.R. No.

93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy."1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition
to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which
the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows:

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo,

nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na,
magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.

CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan,

sabing ganoon —

ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain
ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok.
Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka
sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo
na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.

CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko

up to 10:00 p.m.

ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito

sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo
na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own
makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita
(Sinusumbatan na kita).

CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

 ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic)
ko.

ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel,

kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo.
Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —

ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang

utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka

kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-
anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.

ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa

labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis
ka doon.

CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka

makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang
sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.

CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa

no, nilapastangan mo ako.

CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?

ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa

'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging
petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

INFORMATION

The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of

Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court,
the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized
by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording
to other person.

Contrary to law.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO M.
CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order
May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A.
4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the
communication.4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division)
of June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the
trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A.

4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do
not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari.5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent
Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7 that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise
the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A.
4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that
consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal
under the said act. 10

We disagree.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or
absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by
the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
"even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without
the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons. Thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy

would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not
made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that
would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or
special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties
but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the
actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the
act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you
say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or
outside?
Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense
but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded

conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.

Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the

observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it
is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the
parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being
recorded.

Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of
directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties
know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made
should know that the observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please
be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness
and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging
statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you
are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without
him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is
being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)

Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as
now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under
Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.

Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person — not between a speaker
and a public.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

xxx xxx xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of
the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts
of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication"
to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to
share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications
of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February
22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts
about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to
rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by
Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature
of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have
some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the
expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The
right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by
our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have
recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that
part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and
free exchange of communication between individuals — free from every unjustifiable
intrusion by whatever means.17

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise
was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle
that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."20 The instant case turns on a
different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200
suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of
private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and
leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. NO. 07-8-3-SC : March 28, 2008]

RE: QUERY ON THE EFFECT OF THE 10% SALARY INCREASE UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
611 ON THE SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ) OF JUSTICES, JUDGES AND
COURT OFFICIALS WITH EQUIVALENT RANK OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES OR
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT JUDGES.

RESOLUTION

REYES, R.T., J.:

IN her Memoranda of June 26, 2007, July 4, 2007 and November 20, 2007, Deputy Clerk of Court and
Chief of Office, Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO), Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores seeks
clarification as to the effect of the ten percent (10%) increase authorized under Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 6111 on the monthly Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ) of incumbent justices, judges and
court officials with the equivalent rank of Court of Appeals (CA) justices or Regional Trial Court (RTC)
judges in view of the provision under Section 6, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 92272 which provides:

Sec. 6. Effects of Subsequent Salary Increase. - Upon implementation of any subsequent increase in
the salary rates provided under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended, all special allowances granted
under this Act to justices and all other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of
the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized under existing laws and any
additional allowance granted to other personnel of the Judiciary shall be considered as an
implementation of the said salary increases as may be provided by law. The special allowance
equivalent to the increase in the basic salary as may be provided by law shall be converted as part of
the basic salary: Provided, that, any excess in the amount of special allowance not converted as part
of the basic salary shall continue to be granted as such. (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibra ry

In said Memoranda, Flores requests instructions on (1) whether to deduct 10% from the monthly SAJ
of incumbent justices, judges and judiciary officials with the equivalent rank of CA justices and RTC
judges to correspond to the 10% increase in the basic salary as authorized under E.O. No. 611; and
(2) whether to source this 10% salary increase from the SAJ fund.

The Facts

On March 14, 2007, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 611 directing the
implementation of a 10% increase in the basic monthly salaries of civilian government personnel
whose positions are covered by the Compensation and Position Classification System under R.A. 6758,
as amended, effective July 1, 2007.

On June 18, 2007, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued National Budget Circular
No. 511 prescribing the rules and regulations governing the grant of compensation adjustments
authorized under E.O. No. 611. It failed, however, to provide guidelines as to the effect of E.O. No.
611 on the SAJ of justices, judges and those of equivalent rank in light of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9227.
The Court's Joint Circular with the DBM dated January 13, 2004 providing guidelines for the
implementation of R.A. No. 9227 served no better as a source of enlightenment in this issue. That
being the case, Flores, in her first Memorandum dated June 26, 2007, sought guidance from the
Court.

