Article 351.

Premature Marriage
TITLE XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
Persons liable
Crimes against honor
1. A widow who is married within 301
days from the date of the death of 1. Libel by means of writings or similar
her husband, or before having means (Art. 355);
delivered if she is pregnant at the
time of his death; 2. Threatening to publish and offer to
prevent such publication for a
2. A woman who, her marriage having compensation (Art. 356);
been annulled or dissolved, married
before her delivery or before the 3. Prohibited publication of acts
expiration of the period of 301 days referred to in the course of official
after the date of the legal separation. proceedings (Art. 357);

4. Slander (Art. 358);

The Supreme Court has already taken into
account the reason why such marriage 5. Slander by deed (Art. 359);
within 301 days is made criminal, that is,
because of the probability that there might 6. Incriminating innocent person (Art.
be a confusion regarding the paternity of 363);
the child who would be born. If this reason
does not exist because the former husband 7. Intriguing against honor (Art. 364).
is impotent, or was shown to be sterile such
that the woman has had no child with him,
that belief of the woman that after all there Article 353. Definition of Libel
could be no confusion even if she would
marry within 301 days may be taken as A libel is a public and malicious imputation
evidence of good faith and that would of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
negate criminal intent. imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstances tending to cause
Art. 352. Performance of illegal marriage the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
ceremony. — Priests or ministers of any natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
religious denomination or sect, or civil memory of one who is dead.
authorities who shall perform or authorize
any illegal marriage ceremony shall be Elements:
punished in accordance with the provisions
of the Marriage Law. 1. There must be an imputation of a
crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
The offender under Art. 352 must be imaginary, or any act, omission,
authorized to solemnize marriages. condition, status, or circumstance;

The offender is punished under the 2. The imputation must be made

Marriage Law. publicly;

A clergyman who performed a marriage 3. It must be malicious;

ceremony, not knowing that one of the
contracting parties is a minor, is not liable.
4. The imputation must be directed at a that means the law does not allow
natural or juridical person, or one prosecution on an action based thereon.
who is dead;
Illustration:
5. The imputation must tend to cause
the dishonor, discredit or contempt As regards the statements made by
of the person defamed. Congressmen while they are deliberating or
discussing in Congress, when the privileged
Distinction between malice in fact and character is qualified, proof of malice in fact
malice in law will be admitted to take the place of malice
in law. When the defamatory statement or
Malice in fact is the malice which the law utterance is qualifiedly privileged, the malice
presumes from every statement whose in law is negated. The utterance or
tenor is defamatory. It does not need proof. statement would not be actionable because
The mere fact that the utterance or malice in law does not exist. Therefore, for
statement is defamatory negates a legal the complainant to prosecute the accused
presumption of malice. for libel, oral defamation or slander, he has
to prove that the accused was actuated with
In the crime of libel, which includes oral malice (malice in fact) in making the
defamation, there is no need for the statement.
prosecution to present evidence of malice.
It is enough that the alleged defamatory or When a libel is addressed to several
libelous statement be presented to the court persons, unless they are identified in the
verbatim. It is the court which will prove same libel, even if there are several
whether it is defamatory or not. If the tenor persons offended by the libelous utterance
of the utterance or statement is defamatory, or statement, there will only be one count of
the legal presumption of malice arises even libel.
without proof.
If the offended parties in the libel were
Malice in fact becomes necessary only if the distinctly identified, even though the libel
malice in law has been rebutted. was committed at one and the same time,
Otherwise, there is no need to adduce there will be as many libels as there are
evidence of malice in fact. So, while malice persons dishonored.
in law does not require evidence, malice in
fact requires evidence. Illustration:

Malice in law can be negated by evidence If a person uttered that “All the Marcoses
that, in fact, the alleged libelous or are thieves," there will only be one libel
defamatory utterance was made with good because these particular Marcoses
motives and justifiable ends or by the fact regarded as thieves are not specifically
that the utterance was privileged in identified.
character.
If the offender said, “All the Marcoses – the
In law, however, the privileged character of father, mother and daughter are thieves.”
a defamatory statement may be absolute or There will be three counts of libel because
qualified. each person libeled is distinctly dishonored.

When the privileged character is said to be If you do not know the particular persons
absolute, the statement will not be libeled, you cannot consider one libel as
actionable whether criminal or civil because giving rise to several counts of libel. In
order that one defamatory utterance or
imputation may be considered as having 1. If it appears that the matter charged
dishonored more than one person, those as libelous is true;
persons dishonored must be identified.
Otherwise, there will only be one count of 2. It was published with good motives;
libel.
3. It was for justifiable ends.
Note that in libel, the person defamed need
not be expressly identified. It is enough that
he could possibly be identified because If a crime is a private crime, it cannot be
“innuendos may also be a basis for prosecuted de officio. A complaint from the
prosecution for libel. As a matter of fact, offended party is necessary.
even a compliment which is undeserved,
has been held to be libelous.

The crime is libel is the defamation is in Cases:

