Garcia Vs Mojica

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[ GR No.

139043, Sep 10, 1999 ]


MAYOR ALVIN B. GARCIA v. ARTURO C.
MOJICA +

Naoimi Jose Merl R. Leano

Dexter John N. Bambalan


FACTS:

On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig
for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which period was to
commence on September 1998 when the first delivery should have been made by F.E. Zuellig.

March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by
Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.

Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After his investigation,
he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner
and the other city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas,
approved this recommendation.

June 25, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman issued the questioned preventive suspension
order. On June 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, which motion was
denied in an order dated July 5, 1999.

Petitioner contends that:

THE RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR


EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0452 AND
ISSUING THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDER, THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN BEING
WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, CONSIDERING THAT THE ALLEGED
ACT CONSTITUTING THE CHARGE AGAINST PETITIONER HEREIN WAS COMMITTED DURING HIS
PREVIOUS TERM, AND PETITIONER HAVING BEEN REELECTED TO THE SAME POSITION.

II

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER
OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0452, THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION FOR SIX MONTHS WAS WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AND IN GROSS
VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 63 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE WHICH
MANDATES THAT THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS BE ORDERED
ONLY AFTER THE ISSUES HAVE BEEN JOINED, AND ONLY FOR A PERIOD NOT IN EXCESS OF
SIXTY (60) DAYS.
III

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER
OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0452, THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AND IN GROSS VIOLATION
OF SECTION 26(2) OF THE OMBUDSMAN LAW.
IV

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION, THE
RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE AGAINST PETITIONER WAS "STRONG",
THE LITTLE EVIDENCE ON RECORD CONSISTING SOLELY OF A HEARSAY AFFIDAVIT, AND
INADMISSIBLE NEWSPAPER REPORTS.
Under Article XI, Section 13
- The Ombudsman has the power to:
"investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient."
R.A. 6770

- the Ombudsman Law

- grants the Office of the Ombudsman the statutory power to conduct administrative investigations. Thus,
Section 19 of said law provides:

"SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited
to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification."
Section 21 of R.A. 6770 names the officials subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority:

"SEC. 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary."
Under Section 24 of R.A. 6770

- "SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of
guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition
of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period
of
suspension herein provided."
ISSUES:

Whether or not, given the purpose of preventive suspension and the circumstances of this case, did
respondent deputy ombudsman commit a grave abuse in conducting an inquiry on complaints against the
petitioner.

Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong as to warrant preventive suspension rests with the
Ombudsman.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED insofar as it seeks to declare that respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion in conducting an inquiry on complaints against petitioner, and ordering their
investigation pursuant to respondents' mandate under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Law. But the
petition is hereby GRANTED insofar as it seeks to declare that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion concerning the period of preventive suspension imposed on petitioner, which is the maximum of
six months, it appearing that 24 days the number of days from the date petitioner was suspended on June
25, 1999, to the date of our status quo order on July 19, 1999 were sufficient for the purpose. Accordingly,
petitioner's preventive suspension, embodied in the order of respondent Deputy Ombudsman, dated June
25, 1999, should now be, as it is hereby, LIFTED immediately.

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