Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, 221 SCRA 132, April 07, 1993

316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Zaldivar vs. Gonzalez
*
Nos. L-79690-707. October 7, 1988.
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution,
respondents.
*
No. L-80578. October 7, 1988.
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. HON. RAUL M.

GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
Courts; Attorneys; Contempt; Disbarment; Authority of the

Supreme Court to discipline officers of the Count and members of
the bar.—We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme
Court to discipline officers of the court and members of the Bar.
The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal
profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The
authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court’s
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of
law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice
itself of law Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the
Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration
of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
functions. Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to
punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the
conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and
all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the
Court The power to punish for contempt is “necessary for its own
protection against an improper interference with the due
administration of justice” “[it] is not dependent upon the
complaint of any of the parties litigant.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Two inherent powers of the Court
Power to punish for contempt, and power to discipline attorneys;
explained.—There are, in other words, two (2) related powers
which come into play in cases like that before us here, the Court’s
inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power.
The discipli-
_______________
* EN BANC.
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VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 317
nary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader

than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be
committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of
court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the
contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct
which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme
Court’s disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play
whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is
charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish
for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary
authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of
the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is
called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing
justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part
which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade
the administration of justice constitutes both professional
misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against
him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the
contempt power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court is acting as offended
party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time in the
exercise of its inherent power to discipline attorneys; Case at bar.—
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to
punish for contempt or of the disciplinary authority of the Court
over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party,
prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the
present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get some
members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of
this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later,
he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing
upon the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on
responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due
process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of
judging him impartially and fairly.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reference of complaints against
attorneys either to the IBP or to the Solicitor General, not
mandatory upon the Supreme Court under the terms of Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court; Reasons; Case at bar.—It should not be
necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any
bias or prejudice against the respondent that would prevent them
from acting in accordance with the exacting requirements of their
oaths of office. It
318
also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit
themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the
responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them.
Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory
upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an
exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 138-B of the Revised
Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done
before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further
investigation of facts in the present case for it is not substantially
disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain
statements attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the
amplest opportunity to present his defense: his defense is not that
he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those
statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made
in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus
need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and
the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such
issues.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statements made by respondent
appear designed to cast the Court in gross disrepute and to cause
public scorn for and distrust in the judicial institution of the
Republic; Case at bar.—A second charge that respondent
Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that
they have improperly “pressured” him to render decisions
favorable to their “colleagues and friends,” including dismissal of
“cases” against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly
deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory
examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three (3)
members of this Court addressed to respondent (which
respondent attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated
Petitions) will show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not
pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes had
no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578.
This charge appears to have been made in order to try to impart
some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the first
accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately
rendered a wrong decision to get even with respondent who had,
with great fortitude, resisted “pressure” from some members of
the Court. Once again, in total effect, the statements made by
respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross
disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and
distrust in the Supreme Court and, more generally, the judicial
institutions of the Republic.
319
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 319
Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent’s statement that the

Court was preventing him from prosecuting “rich and powerful
persons” are suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class
war.—Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was
preventing him from prosecuting “rich and powerful persons,”
that the Court was in effect discriminating between the rich and
powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the
other, and allowing “rich and powerful” accused persons to go
“scot-free” while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction
of poor and small offenders. This accusation can only be regarded
as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It
may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme
Court, it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary
class war.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; There is no denial of
procedural due process where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings is accorded.—Respondent,
finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly “dismissed judges
‘without rhyme or reason’ and disbarred lawyers ‘without due
process.’ ” The Court notes that this last attack is not without
relation to the other statements made by respondent against the
Court. The total picture that respondent clearly was trying to
paint of the Court is that of an “unjudicial” institution able and
willing to render “clearly erroneous” decisions by way of reprisal
against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously
denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the
purport of respondent’s attack against the Court as an institution
unworthy of the people’s faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had
respondent undertaken to examine the records of the two (2)
judges and the attorney he later identified in one of his
Explanations, he would have discovered that the respondents in
those administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain their
side and submit evidence in support thereof. He would have also
found that there were both strong reasons for and an insistent
rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the
Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and
upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in
this connection that due process as a constitutional precept does
not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type
proceeding, that the essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence
one may have in support of one’s defense. “To be heard” does not
only mean verbal arguments in court, one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.
320
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is compelled to

hold that the statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly
constitute contempt and call for its exercise of disciplinary
authority; Reasons.—Considering the kinds of statements of
lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past
penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of
disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that the
statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute
contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of
the Supreme Court. Respondent’s statements, especially the
charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and
unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily
implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of
office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here,
constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court Such
statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court
and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of
justice in the country. That respondent’s baseless charges have
had some impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is
clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment
of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members
of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition
of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately
rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the
respondent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Freedom of
Speech and Expression; All constitutional freedoms, not absolute
and freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests.—Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional
guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right,
least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that
freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity
and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is
no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only
within the context of a functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted
by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it: “x x
x A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary,
nor an independent judiciary to a free
321
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 321
press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable
to a free society.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Damages; Proof of actual damage
sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for
a finding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary
authority of the Court.—Respondent Gonzalez also defends
himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been shown,
and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for
Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and
reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May
1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a
court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of
contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the
Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this
Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988
Decision, denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration thereof
and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon this Court
by the respondent through his much publicized acts and
statements for which he is here being required to account.
Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a particular
case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right
and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of
this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country
in general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to
such institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in
time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of
respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered.
The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the
courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily measured;
but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence
is critical for the stability of democratic government.
PETITION to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:

1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt
filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public
respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul
M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and
G.R. No. 80578, and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2
May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to
show cause why
322

he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to

administrative sanctions for making certain public
statements
The pertinent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in
Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the
Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and
filed the criminal informations in those cases (originally
TBP Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (G.R.
Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the
Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other
things, petitioner
1
assailed (1) the 5 February 1987
Resolution of the Tanodbayan” recommending the filing of
criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his
co-accused in TBP Case No. 2
86-00778, and (2) the 1
September 1987 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177
denying his Motion to Quash the criminal informations
filed in those cases by the “Tanodbayan.” In this respect,
petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez as Tanodbayan
and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no
longer vested with power and authority independently to
investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and
corruption against public officials and employees, and
hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution,
which read:
“G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable

Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be
and Acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitu-
_______________
1 Rollo of G.R. Nos. 79690-707, pp. 98-111, Annex “H-1” of Petition.

