Cruz vs. Tan

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PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 087 12/1/19, 11:52 AM

[No. L-3448. November 27, 1950]

MANUEL CRUZ, petitioner, vs. BIENVENIDO A. TAN,


Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Rizal City
Branch, and TELESFORA YAMBAO, respondents.

1. COURTS; JURISDICTION; JUSTICE OF THE PEACE


COURT.·When the demand made in a compliant is for the
sum of P644.31, the case comes within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Court or the Justice of the
Peace Court, pursuant to the provisions of sections 44, 86,
and 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296).

2. lD.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF RESPECTIVE COURTS HOW


DETERMINED.·The jurisdiction of the respective courts is
determined by the value of the demand and not the value of
the transaction out of which the demand arose.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and


prohibition with injunction.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Eliseo Caunca for petitioner.
Miguel R. Cornejo for respondents.
628

628 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED


Cruz vs. Tan

JUGO, J:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari and prohibition


with injunction.
On August 3, 1949, the respondent Telesfora Yambao
(plaintiff in civil case No. 898, Court of First Instance of
Rizal·Rizal City Branch) filed a complaint against the
petitioner Manuel Cruz (defendant in said case), in which
she prayed that the petitioner herein be ordered to finish
the construction of a house mentioned in the complaint, or
to pay her the sum of P644.31. Within ten days from receipt
of the summons, the petitioner filed a motion for a bill of
particulars, which was denied by the court in an order
dated September 3, 1949, received by the petitioner on
September 15, 1949.

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PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 087 12/1/19, 11:52 AM

On September 19, 1949, the petitioner filed a motion to


dismiss the case on the ground that the Court of First
Instance of Rizal has no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter
of the suit inasmuch as the demand contained in the prayer
is only for P644.31, which falls under the jurisdiction of the
Justice of the Peace or the Judge of the Municipal Court.
The motion to dismiss was denied by the court in an
order dated October 3, 1949, which order also set the case
for trial on the merits on October 10, 1949, although the
petitioner had not yet filed his answer nor had he been
declared in default.
Said order setting the case for trial on October 10, 1949
was received by the petitioner's counsel on October 12,
1949, that is, two days afterward.
On October 10, 1949, the court dismissed the case for
lack of interest of the parties, as they did not appear at the
trial.
On October 12, 1949, the respondent Telesfora Yambao
filed a motion praying that the trial of the case be set f or
November 14, 1949, without asking that the order
dismissing the case be set aside.

629

VOL. 87, NOVEMBER 27, 1950 629


Cruz vs. Tan Tan

The above-mentioned motion for setting the trial on


November 14, 1949 was heard on October 15, 1949, but as
the petitioner's counsel received notice of said motion on
the said date, October 15, in the afternoon, he could not
appear at the hearing of said motion in the morning of
October 15.
The court, acting upon said motion of October 12 set the
case for trial on November 17, 1949.
The petitioner filed a so-called "Manifestation," dated
November 17, 1949, stating that inasmuch as the order of
dismissal had not been set aside, said order had become
final.
On November 10, 1949, the petitioner filed the present
petition with this court.
The respondent court after having been informed by the
petitioner that he had filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
and prohibition with injunction with the Supreme Court,
issued an order postponing the trial of the case to
November 29, 1949, and setting aside the order of
dismissal dated October 10, 1949.
It is not necessary to pass on all the questions raised by
both parties in their pleadings and memoranda in this
court, except the question as to jurisdiction, for that is
decisive of this case.

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PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 087 12/1/19, 11:52 AM

It will be noted that the demand of the complaint filed in


the Court of First Instance of Rizal is for the sum of
P644.31. The alternative remedy of specific performance,
which consists in finishing the house, is capable of
pecuniary estimation at the same amount, more or less, for.
Otherwise, the respondent Telesf fora Yambao would not
have made such alternative demand.
In the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296), we
find the following pertinent provisions:

"SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction.·Courts of First Instance shall


have original jurisdiction:
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

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630 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED


Cruz vs. Tan

" (c) In all cases in which. the demand, exclusive of interest, or the
value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than two
thousand pesos;" (Italics ours.)
"SEC. 86. Jurisdiction of justices of the peace and judges of
municipal courts of chartered cities.·The jurisdiction of justices of
the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered cities shall
consist of:
* * * * * * *
"(b) Original jurisdiction in civil actions arising in their
respective municipalities, and not exclusively cognizable by the
Courts of First Instance."
"SEC. 88. Original jurisdiction in civil cases.·In all civil actions,
including those mentioned in rules 59 and 62 of the Rules of Court,
arising in his municipality or city, and not exclusively cognizable by
the Court of First Instance, the justice of the peace and the judge of
a municipal court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where
the value of the subject-matter or amount of the demand does not
exceed two thousand pesos, exclusive of interest and costs. * * *"
(Italics ours.)

It is clear from the above provisions that the case in


question comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the municipal court or justice of the peace court.
The respondent argues that the value of the house, the
construction of which has almost been completed, requiring
only the expenditure of P644.31 to complete it, according to
the allegations of the complaint, is more than P2,873.37,
and that consequently the value of the property involved is
beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court The
jurisdiction of the respective courts is determined by the
value of the demand and not the value of the transaction
out of which the demand arose; that is what the law says in

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PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 087 12/1/19, 11:52 AM

unmistakable terms. The alternative prayer for specific


performance is also of the same value, for, as said above,
the alternative prayers would not have been made in the
complaint if one was more valuable than the other; hence,
the specific performance alternatively prayed for, is capable
of pecuniary estimation at P644.31 (sec. 88, par. 2, Rep. Act
No. 296).

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VOL. 87, NOVEMBER 28, 1950 631


Florendo vs. Vda. de Gonzales

In view of the foregoing, it is declared that the respondent


Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is without
jurisdiction to try the case referred to, and he is ordered to
stop further proceedings by dismissing the case. With costs
against the respondent Telesfora Yambao.

Parás, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason,


Montemayor, Reyes, and Bautista, JJ., concur.

Petition granted.

_________________

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