People V Lee

10/30/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 382
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Lee
*
G.R. No. 139070. May 29, 2002.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

NOEL LEE, accused-appellant.
Witnesses; Affidavits; Affidavits are generally considered

inferior to open court declarations because affidavits are taken ex-
parte and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate.—
Between Herminia’s testimony in open court and her sworn
statement, any inconsistency therein does not necessarily
discredit the witness. Affidavits are generally considered inferior
to open court declarations because affidavits are taken ex-parte
and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate. Oftentimes,
they are executed when the affiant’s mental faculties are not in
such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full
the incident that transpired. They are usually not prepared by the
affiant himself but by another who suggests words to the affiant,
or worse, uses his own language in taking the affiant’s
statements.
Same; Character Evidence; Words and Phrases; Character is
defined to be the possession by a person of certain qualities of mind
and morals, distinguishing him from others—it is the opinion
generally entertained of a person derived from the common report
of the people who are acquainted with him.—Character is defined
to be the possession by a person of certain qualities of mind and
morals, distinguishing him from others. It is the opinion generally
entertained of a person derived from the common report of the
people who are acquainted with him; his reputation. “Good moral
character” includes all the elements essential to make up such a
character; among these are common honesty and veracity,
especially in all professional intercourse; a character that
measures up as good among people of the community in which the
person lives, or that is up to the standard of the average citizen;
that status which attaches to a man of good behavior and upright
conduct.
Same; Same; The rule is that the character or reputation of a
party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017579e041bbbab7b1bb003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/28
controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible.—

The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded
as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that
evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the
issues in the case were allowed to be influenced by evidence of the
character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to
have
_______________
* EN BANC
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VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 597
People vs. Lee
the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry

into the merits of the case. After all, the business of the court is to
try the case, and not the man; and a very bad man may have a
righteous cause. There are exceptions to this rule however and
Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both criminal and
civil cases.
Same; Same; When the accused presents proof of his good
moral character, this strengthens the presumption of innocence,
and where good moral character and reputation are established,
an inference arises that the accused did not commit the crime
charged; The offering of character evidence on his behalf is a
privilege of the defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment on
the failure of the defendant to produce such evidence.—In criminal
cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the
accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to
the moral trait involved in the offense charged. When the accused
presents proof of his good moral character, this strengthens the
presumption of innocence, and where good character and
reputation are established, an inference arises that the accused
did not commit the crime charged. This view proceeds from the
theory that a person of good character and high reputation is not
likely to have committed the act charged against him. Sub-
paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution may not prove the bad
moral character of the accused except only in rebuttal and when
such evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the
accused who might otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty
but because he is a person of bad character. The offering of

character evidence on his behalf is a privilege of the defendant,
and the prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the
defendant to produce such evidence. Once the defendant raises
the issue of his good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal,
offer evidence of the defendant’s bad character. Otherwise, a
defendant, secure from refutation, would have a license to
unscrupulously impose a false character upon the tribunal.
Same; Same; Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the
offended party may be proved “if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense
charged, and such evidence is most commonly offered to support a
claim of self-defense in an assault or homicide case or a claim of
consent in a rape case.—Both subparagraphs (1) and (2) of Section
51 of Rule 130 refer to character evidence of the accused. And this
evidence must be “pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged,” meaning, that the character evidence must be
relevant and germane to the kind of the act charged, e.g., on a
charge of rape, character for chastity; on a charge of assault,
character for peacefulness or violence; on a charge for
embezzlement, character for
598
People vs. Lee
honesty and integrity. Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said

Rule refers to the character of the offended party. Character
evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended party may be
proved “if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the
probability or improbability of the offense charged.” Such evidence
is most commonly offered to support a claim of self-defense in an
assault or homicide case or a claim of consent in a rape case.
Same; Same; In the Philippine setting, proof of the moral
character of the offended party is applied with frequency in sex
offenses and homicide.—In the Philippine setting, proof of the
moral character of the offended party is applied with frequency in
sex offenses and homicide. In rape and acts of lasciviousness or in
any prosecution involving an unchaste act perpetrated by a man
against a woman where the willingness of a woman is material,
the woman’s character as to her chastity is admissible to show
whether or not she consented to the man’s act. The exception to
this is when the woman’s consent is immaterial such as in
statutory rape or rape with violence or intimidation. In the crimes
of qualified seduction or consented abduction, the offended party

must be a “virgin,” which is “presumed if she is unmarried and of
good reputation,” or a “virtuous woman of good reputation.” The
crime of simple seduction involves “the seduction of a woman who
is single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under
eighteen years of age x x x.” The burden of proof that the
complainant is a woman of good reputation lies in the prosecution,
and the accused may introduce evidence that the complainant is a
woman of bad reputation.
Same; Same; The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking
character of the deceased or his calmness, gentleness and peaceful
nature, as the case may be, is relevant in determining whether the
deceased or the accused was the aggressor.—In homicide cases, a
pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in two
situations: (1) as evidence of the deceased’s aggression; and (2) as
evidence of the state of mind of the accused. The pugnacious,
quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the deceased or his
calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is
relevant in determining whether the deceased or the accused was
the aggressor. When the evidence tends to prove self-defense, the
known violent character of the deceased is also admissible to show
that it produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the
mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt
defensive action was necessary.
Same; Same; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery;
Proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary in cases
of murder committed with treachery and premeditation.—
Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not
necessary in cases of murder commit-
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VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 599
People vs. Lee
ted with treachery and premeditation. In People v. Soliman, a

murder case, the defense tried to prove the violent, quarrelsome
or provocative character of the deceased. Upon objection of the
prosecution, the trial court disallowed the same. The Supreme
Court held: “x x x While good or bad moral character may be
availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability
of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123), such is not
necessary in the crime of murder where the killing is committed
through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character
may only be allowed in homicide cases to show “that it has
produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of

the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive
action was necessary (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1952 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does not apply to cases of
murder.”
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Caloocan City, Br. 127.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Benjamin A. Opena for Herminia L. Marquez.
Pajares, Asmal & Adaci for accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial

Court, Caloocan City, Branch 127 in Criminal Case No. C-
54012 (98), which sentenced accused-appellant Noel Lee to
death for the murder of Joseph Marquez.
On May 27, 1998, an Information was filed against
accused-appellant charging him with the crime of murder
committed as follows:
“That on or about the 29th day of September 1996, in Kalookan

City,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot one JOSEPH
MARQUEZ y LAGANDI, with the use of a handgun, thereby
inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries, which
ultimately caused the victim’s death.
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People vs. Lee
1
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. At the

trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (a)
Herminia Marquez, the mother of the victim; (b) Dr.
Darwin Corpuz, a resident doctor at the Manila Central
University (MCU) Hospital; (c) PO2 Rodelio Ortiz, a police
officer who examined the crime scene; and (d) Dr. Rosaline
Cosidon, a medico-legal officer of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory.
The prosecution established the following facts: At 9:00

in the evening of September 29, 1996, Herminia Marquez,
46 years of age and her son, Joseph, 26 years of age, were
in the living room of their house located at No. 173 General
Evangelista St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The living
room was brightly lit by a circular fluorescent lamp in the
ceiling. Outside their house was an alley leading to General
Evangelista Street. The alley was bright and bustling with
people and activity. There were women sewing garments on
one side and on the other was a store catering to
customers. In their living room, mother and son were
watching a basketball game on television. Herminia was
seated on an armchair and the television set was to her
left. Across her, Joseph sat on a sofa against the wall and
window of their house and the television was to his right.
Herminia looked away from the game and casually glanced
at her son. To her complete surprise, she saw a hand
holding a gun coming out of the open window behind
Joseph. She looked up and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee
peering through the window and holding the gun aimed at
Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body
towards the window, and simultaneously, appellant fired
his gun hitting Joseph’s head. Joseph slumped on the sofa.
Herminia stood up but could not move as accused-appellant
fired a second shot at Joseph and three (3) shots more—two
hit the sofa and one hit the cement floor. When no more
shots were fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw
accused-appellant, in a blue sando, flee towards the
direction of his house. Herminia turned to her son, dragged
his body to the door and shouted for help. With the aid of
her neighbor and kumpare, Herminia brought Joseph to
the MCU Hospital where he later died.
_______________
1 Information, Records, p. 1.
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People vs. Lee
Police investigators arrived at the hospital and inquired

about the shooting incident. Herminia told them that her
son was shot by Noel Lee. From the hospital, Herminia
went to the St. Martin Funeral Homes where Joseph’s body
was brought. Thereafter, she proceeded to the Caloocan
City Police Headquarters where

2
she gave her sworn
statement about the shooting.
Upon request of the Caloocan City police, a post-mortem
examination was made on Joseph’s body. Dr. Rosaline O.
Cosidon, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service made the following findings:
“FINDINGS:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished male cadaver in rigor mortis
with postmortem lividity at the dependent portions of the body.
Conjunctiva are pale, Lips and nailbeds are cyanotic. A needle
puncture mark was noted at the dorsum of the right hand.
HEAD:
(1) ‘Gunshot wound, frontal region, measuring 0.5 x 0.5 cm,

just right of the anterior midline, 161 cm from heel, with
an upbraded collar, measuring 0.2 cm superiorly and
laterally, 0.1 cm medially and inferiorly directed
posteriorwards, downwards and to the left fracturing the
frontal bone, lacerating the brain. A deformed slug was
recovered embedded at the left cerebral hemisphere of the
brain.
(2) Gunshot wound, occipital region, measuring 0.5 x 0.5 cm,
2 cm left of the posterior midline, 162 cm from heel, with a
uniform 0.2 cm upbraded collar, directed slightly
anteriorwards, downwards and lateralwards, fracturing
the occipital bone and lacerating the brain. A deformed
slug was recovered at the left auricular region.
(3) Contusion, right eyebrow, measuring 3 x 2 cm, 3 cm from
the anterior midline.
There are subdural and subarachnoidal hemorrhages.

Stomach is 1/4 full of partially digested food particles and positive for
alcoholic odor.
CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is intracranial
3
hemorrhage as a result of
gunshot wounds. Head.”
_______________
2 Exhibit “A,” also Exhibit “2,” Folder of Exhibits, p. 5.

3 Exhibit “L,” Medico-Legal Report, Folder of Exhibits, p. 29.
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People vs. Lee
At the time of his death, Joseph was employed as driver by

the Santos
4
Enterprises Freight Services earning P250.00 a
day. He left behind two children by his live-in partner who
are now under his mother’s care and support. Herminia
spent approximately P90,000.00 for the funeral and burial
expenses of5 her deceased son. The expenses
6
were supported
by receipts and admitted by the defense.
Herminia filed a complaint for murder against accused-
appellant. The complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 96-3246, was
however dismissed for insufficiency of evidence in a
Resolution dated December 4, 1996 by Prosecutor Dionisio
C. Sison with the approval
7
of Caloocan City Prosecutor
Rosauro J. Silverio. Herminia appealed the order of
dismissal to the Secretary of Justice. In a letter dated
March 16, 1998, Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III
reversed and set aside the appealed Resolution and ordered
the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City to file
8
an information
for murder against the accused-appellant. Accordingly, the
Information was filed and a warrant of arrest issued
against accused-appellant on June 8, 1998. On October 16,
1998, appellant was arrested by agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Appellant is a well-known figure in their neighborhood
and has several criminal cases pending against him in
Caloocan City. He was charged with 9frustrated homicide in
1984 and attempted murder in 1989.
For his defense, accused-appellant presented two
witnesses: (a) Orlando Bermudez, a neighbor; and (b)
himself. He denies the killing of Joseph Marquez. He
claims that from 8:00 to 10:00 in the evening of September
29, 1996, he was in his house located at 317 M. de Castro
St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. He was having some
drinks with his neighbor, Orlando Bermudez, and his
driver,
_______________
4 Exhibit “B,” Identification Card, Folder of Exhibits, p. 2; TSN of