2 Id., pp. 126 129, Annex “I” of Petition.
323
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 323

tion).—Acting on the special civil action for certiorari, prohibition

and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with urgent
motion for preliminary injunction, the Court Resolved, without
giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to
COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from this Court, ordering respondent
Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and trying
Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar
as petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and
resolving the Special Prosecutor’s motion to suspend dated
September 3, 1987.”
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.

Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578; on
19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez as respondent That 3
Petition assailed the 24
September 1987 Resolution of the “Tanodbayan” in TBP
Case No. 87-01304 recommending that additional criminal
charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner
Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again,
petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan’s lack of
authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal
cases and to investigate the same Petitioner also moved for
the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No.4 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, this Court,
without giving due course to the second petition (1)
required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment
thereon and (2) issued a temporary restraining order
“ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE
and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394
x x x and particularly, from filing the criminal information
consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary
investigation
5
therein.” In a separate resolution of the same
date, G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were
ordered consolidated by the Court.
_______________
3 Rollo of G.R. No. 80578, pp. 28 38, Annex “B” of Petition.

4 Id., p. 39.
5 Id., p. 48.
324

In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4)

days prior to issuance by this Court of a temporary
restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office 6
of the
Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 with the
Sandiganbayan,7 which issued on 23 November 1987 an
Order of Arrest for petitioner Zaldivar and 8his co-accused
in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion of petitioner
Zaldivar, this Court issued the following Resolution on 8
December 1987:
“G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez

and Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor General for
respondents for an extension of thirty (30) days from the
expiration of the original period within which to file comment on
the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the
Sandiganbayan as party-respondent, the Court Resolved to (a)
Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as party respondent;
and (b) In pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary
Restraining Order of November 24, 1987 ‘ordering respondent
Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further
acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304 entitled, “Commission on Audit
vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al.,’ and particularly, from filing the
criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting
preliminary investigation therein’ ISSUE a TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from this Court, ordering respondents Hon.
Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST
from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, ‘People
of the Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al.’ and from
enforcing the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said
case.”
9
The Solicitor General filed a Comment on the petition in
G.R. No.
10
80578, and we required the petitioner to submit a
Reply thereto.
_______________
6 Id., pp. 57-58, Information.

7 Id., pp. 59-60.
8 Id., pp. 51-56.
9 Id., pp. 75-94.
10 Id., p. 96.
325
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 325

On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar 11filed with the

Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt directed at
respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of
respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the
information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570
before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly
contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the
proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter,
petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news
article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30
November 1987 issue of the “Philippine Daily Globe:”
“Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the

Supreme Court order stopping him from investigating graft cases
involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar ‘can aggravate the
thought that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial.’
‘What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it
appears that while rich and influential persons get favorable
actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary
litigant to get his petition to be given due course.’ Gonzalez told the
Daily Globe in an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal’s order ‘heightens the people’s
apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially
because the people have been thinking that only the small fry can
get it while big fishes go scot-free.’
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last
week after Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan
from investigating graft cases filed against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his
investigations because the latter wanted to help promote the
political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio
Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar’s petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez
from investigating a graft charge against the governor, and from
instituting any complaint with the Sandiganbayan.
‘While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute
graft cases even if they involve the high and mighty, the Supreme
Court had been restraining me.’ Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President’s order, Gonzalez said he had
filed graft cases against two ‘very powerful’ officials of the Aquino
_______________
11 Id., pp. 98-106.
326

government—Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential

Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M.
Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural
Communities.
‘While I don’t wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition
before the Supreme Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the
order) can aggravate the thinking of some people that affluent
persons can prevent the progress of a trial,’ he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over
the weekend and that while she symphatizes with local officials
who are charged in court during election time ‘she said that it
might be a disservice to the people and the voters who are entitled
to know their candidates.’
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials
during election time could be mere harassment suits, the
Constitution makes it a right of every citizen to be informed of the
character of the candidate, who should be subject to scrutiny.”
(Italics supplied)
Acting on petitioner’s Motion to Cite in Contempt, the

Court on 16 February 1988 required respondent Gonzalez
“to COMMENT 12
on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days
from notice.”
13
On 27 April 1988, the Court rendered its
Decision (per cu-riam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The
dispositive portion thereof read:
“WHEREFORE, We hereby.
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner
Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the criminal informations
filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist
from conducting investigations and filing criminal cases
with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the
powers and functions of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.”
14
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by respondent
Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion,
respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits
of his position, made the following statements totally
unrelated to
_______________
12 Id., p. 117.
13 Id., pp. 123-129.
14 Id., pp. 131-135.
327
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 327

any legal issue raised either in the Court’s Decision or in

his own Motion:
1. That he “ha(d) been approached twice by a leading

member of the court x x x and he was asked to ‘go
slow’ on Zaldivar and ‘not to be too hard on him;’ ”
2. That he “was approached and asked to ‘refrain’
from investigating the COA report on illegal
disbursements in the Supreme Court because ‘it
will embarass the Court;’ ” and
3. That “(i)n several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a leading
member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the
cases against (two Members of the Court).”
Respondent
15
Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten
notes which he claimed were sent by “some members of
this Honorable Court, interceding for cases pending before
this office (i.e., the Tanodbayan).” He either released his
Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to
the press or repeated to the press the above extraneous
statements: the metropolitan papers for the next several
days carried long reports on those statements and
variations and embellishments thereof.
On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the following
Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:
“G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon.

