G.R. No. 140974.

 July 11, 2001. *

RAMON ORO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE GERARDO D. DIAZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial

Court, Branch 68, Dumangas, Iloilo; and DONATO MANEJERO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Power of the trial court to disallow or disapprove a
notice of appeal for being filed out of time is expressly recognized.—At the outset, the Court emphasizes
that the power of the trial court to disallow or disapprove a notice of appeal for being filed out of time is
expressly recognized. Section 13, Rule 41 of Rules of Court, explicitly provides: “Sec. 13.  Dismissal of
appeal.—Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the
trial court may motu proprio, or on motion, dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time.’
Same; Same; Same; Approval of a notice of appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the lower court,
provided the appeal is filed on time.—The approval of a notice of appeal becomes the ministerial duty of
the lower court, provided the appeal is filed on time. If the notice of appeal is, however, filed beyond the
reglementary period, the trial court may exercise its power to refuse or disallow the same in accordance
with Section 13 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court proscribes the filing of an appeal
from an order denying a motion for reconsideration.—The trial court was correct in disallowing the
Notice of Appeal, also because it was directed at an Order denying a motion for reconsideration, instead
of at the judgment or final order disposing the case. Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court proscribes
the filing of an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration.
Same; Same; Same; Right to appeal is a procedural remedy of statutory origin and, as such, may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise.—It should
be stressed that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. Rather, it is a procedural
remedy of statutory origin and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions
of law authorizing its exercise.” Hence, its requirements must be strictly complied with. Failure of a party
to perfect an appeal within the period fixed by law renders final the decision sought to be appealed. As a
result, no court could exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision.
Same; Same; Same; The perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by
law is essential.—The perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is
essential; noncompliance with this legal requirement is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment
final and executory. After a decision is declared final and executory, vested rights are acquired by the
winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed period, the winning
party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the case.
Same; Certiorari; The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction
and does not include a review of public respondent’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings.—
The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction and does not include a
review of public respondent’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, questions of fact are generally not permitted, the inquiry
being limited to whether the public respondent acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. Petitioner raises questions of fact, the determination of which is beyond the scope of
certiorari. Moreover, a special civil action for certiorari cannot and should not be a substitute for a lapsed
appeal.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Stevenson G. Conlu for petitioner.
     Darrill P. Venus for private respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The power of the trial court to disallow or disapprove a notice of appeal that has been filed out of
time is expressly recognized by the Rules of Court. The approval of the notice becomes a
ministerial duty of the court only when the appeal is filed on time. Otherwise, the court has the
discretion to refuse or disallow it in accordance with the Rules.
The Case
Before us is a Petition  for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Petition
1

challenges the Order  dated September 15, 1999, issued in Civil Case No. 99-070 by the Regional
2

Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Dumangas, Iloilo. The RTC Order disapproved petitioner’s
Notice of Appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
The Facts
The factual antecedents, as alleged by petitioner in his Memorandum,  are as follows:
3

1. “1.The private respondent is a tenant of the petitioner over a landholding located at

Badiangan, Province of Iloilo, Philippines;
2. “2.When the private respondent maliciously failed to pay his rentals for crop years 1988
and 1989, the petitioner brought an action before the Department Of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the collection of said rentals;
3. “3.Throughout the course and/or pendency of the said DARAB Case, the private
respondent did not pay rentals until the same was decided and finally executed
sometime in 1998 the private respondent was made to pay the past due rentals from
1988 to 1998 without interests and damages;
4. “4.Believing that the private respondent [was] liable for damages arising from the latter’s
malicious act of delaying the said DARAB case and not paying the rentals during the
pendency of the aforesaid case, the petitioner filed an action for Damages before the
Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 68, Dumangas, Iloilo, Philippines,
which case was presided by the respondent judge;
5. “5.After considering the ‘urgent’ motion to dismiss filed by the private respondent, and
before trial, the respondent judge dismissed the complaint of the petitioner;
6. “6.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and after hearing of the same, the
respondent judge denied the said motion;

________________

1. “7.Petitioner filed a notice of appeal thereafter[;] however, the respondent judge denied
the said notice of appeal on the ground that the period to appeal ha[d] already expired.
Hence, this Petition before the Honorable Court.” 4

On the other hand, private respondent relates the facts in his Memorandum in this wise:

1. “1.Respondent Donato Manejero is a bonafide tena[n]t-lessee of the herein petitioner over lot
2660 covered by TCT No. T-37686 located at Barangay Manaulan, Badiangan, Iloilo;
2. “2.Sometime on May 7, 1990, herein petitioner filed a case for ‘Ejectment and Collection of Back
Rentals with Damages’ against said respondent with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (PARAD-ILOILO) docketed as DARAB Case No. VI-421-ILO-90 and
particularly [in] paragraph 7 of his Complaint, he made the following allegations, to wit:

‘x x x      x x x      x x x
 ‘(7) That because of the willful refusal of the defendant to pay his rentals, as well as the fraud committed by
him, complainant suffered wounded feelings, sleepless nights, moral shock, and economic dislocation, or such
reason, complainant should be awarded moral, actual and exemplary damages the amount of which is subject to the
discretion of the Honorable Adjudication Board.’
‘x x x       x x x      x x x

