The Development of Knowledge Management in The Oil
The Development of Knowledge Management in The Oil
The Development of Knowledge Management in The Oil
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Grant, Robert M.
The Development of Knowledge Management in the Oil and Gas Industry
Universia Business Review, núm. 40, 2013, pp. 92-125
Portal Universia S.A.
Madrid, España
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The Development
of Knowledge
Management in the
Oil and Gas Industry
El desarrollo de la Dirección del Conocimiento
en la industria del petroleo y gas
92
executive summary
A review of the knowledge management experiences of BP, Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron,
ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Halliburton, Schlumberger, Paragon Engineering Services,
BHP, Marathon Oil, and Murphy Oil identified two major types of knowledge management
practices: applications of information and communications technology to the management
of explicit knowledge and the use of person-to-person knowledge management techniques
to facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge. The study pointed to the challenges of converting
tacit into explicit knowledge and the importance of knowledge management initiatives that
combined the enthusiasm of bottom-up initiatives with strong top-down support from senior
management.
Notes:
1
Establishment of KM as an explicit program at corporate level.
2
Corporate or business activities most closely associated with subsequent KM program.
3
ExxonMobil has not formally committed itself to KM at the corporate level, however, by early
2003, the term KM was used widely both on upstream and downstream businesses.
N.I.R. = Not Included in Report
6.2. Formalization of KM
There is a sharp contrast between the formalization of most IT-based
approaches to KM and the informal approaches that are characterize
the person-to-person KM techniques—communities of practice in
particular. Many of the proponents of KM have emphasized the non-
hierarchic and emergent characteristics of KM. This was supported
by much of the early research on communities of practice that
emphasized their spontaneity and absence of leadership or formal
authority. For some companies, a reliance on local initiative and lack
of formalization worked relatively well in the early stages of KM. For
example, at BP Exploration, initial experiments in virtual teaming 113
resulting in a clamoring to form teams on an ad hoc basis. Similarly
with Shell’s communities of practices were initially highly informal.
The trend over time has been for person-to-person knowledge
sharing mechanisms to become increasingly formalized. In particular,
communities of practices in several companies have moved from
being loosely-linked, self-governing associations of like-minded
professionals, to having clearly defined individual roles, reporting
requirements, and governance structures.
For example, each of Shell’s Global Networks includes:
• A Global Coordinator.
• Hub Coordinators for each of Shell’s operating units.
• Individuals appointed as “Focal Points” for each Subject Area.
At Chevron, knowledge leader, Jeff Stemke emphasized the
importance of formality in KM activities:
“The most successful communities have defined business goals,
clear sponsorship form senior management, and a dedicated
coordinator… At the other extreme are informal communities
where there’s no leader, just a group of people who get together.
They may have teleconferences or meetings occasionally, but
there’s no formal process for sharing knowledge. These groups
are only valuable if you happen to be in the community… We
now recognize that networks need a coordinator. This position is
funded or we recommend highly that it be funded to the extent of
10 or 20% of a person’s job. We have not been totally successful
in making the communities vital. There definitely needs to
be some executive sponsorship and specific deliverables or
7. PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES
7.1. Quantifying the performance benefits of KM
Every organization we interviewed attested to the importance of
KM and the belief that it will play a role in the in the company in
the years to come. Some companies provided estimates of the
performance benefits of their KM programs. BP estimated that, in
1998, knowledge sharing cut its costs by $700 million. Shell’s Lesley
Chipperfield estimated that KM initiatives had saved the company
over $100 million a year in upstream alone. However, it is unclear that
any acceptable methodology exists for identifying and quantifying
the effects of KM. The central problem is that it is difficult to envisage
a company that does not employ some from of KM system. Other
companies have pointed to the overall contribution of KM programs
t overall performance improvement. Kenneth Derr, Chevron’s CEO
noted that: “Of the initiatives we’ve undertaken at Chevron during the
1990s, few have been as important or as rewarding as our efforts to
build a learning organization by sharing knowledge. In fact, I believe
this priority was one of the keys to reducing our operating costs by
more than $2 billion per year—from about $9.4 billion to $7.4 billion—
over the last seven years” (Derr, 1999).
