EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-92-802. July 5, 1993.]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. HON.

GENARO C. GINES, as Presiding Judge, Branch 26; MA.
GORGONIA L. FLORES, Court Interpreter and Officer-in-Charge,
Branch 26; ROSIE M. MUNAR, Stenographic Reporter, Branch
26; PACITA B. DIAZ, Staff Assistant IV, Office of the Clerk of
Court; MA. CONCEPCION B. DIAZ, Staff Assistant I, Branch 26;
and ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA, JR., Staff Assistant II, Branch 26,
all of the RTC, San Fernando, La Union. respondents.

Ceferino Padua Law Offices for respondent Diazes.

Benigno M. Puno for respondents Munar, Flores & Lacsamana.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; NATURE OF OFFICE OF JUDGE. — The

administration of justice is a sacred task. Upon assumption to office, a judge
ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He becomes "the visible representation of the
law and, more importantly, of justice." A judge must be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence, and should be studiously careful to
avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example
to others.

2. ID.; IRREGULARITIES IN RAFFLE OF CASES COMMITTED BY RTC JUDGE,

AND STAFF MEMBERS, EXCEPT TWO. — The respondents here are Judge Genaro
Gines, the incumbent presiding judge of Branch 26 of the RTC in Judicial Region
No. 1 based in San Fernando, La Union; Pacita Diaz, a staff member in that
court now retired in the period covered by the Sanglay report, in charge of filing
and docketing of land registration cases; Pacita Diaz's daughter, Ma.
Concepcion Diaz, another staff member in Branch 26, during the period covered
by the Sanglay report, the clerk in charge of the filing and docketing of special
proceedings cases; Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., in the period covered by the Sanglay
report the clerk in-charge of the filing and docketing of civil cases; Rosie Munar,
court stenographic reporter; and Ma. Gorgonia Flores, court interpreter and the
Officer-in-Charge of Branch 26. Francisco (sic) Lacsamana, Jr., additionally, was
assigned to gather all cases filed and docketed in the week — civil, criminal
special proceedings, land — one day before the weekly raffle, and to transmit
these newly filed cases to the Committee on Raffle. Ma. Gorgonia Flores,
Officer-in-Charge of Branch 26, oversees the administrative machinery of
Branch 26 . . . The last three, Supreme Court issues, have to do with the
creation of a raffle committee in multi-branch Regional Trial Court, with
supervision of the raffle of newly-filed cases; with the manner of raffling cases,
and establish the policy that no case, in multi-branch trial courts, may be
assigned to any branch or sala unless it had undergone the raffle process.
Supreme Court Circular No. 7, September 23, 1974 mandates that in courts
with several branches, cases shall be assigned to the different branches only by
raffle. 'No case may be assigned to any branch without being raffled.' (Part I)
And immediately after raffle, the Executive Judge is mandated by the said
Circular to indicate the particular branch to which the case is raffled, 'the same
to be written in words and in figures on the cover of the Rollo and on the first
page of the original complaint or information and initialed by the Executive
Judge and the two other officers who attended said raffle.' (Part III). The same
circular created a raffle committee of three, composed of the Executive Judge
and two other judges of the court. The Executive Judge, supervises the Raffle.
Administrative Circular No. 1, (January 28, 1988) reiterates strict compliance
with Administrative Order No. 6 (June 30, 1975) and Circular No. 7 (September
23, 1974) Raffle of cases, this later Circular required, must be 'in open session
in the presence of lawyers and spectators . . .' (Section 8.1). The Court in this
later Circular restated the res ipso loquitor (sic) rule regarding the conduct and
removal of judges (Section 5.2). It is, therefore, beyond cavil, that under the
rules governing the administration of courts, all cases filed in court must go
through the raffle committee for assignment. No case must be assigned, in
multi-branch courts, unless it is raffled by the Raffle Committee. The 80 cases
involved in this case, filed from April 1989 to April 1991, were not raffled, but
were directly assigned to, or taken by, Branch 26 (except 3) under respondent
Judge Gines. Respondent Judge Gines must know, under the above Supreme
Court acts, at a simple glance on the cover of the rollo and the first page of
every such record, whether a case was assigned to him after going through
raffle or not. Cases assigned to his branch, after going through the required
raffle, show on the face of the rollo, in words and figures, the branch to which
the case is assigned, authenticated by the initials of the Executive Judge and
the two other members of the Committee . . . The continuing deliberate
violations of Administrative Order No. 6 (dated 30 June 1975), Circular No. 7
(dated 23 September 1974) and Administrative Order No. 1 (dated 28 January
1988) for the years reported in Atty. Sanglay's report, and their belated
discovery boggle our minds. The irregularities should have been easily
discovered by the respondent Judge either because the fact that a case has not
been properly raffled off is at once discernible on the cover of the records and
on the first page of the original of the initial pleading (complaint, information,
etc.), or because plain common sense would have told him that something was
wrong somewhere as an unusual number of cases of the same class had been
"assigned" to his sala. That he had failed to appreciate the physical evidence or,
at the very least, exhibit surprise at the unusual number of cases is quite
amazing. Thus, we are loathe to grant him the benefit of the doubt and
conclude that he had no interest whatsoever in having those cases raffled off to
him and that he only loved to work more than the others. Given the
circumstances of this case, we cannot merely cut him some slack and assume
good faith on his part; he deserves no such treatment . . . The irregularity and
violations of the aforementioned administrative orders and circular could not
have been committed so blatantly, brazenly and openly for an unusually long
period of time if the respondent Judge did not have the cooperation of some of
the court employees. We therefore agree with the investigating Justice that
such support and cooperation were extended by subordinates who likewise had
something to do with the raffle of cases. Hence, the findings on the degree of
participation, either by commission or omission, of respondents Flores and
Lacsamana are sustained. In his report, the investigating Justice absolves the
Diazes and Munar from responsibility in the aforesaid irregularities. With
respect to respondent Pacita Diaz, the case has become moot as she died on 10
February 1993. Thus, the case is dismissed insofar as she is concerned. On the
other hand, while we find no evidence to link respondent Munar to the
aforementioned irregularities, we hold that respondent Ma. Concepcion Diaz is
not entirely blameless. In her affidavit of 18 September 1991, the relevant
portions of which are quoted in the REPORT of Justice de Pano, she explicitly
admitted: "11. In my explanation dated May 27, 1991 to the Memorandum of
Judge Yaranon, while I might have made an admission that I was the clerk
receiving cases that later turned out to be unraffled, I placed the direct blame
on Judge Gines and my two officemates, namely, Mrs. Ma. Gorgonia L. Flores
and Mrs. Rosie Munar who had applied all sorts of pressures upon me, including
series (sic) of intimidation and insinuations in order that cases of their choice
receive (sic) by me may no longer be forwarded to the proper officer-in-charge
of the raffle, but to them directly in Branch 26," It is to be noted that Ma.
Concepcion did not elaborate on the nature of such intimidation and
insinuations. In view of the fact, however, that she was in charge of receiving
and docketing special proceedings cases, and that out of the controversial 80
unraffled cases, 44 were special proceedings cases, her participation could, by
no means, be considered as insignificant. And even if the alleged "intimidation"
and "insinuations" were true, they still would not exculpate her in view of the
length of time involved, the number of cases questioned and the absence of
proof that such intimidation and insinuations were persistent, continuous and
irresistible. It is thus clear that she had, by neglecting her duty, allowed herself
to be used by the other respondents.

