Wickberg, What Is The History of Sensibilities

What Is the History of Sensibilities?
On Cultural Histories, Old and New
DANIEL WICKBERG
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

FOR THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, the new cultural history that arose out of the social
history revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s has contained within it two broad impulses
or interpretive directions. The dominant one, especially in fields such as modern
European and American history, has been influenced by various forms of cultural
studies and the foregrounding of categories of race, class, and gender in social history
itself. It has concerned itself with issues of discourse and cultural representation. In
this body of scholarship, race, class, gender, and various other objects of represen-
tation—ethnic identities, the body, the natural world, forms of labor, colonial sub-
jects—are foregrounded and treated as the central objects of cultural analysis; cul-
ture is seen largely as a forum for constituting these categories, which are held to
have primary significance within the societies being investigated. The focus on cul-
tural representation—in visual or written texts of various kinds, including documen-
tary, fiction, medical and advice treatises, political tracts, social science, the arts,
photography, film, popular forms such as comic books and dime novels, and more
broadly “discourse”—is guided by the notion that relations of race, class, and gender
are the fundamental or primary objects of discourse or cultural representation. If it
now seems naı̈ve to ask what women actually experienced in the past, it is because
the sophisticated question has become how gender relations and identities were
“constructed” in discourse or particular texts. Private journals and letters, once
thought to offer unmediated access to the experiences of persons in the past, are now
seen as linguistic documents; they contain culturally developed ideologies rather
than direct records of experiences. The movement from social history to cultural
history has been a movement from the primacy of social experience to the primacy
of discursive representation; the cultural historian is concerned less with recovering
the experiences of past persons, and more with charting changes in the images of
persons and things.1
But if this focus on the representation of fundamental cultural categories has
An earlier version of this essay was presented before the Dallas Area Social History (DASH) Group.
I want to thank the members of that group for their insights and criticism, and for allowing me to use
them as a sounding board for my heterodox views over a number of years. My thanks especially to Alexis
McCrossen, who invited me to give that talk to the group. In particular I wish to acknowledge the helpful
comments of my colleague at UTD Erin Smith, who pushed me to consider alternative formulations by
cultural and social theorists as a way to better define what I meant by sensibilities. My thanks also go
to the anonymous reviewers for the AHR and to Sarah Knott for their helpful criticisms.
1 For discussions of this shift from social to cultural history, see Daniel Wickberg, “Heterosexual
White Male: Some Recent Inversions in American Cultural History,” Journal of American History 92,
661
662 Daniel Wickberg
been the dominant interpretive direction of the new cultural history, alongside it has
existed another direction, owing as much to the “old” cultural history as to the new:
what, using Lucien Febvre’s nomenclature, if not his precise meaning, can be called
the history of sensibilities.2 If the cultural history of representation focuses on the
primacy of the objects being represented—for example, the body as a site of cultural
meaning, or the study of blackface minstrelsy as racial representation—the history
of sensibilities focuses on the primacy of the various modes of perception and feeling,
the terms and forms in which objects were conceived, experienced, and represented
in the past. To give an example from modern American cultural history, the history

of whiteness as developed by David Roediger, Grace Hale, Matthew Frye Jacobson,
and others organizes its analysis around the way whiteness as a category and an
identity was defined and represented through opposition to racial others—partic-
ularly blacks—under specific national, regional, and industrial laboring conditions.
The underlying notion is that the strategies and forms of representation were specific
to the category of whiteness itself, that they were about “race” in some fundamental
way.3 The history of nineteenth-century sentimentalism developed by Ann Douglas,
Jane Tompkins, and a spate of followers and challengers in their wake, on the other
hand, foregrounds the sensibility—the terms of representation, the generalized val-
ues and modes of perception and feeling in which various objects could be conceived
and represented—rather than the objects of representation themselves.4
Nineteenth-century sentimentalism as a sensibility might perceive some ob-
jects—one thinks of motherhood, death and loss, the home—as more important than
others, of course, and much of the work in this field has focused on sentimental
representations of gender and race. But this is a function of sentimentalism’s un-
derlying epistemological, moral, and aesthetic framework for comprehending reality,
no. 1 (2005): 136–157; Geoff Eley, A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society (Ann
Arbor, Mich., 2005).
2 Lucien Febvre, “Sensibility and History: How to Reconstitute the Emotional Life of the Past,” in
A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Febvre, ed. Peter Burke, trans. K. Folca (New York, 1973),
12–26.
3 David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class
(London, 1991); Grace Elizabeth Hale, Making Whiteness: The Culture of Segregation in the South, 1890–
1940 (New York, 1998); Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants
and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, Mass., 1998); David R. Roediger, Colored White: Transcending the
Racial Past (Berkeley, Calif., 2002); Roediger, Working toward Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants
Became White—The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs (New York, 2005); Neil Foley, The
White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); Peter
Kolchin, “Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America,” Journal of American History 89,
no. 1 (2002): 154 –173; Eric Arnesen, “Whiteness and the Historians’ Imagination,” International Labor
and Working-Class History, no. 60 (2001): 3–32.
4 Ann Douglas, The Feminization of American Culture (New York, 1977); Jane P. Tompkins, Sen-
sational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction, 1790–1860 (New York, 1985); Shirley Samuels,
ed., The Culture of Sentiment: Race, Gender, and Sentimentality in Nineteenth-Century America (New
York, 1992); Andrew Burstein, Sentimental Democracy: The Evolution of America’s Romantic Self-Image
(New York, 1999); Mary Chapman and Glenn Hendler, eds., Sentimental Men: Masculinity and the Pol-
itics of Affect in American Culture (Berkeley, Calif., 1999); Bruce Burgett, Sentimental Bodies: Sex, Gen-
der, and Citizenship in the Early Republic (Princeton, N.J., 1998); John Phillips Resch, Suffering Soldiers:
Revolutionary War Veterans, Moral Sentiment, and Political Culture in the Early Republic (Amherst, Mass.,
1999); Kristin Boudreau, Sympathy in American Literature: American Sentiments from Jefferson to the
Jameses (Gainesville, Fla., 2002); Elizabeth White Nelson, Market Sentiments: Middle-Class Market Cul-
ture in Nineteenth-Century America (Washington, D.C., 2004); Lori Merish, Sentimental Materialism:
Gender, Commodity Culture, and Nineteenth-Century American Literature (Durham, N.C., 2000).
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

What Is the History of Sensibilities? 663
and not a reflection of the fact that sentimentalism arises out of an inherent or
primary interest in motherhood, death, gender, or race itself; there are, in fact, all
kinds of texts that we would deem “sentimental” that fail to make motherhood cen-
tral. In other words, the cultural sensibility we label “sentimental” is the primary
reality, and the objects represented in various sentimental genres are secondary.
Many antislavery texts partake of a sentimental sensibility, but that does not mean
that slavery is a core feature of the sensibility; sentimentalism is an important aspect
of liberal Protestant theology, but not all sentimental representations are theolog-
ical.5 The sensibility is anterior to the objects it represents in various concrete man-

ifestations.
The distinction between these two forms of cultural history seems somewhat ab-
stract. In reality, of course, much of the new cultural history lies somewhere between
these two ideal types, and is concerned with both objects of representation and sen-
sibility, as should be clear in the attention to issues of race and gender in much of
the recent work on the history of sentimentalism. The distinction is drawn more
sharply here for heuristic purposes. One way to clarify that distinction is to make it
more concrete and specific. Take, for example, one of the foundational texts of the
history of sensibilities, Johan Huizinga’s The Autumn of the Middle Ages. Originally
published in Dutch in 1919 and translated into English as The Waning of the Middle
Ages in 1924, this text was particularly influential in the post–World War II era, as
the anthropological concept of culture came to permeate American academic dis-
course, especially the branch of American historiography that John Higham char-
acterized as “consensus history” and others have called “counterprogressive” his-
tory.6 A new translation was published in 1996.
In the opening chapter, “The Passionate Intensity of Life,” Huizinga says:
When the world was half a thousand years younger all events had much sharper outlines than
now. The distance between sadness and joy, between good and bad fortune, seemed to be
much greater than for us; every experience had that degree of directness and absoluteness
that joy and sadness still have in the mind of a child. Every event, every deed was defined
in given and expressive forms and was in accord with the solemnity of a tight, invariable life
style. The great events of human life—birth, marriage, death—by virtue of the sacraments,
basked in the radiance of the divine mystery. But even the lesser events—a journey, labor,
a visit—were accompanied by a multitude of blessings, ceremonies, sayings, and conventions.7
5 On slavery as an object of sentimental texts, see, for instance, Shirley Samuels, “The Identity of
Slavery,” in Samuels, The Culture of Sentiment, 157–171. On liberal Protestantism and sentimentalism,
see, for instance, James Turner, Without God, Without Creed: The Origins of Unbelief in America (Bal-
timore, Md., 1985), 73–113.
6 Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., “Clio and the Culture Concept: Some Impressions of a Changing Re-
lationship in American Historiography,” in Louis Schneider and Charles Bonjean, eds., The Idea of
Culture in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), 77–100; Gene Wise, American Historical Ex-
planations (Homewood, Ill., 1973); John Higham, “The Cult of the ‘American Consensus’: Homoge-
nizing Our History,” Commentary 27 (1959): 93–100; Higham, “Beyond Consensus: The Historian as
Moral Critic,” American Historical Review 67, no. 3 (April 1962): 609–625. For an example of the use
of the term “counterprogressive history,” see David W. Noble, The End of American History: Democracy,
Capitalism, and the Metaphor of Two Worlds in Anglo-American Historical Writing, 1880–1980 (Minne-
apolis, 1985).
7 Johan Huizinga, The Autumn of the Middle Ages, trans. Rodney J. Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch
(Chicago, 1996), 1. On the significance of Huizinga, see William J. Bouwsma, “The Waning of the Middle
Ages Revisited,” in Bouwsma, A Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History (Berkeley, Calif., 1990),
325–335.

664 Daniel Wickberg
Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether “everyone” experienced the
world in these terms, and the generalizing propensity of this older style of cultural
history, it is significant that Huizinga defines as the object of historical study not the
events, nor the ideas, nor the social structures of the past, but the modes of per-
ception and feelings, which are pictured as collective and historically variable. This
brand of cultural history looks not at the content of thought, but at the forms in which
that content is perceived, given, and expressed. History, in Huizinga, goes beyond
the level of external circumstances that vary from society to society and through time;
the internal states and structure of feeling and consciousness, and not just the objects

of consciousness, vary historically. Instead of treating a particular object or event as
the focus of culture or consciousness, Huizinga gives us the structure, form, and
terms in which any event is comprehended. What separates people in the past from
our contemporaries in the present is not so much the things they were concerned
with, but the alien ways in which they sensed and felt those things. Sensation of all
things was more immediate. Emotions were not mixed and conflated; they were pure
and distinct, and far more intense. The world was not just understood intellectually
as a fixed order; it was immediately experienced and felt as such. Whether this is an
accurate depiction of the past, or whether Huizinga was right or wrong in his par-
ticular characterization of the late Middle Ages, is not at issue here; it is his approach
to understanding the ways in which the past is different from the present that is
important. In Huizinga, the difference is not exactly a difference of beliefs, of values,
modes of representation, or states of feeling, although it seems to encompass all of
these. Rather, it is a difference of sensibilities.
BUT WHAT, EXACTLY, IS MEANT HERE BY “SENSIBILITY”? Raymond Williams famously

said that “culture” is “one of the two or three most complicated words in the English
language.”8 The proliferation of forms of cultural history, and the general capa-
ciousness of any field of study involving “culture,” should confirm his observation.9
While “sensibility” is not as complex as “culture,” its variability of meaning and its
history share a great deal with those of “culture.” A short, general history of the term
will inform and limit its contemporary use in the practice of cultural history but not
determine or fix it; the point is to capture the capaciousness of the concept as re-
vealed in its history, not to show how an eighteenth-century meaning can be fruitfully
applied to the present terms of analysis. Also, sensibility needs to be distinguished
as an object of study from some of the other related terms that cultural historians
have used to describe the things they purport to be studying. There are ways in which
sensibility is different from—and in some fundamental ways, superior to—compet-
ing and overlapping terms such as “ideology,” “worldview,” “habitus,” “structure of
feeling,” “episteme,” “mentalité,” “or paradigm.”
While the term “sensibility” dates from the fourteenth century, the roots of the
Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York, 1983), 87.
8
On the different forms of cultural history, see Peter Burke, Varieties of Cultural History (Ithaca,
9
N.Y., 1997), especially 183–212; Lynn Hunt, ed., The New Cultural History (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); Hunt
and Victoria Bonnell, eds., Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture
(Berkeley, Calif., 1999).

modern concept of sensibility lie in seventeenth-century British empiricism and sen-

sationalist psychology. The notion—found most systematically developed in John
Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding—that all knowledge is derived
from sense experience, and that the human mind is a blank slate prior to sense
experience, pushed the capacity for sensation, as opposed to the capacity for abstract
reason, to the fore in understandings of the human mind. This generalized capacity
for sensation came to be known as “sensibility,” as did the faculty of mind responsible
for perception. From the British empiricist philosophy of the eighteenth century
through the neurological science and materialist psychology of prominent Victorian

thinkers such as Alexander Bain and George Henry Lewes, one stream of definitions
limited sensibility to the specific capacity of the five senses to receive sense impres-
sions. As Bain put it, “sensibility everywhere demands a distribution of nerve fibers.”
To have sensibility, in this definition, is simply to possess the material equipment to
receive impressions from external sources.10
Given the empiricist epistemology that lay in back of it, it is interesting that a
second lineage developed, emphasizing the moral, emotional, and literary elements
of character, rather than simply its material sense-receiving capacity. The so-called
“cult of sensibility” that arose in Britain in the mid-eighteenth century stressed a set
of values that partook of the idea of sensation as moral and emotional capacity,
moving the idea of sensibility beyond the narrow and technical capacity for receiving
impressions from the external world. Influenced by British moral philosophers such
as the Earl of Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson, who argued that human beings
possessed a moral sense and a sense of beauty—among other “internal senses”—by
which moral and aesthetic judgments were rendered in response to immediate per-
ception of objects, and David Hume and Adam Smith, who saw sympathetic iden-
tification with others as a natural response to viewing their experiences, the cult of
sensibility came to associate sensibility with refined feeling, discrimination, and taste,
as well as an intense sensitivity to the suffering of others.
If sensibility was the necessary condition for cognition and the formation of ideas
for the empiricist tradition, it was strongly linked to the capacity for feeling and
emotion as responses to sense experience in the more general intellectual and lit-
erary culture of the eighteenth century. The characterological embodiment of sen-
sibility, the so-called “Man of Feeling,” with his propensity for tears at the sight of
any suffering creature, was the bleeding-heart liberal of his day. Even as the cult of
sensibility became the object of parody and satire, leading to its decline in late-
eighteenth-century Britain, it provided much of the moral orientation of nineteenth-
century American middle-class culture. In the American context, the intensity of
evangelical Protestantism and its epistemologies infused sensibility with a new power
and reform orientation that was less evident in nineteenth-century British culture,
and helped to define a new middle-class set of values to which historians have given
the name “sentimentalism.”11
10 S.v. “sensibility,” Oxford English Dictionary; Alexander Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, ed. Daniel
N. Robinson (1855; repr., Washington, D.C., 1977), 122; George Henry Lewes, The Physical Basis of
Mind: Being the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind (Boston, Mass., 1877); E. Hamilton, “Mr.
Lewes’s Doctrine of Sensibility,” Mind 4, no. 14 (1879): 256–261; Edgar A. Singer, Jr., “On Sensibility,”
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14, no. 13 (1917): 340.
11 Erik Erämetsä, A Study of the Word “Sentimental” and of Other Linguistic Characteristics of Eigh-

666 Daniel Wickberg
In both Britain and the United States, the Victorian extension of this idea of
sensibility as a moral quantity amounted to the definition of a kind of intrinsic char-
acter element of the socially refined and cultivated person. Sensibility in the nine-
teenth century was something that one had or one lacked in varying degrees, in the
same way that Victorians saw culture as something possessed in quantities. To have
sensibility was to have a capacity for sensitivity to moral and aesthetic experience.
To lack sensibility was to be a moral and/or social idiot, unable to discriminate right
from wrong, good art from bad, things to be valued from those to be deplored. In
some ways, this notion of sensibility is similar to what today would be described in

positive moral terms as a “sensitive” character—a person who feels deeply, is in-
clined to have “hurt” feelings, but who is compassionate and caring, capable of
higher moral feeling. Sensibility was strongly associated with the eighteenth-century
aesthetic category of “taste,” linking moral refinement to aesthetic discrimination,
education, and class identity. While sensibility could be qualified as “fine” or “gen-
erous,” it was largely seen as a fixed substance that a person could have more or less
of, and as an index to character in general.12
Up until the twentieth century, then, the idea of sensibility diverged along two
paths, one emphasizing sense experience, the other moral and aesthetic discrimi-
nation and feeling. But they shared a common notion that sensibility was a unitary,
singular thing. In the nineteenth century, the plural “sensibilities” referred to a set
of capacities possessed by individuals, such as “moral and aesthetic sensibilities,”
rather than the different sensibilities possessed by different people. The twentieth-
century revolution in meaning would pluralize sensibility and in the process remove
it from the hierarchical claims of possession vs. non-possession. Just as cultural rel-
ativism under Franz Boas and his followers turned the Victorian idea of culture—as
in Matthew Arnold’s famous unitary definition of “the best that has been said and
thought”—into the idea of plural cultures, so did the movements in modern art of
the early twentieth century take aesthetic sensibility and turn it into sensibilities.13
The implication was twofold. On the one hand, sensibility became strongly as-
sociated with aesthetics and art criticism, and the notion that various artists or artistic
movements expressed specific sensibilities—ways of seeing, feeling, and organizing
sense perception into expressive forms. One result of the departure from older
meanings was that sensibility was no longer solely a matter of passive perception and
teenth Century Sentimentalism in England (Helsinki, 1951), 88–90; Janet Todd, Sensibility: An Introduc-
tion (London, 1986), 7–8, 23–31, 88–109; John Mullen, Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling
in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1988); G. J. Barker-Benfield, The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society
in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Chicago, 1992); Markman Ellis, The Politics of Sensibility (New York,
1996); G. S. Rousseau, Nervous Acts: Essays on Literature, Culture, and Sensibility (New York, 2004). For
an examination of sensibility in the eighteenth-century American context, see Sarah Knott, “Sensibility
and the American War for Independence,” American Historical Review 109, no. 1 (February 2004):
19– 40.
12 Williams, Keywords, 280–283.
13 Ibid., 89–91; Adam Kuper, Culture: The Anthropologists’ Account (Cambridge, Mass., 1999); Regna
Darnell, Invisible Genealogies: A History of Americanist Anthropology (Lincoln, Neb., 2001); Clifford
Geertz, “The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man,” in Geertz, The Interpretation
of Cultures (New York, 1973), 33–54; George W. Stocking, Jr., Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in
the History of Anthropology (New York, 1968); Stocking, A Franz Boas Reader: The Shaping of American
Anthropology, 1883–1911 (Chicago, 1989); Richard Handler, “Boasian Anthropology and the Critique
of American Culture,” American Quarterly 42, no. 2 (1990): 252–273.