January 19, 1999, p. 20.
5 Exhibits “D,” “D-1” to “D-17,” Folder of Exhibits, pp. 4-21.
6 TSN of January 25, 1999, p. 4.
7 Exhibit “5,” Folder of Exhibits, pp. 40-45.
8 Exhibit “O,” Folder of Exhibits, pp. 32-34.
9 Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. C-23084 (84) and C-32351 (89),
Exhibits “G” and “H,” Folder of Exhibits, pp. 23, 24.
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People vs. Lee
Nelson Columba. They were enjoying themselves, drinking

and singing with the videoke. Also in the house were his
wife, children and household help. At 10:00 P.M., Orlando
and Nelson went home and accused-appellant went to
sleep. He woke up at 5:30 in the morning of the following
day and learned that Joseph Marquez, a neighbor, was shot
to death.
10
To appellant’s surprise, he was tagged as Joseph’s
killer.
Accused-appellant had known the victim since childhood
and their houses are only two blocks apart. Joseph had a
bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug
addict. Six days before his death, on September 23, 1996,
accused-appellant caught Joseph inside his car trying to
steal his car stereo. Joseph scampered away. As proof of
the victim’s bad reputation, appellant presented a letter
handwritten by his mother, Herminia, addressed to Mayor
Reynaldo Malonzo of Caloocan City, and sent through PO3
Willy Tuazon and his wife, Baby Ruth. In the letter,
Herminia was surrendering her son to the Mayor for
rehabilitation because he was hooked on shabu, a
prohibited drug, and was a thief. Herminia was scared that
eventually Joseph might not just steal but kill her11 and
everyone in their household because of his drug habit.
The accused-appellant likewise explained the two
criminal cases filed against him in 1984 and 1989. The
information for attempted murder was dismissed as a
result of the victim’s desistance while in the frustrated
homicide 12case, the real assailant appeared and admitted
his crime.
In a decision dated June 22, 1999, the trial court found
accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to the penalty
of death. The court also ordered appellant to pay the heirs
of the victim civil indemnity of P50,000.00, actual damages
of P90,000.00, moral damages of P60,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P50,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Thus:
“WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered and the

prosecution having established beyond an iota of doubt the guilt
of accused NOEL LEE of the crime of Murder as defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the
_______________
10 TSN of April 7, 1999, pp. 3-5.

11 Exhibit “3,” Folder of Exhibits, p. 36.
12 TSN of April 7, 1999, p. 13.
604

People vs. Lee
Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659, this court, in view

of the presence of the generic aggravating circumstance of
dwelling and without any mitigating circumstance to offset it,
hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the extreme penalty of
DEATH; to indemnify the legal heirs of the deceased civil
indemnity of P50,000.00; to pay the private complainant actual
damages of P90,000.00 plus moral and exemplary damages of
P60,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively; and to pay the costs.
Consistent with the provisions of Section 10, Rule 122 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, let the entire
records hereof including the complete transcripts of stenographic
notes be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review
and judgment, within the reglementary period set forth in said
section. 13
SO ORDERED.”
Hence, this appeal. Before us, accused-appellant assigns

the following errors:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING

HEAVILY ON THE SELF-SERVING AND CONTRADICTORY
TESTIMONY OF THE MOTHER OF THE VICTIM, HERMINIA
MARQUEZ, WHOSE NARRATION OF THE CHAIN OF
OCCURRENCE THAT LED TO THE DEATH OF JOSEPH
MARQUEZ WAS BEYOND BELIEF.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HASTILY

TAGGING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, NOEL LEE, AS THE
ASSAILANT BASED MERELY ON THE BIASED
DECLARATION OF THE MOTHER WITHOUT CONSIDERING
THE SHADY CHARACTER OF THE VICTIM AGAINST WHOM
OTHERS MIGHT HAVE AN AXE TO GRIND.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS DECISION

OF FINDING GUILT ON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
WITHOUT EVEN RAISING A FINGER IN SATISFYING
ITSELF THAT THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OBTAINING IN
1996 ARE STILL PREVAILING IN 1999 WHEN THE CASE
WAS TRIED ON THE MERITS SO AS TO ESTABLISH THE

IDENTITY OF THE ASSAILANT BEYOND DOUBT.
_______________
13 Decision, p. 16, Rollo, p. 34.
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People vs. Lee
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN TREATING

WITH LENIENCY HERMINIA MARQUEZ’S VACILLATION
WITH RESPECT TO THE “BUTAS NG BINTANA” AS
CONTAINED IN HER SWORN STATEMENT AND THE
“BUKAS NA BINTANA” AS PER HER REPAIRED TESTIMONY
—A SERIOUS PROCEDURAL ANOMALY THAT ASSAULTED
THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE

EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON ACCUSED- 14
APPELLANT DESPITE OBVIOUS REASONABLE DOUBT.”
The assigned errors principally involve the issue of the

credibility of Herminia Marquez, the lone prosecution
eyewitness. Accused-appellant claims that the trial court
should not have accepted Herminia’s testimony because it
is biased, incredible and inconsistent.
Herminia’s testimony on direct examination is as
follows:
“x x x
ATTY. OPENA: Now who was your companion, if any, at
that time?
WITNESS: Me and my son, Joseph Marquez, and the wife
upstairs
putting the baby to sleep.
Q: What were you and your son, Joseph, doing then?
A: Watching TV.
Q: Will you please tell us your position, I am referring to
you and your son in relation to the television set where
you are watching the show.
A: We were facing each other while watching television

which is on the left side.
Q: Will you please tell us where exactly was your son,
Joseph, seated while watching television?
A: At the end most of the sofa.
Q: The sofa you are referring to is the one near the
window.
A: Yes, sir. Dikit lang po.
_______________
14 Accused-Appellant’s Brief, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 89-90.
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People vs. Lee
Q: Will you give us an idea or describe to us that window

which you mentioned awhile ago?
A: Transparent glass.
Q: How high is it from the ground?
COURT: Which one?
ATTY. OPENA: The window glass?
WITNESS: About three feet from the ground.
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
Q: You said three feet. What do you mean by that? Is that
window elevated from the ground?
A: The same height as this court window which is about
three feet from the ground, and from one another about
four by four window [sic], three feet by the ground.
Q: Now, you demonstrated by showing a portion, you
mean to tell us that window was mounted on a concrete
or hollow block?
A: Hollow block, po.
Q: How high is that hollow block that you were referring
to?
COURT: She said three feet.
Q: Which is higher, that sofa which is posted near the
window or the hollow block?
A: Hollow block.
Q: By how many inches or feet?
A: About half a foot.
Q: You said the sofa was long. Will you please tell us in
what portion of your sofa your son Joseph was seated?
ATTY. VARGAS: Already answered, your Honor. She said
dulo, end of the sofa.
COURT: Sustained.
Q: When you said end of sofa which portion, the left side
or the right side?
A: The right.
Q: Now, while you and your son were watching television,
was there anything unusual that transpired?
A: Yes, sir.
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VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 607

People vs. Lee
Q: Tell us what was that all about.

A: Mayroon po akong napansin na kamay na nakatutok sa
anak ko. Nakita ko po si Noel Lee na nakatayo sa may
bintana.
Q: What do you mean by the word “kamay?”
A: Hawak hawak po niya iyong baril, nakatutok po sa
anak ko.
Q: What did you do with what you saw?
A: Nakita ko pong gumanoon siya, sumilip na ganoon,
sabay putok ng baril. Tumingin po siya sa may bintana,
ganoon po, sabay putok ng baril.
COURT: You said he turned the head. Who turned the
head? Sino ang gumanyan sa sinabi mo?
A: (Witness demonstrating that the victim peeped through
the window).
Q: And then?
A: At the same time the firing of the gun [sic] and I saw
my son slumped.
ATTY. OPENA TO THE WITNESS:
Q: And after your son was slumped, what did you do?
A: I went to my son and carried him to take him to the
hospital.
Q: How many shots did you hear?
A: Five shots.
Q: That was prior to helping your son?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And how many times was your son hit?
ATTY. VARGAS:
Q: Objection, your honor. It was already answered.
Because according to her it was five shots.
COURT: It does not follow that the victim was hit. So, the
witness may answer.
WITNESS: Twice, Two shots hit my son, two shots on the
sofa and one shot on the cement.
COURT: How about the other one?
A: Boon po sa semento.
Q: And who fired these shots?
A: Noel Lee.
608

People vs. Lee
Q: That Noel Lee that you are referring to, will you please
point at him if he is around?
A: (Witness going down the witness stand and pointing to
accused Noel Lee).
Q: How do you know that it was Noel Lee who shot your
son?
A: Kitang kita ko po. Magkatapat po kami.
Q: Will you please describe to us?
A: Maliwanag po kasi ang ilaw. Maliwanag din po sa
labas, may nananahi doon. Nandoon po kaming dalawa
ng anak ko nanonood ng television. (Witness sobbing in
tears). Napakasakit sa akin. Hindi ko man lang
naipagtanggol ang anak ko.
COURT: She was emotionally upset.
ATTY. OPENA: I’ll just make it on record that the witness

was emotionally upset. May I ask if she can still testify?
x x x x x x x x x
WITNESS: Masakit lang po sa loob ko ang pagkawala ng
anak ko.
Q: You saw that the light was bright. Where were those
lights coming from?
A: Maliwanag po sa loob ng bahay namin dahil may
fluorescent na bilog. Saka sa labas may nananahi po
doon sa alley katapat ng bahay namin. At saka po doon
sa kabila, tindahan po tapat po namin, kaya
maliwanag ang ilaw.
Q: After trying to help your son, what happened?
A: I was able to hold on to my son up to the door. Upon
reaching the door, I asked the help of my kumpare.
Q: Meanwhile, what did the accused do after shooting five
times?
A: He ran to the alley to go home.
Q: Now you said he ran to an alley towards the direction of
their house. Do you know where his house is located?
A: Yes, sir. 142 M. de Castro Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City.
Q: How far is that from your residence?
A: More or less 150 to 200 meters.
Q: Where did you finally bring your son?
A: MCU.
Q: When you say MCU, are you referring to MCU
Hospital?
A: Yes, sir. MCU Hospital.
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VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 609

People vs. Lee
Q: At MCU, life-saving devices were attached to my son.