3. ID.; GROSS IGNORANCE OR MALICIOUS DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE

PROCEDURAL LAWS, GRAVE MISCONDUCT, GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, AND
CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE ON PART OF
RTC JUDGE IN CONNECTION WITH PETITIONS FOR GUARDIANSHIP AND FOR
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF DE FACTO ADOPTION BEFORE HIS COURT. — A far
more serious matter which has escaped the attention of the investigating
Justice involves the charges set forth under paragraph 3 of the Administrative
Complaint, particularly on the preparation by the respondent Judge, allegedly in
coordination with respondents Munar and Flores, of petitions in certain cases,
some of which are (a) Special Proceeding No. 1965 wherein it is made to
appear that the petitioner therein — an aunt of the respondent Judge and a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur — resides in San Fernando, La Union, and (b)
Special Proceeding No. 1967 wherein the Office of the Solicitor General and the
other parties were not furnished with copies of the petition upon order of the
respondent Judge. Not having undergone the prescribed raffle procedure, these
two cases were directly assigned to the respondent Judge who then acted
thereon. The said petitions, the pertinent orders issued in the course of the
proceedings therein and the minutes thereof were attached by the respondent
Judge to his 14 May 1993 Comment, which he had adopted as his direct
testimony pursuant to his 17 September 1992 Manifestation. These documents
provide conclusive proof of more serious irregularities amounting to either
gross ignorance or malicious disregard of applicable procedural laws, grave
misconduct, grave abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. The respondent Judge made a mockery of the judicial
process as it is obvious that he had displayed a special interest in these cases;
in fact, he even caused the cases to be excluded from the raffle. A careful
review of the abovementioned petitions will reveal that the designation "Branch
26," indicating the branch presided over by the respondent Judge, has been
originally typewritten as part of the caption, and not merely entered in the
blank space reserved for the branch to which the case may subsequently be
raffled off. It is to be further observed that the petition in Special Proceeding
No. 1965 was subscribed and sworn to before respondent Flores in her capacity
as the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Branch 26. Special
Proceeding No. 1965 involves a petition for guardianship over the person and
property of a certain Juan R. Lagmay . . . A closer examination of the so-called
proofs of notice of hearing to the nearest of kin, consisting supposedly of
"registry return receipts," reveals that there are no entries in the blanks
reserved for information on the name of sender, name of post office,
municipality or province where the same post office is located, registry number
and case number. It is not likewise indicated therein when the addressees
received the "registered" letter. In view thereof, the conclusion that the so-
called notices were not sent at all is inevitable. Respondent Judge knew or
ought to have known that his court was not the proper venue for the case
because the person sought to be placed under guardianship was alleged to be
a resident of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Section 1, Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that: "Guardianship of the person or estate of a minor or
incompetent may be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the province, or
in the justice of the peace court of the municipality, or in the municipal court of
the chartered city where the minor or incompetent person resides, . . ." Worse,
the aforesaid Order of 24 September 1990 did not even direct that notice be
served on Juan Lagmay, the very party sought to be placed under guardianship.
Such an omission, therefore, clearly violated Section 3, Rule 93 of the Revised
Rules of Court which directs the court to fix the time and place for hearing and
cause reasonable notice to be given to the person named in the petition,
including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself. We
have ruled that service of notice to the minor above 14 years of age or the
incompetent is jurisdictional. Failing to have notice sent to Juan Lagmay,
respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing on 8 October
1990, receive the petitioner's testimony, if he did at all, and thereafter appoint
her as Juan Lagmay's guardian . . . Having acquired no jurisdiction to hear the
case and appoint Regina Valdez as Juan Lagmay's guardian, respondent Judge
acted clearly beyond his authority when he designated special sheriffs to take
custody of Juan Lagmay, directed the person who had custody over the latter to
deliver him to the said special sheriffs and ordered the arrest of the said person
who refused to surrender custody. And even if we are to assume, for the sake
of argument, that the respondent Judge had validly acquired jurisdiction over
the case and appointed Regina Lagmay as guardian, and that Boy Cortes did in
fact refuse to deliver Juan Lagmay to the special sheriffs, he (respondent Judge)
would still be guilty of gross ignorance of the law for ordering Cortes' arrest and
confinement. In such a situation, the petitioner's remedy would be to file a
petition for habeas corpus, and not to have Boy Cortes cited for contempt, must
less arrested. We shall now focus our attention to Special Proceeding No. 1967.
It is a very strange proceeding. The case involves a petition for the "judicial
confirmation of the de facto adoption" of Cecilia Averion filed on 11 October
1990 . . . The remedy pursued in Special Proceeding No. 1967 is certainly
unusual as we are not aware of any prescribed action that may be instituted for
the judicial confirmation of a de facto adoption. Nor do our adjective and
substantive laws on adoption provide for such a proceeding. In fact, the only
proper and authorized procedure relative to adoption is outlined in the rule on
adoption itself. That Cecilia Averion had been treated by the petitioner and her
husband as their own child during the former's minority may only provide
compelling reasons to grant the decree of adoption notwithstanding her
(Cecilia's) having attained the age of majority. This is one of the exceptions
provided by the Family Code to the rule that a person of legal age cannot be
adopted. In "confirming" the so-called de facto adoption and decreeing the
same to be "retroactive to the year 1967," respondent Judge has carved a name
for himself in history for, as already pointed out, no action or proceeding for
judicial confirmation of a de facto adoption is authorized in this jurisdiction.
Furthermore, by its very nature and purpose, a decree of adoption can never be
made to retroact. Lastly, considering that the petitioner's husband had died in
1987, or three years before the petition was filed, he could not now be
resurrected for purposes of the adoption, be in fact declared an adopter and be
subsequently bound by the decree to the prejudice of his heirs. Then too,
respondent Judge completely disregarded the fact that Cecilia Averion had
submitted no written consent to the adoption at the time of the filing of the
petition or at any subsequent date . . . a manifest infirmity. Nor was Cecilia
called to testify in the case. Moreover, there seems to be an irregularity in the
publication of the notice of hearing. It is to be observed that as indicated in the
upper right hand corner of the first page of the petition, the proceeding was
instituted on 11 October 1990. If this were so, the notice of hearing which was
issued by the respondent Judge on that same date could not have been
published in the North Tribune in its 10 October 1990 issue. In his affidavit, the
Editor of the said newspaper disclosed that the notice was indeed published on
10 October 1990. All told, respondent Judge completely ignored the procedural
rules on adoption and promulgate guidelines for himself to suit his own purpose
and design. Hence, it is evident that Special Proceeding No. 1965 and Special
Proceeding No. 1967 were not only directly filed with the court of the
respondent Judge without passing through the raffle procedure, the two cases
were also resolved by the latter in a manner that may be characterized by
gross ignorance or the brazen and blatant disregard of the applicable
procedural laws, grave misconduct, palpable abuse of authority and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He is therefore unfit to continue in
the service a day longer.
 DECISION