writing or printed media. Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348, No. L-
58681 May 31, 1982
The crime is slander or oral defamation if it Petitioner’s contention should be
is not printed. sustained. Well settled is the rule that
parties, counsel and witnesses are
Even if what was imputed is true, the crime exempted from liability in libel or slander
of libel is committed unless one acted with cases for words otherwise defamatory,
good motives or justifiable end. Poof of uttered or published in the course of judicial
truth of a defamatory imputation is not even proceedings, provided the statements are
admissible in evidence, unless what was pertinent or relevant to the case. And, as to
imputed pertains to an act which constitutes the degree of relevancy or pertinency
a crime and when the person to whom the necessary to make alleged defamatory
imputation was made is a public officer and matter privilege, the courts are inclined to
the imputation pertains to the performance be liberal The matter to which the privilege
of official duty. Other than these, the does not extend must be so palpably
imputation is not admissible. wanting in relation to the subject matter of
the controversy that no reasonable man can
doubt its irrelevance and impropriety.
When proof of truth is admissible (People vs. Andres, 107 Phil. 1046). In the
case at bar, petitioner was prompted to say:
1. When the act or omission imputed “I doubt how did you become a doctor”
constitutes a crime regardless of when Dr. Macaspac would not answer the
whether the offended party is a question as to who prepared the document
private individual or a public officer; presented to her, and when the witness
repeatedly evaded the question by saying
2. When the offended party is a that she did not understand the word
government employee, even if the “made.”
act or omission imputed does not
constitute a crime, provided if its Mercado vs. Court of First Instance of
related to the discharged of his Rizal, 116 SCRA 93, No. L-38753 August
official duties. 25, 1982
The privilege against being
prosecuted for libel may be lost by proof of
Requisites of defense in defamation malice.—Justice Malcolm, however, is
careful to point out that qualified privilege,
and this is one such instance, may be “lost
by proof of malice.” His opinion continues: “ Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699, No. L-
‘A communication made bona fide upon any 47880 April 30, 1979
subject matter in which the party In order to obviate controversies as
communicating has an interest, or in to the venue of the criminal action for written
reference to which he has a duty, is defamation, the complaint or information
privileged, if made to a person having a should contain allegations as to whether, at
corresponding interest or duty, although it the time the offense was committed, the
contained criminatory matter which without offended party was a public officer or a
this privilege would be slanderous and private individual and where he was actually
actionable.’ (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., residing at that time. Whenever possible,
344; 1 Jur. [N.S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 the place where the written defamation was
W.R., 474, 85 E.C.L., 344.)” He then gave printed and first published should likewise
what was referred to by him as a “pertinent be alleged. That allegation would be a sine
illustration of the application of qualified qua non if the circumstance as to where the
privilege,” namely, “a complaint made in libel was printed and first published is used
good faith and without malice in regard to as the basis of the venue of the action.
the character or conduct of a public official Newsweek, Inc. vs. Intermediate
when addressed to an officer or a board Appellate Court, 142 SCRA 171, May 30,
having some interest or duty in the matter. 1986
Even when the statements are found to be
false, if there is probable cause for belief in Lacsa vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
their truthfulness and the charge is made in 161 SCRA 427, No. L-74907 May 23, 1988
good faith, the mantle of privilege may still The disputed portion of the article
cover the mistake of the individual. which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was
To avoid being prosecuted for libel claimed to be libelous never singled out
for communication given to a superior plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news
officer regarding a subordinate’s alleged report merely stated that the victim had
corrupt acts, the statement must be made been arrested by members of a special
under an honest sense of duty, and not on a police unit brought into the area by Pablo
self-seeking basis.—But the statements Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, the
must be made under an honest sense of report, referring as it does to an official act
duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. performed by an elective public official, is
Personal injury is not necessary. All persons within the realm of privilege and protected
have an interest in the pure and efficient by the constitutional guarantees of free
administration of justice and of public speech and press.
affairs. The duty under which a party is
privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral Six decades ago, in the case of U.S.
in its nature and this person in good faith vs. O’Connell, the Court laid down the test
believes he is acting in pursuance thereof for libelous meaning: xxx xxx xxx Defendant
although in fact he is mistaken. The has imputed nothing wrong to the
privilege is not defeated by the mere fact complainants in certain and express terms.
that the communication is made in But this is not necessary. Words calculated
intemperate terms. A further element of the to induce suspicion are sometimes more
law of privilege concerns the person to effective to destroy reputation than false
whom the complaint should be made. The charges directly made. Ironical and
rule is that if a party applies to the wrong metaphorical language is a favored vehicle
person through some natural and honest for slander. A charge is sufficient if the
mistake as to the respective functions of words are calculated to induce the hearers
various officials such unintentional error will to suppose and understand that the person
not take the case out of the privilege. or persons against whom they were uttered
were guilty of certain offenses, or are
sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or about and quoted above, the name of the
reputation, or to hold the person or persons Mindalano family or clan is not mentioned or
up to public ridicule. Said Chief Justice alluded to in the essay. The identification of
Shaw of the Supreme Court of Amir Mindalano is thus merely illustrative or
Massachusetts: The rule is a sound one that incidental in the course of the development
the law cannot shut its eyes to what all the of the theme of the article. The language
rest of the world can see; and let the utilized by the article in general and the
slanderer disguise his language, and wrap above excerpts in particular appears simply
up his meaning in ambiguous givings out, declaratory or expository in character,
as he will, and it shall not avail him, matter-of-fact and unemotional in tone and
because courts will understand language, in tenor. No derogatory or derisive implications
whatever form it is used, as all mankind or nuances appear detectable at all,
understands it.” (Carter vs. Andrews [1834], however closely one may scrutinize the
16 Pick. [Mass.], 1.) Said another court above excerpts. We find in the quoted
much more recently: “The test of libelous excerpts no evidence of malevolent intent
meanings is not the analysis of a sentence either on the part of the author or the
into component phrases with the meticulous publisher of the article here involved.
care of the grammarian or stylist, but the
import conveyed by the entirely of the Article 354. Requirement for publicity. —
language to the ordinary reader.” (Miller vs. Every defamatory imputation is
O’Connell, City Ct., 57 L.J., 1768, Sept. 12, presumed to be malicious, even if it be
1917.) true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown, except in
Bulletin Publishing Corp. vs. Noel, 167 the following cases:
SCRA 255, No. L-76565 November 9,
1988 1. A private communication made by
No libel has been committed in the any person to another in the performance of
instant case because the published work any legal, moral or social duty; and
alleged to contain libelous statements 2. A fair and true report, made in
appears simply expository in character, good faith, without any comments or
matter-of-fact, and unemotional in tone and remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
tenor, without any evidence of malevolent official proceedings which are not of
intent, either on the part of the author or the confidential nature, or of any statement,
publisher of the article.—Coming now to the report or speech delivered in said
principal issue of whether or not the proceedings, or of any other act performed
complaint states a valid cause of action, the by public officers in the exercise of their
Court finds that libel has not here been functions.
committed; the civil suit for damages must
fail. It is axiomatic in actions for damages
for libel that the published work alleged to Article 355. Libel by Means of Writings
contain libelous material must be examined or Similar Means
and viewed as a whole. We have
accordingly examined in its entirety the A libel may be committed by means of –
subject article "A Changing of the Guard"
which is in essence a popular essay on the 1. Writing;
general nature and character of Mindanao
politics and the recent emergence of a new 2. Printing;
political leader in the province of Lanao del
Sur. We note firstly that the essay is not 3. Lithography;
focused on the late Amir Mindalano nor his
family. Save in the excerpts complained 4. Engraving;
 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 354
5. Radio; refer to qualifiedly privileged
communications. The character of the
6. Photograph; privilege is a matter of defense which may
be lost by positive proof of express malice.
7. Painting; In other words, the onus of proving actual
malice is placed on the plaintiff who must
8. Theatrical exhibition; then convince the court that the offender
was prompted by malice or ill will. Once this
9. Cinematographic exhibition; or is accomplished, the defense of privilege is
unavailing.
10. Any similar means.
Sazon vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA
692, G.R. No. 120715 March 29, 1996
Article 356. Threatening to Publish and In libel cases, the question is not
Offer to Prevent Such Publication for A what the writer of an alleged libel means,
Compensation but what the words used by him mean.
Here, the defamatory character of the words
Acts punished used by the petitioner are shown by the very
recitals thereof in the questioned article. No
1. Threatening another to publish a evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove
libel concerning him, or his parents, it. Petitioner used the following words and
spouse, child, or other members of phrases in describing the private
his family; complainant: “mandurugas,” “mag-ingat sa
panlilinlang,” “matagal na tayong niloloko,”
2. Offering to prevent the publication of “may kasamang pagyayabang,” “ang ating
such libel for compensation or pobreng super kulit,” “patuloy na
money consideration. kabulastugan,” “mastermind sa paninirang
puri,” etc.