Later, after reaching 11:00, he died.
COURT: 11:00 P.M.?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Same day?
A: Yes, ma’am.
15
x x x x x x x x x.”
Herminia’s testimony is positive, clear and

straightforward. She did not waver in her narration of the
shooting incident, neither did she waffle in recounting her
son’s death. She was subjected by defense counsel to
rigorous cross and re-cross examinations and yet she stuck
to her testimony given in the direct examination. She
readily gave specific details of the crime scene, e.g., the
physical arrangement of the sofa and the television set, the
height of the sofa, the wall and the window, because the
crime happened right in her own living room. She
explained that she was unable to warn Joseph because she
was shocked by the sight of accused-appellant aiming a gun
at her son. The tragic events unfolded so fast and by the
time she took hold of herself, her son had been shot dead.
A son’s death in his mother’s house and in her presence
is a painful and agonizing experience that is not easy for a
mother to forget, even with the passing of time. Herminia’s
testimony shows that she was living with a conscience that
haunted and blamed her own self for failing to protect her
son or, at least, save him from death.
Nonetheless, accused-appellant points out
inconsistencies in the eyewitness’ testimony. In her
affidavit of September 30, 1996 given before PO2 Rodelio
Ortiz, Herminia declared that while she and Joseph were
watching television, she saw a hand holding a gun pointed
at her son. The hand and the gun came out of a hole in the
window, i.e., “butas ng bintana.” On cross-examination,
Herminia stated that she saw a hand holding a gun in the
open window, i.e., “bukas na bintana.” According to
accused-appellant, this inconsistency is a serious flaw
which cannot be repaired by her statement on the witness
stand.
_______________
15 TSN of January 19, 1999, pp. 5-11.
610

People vs. Lee
The inconsistency between her affidavit and her testimony

was satisfactorily explained by Herminia on cross-
examination:
“x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. VARGAS
Q: You said that you saw a hand from a hole in the
window with a gun, is that correct?
A: Bukas na bintana. Not from a hole but from an open
window.
Q: Madam witness, do you recall having executed a sworn
statement before the police, right after the shooting of
your son?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I will read to you paragraph 8 of your statement which
is already marked as your Exhibit “A” in which is
stated as follows: “Isalaysay mo nga sa akin ang buong
pangyayari? Answer: Sa mga oras ng alas 9:00 ng gabi
petsa 29 ng Setyembre 1996 habang ang aking anak ay
nanonood ng palabas sa TV ng basketball malapit sa
kanyang bintana sa labas at ako naman ay nakaupo sa
sopa katapat ko siya subalit medyo malayo ng konti sa
kanya, mayroon akong napansin na kamay na may
hawak ng baril at nakaumang sa aking anak sa may
butas ng bintana,” do you recall that?
A: Opo.
Q: What you saw from that butas is a hand with a gun, is
that correct?
A: Opo.
Q: Madam witness, your window is just like the window of
this courtroom?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In your testimony, you did not mention what part of the
window was that hand holding a gun that you saw? Is
that correct?
A: Hindi naman po butas, kundi bukas na bintana.
Nakabukas iyong bintana namin.
Q: So in your sinumpaang salaysay in the statement that
you said butas na bintana is not correct?
A: Mali ho kasi, hindi ko na napansin iyan, kasi ito
napansin ko, kinorect ko.
COURT: You show to the witness. There, butas na
bintana.
WITNESS: Mali po ang letra, Bukas hindi butas.
611
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 611

People vs. Lee
16
Herminia corrected her affidavit by saying in open court

that she saw the hand and the gun coming out of the open
window, not from a hole in the window. In her direct
testimony, Herminia presented a photograph of her living
room just the17 way it looked from her side on the night of
the shooting. The sofa on which Joseph was seated is
against the wall, with the window a few inches above the
wall. The window is made of transparent glass with six (6)
vertical glass panes pushing outwards. The entire window
is enclosed by iron grills with big spaces in between the
grills. The living room is well-lit and the area outside the
house is also lit by a fluorescent lamp.
Between Herminia’s testimony in open court and her
sworn statement, any inconsistency 18
therein does not
necessarily discredit the witness. Affidavits are generally
considered inferior to open court declarations because
affidavits are taken ex-parte 19
and are almost always
incomplete and inaccurate. Oftentimes, they are executed
when the affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a state
as to afford him a fair opportunity
20
of narrating in full the
incident that transpired. They are usually not prepared by
the affiant himself but by another who suggests words to
the affiant, or worse,21 uses his own language in taking the
affiant’s statements.
Accused-appellant argues that since Herminia declared
in her affidavit that she saw a hand coming from the
window, she did not 22
see the person holding the gun, let
alone who fired it. A complete reading of the pertinent
portion of Herminia’s affidavit will refute appellant’s
arguments, viz:
_______________
16 TSN of January 26, 1999, pp. 10-12.

17 Exhibit “F,” Folder of Exhibits, p. 22-A.
18 People v. Templo, 346 SCRA 626, 641 [2000]; People v. Ferrer, 255
SCRA 19, 34 [1996]; People v. Abrenica, 252 SCRA 54, 61 [1996].
19 People v. Jaberto, 307 SCRA 93, 100 [1999]; People v. Silvestre, 307
SCRA 68, 83 [1999]; People v. Mercado, 304 SCRA 504, 527 [1999]; People
v. Botona, 304 SCRA 712, 733 [1999].
20 People v. Ortiz, 266 SCRA 641, 650 [1997].
21 People v. Panela, 346 SCRA 308, 315-316 [2000]; People v. Ortiz,

supra
22 Reply Brief, p. 4, Rollo, p. 339.
612

People vs. Lee
“x x x x x x x x x
T — Isalaysay mo nga sa akin and buong pangyayari?
S — Sa mga oras ng alas 9:00 ng gabi, petsa 29 ng
Setyembre 1996, habang ang aking anak ay
nanonood ng palabas sa T.V. ng basketball malapit
sa aming bintanan [sic] sa labas, at ako naman ay
nakaupo sa sopa katapat ko siya subalit medyo
malayo ng kaunti sa kanya, mayroon akong
napansin akong [sic] kamay na hawak-hawak na
baril na nakaumang sa aking anak sa butas na
bintana na nakaawang, maya-maya ng kaunti ay
nakarinig na ako ng putok at ang unang putok ay
tumama sa ulo ng aking anak kaya napayuko siya,
pagkatapos noon ay sunod-sunod na ang putok na
narinig ko, mga limang beses, kaya kitang kita ko
siya ng lapitan ko ang aking anak at nakita ko itong
si NOEL LEE, pagkatapos noon ay tumakbo na ito
papalabas ng iskinita papunta sa kanila.
23
It is thus clear that when Herminia approached her son,

