Alliance For Progress

Alliance for Progress
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American

History
Stephen G. Rabe
Subject: History of Latin America and the Oceanic World, 1945–1991, Diplomatic History,
International History
Online Publication Date: Mar 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.013.95
Summary and Keywords
On March 13, 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress, an
economic assistance program to promote political democracy, economic growth, and
social justice in Latin America. The United States and Latin American nations formally
agreed to the alliance at a conference held in August 1961, at Punta del Este, Uruguay.
U.S. delegates promised that Latin America would receive over twenty billion dollars in
public and private capital from the United States and international lending authorities
during the 1960s. The money would arrive in the form of grants, loans, and direct private
investments. When combined with an expected eighty billion dollars in internal
investment, this new money was projected to stimulate an economic growth rate of not
less than 2.5 percent a year. This economic growth would facilitate significant
improvements in employment, and in rates of infant mortality, life expectancy, and
literacy rates. In agreeing to the alliance, Latin American leaders pledged to work for
equality and social justice by promoting agrarian reform and progressive income taxes.
The Kennedy administration developed this so-called Marshall Plan for Latin America
because it judged the region susceptible to social revolution and communism. Fidel
Castro had transformed the Cuban Revolution into a strident anti-American movement
and had allied his nation with the Soviet Union. U.S. officials feared that the lower classes
of Latin America, mired in poverty and injustice, might follow similarly radical leaders.
Alliance programs delivered outside capital to the region, but the Alliance for Progress
failed to transform Latin America. During the 1960s, Latin American economies
performed poorly, usually falling below the 2.5 percent target. The region witnessed few
improvements in health, education, or welfare. Latin American societies remained unfair
and authoritarian. Sixteen extra-constitutional changes of government repeatedly
unsettled the region.
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The Alliance for Progress fell short of its goals for several reasons. Latin America had
formidable obstacles to change: elites resisted land reform, equitable tax systems, and
social programs; new credits often brought greater indebtedness rather than growth; and
the Marshall Plan experience served as a poor guide to solving the problems of a region
that was far different from Western Europe. The United States also acted ambiguously,
calling for democratic progress and social justice, but worried that Communists would
take advantage of the instability caused by progressive change. Further, Washington
provided wholehearted support only to those Latin American governments and
organizations that pursued fervent anticommunist policies.
Keywords: anticommunism, Cold War, Cuban Revolution, economic aid, Kennedy administration, Latin America,
Marshall Plan, modernization
Origins
The John F. Kennedy administration designed a grand program—the Alliance for Progress
—to transform and modernize Latin America. President Kennedy pledged to transfer U.S.
wealth to uplift the conditions of Latin America’s poor. The U.S response to Cuban
communism would be representative democracy and socioeconomic progress. The United
States had revivified Western Europe with the Marshall Plan. The Kennedy (1961–1963)
and Lyndon Baines Johnson administrations (1963–1969) believed that they could repeat
the historic achievements of the Marshall Plan by building, in the 1960s, sturdy, stable
Latin American nations that would resist the false promises of communism and remain
closely allied to the United States.
President Kennedy unveiled his reform program for Latin America in an impressive White
House ceremony on the evening of March 13, 1961, just a month before the Bay of Pigs
invasion. After hosting an elegant reception for two hundred fifty people, including the
diplomatic corps of the Latin American republics and congressional leaders, the president
and his wife, Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy, directed guests to move to the East Room. They
seated themselves on gilt-edged chairs arranged in semi-circles on both sides of the
rostrum. President Kennedy’s speech was simultaneously broadcast by the Voice of
America in English, Spanish, French, and Portuguese, the languages of the Western
Hemisphere. Kennedy thrilled his attentive audience, telling Latin Americans what they
had been waiting nearly two decades to hear. The United States would underwrite the
region’s social and economic transformation. The United States would join in a “vast
cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic
needs of Latin American people for homes, work and land, health and schools—techo,
trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela.” Dubbed the Alliance for Progress—Alianza para el
Progreso—the new program would be Latin America’s “Marshall Plan.”
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Kennedy delivered over $600 million in emergency economic aid to Latin America in early
1961. His administration gave real substance, however, to his splendid rhetoric at an
inter-American economic conference held in August 1961, at the Uruguayan seaside
resort of Punta del Este. Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon informed Latin
American delegates that they could count on receiving $20 billion in public and private
capital over the next ten years, “the decade of development.” In 21st-century terms, this
would be the equivalent to the impressive sum of over $100 billion. With this influx of
foreign money, combined with an additional $80 billion that Latin Americans could
reasonably expect to generate in internal savings, Latin American nations would achieve
a real economic growth rate of 2.5 percent a year. Administration officials chose to be
publicly cautious; they actually expected that growth might reach 5 percent a year.
Marvelous changes would flow from foreign aid and economic growth. The Charter of the
Punta del Este Conference enumerated more than ninety lofty goals. Latin Americans
would witness a five-year increase in life expectancy, a halving of the infant mortality
rate, the elimination of adult illiteracy, and the provision of six years of primary education
to every school-age child.
The Alliance for Progress meant more than improvements in health, education, and
welfare. This would be a revolution in human rights. Political freedom and social reform
would go hand in hand with material progress. Archaic tax and land-tenure structures
would be dismantled and self-serving tyrants cast aside. President Kennedy vowed that
North and South Americans would “demonstrate to the entire world that man’s
unsatisfied aspiration for economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by
free men working within a framework of democratic institutions.”
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Fears of Social Revolution