PER CURIAM, : p

This case was initiated by the Office of the Court Administrator with the filing of
an administrative complaint which reads:

"Pursuant to the Resolution of the Court En Banc, dated July 30, 1991,
the undersigned hereby institutes this administrative complaint against
Judge Genaro c. Gines, Presiding Judge, Branch 26; Ma. Gorgonia L.
Flores, Court Interpreter and Officer-in-Charge, Branch 26; Rosie M.
Munar, Stenographic Reporter, Branch 26; Pacita B. Diaz, Staff
Assistant IV, Office of the Clerk of Court; Ma. Concepcion B. Diaz, Staff
Assistant I, Branch 26; and Mr. Alfredo V. Lacsamana, Jr., Staff II,
Branch 26, all of the RTC, San Fernando, La Union, for Dishonesty;
Violation of par. (e), Sec. 3 of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) as amended; and Violation of Administrative Order No. 6,
dated June 30, 1975, Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974, and
Administrative Order No. 1, dated January 28, 1988, by virtue of their
collective illegal acts involving deliberate and surreptitious assignment
of cases at the Docketing and Receiving Section, Office of the Clerk of
Court, RTC San Fernando, La Union . LLpr

1. This complaint is substantially anchored on the Report submitted

by Atty. Aurora P. Sanglay, Clerk of Court, RTC, San Fernando, La
Union, relative to her investigation on the alleged anomaly in the non-
raffling of cases in the said Court, and the Affidavit-complaint of Ma.
Concepcion B. Diaz dated September 19, 1991, implicating other court
personnel involved in the aforestated irregularity;

2. Atty. Sanglay, in her Report, averred that:

2.1. From April 3, 1989 to April, 1991, there were forty-

four (44) Special Proceedings cases, twenty-seven (27) Land
Registration cases, six (6) Civil Cases, and three (3) Criminal
Cases which were directly assigned to the RTC, Branch 26, San
Fernando, La Union, without passing through the mandatory
raffling procedure of cases except for three (3) special
proceedings cases which were assigned to Branch 27, which
anomaly had been going on since 1986;

2.2. Pacita Diaz, Ma. Concepcion Diaz and Alfredo

Lacsamana, Jr. were the court employees in-charge in (sic) the
receiving and docketing of the Land Registration cases, Special
Proceedings cases and Civil Cases, respectively; and

2.3. There is a probability that the aforesaid clerks, who

were in-charge of receiving the cases, did not submit deliberately
to the Officer-in-Charge some of the cases received for
 mandatory raffling in compliance with the Administrative
Orders/Circulars of the Supreme Court;

3. In the Affidavit-Complaint dated September 19, 1991, of Ma.

Concepcion B. Diaz, which was received by the Office of the Court
Administrator on September 20, 1991, she asserted, inter alia, that:

3.1. She blamed Judge Genaro C. Gines, Presiding

Judge, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union, Ma. Gorgonia
Flores, Court Interpreter and Officer-In-Charge, same Court, and
Rosie Munar, Stenographic Reporter, same Court, for applying
pressures and intimidations to her in order that the cases of their
choice may no longer be forwarded to the proper Officer-In-
Charge;

3.2. Several petitions have been prepared by the (sic)

Judge Gines himself in coordination with his Stenographer Rosie
Munar and Court Interpreter Ma. Gorgonia Flores, some of which
are as follows:

3.2.1. Special Proceeding No. 1965 where

the petitioner, who alleged himself to be a resident of
San Fernando, La Union, is actually a resident of Sta.
Cruz, Ilocos Sur and the Aunt of Judge Gines. The
required bond of P500.00 therein has not yet been
posted; and
3.2.2. Special Proceeding No. 1967 where
the Office of the Solicitor General and other parties
were not furnished with copies of the petition upon the
instruction of Judge Gines."

The respondents were then required to answer the complaint.

Separate motions for an extension of time to file their answers were made by
the respondents, but only respondents Pacita Diaz and Ma. Concepcion Diaz
filed their Answer within the extended period. The Resolution which granted the
others the extension warned them that no further postponements would be
granted. Notwithstanding such caveat, however, they again asked for another
extension. In the Resolution of 28 May 1992, this Court ruled, inter alia, that:

"It appearing that said respondents have not taken this case seriously,
and considering the prior warning in the Resolution of 7 May 1992, the
above motions for another extension of time to file the Answers are
hereby DENIED. The respondent Judge and respondents Flores, Munar
and Lacsamana are deemed to have waived the filing of their Answer."

As it turned out, respondents Flores, Munar and Lacsamana were able to post
their joint Answers on 15 May 1992, the last day of the additional period they
had prayed for in their second motion which was eventually denied in the
aforementioned Resolution.

Respondents then filed a motion to reconsider the Resolution of 28 May 1992;

the same was denied in the Resolution of 14 July 1992. This latter resolution
likewise denied the respondent Judge's motion to reconsider the 7 May 1992
Resolution wherein he prayed that his answer (actually a Comment), dated 14
May 1992, be admitted. However, this Court resolved that the said comment be
attached to the record of the instant case. cdrep

In the same 14 July 1992 Resolution, the instant case was referred to Mr. Justice
Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr. of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On 31 March 1993, Justice De Pano, Jr. submitted his 26-page REPORT. It

appears therefrom that on 2 September 1992, he issued an order (a) requiring
the parties to file their respective affidavits which shall serve as their direct
testimonies in this case subject, however, to cross-examination by the adverse
parties and (b) setting the initial hearing of the case for 28 September 1992.
Respondents Pacita Diaz and Ma. Concepcion Diaz submitted their joint
affidavit, dated 9 September 1992, as well as the affidavits of Fortunata
Gualberto, retired branch clerk of court of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in San Fernando, La Union, and Consolacion M. Dulay, Clerk III of the
same Branch 27. Respondents Gorgonia Flores, Rosie Munar and Alfredo
Lacsamana likewise submitted their individual affidavits which are all dated 14
September 1992. Respondent Judge Gines, for his part, filed a manifestation,
dated 17 September 1992, adopting his 14 May 1992 Comment as his direct
testimony as well as the aforesaid affidavits of respondents Flores, Munar and
Lacsamana.

At the hearing on 28 September 1992, the parties entered into a stipulation of

facts. They agreed on the status and personal circumstances of the parties as
stated in the affidavits, as well as the descriptions of their respective positions
in the RTC in San Fernando, La Union; the assumption into office of the
respondent Judge in January of 1987, the non-membership of the respondent
Judge and the other respondents in the raffle committee; and the procedure
prescribed for the raffling of cases filed with the RTC in San Fernando, La Union.
The respondents then marked as exhibits their affidavits and other documents.

