocated subma-
b. Definitions of Principal WSM rine patrol areas (SPAs) and moving havens
Areas. ASW attack rules apply to attacks against (MHNs) within an SAA to avoid mutual in-
all contacts classified as submarines regardless of terference between submarines. While the
whether they are surfaced or submerged. locations of SAAs are promulgated by the
SUBOPAUTH to all friendly forces in the
region, the specific locations of SPAs and
MHNs within SAAs are normally only pletely or partly by message. If activated, SSLs
passed to the submarines concerned and ap- are special cases of SAAs.
propriate submarine movement authorities.
c. Havens. Static havens and moving ha-
(b) Surface or air ASW attacks are vens (MHNs), which may be stationary, are estab-
prohibited in an SAA. lished to provide a measure of security to subma-
rines and surface ships in transit through areas in
(c) Surface forces should not nor- which existing attack restrictions would be inade-
mally enter an SAA. quate to prevent attack by friendly forces. Addi-
tionally, moving havens in peacetime prevent or
(3) Joint Action Area. A joint action minimize mutual interference among friendly sub-
area (JTAA) is one in which a single friendly marines or among friendly submarines and ships
submarine is operating in coordination with air- operating VDS/DTAS systems. Submarines can
craft or in associated or direct support of sur- be made available for exercises with other forces
face forces. Air and surface ASW attacks are during transit only when prior arrangements have
prohibited throughout the JTAA unless a been made. Ships operating towed acoustic de-
submarine-generated search area (SGSA) or vices under circumstances where a VDS/DTAS
NOTACK area has been established. NOTE is required should be routed in moving ha-
vens. (See Article 6780 and paragraph (4) below.)
(a) A separate JTAA is to be estab-
lished for each submarine with which coor- (1) Static Havens. Offensive opera-
d i n a ted operations are pl anne d or tions within a static haven are limited as fol-
envisaged. Note that JTAAs may be used lows:
for submarines tasked in primary roles
other than ASW; e.g., ASUW, strike war- (a) Aircraft and Surface Ships
fare, special operations, etc. shall not attack a submarine and shall not at-
tack surface ships unless they are positively
(b) Surface forces should normally identified as enemy.
not enter a JTAA unless the submarine op-
erating in the JTAA is on associated or di- (b) Submarines shall not attack
rect support of this force and provision for other submarines or surface ships unless
implementation of SGSA procedures has they are positively identified as enemy.
been made.
(2) Submarine Moving Havens
(4) ASW Area of Responsibility. The (MHNs). MHNs may be assigned by the SUBO-
ASW area of responsibility (ASW AOR) of a PAUTH to submarines to prevent or minimize the
surface force is a geographically fixed region or risk of attack between friendly submarines in war-
specified area around PIM in which the OTC, time (e.g., when a submarine is repositioning
as opposed to an area commander, exercises within an SAA occupied by other friendly subma-
ASW responsibility. Size and configuration is rines) or to prevent mutual interference in peace-
determined by the OTC based upon the nature time. Submarine MHNs are established by
of the threat and assets available to counter. Ide- BARNSTORM procedures in ATP 18 or by a sub-
ally, the ASW AOR should be an ASWFA that marine notice (SUBNOTE) promulgated in ac-
permits unrestricted use of air and surface ASW cordance with the procedure in Article 6771. The
weapons. If an SAA or JTAA waterspace is in- sides of the submarine MHN are always described
cluded in or overlaps the ASW AOR, strict in the following sequence — miles ahead, miles
compliance with ASW weapons control proce- behind, and miles on either side of the submarine’s
dures in this chapter is required. ordered position.
(1) Communication schedules and maxi- (a) More Than 24 Hours From
mum speeds of advance will affect the planning Receipt of Requirement. When more
and promulgation of changes in submarine area than 24 hours notice can be given, the OTC
allocations. must decide whether the aim of the mission
is best served by seeking separation or mu-
(2) The inherent difficulties in providing tual support from submarines within SAAs.
adequate information exchange with a covert He must request an ASWFA or JTAA.
submarine demand that communications be
limited and strictly scheduled. Additionally, al- (b) Less Than 24 Hours But
though a submarine may receive a message af- More Than 18 Hours From Receipt of
ter a short while after release, it would not Requirement. It is emphasized that the
normally transmit an acknowledgment for following is an emergency procedure and
OPSEC reasons. These constraints dictate that might be impossible to implement. In this
a SUBOPAUTH cannot normally assume re- case the OTC may request Operation
ceipt of a message, transmitted by broadcast to a GRASSHOPPER from the SUBOPAUTH.
submarine, for at least 12 hours after initial trans- This orders all affected submarines to move
mission. to a small preplanned part of their allocated
area. The duration of GRASSHOPPER and
(3) For both operational effectiveness and the area required must be defined. See Arti-
survivability, a submarine is restricted in speed. cle 6736 for detailed instructions for Opera-
Limitations may be imposed for sonar search tion GRASSHOPPER.
purposes, to ensure continuous communica-
tions, to conserve battery capacity, or to mini- (c) Less Than 18 Hours Notice
mize snorkel periods. A low speed of advance From Receipt of Requirement. An al-
by submarines is a sensible planning assumption. teration of the plans at this notice is not suf-
ficient for any course of action other than
(4) OTCs and MHQs should therefore give for the force to prohibit ASW attacks. It
the SUBOPAUTH the earliest possible notifi- must be emphasized that the short notice
cation of desired routes and water assignments. might be insufficient even to warn friendly
The SUBOPAUTH will acknowledge requests submarines of the transit of friendly surface
as soon as possible (normally within 4 hours of forces. Ships must be aware that they may
receipt). The acknowledgment will be either a be open to attack by a friendly submarine
WSM Allocation and Status message or a denial. and therefore must make every attempt to
make their identity known.
(5) Own mining operations are to be con-
ducted only after preliminary coordination with NOTE
the appropriate SUBOPAUTH. This is also
valid for the conduct of mine countermeasures DTAS/VDS-fitted ships that are pass-
to a limited extent as discussed in Chapter 13. ing through an SAA or JTAA must re-
trieve the DTAS/VDS system unless
e. Procedures for WSM Allocation. GRASSHOPPER is in force. If a CA-
TAS system is considered a hazard to
(1) Procedures for Use When Sur- certain classes of submarine, the
face Forces Require Access to a Sub- SUBOPAUTH will advise of any re-
marine Action Area or Joint Action Area quirement to retrieve the CATAS.
(other than one established for their use). The CATAS-fitted ships must recognize
procedure to be followed depends upon the no- the possibility of damage or loss unless
the system is retrieved.
(1) Purpose. The purpose of this (1) Purpose and Aim. To allow a tran-
paragraph is to formalize the procedure to be siting surface force, at short notice, the maxi-
followed when requesting or allocating ASW- mum freedom for the use of ASW weapons by
FAs, JTAAs, and SAAs. minimizing the size of SAAs or JTAAs in the
quickest possible way.
(2) Aim. The aim is to provide a standard
method to divide water effectively between the (2) Considerations.
commands involved.
(a) This operation is to be regarded as
b. Considerations. an emergency procedure.
(1) In order to reduce message traffic, WSM (b) If a STOVEPIPE Plan is in force,
messages will initially not be addressed lower GRASSHOPPER may be requested, but
than CTF/CTG level of any ASW capable cannot be authorized unless the STOVE-
force. CTGs and subarea commanders are re- PIPE Plan can be canceled.
sponsible for further dissemination as required.
(c) The submarine’s ability to operate
(2) To ensure uniformity of WSM plots, effectively will be significantly reduced
the SUBOPAUTH will issue a serialized WSM during the execution of these procedures.
message for his area of responsibility at an in-
terval not exceeding 24 hours. If a new WSM b. Execution of Operation GRASS-
message is not issued within 24 hours, the last HOPPER.
WSM message remains effective.
(1) Description. When surface forces are
(3) If required the SUBOPAUTH will is- required to enter an SAA or JTAA at short no-
sue numbered amendments to serialized WSM tice, the SUBOPAUTH can order a submarine
messages when time does not allow waiting for to withdraw into a preplanned part of its SPA,
the next serialized WSM message. defined as a MEADOW.
6750 (NC) SPECIAL SURFACE SHIP (2) Unit commanders are to ensure that
PRECAUTIONS transmitters with a power density of 100 watts
per square meter (100 W/m2) or greater at a dis-
6751 (NR) SURFACE SHIP NOTICES tance of 100 yards do not irradiate ships or air-
AND ADVISORIES craft within the 100 W/m2 radius.
Surface ship notices or advisories will only (3) Electro-Explosive Devices (EEDs) are
be required for those specific instances in which not to be exposed in a RADHAZ unsafe condi-
surface ships are required to enter blind bombing tion within a distance of 1,000 yards from other
zones or submarine patrol areas in wartime (see units.
Article 6734), or in peacetime are towing acoustic
devices under the provisions of Article 6780. (4) In the event that units are required to
breach either the 100-yard or 1,000-yard safe
distance, action is to be taken to ensure that risk
6752 (NU) RADIATION HAZARDS transmitters are controlled to ensure safety
(RADHAZ) (e.g., directed to a safe bearing, reduced in
power, or eventually switched off).
a. Ships Fitted With High-Power
Transmitting Equipment. Ships are fitted 6760 (NC) SAFETY PROCEDURES
with a large amount of high-power transmitting FOR SUBMARINES
equipment — radio communications, radar, and
sonar. High-power transmissions are a hazard to Procedures for preventing engagement of
human life because of the effects of radiation on friendly forces are of critical importance and must
the human body. They can also ignite explosive be conscientiously followed, especially within
devices and combustible material. There are also JTAAs. Air and surface units shall not conduct
certain other hazards that originate from the same ASW attacks inside a JTAA unless prior coordina-
source as the radiation hazard, such as the danger tion has been conducted with the submarine per
from rotating antennas and aural shock from the the procedures of this chapter. Likewise, subma-
use of sirens. The commanding officer of each unit rines shall employ ASW and ASUW weapons
is responsible for the safety of his own personnel with due regard for friendly surface units that may
and stores from RADHAZ produced within his be operating within or in the vicinity of the JTAA.
unit. Because of the variety of ships, aircraft, and Within a JTAA, two types of area — submarine-
equipment in NATO forces, it is not always possi- generated search area (SGSA) and NOTACK —
ble for the force commander to provide detailed are used to prevent inadvertent engagement of
regulations for the prevention of RADHAZ acci- friendly submarines. SGSA procedures allow
dents between units. It is therefore also the respon- rapid engagement of hostile submarines by other
sibility of individual commanding officers to warn ASW platforms without having to BELLRING
other units when his unit is within such a range that the friendly submarine, while NOTACK proce-
exceptionally powerful transmitters could be a dures allow direct coordination between the
hazard to personnel in the other units. If feasible, friendly submarine and an attacking ASW plat-
ships are to include details in the RADARAT or form. The two procedures complement each other
SPECINFO paragraphs of OPSTAT UNIT mes- and maximize the operational flexibility of both
sages. It is also the responsibility of each com- submarines and other ASW units.
manding officer to warn other units of stores that
are held in such a location that they could be haz- 6761 (NC) COMPENSATORY
arded by transmissions from the other units. ALLOWANCES FOR ASW
WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT
safety buffer which applies to SAA, JTAA, specified period of time. While the SGSA is in ef-
activated SSL, MEADOW, NOTACK, and fect, an SGSA Coordinating Authority/Unit con-
SGSA boundaries. trols employment of non-submarine ASW
weapons within the JTAA. The manner in which
b. The weapon danger zone is based on the SGSA procedures are implemented depends on
type of weapon, method of employment, run pat- whether the submarine is operating with a task
tern, and estimated acquisition range. This danger group or independently in cooperation with MPA
zone is not intended to be the maximum possible or other land-based tactical aircraft in area opera-
weapon run, but an area which will protect the tions. All message formats associated with SGSA
submarine from a properly operating weapon. establishment, cancellation, and attack authoriza-
Weapon danger parameters are derived from tion are found in APP 4, Vol. I, Chapter 3. Figure
ASW weapon employment publications, and may 6-9 illustrates SGSA attack rules.
also be specified by the ASWC.
a. Definitions.
c. Submarines shall remain clear of their
area boundaries by at least their assessed naviga- (1) SGSA Coordinating Authority/
tion error and take appropriate precautions to pre- Unit is the designated command or platform
vent its own ASW weapons from endangering that controls employment of air and surface
friendly submarines and surface units. ASW weapons within a JTAA when SGSA
procedures are in effect. It is normally a com-
d. Figure 6-8 illustrates compensatory mand or platform with whom the submarine is
allowances. conducting coordinated operations.
by air/surface units, coordinates and autho- the submarine is free to maneuver throughout
rizes ASW engagements in the portion of the JTAA.
the JTAA that lies outside the SGSA. SGSA
Coordinating Authority responsibilities will b. SGSA Utilization. Submarines are
normally be assigned to the SOCA. When authorized to use SGSA procedures any time when
ASW weapons are to be employed and the operating in a JTAA. The submarine commanding
submarine is inside the task group’s ASW officer is the final authority in the establishment of
AOR, this should be the task group’s an SGSA. During task group operations, he will do
ASWC. If delegated, these functions shall be so, in liaison with the SGSA Coordinating Author-
performed by a responsible command in the ity, to meet task group requirements consistent with
ASWC’s chain of command, normally no submarine safety and his ability to complete as-
lower than a sector ASWC. signed tasking. In this regard, any request or direc-
tive to a submarine to establish an SGSA should
(b) Area Operations. When a sub- provide sufficient rationale such that the command-
marine not operating with a task group is ing officer understands its intentions and can assess
conducting coordinated operations with and advise the SOCA on issues that may affect sub-
MPA or other land-based aircraft, a single marine safety. The SGSA may also be used for area
on-station aircraft shall act as the SGSA deconfliction purposes other than those strictly as-
Coordinating Unit. Responsibilities are the sociated with ASW. Examples include:
same as for a task group SGSA Coordinat-
ing Authority. (1) Establishing a specified segment of a
JTAA required by a submarine for ASUW,
(2) FREEWHEEL. FREEWHEEL is the strike warfare, intelligence surveillance, spe-
code word used by an SGSA Coordinating cial operations, etc.