The Kennedy administration decided to embark on a campaign to underwrite change and
social development in Latin America because it perceived that the region was vulnerable
to radical social revolution. U.S. officials feared that Latin American nations would
embrace communism and the Cuban Revolution of Fidel Castro. President Kennedy
characterized the region as “the most dangerous area in the world.”
If poverty and injustice were preconditions for upheaval, Latin America was indeed ripe
for revolution. In several countries—Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Haiti—malnutrition was widespread, with a grossly inadequate daily per
capita consumption of 2,000 calories or less, and a daily intake of fifteen grams of animal
protein. In eight other countries, daily per capita consumption only approached 2,400
calories, the bare minimum necessary to sustain people who toiled in fields and factories.
By comparison, in 1961, U.S. adults consumed every day over 3,000 calories and sixty-six
grams of animal protein. Hungry people had predictably poor health records.
Guatemalans had a life expectancy of less than fifty years, twenty years less than for a
U.S. citizen. In the Andean nations of Ecuador and Peru, approximately 10 percent of
newborns died during their first year of life. The poor of Latin America also lacked
education and skills. Adult illiteracy rates ranged from 35 to 40 percent in relatively
prosperous nations like Brazil and Venezuela. This misery was concentrated in the
countryside, with campesinos working tiny plots of land and a rural oligarchy operating
vast estates or latifundia. In Colombia, 1.3 percent of landowners controlled over 50
percent of the land, and in Chile 7 percent owned 80 percent of the land. Desperate rural
people were fleeing to urban areas, moving into squalid shantytowns that surrounded
cities like Bogotá, Caracas, and Rio de Janeiro.
The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration (1953–1961) poured the foundation for the
Alliance for Progress. The Eisenhower administration knew that Latin Americans
protested that they had been “neglected” in the postwar period. Between mid-1953 and
mid-1958, the United States had provided $12.8 billion in foreign aid. But only $783
million, less than 7 percent, had been directed toward Latin America. Latin American
democrats further resented that the administration had lavished medals and military
support on right-wing dictators, like Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1952–1958) of Venezuela,
because they professed to be anti-Communist. Latin Americans visibly expressed their
anger with U.S. policies in May 1958, when Vice President Richard M. Nixon toured
South America. Protestors hounded Nixon in Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay; in Caracas,
Venezuela, a howling mob tried to assault the vice president. In the aftermath of the
Nixon trip, Eisenhower and his advisors began to listen to Latin Americans, like President
Juscelino Kubitschek of Brazil (1956–1961), who spoke of inter-American economic
cooperation, an “Operation Pan America.” President Kubitschek had won international
acclaim for launching the creation of a fantastic capital city, Brasília, in the heart of the
country. The Eisenhower administration responded by funding an Inter-American
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Development Bank. In the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, the administration went
further, putting $500 million into a Social Progress Trust Fund (1960) to underwrite
health, education, housing, and land reform projects.
Beyond the sense of crisis that informed U.S. perspectives about Latin America, U.S.
officials judged it a propitious time to foster progressive reform in Latin America. In a
series of popular upheavals dubbed by journalist Tad Szulc the “twilight of the tyrants,”
ten Latin American military dictators fell from power between 1956 and 1960. Middle-
class reformers, like Rómulo Betancourt (1959–1964) of Venezuela, replaced the military
men. They vowed to rule democratically and to reform the region’s archaic social
structures. Betancourt and influential political leaders like Arturo Frondizi (1958–1962)
of Argentina and José Figueres (1953–1958) of Costa Rica joined with Kubitschek in
pleading for U.S. help. They unabashedly played on the U.S. fear of communism. Latin
America’s poverty and injustice, they warned, was a fertile breeding ground for the
Communist contagion to fester and spread. A second, third, and fourth “Cuba” might be
on the horizon. Indeed, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, the Cuban revolutionary, attended the
conference at Punta del Este and debated Secretary of the Treasury Dillon. Guevara
boasted that Latin America’s “new age” would be under “the star of Cuba,” not the
Alliance for Progress.
The Communist Threat