It further appears from the REPORT that no testimonial evidence was offered by
the parties. While the complainant wanted to present Atty. Sanglay, the
respondents admitted her report and agreed to dispense with her testimony.
The complainant then marked in evidence the following documents: (1) the
undated Report of Atty. Aurora Sanglay to the Executive Judge, as Exhibit "A",
(2) the 17 June 1991 Letter of Atty. Aurora Sanglay addressed to the Executive
Judge, with annexes, as Exhibit "B"; (3) the Joint Affidavit of Pacita and Ma.
Concepcion Diaz dated 11 September 1992, as Exhibit "C"; (4) the Compliance
of respondents Flores, Munar and Lacsamana, Jr., as Exhibit "D"; (5) the
Affidavit of respondent Flores dated 14 September 1992, as Exhibit "E"; (6) the
Affidavit of Romeo Hermosura dated 14 September 1992, as Exhibit "F"; (7) the
Affidavit of Teodorico Basilio dated 14 September 1992, as Exhibit "G"; (8) the
Affidavit of respondent Munar dated 14 September 1992, as Exhibit "H"; (9) the
Affidavit of respondent Lacsamana, Jr. dated 14 September 1992, as Exhibit "I";
and (10) the Manifestation of respondent Judge Gines dated 17 September
1992, as Exhibit "J." It appears that counsel for the complainant expressed a
desire to cross-examine respondents Flores, Munar and Lacsamana but that the
latter's counsel objected on the ground of possible self-incrimination. These
three respondents further manifested that they were not presenting any
evidence against the other respondents. Respondents Pacita Diaz and
Concepcion Diaz likewise manifested, through counsel, that they will not
present evidence on account of the possibility of self-incrimination. Respondent
Judge Gines did not present his evidence.

Justice De Pano, Jr. then made the following observations, findings and
conclusions in his REPORT:

"Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon of the San Fernando, La Union

Regional Trial Court, in a letter dated June 20, 1991, transmitted to the
Court, the report dated June 17, 1991, of Attorney Aurora Sanglay, the
said Court's Clerk of Court, on the subject of cases that had not been
raffled by the appropriate committee on raffle but which nevertheless,
found their way mostly, to Branch 26 of the said Court (presided over
by respondent Genaro Gines from January 1987) and Branch 27 (the
letter and its annexes were later marked Exhibit B. In 1986, the report
states, 6 criminal cases, 9 civil cases, 51 special proceedings cases and
9 land registration cases, (a total of 75 cases) did not pass through the
raffle committee but went directly to the branch which apparently
acted on the cases without question. In 1987, 8 criminal cases, 9 civil
cases, 13 special proceedings cases, 2 land registration cases (a total
of 32 cases) did not pass through the raffle committee. In 1988, 9 civil
cases, 18 special proceedings cases and 2 land registration cases (a
total of 29 cases) went directly to the branches mentioned. A total of
136 cases from 1986 to 1988, Attorney Sanglay reports, went from
filing/docketing direct to two branches without undergoing the
mandated raffle by the raffle committee.

The more germane report, one which demonstrates the continuing

perpetuation of the above obviously illegal and nefarious system of
directing cases filed with the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La
Union to Branches 26 and 27 of that court, is the undated report of
Clerk of Court Aurora P. Sanglay to Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon,
and received by his office on June 6, 1991. The letter, uncontroverted,
is marked Exhibit A, Court Administrator, and it reads thus:

'In compliance to (sic) your memorandum dated May 23,

1991, directing the undersigned to make an investigation re the
matter of cases filed before my office (Office of the Clerk of
Court), which did not undergo the mandatory raffle procedure,
herewith are my findings:

'The period covered by my investigation is from April 3,

1989 to April 1991. In summary, during this period, there were
FORTY-FOUR (44) Special Cases, TWENTY-SEVEN (27) Land
Registration Cases, SIX (6) Civil Cases, and THREE (3) Criminal
Cases which did not pass through raffle, but which were instead
 directed to specific RTC Branches, particularly Branch 26 and
Branch 27. A great majority of these cases however were
assigned to Branch 26.

'Attached is the list of these cases mentioned for your

reference. This data obtained (sic) by counterchecking the
Minutes of previous raffles covering the period of my
investigation vis-a-vis the corresponding docket books.

'Until your memorandum dated May 24, 1991, the following

persons were in-charge of receiving and docketing the following
kinds of cases:

'Mrs. Pacita Diaz — Land Registration Cases.

'Miss Ma. Concepcion Diaz — Special Proceedings Cases.

'Mr. Alfredo Lacsamana — Civil Cases.

'Criminal Cases were docketed by Mr. Vicente Tatunay of

the Prosecutor's Office and received by either Mr. Alfredo
Lacsamana, Jr., the person handling all cases filed for raffle, or
Mr. Oscarlito Fantastico or any of the clerks in the OCC, in his
absence.

'Supposed to be, all these filed cases are to be turned over

to Mr. Alfredo Lacsamana Jr. for raffle, but as per my findings,
some of these cases were not at all included in the mandatory
raffle, but were instead directed to specific RTC Branches. The
possibility is not remote that these clerks-in-charge of receiving
their respective cases deliberately did not submit some of their
received cases for raffle.

'A lapse in the system and poor monitoring also provided

for this thing to happen. Instances are common where a
client/lawyer is allowed possession of the papers to be filed at
certain docketing and payment of filing fees, and after said
stages, the possibility is not likewise remote that these papers
are not submitted to the person in-charge of the raffle.

'The undersigned had already instituted procedures, i.e.

centralized receiving, payment of filing fees, docketing, and has
strengthen (sic) monitoring of the cases and the number of cases
filed to prevent occurrence (sic) of similar nature. (Exhibit A,
Court Administrator, pp. 76-77, rec., 3rd Folder)

Clerk of Court Sanglay's report includes 44 special proceedings cases,

27 land registration cases, 6 civil cases and 3 criminal cases or a total
of 80 cases that did not pass through raffle from April, 1989 to April,
1991 but found their way directly to Branches 26 and 27 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union. Of these 80 Cases, all
except 3, found their way to Branch 26, occupied by respondent Judge
Genaro Gines who, as he admits, was assigned in (sic) that branch
since January, 1987.
The respondents here are Judge Genaro Gines, the incumbent
presiding judge of Branch 26 of the RTC in Judicial Region No. 1 based
in San Fernando, La Union; Pacita Diaz, a staff member in that court
now retired in the period covered by the Sanglay report, in charge of
filing and docketing of land registration cases; Pacita Diaz's daughter,
Ma. Concepcion Diaz, another staff member in Branch 26, during the
period covered by the Sanglay report, the clerk in charge of the filing
and docketing of special proceedings cases; Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., in
the period covered by the Sanglay report the clerk in-charge of the
filing and docketing of civil cases; Rosie Munar, court stenographic
reporter; and Ma. Gorgonia Flores, court interpreter and the Officer-in-
Charge of Branch 26. Francisco (sic) Lacsamana, Jr., additionally, was
assigned to gather all cases filed and docketed in the week — civil,
criminal, special proceedings, land — one day before the weekly raffle,
and to transmit these newly filed cases to the Committee on Raffle.
Ma. Gorgonia Flores, Officer-in-Charge of Branch 26, oversees the
administrative machinery of Branch 26 (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., September 28,
1992).

The respondents felt that since the Court Administrator limited himself
to the sworn statement and report of Clerk of Court Attorney Aurora
Sanglay, they were not called upon to present evidence in their behalf
as it would amount to self-incrimination. They refused to testify; they
refused to be cross examined. Your investigator informs the Court that
the Sanglay affidavit and report are uncontroverted. Admissions in the
sworn statements forming part of the record are utilized in this report
in addition to the stipulated facts.

