Plaintiff-Appellee Vs Vs Accused-Appellant The Solicitor General Sansano-Suyat Law Office
Plaintiff-Appellee Vs Vs Accused-Appellant The Solicitor General Sansano-Suyat Law Office
Plaintiff-Appellee Vs Vs Accused-Appellant The Solicitor General Sansano-Suyat Law Office
SYNOPSIS
An information for the special complex crime of rape with homicide was filed charging
accused-appellant of having sexual intercourse with one Editha Talan, a minor, 10 years of
age, against her will and consent, and thereafter, with intent to kill, cover the nose and
mouth of the said minor resulting to her death and then bury her in the field. Upon
arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. He interposed the defense of denial
and alibi that he was at home with his mother and brothers at the time the crime occurred.
Trial ensued. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty
of the crime of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
victim actual damages. It convicted accused-appellant of the crime of murder only, not of
the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal
knowledge. Hence, this appeal.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant of
murder in an information charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory
portion of the information showed that there was no allegation of any qualifying
circumstance. In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in case the
evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance must be
sufficiently alleged and proved. In the absence in the information of an allegation of any
qualifying circumstance, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of murder. Nevertheless,
the Court held that the circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken
together, led to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant and no other else, killed
the victim and that he was guilty therefor. The Court found accused-appellant guilty of
homicide. As to the crime of rape, the Court found no convincing proof that the laceration
of the vagina and the rupture of the hymen of the victim were caused in the course of
coitus or by a male organ.
Accused-appellant's alibi and bare denial deserved no consideration. Even assuming that
accused-appellant's claim was true, his stay in his house did not preclude his physical
presence at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity. The place where the body of the
victim was found buried was a few meters from his house, and can be reached in a short
while. aHTcDA
The assailed decision of the trial court was modified by the Supreme Court.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
DAVIDE , JR ., C.J : p
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan,
Branch 51, finding accused-appellant Radel Gallarde 1 (hereafter GALLARDE) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. T-1978, and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Editha Talan (hereafter
EDITHA) the amount of P70,000 as actual damages. 2
On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with
homicide in an information whose accusatory portion reads as follows: cdtai
That on or about the 6th day of May 1997, in the evening, amidst the field located
at Brgy. Trenchera, [M]unicipality of Tayug, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one EDITHA TALAN, a
minor, 10 years of age, against her will and consent, and thereafter, with intent to
kill, cover the nose and mouth of the said minor resulting to her death and then
bury her in the field, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said EDITHA
TALAN. 3
During the arraignment on 1 September 1997, GALLARDE, with the assistance of counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty. 4 Trial of the case immediately ensued as the defense waived
the holding of the pre-trial conference. cdasia
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Mario Fernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy
Clemente, Felicisimo Mendoza, Alfredo Cortez, Renato Fernandez, SPO4 Oscar B. Lopez,
and Dr. Perfecto Tebangin. The relevant and material facts established by their testimonies
are faithfully summarized in the Appellee's Brief as follows:
In the evening of May 26 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan
in Brgy. Trenchera, Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them
were appellant Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez,
Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and
Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. A
fluorescent lamp illuminated them as they partook beer (TSN dated October 13,
1997, pp. 3-4).
After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and appellant to dine in the
kitchen. As they partook of the meal, appellant suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped
out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside the house, he chanced upon appellant and
Editha talking to each other. Jaime whistled at appellant but instead of minding
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
him, the latter sprinted towards the road leading to his house (Id., pp. 4-6). dctai
Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime
followed her and asked where she was going. Editha answered that she would
look for appellant. Soon Editha left enroute to where appellant fled (Id., pp. 7-8).
By 10:00 o'clock that evening, the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime,
Francisco, Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they talked and
relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them that Editha was
missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her (Id., p. 10).
Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about
her daughter's disappearance. The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife
Virginia and nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors
search the houses, dikes and fields to look for the missing child. The searchers
used a lighted rubber tire (TSN dated Sept. 24, 1997, pp. 8-10 and 24).
When Jaime mentioned that appellant was the last person he saw talking to
Editha, the searchers went back to the house of appellant. About 7 meters away
from appellant's house, one of the searchers, Alfredo Cortez, found Editha's left
foot slipper (TSN dated October 22, 1997, pp. 4-6). Suddenly, Edwin Fernandez
announced: "Tata, Radel is here!" pointing to the toilet about 6 meters away from
appellant's house. The searchers found appellant squatting with his short pants.
His hands and knees were covered with soil. When confronted by ex-kagawad
Hernandez why he was there, appellant answered he was relieving himself (Id., pp.
11-16). cda
Asked where Editha was, appellant replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to
her." When told "according to Jimmy, you were with Editha." appellant
responded "I let her go and brought her back to the dike and let her go home." To
the next question, "where did you come from since a while ago you were not yet in
this toilet?" appellant answered "I was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One
of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry and countered that appellant's statement
was impossible because Kiko was with him drinking (Id., pp. 16-20).