President Kennedy perceived the Cuban Revolution as part and parcel of Soviet Premier
Nikita Khrushchev’s “wars of national liberation strategy.” In a lengthy address given in
Moscow on 6 January 1961, Khrushchev briefly raised the issue. Scholars have
questioned whether Khrushchev intended to provoke the president-elect; they have
suggested that the Soviet leader was addressing doctrinal issues within the Communist
camp. Nonetheless, Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon, who helped design the Alliance
for Progress, decided that Khrushchev had signaled his intention to use Cuba as “a base
for military and intelligence activities against the United States and for further
opportunistic conquests in Latin America.” President Kennedy drew similar conclusions
from his one, unpleasant meeting with Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961. Upon
returning home, the president soberly reported to the nation that his Soviet adversary
predicted that in the developing countries “the revolution of rising peoples would
eventually be a Communist revolution, and that the so-called wars of liberation,
supported by the Kremlin, would replace the old methods of direct aggression and
invasion.” Kennedy added that it was “the Communist theory” that “a small group of
disciplined Communists could exploit discontent and misery in a country where the
average income may be $60 or $70 a year, and seize control, therefore, of an entire
country without Communist troops ever crossing any international border.” Secretary of
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State Dean Rusk followed the president’s public warning with a confidential alert to U.S.
diplomats in Latin America. Khrushchev was targeting Latin America.
Not to oppose the alleged Communist master plan for Latin America would imperil the
national security of the United States. The United States would be surrounded if
Communists came to power in Central and South American nations. U.S. officials also
believed that they had to maintain U.S. credibility “in our own backyard.” The U.S. ability
to act on the global stage would be impeded if it could not maintain order and stability in
Latin America, the traditional U.S. sphere of influence. Secretary Rusk once noted to
Argentine diplomats that the Communist adversaries measured the resolve of the United
States in the Western Hemisphere. “A lack of determination on our part,” Rusk warned,
might encourage Soviet aggression in the divided city of Berlin.
Not only national security anxieties but also domestic political calculations informed
President Kennedy’s approach to the region. The president, in his 1964 reelection
campaign, was loath to face the same charge—losing a Latin American country (Cuba) to
communism—that he had thrown at the Eisenhower/Nixon team in 1960. Throughout his
tenure, Kennedy predicted disaster in Latin America. In January 1961, he told an aide
“the whole place could blow up on us.” In November 1962, he cautioned Argentina’s
General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu to be alert, observing “that the next twelve months
would be critical in Latin America with respect to renewed Communist attempts at
penetration.” In October 1963, a month before his death, he warned that Latin America
posed “the greatest danger to us.” A few months earlier, in a meeting with Prime Minister
Harold Macmillan, Kennedy demanded that the United Kingdom postpone the
independence of its South American colony, British Guiana. Kennedy alleged that British
Guiana might become a Communist state. British Guiana would then join Cuba as a major
campaign issue and jeopardize the president’s reelection. As presidential advisor and
biographer Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. put it, it was his boss’s “absolute determination” to
prevent a second Communist outpost in the Western Hemisphere.
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Modernization Theories
Although motivated by Cold War imperatives, the president and his team approached the
task of building a prosperous, democratic, anti-Communist Latin America with supreme
confidence. They thought they knew how to “modernize” Latin America. They fashioned
the Alliance for Progress on contemporary social science theories, espoused by
intellectuals, which included Ambassador Gordon and presidential assistant Walt W.
Rostow. In the postwar period, social scientists had enunciated formal theories on
political and economic development. They posited a universal, quantitatively measurable
movement of all societies from a “traditional” situation toward a single ideal form or
“modern” organization. Traditional societies, as they presumably existed in Latin
America, had authoritarian political structures, rural, backward economies, and a lack of
faith in scientific progress and the entrepreneurial spirit. A modern society that would
resemble the United States would be characterized by a competitive political system, a
commercialized and technologically sophisticated economic system, mass consumption,
high literacy rates, and a geographically and socially mobile population. The assumption
that “modern” Latin Americans wanted to replicate superior U.S.-style institutions and
inculcate Anglo-American values in their societies belied the concept of an “alliance.”
The mission of the United States was to accelerate the modernization process, before the
Communists could subvert it. The United States would identify and support urban,
middle-class leaders in Latin America who favored democracy, universal education, and
state policies that promoted economic development and social welfare. The United States
would assist these leaders with substantial amounts of economic aid until these Latin
American societies could generate enough internal capital to underwrite their own
economic development. At that point, presumably within ten years, Latin American
nations would have reached the “take-off stage,” as outlined in Rostow’s famous treatise,
The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1960).1 The modernization
theory further held that democratic structures would flourish in nations that could
sustain their own economic growth.
The lessons of history affirmed the administration’s faith in the modernization process.
U.S. leaders were proud that the past Democratic administration of Harry S. Truman
(1945–1953) had rebuilt war-torn Western Europe and Japan. The Alliance for Progress
would be the “Marshall Plan for Latin America.” The United States would pursue a policy
of “enlightened anti-Communism.” The United States would win the Cold War in Latin
America by performing righteous works. The United States would build sturdy,
progressive societies that uplifted the poor and dispossessed. These modernized societies
would naturally align themselves with the United States and reject the false promises of
Khrushchev, Castro, and their fellow Communist travelers.
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President Kennedy displayed the enthusiasm, confidence, and empathy inherent in the
Alliance for Progress. During his abbreviated presidency, he toured Colombia, Venezuela,
Mexico, and Costa Rica and received tumultuous welcomes. He participated, for example,
in a land redistribution ceremony in Venezuela.
Kennedy also opened the

Oval Office to Latin
American presidents,
former presidents, foreign,
finance, and labor
ministers, ambassadors,
generals, trade unionists,
and economists. A telling
example of the president’s
commitment occurred
Click to view larger during his visit to Costa
Figure 1. President John F. Kennedy participates in a Rica. He noticed an
land redistribution ceremony in La Morita,
Venezuela, on December 16, 1961. Also present is unoccupied hospital and
President Rómulo Betancourt (dark glasses) of told aides to find funds to
Venezuela. Land reform was an essential part of the
staff it. The U.S. Agency
Alliance for Progress’s plan to transform the
socioeconomic structure of Latin America. Venezuela for International
was one of the few Latin American counties to Development subsequently
achieve in the 1960s some of the Alliance’s goals.
(Cecil Stoughton/John F. Kennedy Library) granted $130,000 for a
children’s hospital in San
José. Bedeviled by his quagmire of a war in Vietnam, President Johnson spent less time
with Latin Americans. He made only one major trip to Latin America, meeting leaders at
Punta del Este in 1967, to review the Alliance. Johnson enjoyed, however, reading reports
about schools and hospitals being built in Latin America with Alliance funds.
The Alliance in Action