Estimating the overall performance impact of KM is more feasible in
relation to specific KM initiatives and particular projects:
• Schlumberger reckoned that its InTouch knowledge
management system that permitted faster and more reliable
decision making had generated significant financial benefits.
In 2001, the program’s cost savings and revenue generation
totalled more than $200 million; n the time required to solve
118 difficult operational problems had been cut by 95%; the time
needed to update engineering modifications reduced by 75%. In
addition, reductions in technical support costs saved $30 million.
Finally, InTouch helped to shorten the 3-year Schlumberger
research and engineering cycle by bringing the technology
centers into direct contact with field operatives and technicians.
• BP Amoco reckoned that it saved $50 million in drilling
costs at the Schiehallion oil field off the coast of Scotland by
leveraging knowledge it had gained from developing prior oil
fields (Ambrosio, 2000). Shell’s global communities-of-practice
produced $200m per year costs savings, increased facility
uptime, and reduced design & planning errors (Leavitt, 2000).
On the cost front, calculations of the costs of KM also pose
problems. The key issue is whether KM is defined to comprise all
knowledge-based activities—IT, R&D, and training—or whether KM
is identifies with specific KM programs, in which case the costs of
KM are incremental to basic information and technological functions.
A survey by the Cranfield School of Management calculated that
European companies, on average, spend 3.3% of their revenues
on knowledge management (that is, on technologies and activities
aimed at finding, collecting and sharing knowledge). By 2005, this is
expected to rise to 5.5%—greater than the amount spent on R&D.
Our strongest and most consistent finding was that the most
troublesome and least successful area of KM was in the application
of IT to knowledge storage and knowledge dissemination. If the
greatest opportunity in KM is to reuse the knowledge generated
in one place in many places, then this was the greatest source of
frustration by KM pioneers.
The primary approach to capturing and reusing knowledge was
systems where every project would require the knowledge generated
in the project and “lessons learned” from the projects to be added
to a corporate database that then became available to other project
teams. Making such systems work posed massive problems for most
of the companies:
• When BP was developing its KM strategy during the mid-1990s,
it surveyed other companies KM experiences and found that: 119
“KM seemed to be grounded in lessons-learned databases
which consisted on information that no one really wanted and
very few people knew how to access”. (Chris Mottershead).
• Shell’s Andy Boyd commented that his experience of
communities of practice at Shell suggested that, in terms of the
value gained, 85% was derived from interpersonal discussion
and only 15% from the knowledge base—however, 80% of the
costs were in the knowledge base. “We have spent millions
building databases of detailed technical documents, but few
people search them”.(Boyd, 2003).
• Halliburton offered similar observations to those of Shell.
Halliburton’s initial efforts focused focused heavily IT-intensive
approaches to KM. The result was an overabundance of
sophisticated IT tools all of which were underutilized. Halliburton
drastically reduced the number of IT-based KM tools it utilized
and reallocated its KM budget such 10-20% was allocated to
information technology and 80-90% to people and processes.
The clear implication is that linking people to people is a more
effective KM strategy then linking people to information. While the
potential gains from the know-how generated during projects being
stored in databases then being reused are potentially huge. The
practical problems associated with such archiving are massive. The
problems reported to us included:
• Users reported being overwhelmed with information when they
tapped into corporate databases. When numerous documents
or alternatives are presented, users have difficulty in knowing
Getting the
No change Organisation Ready Don’t Know What
(Awareness, Behaviour) We Know
Enhanced
Performance
Managing Leveraging
Knowledge Assets Knowledge
(Tools, Processes) (Application)
122
Not Sustainable
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notEs
1. Contact author: Department of Management; Bocconi School of Management; Bocconi
University; Via Roentgen, 1; 20136, Milan; Italy.