she saw that the person firing the gun was accused-
appellant. Appellant continued firing and then ran away
towards the direction of his house. This account is not
inconsistent with the witness’ testimony in open court.
Herminia’s declarations are based on her actual account
of the commission of the crime. She had no ill motive to
accuse appellant of killing her son, or at least, testify
falsely against appellant. Accused-appellant himself
admitted that he and Herminia have been neighbors for
years and have known each other for a long time. Appellant
is engaged in the business of buying and selling scrap 24
plastic and Herminia used to work for him as an agent.
She would not have pointed to appellant if not for the fact
that it was him whom she saw shoot her son.
Indeed, the Solicitor General points out that it was
appellant
25
himself who had strong motive to harm or kill
Joseph. Appellant revealed that six days before the
shooting, he caught Joseph inside his car attempting to

steal the stereo. The alibi that appellant was
_______________
23 Exhibit “A”, also marked as Exhibit “2”, Folder of Exhibits, p. 5;

emphasis supplied.
24 TSN of April 14, 1999, pp. 6-7.
25 Plaintiff-Appellee’s Brief, p. 20; Rollo, p. 20.
613
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 613

People vs. Lee
drinking with his friends that fateful night of September

29, 1996 does not rule out the possibility that he could have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
The victim’s house is merely two blocks away from
appellant’s
26
house and could be reached in several
minutes.
The lone eyewitness’ account of the killing finds support
in the medico-legal report. Dr. Rosalie Cosidon found that
the deceased sustained two gunshot wounds—one to the
right of the forehead, and27the other, to the left side of the
back of the victim’s head. Two slugs were recovered from
the victim’s head. Judging from the location and number of
wounds sustained, Dr. Cosidon theorized that the assailant 28
could have been more than two feet away from 29
the victim.
Both gunshot wounds were serious and fatal.
Accused-appellant makes capital of Joseph’s bad
reputation in their community. He alleges that the victim’s
drug habit led him to commit other crimes and he may
have been
30
shot by any of the persons from whom he had
stolen. As proof of Joseph’s bad character, appellant
presented Herminia’s letter to Mayor Malonzo seeking his
assistance for Joseph’s rehabilitation from drugs. On
rebuttal, Herminia admitted that she wrote such letter to
Mayor Malonzo
31
but denied anything about her son’s
thievery. Character evidence is governed by Section 51,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz:
“Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible;

exceptions’.—
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged.
_______________
26 TSN of April 7, 1999, pp. 9-10.

27 TSN of February 15, 1999, pp. 6, 9; Exhibit “M,” Sketch of human
body, Folder of Exhibits, p. 30.
28 TSN of February 15, 1999, pp. 6-7.
29 Id., at p. 8.
30 Appellant’s Brief, p. 18, Rollo, p. 106.
31 TSN of May 5, 1999, p. 12.
614

People vs. Lee
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad
moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait
involved in the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may
be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree
the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
Character is defined to be the possession by a person of

certain qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing him
from others. It is the opinion generally entertained of a
person derived from the common report of 32the people who
are acquainted with him; his reputation. “Good moral
character” includes all the elements essential to make up
such a character; among these are common honesty and
veracity, especially in all professional intercourse; a
character that measures up as good among people of the
community in which the person lives, or that is up to the
standard of the average citizen; that status which
33
attaches
to a man of good behavior and upright conduct.
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is
regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy,
so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible.
Ordinarily, if the issues
_______________
32 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, vol. I, 3rd revision, p. 457 [1914]. Strictly

speaking, character is not synonymous with reputation. “Character” is the
nature of a person, his disposition generally, or his disposition in respect
to a particular trait such as peacefulness or truthfulness. “Reputation” is

the community estimate of him. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence in
the United States, failure to make the distinction may result in confusion.
“Character evidence” is governed by Rule 404 while reputation is a
method of proving character in Rules 405 and 608—M. Graham, Federal
Rules of Evidence in a Nutshell Series, 2nd ed., p. 94 [1987].
33 14 C.J.S. Character p. 400 [1939]; also cited in V. Francisco, Revised
Rules of Court of the Philippines, vol. VII, Part I, p. 743. The concept of
character has acquired strong moral overtones over the years owing
perhaps to the far greater frequency with which it is encountered in
criminal cases. Inquiry into the nature of the person has largely been
confined to considerations which can be characterized as either goodness
or badness. As psychiatry and psychology progress and win increasing
acceptance in the law, the concept seems destined to encompass a
broadened view of human nature—Graham, supra, at 94-95.
615
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 615