The enthusiasm, energy, and optimism that infused the Alliance for Progress did not
result in meaningful political and social change in Latin America. The Alliance proved to
be a notable policy failure of the Cold War. During the 1960s, sixteen extra constitutional
changes of government shook Latin America. Latin American economies hardly reached
the “take-off stage,” registering an unimpressive annual growth rate of about 2 percent.
Most of the growth took place at the very end of the 1960s. The Alliance failed to reach
any of its ninety-four numerical goals in health, education, and welfare. The number of
unemployed Latin Americans rose from eighteen million to twenty-five million during the
decade.
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U.S. officials misled themselves trying to apply dubious social science theories and
misleading historical analogies like the “Marshall Plan for Latin America.” Latin America
was not Europe. Western European countries had been devastated by war, but they had
financial and technical expertise, familiarity with industrial forms of organization,
institutionalized political parties, strong national identities, and, except for Germany, a
robust democratic tradition. The Truman administration had helped “rebuild” countries
whose social fabrics, political traditions, and economic institutions were notably similar
to those of the United States. On the other hand, the Spanish/Portuguese (Iberian) and
Amerindian political heritages emphasized planned economies, strong central
governments, and the organization of society into corporate groups. Latin Americans
traditionally gave greater significance to group achievement than to individual success.
Latin Americans further believed that national progress came from a unified government
rather than one slowed by a mixed form of power sharing with checks and balances. In
his last address on inter-American affairs, President Kennedy conceded that the Alliance
for Progress should not be compared to the Marshall Plan, for “then we helped rebuild a
shattered economy whose human and social foundation remained. Today we are trying to
create a basic new foundation, capable of reshaping the centuries-old societies and
economies of half of a hemisphere.” Yet Kennedy assured his audience that idealism,
energy, and optimism would bridge the vast cultural gap and bring about the
“modernization” of Latin America. Although recognizing the challenges ahead, Kennedy
was still assuming that Latin Americans wanted their modernized societies to replicate
the social structures of the United States.
The United States also lacked the power to reform Latin America. In the postwar years,
the United States militarily occupied both Germany and Japan, reordering their societies.
General Douglas MacArthur, for example, directed the writing of the Japanese
constitution, requiring the redistribution of land and limitations on military expenditures.
In the 1960s, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations repeatedly meddled and
intervened in Latin America. But the United States could hardly claim the right to invade
a Latin American country because the government wasted resources, abused campesinos,
or discriminated against citizens of African or indigenous heritages. Neither Kennedy nor
Johnson could act in Latin America, as they did when they dispatched federal marshals to
protect the civil rights of African Americans in the U.S. South. In any case, the history of
U.S. rule in Latin America taught sobering lessons. During the first third of the 20th
century, the United States had militarily occupied countries like Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, and Nicaragua in the name of democracy and progress. But the United States
had not successfully exported its values. Dictators like Fulgencio Batista (1940–1944,
1952–1959), Rafael Trujillo (1930–1961), and Anastasio Somoza García (1937–1956), not
democrats, had emerged in the aftermath of those occupations.
The Alliance for Progress also proved far less generous than the Marshall Plan. President
Kennedy regretfully had to inform Latin American leaders in private that the United
States “could not give aid to Latin American countries in the same way that it helped to
rebuild Europe with the Marshall Plan.” Through his eloquence and spectacularly
successful trips to Latin America, he had galvanized public and congressional support for
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the Alliance. But with Kennedy’s rapid expansion of military spending on nuclear
weapons, and Johnson’s war in Vietnam, the United States took on heavy financial
burdens in the international arena. Legislators, worried about government spending, cut
budget requests for foreign aid, from both Kennedy and Johnson, sometimes by as much
as 25 percent. Most Marshall Plan aid was in the form of grants, whereas the Alliance
offered loans, which had to be eventually repaid. In the 1960s, the region received about
$15 billion of the promised $20 billion. Even then, with Latin American nations being
required to repay principal and interest on pre-1961 and Alliance loans, this meant that
the actual net capital flow to Latin America during the 1960s averaged about $920
million a year. This was the equivalent of about $4 per Latin American per year. By
comparison, Marshall Plan money, which did not have to be repaid, amounted to $109 a
year in assistance for every person in the Netherlands.
The Alliance money that Latin America received did have salubrious effects. Both
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson could read upbeat reports about schools and hospitals
being built and more people gaining access to potable water. Democratic leaders in
countries such as Costa Rica, Chile, and Venezuela performed within the spirit of the
Alliance for Progress. During the early 1960s, Venezuela, for example, received over $200
million in loans and grants from the United States to finance public housing and public
works projects. The United States further backed Venezuela’s requests for an additional
$200 million in loans from international agencies like the Inter-American Development
Bank and World Bank. President Rómulo Betancourt and his successor, Raúl Leoni (1964–
1969), toiled diligently for the poor, resettling approximately one hundred sixty thousand
families on their own farms, allocating budgetary expenditures to health and education,
and cutting unemployment. But Venezuela never hit the Alliance’s target of 2.5 percent
annual growth, and 75 percent of Venezuelan youth still did not complete the sixth grade.
Economic growth stagnated, because Venezuela depended on the export of oil, and oil
prices declined precipitously in the 1960s, falling from $2.65 a barrel in 1957 to $1.81 in
1969.
Population growth eroded many gains. With a 2.9 percent annual rate of increase, Latin
America experienced the most rapid population increase in the world in the 1960s.
Colombia saw its population increase from 15.6 million to 21 million, and Brazil added 25
million people, from 70 to 95 million. Alliance programs helped cut the percentage of
Latin American children not attending school from 52 to 43 percent, but, because of this
population growth, the actual number of children not attending school increased during
the 1960s. Latin America added 151,670 hospital beds in the 1960s and ended up with
fewer hospital beds per thousand people in 1969 than in 1960.
The Alliance for Progress did not place population control on its agenda. President
Kennedy took no interest in population control, apparently believing it to be politically
and medically impractical and morally dubious. He once disputed what proved to be the
accurate prediction that the world’s population of 3 billion in 1960 would double to 6
billion in 2000. In truth, no Latin American leader raised population issues with
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Nicaragua took the position that it was under
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populated. Oral contraceptives, an effective method of birth control, became