Authority/Unit to confirm cancellation of an
SGSA. It is sent to the submarine only after (2) Clearing a portion of a JTAA for sur-
verification that no air or surface ASW attacks face ship transit or emergent submerged inter-
or engagements are in progress or authorized in ference advisory event, aircraft emergency
the JTAA and outside an SGSA. Upon receipt, ordnance jettison, or live fire training exercises.
(1) Task Group Operations. A sub- marine is free to operate anywhere in the
marine operating with a task group shall estab- JTAA.
lish the SGSA with the SGSA Coordinating
Authority, who may then authorize engage- (b) If attacks have been authorized,
ments outside the SGSA (including attacks by the SGSA Coordinating Authority shall ac-
MPA operating in support of the task group.) knowledge receipt of the submarine’s mes-
sage and advise that engagements are or
(2) Area Operations. AIR/SUB coop- may be in progress outside the SGSA (spec-
eration procedures per ATP 18, Chapter 12, are ify location). When all attack authoriza-
used in coordinated area operations. An tions have been canceled, confirmation is to
on-station aircraft in the JTAA acts as the be sent to the submarine.
SGSA Coordinating Unit. Note that for area op-
erations, SGSA procedures are executed by the (2) Area Operations. In area operations,
submarine with a single on-station aircraft, the submarine shall cancel the SGSA by con-
which is to coordinate and authorize all attacks tacting the on-station MPA acting as the SGSA
outside the SGSA — its own as well as those of Coordinating Unit. Upon receipt of the cancel-
other ASW aircraft. This duty may be turned lation message, the SGSA Coordinating Unit
over to a relieving aircraft. — after confirming that no ASW attacks are be-
ing conducted in any portion of the JTAA out-
f. SGSA Cancellation by the Sub- side the SGSA — shall concur with the SGSA
marine. To terminate a SGSA, the submarine cancellation. After the SGSA is canceled, the
must send a cancellation message to the SGSA SGSA Coordinating Unit shall not release or
Coordinating Authority/Unit. The message authorize use of ASW weapons until:
should be sent via tactical communications. Use of
SSIXS is also allowable during task group opera- (a) A new NOTACK area or SGSA
tions. The SUBOPAUTH should immediately re- has been established by the friendly subma-
lay such messages sent via SSIXS to the SGSA rine, or
Coordinating Authority by the fastest means pos-
sible. The submarine shall not leave its SGSA un- (b) The contact enters an ASWFA.
til receipt of cancellation concurrence (code word
FREE-WHEEL) by the SGSA Coordinating g. Use of SLOT Buoys. At the subma-
Authority/ Unit per message format in APP 4, Vol. rine commanding officer’s discretion, an SGSA
I, or, in the absence of that concurrence, until the implementation message may be sent by SLOT
Stop time of the SGSA. buoy provided communications have previously
been established with the SGSA Coordinating
(1) Task Group Operations. When op- Authority/Unit. The message must include an en-
erating with a task group, the submarine shall coded position element that must be check de-
cancel the SGSA by contacting the SGSA Co- coded on the submarine before the buoy is
ordinating Authority. Upon receipt of a SGSA released. SGSA messages passed by SLOT buoy
cancellation message, the SGSA Coordinating need not be acknowledged until the two-way com-
Authority shall verify from the SGSA plot and munications opportunity if the SGSA is still in
attack authorization log that no attacks have force. SLOT buoys may not be used to modify or
been authorized outside the SGSA and inside cancel an existing SGSA.
the submarine’s JTAA.
h. SGSA Modification. SGSAs shall
(a) If no attacks have been authorized, not be modified. Changing an existing or pre-
the SGSA Coordinating Authority shall established SGSA requires canceling the existing
concur with SGSA cancellation. The sub- or pre-established SGSA and establishing a new
one.
i. SGSA Cancellation by the SGSA (3) In that SGSA parameters are set or can-
Coordinating Authority. When the SGSA Co- celed by the submarine with an SGSA Coordi-
ordinating Authority desires to cancel an SGSA, nating Authority/Unit, the details of the SGSA
he must first ensure that no attacks have been geographic position may or may not be an
authorized outside the SGSA and inside the sub- aircrew pre-flight briefing item. In any event,
marine’s JTAA. Once verified, the SGSA Coordi- SGSA location and attack authorization must
nating Authority shall inform the submarine of be obtained from the SGSA Coordinating
SGSA cancellation via local communications or Authority/ Unit before any air or surface ASW
advise the SUBOPAUTH to relay the cancellation weapons are released inside a JTAA.
on the submarine broadcast.
k. Aircraft-to-Aircraft SGSA Hand-
j. SGSA Attack Rules. Attack rules as- over During Area Operations. Figure 6-10
sociated with SGSA procedures apply only within defines the rules for handing over SGSA from one
JTAAs and are not applicable to SAAs and ASW- SGSA Coordinating Unit to another during area
FAs. NOTACK area procedures always apply in- operations. It applies specifically to situations in
side an SGSA and throughout the JTAA which an on-station MPA is being relieved by an-
whenever an SGSA has not been established by other aircraft during independent AIR/SUB coop-
the submarine. Unless a NOTACK area is in ef- eration. These rules do not apply during associated
fect, the SGSA Coordinating Authority/Unit or direct support submarine operations.
alone must grant permission before any air or
surface ASW engagements are conducted within
a JTAA. Units desiring to conduct an attack will re- 6763 (NC) NOTACK AREA
quest attack authorization subject to the following:
a. NOTACK Area Specified. In certain
(1) If an SGSA has not been established or circumstances, it is desirable to use other force as-
the target is inside the SGSA, the SGSA Coor- sets to prosecute contacts within the JTAA or
dinating Authority/Unit shall positively deny SGSA. Protection of the friendly submarine is
the request, provide the last known position and maintained by establishing a smaller, stationary
intentions of the submarine, and direct that a area within the JTAA or SGSA around the subma-
NOTACK area be coordinated with the subma- rine known as the NOTACK area. The protected
rine prior to ASW weapon release. submarine is the only unit authorized to release
ASW weapons within this area. Establishment of a
(2) If an SGSA has been established and NOTACK area requires a geographic or relative
the contact is within the JTAA but outside the plot lock between the submarine and another unit,
SGSA, the SGSA Coordinating Authority/Unit so that navigation inaccuracies are reduced over a
shall transmit SGSA coordinates and Stop short period of time, and so that positive identifi-
time to the requesting unit and may authorize cation of a submerged contact as a non-friendly
engagement. If the coordinates along with the submarine can be established. Unless otherwise
serial number or code name of the SGSA cur- specified by the submarine, a NOTACK area has a
rently in effect have already been passed to the 10-nm radius and exists for a period of 2 hours
attacking platform, only the serial number/ (unless canceled by the submarine). Attack rules
code name and Stop time need be transmitted. for NOTACK areas within JTAAs and SGSAs are
The attacking platform, in addition to the illustrated in Figure 6-11.
SGSA Coordinating Authority, must verify that
the target is in the portion of the JTAA that is NOTE
outside the SGSA. Compensatory allowances
must be considered in determining whether an Only the submarine may establish a
attack can safely be made if the target is in the NOTACK area in its JTAA or SGSA.
vicinity of the SGSA boundary.
(3) Plot and maintain the NOTACK area h. Use of Satellite Positioning Sys-
for its specified duration. tem. In lieu of establishing a relative plot
lock, a geographic plot lock (i.e., the passing of
(4) Apply compensatory allowances to a submarine’s position to the cooperating unit)
keep ASW weapons outside of the NOTACK is permissible provided both the aircraft and
area. submarine are equipped with fully functional
satellite positioning systems (e.g., GPS). Dur-
(5) Add navigational drift error for the ing NOTACK establishment, the submarine
aircraft.
shall use the brevity word “GLOBAL” to indi- 6765 (NR) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
cate that its position has been established with OF TRANSITING SUBMARINES
GPS.
The OTC of all escorted submarine moves
6764 (NC) SAFETY LANES is normally the escort commander. In the case of
unescorted moves or when the submarines part
Safety lanes are used to facilitate submarine company with the escort for any reason, the senior
and surface ship operations. Rules governing actions submarine commander present shall assume the
within activated submarine and surface ship safety duties of OTC. The commander of an area through
lanes follow. which submarines are transiting will provide rout-
ing instructions for the SUBOPAUTH.
a. Su b m a rin e Sa fe ty Lanes
(SSLs). SSLs are available as a set of lanes su- 6766 (NU) RESPONSIBILITY TO ASSIST
perimposed on a grid, or geographically de- DISABLED SUBMARINES
scribed, and may be activated wholly or in part by
message. In water-space management, activated Any friendly ship or aircraft meeting a dis-
SSLs are a special case of submarine action area abled friendly submarine is to make every effort,
(SAA) (see Article 6734). Additionally, SSLs so far as circumstances permit, to ensure the sub-
may be used in peace-time to prevent or minimize sequent safe passage of the submarine.
mutual interference among friendly submarines
and ships operating VDS/DTAS systems. Offen- 6768 — 6769 (NU) SPARE
sive operations within activated SSLs are limited
as follows: 6770 (NR) SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS
FOR SUBMARINE OPERATIONS
(1) Aircraft. ASW attacks are prohibited. IN PEACETIME
(2) Surface Ships. Procedures for use This section contains additional procedures
when surface forces require access to an SAA for promulgating NATO submarine movement in-
are described in Article 6734. ASW attacks are formation. It also provides a system that meets the
prohibited. OPERATION GRASSHOPPER or requirements for an orderly transition from peace
designation as a JTAA are not applicable to to war. The primary reason for accurate and timely
SSLs. promulgation of submarine movement informa-
tion is to prevent submerged mutual interference.
(3) Submarines. A submarine in an SSL Secondary reasons are to provide information for
shall not attack another submarine unless it is intelligence plots so that submarine contact re-
positively identified as enemy. ports may be properly evaluated and to establish
a search area in case of SUBLOOK/SUBMISS/
b. Surface Ship Safety Lanes. Offen- SUBSUNK based on the routing information
sive operations within a surface ship safety lane given in the SUBNOTE.
are limited so that surface ships will not be at-
tacked while in the lanes unless they are positively 6771 (NR) SUBMARINE MOVEMENTS
identified as enemy or unless they commit a hos-
tile act. Attacks on aircraft and submarines will be a. Authorities. Authorities who have re-
governed by the designation of the surrounding sponsibilities with regard to submarine move-
zone or area. Cartel ships, enemy hospital ships, ments are the Submarine Operating Authorities
and neutral shipping may be routed along surface (SUBOPAUTHs), Submarine Movement Advi-
ship safety lanes, but surface ship moving havens sory Authorities (SMAAs), and Submarine Exer-
are more appropriate. cise Area Coordinators (SEACs).
Allied nations are responsible for inform- 6772 (NR) ACTION ON SUSPECTED
ing relevant SMAAs about those national subma- MUTUAL INTERFERENCE
rine exercise areas which have been established
permanently as agreed by the nations concerned a. Outside Established Submarine
and are under the control of SEACs. SMAAs are Exercise Areas. The SMAA will advise SUB-
responsible for monitoring submarine and VDS OPAUTHs as soon as interference is suspected.
ship movements and for informing SEACs, However, an interference situation may become
SUBOPAUTHs, and units concerned of possible evident to SUBOPAUTHs concerned as soon as
mutual interference. NATO SMAAs have no SUBNOTEs or changes thereto are promulgated,
authority to control submarine movements. The in which case they should initiate action to elimi-
procedures required below will neither infringe on nate the suspected interference situation without
national prerogatives, infringe on the freedom of waiting for a message from the SMAA. There are
the seas, nor release submarine commanders from no set parameters for determining when an inter-
their responsibilities regarding the International ference situation is deemed to exist, and the
Law of the Seas. They do place a moral obligation good judgment of the authorities involved will de-
on all Allied SUBOPAUTHs to declare accurately termine the necessary action. As a minimum, how-
their submarine operations and in sufficient time ever, interference should be considered to exist
to permit the widest promulgation to “need to when the edge of a moving haven, SPA, or tempo-
know” addressees. rary exercise area is within 10 miles of another
moving haven, SPA, or temporary exercise area.
b. SUBNOTE Procedures. Subma-
rines are routed in peace and in war by means of b. Inside Permanently Established
SUBNOTEs that must clearly and accurately de- Submarine Exercise Areas. The SEAC will
fine the route to be followed. Details are in this be best informed concerning the movements of his
section and APP 4. own submarines within an established exercise
area. On receipt of information of a submarine
c. Notice of Intention (NOI). When ex- transiting through the permanent exercise area,
ercises are being planned it may be considered ad- the SEAC is, if interference is possible, to recom-
visable to establish a temporary submarine mend avoiding action to the SUBOPAUTH in-
exercise area and/or to promulgate the intended volved, keeping the SMAA informed.
track of the submarine well in advance. This
should be done by issuing an intention message to c. Inside Temporarily Established
appropriate addressees in advance of promulgat- Submarine Exercise Areas. The commander
ing a SUBNOTE. This message should state the establishing a temporary submarine exercise area
limits of the area and the duration of its use and/or by a notice of intention (NOI) will be best informed
intended track. Details are in APP 4. concerning the movements of exercise submarines
within the area. On receipt of information of a
d. Diving Restrictions. It is assumed nonexercise submarine transiting through the tem-
that the submarine will proceed along its promul- porary exercise area, the SMAA is responsible for
gated track dived. Those portions of the route that advising the commander who established the area
must be transited surfaced are to be specified in the and the appropriate SUBOPAUTH. The com-
SUBNOTE. Should it be necessary to route the mander who established the area is to decide if in-
submarine dived through permanently established terference is likely and to recommend to the appro-
exercise areas, the provisions of Article 6772 priate SUBOPAUTH, keeping the SMAA in-
apply. formed, whether or not avoiding action is required.