discrimination, but now also included an expressive element: works of art embodied
or expressed underlying sensibilities. On the other hand, the notion of sensibilities
implied a kind of cultural pluralism. For the Victorians, the question was whether
one had or did not have sensibility. For the modernists of the first half of the twen-
tieth century, the question was what kind of sensibility one had; after all, everybody
had a sensibility, and differences were differences in kind rather than in quantity.
The result was potentially to democratize the concept of sensibility by making it, like
culture, relative to the specific social groups, artistic movements, and individuals who
possessed it. This notion of sensibility would be dominant in art circles until the 1960s

and 1970s, when it fell into disuse as a primary analytical category that linked formal,
emotional, and sensual elements of art. As the art world came under the influence
of postmodern theory, multiculturalism, and identity politics in the last third of the
twentieth century, the concept of sensibility appeared as a slightly antiquated artifact
of modernist aesthetics, and while it never disappeared, it became less central to the
vocabulary of art criticism.14
In the world of art criticism, sensibilities could be possessed by groups of artists,
movements, or even individuals. When mid-century literary and cultural critics such
as Lionel Trilling and Susan Sontag took up the concept, they emphasized its col-
lective nature and tied its moral to its aesthetic content. Cultural sensibilities were
the ways of seeing, knowing, and feeling that were characteristic of specific civili-
zations and their forms of literature and life. Although Trilling used the word in-
frequently, many of his essays are concerned specifically with liberalism, not as a
formal political ideology, but as a sensibility revealed through the moral, episte-
mological, and ontological dispositions of literature and criticism.15 Sontag, who fa-
mously rejected much of the modernist orientation associated with critics such as
Trilling, made sensibility—which she equated with collectively held forms of taste—
central to influential essays such as “Notes on Camp” and “One Culture and the New
Sensibility.” In a footnote to the former essay, which is a detailed attempt to describe
a particular modern sensibility, she in fact makes the case for the history of sensi-
bilities:
The sensibility of an era is not only its most decisive, but also its most perishable, aspect. One
may capture the ideas (intellectual history) and the behavior (social history) of an epoch
without ever touching upon the sensibility or taste which informed those ideas, that behavior.
Rare are those historical studies—like Huizinga on the late Middle Ages, Febvre on 16th
century France—which do tell us something about the sensibility of the period.16
Hence the concept of what was sometimes called “the modern sensibility,” in which
the modes of feeling and experiencing the world in modern societies were marked
off from the modes characteristic of past ages. Art and literature were where sen-
sibility was expressed, or given a codified or articulated form, but the larger notion
14 See, for instance, Henry-Russell Hitchcock, “Food for Changing Sensibilities,” Perspecta 6 (1960):
2–3.
15 Lionel Trilling, Beyond Culture: Essays on Literature and Learning (New York, 1965). See especially
the reference to “the modern spiritual sensibility” on p. 78. Trilling, The Liberal Imagination: Essays on
Literature and Society (1950; repr., New York, 1976). See Thomas Bender, “Lionel Trilling and American
Culture,” American Quarterly 42, no. 2 (1990): 324 –347.
16 Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York, 1966), 276.

668 Daniel Wickberg
seemed to be that sensibilities, like cultures, belonged to collectives—nations,

classes, ethnic groups, civilizations, religions. One might distinguish a French sen-
sibility from an English sensibility, a Catholic from a Protestant, a southern from a
northern, a rural from an urban.
When Clifford Geertz picked up this notion of sensibility in explicating his par-
ticular brand of symbolic anthropology, in essays such as “Found in Translation: On
the Social History of the Moral Imagination” (1977) and “Art as a Cultural System”
(1976), he clarified the linkage between culture, in the anthropological sense, and
sensibility. What marked peoples as different from one another was precisely the

difference in the structure of perception, feeling, and value that could be designated
as “sensibility”; the task of cultural anthropology was to translate one sensibility into
another without collapsing the differences between them.17 The influence of Geertz
on the new cultural history is well known, although many seem to read that influence
primarily through his essays on thick description or the Balinese cockfight because
they fit well with the dominant model of cultural representation, rather than his
essays in which the gap between sensibilities provides the basis for the ethnographic
and interpretive imagination. But Geertz was in fact explicit in identifying his own
approach to cultural anthropology with Trilling’s concerns in his cultural criticism—
they were hunting the same beast, and its name was sensibility.18
Not all twentieth-century definitions of sensibility pluralized the concept in terms
of cultural differences as Trilling, Sontag, and Geertz did. A separate but parallel
redefinition was taking place in the debate that came to surround T. S. Eliot’s con-
cept of the dissociation of sensibility. According to Eliot, modern culture after the
metaphysical poets of the seventeenth century was marked by a fundamental and
negative change: a previously comprehensive and immediate way of regarding the
world was fragmented into its component parts of thought and feeling. For Eliot, and
those who followed him, sensibility involved the integration of ideas and emotions,
cognition and feeling, or, as he put it, a structure of experience that involved “a direct
sensuous apprehension of thought.” Its dissociation split experience and perception
in two, creating a kind of self-alienation in which an unbridgeable gap between the
intellect and the emotions was the modern condition. As a result, the intellectual life
of the scientist and rational analyst was split from the expressive life of the artist.
Like other literary modernists, Eliot identified literary and artistic expression as the
embodiment of a more widely shared cultural sensibility, and believed that changes
in literature signified larger shifts in modes of perception and being.19 The signif-
icance of the much-debated argument on the dissociation of sensibility lay in the fact
17 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York, 1983),
36–54, 94 –120.
18 On the influence of Geertz on the new cultural history, see Ronald G. Waters, “Signs of the Times:
Clifford Geertz and Historians,” Social Research 47, no. 3 (1980): 537–556; Lynn Hunt, “Introduction:
History, Culture, and Text,” in Hunt, The New Cultural History, 12–13; Aletta Biersack, “Local Knowl-
edge, Local History: Geertz and Beyond,” ibid., 72–96; Richard Biernacki, “Method and Metaphor after
the New Cultural History,” in Hunt and Bonnell, Beyond the Cultural Turn, 62–92; Jean-Christophe
Agnew, “History and Anthropology: Scenes From a Marriage,” Yale Journal of Criticism 3, no. 2 (1990):
29–50. Probably the most widely cited of Geertz’s essays on historical writing are “Thick Description:
Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 3–30; and “Deep
Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” ibid., 412– 453.
19 T. S. Eliot, “The Metaphysical Poets” (1921), in Eliot, Selected Essays, 1917–1932 (New York,
1932), 241–250, quotation from 246. F. W. Bateson, “Contributions to a Dictionary of Critical Terms:

that while it retained the notion of sensibility as a singular, unitary entity (the sev-
enteenth century had it; we have lost it), it made explicit the linkage between ideas
and emotions contained in the concept. A sensibility was not what would come to
be called an ideology; nor was it simply what Raymond Williams would later call a
structure of feeling. Rather, it was a pattern in which idea and emotion were bound
up with one another.
Given its history, then, it is understandable why the concept of sensibility has
proved to be a fruitful one for contemporary cultural historiography: by bringing
together the elements of sense perception, cognition, emotion, aesthetic form, moral

judgment, and cultural difference, it provides a way of talking about an object of
historical study that is both ubiquitous and yet strangely invisible. Because so much
historical study of cultural values is focused on the objects of representation, or the
content of thought and writing, historians have frequently overlooked the terms of
perception and the forms of expression, both of which embody the linkages between,
say, ontological commitments and pre-cognitive dispositions, moral values and cat-
egories of sense perception, ideas and emotions. But sensibilities are not organized
in archives and conveniently visible for research purposes; they are almost never the
explicit topics of the primary documents we use. We need a concept that lets us dig
beneath the social actions and apparent content of sources to the ground upon which
those sources stand: the emotional, intellectual, aesthetic, and moral dispositions of
the persons who created them. That concept is sensibility.
As with all concepts and categories used by historians and other cultural analysts,
the fact that the concept of sensibility has a history does not fix a meaning for the
present; in fact, it reveals the extent to which that meaning has changed and will likely
change again. This is true of all words and concepts, and the attempt to find a trans-
historical or timeless set of conceptual categories by which the analyst can step into
a neutral space outside of culture is (and should be) doomed to failure. If nothing
else, historical consciousness compels us to see our own thought and practice as in
history rather than outside it. A genealogy of the term can suggest the embeddedness
of a set of conceptual associations, orientations, and distinctions within the heritage
of the language handed down to us, and set both limits and possibilities for the
meaning of the term in the present. Contra Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty, we are
not free to make words mean anything we want them to mean, but the converse of
this powerlessness is that the history of a word provides us with a stock of meanings
that can be fruitfully applied, developed, and transformed. Undoubtedly there is
something new or different in the way the term “sensibility” is being used here, but
it lies in the minor rearrangement of existing elements rather than in some wholesale
reinvention of meaning. What is suggestive about the concept is its loose affiliation
of—among other things—categories of perception, emotional states, a collective or
cultural orientation, moral presupposition, and matters of taste and style. The value
of the concept of sensibility lies not in its ability to define a fixed entity in a trans-
historical way, but in condensed meanings that we encounter in the language avail-
able to us.
II. Dissociation of Sensibility,” Essays in Criticism 1 (1951): 301–312; Frank Kermode, Romantic Image
(New York, 1961), 138–166.