commercially available in the United States in 1960. Bolivian nationalists reacted
furiously when they discovered that Peace Corps volunteers dispensed oral
contraceptives to the rural poor. The family planning program was small, non-aggressive,
and voluntary and was initially approved by Bolivian authorities. Nonetheless, some
Bolivians perceived birth control as part of conspiracy to reduce Bolivia’s geopolitical
power, and the government responded by expelling the approximately one hundred Peace
Corps volunteers in 1971. Latin America’s most populous nations, Mexico and Brazil,
would eventually take effective steps to encourage family planning and population control
in the 1970s and 1980s.
Latin American leaders also bore responsibility for the Alliance’s failures. Their
governments often proved incapable of designing the long-range plans required for
putting their countries on the path of sustainable economic growth. By January 1962, only
Colombia had submitted a development plan. Governments wasted U.S. money on short-
term, politically expedient projects or directed the spending at enhancing the living
standards of middle-income groups, rather than the poor. Latin American leaders, other
than in Chile and Venezuela, also hesitated to attack traditional land tenure patterns, with
5 to 10 percent of the population, the landed oligarchy, owning 70 to 90 percent of the
land. The rural regions were the locus of Latin America’s poverty, underdevelopment, and
population explosion. Ecuadorian agricultural laborers, for example, earned fifteen cents
a day. Mexico continued to sustain its post-1940 economic growth in the countryside. In
the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920), successive Mexican governments
had redistributed over one hundred million acres of land, often in the form of communal
holdings or ejidos. The Alliance for Progress, however, played a minimal role in Mexico.
In their defense, Latin American leaders pointed to the declining terms of trade as the
cause for the region’s economic stagnation. In order to generate the $80 billion on
domestic savings mandated by the Alliance, Latin America needed to sell their primary
products—coffee, sugar, bananas, copper, tin, lead, zinc, and oil—on the global markets.
But the prices of these tropical foods and raw materials declined in the 1960s even as the
prices of imported industrial machinery and finished goods, the very things needed for
economic development, rose. The price of coffee, Latin America’s chief export, fell from
ninety cents a pound in the 1950s to thirty-six cents a pound in the early 1960s. In May
1969, at an inter-American conclave, delegates produced the “Consensus of Viña del
Mar,” calling on the United States to open its markets to Latin American exports and to
work for fair terms of trade. Recognizing the failure of the Alliance for Progress, Latin
Americans now wanted trade, as much as aid, from the United States.
Anti-Communism
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The failure of the Alliance for Progress cannot be explained solely by faulty social science
theories, misread lessons of history, or structural problems. If so, historians could limit
their analyses to noting that President Kennedy virtuously, but unsuccessfully, tried to
end poverty and injustice in the hemisphere with a bold, imaginative program. Scholars
could then add that the Alliance, like the Great Society domestic reform program, became
a casualty of President Johnson’s tragic venture in Vietnam. They would further point to
President Kennedy’s untimely death in November 1963. Kennedy had repeatedly told
aides that he had not given up on his cherished program. Kennedy presumably would not
also have blundered, by dispatching over 500,000 U.S. troops to Vietnam. More money
would have been available for Latin American development. Indeed, U.S. economic aid to
Latin America dropped during the Johnson years, although Latin American economies did
better in the late 1960s than during the Kennedy years.
A fair assessment of Kennedy and Latin America reveals that the president’s Cold War
initiatives undermined the Alliance for Progress. Kennedy judged regional governments
on whether they affirmed the U.S. faith that Fidel Castro’s Cuba represented the focus of
evil. He demanded that Latin American nations break diplomatic relations with Cuba and
enlist in the U.S. campaign to strangle Cuba’s economy. He further required Latin
American leaders to outlaw domestic Communists and to forswear from establishing
relations with the Soviet Union or the Communist bloc. Constitutional heads of state, like
Arturo Frondizi (1958–1962) of Argentina, João Goulart (1961–1964) of Brazil, Cheddi
Jagan of British Guiana (1957–1964), and Juan José Arévalo (1945–1951), the former
president of Guatemala, failed Kennedy’s Cold War test. These leaders respected
constitutional processes and praised the Alliance for Progress, but they believed that the
administration was obsessed with Castro. They also discounted the threat of Cuban
communism to their counties and the hemisphere. The Kennedy administration would not,
however, trust any progressive leader or group deemed suspect on the issues of Castro
and communism. The Kennedy administration authorized 163 major covert operations in
less than three years, many of them in Latin America. It launched campaigns to
undermine the authority of Frondizi, Goulart, and Jagan, and to prevent Arévalo from
returning to electoral office in Guatemala. These destabilization campaigns produced
ironic results. The authoritarian, anti-Communist leaders who seized power in Argentina,
Brazil, Guatemala, and British Guiana opposed free elections and disdained the idea of
social reform, the essence of the Alliance for Progress. The Brazilian generals who
controlled political life in their country between 1964 and 1985 also spread repression
throughout the hemisphere. In the early 1970s, Brazil worked to overthrow civilian
leaders in Bolivia and Uruguay. Brazilian General Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969–1974)
pledged to help President Richard M. Nixon (1969–1974) overthrow the constitutional
leader of Chile, President Salvador Allende Gossens (1970–1973).
President Johnson also waged ruthless Cold War in Latin America. He fulfilled President
Kennedy’s goals of driving President Goulart out of power in Brazil and Prime Minister
Jagan out of British Guiana (Guyana). He authorized the military invasion of the
Dominican Republic in 1965, depriving the supporters of constitutionalism from restoring
the legitimate president to power. U.S. military and civilian advisors became intimately
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involved in the slaughter of political opponents and Mayan Indians by the Guatemalan
government and the military. Operación Limpieza (Operation Clean-Up) of 1966 spread
terror, torture, and assassination throughout Guatemala. Guatemalan security forces,
many trained by the United States, killed up to eight thousand Guatemalans in 1966
alone. Over the next thirty years, over two hundred thousand Guatemalans, many of them
indigenous people, would perish in Guatemala’s nightmarish political violence.
Under President Johnson, the CIA also became adept a manipulating elections in
countries such as Bolivia and Chile. In Chile, the CIA spent millions of dollars to prevent
Allende, a Socialist, from winning the election of 1964. The preferred U.S. candidate,
Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964–1970), a Christian Democrat, won the election. In the
Dominican Republic and Guyana, the CIA went beyond pouring funds into the campaign
coffers of favorite candidates and worked to rig elections to ensure the victory of strident
anti-Communists. President Johnson directly ordered CIA Director Richard Helms to
make certain that the U.S. man, Joaquín Balaguer, an authoritarian and ally of former
dictator Rafael Trujillo, won the 1966 election in the Dominican Republic. Balaguer gave
his nation twelve years of repressive rule. In newly independent Guyana, the CIA and the
U.S. embassy collaborated with Forbes Burnham, the leader of Guyanese of African
descent, in creating false voter lists to insure that Burnham held power in the 1968
election against Cheddi Jagan. Burnham pledged to follow an anti-Communist line.
Burnham (1964–1985) gave his country two decades of misrule, characterized by
corruption and the vicious persecution of Guyanese of Indian descent.
By the end of the 1960s, Latin America was far less democratic and socially progressive
than it was at the beginning of the decade. There had been sixteen extra-constitutional
changes of government in the region. In the name of anticommunism, the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations assisted conservative authoritarians and military dictators in
their seizure of power.
Conclusion
Under the aegis of the Alliance for Progress, the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines
Johnson administrations waged a successful foreign policy with Latin America. At the
beginning of the 1960s, President Kennedy had dubbed Latin America the “the most
dangerous area in the world.” Kennedy and his advisors feared that social revolution
would sweep throughout the Western Hemisphere and that Fidel Castro and his fellow
revolutionaries would be the beneficiaries. Communism would spread throughout the
region. But by the end of the decade, the region was secure, stable, and remained within
the U.S. sphere of influence. Fidel Castro’s Cuba had been contained. No Latin American
country emulated the Cuban Revolution. And the Soviet Union continued to have minimal
influence in the Western Hemisphere. The United States had seemingly won a Cold War
victory.
Page 13 of 19