People vs. Lee
in the case were allowed to be influenced by evidence of the

character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be
apt to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than
a factual inquiry into the merits of the case. After all, the
business of the court is to try the case, and not the34
man;
and a very bad man may have a righteous cause. There
are exceptions to this rule however and Section 51, Rule
130 gives the exceptions in both criminal and civil cases.
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule
130 provides that the accused may prove his good moral
character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in
the offense charged. When the accused presents proof of his
good moral character, this strengthens the presumption of
innocence, and where good character and reputation are
established, an inference arises that the accused did not
commit the crime charged. This view proceeds from the
theory that a person of good character and high reputation
is not
35
likely to have committed the act charged against
him. Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution may
not prove the bad moral character of the accused except
only in rebuttal and when such evidence is pertinent to the
moral trait involved in the offense charged. This is
intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the accused who
might otherwise be convicted not because36 he is guilty but
because he is a person of bad character. The offering of
character evidence on his behalf is a privilege of the
defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment 37on the
37
failure of the defendant to produce such evidence. Once
the defendant raises the issue of his good character, the
prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the
defendant’s bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure
from
_______________
34 Jones on Evidence, Civil and Criminal, vol. I, 5th ed., Sec. 165, p. 294
[1958] citing Thompson v. Church, 1 Root (Conn) 312, and other cases;
also cited in O. Herrera, Remedial Law, vol. V, p. 834 [1999].
35 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, Sec. 367 [1994 ed.].
36 McCormick on Evidence, vol. I, 4th ed., Sec. 190, p. 797 [1992]; 29 Am
Jur 2d, Evidence, Sec. 365 [1994 ed.]; see also People v. Rabanes, 208
SCRA 768, 780 [1992].
37 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, vol. I, 12th ed., Sec. 221, p. 456 [1955].
616

People vs. Lee
refutation, would have a license to38unscrupulously impose

a false character upon the tribunal.
Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 3951 of Rule
130 refer to character evidence of the accused. And this
evidence must be “pertinent to the moral trait involved in
the offense charged,” meaning, that the character evidence
must be40 relevant and germane to the kind of the act
charged, e.g., on a charge of rape, character for chastity;
on a charge of assault, character for peacefulness or
violence; on a charge41 for embezzlement, character for
honesty and integrity. Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of 42
the said Rule refers to the character of the offended party.
Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended
party may be proved “if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the
offense charged.” Such evidence is most commonly offered
to support a claim of self-defense in an assault
43
or homicide
case or a claim of consent in a rape case.
_______________
38 Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 1, 3rd ed., sec. 58, p. 458 [1940]; see
footnotes for English and American cases.
39 In the case at bar, it was the prosecution that first presented
evidence of the bad moral character of the accused-appellant by citing the
two criminal cases pending against him. The presentation of this evidence,
however, was not objected to by the accused-appellant.
40 Francisco, supra, at 746; see also Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, vol.
I, 12th ed., Sec. 221, pp. 459-461 [1955].
41 Francisco, supra citing Wigmore on Evidence (Stud. Txt) 62.
42 With respect to a witness in both criminal and civil cases, his bad
moral character may be proved by either party as provided under Section
11, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence—see Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, vol. II, p. 631 [1995].
43 R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence,
American Casebook Series, p. 238 [1982]; McCormick on Evidence, vol. I,
4th ed., Sec. 193, pp. 820-822 [1992] at Sec. 193, pp. 820-822. In the
American jurisdiction, courts in the past generally admitted evidence of
the victim’s character for chastity. In the 1970’s however, nearly all
jurisdictions enacted “rape shield” laws. The reforms range from barring
all evidence of the victim’s character for chastity to merely requiring a
preliminary hearing to screen out inadmissible evidence on the issue.
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 lies between these extremes Reversing the
traditional preference for proof of character by reputation, it bars
reputation and opinion evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct, but
permits
617
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 617

People vs. Lee
In the Philippine setting, proof of the moral character of

the offended party
44
is applied with frequency in sex offenses
and homicide. In rape and acts of lasciviousness or in any
prosecution involving an unchaste act perpetrated by a
man against a woman where the willingness of a woman is
material, the woman’s character as to her chastity is
admissible45to show whether or not she consented to the
man’s act. The exception to this is when the 46woman’s
consent is immaterial such as47 in statutory rape or rape
with violence
48
or intimidation. In the 49
crimes of qualified
seduction or consented abduction, the offended party
must be a “virgin,” which50is “presumed if she is unmarried
and of good51 reputation,” or a “virtuous woman of good
reputation.” The crime of simple seduction involves “the
seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of good
reputation,
52
over twelve but under eighteen years of age x x
x.” The burden of proof that the complainant is a woman
of good reputation lies in the prosecution, and the accused
may introduce evidence
53
that the complainant is a woman of
bad reputation.
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the

victim is admissible in two situations: (1) as evidence of the
deceased’s aggression; 54and (2) as evidence of the state of
mind of the accused. The pugnacious, quarrelsome or
trouble-seeking character of the
_______________
evidence of specific incidents if certain substantive and procedural

conditions are met.—McCormick on Evidence, supra, Sec. 193, p. 822.
44 Francisco, supra, at 751.
45 Naval v. Panday, 321 SCRA 290, 302 [1999].
46 Ibid., at 302 citing Wigmore on Evidence (Stud. Text) 63; see also
Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, vol. 1, 12th ed., Sec. 229 [1955].
47 People v. Taduyo, 154 SCRA 349, 361 [1987]; People v. Blance, 45
Phil. 113, 116 [1923].
48 Article 337, Revised Penal Code.
50 II L. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code 862 [1981].
51 Ibid., at 882.
53 Francisco, supra, at 752.
54 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, vol. I, 12th ed., Sec. 228, p. 474 [1955];
also cited in Francisco, supra, at 752; see also Herrera, supra, at 839-840.
618

People vs. Lee
deceased or his calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature,

as the case may be, is relevant in determining 55whether the
deceased or the accused was the aggressor. When the
evidence tends to prove self-defense, the known violent
character of the deceased is also admissible to show that it
produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the
mind of the accused and a justifiable56 conviction that a
prompt defensive action was necessary.
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of
the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or
improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not
alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing
was made in self-defense. There is no connection between
the deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with his violent
death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the
positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of
the victim’s bad character he could have been killed by any
one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple

speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is
not necessary in cases of murder committed57
with treachery
and premeditation. In People v. Soliman, a murder case,
the defense tried to prove the violent, quarrelsome or
provocative character of the deceased. Upon objection of the
prosecution, the trial court disallowed the same. The
Supreme Court held:
“x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an

aid to determine the probability or improbability of the
commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123),58 such is not
necessary in the crime of murder where the killing is committed
through treachery or premeditation. The
_______________
55 In People v. Gungob, 108 Phil. 1174 [1960], it was found that the character of
the deceased as reflected by his criminal record of theft and physical injuries was
consistent with the provocative acts ascribed to him by the witnesses.
56 In People v. Sumicad, 56 Phil. 645 [1932], the deceased was a bully of known
violent character, although himself unarmed, he attempted to take from the
accused a bolo, the only means of defense possessed by the latter. Under the
circumstances, it was observed that it would have been an act of suicide for the
accused to allow the bolo to pass into the hands of the victim.
57 101 Phil. 767 [1957].
58 Now Section 51 (a)(3), Rule 130.
619
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 619