After the confrontation at the toilet, Ex-kagawad Fernandez brought appellant to
Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that appellant was the last
person seen talking with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers
(Id., pp. 21-22). Cdpr
Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. As she reached for
her slipper, she saw Editha's right foot slipper (the other one was earlier found
near the house of appellant) (Id., pp. 23-24).
Around 3 meters farther from Editha's right foot slipper; another slipper was
found. It was old, 8 to 9 inches in length and appellant was seen wearing it in the
morning of that day (TSN dated Sept. 25, 1997, p. 25).
The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses. Along the way, they saw a
wide hole among the disheveled grass. Ex-kagawad Fernandez accidentally
dropped the lighted rubber tire and as his nephew Freddie picked it up, the latter
exclaimed: "Uncle, look at this loose soil!" Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith
scratched some earth aside and then Editha's hand pitted out. The Fernandez
screamed in terror (Id., pp. 5-6).
Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heard shouts saying: "She is here, she is
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
now here already dead!" Mindful of appellant's safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza
decided to bring appellant to the municipal building. On their way though, they
met policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the
person of appellant, saying: "Here is the suspect in the disappearance of the little
girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to you" (TSN dated Oct. 21, 1997,
pp. 4-5). cdrep
The policemen together with appellant proceeded to where the people found
Editha. One of the policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was
completely naked when she was recovered. (Id., pp. 9-10).
On the other hand, GALLARDE was the lone witness for the defense. He interposed a denial
and the alibi that he was at home with his mother and brothers at the time the crime
occurred. He declared that he is 18 years old, single, a former construction worker. He
knew EDITHA, a neighbor whom he considered as a sister because she used to come to
his house. They never had a quarrel or misunderstanding. He neither raped nor killed
Editha. 6
On cross-examination by the prosecutor and to questions propounded by the court,
GALLARDE admitted that he saw Editha on the night of 6 May 1997 in her parent's house,
particularly in the kitchen. He was there because he joined a group drinking Colt 45 beer, as
he was called by Rudio Fernandez. He drank and had dinner in the kitchen. After dinner he
returned to the drinking place and eventually went home because he was then a little drunk.
He knows Kgd. Mario Fernandez, but after he left the Talan residence he did not see Kgd.
Fernandez anymore. Kgd. Fernandez saw him inside his (Gallarde's) toilet on the night of
May 6; thereafter Fernandez took him to the barangay captain and later he was turned over
to the PNP at Camp Narciso Ramos. The police informed him that he was a suspect in the
rape and killing of Editha Talan, and he told them that he did not commit the crime. At the
Talan residence he was wearing short pants and rubber slippers. Fernandez asked him at
the police headquarters to pull down his shorts and he complied. He was then wearing
briefs with a hemline that was a little loose. He was informed that a cadaver was recovered
near his house. When he was asked questions while in police custody, he was not
represented by any lawyer. prcd
The trial court did not appreciate the alternative circumstance of intoxication either as a
mitigating or aggravating circumstance pursuant to Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code
because GALLARDE's alleged inebriation on the night of 6 May 1997, was not satisfactorily
proven.
As to the civil aspect of the case, the trial court considered the stipulation of the parties on
27 October 1997 fixing a liquidated amount of P70,000 as actual damages, and leaving the
matter of moral damages to the discretion of the court. The trial court was not inclined to
award moral damages because the "evidence before it tends to disclose that on the night
of 6 May 1997, before she died, Editha was a much-neglected child."
Accordingly, in its decision 8 of 12 February 1998, the trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the
Court hereby convicts the accused RADEL GALLARDE Y HERMOSA of the crime
of MURDER, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the late Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00.
9
His motion for reconsideration, 10 having been denied by the trial court in its Resolution 11
of 28 February 1998, GALLARDE seasonably appealed to us. cdphil
We sustain GALLARDE's contention that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder in
an information charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory portion of
the information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance.
Although it is true that the term "homicide" as used in special complex crime of rape with
homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical
injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape, 1 3 it is settled in this jurisdiction
that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to
one of the component offense, the accused can be convicted of the other. 1 4 In rape with
homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved.
Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of
the offense with which he is charged. 1 5 It is fundamental that every element of the offense
must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various
elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense. 1 6
In the absence then in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance,
GALLARDE cannot be convicted of murder. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense
higher than that with which he is charged in the complaint or information under which he is
tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an
accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or
information for which he is tried, or is necessarily included in that which is charged. He has
a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is
put on trial. To convict an accused of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint
or information under which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right. 1 7
Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court that the evidence for the prosecution, although
circumstantial, was sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of GALLARDE
for the death of EDITHA. cdasia
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court
may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. 1 8 The prosecution is not always tasked to
present direct evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct
evidence does not necessarily absolve an accused from any criminal liability. 1 9 Even in the
absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence,
provided that the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads one
to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 2 0
The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (1) there must be
more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the
accused. 2 1
The importance of circumstantial evidence is more apparent in the prosecution of cases of
rape with homicide. The nature of the crime of rape, where it is usually only the victim and
the rapist who are present at the scene of the crime, makes prosecutions for the complex
crime of rape with homicide particularly difficult since the victim can no longer testify
against the perpetrator of the crime. In these cases pieces of the evidence against the
accused are usually circumstantial. 22
The circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken together, leads to
no other conclusion than that GALLARDE, and no other else, killed EDITHA and that he is
guilty therefor. We quote with approval the lower court's enumeration of the circumstantial
evidence in this case: cdrep
1. Gallarde, 18, and Editha, 10, were neighbors and friends, even as she used
to frequent his place.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
2. Both were at the Talan residence on the night of May 6, 1997 while
neighbors indulged themselves in beer.
3. Among said neighbors Cabinta saw them hand in hand by the toilet
situated five (5) meters east of the Talan kitchen.
4. After Cabinta whistled he saw Gallarde run home towards north after
letting go of Editha's hands. Neighbor Clemente also noticed that Gallarde
disappeared, and that Editha returned to the kitchen.
5. Cabinta followed Editha back to the kitchen, and saw her holding a
kerosene lamp. She told him that she was going to look for "Dalpac," and
off she went in the same direction Gallarde took.
6. Gallarde wore short pants and rubber slippers at the drinking place.
Subsequently he was seen wearing shorts in his own toilet.
7. At past 10:00 in the evening during an intensive search for the then
missing Editha, her lifeless body was found in a shallow grave situated
some distance behind Gallarde's residence.
8. Before Editha's body was discovered, a searcher found a girl's slipper (Exh.
"B"), 5-6 inches long, among thickets seven meters away from Gallarde's
house.
9. Another searcher saw a second slipper (Exh. "B-1"), of the same color and
size as the first one. Both slippers were Editha's, the searchers recalled.
10. A third rubber slipper (Exh. "C') was thereafter found in the field near Exh.
"B-1." It was an old slipper, 8-9 inches long and with a hole at the rear end.
11. Soil stuck to each one of the three slippers.
12. Gallarde was not at home when searchers went to look for him there, after
Cabinta told them that Editha was last seen with Gallarde.
13. When Gallarde was discovered squatting in the dark toilet behind his
house and beside the thickets, his shorts were up and on. His hands and
knees were soiled.
14. At the toilet he was asked the innocent question of where Editha was and
he answered revealingly, thus: "I did not do anything to her" and "I let her go
and brought her back to the dike and let her go home."
15. When asked where he had been, as the toilet was first seen empty,
Gallarde said he was with Kiko and he slept at the latter's house, which
answer Mario Bado promptly refuted saying, "Vulva of your mother . . . Kiko
was with me drinking." Bado and Kiko were not at the place of the Talans
that night.
16. Yanked out of the dark toilet near his own house, Gallarde joined Kgd.
Mario Fernandez sans protest.
17. Dr. Tebangin found on Editha's cheeks two slit wounds, each being an
inch away from her nostrils. Both wounds were fresh and reddish.
From the lower portion of Editha's vagina blood oozed, accompanied by dirt.