Both Democratic presidents had talked, however, about winning the Cold War by building
democratic, progressive societies in Latin America through the Alliance for Progress. The
United States was allegedly pursuing a policy of high ideals and noble purposes. Instead,
the Democratic administrations invaded countries, destabilized constitutional
governments, and rigged elections. The two administrations sacrificed splendid visions of
a prosperous, free, and socially just hemisphere for the short-term security that anti-
Communist, right-wing dictators could provide. Cold War fears led the United States to
compromise, even mutilate, the grand goals that were inherent in the Alliance for
Progress.
Discussion of the Literature

Scholarship on the Alliance for Progress can be readily categorized. Initially, partisans of
President Kennedy dominated the debate. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. set the tone in his
loving biography, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Schlesinger, who
helped design the Alliance, fulsomely praised the president for reversing the Eisenhower
administration’s policies. Eisenhower denied economic aid to Latin America, whereas
Kennedy uplifted the Latin American poor and championed decent democrats like José
Figueres of Costa Rica and Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela. Presidential advisor and
speechwriter Theodore C. Sorenson similarly applauded the president’s efforts, although
he conceded that reality and results did not match the exuberant rhetoric that flowed
about the Alliance for Progress. When it became apparent at the end of the 1960s that
the Alliance had fallen short of its progressive goals, Schlesinger first blamed the Johnson
administration for abandoning the Alliance’s reformist goals. In his biography of
President Kennedy’s brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Schlesinger began to
concede that his beloved administration had not fully embraced the dreams of the
Alliance. Schlesinger admitted that the president and his brother had unwisely listened to
national security officials who wanted to combat Latin American radicalism with
counterinsurgency doctrines and covert interventions. But in March 1986, at a
conference marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the president’s Alliance speech,
Kennedy administration officials again paid homage to their leader’s idealism and claimed
that the Alliance, whatever its immediate shortcomings, paved the way for long-term
economic development in Latin America.2
The journalists Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís offered the first comprehensive history
of the Alliance for Progress in The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the
Alliance for Progress, borrowing their title from a critical article penned by Chilean
President Eduardo Frei Montalva and published in the influential journal, Foreign Affairs.3
Levinson and de Onís thoroughly documented the Alliance’s dismal economic statistics
and failure to reach any of its ninety-four enumerated goals. Why the Alliance failed to
meet its quantitative and qualitative goals became the subject of debate. Lincoln Gordon,
who helped design the Alliance and subsequently served as the U.S. ambassador to Brazil,
Page 14 of 19