1. “3.Respondent filed his answer and denied all the allegations in the Complaint;
2. “4.Sometime on August 12, 1996, Hon. PARAD Manuel Traviria decided said case in favor of
Ramon Oro (petitioner herein) but ruled out the prayer for payment of moral, actual and
exemplary damages[;] ordered the ejectment of Donato Manejero from the premises in question
and ordered him to pay back rentals equivalent to 50 cavans of clean and dried palay
representing unpaid back rentals for agricultural year 1988-89 and 1989-90 or its money
equivalent and he was also ordered to pay litigation expenses of P1,000.00;
3. “5.Donato Manajero (respondent) appealed the questioned Decision with the DARAB Central
Board, Diliman, Quezon City and on appeal said case was docketed as DARAB CASE No.
5296;

1. “6.Sometime on September 3, 1997, the DARAB Appellate Board rendered a Decision by

modifying the Decision of PARAD Manuel Travina dated, August 12, 1996. A machine copy of
the Decision is hereto attached as Annex ‘A’;
2. “7.In said Decision, Donato Manejero (respondent) was xxx MAINTAINED in peaceful
possession and cultivation but he was ordered to pay the aforementioned back rentals for 1988-
89 and 1989-90 or a total of fifty (50) cavans of clean and dried palay or its mon[e]y equivalent;
3. “8.The Decision of the DARAB Central Board still ruled out camages and the same became final
and executory Pursuant to the Entry of Judgment issued by the DARAB executive director
dated, October 6, 1998. A machine copy of the Entry of Judgment is hereto attached as Annex
‘B’;
4. “9.A Writ of Execution has been issued and fully implemented[;] hence, this case is considered
closed and terminated with nothing more to litigate;
5. “10.The record would reveal that petitioner filed a Complaint against respondent Donato
Manejero with RTC-Dumangas, Iloilo (Branch No. 68) being presided by the Honorable Public
Respondent Judge Gerardo Diaz, [and] respondent filed his Answer with Motion to Dismiss. A
machine copy of the Complaint is hereto attached as Annex ‘C’ and Answer as Annex ‘D’;
6. “11.Sometime on May 19, 1999, petitioner’s case docketed as Civil Case No. 99-070 was ordered
dismissed. A machine copy of the Order of Dismissal is hereto attached as Annex ‘E’;
7. “12.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration upon receipt of the Order and sometime on June
9, 1999 file[d] a Motion for reconsideration. Respondent upon receipt of a copy filed an
Opposition and the record would show that his Motion was denied pursuant to the Order of
RTC-Dumangas, Iloilo dated, July 27, 1999. A machine copy of the resolution is hereto attached
as Annex ‘F’;
8. “13.Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and appeal[ing] the Order of Dismissal with the Court of
Appeals, herein petitioner filed this instant Petition;” 5

The Trial Court’s Ruling

The trial court, in disapproving the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner, explained its disposition
in this wise:
“To be dealt with is the legal issue of whether or not to approve Notice of Appeal filed by plaintiff. No
opposition has been filed by defendant.
“The records show that on May 19, 1999 the Court issued an Order dismissing the complaint[,] which
order was received by plaintiff on June 02, 1999. On June 14, 1999, plaintiff filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was opposed by defendant on June 17, 1999. The Motion for Reconsideration was
set for hearing on July 02, 1999 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. On July 01, 1999, a motion to set hearing
was filed by plaintiff which was granted by the Court[, which reset] the hearing on the Motion for
Reconsideration to July 09, 1999 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. On July 09, 1999, the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Opposition was submitted for resolution. On July 27, 1999, the Court issued an
Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration for [the] reason that [the] motion is pro-forma and the
issues therein were already passed upon by the Court. On August 26, 1999, [plaintiff filed] a Notice of
Appeal x x x o[f] the Order dated July 27, 1999 which Order was received by him on August 19, 1999.
“The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the plaintiff is pro-forma. The allegations in plaintiffs
‘Motion for Reconsideration are [a] rehash of the allegations in his opposition which the court had
already passed upon in the Order dated May 19, 1999. Nor [do] the allegations raise new matters which
go beyond the meaning of pro-forma [or] which would prompt the Court to look into the issues raised.
“The Notice of Appeal [was] filed out of time. On July 27, 1999, the plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Court on [the] ground of pro-forma and therefore, when the aforesaid
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by him on June 17, 1999, the said motion did not toll the running of
the 15-day reglementary period to appeal. Sec. 2, paragraph 4, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure provides: ‘A pro-forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary
period of appeal. Notably, the records show that no Notice of Appeal was filed by the plaintiff within the
15-day reglementary period from receipt of the order dated May 19, 1999.
“Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory
but jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal as legally required has the effect of rendering final and
executory [the] judgment of the Court below and deprives the appellate court jurisdiction to entertain an
appeal. (Ceniza vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 390).
“Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal o[f] the Order dated July 23, 1999 which denie[d] his motion for
reconsideration, is misplaced. The appeal should be directed against the order dated May 19, 1999,
dismissing his complaint. Sec. 9, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
‘Sec. 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration.—An order denying a motion for
new trial or reconsideration [is] not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order.’