Sandiganbayan, et al.); G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs.
Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc.).—
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by

respondent Gonzalez under date of April 28, 1988, the
Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT
thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made
public statements to the media which not only deal with
matters subjudice but also appear offensive to and
disrespectful of the Court and its individual members and
calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring the Court into
disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to denigrate and
degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved
to require respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing
within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not
be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions for making such public
_______________
15 Id., p. 136.
328

statements reported in the media, among others, in the

issues of the ‘Daily Inquirer,’ the ‘Journal,’ the ‘Manila
Times,’ the ‘Philippine Star,’ the ‘Manila Chronicle,’ the
‘Daily Globe’ and the ‘Manila Standard’ of April 29 and 30,
and May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely ‘an

offshoot of the position he had taken that the SC Justices
cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by
government prosecutors,’ or motivated by a desire to stop
him ‘from investigating cases against some of their
proteges or friends;’
(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court
‘interceded for and on behalf of persons with pending cases
before the Tanodbayan,’ or sought ‘to pressure him to
render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;’
(c) That attempts were made to influence him ‘to go slow’ on
Zaldivar and ‘not to be too hard on him,’ and ‘to refrain’
from investigating the Commission on Audit report on
illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because ‘it
will embarass the Court;’
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of
cases against two Associate Justices; and
(e) That the Court had dismissed judges ‘without rhyme or
reason’ and disbarred lawyers ‘without due process.’
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to

the purpose of and circumstances attendant upon the
notes written to said public respondent by three (3)
members of the Court have since been submitted to the
Court and now form part of its official records, the Court
further Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to ATTACH
to this Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the
annexes thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent
Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the same period
often (10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of
February 16, 1988 addressed to respondent Gonzalez was
misdelivered and therefore not served on him, the Court
Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE
SERVICE of said Resolution on the respondent and to
REQUIRE the latter to comply therewith.”
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on

9 May 198816
an Omnibus Motion for Extension and
Inhibition alleging, among other things: that the above
quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court “appears to
have overturned that
_______________
16 Id., pp. 168-170.
329
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 329

presumption [of innocence] against him:” and that “he

gravely doubts whether that ‘cold neutrality [of an
impartial judge]’ is still available to him” there being
allegedly “at least 4 members of this Tribunal who will not
be able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and
neutrality.” Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading
with a prayer that the four (4) Members of the Court
identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves
in the deliberation and resolution of the Motion to Cite in
Contempt. 17
On 19 May 1988, after receipt of 18
respondent’s
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. this Court in
19
19
an extended per curiam Resolution denied the Motion and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. That denial was
made “final and immediately executory.”
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following
pleadings of record:
1. Manifestation
20
with Supplemental Motion to
Inhibit, dated 23 May 1988:
2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedings
21
to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, dated 20
May 1988;
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time
22
to
File Explanation Ex Abundante Cautelam, dated
26 May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time

(b) For Inhibition, and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative
23
Proceedings to the
IBP, Under24Rule 139-B, dated 4 June 1988 (with
Annex “A;” an anonymous letter dated 27 May
1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the
Supreme Court” and addressed to respondent);
_______________
17 A Constancia was also filed by respondent on this day arguing the

merits of his motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration.
18 Rollo of G.R. No. 80578, pp. 172-178.
19 Id., pp. 179-188.
20 Id., pp. 193-206.
21 Id., pp. 208-210.
22 Id., pp. 211-216.
23 Id., pp. 218-224.
24 Id., p. 225.
330

25
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation, dated 7 June 1988;
26
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration, dated
6 June 1988; and
27
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion dated
23 September 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court

quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez submitted on 17 June
28
28
1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment offering
respondent’s legal arguments and defenses against the
contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before
this Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex “A” thereof29
was respondent’s own personal Explanation/Compliance.
30
A second explanation called “Compliance,” with annexes,
was also submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme

Court to discipline officers of the court and members of the
Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the
legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from
the Court’s constitutional mandate to regulate admission to
the practice of law, which includes 31
as well authority to
regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this
constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent
power incidental to the proper administration of justice and32
essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has inher-
_______________
25 Id., p. 227.
26 Id., pp. 228-229.
27 Id., pp. 348-352.
28 Id., pp. 235-278.
29 Id., pp. 279-301.
30 Id., pp. 314-321.
31 Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 138,
Sections 27, 28 and 29, Revised Rules of Court.
32 Rule 71, Section 3 (d) Revised Rules of Court; Halili vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112 (1985); Montalban vs. Canonoy, 38
SCRA 1 (1971); Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel,
331
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 331

ent power to punish for contempt, to control in the

furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of
the Court including lawyers and all other persons 33
connected in any manner with a case before the Court.
The power to punish for contempt is “necessary for its own
protection against an improper interference with the due
administration of justice,” “(it) is not dependent
34
upon the
complaint of any of the parties litigant.”
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which
come into play in cases like that before us here; the Court’s
inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt
power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over
members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for
contempt. Contempt of court may be committed both by
lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court.
Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the
contumacious conduct also constitutes professional
misconduct which calls35 into play the disciplinary authority
of the Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer,
however, the Supreme Court’s disciplinary authority over
lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct
with which the respondent is charged also constitutes
contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of
court does not exhaust the
36
scope of disciplinary authority of
the Court over lawyers. The
_______________
20 SCRA 1241 (1967); Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil.

