HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: ESRA Date: 14/02/2001 Sheet No: 1 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:

Pre Drilling See Attendance List

GUIDEWORD EVENT DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS No ACTION RECOMMENDED

Blowout Problems during appraisal Potential fatalities with significant  Normal drilling precautions 2/2  Evaluate drilling program to
drilling with loss of circulation loss of asset  Awareness of potential include loss of circulation
suggest risk of blow out during problems problems
the development drilling  Pre-drilling seismic site survey  Conduct peer review on drilling
of Gas Group 1 Projects

Note: As BZNA

Note that under SAFEGUARDS & ACTIONS consider in descending order of priority means of PREVENTION, CONTROL & MITIGATION
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: ESRA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 2 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:

See Attendance List

Construction of New Platform and 8” – 3.7 miles Pipeline

GUIDEWORD EVENT DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS No ACTION RECOMMENDED

Platform Potential defficiemcy in piling  Platform subsidence  Plan to do a site survey with 1/2
Installation  Potential capital cost the EPCI contractor after
implication on project contract award
 Provided document from
neighboring area
Potential mishandling of platform  Platform damage Normal precaution 1/2
in transit or during installation  Schedule delay
Poor quality of fabrication Failure in service BP quality assurance and quality 1/2
control
Pipelaying Mishandling of 8” pipeline Potential damage to other lines in Part of bidding appraisal will 1/2 A complete evaluation of contractors
the area include consideration of the and subcontractors personnel during
competence and experience of BLEQ and technical bid evaluation.
subcontractors and adequacy of
vessel and equipment
Anchor handling Potential damage to other lines in  Normal precaution 1/2  Pre-construction meeting with
the area  Properly updated drawings parties involved
 Update pipeline drawings
following the seabed survey
Normal diving hazards Normal precautions 1/3

Note that under SAFEGUARDS & ACTIONS consider in descending order of priority means of PREVENTION, CONTROL & MITIGATION
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: ESRA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 3 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:

Construction on Existing Facility (ESA): See Attendance List

 New 8” riser
 Pig Receiver
 Tie-in to production, test header, relief header and closed drain header

GUIDEWORD EVENT DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS No ACTION RECOMMENDED

Mishandled object Riser installation causing damage  Damage to equipment Details of riser installation have not  Platform needs to be assessed in
to existing equipment  Loss of containment yet been defined terms of its capability of
supporting the new riser
 Construction risk need to be
identified as soon as installation
plan has been developed to
ensure safe constructability
Drop of large equipment e.g. Pig  Damage to equipment As far as practicable avoid heavy lifts
Receiver  Loss of containment over live hydrocarbon equipment
Loss of Breaking into production & test A detailed plan needs to be developed
containment header containing hydrocarbon to tie-in to the existing facility and
risk assessed (production header, etc.)
Hotwork Potential ignition source Ignition of any hydrocarbon Arrange for all hotwork to be done
releases from the operating plant during plant shutdown and
depressurization

Note that under SAFEGUARDS & ACTIONS consider in descending order of priority means of PREVENTION, CONTROL & MITIGATION
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: ESRA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 4 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
ESRA-P-PFD-0001
Operation of New Facility (ESRA) See Attendance List

GUIDEWORD EVENT DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS No ACTION RECOMMENDED

Blow out during  Expected frequent well  Potential fatalities Normal well intervention procedure 2/2
workover intervention  Major damage
 Increases possibility of well
blowout
Rig moving into position and As above Both wells will be shut-in by 2/2 Compare with best BP world-wide
potential impact on operating well SCSSV during rig positioning for practice on rig approach.
major workover involving a towed
vessel
(All pipelines also shut-in and
depressurised) as required by NWJ
SIMOPS procedure
However, for wirelining and coiled
tubing involving self-propelled
vessel, normal production is
maintained. Vessel procedures will
define weather limitations that will
apply with agreement with BP rep.

Blow out during Potential problem of stuck drill  Cost and schedule impact  Reduce mud weight 2/2
drilling a third pipe due to pressure depletion  Radioactive source stuck  Redesign casing point to cover
well downhole both gas and depleted zone
 Rig moving into position and  Potential fatalities  Producing wells are shut in
potential impact on operating  Major damage until BOP is in place
well
 Heavy lift associated with
drilling activity
Potential damage  Dropped objects Major damage due to gas release  Rig orientation such that 2/2
to export pipeline  Drilling rig jackup legs from pipeline pipeline is away from drilling
 Anchor handling rig approach
 All potentially causing  Conduct SIMOPS meeting
damage to export line
Loss of Process leak from Manifold  Major damage to the platform,  Means of leak detection limited 2/2  Consider use of ultrasonic leak
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: ESRA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 5 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
ESRA-P-PFD-0001
Operation of New Facility (ESRA) See Attendance List