(4) A ship planning to stream a CATAS at PAUTHs, investigation forces should employ
depths greater than 30 meters (98 feet) is to all acoustic devices in a manner to exploit their
send a CATAS ADVISORY, using the mes- maximum capability for contact investigation.
sage format in APP 4, to the appropriate SMAA When a contact has been classified as “a NATO
at least 48 hours before commencement of the or known friendly” submarine, unless other-
operation. Upon the receipt of the CATAS AD- wise instructed, the ship is to break contact.
VISORY, the SMAA is to send a reply to the
originator of the CATAS ADVISORY ac- (6) Wartime Procedures.
knowledging receipt. In the acknowledgment,
the SMAA may include advice on other units (a) VDS/DTAS NOTES and CATAS
conducting surveillance in the area or advice on ADVISORIES are not required provided
best placement of the sensor for minimizing wartime procedures have been imple-
mutual interference and avoiding duplication mented and Waterspace Management
of effort. Upon receipt of the acknowledgment, (WSM) procedures are in force. (See Arti-
and after considering the SMAA’s advice, the cles 6734 through 6736 and 6774.)
ship may stream its CATAS as stated in the CA-
TAS ADVISORY. If the towing ship departs (b) The use of VDS/DTAS or CATAS
the CATAS ADVISORY area and the system systems is unrestricted in ASWFAs.
cannot be recovered, the towing ship is to pro-
vide warning on sonar or underwater telephone, (c) Surface ships passing through an
as described in the Sonar Signal Code Table of SAA or JTAA (other than one established
AXP 1, at least once every 5 minutes unless oth- for their use) must retrieve their VDS/
erwise specified by the SMAA. DTAS systems unless GRASSHOPPER is
in force. If a CATAS system is considered a
(5) Urgent Contact Investigation. hazard to certain classes of submarine, the
When a ship is required to conduct an urgent in- SUBOPAUTH will advise of any require-
vestigation and time does not permit comple- ment to retrieve CATAS. CATAS-fitted
tion of the procedures in paragraphs (3) and (4) ships must recognize the possibility of dam-
above, VDS/DTAS or CATAS may be used but age or loss unless the system is retrieved.
a VDS/DTAS NOTE or CATAS ADVISORY
should be dispatched by IMMEDIATE prece- (d) The restrictions in subparagraph
dence message. The initial submarine contact (c) above also apply to surface ships in a
report to national or NATO authorities must JTAA established for their use, unless
contain a statement that VDS/DTAS or clearance has been received from the
CATAS is being employed. During investiga- SUBOP-AUTH. The use of VDS/DTAS or
tion of unclassified contacts, ships streaming CATAS systems and any restrictions that
towed acoustic devices should not deliberately may apply should be negotiated between
close the contact within 4,000 yards. When a the surface force commander and the
contact has been classified as “not a NATO or known SUBOPAUTH when a JTAA is established.
friendly” submarine by the appropriate SUBO-
7022 (NC) COMBAT AIR PATROL unit knows the time, location, and altitude at
MANAGEMENT which the parent carrier wishes the aircraft to be
returned to her control for recovery.
a. General. CAP aircraft can be either
land based or carrier based. Instructions in this (7) Units controlling another carrier’s air-
article on the use of CAP aircraft are applicable craft are to pass aircraft status reports to the par-
generally, but details given in this article concern ent carrier as soon as they are received from
carrier-based CAP aircraft only. For details con- CAP aircraft. CAP aircraft must pass this infor-
cerning land-based CAP aircraft, see ATP 34. mation immediately on gaining contact with
CAP missions can be more precisely identified the controlling unit.
when one of the following modifiers is used before
the CAP: force CAP (FORCECAP), barrier CAP c. CAP Aircraft Stations. CAP aircraft
(BARCAP), target CAP (TARCAP), rescue CAP should be stationed to engage enemy bombers
(RESCAP), and surveillance CAP (SUCAP). prior to their anticipated weapons release point
CAP aircraft employed in the AAW role are nor- and as listed in ATP 31.
mally referred to as force CAP (FORCECAP).
(1) CAP aircraft may be stationed by the
b. Air Resource Element Coordina- OTC or AAWC at the following altitude bands:
tor (AREC)/CAP Instructions. The following
points are to be considered with respect to CAP (a) High (HICAP) — above 25,000 feet.
aircraft during AAW operations:
(b) Medium (MEDIUMCAP) —
(1) The OTC or AAWC will direct the between 5,000 and 25,000 feet.
AREC to maintain an alert posture and fill as-
signed CAP stations. CAP aircraft will relieve (c) Low (LOWCAP) — between 500
on station or within a specified distance of and 5,000 feet.
station.
(2) Distance of CAP stations from the main
(2) The AREC must keep the OTC or body may vary from overhead to 200 nm. Any
AAWC informed of the ability to maintain alert combination of altitudes and distance is possi-
posture. Weather, maintenance, or deck respot- ble. However:
ting operations may degrade alert posture.
(a) The radial size of sector covered
(3) Alert CAP aircraft will be launched on by a fighter decreases as its distance from
assigned control frequencies to expedite sta- the main body increases.
tioning and/or intercept of assigned raids.
(b) Stationing at long range reduces
(4) CAP aircraft proceed to and return from overall fighter availability due to loss of
assigned stations within safety sectors or on return time in transit and short time on station.
to force (RTF) or minimum risk route (MRR)
profiles. Positive control must be maintained to (c) When employing modern fighters
avoid engagements by friendly units, especially that have a high rate of climb, low and close
when the safety sector is near or traverses mis- CAP stations should generally be preferred,
sile engagement zones or missile arcs. Provi- especially when the direction of the threat
sion should be made for deviation to expedite cannot be determined.
stationing and facilitate prompt intercept action.
d. Procedures. The following proce-
(5) EMCON permitting, carriers will track dures are used to control CAP aircraft:
CAP aircraft operating within their radar cover-
age but controlled by other ships, so that they (1) CAP voice call signs will be used as
can take over control if necessary. follows:
(6) Parent carriers of CAP aircraft controlled (a) On CAP control nets, use the
by other units are to ensure that the controlling squadron call plus a three-number suffix.
(b) On AAW nets, use the word STA- CWC/AAWC. VL should always be de-
TION, followed by the station number. fined as a geographic point (latitude and
longitude). However, a surface tacan can
(c) Airborne CAP aircraft steering, or also be positioned at VL as a navigation aid
whose relief has been launched, will be re- for non-INS equipped aircraft. If VL is de-
ported as STEERED plus station number. fined only by a tacan, long-range CAP may
The launched relief will assume the station have difficulties maintaining station due to
call. intermittent tacan reception. The grid is ori-
ented to magnetic north with distance from
(d) CAP aircraft in alert will be given VL made by letter notation. Fifty (50) nm
stations by the OTC or AAWC, whether or from VL is designated ALFA, 100 nm from
not there is any immediate prospect of VL is BRAVO, etc. The bearing is desig-
launching. Call signs are to be based on nated by a number from 01 through 36
these stations using the procedure in sub- representing a bearing in degrees mag-
paragraph (b). netic. The bearing 010 is designated 01, 110
is 11, 260 is 26, etc. With this as a basis,
(2) The OTC or AAWC may delegate con- any CAP station can be readily identified
trol of CAP stations to an AAW air control unit by a number and a letter. For example, CAP
(AAWACU). This designation is passed on the station 010 at 250 nm from VL is desig-
AAW coordination net. nated station “ONE ECHO.” This grid ref-
erence system provides a simple means of
(3) CAP stations will be assigned using the position both for friendly aircraft and en-
following systems: emy targets.
iv. Minimum altitude in hundreds (c) If, for some reason, it appears
of feet (or using the words HIGH, ME- doubtful that the interception can be suc-
DIUM, or LOW). cessfully completed within the fighter en-
gagement zone (FEZ).
v. Control channel numbers
(primary/alternate). (d) Immediately, if the interception
fails.
For example, CAP station 2 is to be in a
position that is 060 degrees true, 50 nautical 7023 (NC) ELECTRONIC WARFARE
miles distant from ZZ, and at an altitude of AIRCRAFT
over 25,000 feet. The primary control fre-
quency is channel 12 and channel 8 is the al- Electronic warfare aircraft can be either
ternate. This station would be passed as: land based, carrier based, or ship based. The
STATION 2 — 060ZZ50 — 250 — 12/8. primary function of these aircraft is to provide
electronic warfare support measures (ESM) and
(b) VL Method. In order to simplify electronic countermeasures (ECM) support to
AAW reporting, a standard grid origin has the force, as defined in Article 5101. Coordination
been adopted. The center point of the grid of the EW capabilities of these aircraft is normally
(VL) is a reference point specified by the exercised by the OTC through the Electronic War-
fare Coordinator (EWC).
c. Promulgation. The method of coordi- (2) Any change in status of a MEZ is prom-
nation is normally promulgated by the OPTASK ulgated to aircraft and friendly units by the
AAW. An operation order may, in addition, spec- AAWC using the appropriate code words from
ify jammer frequency restrictions and the circum- APP 7.
stances under which the method of weapon
coordination is automatically changed. It is the re- b. Silent SAM MEZ. When covert, long-
sponsibility of the AAWC to ensure that forces in- or medium-range, SAM-equipped ships are sta-
volved are aware of the method of coordination in tioned upthreat, a Silent SAM MEZ may be estab-
use. Procedural messages enable the AAWC to es- lished; this has significant differences from the
tablish, change, or give warning of a change of MEZ described above. The key factors for ships
method, as in the following examples: operating a Silent SAM MEZ are:
(1) Establish — “(Method) coordination (1) Ships remain covert, receiving the air
is in force.” picture via data links.
(2) Change — “Cancel (method) coordi- (2) Ships’ weapon control status is auto-
nation — assume (method) coordination.” matically WEAPONS FREE.
(3) Warning — “At (time) — cancel (3) The OPTASK AAW will contain de-
(method) coordination — (method) coordina- tails of MEZ size, position, and timing.
tion will be assumed.”
(4) No safety sectors are established in a
d. Local Coordination. Local coordina- Silent SAM MEZ.
tion only applies to the employment of self-
defense SAMs, ECM, and guns; it is not an al- (5) No friendly aircraft are allowed in the
ternative to area or zone coordination. The Silent SAM MEZ, except for AEW, ASW, and
LAAWC will compile and promulgate the local ASUW aircraft that are required to operate in
air picture to specifically enable ships to identify the Silent SAM MEZ, providing the following
friendly aircraft and prevent their engagements by criteria are met:
friendly units. No further attempt to coordinate
weapons employment is normally made, and tar- (a) SAM ships must be alerted to the
get engagement messages for self-defense weap- mission, the aircraft must be continuously
ons systems are not required. tracked, and their position transmitted on
data link.
h. CANYON AFFIRM (Track Num- To inform the OTC and AAWC of SAMs
ber). Used by a ship fitted with a jammer to indi- available, missile states are reported by means of
cate that designated target is being jammed. SUGAR reports, which are passed, without re-
quest, to the OTC and AAWC whenever the mis-
i. HOSTILE (Track Number) sile availability status of any one type of missile is
SPLASHED. Used to indicate that the raid des- reduced by 25 percent of the total missiles carried.
ignated is believed to be destroyed. The OTC and AAWC may also ask for current
SUGAR states, by category or specific type, de-
j. HEADS UP HOSTILE (Track Num- pending upon the requirement. The letters pro-
ber). Used to indicate that action by reporting unit vided in Table 7-1 are to be used.
against target in question has ceased for one of the
following reasons: 7054 (NC) AMMUNITION STATE
REPORTS
(1) When a previously reported engage-
ment has been broken off prematurely (e.g., af- Ammunition states are reported by means
ter shifting to a more threatening target). of CANDY reports, which are passed, without re-
quest, to the OTC and AAWC whenever the am-
(2) If the interception is found to be munition or chaff is reduced by 50 percent of the
impossible. total ammunition carried. The OTC and AAWC
may also ask for current CANDY states. The fol-
(3) At the end of an inconclusive lowing letters are to be used:
engagement.
A 15.2 cm
(4) When a SPLASHED message is shown B 5 in/38
to be untrue. C 5 in/54
k. SALVO HOSTILE (Track Number). D 12 cm
Means “about to engage with Birds,” and is used E 4.5 in
by a SAM ship when it is threatened by a target F 100 mm
that is already being taken by a fighter and the ship G 3 in/50
intends to engage the target with missiles. When
this occurs, it is the responsibility of the ship about H 3 in/70
to open fire to warn the unit controlling the fighter: I 76 mm
J 57 mm
“This is (call sign) SALVO HOSTILE K 40 mm
(TRACK NUMBER) COUNTDOWN
SIXTY NOW (engaging in 60 seconds).” L 30 mm
M 25 mm
The fighter is to be hauled off in ample time N Chaff for confusion
to clear the missile shot and the controller is to P Chaff for distraction
pass the fighter’s disengagement direction:
Q Chaff for seduction
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
For example, a unit that has 48 percent of its (1) Completion of the launch and call signs
100 mm AA ammunition remaining would report: of the aircraft.