Blackmail – In its metaphorical sense, Test to determine the defamatory

blackmail may be defined as any unlawful character of words used.—Jurisprudence
extortion of money by threats of accusation has laid down a test to determine the
or exposure. Two words are expressive of defamatory character of words used in the
the crime – hush money. (US v. Eguia, et following manner, viz: “Words calculated to
al., 38 Phil. 857) Blackmail is possible in induce suspicion are sometimes more
(1) light threats under Article 283; and (2) effective to destroy reputation than false
threatening to publish, or offering to prevent charges directly made. Ironical and
the publication of, a libel for compensation, metaphorical language is a favored vehicle
under Article 356. for slander. A charge is sufficient if the
words are calculated to induce the hearers
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA to suppose and understand that the person
110, G.R. No. 45031 October 21, 1991 or persons against whom they were uttered
Malice is presumed in every were guilty of certain offenses, or are
defamatory imputation.—Generally, malice sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or
is presumed (malice in law) in every reputation, or to hold the person or persons
defamatory imputation. This presumption, up to public ridicule. x x x.”
however, does not arise if the
communication is privileged under Article Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA
354. 460, G.R. No. 118971 September 15, 1999
 A person cannot claim to have been absolute privilege was first categorically
the source of only a few statements in an established in the case of Sison vs. David.
article and point to other parties as the
source of the rest when he admits that he
was correctly identified as the spokesperson Jalandoni vs. Drilon, 327 SCRA 107, G.R.
during the interview.—Petitioner claims he Nos. 115239-40 March 2, 2000
was “unfairly singled out” as the source of In libel cases against public officials,
the statements in the article when any for liability to arise, the alleged defamatory
member of the 38 complainant-families statement must relate to official conduct,
could have been the source of the alleged even if the defamatory statement is false,
libelous statements. x x x It is true petitioner unless the public official concerned proves
did not directly admit that he was the source that the statement was made with actual
of the statements in the questioned article. malice.—This Court has ruled in a plethora
What he said in his sworn statement was of cases that in libel cases against public
that the contents of the article are true in officials, for liability to arise, the alleged
almost all respects, thus: x x x This was defamatory statement must relate to official
likewise what he stated in his testimony in conduct, even if the defamatory statement is
court both on direct and on cross- false, unless the public official concerned
examination. However, by claiming that proves that the statement was made with
what he had told the reporter was made by actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it
him in the performance of a civic duty, was false or not. Here petitioner failed to
petitioner in effect admitted authorship of prove actual malice on the part of the
the article and not only of the statements private respondents.
attributed to him therein, to wit: x x x
Petitioner cannot claim to have been the
source of only a few statements in the Figueroa vs. People, 498 SCRA 298, G.R.
article in question and point to the other No. 159813 August 9, 2006
parties as the source of the rest, when he Defamation means injuring a
admits that he was correctly identified as person’s character, fame or reputation
the spokesperson of the families during the through false and malicious statements;
interview. Defamation, which includes libel and
slander, means injuring a person’s
Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 character, fame or reputation through false
SCRA 540, G.R. No. 124245 February 15, and malicious statements.—Defamation,
2000 which includes libel and slander, means
It is a settled principle in this injuring a person’s character, fame or
jurisdiction that statements made in the reputation through false and malicious
course of judicial proceedings are statements. It is that which tends to injure
absolutely privileged. This absolute privilege reputation or to diminish the esteem,
remains regardless of the defamatory tenor respect, goodwill or confidence in the
and the presence of malice if the same are complainant or to excite derogatory feelings
relevant, pertinent or material to the cause or opinions about him. It is the publication of
in hand or subject of the inquiry. Thus, the anything which is injurious to the good
person making these statements such as a name or reputation of another or tends to
judge, lawyer or witness does not thereby bring him into disrepute.
incur the risk of being found liable thereon in
a criminal prosecution or an action for the Brillante vs. Court of Appeals, 440 SCRA
recovery of damages. The doctrine that 541, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571 October
statements made during the course of 19, 2004
judicial proceedings enjoy the shield of To be liable for libel, the following
elements must be shown to exist: (a) the
allegation of a discreditable act or condition In applying these rules to the language of
concerning another; (b) publication of the an alleged libel, the court will disregard any
charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; subtle or ingenious explanation offered by
and (d) existence of malice. There could be the publisher on being called to account.
no dispute as to the existence of the first The whole question being the effect the
three elements of libel in the cases at bar. publication had upon the minds of the
An allegation made by a person readers, and they not having been assisted
against another is considered defamatory if by the offered explanation in reading the
it ascribes to the latter the commission of a article, it comes too late to have the effect of
crime; the possession of a vice or defect, removing the sting, if any there be, from the
whether real or imaginary; or any act, words used in the publication. Gauging from
omission, condition, status or circumstance the above–mentioned tests, the words used