The respondents are charged in the administrative complaint:

(1) for dishonesty, in violation of paragraph (e), Section

3 of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as amended;

(2) for violation of Administrative Order No. 6, dated

June 30, 1975;

(3) for violation of Circular No. 7, dated September 23,

1974; and

(4) for violation of Administrative Order No. 1, dated

January 28, 1988.

The last three, Supreme Court issues, have to do with the creation of a
raffle committee in multi-branch Regional Trial Courts, with supervision
of the raffle of newly-filed cases; with the manner of raffling cases, and
establish the policy that no case, in multi-branch trial courts, may be
assigned to any branch or sala unless it had undergone the raffle
process.

Supreme Court Circular No. 7, September 23, 1974 mandates that in

courts with several branches, cases shall be assigned to the different
branches only by raffle. 'No case may be assigned to any branch
without being raffled.' (Part I) And immediately after raffle, the
Executive Judge is mandated by the said Circular to indicate the
particular branch to which the case is raffled, 'the same to be written
in words and in figures on the cover of the Rollo and on the first page
of the original complaint or information and initialed by the Executive
Judge and the two other officers who attended said raffle.' (Part III).
The same circular created a raffle committee of three, composed of the
Executive Judge and two other judges of the court. The Executive
Judge, supervises the Raffle. Administrative Circular No. 1, (January 28,
1988) reiterates strict compliance with Administrative Order No. 6
(June 30, 1975) and Circular No. 7 (September 23, 1974) Raffle of
cases, this later Circular required, must be 'in open session in the
presence of lawyers and spectators . . .' (Section 8.1). The Court in this
later Circular restated the res ipso loquitor (sic) rule regarding the
conduct and removal of judges (Section 5.2).

It is, therefore, beyond cavil, that under the rules governing the
administration of courts, all cases filed in court must go through the
raffle committee for assignment. No case must be assigned, in multi-
branch courts, unless it is raffled by the Raffle Committee. The 80
cases involved in this case, filed from April 1989 to April 1991, were
not raffled, but were directly assigned to, or taken by, Branch 26
(except 3) under respondent Judge Gines. Respondent Judge Gines
must know, under the above Supreme Court acts, at a simple glance on
the cover of the rollo and the first page of every such record, whether a
case was assigned to him after going through raffle or not. Cases
assigned to his branch, after going through the required raffle, show on
the face of the rollo, in words and figures, the branch to which the case
is assigned, authenticated by the initials of the Executive Judge and the
two other members of the Committee. From January 1987, when
respondent Judge Gines was appointed to Branch 26, the respondent
judge had received unraffled cases, considered them and decided
them. He had done so, apparently, not because he was a maniac of a
worker, nor because he loved his work but for reasons unspoken in this
case. Why should a sane judge accept additional cases for study and
decision, in addition to his regular load, without any benefit or
consideration? Here, obviously, the res ipso loquitor (sic) doctrine
applies.

Among the administrative officers charged here, Alfredo Lacsamana,

Jr., as stipulated, gathers all the cases filed and docketed in any
particular week, for transmittal to the Committee on Raffle. He
prepared the cases for raffle, including the preparation of the pieces of
paper properly written on, to be picked in the raffle. It was his job to do
so. He was assigned to do so; he admitted so. That he did not do so is
obvious from the Sanglay report — from 1989 to 1991, he failed to
transmit 80 cases — and these cases found their way (except for 3) to
respondent Judge Gines. The Sanglay report is not controverted. It was
Lacsamana's job to collect all cases docketed, and to transmit them to
the Raffle Committee. 80 such cases he did collect and failed to report
to the Raffle Committee from April, 1989 to April, 1991.

The Diazes, in the period covered by the Sanglay report had apparently
fallen out with respondent Judge Gines and respondents Flores, Munar
and Lacsamana. In an affidavit dated September 18, 1991 executed by
respondent Ma. Concepcion Diaz, the following passages appear, to
wit:

xxx xxx xxx

The conflict between the Diazes and the other respondents deem (sic)
to have arisen from the suspicion the respondent Judge entertained
that the Diazes had 'squealed' on him to the Executive Judge, the
Honorable Braulio Yaranon. This is contained in the Diazes Joint
Affidavit dated September 9, 1992 (Marked C-Diaz), in the following
passage:

xxx xxx xxx

As to the two other respondents, respondents Ma. Gorgonia Flores, who

is officer-in-charge of Branch 26, and Rosie Munar, court interpreter,
there appears to be no evidence. The record shows that when the
Court Administrator's lawyers rested their case with the presentation of
the Sanglay report, the respondents refused to be cross-examined on
their sworn statements. Consequently, each sworn statement lost
value as evidence against the other respondents. However, it may be
easily inferred that as court officer-in-charge, respondent Flores was in
(sic)-duty bound to supervise the work of her subalterns. The non-
raffling of 80 cases during the period covered from April, 1989 to April
1991 reflects her failure to do her job.

xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court orders and circulars complained of as having been

violated, are directed to district judges, while Section 3, paragraph (e)
of RA 3019 is inclusive in scope, penalizing public officers for 'causing
undue injury to any party . . . or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative a (sic) judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence . . .'

The prosecution had limited itself to presenting the Sanglay report. It is

apparent that we must take the Diazes' statement that they were
pressured to do that which they had to do, and whatever it was, was
done without consent, and against their will. However, under the facts
here, all the cases filed docketed in Branch 26 were collected by
respondent Lacsamana, Jr. who was in (sic) duty bound to forward the
cases to the Raffle Committee. That 80 such cases did not find their
way to the Committee, but ended up as 80 extra cases (except 3) in
the docket load of the respondent judge, means at the very least that
Lacsamana, Jr. failed to perform his job. The respondent judge in
accepting or securing, such 80 cases, (minus 3) that did not pass
through raffle, for his action and resolution, and which he eventually
resolved violated all the Supreme Court circulars on the matter with the
help and cooperation of respondent Lacsamana, Jr. Evidently,
respondent judge must have received undue benefits and advantages
(which have not been demonstrated in this case) in securing this extra
load of cases, benefits and advantages coming from the party
benefitted (sic) by his action, and at the same time, granted the parties
 involved in the some (sic) 80 cases that did not undergo raffle, undue
and unwarranted benefits resulting from the bias and partiality in their
favor coming from the respondent judge. As earlier observed, a single
glance at the cover and first page of each of the 80 or so rollos would
show that they were unraffled, and yet, the respondent judge knowing
that such cases were unraffled, secured the said cases, considered
them and decided or resolved them, in violation of law.

It would appear, therefore, that the respondent judge is guilty of the

charges in the administrative complaint. Along with him as guilty, is
respondent Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. This conclusion is bolstered by,
among other things, the Diazes' statement that cases were indeed
directly secured by the respondent judge without their undergoing
raffle.

With respect to the other respondents, it could be deduced that

respondent Ma. Gorgonia Flores, as officer-in-charge of Branch 26,
would have known that Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. was not doing his job of
forwarding all docketed cases to the Raffle Committee faithfully."