People vs. Lee
proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to

show “that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger
in the mind of the accused I and a justifiable conviction that a
prompt defensive action was necessary (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 195259 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does not apply
to cases of murder.”
In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with

murder committed through treachery and evident
premeditation. The evidence shows that there was
treachery. Joseph was sitting in his living room watching
television when accused-appellant peeped through the
window and, without any warning, shot him twice in the
head. There was no opportunity at all for the victim to
defend himself or retaliate against his attacker. The
suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack ensured his

death without risk to the assailant. Following the ruling in
People v. Soliman, where the killing of the victim was
attended by treachery, proof of the victim’s bad character is
not necessary. The presence of this aggravating
circumstance negates the necessity of proving the victim’s
bad character to establish the probability or improbability
of the offense charged and, at the same time, qualifies the
killing of Joseph Marquez to murder.
As to the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, this cannot be appreciated to increase the
penalty in the absence of direct evidence showing that
accused-appellant deliberately
60
planned and prepared the
killing of the victim.
Neither can the aggravating circumstance of dwelling
found by the trial court be applied in the instant case. The
Information alleges only treachery and evident
premeditation, not dwelling. Under Sections 8 and 9, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
complaint or Information must specify the qualifying and
aggravating
61
circumstances in the commission of the
offense.
_______________
59 People v. Soliman, supra at 772; emphasis supplied.

60 People v. Platilla, 304 SCRA 339, 354 [1999]; People v. Basao, 310
SCRA 743, 778-779 [1999].
61 People v. Edgar Legaspi, G.R. Nos. 136164-65, April 20, 2001, pp. 14-
16, 357 SCRA 234; People v. Joel Bragat, G.R. No. 134490, September 4,
2001, pp. 16-17, 364 SCRA 425; People v. Melecio Sagarino, Jr., G.R. Nos.
135356-68, September 4, 2001, pp. 10-11, 364 SCRA 438; People v.
620

People vs. Lee
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on

December 1, 2000, and Section 8, Rule 110 is favorable to
the accused. It may be applied retroactively to the instant
case.
Accordingly, without the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, the penalty of death was erroneously imposed by
the trial court. There being no aggravating circumstance,
62
there is no basis for the award of exemplary damages.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated June 22, 1999
of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 127 in
Criminal Case No. C-54012 (98) is affirmed insofar as

accused-appellant Noel Lee is found guilty of murder for
the death of Joseph Marquez. The death sentence imposed
by the trial court is however reduced to reclusion perpetua,
there having been no aggravating circumstance in the
commission of said crime. Except for the award of
exemplary damages, the award of civil indemnity, other
damages and costs are likewise affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan,

Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De
Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez
and Corona, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.—While the accused may prove the bad moral

character of the victim, the proof must be of his general
reputation in the community and not merely of isolated and
specific acts. (People vs. Adonis, 240 SCRA 773 [1995])
While it is true that the good moral character of an
accused having reference to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged may be proven by him, the accused is not
entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good
moral character and exemplary conduct if the Court
believes he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. (People vs. Yungot, 367 SCRA 586 [2001])
——o0o——
_______________
Noel Feliciano, G.R. Nos. 127759-60, September 24, 2001, pp. 15-16,
365 SCRA 613.
62 Civil Code, Article 2230.
621
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10/30/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 382

596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

Witnesses; Affidavits; Affidavits are generally considered

controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible.—

VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 597

People vs. Lee

the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry

but because he is a person of bad character. The offering of

598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Lee

honesty and integrity. Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said

of qualified seduction or consented abduction, the offended party

VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 599

People vs. Lee

ted with treachery and premeditation. In People v. Soliman, a

produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of

AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial

“That on or about the 29th day of September 1996, in Kalookan

600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. At the

The prosecution established the following facts: At 9:00

VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 601

Police investigators arrived at the hospital and inquired

City Police Headquarters where

(1) ‘Gunshot wound, frontal region, measuring 0.5 x 0.5 cm,

There are subdural and subarachnoidal hemorrhages.

2 Exhibit “A,” also Exhibit “2,” Folder of Exhibits, p. 5.

602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

At the time of his death, Joseph was employed as driver by

4 Exhibit “B,” Identification Card, Folder of Exhibits, p. 2; TSN of

VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 603

People vs. Lee

Nelson Columba. They were enjoying themselves, drinking

“WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered and the

10 TSN of April 7, 1999, pp. 3-5.

604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659, this court, in view

Hence, this appeal. Before us, accused-appellant assigns

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HASTILY

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS DECISION

WAS TRIED ON THE MERITS SO AS TO ESTABLISH THE

13 Decision, p. 16, Rollo, p. 34.

VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 605

THE COURT A QUO GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN TREATING

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE

The assigned errors principally involve the issue of the

A: We were facing each other while watching television

14 Accused-Appellant’s Brief, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 89-90.

606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Q: Will you give us an idea or describe to us that window

VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 607

Q: Tell us what was that all about.

608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ATTY. OPENA: I’ll just make it on record that the witness

VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 609