“(OTC) this is (call sign) CANDY report — F48
over.” (2) Changes in alert states of CAP aircraft.
For ASSM state reports, see Chapter 8. (3) When CAP aircraft are steered for
recovery.
7055 (NC) AIRCRAFT OPERATING
REPORTS (4) When recovery is completed.
The carrier or AAWACU is to make reports (5) When CAP aircraft are on station at al-
of the following to the OTC or AAWC on the ap- titude and under positive control.
propriate tactical net:
(6) Progress of intercept.
CHAPTER 8
Antisurface Warfare
SECTION I — GENERAL
8100 (NR) GENERAL and air forces in order to deny the enemy effective
use of his surface forces.
a. This chapter contains tactical and proce-
dural instructions for ships (including subma- b. Antisurface operations by surface ships
rines) and aircraft when operating against enemy and submarines include all actions to combat en-
surface forces. Its purpose is to: emy surface forces. In the case of an offensive an-
tisurface action, a SAG will be formed. A SAG
(1) Specify tactics and procedures in anti- may be comprised of surface ships and/or subma-
surface operations. rines. If the action is of a defensive nature, the
OTC may either detach a SAG to counter the sur-
(2) Enable commanders to issue orders and face threat, maintain the integrity of the force, or
instructions to fulfill their responsibilities. avoid any action by altering course with the whole
force, depending upon the significance of the sur-
(3) Enable subordinates to understand and face threat as compared to the air and subsurface
comply with orders and instructions received. threats.
b. Surface Policy. The Surface Policy (g) Obtaining accurate target data for
can be stated in broad terms only, or specified in possible engagement.
detail as required. Table 8-1 contains a checkoff
list, based on the phases of surface action outlined (3) Phase 3 — Long-Range Engage-
in Article 8105. They may be used to prepare or- ment.
ders and to update and execute them.
(a) Consideration of detaching air
c. Success of Surface Action. The assets or submarines for long-range attacks.
success of surface action depends on a thorough
understanding of the Surface Policy, a good initial (b) Detachment as necessary of long-
plan, and the initiative of commanding officers. range ASSM units in SAGs with supporting
submarines as appropriate or single units for
8105 (NC) SURFACE ACTION long-range engagements.
(2) The conflicting use of SAM systems for f. Pre-action fire control settings. It is vital
AAW on the one hand and for SAM in the that these are obtained as early in the action as pos-
surface-to-surface (SASS) mode on the other sible. Thus, initial settings on fire control equip-
must be carefully weighed by the OTC. Systems ment must be accurate. However, fire control is
with more than one tracker can maintain both, al- vulnerable to jamming and therefore calibration
though with reduced capabilities. However, most involving fire control radar transmissions may be
medium- and long-range SAM systems have suf- inadvisable and should only be carried out on in-
ficient surface-to-surface capability to favora- struction from the SAG commander.
bly influence the outcome of the surface action.
g. Fire distribution.
8202 (NC) SURFACE ACTION GROUP
POLICY (1) Normal fire distribution. Normal fire
distribution entails the engagement of opposite
In defense of the main body, the primary con- numbers of the enemy force and should as far as
cern must be to remain between the enemy and the possible leave no enemy ship unengaged. If
main body. If the SAG has been detached to destroy, concentration of fire is possible, major enemy
neutralize, or repel missile carrier(s), the SAG ships should receive priority. Normal fire dis-
should do so as far as possible from the main body or tribution is automatically in force.
convoy. In formulating his policy, the SAG
commander must consider the following factors: (2) Targets to individual units. The SAG
commander may make a fire distribution signal
a. Relative capabilities of own and enemy allotting targets to individual units at any time
forces. before or during an action. Special signal
groups are available for this purpose.
b. Likely tactics of enemy forces.
h. Number of missiles to be fired in ASSM
c. The use of ECM. The SAG commander salvos.
should make use of the ECM capability of ships of
the SAG to disrupt enemy fire control, surface warn- 8203 (NC) STANDARD SURFACE
ing sensors, missile systems, and communications. ACTION PLANS
d. The use of deception. When approach- Three standard surface action plans are de-
ing the enemy, the SAG commander should con- tailed in ATP 31, Chapter 8.
sider the use of physical and electronic measures
designed to conceal the size and formation of the a. Plan GREYHOUND. Plan GREY-
SAG. The electronic emission pattern of the SAG HOUND is the plan for SSM attack by ships using
must conform with the deception plan in use. a target reporting unit (TRU) and is best suited for
over-the-horizon (OTH) attacks.
e. The formation. It is important that de-
ployment into the chosen surface-action forma- b. Plan GROUSE. Plan GROUSE is the
tion should have been completed before action plan for SAGs, which may include helicopters, in
commences. The surface-action formation must a coordinated attack against enemy surface units
allow ships to engage with all their weapons, and other than missile-armed fast patrol boats. This
to take avoiding action without endangering adja- plan is best suited for engagements within horizon
cent ships. Unnecessarily large intervals between range.
ships give an enemy with superior speed the op-
portunity to concentrate on one part of the group at c. Plan SNIPE. Plan SNIPE is the plan for
a time. SAGs against missile-armed fast patrol boats.
Towed array sonar (TAS) is capable of pas- Pickets are stationed primarily to extend the
sively detecting surface as well as subsurface con- surveillance area, and in littoral areas especially to
tacts at extended ranges. In an area of high surface cover entrances and choke points. A picket-chain
threat, the OTC may consider assigning a TAS consisting of several units might be ordered to
ship to the ASUW role in addition to or in lieu of cover large areas. The ASUW picket may be a sur-
the ASW role. In either case, the resultant effect on face unit, a submarine, or an aircraft. For further
the force’s ASW posture must be considered. details on capabilities and tasking see ATP 31.
(1) Attacks on enemy surface forces. (1) Controlled Operations. When the heli-
copter has two-way communications with and is within
(2) Scouting, using any sensor to acquire the radar range of the control unit, the helicopter is
tactical information. to operate under positive or advisory control.
(2) Shipborne ASW aircraft. (5) Sensors available in the firing unit.
(3) Maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). (6) ASSM flight profile, missile-homing
search capability, and missile facility to receive
(4) Land- or carrier-based fighter/attack/ midcourse guidance corrections.
reconnaissance aircraft.
(7) Geographic and environmental
(5) EW/AEW aircraft. constraints.
(6) Land-based ESM and radar stations, (8) Geometric considerations, including
including installations, such as oil and gas the need for passive sensor baseline.
platforms.
(9) Enemy’s defensive systems.
(7) Surface units, preferably capable of
data link transmissions to the firing unit. (10) Rules of Engagement (ROE).
b. Link Reporting. The data link can be c. Methods Used for Passing Target
directional to a dedicated ASSM platform, or Bearing and Range. Table 8-2 shows the meth-
omnidirectional to permit a number of suitable ods that may be used for passing target bearing
units to achieve a firing solution. The link need not and, when available, range. The selection of the
be dedicated to TPT, because of the high capacity most suitable method depends upon the tactical
of modern data link systems, but may be usefully situation and the equipment of the participants. It
employed simultaneously in other fields of war- must be established by the firing unit. The TRU
fare to best exploit the capabilities of the TRU. should inform the firing unit if it is unable to com-
Caution should be exercised when using data link ply and propose an alternative method. Details are
to ensure sufficient gridlock accuracy and track in ATP 31.
quality for discriminative targeting of a multiship
formation. 8506 — 8509 SPARE
8600 (NC) DEFENSE AGAINST forces to ensure the timely initiation of suitable de-
MISSILE-ARMED SHIPS fense measures. Especially, in this context, ESM
and airborne surface surveillance efforts must care-
a. For a successful defense against missile- fully be considered and coordinated.
armed ships, the following criteria must be consid-
ered in addition to other procedures for antisurface a. Target/Threat Radars. The intercep-
warfare: tion of electronic emissions will normally be the
first indication of the enemy. Therefore, those ra-
(1) Detection of the missile carrier(s). dar frequencies should be watched continuously
that are known to be surveillance or fire-control
(2) Actions upon interception of threat radars of missile carriers and would therefore pose
radars. an immediate threat (e.g., SQUARE TIE). Careful
ESM tasking is required, including the determina-
(3) Destruction or neutralization of the tion of threat radars.
missile carrier(s) befor reaching its engage-
ment range against friendly forces. b. Use of Active Sensors. The policy
of using own airborne and surface platform
(4) Detection of missile(s) in flight. radars must be carefully matched with ESM task-
ing in order to provide maximum warning and
(5) Deception and jamming of missile bef- minimum interference to ESM equipment and
ore lock-on. minimum ESM data to a launching platform.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
Figure 8-2. (NU) Aircraft Flightpaths for Air Plan BLUEBELL (Cont.)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
Figure 8-2. (NU) Aircraft Flightpaths for Air Plan BLUEBELL (Concl.)
J Lightweight -Example-
The design and selection of ASW surface These and other factors are considered in
screens will depend on: ATP 28 and in Chapters 3 and 12.
a. Number of screening units available and 9105 (NR) SURFACE SHIP TOWED
their individual and collective weapons and sensor ARRAYS
fits.
9106 (NC) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
b. Size and disposition of the force being (see also ATP 28)
screened.
a. Generally, the method of employing a
c. Availability of ASW aircraft. towed array ship will depend on the type of array
fitted. Surveillance Towed Array Systems (SUR-
d. Anticipated threat. TAS) tend to have an extremely long length and
are optimized for very slow towing speeds. For
e. Environmental conditions. this reason, they are best suited to stationary op-
erations which allow them to patrol their stations
f. Tactical sonar ranges. at slow speed and to avoid frequent maneuvers
which cause array destabilization and degrade its
g. PIM, including any navigational performance. Tactical Towed Array Systems
constraints. (TACTAS) are specifically designed for higher
speeds and are the best option for moving-PIM op-
h. Requirement for command, control, and erations such as convoy escort. The actual per-
communication, including Emission Policy. formance of an array depends as well on its design.
Critical Angle Towed Array Systems (CATAS)
i. Requirement for supporting operations; tend to be less affected by tow ship noise due to the
for example, replenishment. greater length of tow cable than do arrays towed
from a depressor (DTAS). Hence a CATAS will
j. Requirement for other forms of defense; tend to provide better all round ranges of initial de-
for example, AAW. tection and tracking than can be expected of a
DTAS.
b. To enhance effectiveness as an ASW towed array ship should institute measures to re-
sensor system, it is necessary for a towed array duce their radiated noise levels. For the same rea-
ship to reduce the range at which it may be counter- son, the towed array ship’s station must be
detected by the submarine. For this reason, the selected so as to be clear of the force’s residual ra-
towed array ship will tend to operate in as silent an diated noise. In particular, the direct path and con-
Emission Policy as possible. It is therefore neces- vergence zone annulus must be avoided. In this
sary for the OTC to provide as much guidance as regard, degradation caused by tow ship noise
possible to the ship prior to its taking up station to and/or endure gaps should also be considered.
avoid unnecessary electromagnetic (EM) emis-
sions which may reveal its presence. The follow- b. Reaction Time. Towed array ships
ing areas should be addressed in appropriate may be stationed ahead, astern, or on the flanks of
messages/orders. a force. Regardless of the relative position chosen,
such ships should be stationed sufficiently far
(1) The policy on contact reporting frequency. from the force to allow the OTC time to react to
detections made by the TAS ships. The actual dis-
(2) The relative importance of station- tance will depend on:
keeping versus contact holding.
(1) Whether the expected threat is
(3) The degree of freedom allowed the equipped with missiles, torpedoes, or a mixture
towed array ship with respect to EMCON in or- of both.
der to prosecute his contacts.
(2) Whether the threat is from nuclear or
(4) Additional assets available to help prose- diesel-electric submarines.
cute contacts and the means of obtaining them.
(3) The type of localization to be employed.
(5) The OTC’s assessment of the tactical
situation, together with a summary of the posi- (4) The time to complete localization. This
tions of friendly, neutral, and hostile shipping, time will vary from several minutes when ships
should be transmitted to the TAS ship as fre- are stationed to allow cross-fixing to several
quently as possible. hours for single-ship TMA localization.
(6) Anticipated changes to PIM and the time (5) Detection envelopes will vary for dif-
the TAS ship is to reposition with respect to it. ferent types of TAS. In addition, the detection
range will vary depending on the direction from
(7) Acoustic intelligence. Area Command- which a submarine closes the force. For exam-
ers and the ASWC should promulgate all cur- ple, a ship stationed astern of the force can ex-
rent target acoustic intelligence in the form of a pect to encounter submarines, moving, closing
brief summary including the significant slowly relative to the force but at a higher and,
sources, frequencies, source levels, modes of thus, noisier true speed than a TAS ship sta-
operation, and aspect dependencies of all tar- tioned ahead. Thus, the range of detection for a
gets of interest in their subordinate’s area. given system can be increased, thereby provid-
ing more reaction time than by choice of station
9107 (NC) STATIONING OF TOWED AR- alone.