which tends to dishonor or discredit or put in the letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by
him in contempt, or which tends to blacken petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In
the memory of one who is dead.—An using words such as “lousy,” “inutile,”
allegation made by a person against “carabao English,” “stupidity,” and “satan,”
another is considered defamatory if it the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion
ascribes to the latter the commission of a on the character, integrity and reputa- tion
crime; the possession of a vice or defect, of respondent as a lawyer which exposed
whether real or imaginary; or any act, him to ridicule. No evidence aliunde need
omission, condition, status or circumstance be adduced to prove it. As the CA said,
which tends to dishonor or discredit or put these very words of petitioner have caused
him in contempt, or which tends to blacken respondent to public ridicule as even his
the memory of one who is dead. Brillante’s own family have told him: “Ginagawa ka
statements during the January 7, 1988 lang gago dito.”
press conference and in the open letter When the imputation is defamatory,
explicitly referred to reprehensible acts the prosecution need not prove malice on
allegedly committed by Binay, Prudente and the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the
their associates, such as the use of goons law already presumes that petitioner’s
to threaten Binay’s opponents in the imputation is malicious (malice in law).—
election and the plotting of Syjuco’s Any of the imputations covered by Article
assassination. 353 is defamatory; and, under the general
rule laid down in Article 354, every
Buatis, Jr. vs. People, 485 SCRA 275, defamatory imputation is presumed to be
G.R. No. 142509 March 24, 2006 malicious, even if it be true, if no good
For the purpose of determining the intention and justifiable motive for making it
meaning of any publication alleged to be is shown. Thus, when the imputation is
libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez v. defamatory, the prosecution need not prove
Reyes, 27 Phil. 52 (1914), to wit: In Tawney malice on the part of petitioner (malice in
vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 fact), for the law already presumes that
Minn., 341), the court had the following to petitioner’s imputation is malicious (malice
say on this point: “In determining whether in law). A reading of petitioner’s subject
the specified matter is libelous per se, two letter-reply showed that he malevolently
rules of construction are conspicuously castigated respondent for writing such a
applicable: (1) That construction must be demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was
adopted which will give to the matter such a nothing in the said letter which showed
meaning as is natural and obvious in the petitioner’s good intention and justifiable
plain and ordinary sense in which the public motive for writing the same in order to
would naturally understand what was overcome the legal inference of malice.
uttered. (2) The published matter alleged to
be libelous must be construed as a whole.”
Fortich vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
152, G.R. No. 120769 February 12, 1997 omission, condition, status or circumstance
While the imputation of a vice or tending to discredit or cause the dishonor or
defect on the petitioner’s character might contempt of a natural or juridical person, or
have been apparent from the second to the to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
last paragraph of the memorandum, the Thus, the elements of libel are: (a)
imputation was never really made publicly. imputation of a discreditable act or condition
—Firstly, the assailed letter was obviously to another; (b) publication of the imputation;
part and parcel of the initial investigation (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d)
surrounding the non-remittance of existence of malice.
collections by petitioner. The right hand A person’s liability for libel need not,
caption of the memorandum clearly shows admittedly, stem from the fact that he was
the phrase “Inter-office Memorandum,” the original publisher of the discreditable
implying confidentiality. Secondly, petitioner act.—A person’s liability for libel need not,
was unable to prove that the letter was admittedly, stem from the fact that he was
circulated or publicized, much less read by the original publisher of the discreditable
officers of the corporation other than those act. The maker of a libelous republication or
involved in the investigation or those directly repetition, although not liable for the results
supervising the petitioner’s work. While of the primary publication, is liable for the
imputation of a vice or defect on the consequence of a subsequent publication
petitioner’s character might have been which he makes or participates in making. It
apparent from the second to the last is no justification that the defamatory matter
paragraph of the memorandum, the is previously published by a third person,
imputation was never really made publicly. provided malice is present.

Salcedo-Ortañez vs. Court of Appeals, Article 357. Prohibited Publication of

235 SCRA 111, G.R. No. 110662 August Acts Referred to in the Course of Official
4, 1994 Proceedings
Unauthorized tape recordings of
telephone conversations not admissible in Elements
evidence.—Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An
Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping 1. Offender is a reporter, editor or
and Other Related Violations of the Privacy manager of a newspaper, daily or
of Communication, and for other purposes” magazine;
expressly makes such tape recordings
inadmissible in evidence. Clearly, 2. He publishes facts connected with
respondents trial court and the Court of the private life of another;
Appeals failed to consider the provisions of
the law in admitting in evidence the cassette 3. Such facts are offensive to the
tapes in question. Absent a clear showing honor, virtue and reputation of said
that both parties to the telephone person.
conversations allowed the recording of the
same, the inadmissibility of the subject
tapes is man-datory under Rep. Act No. The provisions of Article 357 constitute the
4200. so-called "Gag Law."

Vicario vs. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA

25, G.R. No. 124491 June 1, 1999 Article 358. Slander
Libel is defined as a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
Slander is oral defamation. There are tow will take these statements out of the
kinds of oral defamation: compass of grave oral defamation x x x. No
circumstances need to be shown to upgrade
(1) Simple slander; and the slander.”

(2) Grave slander, when it is of a People vs. Orcullo, 111 SCRA 609, No. L-
serious and insulting nature. 57103 January 30, 1982
Calling a married woman a
Cases: prostitute, meaning of.—Thus, to call a
married woman a prostitute is not merely to
Reyes vs. People, 27 SCRA 686, Nos. L- proclaim her an adulteress, a violator of her
21528 March 28, 1969 marital vows: it is to charge her of having
Where the expression “putang ina committed an offense against public morals,
mo“is not considered slanderous. The of moral degeneracy far exceeding that
words, “Agustin, putang ina mo” is a involved in the maintenance of adulterous
common ‘expression in the dialect that is relations.
often employed not really to slander but Imputation of a crime of prostitution
rather to express anger or displeasure. It is against a woman can be prosecuted de
seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sence by oficio.—Indeed, the words quoted in the
the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the information are indubitably an imputation of
virtue of a mother. In the instant case, it the crime of prostitution which can be
should be viewed as part of the threats prosecuted de oficio.
voiced by appellant against the complainant
evidently to make the same more emphatic. Article 359. Slander by Deed

Victorio vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA Elements

645, G.R. Nos. 32836-37 May 31, 1989
To determine whether the offense 1. Offender performs any act not
committed is serious or slight oral included in any other crime against
defamation, the Court adopted the following honor;
guidelines: “x x x We are to be guided by a
doctrine of ancient respectability that 2. Such act is performed in the
defamatory words will fall under one or the presence of other person or
other, depending upon, as Viada puts it, ‘x x persons;
x not upon their sense and grammatical
meaning judging them separately, but also 3. Such act casts dishonor, discredit or
upon the special circumstances of the case, contempt upon the offended party.
antecedents or relationship between the
offended party and the offender, which
might tend to prove the intention of the Slander by deed refers to performance of an
offender at the time.’ act, not use of words.
Calling Atty. Ruiz “estapador” attributes to
the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and Two kinds of slander by deed
insulting imputation. ___ In the instant case,
appellant-petitioner admitted having uttered 1. Simple slander by deed; and
the defamatory words against Atty. Vivencio
Ruiz. Among others, he called Atty. Ruiz, 2. Grave slander by deed, that is,
“estapador”, which attributes to the latter the which is of a serious nature.
crime of estafa, a serious and insulting
imputation. As stated by the Court in Balite
v. People, supra, “no amount of sophistry
Whether a certain slanderous act should not prevail over what the utterances
constitutes slander by deed of a serious convey to an ordinary listener.
nature or not, depends on the social
standing of the offended party, the People vs. Motita, 59 OG 3020, April 30,
circumstances under which the act was 1966
committed, the occasion, etc. Accused placed a mirror between
the legs of complainant in a public place to
Cases: reflect her private parts. The crowd laughed.
- Slander by deed because it was
Gonzales vs. Arcilla, 203 SCRA 609, G.R. committed to create contempt or ridicule
No. 27923 November 18, 1991 upon the offended party. Slander by deed is
Slander is oral defamation while libel committed when annoyance is attended
is defamation in writing. In both, there is a with publicity, dishonor or contempt. If the
public and malicious imputation of a crime, annoyance was attended by those
or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or circumstances mentioned in rape, the crime
any act, omission, condition, status, or would be acts of lasciviousness.
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, Section Two. — General provisions
discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory Art. 360. Persons responsible. — Any
of one who is dead. In determining whether person who shall publish, exhibit, or
the offense has been committed, the cause the publication or exhibition of
defamatory words are to be construed in any defamation in writing or by similar
their entirety, and should be taken in their means, shall be responsible for the
plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they same.
would naturally be understood by persons
reading or hearing them, unless it appears The author or editor of a book or pamphlet,
that they were used and understood in or the editor or business manager of a daily
another sense. In short, the language used newspaper, magazine or serial publication,
must be understood “in its plain and popular shall be responsible for the defamations
sense—to read the sentences as would the contained therein to the same extent as if
man on the street.” The intent or purpose he were the author thereof.
then of the speaker or writer is not relevant.
The criminal and civil action for damages in
Madrona, Sr. vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1, G.R. cases of written defamations as provided for
No. 39120 November 21, 1991 in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously
The rule is settled that in or separately with the court of first instance
determining whether certain utterances are of the province or city where the libelous
defamatory, the words used are to be article is printed and first published or where
construed in their entirety and should be any of the offended parties actually resides
taken in their plain, natural and ordinary at the time of the commission of the offense:
meaning as they would naturally be Provided, however, That where one of the
understood by persons hearing (or reading, offended parties is a public officer whose
as in libel) them, unless it appears that they office is in the City of Manila at the time of
were used and understood in another the commission of the offense, the action
sense. In short, the language used must be shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of
understood “in its plain and popular sense— the City of Manila, or of the city or province
to read the sentences as would the man on where the libelous article is printed and first
the street.” The intent or purpose then of the published, and in case such public officer
speaker or writer is not relevant Thus, at the does not hold office in the City of Manila,
stage of the case before the court below, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
the explanation of private respondent Instance of the province or city where he
held office at the time of the commission of have been made against Government
the offense or where the libelous article is employees with respect to facts related to
printed and first published and in case one the discharge of their official duties. library
of the offended parties is a private
individual, the action shall be filed in the In such cases if the defendant proves the
Court of First Instance of the province or city truth of the imputation made by him, he
where he actually resides at the time of the shall be acquitted.
commission of the offense or where the
libelous matter is printed and first published: Art. 362. Libelous remarks. — Libelous
Provided, further, That the civil action shall remarks or comments connected with
be filed in the same court where the criminal the matter privileged under the
action is filed and vice versa: Provided, provisions of Article 354, if made with
furthermore, That the court where the malice, shall not exempt the author
criminal action or civil action for damages is thereof nor the editor or managing editor
first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the of a newspaper from criminal liability.
exclusion of other courts: And, provided,
finally, That this amendment shall not apply Article 363. Incriminating Innocent
to cases of written defamations, the civil Persons
and/or criminal actions which have been
filed in court at the time of the effectivity of Elements
this law.
1. Offender performs an act;
Preliminary investigation of criminal action
for written defamations as provided for in 2. By such an act, he incriminates or
the chapter shall be conducted by the imputes to an innocent person the
provincial or city fiscal of the province or commission of a crime;
city, or by the municipal court of the city or
capital of the province where such action 3. Such act does not constitute perjury.
may be instituted in accordance with the
provisions of this article.
This crime cannot be committed through
No criminal action for defamation which verbal incriminatory statements. It is
consists in the imputation of a crime which defined as an act and, therefore, to commit
cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be this crime, more than a mere utterance is
brought except at the instance of and upon required.
complaint expressly filed by the offended
party. (As amended by R.A. 1289, approved If the incriminating machination is made
June 15, 1955, R.A. 4363, approved June orally, the crime may be slander or oral
19, 1965). defamation.

Art. 361. Proof of the truth. — In every If the incriminatory machination was made
criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may in writing and under oath, the crime may be
be given in evidence to the court and if it perjury if there is a willful falsity of the
appears that the matter charged as libelous statements made.
is true, and, moreover, that it was published
with good motives and for justifiable ends, If the statement in writing is not under oath,
the defendants shall be acquitted. the crime may be falsification if the crime is
a material matter made in a written
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act statement which is required by law to have
or omission not constituting a crime shall been rendered.
not be admitted, unless the imputation shall
As far as this crime is concerned, this has [1997]). Consequently, his findings are
been interpreted to be possible only in the subject to review by the Provincial
so-called planting of evidence. Prosecutor, whose findings in turn may, in
appropriate cases, be reviewed by the
Cases: Secretary of Justice.

People vs. Alagao, et al., 16 SCRA 879, Article 364. Intriguing against Honor
No. L-20721 April 30, 1966
For a criminal complaint or This crime is committed by any person
information to charge the commission of a who shall make any intrigue which has
complex crime, the allegations contained for its principal purpose to blemish the
therein do not necessarily have to charge a honor or reputation of another person.
complex crime as defined by law. It is
sufficient that the information contains
allegations which state that one offense was Intriguing against honor is referred to as
a necessary means to commit the other. gossiping. The offender, without
The information in question in the present ascertaining the truth of a defamatory
case contains allegations properly charging utterance, repeats the same and pass it on
the commission of the complex crime of in- to another, to the damage of the offended
criminatory machinations through unlawful party. Who started the defamatory news is
arrest, and the court a quo committed error unknown.
when it ordered its dismissal.
Distinction between intriguing against honor
Huggland vs. Lantin, 326 SCRA 620, A.M. and slander:
No. MTJ-98-1153 February 29, 2000
Respondent’s court, the Municipal When the source of the defamatory
Trial Court of San Felipe, Zambales, had utterance is unknown and the offender
only a preliminary jurisdiction over Criminal simply repeats or passes the same, the
Case No. 3886. After the preliminary crime is intriguing against honor.
investigation was conducted, and
respondent judge had recommended the If the offender made the utterance, where
filing of the corresponding information and the source of the defamatory nature of the
forwarded the record of the case to the utterance is known, and offender makes a
Provincial Prosecutor, the Court lost its republication thereof, even though he
preliminary jurisdiction over the case. The repeats the libelous statement as coming
case was finally brought within the exclusive from another, as long as the source is
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial identified, the crime committed by that
Court of Iba, Zambales with the filing of the offender is slander.
information on 28 August 1995. Clearly
then, respondent Judge should have known Distinction between intriguing against honor
that he had absolutely no power or authority and incriminating an innocent person:
to cancel the hold departure order which he
issued in the course of the preliminary In intriguing against honor, the offender
investigation. In the first place, he never had resorts to an intrigue for the purpose of
that authority from the inception of the case. blemishing the honor or reputation of
In the conduct of the preliminary another person.
investigation a judge exercises a non-
judicial function, an exception to his general In incriminating an innocent person, the
duties. This is because a preliminary offender performs an act by which he
investigation is basically an executive directly incriminates or imputes to an
function (People v. Navarro, 270 SCRA 393 innocent person the commission of a crime.
 the use of the qualifier “any.” Consequently,
Cases: as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, communication who records his private
145 SCRA 112, No. L-69809 October 16, conversation with another without the
1986 knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
Hence, the phrase “device or violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.
arrangement” in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, Where the law makes no
although not exclusive to that enumerated distinctions, one does not distinguish.—The
therein, should be construed to comprehend unambiguity of the express words of the
instruments of the same or similar nature, provision, taken together with the above-
that is, instruments the use of which would quoted deliberations from the Congressional
be tantamount to tapping the main line of a Record, therefore plainly supports the view
telephone. It refers to instruments whose held by the respondent court that the
installation or presence cannot be provision seeks to penalize even those privy
presumed by the party or parties being to the private communications. Where the
overheard because, by their very nature, law makes no distinctions, one does not
they are not of common usage and their distinguish.
purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting
or recording a telephone conversation. Betguen vs. Masangcay, 238 SCRA 475,
A person calling another by phone Adm. Case No. P-93-822 December 1,
may safely presume that the other may 1994
have an extension line and runs the risk of Article 364 of the Revised Penal
being heard by a 3rd party.—An extension Code defines “intriguing against honor” as
telephone is an instrument which is very any intrigue which has for its principal
common especially now when the extended purpose to blemish the honor and reputation
unit does not have to be connected by wire of a person. This felony undoubtedly falls
to the main telephone but can be moved under the coverage of crimes involving
from place to place within a radius of a moral turpitude, the latter term having been
kilometer or more. A person should safely defined as “an act of baseness, vileness,
presume that the party he is calling at the depravity in the private and social duties
other end of the line probably has an which a man owes his fellow man, or to
extension teiephone and he runs the risk of society in general, contrary to the accepted
a third party iistening as in the case of a and customary rule of right and duty
party line or a telephone unit which shares between man and man, or conduct contrary
its line with another. to justice, honesty, modesty and good
morals” (Tak Ng vs. Republic of the
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA Philippines, 106 Phil. 727 [1959]).
590, G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and TITLE XVI. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly Article 365. Imprudence and Negligence
record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction Quasi-offenses punished
as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party 1. Committing through reckless
other than or different from those involved in imprudence any act which, had it
the private communication. The statute’s been intentional, would constitute a
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized grave or less grave felony or light
to make such recording is underscored by felony;
 If the criminal negligence resulted, for
2. Committing through simple example, in homicide, serious physical
imprudence or negligence an act injuries and slight physical injuries, do not
which would otherwise constitute a join only the homicide and serious physical
grave or a less serious felony; injuries in one information for the slight
physical injuries. You are not complexing
3. Causing damage to the property of slight when you join it in the same
another through reckless information. It is just that you are not
imprudence or simple imprudence or splitting the criminal negligence because
negligence; the real basis of the criminal liability is the
negligence.
4. Causing through simple imprudence
or negligence some wrong which, if If you split the criminal negligence, that is
done maliciously, would have where double jeopardy would arise.
constituted a light felony.
Cases:

Distinction between reckless imprudence Gaid vs. People, 584 SCRA 489, G.R.
and negligence: No. 171636 April 7, 2009
Negligence has been defined as the
The two are distinguished only as to failure to observe for the protection of the
whether the danger that would be interests of another person that degree of
impending is easily perceivable or not. If
care, precaution, and vigilance which the
the danger that may result from the criminal
circumstances justly demand, whereby such
negligence is clearly perceivable, the
other person suffers injury. The elements of
imprudence is reckless. If it could hardly be
perceived, the criminal negligence would simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack
only be simple. of precaution the part of the offender; and
(2) that the damage impending to be
There is no more issue on whether culpa is caused is not immediate or the danger is
a crime in itself or only a mode of incurring not clearly manifest. The standard test in
criminal liability. It is practically settled that determining whether a person is negligent
criminal negligence is only a modality in in doing an act whereby injury or damage
incurring criminal liability. This is so results to the person or property of another
because under Article 3, a felony may result is this: could a prudent man, in the position
from dolo or culpa. of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person
Since this is the mode of incurring criminal injured as a reasonable consequence of the
liability, if there is only one carelessness, course actually pursued? If so, the law
even if there are several results, the imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from
accused may only be prosecuted under one that course or to take precautions to guard
count for the criminal negligence. So there against its mischievous results, and the
would only be one information to be filed,
failure to do so constitutes negligence.
even if the negligence may bring about
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
resulting injuries which are slight.
the ignoring of the admonition born of this
Do not separate the accusation from the provision, is always necessary before
slight physical injuries from the other negligence can be held to exist.
material result of the negligence.
Reodica vs. Court of Appeals, 292
SCRA 87, G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998
 Felonies are committed not only by day to 4 years) and maximum period (4
means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years).
means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when
the wrongful act is performed with Ivler vs. Modesto-San Pedro, 635
deliberate intent; and there is fault when SCRA 191, G.R. No. 172716 November
the wrongful act results from imprudence, 17, 2010
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. The confusion bedeviling the
As earlier stated, reckless imprudence question posed in this petition, to which the
resulting in slight physical injuries is MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent
punishable by public censure only. Article 9, but awkward attempts to harmonize
paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code conceptually incompatible substantive and
defines light felonies as infractions of law procedural rules in criminal law, namely,
carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since offenses and Article 48 on complexing of
public censure is classified under Article 25 crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code.
of the Code as a light penalty, and is Article 48 is a procedural device allowing
considered under the graduated scale single prosecution of multiple felonies falling
provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a under either of two categories: (1) when a
penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows single act constitutes two or more grave or
that the offense of reckless imprudence less grave felonies (thus excluding from its
resulting in slight physical injuries is a light operation light felonies); and (2) when an
felony. offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature
Dayap vs. Sendiong, 577 SCRA 134, crafted this procedural tool to benefit the
G.R. No. 177960 January 29, 2009 accused who, in lieu of serving multiple
The offense with which petitioner penalties, will only serve the maximum of
was charged is reckless imprudence the penalty for the most serious crime. In
resulting in homicide, less serious physical contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule
injuries and damage to property, a complex penalizing not an act defined as a felony but
crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or “the mental attitude x x x behind the act,
negligent act results in two or more grave the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
or less grave felonies, a complex crime is foresight x x x,” a single mental attitude
committed. Article 48 of the Revised Penal regardless of the resulting consequences.
Code provides that when the single act Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-
constitutes two or more grave or less grave crime resulting in one or more
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary consequences.
means for committing the other, the penalty Court hold that prosecutions under
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, Article 365 should proceed from a single
the same to be applied in its maximum charge regardless of the number or severity
period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it of the consequences. In imposing penalties,
is applicable to crimes through negligence in the judge will do no more than apply the
view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 penalties under Article 365 for each
as “acts or omissions punishable by law” consequence alleged and proven. In short,
committed either by means of deceit (dolo) there shall be no splitting of charges under
or fault (culpa). Thus, the penalty Article 365, and only one information shall
imposable upon petitioner, were he to be be filed in the same first level court.
found guilty, is prision correccional in its
medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1
People vs. Cano, 17 SCRA 237, No. L- jeopardy exists where the reckless act
19660 May 24, 1966 resulted into homicide and physical injuries,
The information alleges that, then the same consequence must perforce
through reckless negligence of the follow where the same reckless act caused
defendant, the bus driven by him hit merely damage to property—not death—
another bus causing upon some of its and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a
passengers, serious physical injuries, upon human life lost as a result of a vehicular
others less serious physical injuries and collision cannot be equated with any
upon still others slight physical injuries, in amount of damages caused to a motor
addition to damage to property. Such vehicle arising from the same mishap.”
information does not purport to complex the Gan vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA
offense of slight physical injuries with 378, No. L-44264 September 19, 1988
reckless negligence with that of damage to The test for determining whether or
property and serious and less serious not a person is negligent in doing an act
physical injuries through reckless whereby injury or damage results to the
imprudence. person or property of another is this: Would
a prudent man in the position of the person
Ibabao vs. People, 132 SCRA 216, No. to whom negligence is attributed foresee
L-36957 September 28, 1984 harm to the person injured as a reasonable
We find merit in petitioner’s consequence of the course about to be
contention, however, that the increased pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on
penalty is inapplicable to him because the the doer to take precaution against its
failure to give aid to the injured on the spot mischievous results and the failure to do so
has not been alleged in the Information. So constitutes negligence. Applying the above
far as we have been able to ascertain, this tests to the case at bar, we find the
question has not been definitely passed petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple
upon by this Court. But, we agree with the Imprudence resulting in Homicide. The
then Court of Appeals when it ruled in appellate court in finding the petitioner
People vs. Beduya that “the failure to guilty said: “The accused should have
render assistance, constitutes a qualifying stepped on the brakes when she saw the
circumstances because the presence thereof car going in the opposite direction followed
raises the penalty by one degree (like by another which overtook the first by
treachery which qualifies homicide to passing towards its left. She should not only
murder). The same must be alleged in the have swerved the car she was driving to the
information to apprise the defendant of this right but should have also tried to stop or
charge unlike an ordinary aggravating lessen her speed so that she would not
circumstance which even if not alleged in bump into the pedestrian who was crossing
the information, can be taken into account at the time but also the jeepney which was
if proved at the trial without objection.” then parked along the street.” The course
of action suggested by the appellate court
Buerano vs. Court of Appeals, 115 would seem reasonable were it not for the
SCRA 82, No. L-30269 July 19, 1982 fact that such suggestion did not take into
Conviction of accused in the charge account the amount of time afforded
of slight and less serious physical injuries petitioner to react to the situation she was
through reckless imprudence constitutes in. For it is undeniable that the suggested
double jeopardy to the charge of the crime course of action presupposes sufficient time
of damage to property through reckless for appellant to analyze the situation
imprudence. He stressed that “if double confronting her and to ponder on which of
the different courses of action would result degree of care and diligence is a negative
in the least possible harm to herself and to ingredient of the offense charged.
others. Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no
evidence was presented by the prosecution People vs. Belbes, 334 SCRA 161, G.R.
with respect to the relative distances of No. 124670 June 21, 2000
petitioner to the parked jeepney and the Appellant’s claim of self-defense
oncoming overtaking vehicle that would could not prosper. The evidence on record,
tend to prove that petitioner did have however, reveals an incomplete justifying
sufficient time to reflect on the circumstance defined in Article 11,
consequences of her instant decision to paragraph number 5 of the Revised Penal
swerve her car to the right without stepping Code. A person incurs no criminal liability
on her brakes. when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or
Carillo vs. People, 229 SCRA 386, G.R. in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
No. 86890 January 21, 1994 But we must stress there are two requisites
Petitioner should serve the interest for this justifying circumstance: (a) that the
of his patient with the greatest of solicitude offender acted in the performance of a duty
giving them always his best talent and skill. or in the lawful exercise of a duty or in the
Once summoned, petitioner lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the
anaesthesiologist could not be readily injury or offense committed be the
found. When he finally appeared at 10:30 in necessary consequence of the due
the evening, he was evidently in a bad performance of such right or office. In the
temper, commenting critically on the instant case, only the first requisite is
dextrose bottles before ordering their present; admittedly appellant acted in the
removal. This circumstance indicated he performance of his duty. However, the
was not disposed to attend to this second requisite is lacking, for the killing
unexpected call, in violation of the canons need not be a necessary consequence of
of his profession that as a physician, he the performance of his duty.
should serve the interest of his patient “with
the greatest of solicitude, giving them Loney vs. People, 482 SCRA 194, G.R.
always his best talent and skill.” No. 152644 February 10, 2006
Simple negligence is defined as a Mala in se cannot absorb mala
mere lack of prevision in a situation where prohibita crimes; What makes the former a
either the threatened harm is not immediate felony is the criminal intent (dolo) or
or the danger not openly visible.—As early negligence (culpa) while what make the
as in People v. Vistan, the Court defined latter crime are special laws enacting them.
simple negligence, penalized under what is —On petitioners’ claim that the charge for
now Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, violation of Article 365 of the RPC “absorbs”
as “a mere lack of prevision in a situation the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD
where either the threatened harm is not 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a
immediate or the danger not openly visible.” mala in se felony (such as Reckless
Put in a slightly different way, the gravamen Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
of the offense of simple negligence is the Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita
failure to exercise the diligence necessitated crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD
or called for by the situation which was not 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former
immediately life-destructive but which a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or
culminated, in the present case, in the negligence (culpa); what makes the latter
death of a human being three (3) days crimes are the special laws enacting them.
later. Such failure to exercise the necessary