670 Daniel Wickberg
BUT WHY IS SENSIBILITY PREFERABLE TO OTHER CONCEPTS that historians have used and
developed in the past half-century to describe the systematic and collectively held
mental maps or dispositions of persons? Given its history, it is a broader concept that
integrates ideas, emotions, beliefs, values, and perceptions in a way that terms such
as “ideology,” “mentalité,” and “paradigm” do not, or at least have not, in their
application. The term “ideology,” for instance, has been used in a number of ways
and has proved itself significant, particularly for historians of political thought and
language. While Marxists and others have used the concept in a fairly narrow way
to designate a formal body of political ideas that reflect social structures and/or guide

political action, such as classical liberalism and revolutionary socialism, others, in-
cluding the historians of classical republicanism, have seen ideology as a screen
through which people perceive the world and impose a meaningful pattern upon
experience. But a history of ideologies, understood even in its broadest application
as the system of mental categories by which experience is organized and given sense,
or in Geertz’s terms as a “cultural system,” defines mental life exclusively in terms
of ideas and logics.20
The life of emotions, desires, and inclinations is oddly absent from most of the
concepts that historians have used to understand the deep structure of belief systems.
Michel Foucault’s “episteme” and Thomas Kuhn’s “paradigm,” for instance, are ex-
plicitly concerned with knowledge systems, and as such reproduce the modern West-
ern separation between idea and emotion in their approach to science; there is no
room even for consideration of emotion in the maps of reality that they draw. Kuhn
suggests that the choice of paradigms under revolutionary conditions may be guided
by criteria that are non-rational, and even aesthetic in nature, but the content of
paradigms themselves is entirely ideational and non-emotional. More generally, such
terms simply have not been defined in broad enough ways to go much beyond the
boundaries of the history of science or “knowledge regimes,” into the murky worlds
of belief and feeling that lie outside the organized institutions of knowledge.21
The concept of mentalité, first developed by the mid-twentieth-century Annales
School of French historians as an alternative to intellectual history or the history of
ideas, suggests another way to approach the problem. The advocates of the concept
of mentalité drew a distinction between the formal systems of thought associated
with intellectual history and the popular thought of the many, which was held to be
less systematic, more informal, and less articulate or explicit than the subject matter
of intellectual history. In general, the history of mentalités brought a host of new
objects under historical scrutiny: popular attitudes toward death, sex, and family, for
20 On the Marxist concept of ideology, see Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford,
1977), 55–71. On the use of the notion of ideology by historians of republicanism and political thought,
see Daniel T. Rodgers, “Republicanism: The Career of a Concept,” Journal of American History 79, no.
1 (1992): 11–38. On Geertz’s notion of ideology, see Geertz, “Ideology as a Cultural System,” in Geertz,
The Interpretation of Cultures, 193–233.
21 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York, 1971);
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1962). On Kuhn and his use by historians,
see David A. Hollinger, “T. S. Kuhn’s Theory of Science and Its Implications for History,” in Hollinger,
In the American Province: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ideas (Baltimore, Md., 1985),
105–129; Robert Berkhofer, Jr., Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse (Cambridge, Mass.,
1997), 112; Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical
Profession (Cambridge, 1988), 526–537.

instance, or popular religious beliefs and ideas about manners and social behavior.
Following Febvre’s groundbreaking work on the cultural limits of belief and on the
cultural history of emotions, it also conceptualized the history of mind and psy-
chology in terms of culture, belief, and feeling.22
The tendency of the history of mentalités, however, was to draw an invidious
distinction between social, political, and intellectual elites—who appeared to have
ideas and to approach the world rationally through formal bodies of thought—and
the broader populace of all eras—who had mentalités, or subrational compounds of
attitudes, beliefs, and prejudices. The notion of sensibility, on the other hand, can

easily be applied to all persons; elite writings embody sensibilities as much as do
popular entertainments, and there is no a priori notion that rationality somehow rises
above emotion and attitudes, instead of being an affective disposition, or what Wil-
liam James called “the sentiment of rationality.”23 In addition, sensibility refers to
forms of expression and aesthetic commitments in a way that the term “mentalité”
generally has not; it is more comprehensive in the domain that it defines. If the idea
of mentalités partakes of a sociological vision of thought and reality, the idea of
sensibilities navigates between the sociological and a more humanistic or aesthetic
domain of experience. And the study of sensibilities, unlike that of mentalités, tends
to lead us away from the specific objects of consciousness—such as attitudes toward
childhood and death—and toward the terms in which any such objects might be
perceived and felt.
Perhaps closer to the idea of sensibilities is what Raymond Williams has called
“structures of feeling.” “ ‘Feeling,’ ” says Williams, “is chosen to emphasize a dis-
tinction from more formal concepts of ‘world-view’ or ‘ideology’ . . . We are talking
about characteristic elements of impulse, restraint, and tone; specifically affective
elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling against thought, but thought
as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living
and interrelating continuity.”24 But this definition, and the cultural Marxism that
comes along with it, tends to pit formal thought against informal or “lived” expe-
rience, with the implication that formal systems of thought do not contain particular
structures of feeling, but are the very antithesis of them. For Williams, if one finds
ideology in the writings of social theorists and political economists, for instance, one
finds structures of feeling not only in everyday experience, but in art and literature.
The concept of sensibility as used here, on the other hand, is no respecter of invidious
22 As most commentators on the idea of a history of mentalities or mentalités note, there has been
a great deal of vagueness in the use of the term. Some seem to use it as a synonym for “popular attitudes,”
others for “informal thought,” others for “cultural psychology.” See Burke, Varieties of Cultural History,
162–182; Roger Chartier, Cultural History: Between Practices and Representations, trans. Lydia G.
Cochrane (Ithaca, N.Y., 1988), 19–52; Patrick H. Hutton, “The History of Mentalities: The New Map
of Cultural History,” History and Theory 20, no. 3 (1981): 237–259; Hutton, “Philippe Ariès and the
Secrets of the History of Mentalities,” Historical Reflections 28, no. 1 (2002): 1–19. The most widely
known example of Febvre’s work on the limits of cultural belief is Lucien Febvre, The Problem of Unbelief
in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais, trans. Beatrice Gottlieb (Cambridge, Mass., 1982).
23 William James, “The Sentiment of Rationality” (1882), in James, The Will to Believe and Other
Essays in Popular Philosophy (London, 1897), 63–110.

24 Williams, Marxism and Literature, 128–135, quotation from 132. The idea of “structures of feeling”
has proved much more popular with students of literary and cultural studies than with historians. For
a work that uses Williams’s concept, see Glenn Hendler, Public Sentiments: Structures of Feeling in Nine-
teenth-Century American Literature (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2001).

672 Daniel Wickberg
distinctions between practice and theory, low and high, informal and formal, art and
philosophy; all embody sensibilities. The historian of sensibilities takes her objects
where she can find them—which is everywhere. Formalism, in fact, is a specific el-
ement of some sensibilities, so much so that we might distinguish between formalist
and anti-formalist sensibilities.25 In addition, the term “structure of feeling” is some-
what misleading, as Williams himself admits, for on the surface it seems to partake
of the sharp distinction between emotion and thought that it is intended to overcome.
A related concept that has been taken up by some cultural studies scholars, and
in a very limited way by a few historians, is the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s concept

of “habitus.” Much of Bourdieu’s social and cultural theory, deriving its orientation
from Émile Durkheim’s concern with collective and unconscious representation of
social forms, is opaque and lacking in definition. It is impossible, for instance, to find
a clear definition of habitus in his writings, despite the centrality of the idea to his
sociology. Like Norbert Elias’s influential History of Manners, Bourdieu’s sociology
is concerned with finding a set of collective and virtually pre-conscious dispositions
that societies create within individuals and which can then be connected to a larger
social organization and its determinations; as a consequence, the concept of habitus
bears the impress of his particular theory of social action. In classic sociologese,
Bourdieu’s Distinction tells us, for instance, that the habitus is “not only a structuring
structure, which organizes practices and the perceptions of practices, but also a struc-
tured structure”—which seems to mean that cultural dispositions are given structure
by social structures, and in turn shape the perceivable social order in terms of their
practical consequences. One distinctive feature of the idea of habitus is its emphasis
on the body and its dispositions. In this sense, it has something in common with the
concept of “attitude” as it was developed and used by twentieth-century psychol-
ogists and social scientists—an attempt to make a bodily stance into a pre-rational
cultural orientation.26
However, as appealing as it is for those who wish to connect cultural dispositions
and social structures in a systematic way, the notion of habitus is lacking that sense
of the interior mental and emotional life that the concept of sensibility captures so
well; its problem in some sense is that it is too rigid in its focus on system and struc-
ture to capture the looseness and fluidity of sensibilities. And it is unclear how the
habitus can be seen as a collective feature of groups when it is tied so closely to
individual bodies. As Richard Jenkins says,
The concept of the habitus—embodied dispositions—functions as an analogue for culture

when it comes to explaining behaviour. But what does embodiment mean in this context, other
than a gesture of faith in the direction of materiality (as in ‘biological individuals’)? What
exactly is the habitus? How does it relate to the notion of ‘culture’? How can individuals, social
25 For the distinction between formalism and anti-formalism as elements of religious cultures, see
Ann Taves, Fits, Trances, and Visions: Experiencing Religion and Explaining Experience from Wesley to
James (Princeton, N.J., 1999). Formalism and anti-formalism have been treated much more extensively
by intellectual historians. See Morton White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt against Formalism
(Boston, 1957); Wilfred McClay, The Masterless: Self and Society in America (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1994),
149–188; Thomas L. Haskell, Objectivity Is Not Neutrality: Explanatory Schemes in History (Baltimore,
Md., 1998), 307–367.
26 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1984), 170; Donald Fleming, “Attitude: The History of a Concept,” Perspectives in Amer-
ican History 1 (1967): 287–365.