He then recommends:

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended:

1. That respondent Judge Genaro C. Gines be

appropriately penalized for violation of all the Supreme Court
orders and circulars mentioned in the Administrative Complaint
for the period covered from April 1989 to April 1991, plus
apparent violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A. 3019;

2. That respondent Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. for his

apparent failure to do his job, be, likewise appropriately
penalized, at least with a 6-month suspension without pay; and

3. That respondent Ma. Gorgonia Flores be likewise

penalized with a 3-month suspension without pay; and

4. That the other respondents be warned against

committing any such violations."

The continuing deliberate violations of Administrative Order No. 6 (dated 30

June 1975), Circular No. 7 (dated 23 September 1974) and Administrative Order
No. 1 (dated 28 January 1988) for the years reported in Atty. Sanglay's report,
and their belated discovery boggle our minds. The irregularities should have
been easily discovered by the respondent Judge either because the fact that a
case has not been properly raffled off is at once discernible on the cover of the
records and on the first page of the original of the initial pleading (complaint,
information, etc.), or because plain common sense would have told him that
something was wrong somewhere as an unusual number of cases of the same
class had been "assigned" to his sala. That he had failed to appreciate the
physical evidence or, at the very least, exhibit surprise at the unusual number
of cases is quite amazing. Thus, we are loathe to grant him the benefit of the
doubt and conclude that he had no interest whatsoever in having those cases
raffled off to him and that he only loved to work more than the others. Given
the circumstances of this case, we cannot merely cut him some slack and
assume good faith on his part; he deserves no such treatment. As the
investigating Justice himself assessed the situation:

". . . The 80 cases involved in this case, filed from April 1989 to April
1991, were not raffled, but were directly assigned to, or taken by,
Branch 26 (except 3 under respondent Judge Gines. Respondent Judge
Gines must know, under the above Supreme Court acts, at a simple
glance on the cover of the rollo and the first page of every such record,
whether a case was assigned to him after going through raffle or not . .
. From January 1987, when respondent Judge Gines was appointed to
Branch 26, the respondent judge had received unraffled cases,
considered them and decided them. He had done so, apparently, not
because he was a maniac of a worker, nor because he loved his work
but for reasons unspoken in this case. Why should a sane judge accept
additional cases for study and decision, in addition to his regular load,
without any benefit or consideration? Here, obviously, the res ipso
loquitor (sic) doctrine applies."

The irregularity and violations of the aforementioned administrative orders and

circular could not have been committed so blatantly, brazenly and openly for an
unusually long period of time if the respondent Judge did not have the
cooperation of some of the court employees. We therefore agree with the
investigating Justice that such support and cooperation were extended by
subordinates who likewise had something to do with the raffle of cases. Hence,
the findings on the degree of participation, either by commission or omission,
of respondents Flores and Lacsamana are sustained.

In his report, the investigating Justice absolves the Diazes and Munar from
responsibility in the aforesaid irregularities.

With respect to respondent Pacita Diaz, the case has become moot as she died
on 10 February 1993. 1 Thus, the case is dismissed insofar as she is concerned.

On the other hand, while we find no evidence to link respondent Munar to the
aforementioned irregularities, we hold that respondent Ma. Concepcion Diaz is
not entirely blameless. In her affidavit of 18 September 1991, the relevant
portions of which are quoted in the REPORT of Justice de Pano, she explicitly
admitted:

"11. In my explanation dated May 27, 1991 to the Memorandum of

Judge Yaranon, while I might have made an admission that I was the
clerk receiving cases that later turned out to be unraffled, I placed the
direct blame on Judge Gines and my two officemates, namely, Mrs. Ma.
Gorgonia L. Flores and Mrs. Rosie Munar who had applied all sorts of
pressures upon me, including series (sic) of intimidation and
insinuations in order that cases of their choice receive (sic) by me may
no longer be forwarded to the proper officer-in-charge of the raffle, but
to them directly in Branch 26." 2

It is to be noted that Ma. Concepcion did not elaborate on the nature of such
 intimidation and insinuations. In view of the fact, however, that she was in
charge of receiving and docketing special proceedings cases, and that out of
the controversial 80 unraffled cases, 44 were special proceedings cases, her
participation could, by no means, be considered as insignificant. And even if
the alleged "intimidation" and "insinuations" were true, they still would not
exculpate her in view of the length of time involved, the number of cases
questioned and the absence of proof that such intimidation and insinuations
were persistent, continuous and irresistible. It is thus clear that she had, by
neglecting her duty, allowed herself to be used by the other respondents.

A far more serious matter which has escaped the attention of the investigating
Justice involves the charges set forth under paragraph 3 of the Administrative
Complaint, particularly on the preparation by the respondent Judge, allegedly in
coordination with respondents Munar and Flores, of petitions in certain cases,
some of which are (a) Special Proceeding No. 1965 wherein it is made to
appear that the petitioner therein — an aunt of the respondent Judge and a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur — resides in San Fernando, La Union, and (b)
Special Proceeding No. 1967 wherein the Office of the Solicitor General and the
other parties were not furnished with copies of the petition upon order of the
respondent Judge. Not having undergone the prescribed raffle procedure, these
two cases were directly assigned to the respondent Judge who then acted
thereon. The said petitions, the pertinent orders issued in the course of the
proceedings therein and the minutes thereof were attached by the respondent
Judge to his 14 May 1993 Comment, which he had adopted as his direct
testimony pursuant to his 17 September 1992 Manifestation (Exhibit "J"). These
documents provide conclusive proof of more serious irregularities amounting to
either gross ignorance or malicious disregard of applicable procedural laws,
grave misconduct, grave abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. The respondent Judge made a mockery of the judicial
process as it is obvious that he had displayed a special interest in these cases;
in fact, he even caused the cases to be excluded from the raffle. A careful
review of the abovementioned petitions will reveal that the designation "Branch
26," indicating the branch presided over by the respondent Judge, has been
originally typewritten as part of the caption, and not merely entered in the
blank space reserved for the branch to which the case may subsequently be
raffled off. It is to be further observed that the petition in Special Proceeding
No. 1965 was subscribed and sworn to before respondent Flores in her capacity
as the Officer-in-Charge of the Officer of the Clerk of Court, Branch 26.prLL