RAY UNITS
(6) Whether the OTC is primarily con-
The selection of a station for a TAS ship is cerned with alertment to allow evasion or
based on the following considerations: whether he intends further prosecution.
a. Own Force Noise. The reduction of (7) Other sensors and weapons such as
force noise levels reaching a towed array is an im- ESM or Area Air Defense fitted in the towed ar-
portant element in increasing its detection enve- ray unit.
lope. For this reason, all units operating near a
c. Communications. The communica- lines of approach (LLA) and the frontal cover-
tion fit of a towed array ship will affect the OTC’s age desired, it may be advantageous to station
stationing decision as well. Ships should not be towed array ships specifically to allow for
stationed at a distance from the OTC/ASWC such cross-fixing. In this event, it will be necessary to
that they are not capable of passing, on a real-time provide reliable communications between the
basis, contact information and of receiving orders TAS ships. If equipment fitment or EMCON re-
from the OTC/ASWC (see Chapter 4). Long-range strictions prevent such communications, an
communications are required between towed acoustically quiet surface ship or an aircraft may
array ships and the OTC/ASWC to: be stationed between the TAS ships to act as a
relay unit. If it is decided to position towed ar-
(1) Station units. ray ships to enable cross-fixing, the following
points are relevant:
(2) Report figure of merit (FOM) and con-
tact data to the OTC/ASWC. (1) The LLA for the anticipated threat
should be covered by the TAS ships.
(3) Request and coordinate nonorganic air
support (from ashore). (2) The TAS ships should be stationed to
provide a significant overlap in their passive
(4) Assign aircraft to a TAS contact coverage to maximize the probability of con-
prosecution. current contact. A separation between TAS
ships equal to UHF communication range opti-
(5) Coordinate the task force/task group mizes both probability of simultaneous contact
response to an ASW contact. and UHF communications.
(6) Join MPA coming on task. This may be (3) The ships should be stationed at a dis-
delegated to the ASWACU (see Chapter 6 for tance along PIM from the main body sufficient
MPA joining procedures). to maximize coverage within the LLA while
minimizing interference caused by force-
d. Mutual Support. Because of the generated noise and providing sufficient reac-
distance at which TAS ships can operate from the tion time for the OTC.
force, mutual support for TAS ships should be
considered in the following areas: (4) Depending on the TAS ship fitment, it
may be necessary for the TAS escort to employ
(1) Defense Against Air Attack. TAS sprint and search tactics to optimize detection
ships tend to operate in the covert mode; there- opportunities in high speed of advance (SOA)
fore, they may be vulnerable to air attack. If un- situations. The OTC must be kept informed of
able to defend itself, some provision should be the TAS escort’s requirement to conduct sprint
made to include the TAS station in the force’s and search as the possible resultant degradation
AAW defended area. to screen integrity must be considered when
formulating his overall ASW plan. If sufficient
(2) Independent Localization and TAS escorts are available, the OTC should con-
Attack. Normally TAS ships are capable of de- sider coordinating their sprint and search cycles
tecting contacts at distances far greater than the so that as one searches the other sprints. In addi-
effective range of their weapon systems and are tion, it may be possible to employ sprint and
often unable to localize to attack criteria. As a search tactics as a means of generating subma-
result, it may be necessary to provide the TAS rine movement. Generally, a short sprint/search
ship with an independent localizing and attacking cycle is preferable to a cycle which employs a
vehicle such as a helicopter or MPA. Surface long period of sprint coupled with long search
ship ASW pouncers may provide another option. times. SOA in excess of 12 knots may degrade
towed array operations.
(3) Communications and Stationing
Considerations. Depending on the limiting
(5) Delivery boy replenishment is recom- proximity of force-generated noise may reduce
mended for towed array ships in the outer the size of the TAS detection envelope.
screen. If, however, the towed array ship de-
parts station for replenishment, the OTC must c. Astern.
determine the time to return to station and the
method of screening in the interim. (1) Advantages. The principle advan-
tage of the astern station lies in covering the
rear of the force against the approach of the fast
9108 (NC) TOWED ARRAY SCREEN nuclear submarine. Escorts with a low passive
STATION OPTIONS FOM or badly degraded forward endfire may
be best employed in this role particularly if fit-
Towed array surface ships may be stationed ted with a broadband intercept capability.
ahead in the outer or inner screen within the LLA,
or astern of the escorted force. The advantages and (2) Disadvantages. The use of a TAS
disadvantages are: ship astern of the force may reduce the overall
ASW coverage provided ahead within the LLA.
a. Outer Screen.
9109 (NC) TOWED ARRAY ZERO-PIM
(1) Advantages. A station in the outer OPERATIONS
screen will optimize the TAS detection enve-
lope, the frontal coverage, and reduce interfer- Towed array ships may also be employed in
ence caused by force-radiated noise. In zero-PIM operations such as barrier patrols, de-
addition, it will provide the OTC with the most fended lanes, and area surveillance. The OTC
reaction time. should consider these factors:
(1) Advantages. The OTC will have bet- b. Selection of Search Type. This is
ter control over the TAS ship due to improved based on the criteria laid out in ATP 31, Chapter 6,
communications. At the same time, mutual and ATP 28, Chapter 4. When applied to towed ar-
support is more easily provided. ray searchers, the sweep width should be replaced by
the expected PSR. The specific type of search will
(2) Disadvantages. The proximity of depend on the actual operation. For example, to
the TAS ship to the escorted force will consid- search an area or probability (AOP) or datum, the
erably reduce the reaction time available to the expanding square search may provide the best re-
OTC as well as preclude totally effective use of sults whereas for defended lane operations, a lin-
the frontal coverage available. In addition, the ear or crossover patrol may be appropriate.
9122 (NU) CONDUCT OF AIRPLANS FOR PIM on which a relative airplan is based, the
FIXED-WING ASW AIRCRAFT AND airplan is to be reordered.
HELICOPTERS
f. Accuracy of Airplan Origin, Datum,
a. Aircraft Flightpath. The flightpath or Contact Position. When ordering an air-
of an aircraft within an assigned area depends on plan, it may be desirable to use radar to ensure that
the type of aircraft; on the search, localization, and the origin of the airplan, datum, or contact position
navigation equipment available; and on environ- is accurately established. (See Table 9-2.) For spe-
mental conditions. An ASW aircraft joining a cific details of these airplans, see Figures 9-5 to
force should be prepared to inform the OTC of the 9-15.
maximum size of the area that it can search effec-
tively under the prevailing conditions. 9123 (NC) AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORT OF
TOWED ARRAY SHIPS
b. Contact Investigation. When an
airplan is ordered which requires an aircraft to in- The aircraft assigned is required to:
vestigate a contact or bearing, it is essential that
sufficient details of the contact or bearing be a. Join the AAWC/ASWC/ASWACU in
passed to the aircraft to allow the aircraft com- direct support. In associated support and area op-
mander to determine the most appropriate search erations, the aircraft will cooperate with the towed
and localization procedures to be used. array ship, depending on the disposition of forces,
to prosecute contacts.
c. Variations to Airplans. When an
airplan is ordered, the order may include varia- b. Report contacts to the OTC/ASWC/
tions to the airplan and any amplifying instruc- ASWACU in direct support and to the area com-
tions not included in the order table. mander and cooperating individual towed array
ships in area operations. In associated support,
d. Relative Airplans. The term “rela- report contacts to the OTC/AWC/ASWACU and
tive” applied to an airplan implies that the area so to the area commander.
ordered shall assume the intended movement of
the force. It does not affect the bearings associated c. Receive and acknowledge the SAC’s
with airplans. These bearings are always given in AOP, airplans, search plans, and attack plans when
degrees from true North. contact is held.
9215 (NC) ATTACK RESTRICTIONS (3) Use of air or surface ASW weapons is
WHEN OPERATING WITH unrestricted in an ASWFA.
SUPPORT SUBMARINES
b. Compensatory Allowances.
a. Requirements. ASW attack restric-
tions when operating with a support submarine are (1) Air/Surface ASW Attacks. For
governed by the type of action area in which the sub- any ASW engagement, air and surface units
marine is operating. See Chapter 6. shall apply a compensatory allowance that
minimizes the risk of that weapon inadvertently
(1) No air or surface ASW attacks are per- entering an area containing a friendly subma-
mitted inside a SAA. rine. Conceptually, a compensatory allowance
is a weapons danger zone with a navigation
(2) No aircraft (including helicopters) or safety buffer that applies to SAA, JTAA, and
surface units may attack a submarine contact activated SSL, MEADOW, NOTACK, and
inside a JTAA unless a SGSA or NOTACK SGSA boundaries.
area has been established per the procedures of
Chapter 6. (2) ASW Aircraft With Inoperable
Navigation Systems. ASW aircraft which
NOTE cannot make an accurate assessment of naviga-
tion error because of inoperable navigation
No aircraft or surface unit may attack a equipment may not attack a submarine contact
submarine contact that is within a inside a JTAA or within 10 nm of a SAA or
NOTACK area. Attacks may be con- JTAA boundary without authority, and then
ducted within a SGSA provided a only while under the direction of another unit
NOTACK area has been established. with an adequate navigation capability, such as
Attacks within a JTAA but outside an an ASW helicopter control ship.
established SGSA require authoriza-
tion by the SGSA Coordinating Au- 9216 (NU) ASSESSING DAMAGE
thority/Unit.
The standard method of damage assess-
ment is set forth in ATP 28.
(1) Target bearing, bearing accuracy, time with or are endangered by the running torpedos.
of bearing. DOGBOX is based upon type of torpedo, method
of employment, and estimated acquisition range.
(2) Acoustic signature information. The DOGBOX is time limited to torpedo expiry.
ASW torpedo parameters can be found in ATP 29
(3) Range estimate, and how obtained. Secret Supplement.
g. Aircraft Gains Contact. When the Table 9-6 summarizes the ASW attack and
aircraft gains contact, it will pass contact informa- support methods available for use by ships alone
tion to the TAS ship in the form of a Raid Report, or by ships and helicopters. When helicopters are
unless otherwise directed by the OTC/shore used in these methods, the letter H must be added
authority. Similar procedures can be used with as a suffix to the method number. Attack and sup-
other units, such as surface ship pouncers. port methods are in Figures 9-16 to 9-21.
3A MOD Modified Coordinated 2-ship attack To be used when one ship is equipped
Geographic with short-range weapons and the com-
Sector bination of weapon systems does not al-
low Attack Method 3A.
11AH Bear 1. Line of bearing support for a To cover a definite direction or a probable
close ASW action. course of action by the submarine.
2. Stand-off attack from a
definite direction.
14AH Cordon 1. Sector support for a close 1. When support or attack is desired from
ASW action. one or more specified sectors.
2. Stand-off attack in sectors. 2. 3,000-yard attack zone based on
3. Circular attack in zone. contact. This is a designated sector
4. Automatic search plan. zero. The radius may be amended by
the SAC, if required.
NOTE
(4) Exchanging information and passing (2) Maneuvering in accordance with the
movements and intentions of own ship and at- rules for the attack method ordered to gain and
tacking aircraft under control. maintain sonar contact and remain clear of tor-
pedo interference/weapon danger (DOG BOX)
(5) Indicating by signal immediately when areas. If deemed necessary to keep a constant
the contact is lost or the contact becomes doubtful. range or open the contact, use a figure-of-eight
maneuver to ensure the stern is never pointed
(6) In a close ASW action, transferring the towards it. This will limit chances of the contact
attacking ship responsibility to an assisting ship being lost in the stern arcs of the sonar.
holding contact as the situation dictates.
(3) Exchanging information with the at-
(7) Promulgating the torpedo interference/ tacking ship.
weapon danger (DOG BOX) where appropriate.
(4) Reporting immediately when the con-
b. Assisting Ship. The assisting ship’s tact is lost or becomes doubtful.
duties include:
(5) Reporting when ready to assume the
(1) Maneuvering to keep clear of the at- duties of attacking ship.
tacking ship and to avoid obstructing the attack.
ATTACK METHOD 1A
LOCK ON ATTACK
This method is a coordinated attack for use in duties of attacking ship to another ship as cir-
a multiship ASW action. It is particularly useful cumstances require.
when difficulty is experienced in holding contact on
(3) ACTION BY ASSISTING SHIPS.
a high-speed submarine by the sector method. It
When the SAC orders the attack, assisting
also provides a good safety factor for ships maneu-
ships maneuver to stations at the range or-
vering at high speeds. Other ships present may be
dered by the SAC to contain the contact within
ordered to carry out support plans Bear (11A). The
a good holding formation. For two ships, sta-
aim is to contain the submarine between the ships
tions should be in the quarter opposite the at-
of the SAU, maintain contact, and attack.
tacking ship. For three ships, stations should
a. GENERAL be apexes of an equilateral triangle oriented to
best suit the position of all ships at the time of
(1) DISTANCE APART OF SHIPS. Opti-
ordering and centered on the contact. For the
mum distance between ships is between 2,000
few times when ambiguity could arise, the
and 3,000 yards. This may, however, be amended
SAC can clarify by ordering “(CALL SIGN)
as dictated by sonar conditions, characteristics of
EAST, (CALL SIGN) WEST” or a similar delin-
weapons fitted, and compatibility of sonars.
eation. When ships are in station, they are to
(2) TACTICAL DIAMETER. With ships of report “LOCKED ON.” In Method A, assisting
similar characteristics, the attacking ship should ships comply with all maneuvering orders im-
pass the rudder, speed, and engine orders. With mediately. In Method B, assisting ships com-
ships of dissimilar characteristics, it is necessary for ply with the direction of turn and come to the
the SAC to signal the tactical diameter to be used. required course and speed. They are to be
prepared to assume duties of attacking ship at
(3) LOCK ON RANGE. The lock on
any time and should report if they find them-
range is the range from each unit of the SAU to the
selves in a good attack position. Ships are to
attacking ship.
acknowledge all maneuvering information
b. PROCEDURES with the single word “(Ship’s call sign)” in al-
phabetical sequence.