As to the crime of rape, there is much to be desired with respect to the prosecution's
evidence therefor, but not for the reason adduced by the trial court, namely, the absence of
spermatozoa in EDITHA's private part and thereabout. It is well settled that the absence of
spermatozoa in or around the vagina does not negate the commission of rape. 24 Our
doubt on the commission of rape is based on the fact that there is at all no convincing
proof that the laceration of the vagina and the rupture of the hymen of EDITHA were
caused in the course of coitus or by a male organ. Our meticulous reading of the testimony
of Dr. Tebangin disclosed that he was never asked if the laceration and the rupture could
have been caused by the penis of a human being. Needless to state, these could have been
caused by any object other than the penis of a person. LLphil
We cannot sustain the contention of GALLARDE that he was not positively identified as the
assailant since there was no eyewitness to the actual commission of the crime. It does not
follow that although nobody saw GALLARDE in the act of killing EDITHA, nobody can be
said to have positively identified him. Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of
identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the
crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identity a suspect or
accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act
of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be
instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of
commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as
the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the
persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the
crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial
evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is
the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only
ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of
others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is
basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is
positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that
direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court
may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. 25 If resort to circumstantial evidence would
not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then
felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. cdasia
Contrary to the claim of GALLARDE, the prosecution was able to establish the proximate
time of the commission of the crime, which was sometime between 9:00 p.m., when
GALLARDE left the house of Talan followed by EDITHA, and 10:30 p.m., when the body of
EDITHA was found. This was further corroborated by the examining physician who
testified, on the basis of the degree of rigor mortis, that EDITHA died more or less, at
10:00 p.m. of 6 May 1997. 38
Likewise, GALLARDE's alibi and bare denial deserve no consideration. He did not present
witnesses who could confirm his presence in his house. No member of his family
corroborated him on this matter. The defenses of denial and alibi, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving, deserve no weight in law, and
cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. 39
Moreover, even assuming that GALLARDE's claim is true, his stay in his house did not
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
preclude his physical presence at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity. The place
where the body of EDITHA was found buried was a few meters from his house, the place
pointed to in the alibi and can be reached in a short while. For the defense of alibi to
prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove
that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. 4 0
Besides, no evil motive has been established against the witnesses for the prosecution
that might prompt them to incriminate the accused or falsely testify against him. It is
settled that when there is no showing that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that the witnesses were not so actuated
and their testimonies are thus entitled to full faith and credit. 41 Testimonies of witnesses
who have no motive or reason to falsify or perjure their testimonies should be given
credence. 42
With respect to GALLARDE's claim that he was arrested without warrant, suffice it to say
that any objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the
accused enters his plea. 4 3 The records show no objection was ever interposed prior to
arraignment and trial. 4 4 GALLARDE's assertion that he was denied due process by virtue
of his alleged illegal arrest is negated by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, as manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted plea he entered during
arraignment and by his active participation in the trial thereafter. 4 5 It is settled that any
objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived. 4 6 It is much too late in the day to complain
about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed and the accused
arraigned and trial commenced and completed and a judgment of conviction rendered
against him. 4 7 Verily, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error; such
arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. 4 8
Homicide, which we find to be the only crime committed by GALLARDE, is defined in Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code and is punished with reclusion temporal. In the absence of
any modifying circumstance, it shall be imposed in its medium period. GALLARDE is
entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Accordingly, he can be
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of the medium
period of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of the
medium period of reclusion temporal as maximum. LexLib
As to the civil aspect of the case, the parties agreed on P70,000 as liquidated damages.
This should be construed as actual damages. However, as indemnity for death, the
additional sum of P50,000, per current case law, should be awarded.
WHEREFORE the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Tayug,
Pangasinan, in Criminal Case No. T-1978 nding accused-appellant RADEL GALLARDE
guilty of the crime of murder is hereby modi ed. As modi ed, RADEL GALLARDE is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Homicide,
de ned under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of the medium period of prision
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of the medium period
of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim, Editha Talan, the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
sum of P70,000 as liquidated actual damages and P50,000 as indemnity for the death
of Editha Talan. LLphil
1. Spelled GALLARDI in the Information but corrected, upon order of the trial court made in
open court on 17 December 1997 when accused told the court that his surname is
GALLARDE (TSN, 17 December 1997, 5).
5. Rollo, 76-83.
6. TSN, 17 December 1997, 3-4.
7. Rollo, 7-13.
8. Supra note 1.
9. Rollo, 47.
10. OR I, 142-144.
11. Id., 146.
12. Rollo, 57.
13. See People v. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546, 564 [1994]; People v. Sequino, 264 SCRA 79, 101
[1996].
14. U.S. v. Lahoylahoy, 38 Phil. 330, 334 [1918].
15. People v. Pardilla, 92 SCRA 591 [1979].
16. People v. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559, 576 [1998], citing Balitaan v. CFI of Batangas, et al.,
115 SCRA 729 [1982].
17. Ibid., citing Matilde, Jr. v. Jabson, etc., et al., 68 SCRA 456 [1975].
18. People v. Danao, 253 SCRA 146 [1996].
19. People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 131151, 25 August 1999.
20. People v. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 [1991]; People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349 [1992]; People
v. Alvero, 224 SCRA 16 [1993].
21. Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court; People v. Abrera, 283 SCRA 1 [1997].
27. People v. Olvis, et al., G.R. No. 71092, 154 SCRA 513 [1987].
28. People v. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People v. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994];
People v. Rondero, G.R No. 125687, 9 December 1999.
29. Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920].
30. U.S. v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912].
31. U.S. v. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917].
32. U.S. v. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. v. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921].
33. People v. Otadora, et al., 86 Phil. 244 [1950].
34. People v. Puedan, 196 SCRA 388, 393 [1991].
35. Sec. 10, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.
39. People v. Gayon, 269 SCRA 587 [1997]; People v. Patalin, et al., G.R. No. 125539, 25
July 1999.
40. People v. Compendio, 258 SCRA 254, 263-264 [1996]; People v. Alshaika, 261 SCRA
637, 646 [1996]; People v. Naguita, et al., G.R. No. 130091, 30 August 1999.