classes (groups) and fields all, in some way, ‘have’ distinctive and characteristic habituses?
The criterion of embodiment makes habitus a reasonable enough individualistic concept—
allowing for its problems of definition—but a wholly implausible attribute of collective or
abstract social entities.
For those historians, social theorists, and cultural analysts who are concerned with
the classic antinomies of agency and structure, power and resistance, dominance and
subalterity, Bourdieu’s habitus seems to provide a way to talk about cultural dis-
positions that is consistent with these theoretical concerns.27 One of the virtues of

the concept of sensibility, unlike some of the other competing formulations, is that
it comes unburdened with specific theoretical baggage—one can hardly say that of
habitus, episteme, paradigm, or structure of feeling.
THE POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF AN APPROACH TO CULTURAL HISTORY that focuses on

sensibilities are many. This is not the forum in which to provide a full-scale exam-
ination of those criticisms, but it is worth mentioning some of the most obvious.
Anyone who has been following cultural historiography—and cultural studies more
generally—for the past thirty years cannot be unaware of the centrality to the field
of issues of power, hegemony, and domination, on the one hand, and agency, re-
sistance, and complicity, on the other. The influence of cultural Marxism, Foucaul-
dian postmodernism, and the various forms of critical race theory, queer theory, and
gender theory has animated much of the focus on cultural representation precisely
in terms of issues of power and agency. From the point of view of historians trained
in these modes of thinking, the biggest problem with the history of sensibilities might
be that it seems silent on the issue of power and agency. In the first place, it ap-
parently posits a deep structure of mind that lies in back of, and is a precondition
for, action or agency. If the new cultural history of representations sees cultural texts
as actions, as plays in an ongoing game of power in which meaning is an instrument
of domination or resistance, the cultural history of sensibilities sees them as em-
bodying relatively stable predispositions; meaning is not “negotiated,” but is already
given. The complaint of those historians who would see a false uniformity, stability,
and consensus in such approaches is the same one that has been voiced at Geertz
and others: Why has no attention been paid to the dimension of power that is nec-
essarily implicated in culture? Second, the history of sensibilities might seem to be
concerned more with description than with explanation, and thus to be content to
avoid issues having to do with why sensibilities take the form they do or what their
social roots or sources are. In sidestepping questions of the social determination of
cultural forms, such an approach necessarily avoids questions of power and agency.
By focusing on cultural representation, we can identify the social roots and agencies
27 Richard Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu (New York, 1992), 92–93. For an example of a historian’s use
of habitus, see Linda Young, “ ‘Extensive, Economical and Elegant’: The Habitus of Gentility in Nine-
teenth Century Sydney,” Australian Historical Studies 24 (2004): 201–220. On issues of structure, agency,
and power in social theory and history and how Bourdieu fits into those issues, see William H. Sewell,
Jr., Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation (Chicago, 2005), 137–139. For an inter-
pretation that stresses Bourdieu’s consistency with the political outlooks of social history and distin-
guishes habitus from mentalité in terms of agency, see Julian Vincent, “The Sociologist and the Republic:
Pierre Bourdieu and the Virtues of Social History,” History Workshop Journal 58 (2004): 140.

674 Daniel Wickberg
of culture, and the ways in which culture is implicated in power relations. That would
seem to be the nature of this criticism.28
What this brand of criticism might see as a fundamental flaw, however, can ac-
tually be regarded as a virtue. The overwhelming focus on instrumentalizing culture
as a tool of power in some of the dominant forms of cultural history finds no room
for those elements of culture that cannot be implicated in power relations. Culture
is not power, nor is power the only or the most important element of culture. Power
is but one dimension of culture, a dimension that might be more or less important
for the historian and analyst, depending upon the concrete specifics of the cultural

moment being studied. It is an impoverished vision of human life that insists on
turning people’s whole ways of experiencing, perceiving, and feeling into expressions
of one dimension of human life. Whatever the important intellectual gains and suc-
cesses that have been achieved by the cultural historians of representation, and their
view that historical analysis means explaining the ways in which culture both ex-
presses and constitutes power relations, there is a world of meaning that falls by the
wayside when this view predominates. The debate over agency ends up insisting that
culture is an object of negotiation or a forum for manipulation of meaning based on
some pre-cultural standing; the idea of a history of sensibilities, on the other hand,
finds culture to be the condition of being and action rather than primarily an in-
strument or object of action.
One of the consequences of the sensibilities approach to history is the fore-
grounding of the “what” of history, and the backgrounding of the “why.” Thus his-
torians who are focused overwhelmingly on providing causal explanations might find
this approach inadequate to their conception of history.29 All historians purport to
give explanations, and it would be hard to imagine a form of historical writing that
did without any causal mechanisms at all; the absence of explanation would be a
genre violation, if nothing else. That said, the relative emphasis of a sensibilities
28 I am assuming that the criticisms that anthropologists and historians have aimed at the early- and
mid-twentieth-century concepts of culture, as well as at more recent Geertzian notions of culture as a

semiotic system, would be similar in kind to those aimed at the approach I am advocating—that they
provide a false notion of uniformity and consensus, thereby hiding the battle over meaning arising from
differential power situations. See Agnew, “History and Anthropology”; Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley,
and Sherry B. Ortner, eds., Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory (Princeton,
N.J., 1994), especially 22, where the editors state that Geertz “never confronted the issue of power”;
George E. Marcus and Michael M. J. Fisher, Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment
in the Human Sciences (Chicago, 1986); Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler, eds.,
Cultural Studies (New York, 1992); Sherry B. Ortner, Anthropology and Social Theory: Culture, Power,
and the Acting Subject (Durham, N.C., 2006); William H. Sewell, Jr., “The Concept(s) of Culture,” in
Gabrielle Spiegel, ed., Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn
(New York, 2005), 76–95.
29 The difference between interpretive and explanatory approaches, or descriptive and causal ac-
counts, goes deep into the history of historiography and the philosophy of history. Perhaps its most
explicit formulation was in the debate between Carl Hempel and William Dray over “covering laws” in
historical explanation, in which Hempel argued that all historical accounts involve causal explanations
deduced from general laws, while Dray followed Collingwood and others in emphasizing that historical
accounts involve a rethinking of the motives and understandings of historical actors, or a kind of de-
scriptive explication of meaning. The issue thus speaks to whether history is to be understood as a
nomothetic or ideographic discipline, as a social science or a humanistic discipline. See Hempel, “The
Function of General Laws in History,” Journal of Philosophy 39 (1942): 35– 48; Dray, Laws and Expla-
nations in History (New York, 1957); Novick, That Noble Dream, 393– 400; Haskell, Objectivity Is Not
Neutrality. On the shift in the social sciences from causal mechanics to interpretive understandings, see
Geertz, “Blurred Genres: The Refiguration of Social Thought,” in Geertz, Local Knowledge, 19–35.

approach to history is on explicating what makes the cultures of the past different
from those of the present, and not on applying causal mechanics to cultures. The
history of sensibilities seeks to understand what and how other peoples have per-
ceived, thought, and felt, and sometimes that understanding requires a willingness
to avoid the necessary reductionism and instrumentalism that all causal accounts
require. The history of sensibilities involves a kind of interpretation that is analytical
and descriptive in its orientation and imaginative in its capacity to understand oth-
erness, but that gives secondary importance to causal explanation.
The history of sensibilities is compatible with various kinds of historical expla-

nations as they have been rendered in the writings of historians, but it is not com-
patible with any approach that says that understanding is equivalent to providing a
causal explanation. Although debates about causality might provide great fodder for
drawing lines of historiographical difference, if we look at what historians actually
do, much of their attention is given to issues of explication, description (both “thick”
and “thin”), and presentation of what was, rather than what “caused” events. In this
sense, the approach being advocated here is consistent with the general sensibility
of historians, if not with those who lean in the most social scientific and theoretical
direction.
A related criticism of the concept of a history of sensibilities, and its association
with an older style of cultural history, is its propensity for use in a sweeping and
over-generalizing fashion. Like “zeitgeist” or “mind,” terms used to characterize the
culture of particular epochs, the idea of sensibility is perhaps associated with a ver-
sion of history that makes claims about the uniform or “consensus” culture of entire
periods of cultural life. This way of regarding the past runs like a thread through
much of the writing of cultural history in the twentieth century; we find it, for in-
stance, in the passages from Huizinga and Sontag quoted above. And it is probably
responsible for the low esteem in which such history has been held since the social
history revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s. But there is nothing inherent in looking
at past sensibilities as collective predispositions that requires this kind of general-
ization. It is perfectly reasonable, and very much in line with any serious attention
to the past, to recognize that multiple and overlapping cultural sensibilities exist at
any given time, that there are countercultures as well as dominant orientations, that
the concept of culture does not require uniform and homogeneous sensibilities. Any
serious historian of sensibilities should be able to make a distinction between what
is worth preserving in the older cultural history and what is indefensible. This does
not mean that culture should necessarily be viewed as an arena of conflict and con-
test, or as a source of power.30 Instead of regarding culture as an instrument of
30 Marxist and Foucauldian approaches seem equally obsessed with the idea that power—however
abstractly defined—is necessarily situated in culture; the analysis of cultural forms becomes a means of
situating those forms and meanings in relationship to power. This view often leads back to the analysis
of social categories, identities, and objects such as race, class, and gender as at the core of culture, since
these social categories express power relations most explicitly. The foregrounding of such categories,
however, may tell us much more about the sensibilities of contemporary analysts than about the sen-
sibilities of those people in the past we are trying to understand. On the idea of power in cultural history,
see Dirks, Eley, and Ortner, Culture/Power/History; Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Inter-
views and Other Writings, ed. Colin Gordon (New York, 1980); Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Understanding
the Relative Autonomy of Culture,” in Alexander and Steven Seidman, eds., Culture and Society: Con-
temporary Debates (Cambridge, 1990), 21–25.

676 Daniel Wickberg
political and social conflicts, the history of sensibilities pulls us back to the substance
of culture. It asks us not about how people used culture for social and political ends,
but about the terms in which they experienced the world. It does, however, require
us to recognize the diversity of sensibilities and to avoid making unsubstantiated
generalizations about “the spirit of the age.”
The notion of a history of sensibilities might also be associated in a narrow way
with literary or art history. Given its provenance—its ties to modern conceptions of
taste and aesthetics—this association makes sense. But there is no reason why sen-
sibilities should necessarily be understood in this narrow way, and for historians they

should in fact be understood in the broadest possible way. All persons presumably
have ways of perceiving, feeling, and experiencing the world. Literary texts are only
one possible source for the historian of sensibilities, and certainly not her specific
subject matter. Every document, insofar as it is the product of an author’s conscious-
ness, embodies some element of a sensibility that can be reconstructed from it. A
personal diary records aspects of a sensibility—those who choose to record only
weather, births, and deaths obviously have different sensibilities than do those who
record personal thoughts or the minutiae of social life. Account books reveal a sen-
sibility, as do tax registers.31 As with all fields of historical research, most people did
not leave firsthand accounts, and most of reality itself has gone unrecorded. But if
this fact has not narrowed the scope of social or economic history, there is no reason
why it should delimit the field of the history of sensibilities. Historians are always
in the position of having to reconstruct the past from a tiny record of actual human
existence; they simply need to find creative ways to use the existing sources. But this
does not mean that sensibilities find a special place in literary texts or works of art,
and that literary texts and works of art should be the distinctive sources for a history
of sensibilities.
A good illustration of sensibilities comes from a somewhat unexpected place: the
writing not of contemporary historians, but of the philosopher William James. In a
well-known passage in his book Pragmatism (1907), James distinguished between two
bodies of philosophical thought, which he characterized as “tough-minded” and
“tender-minded.” Instead of discussing the empiricist and rationalist traditions as
schools of modern philosophy based on specific doctrines, assumptions, logical con-
clusions, methods of argument, and the like—that is, as philosophies—James sinks
philosophical thought into attitudes, dispositions, temperaments, feelings, and moral
preferences—in a word, into sensibilities. Using two columns, he distinguishes the
traits of the tough-minded and the tender-minded, and catalogues them thus: The
“mental make-up” of the tender-minded is rationalistic (going by “principles”), in-
tellectualistic, idealistic, optimistic, religious, free-willist, monistic, dogmatical. That
of the tough-minded is empiricist (going by “facts”), sensationalistic, materialistic,
pessimistic, irreligious, fatalistic, pluralistic, skeptical. Note that for James, the ques-
tion is not whether one or the other of these sensibilities is concerned with some
particular problem, issue, or object, but how each would comprehend any problem,
31 For an example of the ways in which account books can be used, in conjunction with the writings
of political economists and novelists, to unpack a cultural sensibility, see Mary Poovey’s discussion of
double-entry bookkeeping in A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of
Wealth and Society (Chicago, 1998), 29–65.

issue, or object. The connections between these dispositions, feelings, and habits of
thinking are not matters of logic or necessity in the way that James describes them.
The tender-minded is not to be argued into tough-mindedness by appeal to argu-
ment, or vice versa; these are dispositions and ways of feeling that exist prior to
argument, and they are the ground upon which argument can take place.32 In one
important sense, however, these are not sensibilities as the concept is being used
here. For James, these dispositions are not culturally specific; in fact, he indicates
that one finds persons of these two dispositions in all times and places—a claim that
many historians would be inclined to dispute. For him, these are psychological habits

of persons, rather than cultural habits of collectivities. So James is no historian.
But the dispositions he describes, if we frame them as culturally specific collective
forms, sound very much like sensibilities. They link an epistemological preference
to a moral outlook to an ontology to a way of feeling. They define the terms in which
people experience and make sense of the world, and in which they represent it to
themselves and others. In other words, these philosophies are the subject not just
of intellectual history or the history of ideas, but of the broader cultural history and
study of collective forms of perception. Instead of thinking of thought as an au-
tonomous realm of logic, reason, and argument, James links it to generalized values,
emotions, and perceptions. Empiricism for James is not so much an epistemology
as an emotional state—a foregrounding of some potential dispositions and a back-
grounding of others, a “feeling for facts” tied to a clinical stance of detachment and
a skeptical fatalism.
THERE ARE A NUMBER OF AMERICAN HISTORIANS who have taken up the history of
sensibilities, going back, in fact, to an era prior to the social history revolution of the
1960s and 1970s. One of the best early examples is Richard Hofstadter, who shared
many of the prevailing post–World War II liberal tendencies of contemporaries such
as Lionel Trilling, particularly Trilling’s concern with liberalism as a temperament,
a way of imagining, a set of dispositions. One of the primary architects of postwar
“consensus history,” the prolific Hofstadter is probably best remembered today for
his interpretations of Populism and Progressivism in The Age of Reform (1954), on
which several generations of graduate students cut their teeth, and for his incisive
and ironic portraits in The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It
(1948).33 His contribution to the history of sensibilities is best exemplified in his
analysis of what he called “the paranoid style” in American history. Looking at a long
tradition of American conspiratorial thinking—from the anti-Masonic movement of
the Jacksonian era, through Populism in the 1890s, nativist and anti-Catholic or-
32 William James, Pragmatism and Other Writings, ed. Giles Gunn (New York, 2000), 7–12.
33 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York, 1955); Hofstadter, The
American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York, 1974). For discussions of Hofstadter
and his role in American historiography, see David S. Brown, Richard Hofstadter: An Intellectual Bi-
ography (Chicago, 2006); Christopher Lasch, “Foreword,” in Hofstadter, The American Political Tra-
dition, vii–xxiv; Alan Brinkley, “In Retrospect: Richard Hofstadter’s The Age of Reform—A Reconsid-
eration,” Reviews in American History 13, no. 3 (1985): 462– 480; Daniel Joseph Singal, “Beyond
Consensus: Richard Hofstadter and American Historiography,” American Historical Review 89, no. 4
(October 1984): 976–1004.

678 Daniel Wickberg
ganizations in the Progressive Era, and McCarthyism in the 1950s—Hofstadter

found the continuous underpinnings of a “pseudo-conservative” sensibility operating
within a set of American subcultures. His tendency to see the American right as
pathological and deluded, and his penchant for psychological explanations based on
a casual Freudianism, among other things, make his work appear dated today and
very much of its own cultural moment. An entire subsequent generation of scholars
has sought to demonstrate that conservative and far-right movements were anything
but irrational and out of the mainstream of American life.34
But Hofstadter’s analysis of the paranoid style was innovative in its search for a

pattern of thought, perception, and feeling beneath the various expressions of right-
wing movements. The paranoid style yokes a set of emotional states (fear, anger,
powerlessness, resentment) to an ontology (an understanding of the world and far-
flung events in it as controlled by secret forces and agencies) to an epistemology (a
kind of “connect the dots” approach to reality, in which the absence of information
serves as proof of the existence of an unseen reality, and education is distrusted as
a tool of sophistry) to a moral order (in which the virtuous stand as exemplars of
purity against the forces of disease, impurity, and crime associated with alien “oth-
ers”) to a mode of action (the identification and purging of the source of corruption).
The specific objects of right-wing movements might vary, in this understanding, but
they all partake of a common sensibility or “style.”35 And as conservative journalists
found, by emulating the “reasonable” stance of postwar liberals such as Hofstadter,
they were able to turn the tables on left-wing critics of the presidential administration
of George W. Bush. The concept of the paranoid style, free of specific content, can
easily be applied to those on the left wing of the political spectrum as well.36
Another practitioner of the history of sensibilities is Jackson Lears, whose Fables
of Abundance (1994) is at first glance a cultural history of advertising, but on deeper
inspection reveals itself to be a history of the transformation of the relationship
between mind and body, between a feeling for nature and the world and what Lears
calls the modern de-materialization of consumer culture; the history of advertising
serves as an entrée into the history of a modern sensibility. Lears describes an op-
position between a premodern “animistic sensibility” and the modern disembodi-
ment of abundance underwriting consumer culture; his reading of advertisements is
focused on unpacking the cultural sensibilities that underlie them. Inverting the cul-
tural critique that sees consumerism as rooted in a shallow materialism, Lears argues
that Protestant demystification of the material world, capitalist instrumentalism, and
34 See Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression (New
York, 1983); Leo Ribuffo, The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great Depression
to the Cold War (Philadelphia, 1983); Glenn Jeansonne, Gerald L. K. Smith: Minister of Hate (New Haven,
Conn., 1988); Kathleen M. Blee, Women of the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s (Berkeley, Calif.,
1991); Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus
(New York, 2001); Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton,
N.J., 2001).
35 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (Chicago, 1965),
3– 40.
36 David Brooks, “The Prosecutor’s Diagnosis: No Cancer Found,” New York Times, October 30,
2005, 13; William Kristol, “The Paranoid Style in American Liberalism,” The Weekly Standard 11, no.
16 (2006): n.p.

managerial rationality resulted in a separation of the desiring self from the embodied
world of fertile forces, and an alienation of the consumer from his or her own body.
Compare the opening paragraph of Fables of Abundance to that of Huizinga’s
Autumn of the Middle Ages, cited earlier: “For centuries the hungry peasant bent to
face the earth. Homo and humus were twinned. Death and rebirth mingled in the
dung heap; filth and fecundity merged in formless, inchoate matter. Intimate ac-
quaintance with dirt shaped dreams of deliverance from want. Ethereal visions of
paradise were touched with significant soil.”37 Like Huizinga’s romantic image of a
non-alienated past, this is another variant of “the world we have lost,” a trope that

pervades so much of contemporary historiography and that has a distinguished lin-
eage in Western culture.38 And as with Huizinga, the difference in the worlds of past
and present is figured as a matter of sensibility, as what Lears calls “ways of being
in the world.” Reading images and texts not so much in terms of the specific objects
being represented or the goods being sold, but in terms of their approach to the world
of matter and goods in general, Lears asks his readers to look beyond the “what”
of consumer culture—its proliferation of commodities—to see the “how”—the sep-
aration of desire from the embodied world. His argument owes more than a little
to Eliot’s dissociation of sensibility.39
Perhaps the best-known instance of historical concern with sensibility lies in the
debate surrounding the rise of the humanitarian sensibility in eighteenth- and early-
nineteenth-century Britain and America.40 David Brion Davis had identified an enor-
mous shift in moral perception in the eighteenth century, when slavery, which, with
very little dissent, had seemed morally unproblematic in Western thought and cul-
ture, began to appear morally unacceptable to a significant minority of Britons and
Americans. While Davis offered a multicausal explanation for the rise of antislavery
thought and action in “the age of revolution,” one of the key elements of his dis-
cussion was the development of a new literary, religious, and philosophical orien-
tation in British culture that emphasized human benevolence, sympathetic concern
37 Jackson Lears, Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America (New York, 1994),
17. See also Lears, Something for Nothing: Luck in America (New York, 2003).
38 The expression “the world we have lost” comes from Peter Laslett, The World We Have Lost (New
York, 1973), but of course the idea of a golden age from which the present represents a falling away
or a decline goes back at least to Hesiod and finds expression in central cultural symbols such as the
Garden of Eden. Its use in modern historical argument derives more immediately from nineteenth-
century sociology and its variety of binary distinctions between the social forms of medieval and modern.
For an interesting discussion of the relationship between modern historical consciousness and the sense
of a lost past, see Peter Fritzsche, “Specters of History: On Nostalgia, Exile, and Modernity,” American
Historical Review 106, no. 5 (December 2001): 1587–1618.
39 The list of works that partake of some facet of the approach I am describing as the history of
sensibilities is extensive. Some other exemplary works include Miles Orvell, The Real Thing: Imitation
and Authenticity in American Culture, 1880–1940 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1989); John E. Crowley, The In-
vention of Comfort: Sensibilities and Design in Early Modern Britain and Early America (Baltimore, Md.,
2001); Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: A History of the Modern Sensibility (New York, 1983);
Lawrence Levine, Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to
Freedom (New York, 1977); Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 1740–1790 (Chapel Hill, N.C.,
1982); James W. Cook, The Arts of Deception: Playing with Fraud in the Age of Barnum (Cambridge, Mass.,
2001); Daniel Wickberg, The Senses of Humor: Self and Laughter in Modern America (Ithaca, N.Y., 1998);
David Shi, Facing Facts: Realism in American Thought and Culture, 1850–1920 (New York, 1995).
40 This debate, with contributions by John Ashworth, David Brion Davis, and Thomas L. Haskell,
is compiled in Thomas Bender, ed., The Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem
in Historical Interpretation (Berkeley, Calif., 1992).

680 Daniel Wickberg
with suffering, and a revulsion from pain. The humanitarian sensibility united an
ethics of feeling with an empiricist epistemology, a moral universalism and a notion of
necessary action to alleviate suffering. Antislavery was a matter not only of a new set
of ideas or an intellectual perspective, but of a new way of perceiving and feeling.41
It is ironic, then, that Thomas Haskell’s well-known critique of Davis, which in
fact made the term “humanitarian sensibility” central to the debate and to historians’
vocabulary, had so little to say about the historically specific sensibility it purported
to examine. The central debate about the causal relationship between the antislavery
movement and the rise of capitalism—was it a matter of class interest and “hege-

mony,” the mechanism of the market, or the valorization of the bourgeois family as
a counterbalance to the market?—tended to shunt the discussion of the sensibility
itself to the side, as did Haskell’s rather abstract and speculative argument about
markets, causal chains, and “recipes” for action. Haskell offered a powerful and
sophisticated causal explanation linking capitalism to antislavery activism. But here
is an excellent object lesson on the way in which the focus on causality leads the
historian away from the specific and concrete historical sensibility to a more general
and abstract process that instrumentalizes the sensibility. Haskell’s argument simply
assumed an equation between the antislavery movement and a humanitarian sen-
sibility, and then proceeded to create a model of the market and its consequences
for patterns of thought, with very little specific historical reference. That is, his for-
mulation sought to explain the action of antislavery activism in relation to a pre-
sumed logic of the market without showing how historical actors perceived, sensed,
and felt, or how texts created by them expressed a sensibility. By focusing on the
outcome—antislavery activism—and the presumed intellectual consequences of
capitalist markets, Haskell made the sensibility embedded in historical documents
largely irrelevant to his account.
What Haskell seemed to see as the humanitarian sensibility was less a new pattern
of moral and emotional understanding, and more a new imaginative capacity for
understanding action at a distance through extended causal chains, and putting
moral principle into action. If Davis linked Protestant latitudinarianism to Scottish
moral philosophy to the literary culture of sentiment to evangelical experiential re-
ligion, and in doing so painted a picture of a new sensibility through the examination
of a wide range of texts and documents, Haskell preferred to create abstract and
speculative models of “starving strangers” and the capacity for imagining complex
causal changes that he never showed as evident in any specific historical texts or
documents. In order to emphasize the supposed new ways of imagining causal se-
quence provoked by the market, Haskell had to downplay the moral ideas and feel-
ings of the new sensibility. His argument focused more on the rise of a new form of
behavior (antislavery activism) and less on what made up the sensibility behind that
activism. In fact, he insisted that as a matter of moral prescription, nothing had
changed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: the Golden Rule contained all
that anyone needed to know about prescriptive morality in antislavery thought, as
41 David Brion Davis, “What the Abolitionists Were Up Against,” in Davis, The Problem of Slavery
in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1975), 45– 46; also in Bender, The Antislavery Debate,
22–23. For the more detailed argument, of which this is a summary and restatement, see Davis, The
Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966), 333– 493.

if the prescription were itself self-evident and unchanging and required only new
application to a world of imagined possibilities.42
Those who followed Haskell in discussing the humanitarian sensibility were more
concerned with analyzing the modes of perception, feeling, and being contained in
the humanitarian sensibility. Thomas Laqueur, for instance, showed that realistic
representation of concrete details in medical and reform texts, by foregrounding the
specific and empirical, drew a moral connection between concreteness, immediate
sensation, and ameliorative action. The rise of realism and descriptive empiricism,
in this account, fosters not a fatalistic detachment, but a moral impulse to inter-

vention. Karen Halttunen has taken this further by showing the flip side or “evil twin”
of the humanitarian sensibility: the genre of horror, with its commitment to de-
scriptive detail as a substitute for its inability to understand evil as a feature of human
nature; and what she calls the “pornography of pain,” the detailed depiction of phys-
ical suffering as a form of titillation based on the same sensationalist epistemology
as humanitarian depictions of suffering. And Elizabeth Clark has demonstrated the
ways in which the logic of humanitarian sympathy and the emotive connections it
drew between persons could underwrite a liberal political philosophy of rights. Schol-
arship on humanitarianism is one of the most fruitful areas of research in the history
of sensibilities.43
In addition to texts such as these, there are two bodies of historiography that seem
to be developing elements of the history of sensibilities. The first is the history of
emotions, which has received a very strong push from Peter Stearns, particularly in
his role as editor of the Journal of Social History. It was Febvre who first proposed
a history of emotions more than sixty years ago. Scholars such as Stearns, Jan Lewis,
and William Reddy have sought to historicize emotions—first by looking at varying
emotional rules as developed in prescriptive literature, or what Stearns and Stearns
called “emotionology,” and then by developing the idea of emotional style as a his-
42 Thomas L. Haskell, “Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility, Part I,” in
Bender, The Antislavery Debate, 107–135, and “Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sen-
sibility, Part II,” ibid., 136–160; Haskell, “Convention and Hegemonic Interest in the Debate over An-
tislavery: A Reply to Davis and Ashworth,” ibid., 200–259, especially 224, where Haskell argues that “The
rule of reciprocity that the Golden Rule embodies is so central to moral judgment that everything else
that can be said by way of prescribing moral duty is gilding the lily. The idea of reciprocity was not new;
it has been available in the form of biblical precept for at least two millennia, and by itself it provided
an adequate prescriptive basis for devoting one’s entire life to the liberation of slaves . . . [T]he sudden
surge of humanitarian activism in the eighteenth century was not fundamentally a matter of prescription,
no matter how indispensable prescription may have been to the outcome.” For an alternative reading
of the prescriptive orientation of the Golden Rule in proslavery thought, see Eugene Genovese and
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The Mind of the Master Class: History and Faith in the Southern Slaveholder’s
World View (Cambridge, 2005), 613–624. The Haskell articles originally appeared, respectively, in the
American Historical Review 90, no. 2 (April 1985): 339–361; 90, no. 3 (June 1985): 547–566; and 92, no.
4 (October 1987): 829–878.
43 Thomas W. Laqueur, “Bodies, Details, and the Humanitarian Narrative,” in Hunt, The New Cul-
tural History, 176–204; Karen Halttunen, “Early American Murder Narratives: The Birth of Horror,”
in Richard Wightman Fox and T. J. Jackson Lears, eds., The Power of Culture: Critical Essays in American
History (Chicago, 1993), 67–101; Halttunen, “Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-
American Culture,” American Historical Review 100, no. 2 (April 1995): 303–334; Elizabeth B. Clark,
“ ‘The Sacred Rights of the Weak’: Pain, Sympathy, and the Culture of Individual Rights in Antebellum
America,” Journal of American History 82, no. 2 (1995): 463– 493. See also Michael Meranze, Laboratories
of Virtue: Punishment, Revolution, and Authority in Philadelphia, 1760–1835 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996);
Susan M. Ryan, The Grammar of Good Intentions: Race and the Antebellum Culture of Benevolence
(Ithaca, N.Y., 2005).

682 Daniel Wickberg
torical variable, as in Stearns’s book American Cool, and finally by attempting to

integrate psychological research on emotions with linguistic analysis of emotional
speech acts, as in Reddy’s The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of
Emotions.44 The problem with the history of emotions is its tendency to separate
emotion from cognition, to treat emotions as if they were a discrete realm rather than
seeing them as linked to larger characterological patterns involving modes of per-
ception and thinking as well as feeling. In some ways, the focus on emotions as a
discrete set of psychological phenomena would seem to confirm Eliot’s notion that
modern culture views emotions and thought as entirely distinct from one another.

Intellectual historians want precious little to do with emotions, and historians of
emotions want precious little to do with intellectual history.
The second body of scholarship focuses on the history of the senses themselves.
As is frequently the case, the French were in the vanguard. Alain Corbin’s studies
of the history of odor and the history of sound in France laid the foundation for
scholarship that would isolate sensory perception as a legitimate object of historical
research, and that would lift sensation out of the realm of biology and psychology
and into the realm of culture. American historians such as Mark Smith, Peter Charles
Hoffer, and Richard Cullen Rath have built upon this foundation by identifying
different sensory patterns in the colonial American past and linking the senses to
such notable historical phenomena as race and segregation. Historians of technology
have shown the ways in which changes in technologies have had consequences for
the forms in which sound and vision are experienced.45 Many of the works in modern
European history have focused on cultural attitudes toward vision and its privileged
place in the hierarchy of senses, in particular.46 There is very little yet written on the
44 Febvre, “Sensibility and History,” is more an argument for the history of emotions than for the
history of what I am calling sensibilities. For developments in the last twenty-five years, see Peter N.
Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns, “Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Stan-
dards,” American Historical Review 90, no. 4 (October 1985): 813–836; Carol Zisowitz Stearns and Peter
N. Stearns, Anger: The Struggle for Emotional Control in America’s History (Chicago, 1986); Peter N.
Stearns, American Cool: Constructing a Twentieth-Century Emotional Style (New York, 1994); Karen
Lystra, Searching the Heart: Women, Men, and Romantic Lives in Nineteenth-Century America (New York,
1989); Jan Lewis and Peter N. Stearns, eds., An Emotional History of the United States (New York, 1998);
William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge,
2001); John C. Spurlock and Cynthia A. Magistro, New and Improved: The Transformation of American
Women’s Emotional Culture (New York, 1998); Barbara H. Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions in
History,” American Historical Review 107, no. 3 (June 2002): 821–845; Joanna Bourke, “Fear and Anx-
iety: Writing about Emotion in Modern History,” History Workshop Journal 55 (2003): 111–133; Andrew
Cayton, “Insufficient Woe: Sense and Sensibility in Writing Nineteenth-Century History,” Reviews in
American History 31, no. 3 (2003): 331–341.
45 Alain Corbin, The Foul and the Fragrant: Odor and the French Social Imagination (Cambridge,
Mass. 1986); Corbin, Village Bells: Sound and Meaning in the Nineteenth-Century French Countryside,
trans. Martin Thom (New York, 1998); Constance Classen, David Howes, and Anthony Synott, Aroma:
The Cultural History of Smell (New York, 1994); Mark M. Smith, Listening to Nineteenth-Century America
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 2001); Emily Thompson, The Soundscape of Modernity: Architectural Acoustics and
the Culture of Listening in America (Cambridge, Mass., 2002); George H. Roeder, Jr., “Coming to Our
Senses,” Journal of American History 81, no. 3 (1994): 1112–1122; Mark M. Smith, “Making Sense of
Social History,” Journal of Social History 37, no. 1 (2003): 165–186; Peter Charles Hoffer, Sensory Worlds
in Early America (Baltimore, Md., 2003); Richard Cullen Rath, How Early America Sounded (Ithaca,
N.Y., 2003); Leigh Eric Schmidt, Hearing Things: Religion, Illusion, and the American Enlightenment
(Cambridge, 2000); Mark M. Smith, “Making Scents Make Sense: White Noses, Black Smells, and De-
segregation,” in Peter N. Stearns, ed., American Behavioral History: An Introduction (New York, 2005),
181–198; Smith, How Race Is Made: Slavery, Segregation, and the Senses (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2006).
46 See, for instance, Donald M. Lowe, History of Bourgeois Perception (Chicago, 1982). But Leora

history of the senses of taste or touch. The starting point for much of the history of
the senses is a consciousness that modern cultures have privileged the visual and
made the sense of sight the primary source of knowledge; those societies in which
vision was not primary have been evaluated in terms of the visual, rather than the
significance of the other senses. So we have yet another version of the world we have
lost. Rath says in his introduction: “My hope is that by attending to sound I have
been able to open up parts of these worlds, not to get a glimpse of them but to listen
in. These were worlds much more alive with sound than our own, worlds not yet
disenchanted, worlds perhaps even chanted into being.”47 The notion that the sig-

nificance of various forms of sensory experience is culturally variable fits well with
the approach examined here. Any cultural sensibility would seem to involve a par-
ticular hierarchy of sensory experience, rather than a fixed universal mode of sen-
sation applicable across cultures. So far, however, the scholarship has focused more
on the individual senses—smell, hearing—than on the way those senses fit into an
overall pattern of sensation, or how they might be linked to emotional states.
SKEPTICS WILL SAY THAT SENSIBILITIES CAN BE FOUND only in representations, that it
is only in discourse or texts of various kinds that sensibilities achieve any defini-
tion—and they are right. But instead of assembling a group of texts defined by their
content, and then saying that these texts are all part of a discourse that is about that
content in some fundamental way, that its terms of representation are somehow
central to the object being depicted, historians might try to move away from the
object and find the perceptual, emotive, and conceptual frameworks that make it
possible for that object to be represented in that way. For instance, cultural studies
of the discourse of slavery begin with the idea that slavery is an object of repre-
sentation, and assemble various depictions, images, and discussions of slavery with
the assumption that the discourse of slavery is defined by the common subject matter
at the center of it, and not by preexisting sensibilities. The assumption is that the
discourse of slavery is a response to slavery itself, rather than part of a broader set
of perceptual orientations that make slavery visible.48 To use James’s categories, the
tough-minded and the tender-minded will see and feel objects through different
lenses; the detached scientist encounters a different world from that of the human-
itarian sentimentalist. In order to see the object at all, we need to have the equipment
for seeing; in order to find emotional response, we need to identify the orientation
toward feeling. The humanitarian sensibility is not a response to slavery, for instance,
even if slavery comes to be important in giving shape and content to that sensibility.
Rather, slavery comes to be represented as a moral evil in the eighteenth and nine-
Auslander and others have argued that vision is denigrated as a source of knowledge in contemporary
intellectual discourse by a relentless focus on language and abstraction. The advocates of “visual culture”
are arguing that we have overlooked the visual, at the very moment that the advocates for a history of
hearing or smelling are arguing that we have given primacy to the visual over the other senses. See
Auslander, “Beyond Words,” American Historical Review 110, no. 4 (October 2005): 1015–1045.
47 Rath, How Early America Sounded, 9.
48 For an example of an influential work that takes slavery as an object of representation around
which to orient its cultural analysis, see Saidiya V. Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and
Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America (New York, 1997).

684 Daniel Wickberg
teenth centuries at least in part because of the development of a humanitarian sen-

sibility. Advocates of cultural studies have been so busy analyzing (or, as they like
to say, “interrogating”) the making, constructing, constituting, queering, and gen-
dering of categories that they have neglected the ground of perception and feeling
that makes such categories visible in the first place. So, without dismissing the in-
fluence of cultural studies altogether, let us make a modest plea for recovering what
continues to be of value in the old cultural history. Historians will always need ac-
counts that seek to explain historical events, movements, and actions; they will always
need accounts that focus on the ways in which power structures cultural beliefs and

practices. But the historical imagination also provides us with the capacity to see
more than the objects of consciousness or the material circumstances of the past as
different from those of the present. It gets us in back of the cultural world, and lets
us see patterns of perception, feeling, thinking, and believing as fundamental to what
makes one culture different from another. And it might even help us bind up the
wounds of the dissociation of sensibilities, and put us on the road to recovery of those
worlds we have lost.
Daniel Wickberg is Associate Professor of Historical Studies/History of Ideas

at the University of Texas at Dallas, where he has taught since 1996. He is the
author of The Senses of Humor: Self and Laughter in Modern America (Cornell
University Press, 1998) and is currently working on a history of the idea of sym-
pathy in American culture. This is one in a planned series of articles on cultural
and intellectual historiography and methods.

Wickberg, What Is The History of Sensibilities

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Wickberg, What Is The History of Sensibilities

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Wickberg, What Is The History of Sensibilities

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What Is the History of Sensibilities?

On Cultural Histories, Old and New

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

BUT WHAT, EXACTLY, IS MEANT HERE BY “SENSIBILITY”? Raymond Williams famously

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

modern concept of sensibility lie in seventeenth-century British empiricism and sen-

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

seemed to be that sensibilities, like cultures, belonged to collectives—nations,

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

Essays in Popular Philosophy (London, 1897), 63–110.

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

The concept of the habitus—embodied dispositions—functions as an analogue for culture

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

THE POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF AN APPROACH TO CULTURAL HISTORY that focuses on

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

mid-twentieth-century concepts of culture, as well as at more recent Geertzian notions of culture as a

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

ganizations in the Progressive Era, and McCarthyism in the 1950s—Hofstadter

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

torical variable, as in Stearns’s book American Cool, and finally by attempting to

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2007

teenth centuries at least in part because of the development of a humanitarian sen-

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/112/3/661/27451 by guest on 15 December 2019

Daniel Wickberg is Associate Professor of Historical Studies/History of Ideas