Special Proceeding No. 1965 involves a petition for guardianship over the
person and property of a certain Juan R. Lagmay. The said petition was filed by
Regina Lagmay Valdez — who claims to be a resident of Poblacion, San
Fernando, La Union 3 — on 24 September 1990, and alleges that Juan R.
Lagmay is " presently residing at No. 2579 Pamintuan Village, Mabalacat,
Pampanga." Upon its filing, the respondent Judge immediately issued an order
(a) giving due course to the petition, (b) directing that notices be served to Juan
Lagmay's nearest of kin, namely Bonifacia Lagmay, Lilia Gumangan and
Mariano Lagmay, all residents of Las-ud, Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur and (c) directing
the latter to submit their opposition to the petition, if any, on or before 8
October 1990 at 8:30 a.m. 4 No order setting the case for hearing at that
particular date, time and place was issued. It would appear, however, that this
24 September 1990 order was considered by the respondent Judge as the order
setting the case for hearing on 8 October 1990 because respondent Flores
prepared the Minutes of the alleged proceedings conducted on 8 October 1990.
5 The said Minutes show that the following exhibits were offered for

jurisdictional purposes: (1) Notice of hearing, as Exhibit "A" and (b) the dorsal
side of Exhibit "A," purportedly to show that Juan Lagmay's nearest of kin were
furnished with the notice of hearing, as Exhibit "A-1." Said Minutes further
disclose that the petitioner therein was not assisted by counsel; that
respondent Flores acted as Interpreter while respondent Munar acted as
Stenographer; and that since no opposition was filed therein, the testimony of
the petitioner was received. The latter then allegedly declared that she is a
resident of Poblacion, San Fernando, La Union; she is Juan Lagmay's niece as he
is her father's brother; and Juan Lagmay is an American citizen, single,
childless, a resident of 2579 Pamintuan Village, Mabalacat, Pampanga and a
retired seaman receiving pension from the Social Security Administration of the
United States of America in the amount of $550.00 a month. Thereafter, the
respondent Judge issued an order appointing petitioner Regina Valdez as the
guardian of the person and property of Juan R. Lagmay, and directing her to
take her oath as such upon the filing of a bond of P500.00, after which she
would be issued letters of guardianship. Without the bond having first been
filed, however, respondent Flores administered the oath to Regina Valdez. 6
Thereafter, or on 18 October 1990, respondent Flores issued to the latter her
letters of guardianship. 7

A closer examination of the so-called proofs of notice of hearing to the nearest

of kin, consisting supposedly of "registry return receipts," reveals that there are
no entries in the blanks reserved for information on the name of sender, name
of post office, municipality or province where the same post office is located,
registry number and case number. It is not likewise indicated therein when the
addressees received the "registered" letter. In view thereof, the conclusion that
the so-called notices were not sent at all is inevitable.

Respondent Judge knew or ought to have known that his court was not the
proper venue for the case because the person sought to be placed under
guardianship was alleged to be a resident of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Section 1,
Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

"Guardianship of the person or estate of a minor or incompetent may

be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the province, or in the
justice of the peace court of the municipality, or in the municipal court
of the chartered city where the minor or incompetent person resides, . .
." (emphasis supplied).

Worse, the aforesaid Order of 24 September 1990 did not even direct that
notice be served on Juan Lagmay, the very party sought to be placed under
guardianship. Such an omission, therefore, clearly violated Section 3, Rule 93
of the Revised Rules of Court which directs the court to fix the time and place
for hearing and cause reasonable notice to be given to the person named in the
petition, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent
himself. We have ruled that service of notice to the minor above 14 years of
age or the incompetent is jurisdictional. 8 Failing to have notice sent to Juan
Lagmay, respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing on 8
October 1990, receive the petitioner's testimony, if he did at all, and thereafter
appoint her as Juan Lagmay's guardian. Nor was the respondent Judge justified
in issuing on 22 January 1990 — pursuant to the petitioner's 17 January 1990
motion 9 — an order appointing deputy sheriffs Oscar Fantastico and Romualdo
Baladad as special sheriffs to take custody over the person of Juan Lagmay
from one Florencio "Boy" Cortes of Bolinao, Pangasinan. In the said order,
respondent Judge further directed Boy Cortes "to release from his custody and
deliver the person of said Juan R. Lagmay, a.k.a. John R. Lagmay to the
aforementioned special sheriffs immediately upon receipt of this Order, under
pain of contempt." 10 Based on the special sheriffs' report, 11 however, Boy
Cortes did not release Juan Lagmay because the latter was too weak and sickly
to travel. This refusal prompted the respondent Judge to order Boy Cortes'
arrest (for contempt) and confinement until he shall have complied with the
said order. 12 It was respondent Flores who forwarded the warrant of arrest to
the PNP Regional Command at San Fernando, La Union for its service. 13

Having acquired no jurisdiction to hear the case and appoint Regina Valdez as
Juan Lagmay's guardian, respondent Judge acted clearly beyond his authority
when he designated special sheriffs to take custody of Juan Lagmay, directed
the person who had custody over the latter to deliver him to the said special
sheriffs and ordered the arrest of the said person who refused to surrender
custody. And even if we are to assume, for the sake of argument, that the
respondent Judge had validly acquired jurisdiction over the case and appointed
Regina Lagmay as guardian, and that Boy Cortes did in fact refuse to deliver
Juan Lagmay to the special sheriffs, he (respondent Judge) would still be guilty
of gross ignorance of the law for ordering Cortes' arrest and confinement. In
such a situation, the petitioner's remedy would be to file a petition for habeas
corpus, and not to have Boy Cortes cited for contempt, much less arrested.

We shall now focus our attention to Special Proceeding No. 1967. It is a very
strange proceeding. The case involves a petition for the "judicial confirmation of
the de facto adoption" of Cecilia Averion filed on 11 October 1990. The
petitioner therein alleges that she and her late husband, Fernando Averion —
who died in 1987 — "adopted" Cecilia Averion in 1967; only 1 year and 3
months old at the time, Cecilia was supposedly given up by her natural parents,
the whereabouts of whom remain unknown. Petitioner further avers that she
and her husband, during his lifetime, reared the child and gave her all their
love, attention, care and understanding. They also provided her with an
education and considered her as their own child. Hence, the petition was filed
"for the purpose of judicially confirming the de facto adoption of Cecilia Averion
by herein petitioner and her late husband." 14 The said petition was not
accompanied by the written consent of Cecilia Averion who, at the time of
filing, was already of legal age. On the very day the petition was filed,
respondent Judge forthwith issued a Notice of Hearing which provided that the
petition would be heard on 31 October 1990; it was likewise ordered therein
that "a copy of this notice be published once a week for three consecutive
weeks at the expense of the petitioner in a newspaper of general circulation in
La Union and in the Philippines." 15

From the so-called Minutes of the proceedings of 31 October 1990, 16 as

prepared by respondent Flores, it appears that the following exhibits were
offered to establish the jurisdiction of the court: (1) the affidavit of the Editor of
the North Tribune, "a newspaper of general circulation in La Union and Northern
Luzon provinces," published in San Fernando, La Union, as Exhibit "A"; (2)
clippings of the published order in the 10, 17 and 24 October 1990 issues of the
North Tribune, as Exhibits "A-1," "A-2" and "A-3," respectively; and (3) the
entire issues of the North Tribune for 10, 17 and 24 October 1990, as Exhibits
"B," "B-1" and "B-2," respectively. It may further be gleaned from the said
Minutes that since no opposition was registered by any other party, the
petitioner's testimony was received by the court. On 6 November 1990, the
respondent Judge handed down a decision 17 granting the petition and
decreeing as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the petition and hereby

confirms the de facto adoption of Cecilia Averion by herein petitioner
and her late spouse Fernando Averion retroactive to the year 1967."

The remedy pursued in Special Proceeding No. 1967 is certainly unusual as we

are not aware of any prescribed action that may be instituted for the judicial
confirmation of a de facto adoption. Nor do our adjective and substantive laws
on adoption provide for such a proceeding. In fact, the only proper and
authorized procedure relative to adoption is outlined in the rule on adoption
itself. 18 That Cecilia Averion had been treated by the petitioner and her
husband as their own child during the former's minority may only provide
compelling reasons to grant the decree of adoption notwithstanding her
(Cecilia's) having attained the age of majority. This is one of the exceptions
provided by the Family Code to the rule that a person of legal age cannot be
adopted. 19

In "confirming" the so-called de facto adoption and decreeing the same to be

"retroactive to the year 1967," respondent Judge has carved a name for himself
in history for, as already pointed out, no action or proceeding for judicial
confirmation of a de facto adoption is authorized in this jurisdiction.
Furthermore, by its very nature and purpose, a decree of adoption can never be
made to retroact. Lastly, considering that the petitioner's husband had died in
1987, or three years before the petition was filed, he could not now be
resurrected for purposes of the adoption, be in fact declared an adopter and be
subsequently bound by the decree to the prejudice of his heirs. Cdpr

Then too, respondent Judge completely disregarded the fact that Cecilia
Averion had submitted no written consent to the adoption at the time of the
filing of the petition or at any subsequent date — a manifest infirmity. Nor was
Cecilia called to testify in the case. Moreover, there seems to be an irregularity
in the publication of the notice of hearing. It is to be observed that as indicated
in the upper right hand corner of the first page of the petition, the proceeding
was instituted on 11 October 1990. If this were so, the notice of hearing which
was issued by the respondent Judge on that same date 20 could not have been
published in the North Tribune in its 10 October 1990 issue. In his affidavit, the
Editor of the said newspaper disclosed that the notice was indeed published on
10 October 1990.

All told, respondent Judge completely ignored the procedural rules on adoption
and promulgated guidelines for himself to suit his own purpose and design.

Hence, it is evident that Special Proceeding No. 1965 and Special Proceeding
No. 1967 were not only directly filed with the court of the respondent Judge
without passing through the raffle procedure, the two cases were also resolved
by the latter in a manner that may be characterized by gross ignorance or the
brazen and blatant disregard of the applicable procedural laws, grave
misconduct, palpable abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. He is therefore unfit to continue in the service a day
longer. He has evidently forgotten that the administration of justice is a sacred
task. Upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He
becomes "the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of
justice." 21 A judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence, 22 and should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest
infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. 23

As shown in the above disquisitions, respondent Flores was a willing participant

in the commission of the irregularities in both proceedings. On the other hand,
however, respondent Munar's participation has not been substantiated.

Before closing, we would like to point out that per our Resolution of 2 March
1993, we referred to Justice De Pano for inclusion in his investigation the 29
January 1993 letter of Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon which was addressed to
Deputy Court Administrator Juanito Bernad. 24 In his letter, Judge Yaranon
informs the latter about matters discovered in the course of the audit which are
more serious than the "illegal raffling" of cases. He then exposes alleged case
fixing and illegal office practices committed on a large scale by a syndicate
composed principally of court officers and personnel, and describes the modus
operandi of those involved as follows:

"The operation in a particular case, starts with 'AMBULANCE CHASING';

after arrangements are made with a prospective applicant/petitioner, a
petition is prepared by the syndicate; the same is then signed
personally by the petitioner/applicant; and the oath for purposes of
verification, is administered also by the syndicate.

The petition/application is then filed with the Office of the Clerk of

Court, where syndicate members receive and docket the case in the
docket book of Branch 26; the case is deliberately separated from the
 cases that are turned over to the Raffle Committee, and is directly
turned over to Branch 26. Care is taken that the date of filing is made
to coincide with the scheduled day for raffling of cases (Tuesdays).

On the same date of filing, the ORDER setting the case for initial
hearing, is issued by Branch 26. On the date of initial hearing, a
lawyer-contact of the syndicate enters an appearance for the
petitioner/applicant, and he then presents jurisdictional facts.

On the very same day of initial hearing (in special proceedings) and
without any ACTUAL HEARING (in special proceedings and land
registration cases), for the reception of evidence on the material
allegations of facts in the application/petition, a DECISION is forthwith
issued."

Judge Yaranon then partly concludes:

"Just one aspect of the matter is herein submitted for consideration.

The issuance of a DECISION without any previous hearing being held
for the reception of evidence by the applicant/petitioner, constitutes
FALSIFICATION OF A PUBLIC DOCUMENT by a public officer, under
Article 171, Revised Penal Code committed by:

'2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated

in an act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; .
. .' (par. 2, Art. 171, Revised Penal Code)."

According to Justice De Pano, he received the 2 March 1993 Resolution just as

he was about to write his report in this case. He then suggests that the matter
subject thereof be treated separately and that "appropriate charges be levelled
against the respondent Judge principally, and his cohorts, with the Tanod
Bayan, for criminal prosecution." 25 Indeed, the referral of Judge Yaranon's
letter to Justice De Pano may have been too late. In any event, the charges
proffered therein may be separately dealt with.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) DISMISSING from the service respondent Judge GENARO C.

GINES with prejudice to re-employment in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all
benefits except earned leave credits. This dismissal shall be
immediately executory and said respondent Judge is hereby ordered to
forthwith vacate his position and desist from performing any further
official function;

(2) SUSPENDING from office respondents MA. GORGONIA L. FLORES

and ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA, JR. for a period of six (6) months each,
without pay;

(3) SUSPENDING from office respondent MA. CONCEPCION B. DIAZ,

for a period of three (3) months, without pay.

The foregoing suspensions shall take effect immediately upon the

service of a copy of this Decision on the aforenamed respondents MA.
 GORGONIA L. FLORES, ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA, JR. and MA.
CONCEPCION B. DIAZ. The periods of their respective suspensions shall
not be charged against their leave credits, if any;

(4) DISMISSING this case as against respondent PACITA B. DIAZ in

view of her demise; and

(5) DISMISSING this case as against respondent ROSIE M. MUNAR

for lack of substantial evidence.

The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to evaluate the 29

January 1993 letter of Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon — subject of the 2
March 1993 Resolution of this Court in this case — and to submit to this Court
appropriate recommendations thereon within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C . J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide,

Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., No part.

Footnotes

1. See 29 April 1993 urgent motion of respondent Ma. Concepcion Diaz,

temporary rollo.

2. Report, 17.

3. Rollo, vol. 1, 180-181.

4. Id., 182.

5. Id., 186.

6. Rollo, vol. 1, 190.

7. Id., 189.

8. REGALADO, F.D., Remedial Law Compendium, vol. 2, 1984 ed., 504, citing
Nery vs. Lorenzo, L-23376, 27 April 1972.

9. Rollo, vol. 1, 191-192.

10. Id., 199.

11. Id., 200.

12. Id., 201-202.

13. Id., 203.

14. Rollo, vol. 1, 206-207.

15. Rollo, vol. 1, 208.

16. Id., 217.

17. Id., 218-219.

18. Rule 99, Revised Rules of Court.

19. Article 187.

20. Rollo, vol. 1, 208.

21. De la Paz vs. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540 [1975]; Fonacier-Abaño vs. Ancheta, 107
SCRA 538 [1981]; Inciong vs. De Guia, 154 SCRA 93 [1987].

22. Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.

23. Heading 22, Canons of Judicial Ethics.

24. Rollo, vol. 1, 497-498.

25. Report, 24.