On July 2, 2007, during the technical hearing on the Calendar Year (CY) 2008 budget of the Court and
the lower courts, DBM representatives referred to the afore-cited provision of R.A. No. 9227 and
advised that 10% should be deducted from the SAJ of justices, judges and court officials of equivalent
rank corresponding to the 10% increase in the salary effective July 2007. When informed that National
Budget Circular No. 511 does not provide for the mechanics of this adjustment, the DBM
representatives said that a circular on the implementing guidelines was being prepared and would be
issued soon.

The DBM panel further explained that the 10% to be deducted from the SAJ of justices, judges and
court officials of equivalent rank would not be remitted to the National Treasury but would still be kept
in the SAJ fund until such time when 100% conversion of the SAJ into salary has been effected. It
appears, however, that fund releases by the DBM for basic salaries of justices, judges and court
officials who are entitled to SAJ shall be the net of the 10% increase. This 10% deficiency shall then
be sourced from the SAJ fund pursuant to Section 6, R.A. No. 9227. The DBM said they would only
provide funding for the 10% increase in the basic salary of court officials and employees who are not
direct beneficiaries under R.A. No. 9227.

Forthwith, the DBM issued its Circular Letter No. 2007-9 of June 29, 2007 providing for additional
guidelines on the release of funds to cover compensation adjustments of national government
personnel effective July 1, 2007. The circular letter provides:

4.0 In cases where personnel of national government agencies have been granted special allowances
under special laws and said allowances are considered as advance payment of any future increase in
basic salary as may be provided by law, the following policies shall be adopted:

4.1 The special allowance equivalent to the amount of authorized increase under EO No. 611 shall be
integrated into the basic salary.

4.2 Any excess in the amount of special allowance not converted as part of the basic salary shall
continue to be granted as such.

Flores promptly brought the court up-to-date on the above developments with a second Memorandum
dated July 4, 2007.

Flores' most recent Memorandum of November 20, 2007, has brought to our attention the DBM's
issuance, on November 13, 2007, of the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) No. SARO-BMB-C-
07-00061373 in the amount of One Hundred Sixty-Five Million Pesos (P165,000,000.00) to cover the
subsidy from the national government for the SAJ pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 3 4 of R.A. No.
9227.

In the Advice of SARO Issued5 on even date, the DBM qualifies the purpose for which the P165 Million
was issued, providing therein that the release of allotment is "to cover the Special Allowance for the
Judiciary (SAJ) authorized under 9227/10% compensation adjustment." It further states that:

In accordance with Republic Act No. 9227, this release likewise covers the implementation of the 10%
salary adjustment under Executive Order No. 611 dated March 14, 2007 as implemented under
National Budget Circular No. 511 dated June 18, 2007 for Justices, Judges and all other positions with
equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court in the
Judiciary.

The 10% increase in the basic salary of the Justices and Judges shall result in a parallel reduction in
the amount of special allowance they receive; while the total monthly compensation will remain
unchanged.

It would therefore appear that the DBM qualified the purpose of the subject SARO on the basis of
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9227. Thus, applying the condition set forth in the subject SARO, the basic
monthly salary of incumbent justices, judges and officials with the equivalent rank of CA justices or
RTC judges will get a 10% increase pursuant to E.O. No. 611, which shall be sourced from the P165
Million subsidy. The monthly SAJ will, in turn, have a corresponding reduction of 10%.
 Issues

1. Whether to deduct 10% from the monthly SAJ of incumbent justices, judges and judiciary officials

with the equivalent rank of CA justices and RTC judges corresponding to the 10% increase in their

basic salary as authorized under E.O. No. 611; and c ralawl ibra ry

2. Whether to source the 10% salary increase from the SAJ fund.

Our Ruling

The law is clear. The SAJ is to be considered as an implementation of any subsequent increase in
salary rates. This would include the 10% increase in basic salary under E.O. No. 611. Hence, the 10%
increase in basic salary shall be made to apply to justices, judges and other court personnel of ranks
equivalent to CA justices and RTC judges but will be sourced from the SAJ funds and result in a
corresponding 10% reduction in SAJ.