containment if ignited to low pressure (decreasing detector

 Potential fatality if the platform pressure?) detection  Procedure for boarding platform
is manned  Open well ventilated platform shall include gas detection as a
 Potential escalation to pipeline will help disposed gas released first priority
riser  Fusible plugs in instrument gas  Check with HSE dept on
system to initiate shut down procedure/criteria for offshore
 Two means of escape to evacuation
boatlanding platform  Procedure of detection and
 (Boat maybe 1-2 miles away at evacuation for injured people
another platform) (buddy system?)
 Platform operator carries  Main isolation valve need to be
personal radio with 13 miles operable in the event of possible
range fire exposure for 15 minutes
Corrosion due to high CO2 and General corrosion Design philosophy is for carbon  Consider metallurgy on ESRA
water content steel material protected by chemical topsides, pipeline, and risers to
injection and supported by pigging give improved resistance to
to control micro-biologically corrosion in the event of an
induced corrosion unreliable chemical injection
Bioside added when high bacterial  Review relevant NWJ corrosion
levels measured data on high CO2 services
Riser leak outboard of the ESDV Uncontrolled release from pipeline  Host platform has an isolation 2/2  Ensure that there is appropriate
valve but no means of protection of the riser from
detection of release other than impact damage (e.g. supply boat)
low pressure at ESRA  ESA platform needs to be
 Splash zone will have modified to send a signal to the
protection Neoprene Coating nearest manned platform (ECHO
Flow station)
Pipeline leak  Uncontrolled release from  Fortuitous detection during 1/2  Chemical injection arrangement
Corrosion as the leak source pipeline routine travel between should include at least 2 times
 Gas and some condensate platforms 50% pumps on line
release to the environment  Corrosion inhibitor injection at  Chemical storage should be
 Hazard to passing ships/boats ESRA sufficient to allow continuous
 8” line is pigable operation between platform
 No means of detecting a leak service
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: ESRA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 6 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
ESRA-P-PFD-0001
Operation of New Facility (ESRA) See Attendance List

directly.  Review the realistic pipeline

 Regional emergency response leaks and the potential effect on
plan & procedures in place the environment (local fish and
with the equipment at Citra shrimp farm, etc.) for all pipeline
Ayu terminal located in the locations (note that JJA and KKA
vicinity of Bravo area. are very close to shore,
 Collaboration with MAXUS approximately 2 miles for JJA)
(neighbouring PSC) for
additional support of spillage
handling
Leak from instrument gas system  Potentially up to 2” failure of  Maximum size 2” 1/3 Consider the merits of gas powered
production gas system  Potential escalation to main hydrolic system
 Increased frequency of gas production system
releases  ESDV on instrument gas
system
Normal venting of instrument gas Environmentally impact  Project requirement to 1/3 Consider the merits of gas powered
system minimize hydrocarbon venting hydrolic system
Leak of scale inhibitor or Hazard to personal and  Spill containment of the 1/3
corrosion inhibitor environment chemical skid is directed to the
slop tank
Structural failure Corrosion Structural collaps  Sacrificial anode protection 15 2/1 Anode should be welded to the
years design life structure
 Increased corrosion allowance
by 1/8” in the splash zone
 Major inspection of the
platform every 2-3 years,
topsides and subsea
Wind & waves Structural collaps  Design criteria is 2/1
simultaneously 100 years wind
and waves
 10 years wave occurrence,
fatigue design life 15 years
Seismic, earthquake  Structural collaps Ductility criteria 800 years 2/1 Consider providing seismic detector
 Potential failure of well recurrence interval and 0.2 g peak system to initiated shut down
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: ESRA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 7 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
ESRA-P-PFD-0001
Operation of New Facility (ESRA) See Attendance List

conductors and loss of contain ground acceleration

hydrocarbon
Seabed foundation failure Structural subsidence
Ship Impact Attendant vessel Structural damage Design caters for potential energy 2/1
of attendant vessel impacts
Riser impact Riser currently shown as outside the 2/2 Consider pre-installing riser inside
platform structure the jacket structure
Passing vessel Structural failure  Platform is outside normal 2/1
shipping route
 No radar monitoring of
shipping traffic on manned
platform
Dropped objects Normal platform crane lift eg. Potential damage to hydrocarbon Crane, boat unloading area and 2/1 Confirm this is the case for the
chemical tote tanks equipemnt laydown area such that thereis no instrument gas skid
lifting over the main hydrocarbon
process area
Transport People arriving by boat Personal injury with potential  Life jacket is worn 2/2  Only trained personnel is allowed
fatality  Training available to embark/disembark the
 2-meter wave and 30-knot wind platform
limitations  Consider improvements to
 Water survival training landing space on the boat
 Consider medical certification as
a requirement for offshore visit
 Review of incident data on such
activities with a view to
investigating any improvement
that could be made
Security Platform equipment subject to Loss/damage to equipment. Consider the means of making the
damage and loss due to theft from platform facilities less
the facility (particularly in Potential threat to the vulnerable/accessible to theft.
consideration of its close integrity/safety of the installation. Consider also ensuring that any such
proximity to the shore) activity will not threatent the integrity
of the installation.
Other Uncertainty in ESRA gas Possible under prediction of Review data and consider impact of
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: ESRA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 8 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
ESRA-P-PFD-0001
Operation of New Facility (ESRA) See Attendance List