rejected Arthur Schlesinger’s contention that President Johnson had undercut the
Alliance. Gordon pointed out that economic growth in Latin America during the Johnson
years exceeded growth during the Kennedy presidency. Gordon also denied that he or any
other U.S. official played any role in the military overthrow of President João Goulart of
Brazil in 1964.4 Abraham F. Lowenthal suggested that State Department bureaucrats
preferred stability over change and declined to push reform on reluctant Latin American
elites or U.S. business interests who operated in Latin America.5
In the fields of diplomatic history, foreign relations, and international history, scholarship
relies on access to the archival record. Scholars need to compare the statements and
proclamations of actors in the international arena with their internal, private
deliberations. Through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, memorandums of conversation and
diplomatic dispatches of U.S. officials in the Kennedy and Johnson administration were
declassified and opened to research to scholars. For example, Phyllis R. Parker
demonstrated that Ambassador Gordon had not told the whole truth about the U.S. role in
the overthrow of President Goulart. Under the direction of Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson, the U.S. military attaché in Brazil, Colonel Vernon Walters, encouraged the
Brazilian military to strike. Ambassador Gordon collaborated with Colonel Walters.
Conducting research in U.S. and Brazilian archives, W. Michael Weis confirmed Parker’s
findings and conclusions.6
Strong archival research has subsequently marked scholarship on the Alliance for
Progress. Stephen G. Rabe demonstrated that, contrary to Schlesinger’s argument, many
of the ideas inherent in the Alliance for Progress were first proposed by Eisenhower
administration officials and Latin American leaders in the late 1950s. Rabe’s monograph,
The Most Dangerous Area in the World, remains the most complete analysis of the
Alliance for Progress.7 Rabe found merit in President Kennedy’s commitment to the
dispossessed of Latin America but concluded that Kennedy and President Johnson
undermined the Alliance with anti-Communist counterinsurgency initiatives and covert
interventions. In an outstanding study, Jeffrey Taffet established that the United States
used Alliance money to achieve specific U.S. policy goals. Brazil and the Dominican
Republic received a disproportionate amount of economic aid, because the Johnson
administration wanted to bolster the anti-Communist authoritarians that the United
States had helped place in power.8 Michael E. Latham placed the Alliance for Progress
within the context of the ambitious U.S. anti-Communist effort to transform foreign
societies throughout the world, including South Vietnam, into bastions of capitalism,
constitutionalism, and social progress.9
The newest studies have focused on examining U.S. policies in the 1960s in individual
Western Hemisphere countries. A welcome development is that these studies are also
grounded in primary-source research in the individual countries. An outstanding example
is Thomas C. Field’s From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for
Progress. Field conducted extensive research in Bolivian archives and interviewed key
Bolivian and U.S. officials. He found that the Kennedy administration’s emphasis on
security and anticommunism pushed Bolivian leaders to the right, undermining the
Page 15 of 19


progressive goals of the Alliance for Progress.10 Greg Grandin, in The Last Colonial
Massacre, revealed the chilling nature of the U.S.-backed counterinsurgency campaign in
Guatemala.11 Piero Gleijeses has updated and translated into Spanish his 1978
examination of the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965. Piero Gleijeses
conducted multi-archival research and interviewed numerous Dominicans who testified to
their destroyed hope for a society that honored constitutional processes.12 Multi-archival
research also characterized Stephen G. Rabe’s, The U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, a
study of efforts by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to subvert democracy in
South America’s only English-speaking nation.13 Combing through Haitian archives, Wien
Weibert Arthus has produced an imaginative article, “The Challenge of Democratizing the
Caribbean during the Cold War,” that demonstrated the limits of U.S. power. President
Kennedy wanted to overthrow the odious dictator of Haiti, François Duvalier (1957–
1971). But Kennedy hesitated, because he and aides feared than an extreme leftist might
gain power in the wake of Duvalier’s downfall. Duvalier also proved a crafty and resilient
opponent of the president.14
Primary Sources
Before entering the archives, students of the Alliance for Progress would want to be
certain that they are thoroughly grounded in the secondary literature. Two recent
historiographic essays on the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies and Latin America are
by Jeffrey F. Taffet, and Alan McPherson.15
After perusing the secondary literature, students would be then advised to visit a library
that is a government repository to consult published primary services. The public
statements of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson can be found in General Services
Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents.The statements, speeches, and
observations on inter-American affairs by U.S. officials can also be found in U.S.
Department of State.16 Research libraries will also have guides or indices to government
publications for individual years. By using these guides, students will be able to identify
congressional hearings on U.S. relations with Latin America.
The most invaluable published primary sources for a student of international affairs are
the volumes in the series, U.S. Department of State, Historical Documents, Foreign
Relations of the United States. The published volumes for 1961–1969 would be available
in a library that is a government depository. The volumes have sections on U.S. relations
with Latin America as a region and relations with individual countries. Some but not all of
the series are now available via the Internet. Fortunately, for the Kennedy presidency,
Volumes X–XII and the microfiche supplement, of the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961‐1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and
Aftermath, are available for digital research. Similarly, Volume XXXI, South and Central
America; Mexico and Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti, Guyana, on U.S.
Page 16 of 19