(1) ORDERING THE ATTACK. The SAC
orders “EXECUTE LOCK ON RANGE . . . (in hun- (4) REVERTING TO GEOGRAPH-
dreds of yards),” designates the attacking ship and, ICAL SECTOR ATTACK METHOD. The SAC
where applicable, the tactical diameter to be used. may revert to the Geographical Attack Method
Thereafter, the SAC executes tactical command at any time by ordering “Unlock” and then or-
and the attacking ship executes tactical control of dering the Geographic Sector Attack Method.
ships ordered to “LOCK ON” and directs the action. If more than one assisting ship is present, the
SAC must redesignate the assisting ship and
(2) ACTION BY ATTACKING SHIP. The
assign others to support stations.
attacking ship immediately informs the assisting
ship(s) of her present course and speed. If in a po- c. ACTION WHEN CONTACT IS LOST.
sition to attack, she does so. She then endeavors These attack procedures are repeated as ap-
to keep the submarine inside the attack formation, propriate until the submarine is destroyed or all
maneuvering the SAU by either of two methods. In ships have lost contact. When all ships have
In Method A, the lock on control ship passes rud- lost contact, the lost contact search plan speci-
der, speed, and engine orders over the tactical fied by the SAC is to be carried out
net. In Method B, the lock on control ship passes
direction of turn and the desired course and speed
over the tactical net. The attacking ship passes the
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
ATTACK METHOD 2A
DEEP CREEP ATTACK
This method is designed for a two-ship depth assisting ship and the submarine and,
charge or short-range homing torpedo attack on a if possible, forward of the submarine
submarine which is using deep submergence and beam. If this is not possible, bring the
slow speeds for evasion. It is effective only when attacking ship up from astern of the
surprise can be achieved. submarine.
a. OCCASIONS FOR USE. This method 3. Vectors the attacking ship to the at-
may be used when ships have no effective depth tack position by ordering courses and
determining sonar and under any one, or any com- speeds at frequent intervals. Low
bination of, the following conditions. speed should be ordered whenever
possible.
1. When intelligence indicates that the sub-
marine is damaged and has gone deep. 4. Advises the attacking ship “Fifty yards
to go” to the attack position.
2. When one of the ships involved has the
only weapons available, but its sonar is 5. Orders the attacking ship to “Fire” at
inoperative. attack position.
3. When sonar conditions prevent attack by 6. Vectors attacking ship to a new ap-
other procedures. proach position for the next attack
when she has reported “Weapon
fired.”
CAUTION
(2) ATTACKING SHIP
Deep Creep Attack procedures 1. Takes position as directed by the as-
may place both ships in danger if sisting ship.
the submarine decides to take of- 2. Listens with sonar, but does not
fensive action. transmit.
3. Steers courses, and regulates speed
b. PROCEDURES
as ordered by the assisting ship.
(1) ASSISTING SHIP
4. Lays a depth charge pattern, or fires
1. Maneuvers to maintain a position in so- torpedo, as directed by the assisting
nar contact 1,000 to 2,000 yards from, ship.
and on the quarter of, the submarine.
5. On completion of attack reports
2. Vectors the attacking ship to start the run “Weapon fired.”
from a point about 800 yards at right an-
gles to the line of bearing between the
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
10035 (NC) STATIONING CONVOY sea, the new positions should be drawn up on a fur-
SHIPS ther grid diagram, also to be issued before sailing.
Although it is technically possible to signal a com-
a. The convoy formation will be formu- pletely new formation by the grid system, it should
lated by the OCA, OTC, Commodore, and Naval be avoided because merchant ships are neither
Control of Shipping Officer (NCSO). Shown as trained nor practiced in complicated signaled ma-
positions on the grid diagram, it will be included in neuvers. However, the movement of individual
the Sailing Order Folder issued to each ship before ships within the formation, by signal, is perfectly
sailing. If a change of formation is to take place at feasible.
(1) Warships. When a warship occupies The size of the grid squares may be changed to
a station in a convoy formation, the station to be meet the requirements of the situation.
occupied will be detailed by OTC, who may
consult the Commodore. (a) Each vertical line of the grid is al-
located to a single letter in alphabetical se-
(2) Aircraft Carrier. An aircraft carrier quence (less I and O) starting at the left of
operating in a convoy may occupy a “box” the grid.
formed by omitting ships from stations in the
rear and center of the convoy. The size of the (b) Each row is allocated a number of
box will be governed by the requirements of the sequence starting with row 1 at the top.
carrier for operating aircraft and the spacing of
the ships in the convoy. (3) Individual Ship. Individual ship sta-
tions are indicated as shown in the following
b. Convoy station designators will be used examples.
as call signs on convoy tactical nets.
(a) Station J5 = the intersection of line
10036 (NC) FORMING UP A CONVOY J with row 5.
a. Departure Operations. The OTC, (b) Station FG3 = the point midway
after consulting the local naval authority, is to is- between lines F and G in row 3.
sue the necessary orders to escorts regarding de-
parture operations (see Chapter 3). He is also to (c) Station K6L7 = the point midway
detail screening ships to round up and direct indi- between the intersections of line K, row 6,
vidual merchant ships to their proper stations. and line L, row 7.
b. Intership Spacing. The ordering of (d) Station PP67 = the point midway
intership spacing is the responsibility of the OTC. between row 6 and 7 in line P.
In open water, the minimum distance between
ships in column and the interval between columns Note
is 1,000 yards of clear water. In restricted waters,
the minimum distance between ships in column In example d, it is necessary to repeat
may be reduced to 600 yards of clear water. When the line indicator to prevent confusion.
the primary threat is from pattern-running torpe- For example: PP12 = the point mid-
does, some increase in minimum convoy spacing way between rows 1 and 2 in line P,
may be justified. When the primary threat is from while P12 = the intersection of line P
kiloton nuclear weapons, the spacing of columns with row 12.
and ships in column should be at least 2,000 yards.
When the primary threat is from megaton nuclear (4) Columns. Columns, if appropriate,
weapons, spacing should be at least 10,000 yards. are numbered from left to right, with every
number prefixed with a zero, beginning with 01
c. Convoy Formation Grid Instruc- for the left-hand column. Lanes (the spaces be-
tions. tween columns, and to the left of the left-hand
column and the right of the right-hand column)
(1) Forming Up. The grid is oriented take their numbers from the adjacent columns
relative to the convoy’s base course on forming (12, 23, etc.), with the left-hand lane being
up. numbered 01 and the right-hand lane taking the
number of the right-hand column less the prefix
(2) Grid Square Size. Grid square size 0, but with suffix 0 (e.g., 90).
is to be 1,000 yards unless otherwise ordered.
BEETROOT
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
BEETROOT
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
CARROT
An ASW search plan for use when escorts b. Screen units detailed are to proceed at
are stationed by the skeleton screen diagram optimum sonar speed, make broad weave, and
(see Chapter 3). It may be used by day or night fan outward from the convoy for 8 minutes un-
when the convoy is attacked by a submarine that less otherwise ordered. They are then to resume
is suspected of having fired from outside the their stations.
screen. Units execute this search plan as fol- c. Helicopters should continue as previ-
lows: ously employed, unless otherwise ordered.
a. Screen units in stations A and S are to
patrol their stations as shown in the diagram.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(5) Protected Anchorages. When area protection, but gives greater protection to the
coastal shipping is required to anchor, it should unit(s) defended.
be routed to a protected anchorage. OCAs
should establish and promulgate details of pro- d. Choice of Protection. Choic e of
tected anchorages. Protection of these areas the type of protection will depend on the volume
presents special difficulties because of the large of coastal shipping, the relative importance of the
number of stationary ships concentrated in con- units to be protected, the availability and capabil-
fined waters for long periods. ity of assets, and intelligence and environmental
factors. If possible, area and individual protection
(6) Point Defense. Point defense in should be given to high-value units.
coastal operations is normally established for
the protection of the anchorages/harbors and 10070 (NU) CONVOY FORMATION
important offshore installations. The proximity SELECTION
of land-based weapon systems and the avail-
ability of air support will hamper enemy move- This section describes various convoy for-
ments in coastal areas and this confers a mations and gives guidance on their employment.
measure of area defense. Route selection for
coastal shipping should make full use of this ad- 10071 (NU) BROAD FRONT RECTANGU-
vantage. LAR (GRID) FORMATION
MLA
A B C D E F G H J K L M N P
(NATO-UNCLASSIFIED)
CHAPTER 13
Mine Warfare
13000 (NR) INTRODUCTION b. During the initial stages of a mining cam-
paign, offensive operations are likely to be con-
Mine warfare includes the whole field of fined to ports, harbors, and focal points where
designing, producing, and laying mines and the traffic concentrations can be foreseen. Only wa-
parallel effort of designing, producing, and oper ters of 10 nm or less in width that cannot be readily
ating all forms of mine countermeasures to combat avoided by traffic should be considered during the
the enemy’s mining campaign. This chapter initial stages.
provides background knowledge and instructions
to commands and personnel not normally involved
in mine countermeasures and minelaying opera- 13003 (NC) TYPES OF MINES
tions. For more detailed information, refer to ATP
2, ATP 6, ATP 24, and AHP 1. a. Mines are explosive devices laid in the
water by aircraft, submarines, or surface ships.
13001 (NR) MINING They can be divided into two main categories:
The aim of minelaying operations is to as- (1) Controlled mines are controlled by the
sist in the dislocation of the enemy war effort to user and enable him to deny the use of certain
the maximum possible extent and to contribute to areas to the enemy while retaining freedom of
the security of our sea communications by the de- movement for his own forces.
struction — or threat of destruction — of the
enemy’s merchant and naval units. (2) Independent mines are not controlled
by the user after laying and create the same dan-
13002 (NC) MINEABLE WATERS ger to own and enemy shipping. Types of set-
tings used with these mines include:
a. Mineable waters are waters in which
mines may be effectively used against submarines (a) Ship counts, which allow a certain
or surface ships. The depth of the water may dictate number of ships to pass the mine before it
the use of either moored or ground mines. Drifting detonates.
mines can be encountered in any depth of water.
(b) Arming or rising delays, which
(1) Moored mines can normally be encoun- prevent the mine from becoming active be-
tered in waters with depths up to 1,000 meters, fore a preset time.
although this is not necessarily the technical
depth limitation. Mines used in antisubmarine (c) Sterilizing time, which renders the
minefields may be laid in depths down to the mine inoperative after a preset time.
case-crushing depth.
b. The mines described above may be ei-
(2) Ground mines can normally be encoun- ther mines that are fired by remote control, contact
tered in waters with depths up to 90 meters. mines, or influence mines. Contact mines will nor-
Ground mines used in antishipping minefields mally be moored mines, although drifting mines
are unlikely to be laid in depths of more than 55 can be used in this context. Influence mines can be
meters, except where these mines are laid against either moored or bottom mines.
surface targets whose draft exceeds 9 meters.
(2) Offensive Mining may be conducted Although the distribution of orders should
in harbors or approaches thereto, straits, and be confined to units that are concerned directly,
territorial waters that normally are under the the position, nature, and extent of a new minefield,
control of the enemy, although under certain or an addition to an existing minefield, must be
circumstances, it may be conducted in neutral communicated to all other units that may transit
or international waters. the area. For this purpose the warning message
and worldwide Q-message systems have been in-
troduced. For details, see AHP 1.
-EXAMPLES-
LTV “GUIDEDOG”
(1) Visual: N TACK XAX
VTM “SHEEP”
(2) Voice: NEGAT FLAG XRAY ALFA
i. If more than one LTV is operat-
XRAY
ing in the same area, then suffix
Note: The International Flag outfit, as held intervals. In this case they will be warned in ad-
by merchant ships, contains numerical pen- vance by the OTC of the MCM force.
nants and NOT number flags. The first mer-
chant ship will repeat the signal for the benefit b. Safety Measures and Prepara-
of those ships astern; in the absence of such tions. Take action in accordance with paragraph
signals, subsequent ships should endeavor to 13033a.
pass over the same ground as the LTV or their
next ahead. (1) When a convoy is approaching:
(4) Units being led (VTM) and transiting a (a) The Convoy Commodore must form
swept/hunted channel should sail at minimum his convoy into a single column formation.
steerageway and keep station on the LTV or Intership spacing should be in accordance
lead unit, or navigate by radio direction finding with paragraph 13060a(4), depending on sizes of
(if available) or radar (if permitted by EMCON the ships and the navigational facilities. As
policy), in order to proceed on the centerline or a general rule, intership spacing should not
on another track as ordered. The LTV is to exceed 1,000 yards.
maintain distance between the first VTM and
distance between units being led should be the (b) A naval force should pass in a sin-
minimum feasible; it should be kept in mind gle column formation at standard distance
that the shorter the distance between the ships or less if possible.
in column, the less the danger from influence
mines with regard to the mines’ intercount dor- NOTE
mant period. Warships can be led at 250 yards,
whilst merchant ships should normally be led at Other distances may be indicated by
500 to 1,000 yards, depending on size. It should the OTC of the MCM force.
be noted that VLCCs rarely have clear visibil-
ity, ahead on the waterline, within 700 yards, (2) If an entry/departure screen has to be
and some merchant vessels lose steerageway established by escort forces, patrol sectors must
whilst at relatively high speeds. be at least 500 yards off the mine danger area.
(5) One LTV can lead a maximum of three (3) If rendezvous with an LTV/MCM force
VTMs through a mined area; a ratio of one LTV is expected during darkness, the first unit to be
to one VTM is ideal. led of the column is to show three white lights
displaced vertically at her bow for identifica-
(6) MCMVs may be used to lead, but this tion purposes. The LTV will point the rendez-
should not preclude the use of other units that vous position, showing a white light over red. If
have suitably qualified personnel, such as pilots, more than one LTV is employed, only the first
and navigation equipment that is accurate and LTV will show the lights mentioned. Other
repeatable, in particular DGPS. LTVs are to proceed to their assigned stations
and to show those lights after arrival.
(7) Navigation. The navigation of the
LTV must be accurate and repeatable. The Pre- (4) Proceed along the centerline (Figure
cise Navigation System (PNS) and Differential 13-1) or along another indicated track, each
Global Positioning System (DGPS), if avail- unit navigating independently.
able, are the preferred methods of navigation.
Radar danning is the best alternative method if (5) The LTV only is to adjust speed to
Radio Fixing Aids (RFAs) are not available. maintain the signaled distance (see paragraph
13060a(4)).
(8) In some MCM operations, units may
h av e t o t ransit t he channel at spe c ifie d (6) The speed ordered should not be
exceeded.
c. Situations. Table 13-1 provides a list (a) Conduct the lead through operation.
of actions for transiting units that applies to situa-
tions involving: (b) Ensure that ordered distances are
maintained.
(1) Mine danger area known/not known.
(c) Ensure that Vessels Transiting the
(2) Channels established/not established. Minefield (VTMs) maintain the ordered
track or centerline.
(3) MCM forces available/not available.
e. Units Damaged by Mines. Units
d. Responsibilities. damaged by mine detonation and unable to pro-
ceed at the ordered speed should attempt to ma-
(1) Arrival Time. From 36 to 48 hours in neuver clear of the channel’s centerline. In narrow
advance of arrival, the OCA of the transiting and shallow channels, such as harbor entrances,
unit shall: heavily damaged or sinking units should be
grounded outside the main channel.
(a) Inform the respective MCM task-
ing authority about the ETA and composition f. Transit Instructions. A naval force,
of a convoy/naval force that has to transit a convoy, or independent unit about to be led
certain channel, using the Lead Through through, or transiting a channel without a LTV,
Order format of APP 4. will be passed relevant instructions using the Lead
Through Transit Instructions format of APP 4;
(b) Inform the OTC of transiting merchant vessels will use ATP 2, Vol. II.
units/Convoy Commodore about MCM
data, including valid Q-messages and 13061 (NC) TRANSIT OF SUBMARINES
NAVWARNs, using the Leadthrough Infor- THROUGH MINED AREAS
mation format of APP 4.
a. General Remarks.
(2) MCM Tasking Authority. The
MCM tasking authority shall: (1) Purpose. The purpose of this article
is to provide the commanding officer of a sub-
(a) In accordance with the Lead marine with instructions for maneuvering in
Through Order, give the appropriate order mine danger areas. The prescribed procedure can
to the OTC of the MCM force to execute the also be applied for a submarine passage be-
leadthrough operation. tween minefields, through an established chan-
nel in an enemy minefield or a gap in a friendly
(b) Provide information as shown by minefield, or in waters difficult to navigate.
Figure 13-2.
(2) If a Leadthrough Operation is Or-
(3) OTC of MCM Forces. The OTC of dered. The OTC of the MCM force is required
MCM forces shall provide information in ac- in accordance with paragraph 13060 to send the
cordance with paragraph 13060.f, 4 hours (2 Transit Instructions message to the SUBOP-
hours for coastal convoys) in advance. He may AUTH, who in due time will promulgate the
delegate this task to the LTV or MCMV that has message. The format must be amplified by the
been ordered to execute the leadthrough. SUBOPAUTH/OTC of the MCM force by a
new paragraph, as follows:
(4) The Lead Through Vessel (LTV).
The LTV shall:
Table 13-1. (NU) Actions for Transiting Units in Mine Danger Areas
Mine danger area being es- 1. BEFORE ARRIVAL at danger area or channel entrance:
tablished, channel being
established, and channel (a) OTC or Convoy Commodore set watch on MCM
may be marked. tactical frequency (HF/UHF), establish communi-
cations 4 to 2 hours before ETA, and pass relevant
MCM operations information to units in company.
(b) Keep OTC of MCM force informed of first unit’s ETA.
(c) Prepare to comply with appropriate safety measures.
1. Continue transit.
2. Comply with appropriate safety measures.
3. Inform the OCA, if appropriate.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
CHAPTER 14
(1) Officer in Charge of the Seaward (a) The use of radar, sonar, and hydro-
Defense Organization. He shall provide the phone by ships.
arriving ship(s) with the following material and
information if it is not already held by them: (b) The times at which scare charges
are to be dropped and the number of
(a) Chart showing fixed targets and charges.
facilities in the base (nets and booms, dry
docks, and so forth) and their identification (c) The intentions for silent routine.
symbols.
(d) Search of ship's bottom and adja-
(b) Chart showing the defense ar- cent sea bed by shipborne divers, times of
rangements and the location of seaward de- search, and number of divers employed by
fense weapons and facilities. each ship. Searches should be conducted at
random intervals.
(c) Chart showing berths and anchor
berths assigned to each ship. (e) The numbers of boats to be pro-
vided by ships for the surveillance of the
(d) Charts showing suitable positions waters surrounding them.
for beaching ships.
(f) The location of ships's lookout sta-
(e) Chart showing the track of perma- tions and assigned sectors to integrate with
nent or occasional patrols by Seaward De- the sectors covered by the stations to the
fense Organization boats. Seaward Defense Organization.
(f) Chart showing the location and (g) The channels available for quick
sectors assigned to the Seaward Defense communications with the Seaward Defense
Organization lookout stations. Organization.
(g) Rules governing the use of anti- (h) Area lighting conditions and
swimmer charges. recommendations.
14013 (NC) STATES OF READINESS (8) Prepare diving safety boat if available.
2. Intelligence reports attack probable (6) Rig bottom lines if not already rigged.
at some unspecified time (e.g., not (Bottom lines are lines passing from one side of
imminent). the ship to the other, beneath the hull, for the as-
sistance of divers.)
3 On all occasions when ships may be
subjected to clandestine attack but (7) Send away one boat to carry out irregu-
which are not covered by States 1 or 2.
lar patrols in the vicinity of the ship.
14014 (NC) ACTION TO BE TAKEN (8) Set watch on the main harbor intercom-
BY INDIVIDUAL SHIPS WHEN munications net and/or appropriate local com-
OPERATION AWKWARD IS munications net as laid down in local orders.
ORDERED Set visual signaling (V/S) watch.
(1) Have scare charges readily available. (10) Helicopter, if available, airborne to
carry out:
(2) Assume appropriate degree of damage
control readiness. (a) Visual search of coastline and
breakwaters.
(3) Retain on board one watch of divers
sufficient to carry out a ship's bottom search. (b) Visual search for swimmers.
ANNEX A
List of Acronyms
D H
M R
T W
helicopter windline screen. A helicopter screen vicinity of the mine or on radiations ema-
provided for a carrier temporarily during nating from the mine.
flight operations, relative to the carrier’s
track into the wind. initial point. A well-defined point, easily distin-
guishable visually and/or electronically,
high probability intercept equipment. An in- used as a starting point for the run to the
tercept receiver which will detect any trans- target; a pre-selected point on the surface
mission which illuminates its antenna, within of the earth which is used as a reference.
the wide frequency band it is designed to
cover, as soon as that transmission is made inner defense zone (IDZ). A circle around each
within a certain limiting range. CV whose radius is normally 100 nm but
may be adjusted by the CWC based on ex-
HOVERTAC. An attack conducted by a dipping pected air threats and geographic
helicopter on its own target while maintain- considerations.
ing sonar contact.
inner defense zone coordinator (IDZC). The
I TDS tasked to coordinate fighter and mis-
sile engagements within the IDZ.
identification. The assignment of one of the six
standard identities, based upon available data intercepting search. A type of search designed
and the determined identification criteria. to intercept an enemy whose previous posi-
tion is known and the limits of whose subsequent
identification criteria. Criteria laid down by the course and speed can be assumed.
OTC or delegated authority to determine
which standard identity can be assigned to a J
detected contact based on the available lo-
calization and recognition data. joining (aircraft). The procedure whereby an air-
craft commander transfers tactical control
identification/recognition. The determination of his aircraft to the OTC.
by any means of the friendly or enemy char-
acter or of the individuality of another, or of joining (ships). A ship or group of ships which
objects such as aircraft and ships, or of phe- have sailed independently and subsequently
nomena such as communications-electronics rendezvous with a main body or convoy.
patterns.
joint action area (JTAA). An area in which a sin-
identification safety range (ISR). The mini- gle friendly submarine is operating in coor-
mum range to which an aircraft may close dination with air and/or surface forces. Air
an assumed friendly force without having and surface ASW weapon employment is
been positively identified to ensure that the prohibited throughout the JTAA unless a
force does not mistake the aircraft for enemy. NOTACK area or a submarine-generated
search area (SGSA) has been established.
identify. The process of determining identity by
either recognition or identification/ Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL). A list-
recognition. ing of frequencies which map the use of the
EM spectrum within the area of responsi-
identity. The friendly or hostile character or indi- bility. The JRFL is composed of Taboo,
viduality of a contact. Protected, and Guarded Frequencies.
independent. A merchant ship under naval joint zone. An air and sea area in which friendly
control sailed singly and unescorted air, surface, and subsurface forces operate
by a warship. simultaneously.
maximum speed. The highest speed at which a mercantile convoy. A convoy consisting of mer-
ship is capable of proceeding when using chant ships controlled by the Naval Control
full power. of Shipping Organization (NCSO).
position and intended movement (PIM). A ref- radar picket. Any ship or aircraft stationed at a
erence position established by the OTC at a distance from the force protected, for the
given time and a forecast of the course(s) purpose of increasing the radar detection
and speed(s) expected to be made good over range.
the ground.
radar silence. An imposed discipline prohibiting
precedence. A designation assigned a message the transmission by radar of electromag-
by the originator to indicate to communica- netic signals on some or all frequencies.
tion personnel the relative order of han-
dling and to the addressee the order in radio silence. A period during which all or cer-
which the message is to be noted. tain radio equipment capable of radiation
is kept inoperative.
prevention of mutual interference.
range. The distance between any given point and
1. Procedures to prevent interference be- an object or target.
tween active or between active and passive
electromagnetic or acoustic sensors of receiving ship. The ship in a replenishment unit
friendly forces. that receives the rig(s).
radar. Radio detection and ranging equipment reference position. The OTC’s promulgated es-
that determines the distance and usually the timate of his navigational position at a
direction of objects by transmission and re- given time.
turn of electromagnetic energy.
Regional Naval Control of Shipping (RNCS).
radar coverage. The limits within which ob- Naval Control of Shipping measures intro-
jects can be detected by one or more ra- duced within a limited area. RNCS is vol-
dar stations. untary unless compulsion is imposed by
national authorities or written into a charter
party.
release criteria. Criteria laid down by the OTC or safety zone. An area (land, sea, or air) reserved
delegated authority to be satisfied before for noncombat operations of friendly air-
weapon employment is authorized. craft, surface ships, submarines, or ground
forces.
rendezvous. A pre-arranged meeting at a given
time and location from which to begin an scene of action commander (SAC). The officer
action or phase of an operation, or to which who assumes tactical control of assigned
to return after an operation. units in a limited area, operating against a
specific contact or datum. (Until such time
replenishment at sea (RAS). Those operations as a SAU is formally detached, the first unit
required to make a transfer at sea of person- reporting contact by any means (sonar, radar,
nel and/or materiel. visual, or ESM) shall be deemed to be the
scene of action commander.)
replenishment course and speed. The course
and speed ordered by the OTC for the re- screen. An arrangement of ships, aircraft,
plenishment unit’s guide. and/ or submarines to protect a main
body or convoy.
replenishment ships. Ships loaded with or sup-
plying certain supplies and services to war- screen center. The point on which screen units
ships at sea. are stationed, normally QQ or ZZ.
replenishment unit. A group of ships consisting screen unit. A surface ship, fixed-wing aircraft,
of one or more delivering ships with one or helicopter, or submarine employed in a
more receiving ships replenishing and ships screen.
in waiting and/or lifeguard stations.
search. A systematic investigation of a particu-
rescue combat air patrol. Combat air patrol lar area to establish the presence or the ab-
which provides cover for a search and res- sence of (a) specific contact(s).
cue operation.
search attack unit (SAU) . The designation
restricted area. An area or airspace of defined given to a unit separately organized or dis-
dimensions in which there are special re- patched from a formation to search for and
strictive measures to prevent or minimize attack submarines.
interference between friendly forces.
search axis. The reference bearing on which an
rhumb line. A line on the surface of the earth ASW search is oriented.
transecting all meridians at the same angle.
search center. The origin or reference point of
route. The prescribed course to be traveled from an ASW search when established at a point
a specific point of origin to a specific other than datum.
destination.
sector. A defense area designated by boundaries
S within which a unit operates, and for which
it is responsible.
safety lanes. Specified sea lanes designated
for use in transit by submarines and sur- sector method. The method of stationing units
face ships in order to prevent attack by by designating sectors defined by bound-
friendly forces. aries and depth limits from screen center.
safety sector. An airspace in the AAW area in sector screen. A screen in which individual
which aircraft are safe from attack by units are assigned particular sectors of re-
friendly fighters, missiles, or self-defense sponsibility according to their sensors and
weapons. capabilities.
self-identification. The indication by any act or SELFTAC. An attack conducted by a dipping he-
means of your own friendly character or licopter on its own target after the helicop-
individuality. ter has broken dip.
transfer. The distance gained by a ship at right although variable in depth, are not usually
angles to the original course while turning. included.
transfer station. A ship’s designated area vectored attack (VECTAC). An attack in which
equipped for replenishment at sea. a weapon-carrying unit (air, surface, or
subsurface) not holding contact on the tar-
TT. The standard position in the force for the get is vectored to the weapon delivery point
present position of the originator of the by a unit which holds contact on the target.
message.
vectoring (aircraft). The directional control of
turning circle. The path of a ship with a constant an inflight aircraft through transmissions of
rudder angle. azimuth headings.
turn-together. A maneuver in which all ships vertical replenishment (VERTREP). The use of
turn simultaneously, maintaining their true helicopters for the transfer of stores and/or
bearings and distances from the Guide. ammunition from ship-to-ship or
ship-to-shore.
type organization. The organization of units
normally of the same type into flotillas/ VICTOR LIMA (VL). A reference point used as an
groups, squadrons, divisions, and subdivi- AAW grid origin.
sions mainly for administrative and logistic
purposes. visual call sign. A call sign provided primarily
for visual signaling.