composition condensate production higher condensate production

Shutdown philosophy ESD shutdown (including sub There is no means of remote shut
surface safety valve) of the down; consider the merits of remote
platforms is by the following shutdown in the context of
means: earthquake risk etc ?
Fusible plugs
Manual local push button initiation.

Process shutdown (without sub

surface valve) is also initiated by:
High & low pressure trips
High & low
Lifting equipment loss of power Suspended load or dropped object Review arrangement for safe load
during lifting handling in the event of loss of power
(for shallow water facilities, the
power supply is from the attending
supply boat which may be more
liable to cable damage in use)

Note that under SAFEGUARDS & ACTIONS consider in descending order of priority means of PREVENTION, CONTROL & MITIGATION
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: ESRA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 9 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
ESRA-P-PFD-0001
Operation of New Facility (ESRA) See Attendance List
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: ESRA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 10 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
ESA-MD-001
Operation on the Existing Facilities (ESA, E Process, E Compression ) See Attendance List

GUIDEWORD EVENT DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS No ACTION RECOMMENDED

HP/LP Interfaces Between pipeline (675 #) and the Catstrophic failures of Production manifold PSHH set @ 2/1
production header (2200 #) and production/test separator 250 # and separator PSV set at 230
the production separator (260 #) psig
Slugging @ ESA Arrival of slugs through pipelines  Process Shutdown on high  Compressor slug catcher and 1/2  Evaluate that E-Compressor slug
@ Test and Production Separator level inlet scrubber at E-Comp. catcher is capable to handle the
 Liquid carry-over into gas  ESRA Flow calculation on 8” liquid carry-over
export line pipeline suggests that slugging  Provide all drawings of receiving
is unlikely facilities to EPCI contractor
 Shutdown on ESA should be
transmitted to host platform
 Double check that ESA facility
can handle the slugs from ESRA
Loss of Release from ESA Process area  Small increase of release As per ESRA (fusible plugs) 1/2 Some additional leak detection such
containment because of the additional as sonic detection
control valve and the piping as Review condition of existing
well as the small increase of equipment and piping and hence their
gas that could be released due suitability for exposure to high CO2
to the increase gas through-put gas
(original capacity?)
 Increased corrosion risk
Release from new ESA riser  Major gas release from pipeline Frequent inspection of riser 2/2  Establish an on-going inspection
 Potential major damage to program for the new riser
platform
ESA Gas line to E-COMP  Uncontrolled release of gas PSLL pressure trip will initiate 1/2  Review potential corrosion in the
(no change to the existing shutdown but only for major pipeline
condition other than the pipeline failure
increase of gas through-put
from 10 MM to 25 MM)
 Pipeline velocity is low leading
to liquid drop-out and combine
with high CO2 leading
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: ESRA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 11 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
ESA-MD-001
Operation on the Existing Facilities (ESA, E Process, E Compression ) See Attendance List

topotential corrosion
ESA Liquid line to E Process ESRA producing mainly water Confirm adequate capacity of VRU
Increase of liquid from 3 M to 9 liquid. The main impact is a small for additional gas on E-Process (and
M BPD increase in water separation load at also B-Process)
Junction and increase vapor Better definition of process flow and
generation at E-Process capacities for all downstream
facilities prior to issue of EPCI bid
package

Note that under SAFEGUARDS & ACTIONS consider in descending order of priority means of PREVENTION, CONTROL & MITIGATION
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: ESRA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 12 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:

Abandonment See Attendance List

GUIDEWORD EVENT DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS No ACTION RECOMMENDED

Wellhead abandonment – All

production casing will plugged
and abandoned (P&A).
The casing will be cut about 10
feet below the mudline
Remove the jacket and return it to
fabrication yard for reuse or
refurbishment
Remove pipeline from seabed and
dispose

Note that under SAFEGUARDS & ACTIONS consider in descending order of priority means of PREVENTION, CONTROL & MITIGATION