271 (1953); In re Vicente Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567 (1923); In re Kelly, 35 Phil.
944 (1916).
33 In Re Kelly, supra; In Re Severino Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo, 54
Phil. 801 (1930); In Re Vicente Pelaez, supra; Slade Perkins v. Director of
Prisons, supra; and In Re Vicente Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949).
34 Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra; Andres vs. Cabrera,
127 SCRA 802 (1984); Montalban vs. Canonoy, supra; Commissioner of
Immigration vs. Cloribel, supra; Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons,
76 Phil. 630 (1946).
35 See Section 3 (a), (c) and (d), Rule 71 and Section 27, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court.
36 The same rule obtains in other jurisdictions, E.g., In re Isserman 87
A. 2d 903 (1951) cert, denied Isserman v. Ethics Committee of Essex
County Bar Assn., 345 U.S. 927, 97 L. Ed. 1357 (1953):
“x x x The right or power of suspension or disbarment is different and distinct from

the power to punish for contempt, and the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt does not prevent disbarment.”
332

disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar

is but corollary to the Court’s exclusive power of admission
to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also
an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to
share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice
and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which
visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade
the administration of justice constitutes both professional
misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action
against him, and contumacious conduct warranting
application of the contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the
power to punish for contempt or of the disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court
is acting as offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at one
and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent
Gonzalez first sought to get some members of the Court to
inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged
bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect
asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon
the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on
responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot
expect due process from this Court, that the Court has
become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly.
Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the
proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members of
the Court in such proceeding. Respondent’s 37
contention is
scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, then Associate
(later Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal
with this contention in the following lucid manner:
“x x x x x x x x x
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of
our authority in the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it
appear, the members of the Court are the ‘complainants,
prosecutors and judges’ all rolled up into one in this instance. This
is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of
the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
_______________
37 31 SCRA 564 (1970).
333
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 333

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like

the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not—and does not involve—a trial of
an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of
the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion
to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree,
aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is
necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic
nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as
such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. The distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So that, in a
very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it
can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof—
as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard
should the administration of justice be threatened by the
retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is
but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said
practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively
in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it
cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it.
So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in
a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot
disqualify them from the exercise of the power because public
policy demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in
all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a
case. In the end, the imagined anomaly
334

of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant,

prosecutor and judge is absolutely
38
inexistent.
x x x x x x x x x.”
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court

expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice against the
respondent that would prevent them from acting in
accordance with the exacting requirements of their oaths of
office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members
to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate
the responsibility with which the Constitution has
burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys
either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the
Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme
Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an
exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the
Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge
consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no
need for further investigation of facts in the present case
for it is not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez
that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to
him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest
opportunity to present his defense; his defense is not that
he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that
those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having
been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The
issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law
and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is
compelled to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what

respondent Gonzalez was saying in his statements set out
above. Respondent has not denied making the above
statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper
reports of the statements
39
attributed to him are
substantially correct.
_______________
38 31 SCRA at 598-602. The same contention was made and rejected or

disregarded in e.g., De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 99
Phil. 907 (1956).
39 Answer with Explanation and Comment, Annex “A,” pp. 7-10.
335
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 335

Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the

Supreme Court deliberately rendered an erroneous or
wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision
dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578.
That decision, according to respondent Gonzalez, was
issued as an act of retaliation by the Court against him for
the position he had taken “that the (Supreme Court)
Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation
by government prosecutors,” and in order to stop
respondent from investigating cases against “some of (the)
proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court Justices).” The
Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness
of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated
19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez’ Motion for
Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases.
Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter, is
free intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of
the Court set out in its per curiam Decision and Resolution
in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not,
however, obscure the seriousness of the assault thus
undertaken by respondent against the Court and the
appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of
the system of administration of justice in our country.
Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision
and Resolution without regard to the legal merits of the
Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial process to impose
private punishment upon respondent for positions he had
taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his
duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront
to, or a greater outrage upon, the honour and dignity of this
Court than this. Respondent’s statement is also totally
baseless. Respondent’s statements were made in complete
disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act as
Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this Court
as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus 40
filed against him in these
consolidated Petitions, that is, more than seven (7)
months before the Court rendered its
_______________
40 The question was raised by petitioner Zaldivar even earlier, on 27

August 1987, before the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Quash in Criminal
Cases Nos. 12159-12177.
336

Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day

later, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease
and desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against
petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent
also disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987, upon
the filing of a second Petition for Certiorari for Prohibition
by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and
desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934, Thus,
the decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on
the constitutional law issue pending before the Court for
the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been
invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled
against members of the Supreme Court is that they have
improperly “pressured” him to render decisions favorable to
their “colleagues and friends,” including dismissal of
“cases” against two (2) members of the Court. This
particularly deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as
even a cursory examination of the contents of the
handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court
addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of
27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) will show. It is
clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise,
that the subject matters of the said notes had no relation at
all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This
charge appears to have been made in order to try to impart
some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the
first accusation made by respondent that the Court had
deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with
respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted
“pressure” from some members of the Court. Once again, in
total effect, the statements made by respondent appear
designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute, and to
cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in
the Supreme Court and, more generally, the judicial
institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court
was preventing him from prosecuting “rich and powerful
persons,” that the Court was in effect discriminating
between the rich
337
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 337

and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless
upon the other, and allowing “rich and powerful” accused
persons to go “scot-free” while presumably allowing or
affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This
accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present
the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be seen as
intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is
also suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class
war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having
allegedly “dismissed judges ‘without rhyme or reason’ and
disbarred lawyers ‘without due process.’ ” The Court notes
that this last attack is not without relation to the other
statements made by respondent against the Court. The
total picture that respondent clearly was trying to paint of
the Court is that of an “unjudicial” institution able and
willing to render “clearly erroneous” decisions by way of
reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily
and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of
law. Once again, the purport of respondent’s attack against
the Court as an institution unworthy of the people’s faith
and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to
examine the records of the two (2) judges and the attorney
he later identified in one of his Explanations, he would
have discovered that the respondents in those
administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain 41
their side and submit evidence in support thereof. He
would have also found that there were both strong reasons
for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures
there administered by the Court in the continuing effort to
strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of
the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that
due process as a constitutional precept does not, always 42
and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding,
that the essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
_______________
41 See Prudential Bank v. Judge Jose P. Castro and Atty. Benjamin M.

Grecia, Adm. Case No. 2756, prom. November 12, 1987; Consolidated
Bank v. Hon. Dionisio M. Capistrano, etc., Adm. Matter No. R-66-RTJ,
prom. March 18, 1988.
42 Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272 (1987).
338

43
evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. “To be
heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one
may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, 44
is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by
the Court to explain why he should not be punished for
contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for
making the statements adverted to above. In his
subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to
inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative proceedings
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made,
among others, the following allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court “should inhibit

[themselves] in the contempt and administrative
charges against the respondent, in the light of the
manifest prejudice and anger they hold against
respondent as shown in the language of the
resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;” (b)
That “the entire membership of the court has
already lost that ‘cold neutrality of an impartial
judge’ [to] be able to allow fairness and due process
in the contempt citation as well as in the possible
administrative charge;”
(c) That “respondent honestly feels that this court as
angry and prejudiced as it is, respondent has no
china man’s chance to get fair hearing in the
contempt and possible administrative charges;”
(d) That one must consider “the milieu before this
Tribunal with, perhaps passion and obfuscation
running riot;”
(e) That respondent, “after having been castigated with
such venom by the entire Court in its decision
denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not
have confidence in the impartiality of the entire
Court” and that he “finds it extremely difficult to
believe that the members of this Tribunal can still
act with unbiased demeanor towards him;” and
(f) That “the Tribunal is determined to disbar
[respondent] without due process” and that a
specified Member of the Court “has been tasked to
be the ponente, or at least prepare the decision.”
(Underscoring in the original)
_______________
43 Tajonera v. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438 (1981); and Richards v. Asoy,

152 SCRA 45 (1987).
44 Juanita Yap Say, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
73451, March 28, 1988.
339
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 339

Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his

statements earlier made, respondent sought to heap still
more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being
incapable of judging his acts and statements justly and
according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a
body not only capable of acting without regard to due
process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to
hold up this Court to public scorn and disrespect as an
unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at
respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult for
members of this Court to understand how respondent
Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal
of the land would be ready and willing to violate their most
solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private
feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court
revolves around the daily demands of law and justice and
duty, not around respondent nor any other person or group
of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent
Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by this Court as
contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary
authority of this Court over members of the Bar, may best
be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of
statements which have been held in our jurisdiction as
constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise
of the Court’s authority. 45
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, Atty. Quirico del Mar as
counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in a slander case,
moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in
favor of the complainant with a veiled threat that he
should interpose his next appeal to the President of the
Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he referred
to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on “knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment,” and “judgment rendered
through negligence” and implied that the Court of Appeals
had allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held
guilty of contempt of court by the Court of Appeals. He
then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for
damages before the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the
appealed slander case. This suit was terminated, however,
_______________
45 60 SCRA 234 (1974).
340

by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to

the Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and agreed
to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some
time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander
case. This Court denied the Petition for Review. Atty. del
Mar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and addressed
a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the
names of the justices of this Court who had voted in favor
of and those who had voted against his Motion for
Reconsideration. After his Motion for Reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation
in this Court saying:
“I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court
furnished me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions
of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge
Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the
same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the Court
of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by
Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a
favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the
people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they
may well know them and work for their extermination.” (60 SCRA
at 240: italics supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be

administratively dealt with for making the above
statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar
made the following statements:
“x x x Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside

of the Government. It is this state of things that convinced me
that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will
be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have
already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of
seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up deficiencies.” (60 SCRA at
242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, “until further orders,”

from the practice of law saying:
341
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 341

“x x x Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of

graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of
the government as justification for his contemptuous statements.
In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous
utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant
corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the government, We,
by Our act in G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the
grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a
complete loss to follow respondent del Mar’s logic x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
“To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind
them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and
obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do
remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren
its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that
he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving
in the noble mission of administering justice.”
x x x x x x x x x
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. No. 46504-Rwas based on its evaluation of the evidence on
only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the
petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found
no reason for disturbing the appellate court’s finding and
conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this
Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective
jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del
Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider
their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that
spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure
contumely for said tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the
two highest Court of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged
error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of
both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust
judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent
and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of
the case of his client.
x x x x x x x x x
x x x To those who are in the practice of law and those who in
the future will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to
this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and
minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of
justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic
institutions.” (60
342

SCRA at 242-247; italic supplied)

46
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, four
(4) members of the bar, acting as counsel for Mac Arthur
International Minerals Company were required by this
Court to explain certain statements made in MacArthur’s
third Motion for Reconsideration:
“d. ‘x x x; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the

applicable law due to the misrepresentation and
obfuscation of the petitioners’ counsel.’ (Last
sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration
dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ‘x x x Never has any civilized democratic tribunal
ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the “right to
reject any and all bids”) can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse losses to the
public, a government agency or just plain fraud x x
x and it is thus difficult, in the light of our
upbringing and schooling, even under many of the
incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme
Court intends to create a decision that in effect does
precisely that in a most absolute manner.’ (Second
sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration
dated Sept. 10, 1968).” (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in

their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21 September 1968 asking
—
“Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and
resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to
January 11, 1967. The motion charges ‘[t]hat the brother of the
Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the
favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous
and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968’ and the ex-parte
preliminary injunction rendered m the above-entitled case, the
latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even
before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion
states ‘[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President a short time before the decision of
July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case.’ The appointment
referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Invest
ments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics,
_______________
46 31 SCRA 1 (1970).
343
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 343

and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed
to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It
enumerates ‘incidents’ which, according to the motion, brought
about respondent MacArthur’s belief that Unjudicial prejudice’
had been caused it and that there was ‘unjudicial favoritism’ in
favor of ‘petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored
party directly benefited by the said decision.’ ” (31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel

for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for
Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion
contained the following paragraphs:
“4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the

Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was
outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time
of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case—which condition
is prohibited by the New Rules of Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and
we quote: ‘Justices; who may take part.—x x x x. Only those
members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument
will take part in its consideration and adjudication x x x.’ This
requirement is especially significant in the present instance
because the member who penned the decision was the very
member who was absent for approximately four months or more.
This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio
Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
x x x x x x x x x
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals
Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the
Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft
and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding
of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the
operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on
grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property
and/or to the United States Government, either its executive or
judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of
respondent’s proprietary vested rights by the Philippine
Government without either compensation or due process of law—
and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting
off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including
the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million
dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made.” (31
SCRA at 10-11)
344

Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court,

speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three (3)
attorneys guilty of contempt:
“1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his
third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is
not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures
petitioners as ‘vulturous executives.’ He speaks of this Court as a
‘civilized, democratic tribunal,’ but by innuendo would suggest
that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our
decision of July 31, 1968 as ‘false, erroneous and illegal’ in a
presumptuous manner. He then charges that the ex parte
preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and
predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He
accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being
interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored
party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of
the newly-created Board of Investments, ‘a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a
short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.’ In
this backdrop, he proceeds to state that ‘it would seem that the
principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for
inhibition of any judicial authority] by the Honorable Supreme
Court should first apply to itself.’ He puts forth the claim that
lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create
favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief
that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro ‘would be less likely to engender favoritism and
prejudice for or against a particular cause or party.’ Implicit in
this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are
insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation
suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice
and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of
impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did
affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above
suspicion at all times like Ceasar’s wife, warns that loss of
confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be
allowed to happen in our country, ‘although the process has
already begun.’
x x x x x x x x x
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago’s accusations have
no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion
on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we repeated,
‘any other
345
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 345

justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly
from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-
petitioner or their agents or principals, including the president.’
The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing,
the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in
that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from
the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time
a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought
may not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would
be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be
wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating
in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the
unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the
part of a losing litigant’s attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross
disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from
the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of
faith, counsel’s words are intended to create an atmosphere of
distrust, of disbelief.
x x x x x x x x x
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not
unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of
Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the
administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71
of the Rules-—against improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice—is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is
guilty of contempt of court.
x x x x x x x x x
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case
to the World Court and/or the United States government. It must
be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still
trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In
doing so, unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically,
the motion announced that McArthur ‘will inevitably x x x raise
the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in
the bidding of May 12, 1965 x x x to the World Court’ and would
invoke ‘the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of
all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the
sugar price premium, amount to more than fifty million dollars
annually x x x.’
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this
Court to decide the case’ in its favor. A notice of appeal to the
World Court has even been embodied in Meads’ return. There is a
gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to
reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes
that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that
decision. And yet, it would appear
346

that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to

effect a change of the decision of this Court Such act has no
aboveboard explanation.
x x x x x x x x x
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be
protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather
than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break
faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst
men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to
the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is
a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause
before a court of justice.” (31 SCRA at 13-23; italics supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in

protest against what he asserted was “a great injustice
committed against his client by the Supreme Court,” filed a
Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title. He
alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Courts
“unjust judgment,” and had become “one of the sacrificial
victims before the altar of hypocrisy,” saying that “justice
as administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court [was] not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” Atty.
Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client “in the
people’s forum” so that “the people may know of this silent
injustice committed by this Court” and that “whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed [may]
never be repeated.” Atty. Almacen released to the press the
contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the
“Manila Times” published statements attributed to him as
follows:
“Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did

not expose the tribunal’s ‘unconstitutional and obnoxious’ practice
of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal’s ‘short-cut justice.’ Almacen deplored, his
client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he
lost the case. x x x x x x x x x
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in
this petition, ‘where our Supreme Court is composed of men who
are calloused to our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity.’
347
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 347

x x x x x x x x x
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by
which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme
Court ‘will become responsible to all cases brought to its attention
without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious “lack of merit” or “denied
resolutions.’ ” (31 SCRA at 565-566; italics supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause

why disciplinary action should not betaken against him.
His explanation, which in part read:
“x x x x x x x x x
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can
be found in all courts and government offices. We have added only
two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the
sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for
justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings,
supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeals
has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given x x x. We
refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We
only described the impersonal state of things and nothing more.
x x x x x x x x x
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the
members of this Court and for which reason we offered to
surrender our lawyer’s certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because
what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer
was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may
decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in
the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to
uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this
Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.” (31 SCRA at
572; italics supplied)
was found by the Court to be “undignified and cynical” and

rejected. The Court indefinitely suspended Almacen from
the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, that Almacen had exceeded 47
the boundaries of “fair
criticism.” 4. In Paragas v. Cruz, counsel, whose Petition
for Certio-
_______________
47 14 SCRA 809 (1965).
348

rari was dismissed by this Court, made the following
statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:
“The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the

resolution of this Honorable Court dated April 20, 1965 on the
ground that it constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court promulgated by this very Hon. Supreme Court,
and on the further ground that it is likewise a violation of the
most important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of
the Philippines, a culpable violation which is a ground for
impeachment.
x x x The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld
and protected by all means, because the rule of law creates and
preserves peace and order and gives satisfaction and contentment
to all concerned. But when the laws and the rules are violated, the
victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the
cave-men! We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and
again, killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of
the City Hall of Manila. Educated people should keep their
temper under control at all times! But justice should be done to all
concerned to perpetuate the very life of Democracy on the face of
the earth.’ ” (14 SCRA at 810; italics supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory

to the dignity of the Court and required counsel to show
cause why administrative action should not be taken
against him. Counsel later explained that he had merely
related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and
Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid repetition of such
acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found
these explanations unsatisfactory and the above
statements contumacious:
“x x x The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration

x x x are plainly contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to
the recent killing of two employees is but a covert threat upon the
members of the Court. x x x That such threats and disrespectful
language contained in a pleading filed in courts are constitutive of
direct contempt has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769;
Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, L-9785, September 19, 1956; Sison vs. Sandejas,
L-9270, April 29, 1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What
makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty party is a
member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil.
580—
349
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 349

‘Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with
that courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.’
It is right and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause

and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and
energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so,
for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of
the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61
Phil. 729)” (14 SCRA at 811-812; italics supplied)
48
5. In In re Sotto, a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo,
invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to divulge the
source of the news item which carried his by-line and was
sent to jail for so refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator
and author of said law, caused the publication of the
following item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:
“As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53),
interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo,
reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days
imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news
published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has
not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more
putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the
majority of its members. In the wake of so many blunders and
injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I believe
that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one
of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming
congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the
Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and
democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the
deaf may hear: The Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the
impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of
Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other
learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine
Judiciary.” (82 Phil. at 597-598; italics supplied)
_______________
48 82 Phil. 595 (1949).
350

In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of
goodfaith and his invocation of the constitutional guarantee
of freespeech and in requiring him to show cause why he
should notbe disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice
Feria, said—
“To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last
years committing deliberately ‘so many blunders and injustices,’
that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party
and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in
many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily
to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower
and degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the
last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain
relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these
are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe
that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to
take the law into their hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos
might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the
courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and
not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to
the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.” (82 Phil. at 601-602; italics supplied)
49
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a
Motion before the Supreme Court which contained the
following paragraph (in translation):
“We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that

the resolution of this court, denying our motion for
reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an
outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery
of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our
power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court
which has committed it, because we
_______________
49 61 Phil. 724 (1935).
351
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 351

should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the
municipality, of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to
denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which
the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our
utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court
and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public.
But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of
voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of
sakdalism’ and make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice.” (61 Phil. at 726; italics supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should

not be declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco responded by
saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth.
Examining the statements made above, the Court held:
“x x x [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable

disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional
contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with
no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the
rights of the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco’s client, because the acts of
outraging and mocking from which the words ‘outrage’ and
mockery’ used therein are derived, means exactly the same as all
these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language
published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish
Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for many years a member of the
Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least necessary,
because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way
to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to
emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said
motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were
superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly
improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are
annoying and good practice can ever sanction them by reason of
their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a
serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in
the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco’s motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the
court
352

because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course
which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his
attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of
denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his
client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening
manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader
against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices
against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that
decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion to promote
distrust in the administration of justice and increase the
proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public
knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot
mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and
disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the
sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would
maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven,
with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold
its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only
because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right
(Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a
priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but
also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust
in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from
harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is
the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon
which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who
are aggrieved turn for protection and relief.” (61 Phil. at 727-728;
italics supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above

discussed exhaust our case law on this matter. In the
following cases, among others, the Supreme Court
punished for contempt or administratively disciplined
lawyers who had made statements not very different from
those made in the cases discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);

2) Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441
(1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasay City
353
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 353

Branch, 99 Phil. 907 (1956);

6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution
(unreported), Promulgated 29 April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario Olba; Contempt
Proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312
(1939); and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed

above which the Court has in the past penalized as
contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary
sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that the
statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly
constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent’s
statements, especially the charge that the Court
deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in
the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the
justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to
wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the
grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements
very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and,
through the Court, the entire system of administration of
justice in the country. That respondent’s baseless charges
have had some impact outside the internal world of
subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a
complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then
fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a
complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the
appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately
rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the
respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he

was merely exercising his constitutional right of free
speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified
privileged communications and fair criticism in the public
interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional
guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that
right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems
unaware of is that
354

freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional

freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression
needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with
the requirements of equally important public interests. One
of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of
the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration
of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression
and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For
the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression
itself can be secured only within the context of a
functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice,
within the context, in other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the
general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
“x x x A free press is not to be preferred to an independent

judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither
has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free
society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an
independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if
necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent 50
means for
assuring judges their independence is a free press.”
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same

thought in the following terms:
“The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press.

This constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The
Court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for
charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its
violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the
citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But license
or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be
confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the
maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the
rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the
Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are
privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good
purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean
means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential
_______________
50 Concurring in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 at 354-356 (1946).
355
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 355
51
proceedings to the embarassment of the parties and the courts.”
(Italics supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest

in the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and
control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who
are, first aid foremost, indispensable participants in the
task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have
held, persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer’s right of
free expression
52
may have to be more limited than that of a
layman.
_______________
51 In Re Severino Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 at 807

(1930).
52 In the Matter of the Citation of Atty. C.A. Frerichs, 238 N.W. 2d 764
(1976), respondent attorney charged the Supreme Court of Iowa with
willfully avoiding constitutional questions raised by him thus violating the
constitutional rights of his clients. In answering the citation for contempt,
respondent argued that he was merely fulfilling his duty to be critical and
exercising his freedom of expression. The Supreme Court of Iowa said:
“A lawyer, acting in a professional capacity, may have some fewer rights of free
speech than would a private citizen. As was well explained in In re Woodward, 300
S.W. 2d 385. 393-394 (Mo. 1957);
‘x x x Neither the right of free speech nor the right to engage in “political” activities can be
so construed or extended as to permit any such liberties to a member of the bar;
respondent’s action was in express and exact contradiction of his duties as a lawyer. A
layman may, perhaps, pursue his theories of free speech or political activities until he runs
afoul of the penalties of libel or slander, or into some infraction of our statutory law. A
member of the bar can, and will, be stopped at the point where he infringes our Canons of
Ethics; and if he wishes to remain a member of the bar he will conduct himself in accordance
therewith. x x x.’
The United States Supreme Court had before it an attorney disciplinary

proceeding in In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 79 S.Ct. 1376. 3 L.Ed. 2d 1473 (1959).
On the ‘free speech’ issue respondent raises here, Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring
in result, clearly was speaking for at least five members of the court when he said:
‘x x x A lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited standards of propriety and honor,

which experience has shown
356

It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from
being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special
Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the
Republic and to this Court as the embodiment and the
repository of the judicial power in the government of the
Republic. The responsibility of the respondent “to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court” and “not53 to
promote distrust in the administration of justice” is
heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course,
entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out
where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once
more, however, the right of criticism is not unlimited. Its
limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re
Almacen which ar e worth noting:
“But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall

be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on
the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of
the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to
_______________
necessary in a calling dedicated to the accomplishment of justice. He who would

follow that calling must conform to those standards.
‘Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances
might be constitutionally protected speech. x x x.’” (238 N.W. 2d at 769; italics supplied)
In In re Raggio, 487 P.2d 499 (1971), the Supreme Court of Nevada said:
“We are never surprised when persons, not ultimately involved with the administration
of justice, speak out in anger or frustration about our work and the manner in which we
perform it, and shall protect their light to so express themselves. A member of the bar,
however, stands in a different position by reason of his oath of office and standards of
conduct which he is sworn to uphold conformity with those standards has proven essential to
the administration of justice in our courts.”
x x x x x x x x x.” (487 P.2d at 500-501; italics supplied)
53 In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 at 602 (1949).
357
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 357

disciplinary action.”
The lawyer’s duty to render respectful subordination to the
courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence,
in the assertion of their clients’ rights, lawyers—even those gifted
with superior intellect—are 54
enjoined to rein up their tempers.
x x x x x x x x x” (Italics supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that
respondent has criticized the Court; it is addressed rather
to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner
in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and
denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the respondent
are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or
misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed
to disclaim
55
the natural and plain import of his words and
acts. It is, upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out
that respondent offered no apology 56 in his two (2)
explanations and exhibited no repentance.
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending
that no injury to the judiciary has been shown, and points
to the
_______________
54 31 SCRA at 580-581.
55 Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978).
56 Subsequent public statements and acts of respondent Gonzalez fully
document the lack of repentance and the absence of bona fides so essential
for legitimate criticism and fair comment. E.g., he repeated before a
Committee of the House of Representative his charge that the Court was
promoting “unequal opportunity (for) justice in the country” by issuing
restraining orders against criminal prosecution of “big cases” (Daily Globe,
May 4, 1988; Evening Star, May 4, 1988). He threatened personally to file
impeachment proceeding against three (3) members of the Court whom he
had accused of “pressuring” him to render decisions favorable to their
friends (Philippine Star, May 4, 1988). He accused the Court of
“malversation of public funds” for using “public funds” to pay premiums on
“private [group hospitalization] insurance policies” of its members (Manila
Chronicle, May 4, 1988). He asserted that four (4) members of the Court
could not dispense justice to him with “the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge” (Malaya, May 6, 1988; Manila Chronicle, May 10, 1988).
358

fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration

of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated
and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May
1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained
by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a
finding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary
authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated
Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review of
the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondent’s
Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public
pressures brought to bear upon this Court by the
respondent through his much publicized acts and
statements for which he is here being required to account.
Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a
particular case is not the only species of injury that the
Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What
is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the
judicial institutions of the country in general and of the
Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions
might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time but
damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent
Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered. The
level of trust and confidence of the general public in the
courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily
measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such
trust and confidence is critical for the stability of
democratic government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment
for contempt is not the proper remedy in this case and
suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to
libel suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits by
individual members of this Court may well be available
against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an
exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case,
it is not only the individual members of the Court but the
Court itself as an institution that has been
57
falsely attacked,
libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy.
_______________
57 This was underscored by then Mr. Justice Moran in his dissenting

opinion in People v. Alarcon—
“It might be suggested that judges who are unjustly attacked have a remedy in
action for libel. This suggestion has,
359
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 359

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty

both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross
misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the
Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty.
Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely and
until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take
effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice,
the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their
information and guidance.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,

Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Raul M. Gonzalez suspended from the practice of law

indefinitely.
Notes.—Confidentiality of proceedings in disbarment

case against a lawyer may be waived by the lawyer himself.
(Villalon, Jr. vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 443.)
Court may suspend or debar a lawyer whose acts show
his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili vs.
CIR, 136 SCRA 112.)
——o0o——
_______________
however, no rational basis in principle. In the first place, the outrage is not
directed to the judge as a private individual but to the judge as such or to the court
as an organ of the administration of justice. In the second place, public interests
will gravely suffer where the judge, as such, will, from time to time, be pulled
down and disrobed of his judicial authority to face his assailant on equal grounds
and prosecute cases in his behalf as a private individual. The same reasons of
public policy which exempt a judge from civil liability in the exercise of his judicial
functions, most fundamental of which is the policy to confine his time exclusively
to the discharge of his public duties, applies here with equal, if not superior, force.
x x x.” (69 Phil. 265 at 278 [1939]).
360
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316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Zaldivar vs. Gonzalez

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. THE

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. HON. RAUL M.

Courts; Attorneys; Contempt; Disbarment; Authority of the

VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 317

Zaldivar vs. Gonzalez

nary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader

318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Zaldivar vs. Gonzalez

VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 319

Zaldivar vs. Gonzalez

Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent’s statement that the

320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Zaldivar vs. Gonzalez

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is compelled to

VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 321

Zaldivar vs. Gonzalez

PETITION to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

The following are the subjects of this Resolution:

322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to

The pertinent facts are as follows:

“G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable

1 Rollo of G.R. Nos. 79690-707, pp. 98-111, Annex “H-1” of Petition.

VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 323

tion).—Acting on the special civil action for certiorari, prohibition

The parties later filed their respective pleadings.

3 Rollo of G.R. No. 80578, pp. 28 38, Annex “B” of Petition.

324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4)

“G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez

6 Id., pp. 57-58, Information.

VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 325

On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar 11filed with the

“Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case

TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the

11 Id., pp. 98-106.

326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

government—Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential

Acting on petitioner’s Motion to Cite in Contempt, the

VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 327

any legal issue raised either in the Court’s Decision or in

1. That he “ha(d) been approached twice by a leading

“G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon.

1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by

328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

statements reported in the media, among others, in the

(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely ‘an

3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to

Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on

16 Id., pp. 168-170.

VOL. 166, OCTOBER 7, 1988 329

presumption [of innocence] against him:” and that “he

(a) For Extension of Time

17 A Constancia was also filed by respondent on this day arguing the

330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court

We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme