Opulencia v. CA, Et. Al

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[SUCCESSION: GENERAL PROVISIONS]

Case Citation: G.R. No. 125835

Date: July 30, 1998

Petitioners: NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA

Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, ALADIN SIMUNDAC and MIGUEL OLIVAN

Doctrine: ● Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedents
death. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell,
because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her
share in the estate of her late father.

Subject matter of Validity of the Contract to Sell


controversy:

Antecedent ● In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo [herein private
Facts: respondents] Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that [herein petitioner]
Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in their favor a CONTRACT TO SELL Lot 2125
of the Sta. Rosa Estate; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but
defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the
contract. [Private respondents] therefore prayed that [petitioner] be ordered to
perform her contractual obligations.

Petitioner’s ● Petitioner admitted the execution of the contract in favor of plaintiffs. However, she
Contention: put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the
contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioners father), in
respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
24, Bian, Laguna; that at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware
of the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not
approved by the probate court;
● that realizing the nullity of the contract [petitioner] had offered to return the
downpayment received from [private respondents], but the latter refused to accept it;
that [private respondents] further failed to provide funds for the tenant who
demanded P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy rights on the land; that [petitioner]
had chosen to rescind the contract.

Respondent’s
Contention:

MTC/RTC Ruling: ● It appears further that in an Order that the court a quo granted the demurrer to
evidence filed by petitioner and dismissed the complaint. It justified its action in
dismissing the complaint in the following manner:
It is noteworthy that when the contract to sell was consummated, no petition was filed in
the Court with notice to the heirs of the time and place of hearing, to show that the sale
is necessary and beneficial. A sale of properties of an estate as beneficial to the
interested parties must comply with the requisites provided by law, (Sec. 7, Rule 89,
Rules of Court) which are mandatory, and without them, the authority to sell, the sale
itself, and the order approving it, would be null and void ab initio. Besides, it is
axiomatic that where the estate of a deceased person is already the subject of a testate
or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it
without prior approval of the probate Court.

CA Ruling: Declaring the Contract to Sell valid, subject to the outcome of the testate proceedings
on Demetrio Carpenas estate, the appellate court set aside the trial courts dismissal of
the complaint and correctly ruled as follows:
Presumably, what the lower court had in mind was the sale of the estate or part thereof
made by the administrator for the benefit of the estate, as authorized under Rule 89 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which requires the approval of the probate court upon
application therefor with notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees.
However, as adverted to by appellants in their brief, the contract to sell in question is
not covered by Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court since it was made by appellee in
her capacity as an heir, of a property that was devised to her under the will sought to be
probated. Thus, while the document inadvertently stated that appellee executed the
contract in her capacity as executrix and administratrix of the estate, a cursory reading
of the entire text of the contract would unerringly show that what she undertook to sell
to appellants was one of the other properties given to her by her late father, and more
importantly, it was not made for the benefit of the estate but for her own needs.

Issue: WON the Contract to Sell executed by the [p]etitioner and [p]rivate
[r]espondent[s] without the requisite probate court approval is valid.

SC Ruling: Contract to Sell Valid


● As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court
is not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity
as an heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she
represented herself as the lawful owner and seller of the subject parcel of land. She
also explained the reason for the sale to be difficulties in her living conditions and
consequent need of cash. These representations clearly evince that she was not
acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she entered into the Contract to
Sell. Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by petitioner has no application to the
instant case.
● We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the
moment of the decedents death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her
hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial
approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has
the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her
late father. Thus, in Jakosalem vs. Rafols, the Court resolved an identical issue
under the old Civil Code and held:
● Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of hereditary
property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the
instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted. And
Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs
becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or
portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus
formed among the coowners of the estate while it remains undivided. xxx And
according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or
mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment
or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the
partition upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, where some of the
heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased
father, this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that
the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may be
allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.
Administration of the Estate Not Prejudiced by the Contract to Sell
● Petitioner further contends that [t]o sanction the sale at this stage would bring about
a partial distribution of the decedents estate pending the final termination of the
testate proceedings.
● Petitioners contention is not convincing. The Contract to Sell stipulates that
petitioners offer to sell is contingent on the complete clearance of the court on the
Last Will Testament of her father. Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was
perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the
probate proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over
the parcel of land to the private respondents is subject to the full payment of the
purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings.
Therefore, there is no basis for petitioners apprehension that the Contract to Sell
may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate.
● WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

OTHER ISSUE:
Estoppel
● Finally, petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representations in her valid Contract to Sell with
private respondents, from whom she had already received P300,000 as initial payment of the purchase
price. Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and representations, to the prejudice of the private
respondents who have relied on them.

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