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Notice of Appeal filed by plaintiff is
hereby DISAPPROVED for the same was filed out of time.” 6

Hence, this Petition. 7

The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the consideration of this Court:

1. “I.Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
notice of appeal.
2. “II.Whether the private respondent is liable for damages as claimed by the petitioner
before the lower court.” 8

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.
FirstIssue:
No Grave Abuse of Discretion
For the disapproval of his Notice of Appeal, petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion to
public respondent. He likewise questions the finding of the trial court that his Motion for
Reconsideration, being pro forma, did not interrupt the running of the period within which to file
an appeal. He argues that because it was the appellate court which had jurisdiction to disapprove
the Notice of Appeal for having been filed late, public respondent had no authority to do so.
At the outset, the Court emphasizes that the power of the trial court to disallow or disapprove
a notice of appeal for being filed out of time is expressly recognized. Section 13, Rule 41 of
Rules of Court, explicitly provides:
“Sec. 13. Dismissal of appeal.—Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to
the appellate court, the trial court may motu proprio, or on motion, dismiss the appeal for having been
taken out of time.” (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner also contends that respondent judge should not have deemed the Motion for
Reconsideration as pro forma, simply because it was a mere rehash of the earlier arguments in
the Complaint. The former believes that a contrary finding would have tolled the running of the
15-day prescriptive period, and so his Notice of Appeal would not have been considered late.
Indeed, although a motion for reconsideration merely reiterates issues already passed upon by the
court, that by itself does not make it pro forma. What is essential is compliance with the
requisites of the Rules. 9

However, even if petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is not considered pro forma—in

which case the running of the 15-day reglementary period is effectively interrupted—still, the
trial court was correct in ruling that the Notice of Appeal had been filed out of time.
A review of the records of the case shows that the RTC Order dismissing the Complaint was
received by petitioner on June 2, 1999. On that date, the 15-day prescriptive period within which
to file an appeal began to run. Instead of preparing an appeal, petitioner filed his Motion for
Reconsideration on June 14, 1999. His filing of the Motion interrupted the reglementary period
to appeal. By that time, however, 12 days had already lapsed; thus, from his receipt of the Order
denying his Motion for Reconsideration, he had only three (3) days left within which to file a
notice of appeal.
On August 19, 1999, petitioner received the RTC Order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration. Accordingly, he had three (3) days or until August 22, 1999 to file a notice of
appeal. Unfortunately, he was able to do so only on August 26, 1999, or four (4) days late.
The approval of a notice of appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the lower court, provided
the appeal is filed on time.  If the notice of appeal is, however, filed beyond the reglementary
10

period, the trial court may exercise its power to refuse or disallow the same in accordance with
Section 13 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court was correct in disallowing the Notice of Appeal, also because it was directed at
an Order denying a motion for reconsideration, instead of at the judgment or final order
disposing the case. Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court proscribes the filing of an appeal
from an order denying a motion for reconsideration. That provision reads:
“Section 1. Subject of appeal.—An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
‘x x x       x x x      x x x
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.” (Emphasis supplied)
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. Rather,
it is a procedural remedy of statutory origin and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise.”  Hence, its requirements must be
11
strictly complied with.  Failure of a party to perfect an appeal within the period fixed by law
12

renders final the decision sought to be appealed. As a result, no court could exercise appellate
jurisdiction to review the decision. 13

Moreover, the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by
law is essential; noncompliance with this legal requirement is fatal and has the effect of
rendering the judgment final and executory.  After a decision is declared final and executory,
14

vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal
within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of
the case.15

Second Issue:
Liability for Damages,
A Factual Determination
A discussion of damages can no longer be entertained because of the lateness of the appeal
notice, the impropriety of the mode of review and, consequently, the finality of the assailed
Order as discussed above.
The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction and does not
include a review of public respondent’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings.  In a 16

special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, questions of fact are
generally not permitted, the inquiry being limited to whether the public respondent acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.  Petitioner raises questions of
17

fact, the determination of which is beyond the scope of certiorari.  Moreover, a special civil
18

action for certiorari cannot and should not be a substitute for a lapsed appeal. 19

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
     Melo (Chairman), Vitug and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
     Gonzaga-Reyes, J., On leave.
Petition dismissed, order affirmed.
Note.—Appeal is only a statutory privilege and it must be exercised in the manner provided
by law. (Lamzon vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 307 SCRA 665 [1999])

——o0o——
__________________

 Building Care Corporation v. NLRC, 268 SCRA 666, February 26 1997.

16

 Buñag v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 591, February 25, 1999.

17

 Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. v. NLRC, 294 SCRA 567, August 25, 1998; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 321
18

SCRA 368, December 21 1999.

 GSIS v. Olisa, 304 SCRA 421, March 10, 1999; Mathay, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, 312 SCRA 91, August 9,
19

1999.