U
voice call sign. A call sign provided primarily
underway replenishment force. Replenish- for voice communications.
ment ships, together with their escort,
which provide replenishment services to a W
force at sea.
WARM. War Reserve Modes. Characteristics or
unit. A ship, aircraft, or submarine; or a small operating procedures of equipment or
group of ships and/or aircraft acting as an systems which are held in reserve for war or
entity. crisis.
unit guide. The ship in a unit that is the guide; the warning. The indication by any tactical informa-
guide in a replenishment unit. tion source of the presence of a threat.
urgent attack. An attack delivered with maxi- WATCHDOG. A surface picket whose main tasks
mum rapidity against an enemy submarine is AAW.
located in a position such that it is consid-
ered an immediate threat. watch zone. A sector in which the assigned ship
is responsible, subject to no overriding
UTM. The grid used for naval bombardment and weapon coordination instructions from the
similar purposes, especially when ground AAWC, to ensure that air attacks on the unit
forces and other forces are jointly engaged. or force do not take place unopposed.
INDEX
Page
No. Page
No.
Activation of naval control of shipping
A organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
Active:
Acceleration and deceleration . . . . . . . 2-12 Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16
Accompaniment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 Electronic protective measures
Accuracy of target data . . . . . . . . . . . 8-18 (definition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
Acoustic: Mine countermeasures . . . . . . . . . 13-11
Arrays, ships towing acoustic . . . . . . 2-18 Sensors, use of active. . . . . . . . . . . 8-20
Countermeasures (definition) . . . . . . . 5-1 Sonar or sonobuoy contact . . . . . . . . 9-17
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14 Adjustable columnar unit formation . . . 10-21
Devices streamed, prevention of Advance force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
mutual interference between sub- Advisories, surface ship notices and . . . . 6-67
merged submarines and surface Advisory control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
ships with towed acoustic . . . . . . 6-79 After-action reports, engagement. . . . . . 6-16
Interference: Aided intercept by submarine . . . . . . . 9-14
From own force . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-12 Air:
Own transmissions on search Anti-fast patrol boat operations . . . . . 8-22
equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12 Attacks:
Protective measures (definition) . . . . . . 5-2 Convoy protection against . . . . . . 10-14
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16 Protection of shipping against . . . . . 10-6
Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 Towed array ship defense against . . . . 9-5
Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14 Combat report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-15
Delegation of functions . . . . . . . . . 5-2 Control:
Support measures (definition) . . . . . . 5-1 Combat air patrol aircraft procedures. . . 7-5
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12 Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
Tasking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12 Cooperation in antisurface warfare. . . . 8-10
Acronyms, list of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1 Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14, 6-28c
Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 Communications. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
Antisubmarine warfare actions . . . . . . 9-21 Force air coordination area . . . . . . . 6-22
Ship actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37 Overlapping areas . . . . . . . . . . 6-33
Assistance is required, action when . . . 9-32 Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17
Attack in harbor, action after . . . . . . . 14-4 Air resource element
Contact when direct support forces are coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17, 7-5
involved, action following . . . . . 9-31 Force track coordinator — air . . . . . 6-12
Danger, individual action to avoid . . . . 2-16 Corridors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57
Gaining contact, action on . . . . . . . . 9-24 Defense tactics, carrier battle group
Increased tension, action at time of . . . 6-78 air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-20
Individual ship action when Operation Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
AWKWARD is ordered . . . . . . . 14-3 Forces:
Intercept of target or threat radar, Command of air forces . . . . . . . . . 6-42
action upon . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-20 Other air forces, support operations
Nuclear attack, action prior to . . . . . . 12-9 controlled by . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28c
Readiness for action . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19, 6-41
Suspected mutual interference, Outside tactical air support of
action on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77 maritime operations . . . . . . . . . 6-20
Units in vicinity of unit gaining Picture, local situation and air . . . . . . 6-15
contact, action by . . . . . . . . . . 9-24 Raid reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14
Safety procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30b
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C Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
When changing station . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Call signs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3 Checklist for aircraft joining a force . . . . 6-26
Airborne early warning aircraft . . . . . . 7-4 Checkoff list, surface action . . . . . . . . . 8-8
Antiair warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 Check-sum digits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6
Functional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16 Chemical warfare threat . . . . . 12-11 to 12-15
Canceling: Circle, size of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
NOTACK area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-75 Circular:
Submarine-generated search Convoy formation . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-24
area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71 to 6-72 Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29
Weapon control orders . . . . . . . . . . 6-66 Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
Carrier: Stationing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
Adjustment of movements by ships Classification:
relative to carrier . . . . . . . . . . 6-35 Antisubmarine warfare contact. . . . . . 9-17
Air defense tactics, carrier battle group . . 7-20 Initial reporting and classification . . . 9-19
Air operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-41 Recognition, classification, and
Approach procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45 identification . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13
Convoy, carrier operating aircraft in. . . . 6-41 Clearance to employ nuclear antisub-
Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 marine warfare weapons . . . . . . 9-41
Duties of carriers in a task group . . . . . 6-36 Close:
Principles affecting carrier group Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8 Covering group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Requests for carrier aircraft . . . . . . . 6-44 Close, meaning of order to . . . . . . . . . 2-15
Screening carriers during flight Closing or rejoining, units . . . . . . . . . 2-15
operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-46 Coastal convoy (See Convoy)
Stationing carrier in convoy formation . . 10-8 Collision:
Turns by carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12 Avoiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12
Cartesian coordinate grid . . . . . . . . . . 2-3 Hazard during antisubmarine
CARTWHEEL disposition/formation . . . 3-31 warfare operations . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Casting ship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25 Combat air patrol aircraft (See Aircraft)
CERTSUB classification (definition) . . . 9-17 Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
Chaff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14 Aircraft, command of . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
Chain of command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 Air forces, command of . . . . . . . . . 6-42
Parallel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8a Allied forces, command of. . . . . . . . . 1-6
Chainsaw tactic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-22 Amphibious:
Change in: Operations, command during . . . . . 11-7
Course and axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 Warfare, command in . . . . . . . . . 1-8a
Composition of force . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 Antiair warfare, command and
Helicopter arming . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-48 control in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1
Organization of force . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 Antiship missile defense, command and
Signaled speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14 control responsibilities for. . . . . . 7-15
Task organization assignments . . . . . . 1-1 Antisubmarine warfare, command in . . . 9-1
Change of: Antisurface warfare, command in . . . . . 8-1
Operational control . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 Chain of command. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
Position and intended movement in Convoy, command of a . . . . . . . . . 10-11
relative airplans . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8 Delegation of command functions . . . . 1-13
Type of control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30b Development of command structure . . . 1-12
Changing: Direct support submarine operations;
Scene of action commander . . . . . . . 9-31 command, control and communi-
Sectors or patrol lines . . . . . . . . . . 3-49 cations in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
Size of tactical diameter . . . . . . . . . 2-12 Exercising command. . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
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True bearings, course and . . . . . . . . 6-30b Missile-armed ships, defense against . . 8-20
Cover. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7, 7-11 Missile attack, defense against . . . . . . 7-13
Covert: Nuclear warfare defense concept . . . . . 12-8
Joining procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27 Towed array ship against air attack,
Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7 defense of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5
Cross-fixing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34 Underwater swimmers, defense
Crossover zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9 against attack by . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Cruising: Defensive:
Antisubmarine warfare formations . . . . 3-4 Mine countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Wartime cruising precautions . . . . . . 2-23 Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
Cryptological activity . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3 Definitions, terms and . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11
Degrees of readiness . . . . . . . . 1-24 to 1-25
D Delegation of:
Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3, 1-15
Daily changing call signs . . . . . . . . . . 4-3 Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Damage, assessing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22 Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13
Damaged ship: Electronic and acoustic warfare . . . . . 5-2
Action when ship is damaged . . . . . . 3-47 Delegation to commanders,
Screen for damaged ship . . . . . . . . . 3-43 coordinators, and
Danger: control units . . . . . . . . 1-16 to 1-20
Individual action to avoid danger . . . . 2-16 Deliberate attack by screen
Navigational danger . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8 helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Dangerous to subsurface operations, Demonstration, amphibious . . . . . . . . 11-2
operations inherently . . . . . . . . 6-78 Departure:
Darkened ships, navigation lights on . . . . 2-22 Arrival and departure . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Darkening ships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23 Launch and departure:
Data: Fixed-wing aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . 6-44
Antiair warfare data links . . . . . . . . . 4-8 Helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45
Compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12 Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22
Link. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4, 6-16a Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8
Reference point . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6 Officer in tactical command’s
Net control station. . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16d responsibilities for . . . . . . . . . . 1-14
Datum: Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-37, 3-42
Accuracy of airplan datum position . . . . 9-8 Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5
Approach tactics to contact or datum . . . 9-27 Designating datum . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Establishing and designating datum . . . . 9-23 Designation of:
Search attack unit’s approach to Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8a
contact or datum . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26 For amphibious operation . . . . . . . 11-7
Deceleration, acceleration and . . . . . . . 2-12 Guide, new . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
Decentralized command and control, Officer in tactical command for
communications for . . . . . . . . . 4-14 nuclear antisubmarine warfare
Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15 operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-42
Measures against deception . . . . . . . 5-17 Search attack unit . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Risk of imitative deception . . . . . . . . 4-5 Designator:
Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 Aircraft mission designators . . . . . . . 6-20
In amphibious warfare . . . . . . . . . . 11-5 Antisubmarine warfare mission
Deck-launched interceptors. . . . . . . . . 7-22 designators . . . . . . . . . . 6-20, 6-28
Decontamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11 Letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28
Decoys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14 Task designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Defense: Destroyer:
Carrier battle group air defense tactics . . 7-20 Rescue destroyer . . . . . . . 1-19, 6-48, 6-50
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Reserve speed for station-keeping . . . . . 2-14 Reverse arrow head formation . . . . . . 10-22
Residual radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2 Reverse radar:
Responses, planned . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 Grid lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17
Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13 On top . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-30
Aircraft control unit . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25 Vectored attack method . . . . . . . . . 9-37
Antiship missile defense . . . . . . . . . 7-15 Right of way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Commanders subordinate to officer in Ships launching/recovering aircraft . . . 6-35
tactical command . . . . . . . . . . 9-43 Ships over screen units . . . . . . . . . . 3-49
Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14 Romeo, point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
Departure and entry operations. . . . . . 1-14 Rotating formation axis . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Electronic warfare coordination Rough weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15
cell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18 Routes and reference points . . . . . . 2-7, 6-57
NOTACK area, establishing . . . . . . . 6-74 Routing, protective . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5
Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 Rudder used, amount of . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
Scene of action commander . . . . . . . 9-29 Rules:
Search attack unit commander . . . 9-25, 9-29 Antisubmarine warfare attack rules . . . 6-65
Units carrying aircraft . . . . . . . . . . 6-29 Engagement, rules of . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
Warfare commander and coordinator . . 1-16 Low-altitude rules . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-32
Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . 1-3, 1-12, 6-56 Maneuvering, rules for . . . . . . . 2-11, 2-16
Antisubmarine warfare area of Road, special rules of the. . . . . . . . . 2-17
responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-60 Vectored attack, rules for. . . . . . . . . 9-37
Authority and responsibility . . . . . . . 1-15
Command responsibility for anti- S
submarine warfare contacts . . . . . 9-19
Contacts, responsibility for passing Safe stand-off ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-49
information about . . . . . . . . . . 6-14 Safety:
Disabled submarine, responsibility to . . 6-76 Aircraft, safety of . . . . . . . . . 6-30b, 6-66
Landing ashore, responsibility for Helicopters, safety of . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
conduct of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-7 Identification safety point . . . . . . . . 6-23
Restricted: Identification safety range . . . . . . . . 6-22
Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57 Lanes, submarine safety . . . . . . 6-60, 6-66
Procedures for surface ships entering . . 6-65 Maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Emission control, reporting during . . . 6-18 Maritime air operations, safety
Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18 procedures for . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30b
Screening in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-39 Measures and preparations . . . . . . . 13-14
Restrictions: Precautions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Antiship missile defense reactions, Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
restrictions on planned . . . . . . . 7-19 Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58
Antisubmarine warfare weapons, Submarine safety procedures . . . . . . . 6-65
restrictions on . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58 Sailing order folder . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5
Attack restrictions when operating with Salvage and breakdown . . . . . . . . . . 10-13
support submarines . . . . . . . . . 9-22 Satellite communication . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
Diving restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77 Scare charges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Subdivision, restriction on . . . . . . . . . 1-1 Scene of action:
Weapon restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66 Commander. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-29
Resuming: Changing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31
Course and station in maneuvering In nuclear antisubmarine warfare
Methods B and C . . . . . . . . . . 6-38 weapon attack . . . . . . . . 9-43, 9-46
Previous station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15 Sending reinforcements to scene of
Return to force procedures . . . . . . . . . 7-22 action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Returning aircraft, procedure for . . . . . . 6-45
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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL