INFANTE V.

CUNANAN
G.R. No. L-5180 | August 31, 1953
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

DIGEST AUTHOR: LMP

CASE SUMMARY: Consejo Infante, was the owner of two parcels of land together with a house
built thereon. She "contracted the services of Jose Cunanan and Juan Mijares... to sell" her property
for P30,000 subject to the condition that the purchaser would assume the mortgage on the
property. As commission, she agreed to pay 5% commission of the purchase price plus whatever
overprice they may obtain for the property. The agents found Pio Noche who was willing to buy
the property, but when they introduced him to the principal she informed them that she was no
longer interested in selling the property. She succeeded in making them sign a document stating
therein that the written authority she had given them was already cancelled. However,
subsequently, the principal dealt directly with the buyer and sold the property to him for P31,000.
Upon learning of this transaction, the agents demanded from principal the payment of their
commission, but she refused and so they brought the action. The Court ruled that the agents were
entitled to their commission even if the sale was consummated after their authority had been
revoked.

DOCTRINE: The agent may be entitled to commission even if the sale is consummated after the
revocation of his authority, if the revocation was done in bad faith by the principal to avoid
payment of commission.

FACTS:
o Consejo Infante was the owner of two parcels of land, together with a house built
thereon, situated in the City of Manila.
o On or before November 30, 1948, she contracted the services of Jose Cunanan and Juan
Mijares to sell the above-mentioned property for a price of P30,000
o subject to the condition that the purchaser would assume the mortgage existing
thereon in the favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation.
o She agreed to pay them a commission of 5% on the purchase price plus whatever
overprice they may obtain for the property.
o Cunanan and Mijares found one Pio S. Noche who was willing to buy the property
under the terms agreed upon with Infante.
o But when they introduced him to Infante, the latter informed them that she was
no longer interested in selling the property and succeeded in making them sign a
document stating therein that the written authority she had given them was
already cancelled.
o However, Infante later dealt directly with Pio S. Noche selling to him the property for
P31,000.
o Upon learning this transaction, Cunanan and Mijares demanded from Infante the
payment of their commission, but she refused and so they brought the present
action.
 o Infante admitted having contracted the services of the two to sell her property as set
forth in the complaint,
o but stated that she agreed to pay them a commission of P1,200 only on condition
that they buy her a property somewhere in Taft Avenue to where she might
transfer after selling her property.
o Infante avers that while the two took steps to sell her property as agreed upon,
they sold the property at Taft Avenue to another party and because of this failure
it was agreed that the authority she had given them be cancelled.
o The lower court found that the preponderance of evidence was in favor of Cunanan and
Mijares and rendered judgement ordering Infante to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P2,500
with legal interest thereon from February 2,1949 plus the costs of action.
o This decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
ARGUMENTS:
o Petitioner contends that:
o The authority has already been withdrawn when, by the voluntary act of
respondents, they executed a document stating that said authority shall be
considered cancelled and without any effect
o When petitioner sold the property to Pio S. Noche, she was already free from her
commitment with respondents and, therefore, was not in duty bound to pay
them any commission for the transaction.
o Respondents claim that:
o While they agreed to cancel the written authority given to them, they did so
merely upon the verbal assurance given by petitioner that, should the property
be sold to their own buyer, Pio S. Noche, they would be given the commission
agreed upon.
ISSUE/S & HELD:
1. W/N Cunanan and Mijares are entitled to the commission agreed upon with Infante.
YES.
o A principal may withdraw the authority given to an agent at will. (Article 1733.) But this
fact is disputed in this instant case.
o Even disregarding the oral evidence adduced by respondents in contravention of the
parole evidence rule, there is enough justification to the effect that respondents are
entitled to the commission originally agreed upon.
o After petitioner had given the written authority to respondents to sell her land for
the sum of P30,000, respondents found a buyer in the person of one Pio S. Noche
who was willing to buy the property under the terms agreed upon, and this matter
was immediately brought to the knowledge of petitioner.
o But the latter, perhaps by way of strategem, advised respondents that she was no
longer interested in the deal and was able to prevail upon them to sign a document
agreeing to the cancellation of the written authority.
o That petitioner had changed her mind even if respondents had found a buyer who was
willing to close the deal, is a matter that would not give rise to a legal consequence if
respondents agree to call off the transaction in deference to the request of the petitioner.
o But the situation varies if one of the parties takes advantage of the benevolence
of the other and acts in a manner that would promote his own selfish interest.
o This act is unfair as would amount to bad faith. This act cannot be sanctioned
without according to the party prejudiced the reward which is due him.
 o This is the situation in which respondents were placed by petitioner. Petitioner
took advantage of the services rendered by respondents, but believing that she
could evade payment of their commission, she made use of a ruse by inducing
them to sign the deed of cancellation.
o This act of subversion cannot be sanctioned and cannot serve as basis for petitioner
to escape payment of the commission agreed upon.
2. W/N oral evidence should have been allowed to prove the alleged verbal assurance
from Infante that she will pay the commission agreed upon should the property be
sold. NO.
o Oral evidence should not have been allowed to prove the alleged verbal assurance since
the written authority given to respondents has been cancelled in a written statement.
o The rule on this matter is that "When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is to be considered as containing all those terms, and, therefore, there can be,
between parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement
other than the contents of the writing." (Section 22, Rule 123, Rules of Court.)
o The only exceptions to this rule are:
§ "(a)Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express
the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the
agreement is put in issue by the pleadings"; and
§ "(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing." (Ibid.)
• There is no doubt that the point raised does not come under any of
the cases excepted, for there is nothing therein that has been put in
issue by respondents in their complaint.
• The terms of the document seem to be clear and they do not contain
any reservation which may in any way run counter to the clear
intention of the parties.

DISPOSITIVE: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioner.

Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
o Concurs in the result, but does not agree, however, to the ruling that the petitioners cannot
introduce evidence of the circumstances under which the document was signed, i.e. upon
promise by respondent that should the property be sold to petitioner's buyer they would
nevertheless be entitled to the commission agreed upon.
o Such evidence is not excluded by the parole evidence rule, because it does not tend
to alter or vary the terms of the document.
o This document was merely a withdrawal of the authority granted the petitioner to
sell the property, not an agreement that they shall not be paid their commission.