relations with Latin America during the Johnson presidency can be found in published
volumes in a research library or on the web.
Outstanding research requires a student to visit archives. For U.S. relations with Latin
America, this entails visiting the U.S. National Archives. U.S. documents on relations with
Latin America in the 20th century are found at The National Archives at College Park,
Maryland. The other key archival locations for the Alliance for Progress would be the John
F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, at Columbia Point (near Boston) and the
LBJ Presidential Library in Austin, Texas. The private papers of U.S. officials are scattered
throughout the United States, although officials often deposit their papers either at the
presidential libraries or with the Library of Congress in Washington, DC.
Research advice has focused on records generated in the United States. But studies on
the Alliance for Progress need a Latin American perspective. Some Latin American
governments have opened official papers for research on relations with the United States
in the 1960s. For examples of this multi-archival approach, see works by Thomas C. Field,
Jr., Tanya Harmer, and Renata Keller, on Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico. respectively,17
Further Reading
Field, Jr., Thomas C.From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for
Progress. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
Giglio, James N.The Presidency of John F. Kennedy. 2d ed. Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 2006.
Latham, Michael E.Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation

Building” in the Kennedy Era. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
Levinson, Jerome, and Juan de Onís. The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on
the Alliance for Progress. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970.
Lowenthal, Abraham F. “United States Policy Toward Latin America: ‘Liberal,’ ‘Radical,’
and ‘Bureaucratic’ Perspectives.” Latin American Research Review 8.3 (1974): 3–25.
Martin, Edwin McCammon. Kennedy and Latin America. Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1994.
Packenham, Robert. Liberal America and the Third World: Political Ideas and Social
Science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973.
Rabe, Stephen G.Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
Page 17 of 19


Rabe, Stephen G.The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts
Communist Revolution in Latin America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1999.
Taffet, Jeffrey F.Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America.
New York: Routledge, 2007.
Notes:
(1.) Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto

(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
(2.) Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Kennedy (New York: Harper &
Row, 1965); and Theodore C. Sorenson, Robert F. Kennedy and His Times (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1978). L. Ronald Scheman edited these testimonials in The Alliance for
Progress: A Retrospective (New York: Praeger, 1988).
(3.) Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís, The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report
on the Alliance for Progress (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970); and see Eduardo Frei
Montalva, “Urgencies in Latin America,” Foreign Affairs 45 (April 1967): 437–448.
(4.) Lincoln Gordon, “US-Brazilian Reprise,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World
Affairs 32 (Summer 1990): 165–178.
(5.) For a theoretical piece, see Abraham F. Lowenthal, “United States Policy Toward
Latin America: ‘Liberal,’ ‘Radical,’ and ‘Bureaucratic’ Perspectives,” Latin American
Research Review 8.3 (1974): 3–25.
(6.) W. Michael Weis, Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964 (Austin, University of Texas
Press, 1979); and W. Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups d’Etat: Brazilian-American
Relations, 1945–1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993).
(7.) Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of
Anticommunism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); and Stephen G.
Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist
Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).
(8.) Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin
America (New York: Routledge, 2007).
(9.) Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation
Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
(10.) Thomas C. Field, From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for
Progress (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).
Page 18 of 19


(11.) Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2004).
(12.) Piero Gleijeses, La Esperanza Desgarrada: La rebellion dominicana de 1965 y la

invasión norteamericana (Santo Domingo: Editora Búho, 2012).
(13.) Stephen G. Rabe, The U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).
(14.) Wien Weibert Arthus, “The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the
Cold War: Kennedy Facing the Duvalier Dilemma,” Diplomatic History 39 (June 2015):
504–531.
(15.) Jeffrey F. Taffet, “Latin America” in A Companion to John F. Kennedy, ed. Marc J.
Selverstone (Malden: MA, Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 307–327; and Alan McPherson, “Latin
America” in A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson, ed. Mitchell B. Lerner (Malden, MA:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 387–405.
(16.) General Services Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1962–1970); additional statements and observations can be
found in U.S. Department of State, Bulletin of the Department of State (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1961–1969).
(17.) Thomas C. Field, Jr., From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for
Progress in the Kennedy Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); Tanya Harmer,
Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2011); and Renata Keller, Mexico’s Cold War: Cuba, the United States, and the
Legacy of the Cuban Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
Stephen G. Rabe
Department of History, University of Texas at Dallas
Page 19 of 19


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Summary and Keywords

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Fears of Social Revolution

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The Communist Threat

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Kennedy also opened the

The Alliance in Action

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populated. Oral contraceptives, an effective method of birth control, became

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Discussion of the Literature

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Latham, Michael E.Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation

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(1.) Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto

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(12.) Piero Gleijeses, La Esperanza Desgarrada: La rebellion dominicana de 1965 y la

Department of History, University of Texas at Dallas

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