Continued implementation of Sec. 6 would defeat the purpose of R.A. No. 9227.

The confusion, however, over the effects of Section 6, R.A. No. 9227 is understandable, given the
foreseeable long-term consequences of said provision.

Under Section 6, R.A. No. 9227, the following allowances granted to officials and personnel under this
law are supposed to be affected by the implementation of the increase in salary under E.O. No. 611:

1) The SAJ under R.A. No. 9227 to justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the

equivalent ranks of justices of the CA and judges of the RTC; and c ralawl ibra ry

2) Any additional allowances granted to other personnel of the Judiciary.

Pursuant to the aforesaid Section 6 of R.A. No. 9227, a percentage of the SAJ being received by
incumbent justices, judges and officials with equivalent rank of CA justices or RTC judges shall be
converted as part of the basic salary to correspond to the 10% increase in the basic salary authorized
under E.O. No. 611. Thus, upon implementation of the 10% increase in the basic salary authorized
under E.O. No. 611 in July 2007, the monthly SAJ of incumbents shall correspondingly be decreased
by 10%.

The additional allowances granted to other personnel of the judiciary referred to in Section 6, R.A. No.
9227 are the allowances sourced from the surplus of the SAJ fund which are given to court personnel,
who are not direct beneficiaries under R.A. No. 9227, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 3 of the law.6

Since this additional allowance is variable in amount and is not consistently and regularly granted, the
grant thereof being dependent on availability of funds, the question now arises as to how the 10%
increase may affect the additional allowances granted to other personnel of the Judiciary in order to be
considered as an implementation of the said salary increase.

The net effect of converting 10% of the monthly SAJ to basic salary is a corresponding decrease in the
monthly income of incumbent justices, judges and judiciary officials of equivalent rank, since the 10%
increase in their salary, formerly part of their SAJ, will now be subject to income taxation. Other court
personnel who are not direct beneficiaries under R.A. No. 9227 may be expected to benefit with higher
additional allowance, in view of the expected increase in the surplus by reason of the 10% deduction
from the monthly SAJ of incumbents.
Assuming further across-the-board increases in the salary rates as may be authorized by law, it will
reach a point where the incumbent justices and other officials of equivalent rank, who are presently
receiving their monthly SAJ, will be in the same position as they were before the grant of the SAJ
under R.A. No. 9227 in relation to other government personnel. Every subsequent increase in the
basic salary will mean a corresponding decrease of an equivalent amount in the monthly SAJ of
justices, judges and other officials of equivalent rank. When their present salaries will have reached a
100% increase in subsequent years, they will no longer be receiving their SAJ, as this would have
been completely converted to salary pursuant to Section 6, R.A. No. 9227.

Moreover, they would be receiving less than before, since their salaries would then be subject to
tax.7 Other government personnel, on the other hand, would have likewise received the same 100%
increase in their salaries without any corresponding decrease in allowance. Thus, it would appear that
the very purpose for which R.A. No. 9227 was enacted, to attract lawyers to the Judiciary through an
attractive compensation package, would be defeated.

In the long run, the real beneficiaries of R.A. No. 9227 would not be those intended by the framers of
the law to benefit, but the so-called "indirect" beneficiaries under paragraph 3, Section 3 which
provides as follows:

If the collections from any increase in current fees and any new fees imposed after the effectivity of
this Act exceed the amount needed to fund the special allowances granted to justices, judges and all
other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges
of the Regional Trial Court as authorized under existing laws, the surplus may be used by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to grant additional allowances exclusively to other court
personnel not covered by the benefits granted under this Act. (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibra ry

However, these other court personnel not directly covered by R.A. No. 9227, already have their
salaries augmented by the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF), which purposefully grants a higher
allowance to those with lower basic salaries.8

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9227 provides for the continuation of the grant of JDF despite the indirect benefit
other court personnel gain from the SAJ:

Sec. 4. Continuance and Non-Diminution of Benefits under the Judiciary Development Fund. - The
existing allowance and other fringe benefits, if any, of the members and personnel of the Judiciary
which are currently paid or augmented chargeable against the increase in the rates of the legal fees
prescribed in the amendments to Rule 141 of the Rules of Court which accrue to the Judiciary
Development Fund established under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1949 shall all continue to be
funded and paid chargeable against said Development Fund, and in no case shall these be stopped or
discontinued by reason of the implementation of this additional compensation.

Clearly, this distribution of surplus SAJ to other court personnel was intended to be a mere incidental
benefit to the main objective of the law, which was to augment the salaries of members of the
Judiciary in an effort to entice more lawyers thereto. The continuing implementation of Section 6 of
said law would defeat this main objective. In actual practice and with the passage of time, it puts to
the fore the interests of other personnel, instead, whose interests are more properly and directly
addressed via the grant to them of the JDF.

Verba Legis Non Est Recedendum

While continued, long-term implementation of Section 6, R.A. No. 9227 would, indeed, defeat the very
purposes for which said law was passed, there is no escaping the express provisions of the law. Well-
established is the rule that "from the words of the statute there should be no departure." Hindi dapat
lumihis sa mga titik ng batas. Where, by the use of clear and equivocal language capable of only one
meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced even though it is absurd or
mischievous.9 Hence, there is nothing to do but to allow the 10% increase in basic salary of justices,
judges and those other officials likewise directly benefiting from R.A. No. 9227 to be sourced from the
SAJ fund, and to allow the corresponding 10% reduction in SAJ. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be
harsh but it is the law. Ang batas ay maaaring mahigpit ngunit ito ang batas.

The Court has previously ruled on the nature of SAJ as basic salary.

Besides, We cannot go back on our previous rulings on the nature of SAJ as being part of the basic
salary of justices and judges. In Re: Request of Retired Justices of the Supreme Court for Upgrading
of their Retirement Gratuities,10 We reiterated our recognition of the SAJ as forming part of basic
salary, to wit:

x x x As we have ruled in the Resolution dated 01 December 2004 and reiterated in the Resolution
dated 25 January 2005, the special allowance under RA 9227 is intended to be part of the basic salary
of the justices, judges and all other positions in the judiciary of equivalent rank. Section 6 of RA 9227
categorically states that "the special allowance equivalent to the increase in the basic salary as may be
provided by law shall be converted as part of the basic salary." The first sentence on Section 6 is
clear. All special allowances granted under RA 9227 shall be considered as an
implementation of the salary increases or subsequent increases in the salary rates provided
under RA 6758 as amended. In other words, the special allowance is merely an advance
salary increase for the justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with
equivalent rank. An advance salary increase is still a salary increase. When a new law is
enacted providing for all government officials and employees, said special allowance will be
converted formally as part of the basic salary and any excess in the amount of special
allowance not formally converted as part of the basic salary shall continue to be granted as
such.

x x x

x x x And we have stated in the Resolution dated 01 December 2004, that since the special allowances
that are being received by incumbent justices under R.A. No. 9227 are actually part of their increased
basic salary, a fortiori, such increased salary of the incumbent justice becomes the basis of the
retirement pension of the retiree at the time of his cessation in office. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibra ry

Seeing that We have previously established the nature of the SAJ as to be considered basic salary for
purposes of computation of retirement benefits, We can hardly flip-flop on the issue in order to declare
the SAJ free of income tax and to steer clear of deductions therefrom corresponding to each salary
increase, no matter how ludicrous the overall long-term effect of the implementation of Section 6 may
be. Future legislation is encouraged to rectify this blip in the law.

In sum, this ruling is guided by an obligation to be consistent with the wording of the law as well as
previous rulings of the Court on the nature of the SAJ fund. It is instilled with a spirit of generosity
towards other court personnel and with self-sacrifice for, indeed, it runs contrary to Our own self-
interests. The distortion in pay that the law may very well cause can be addressed properly by future
legislation.

WHEREFORE, the Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief of the Fiscal Management and Budget Office
Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores is hereby instructed:

1. To deduct 10% from the monthly SAJ of incumbent justices, judges and judiciary officials with the

equivalent ranks of CA justices and RTC judges, corresponding to the 10% increase in their basic

salary as authorized under E.O. No. 611; and c ralawli bra ry

2. To source the 10% salary increase from the SAJ fund.

SO ORDERED.