Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia:

Reassessing the Asian Values Debate

Doh Chull Shin

Center for the Study of Democracy
University of California
Irvine, California
U. S. A.

Prepared for presentation at a symposium on “Confucianism, Democracy, and Constitutionalism” to be

held in National Taiwan University on June 14-15, 2013, Taipei, Taiwan.

This is only a draft. Please do not quote without author’s permission.

 Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia:
Reassessing the Asian Values Debate

Today, East Asia represents a region of democratic underdevelopment. More than three
decades after the third wave of democratization began to spread from Southern Europe,
much less than half the countries (six of sixteen) in the region meet the minimum criteria
for electoral democracy. This ratio is much lower than the worldwide average of six
democracies for every ten countries.

Why does a region, blessed with rapid economic development, remain cursed with
democratic underdevelopment? What makes it hard for democracy to take root in the region
known as culturally Confucian Asia? To explain a lack of democratic development in the region,
many scholars and political leaders have often promoted Confucian values as Asian values, and
vigorously debated their influence, either actual or potential, on the democratic transformation of
authoritarian regimes in the region from a variety of perspectives.

For decades, politicians and scholars have vigorously debated whether Confucian cultural
legacies have served to deter the democratization of authoritarian regimes in the region. Lee
Kuan Yew (2000) and other proponents of the Asian Values thesis, for example, have claimed
that Western-style liberal democracy is neither suitable for nor compatible with the
Confucianism of East Asia, where collective welfare, a sense of duty, and other principles of
Confucian moral philosophy run deep in people’s consciousness. These proponents advocate a
benevolent and paternalistic form of governance as a viable alternative to a liberal democracy
based on the principles of Western individualism.

Kim Dae Jung (1994), Amartya Sen (1999), and many other advocates of liberal
democracy, on the other hand, have denounced the Confucian Asian Values thesis as a
politically motivated attempt to legitimate authoritarian rule and have rejected it as
anachronistic and oppressive. Francis Fukuyama (1995) also rejects the portrayal of
Confucianism and democracy as antithetical doctrines. However, Fareed Zakaria (2003)
argues that democracies in Confucian Asia are likely to remain “illiberal democracies”
because elites and ordinary citizens are reluctant to embrace and observe the fundamental
tenets of constitutional liberalism.

Despite decades of the debate, there is little intellectual consensus about the relationship
between the fundamental values and norms of Confucianism and those of democracy.
Empirically also, there is little agreement about the relationship between Confucian legacies and
a lack of democratic development in East Asia. In the theoretical and empirical literature,
therefore, there is much left to explore and understand concerning the influence Confucian
legacies and democratic politics have on each other.

My new book “Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia”, which was published
by Cambridge University Press last year, offers a comprehensive review of the theoretical debate
on Confucianism and democracy and public opinion survey research on their relationship. It also

1
offers a variety of empirical evidence and theoretical insights that can help to conclusively settle
the age-old Asian Values debate. In addition, it examines the implications of key empirical
findings in Confucian East Asia for competing theories of cultural democratization. This paper
aims to highlight the most notable of the empirical findings and theoretical contributions
presented in the book.

Organizationally, this paper consists of seven sections. The first section of the paper
reviews claims and counterclaims of the Asian Value thesis and identifies three theoretical theses
for empirical testing. It is followed by a brief review of what has been done to test those theses
empirically. The third section discusses how my study conceptualized the two central terms of
Confucianism and democratization to offer a comprehensive and balanced account of their
linkage. The next two sections discuss how broadly and deeply East Asians remain attached to
Confucian legacies and their attachment to those legacies affect their engagement in civil life and
reaction to democratic politics. The final two sections summarize the main contributions of the
study reported in the book for the Asian Values debate and for the theoretical literature on
cultural democratization.

Theoretical Debates

To date, numerous scholars and politicians in East Asia and elsewhere have
vigorously debated the actual and potential role which Confucian cultural legacies can
play in the process of democratization. These scholars and politicians generally espouse
one of three perspectives, each of which will be reviewed and analyzed here. The first
camp argues that the political and social ethical principles of Confucianism are
fundamentally incompatible with those of liberal democracy. In contrast, the second
camp interprets some key principles of Confucianism as analogous to or compatible with
democratic values. The third camp suggests that some characteristics of Confucianism
and democracy can be reformulated to create a hybrid system that can be more suitable
for historically and culturally Confucian societies. Of these three contrasting perspectives,
the incompatibility thesis is known as orthodoxy (Nuyen 2000, 133).

The Incompatibility Thesis

Proponents of this interpretation focus on the overall character of Confucianism,

and its prime concern as a system of social and political ethics, and evaluate its
fundamental principles as undemocratic or antidemocratic Confucianism (Pye 1985).
Specifically, they interpret Confucianism as a system of social and political ethics that
emphasizes collective good, hierarchical social relations, and meritocratic rule by the
wise and virtuous. Confucianism, therefore, constitutes an ethical system fundamentally
different from the liberal ethical system of the West, which places priority on individual
freedom and rights, and mass participation and competition in the political process. In
short, Confucianism and democracy are viewed to constitute two distinct and
incompatible value systems (Chan 1999; Li 1997, 1999).

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 The incompatibility thesis, therefore, reflects a very comprehensive analysis of
Confucianism as a system of both social and political ethics, and offers a very critical
assessment of the relationships between its social and political values and those of
democracy. According to Baogang He’s (2010, 20) recent literature review,
Confucianism represents “a political order in which the rule of the gentleman prevails,
where duty is central, political inequality if taken for granted, moral concern overrides
the political bargaining process, and harmony prevails over conflict. ”Confucian political
order, therefore, “conflicts with a democratic political order in which the rule of law
prevails, rights are central, political equality is taken for granted, the political bargaining
process overrides moral consensus, and conflict is seen as a necessarily normal condition
of political life. ”To put it differently, the fundamental values that serve as prerequisites
for democracy, particularly the values of freedom, equality, and pluralism, are
incompatible with the Confucian key values of duty, responsibility, and loyalty (Nuyen,
2000, 135; Li 1997, 187).

Many scholars and political leaders subscribe to the incompatibility thesis.

Samuel P. Huntington is the most outspoken of scholars in this incompatibility camp. He
claims that classical Confucian thought is inherently antidemocratic, and Confucian
democracy is a contradictory term (1991, 30). 1Accordingly, Confucian-influenced
societies are inhospitable to democratization because Confucian heritage promotes the
group over the individual; authority over liberty; and responsibilities over rights; and it
offers no institutional protection of individual rights against the state (Huntington 1991,
24; 1996, 238). Several East Asian leaders also espouse such ideas as well, with
Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamed suggesting publicly that
the dominance of Confucian Asian values in those states precludes any emergence of
Western liberal democracy. Other critics maintain that state leaders in Confucian East
Asia have used Confucian doctrines to justify illiberal policies (Brennan and Fan 2007;
Zakaria 1994).

What specific principles of Confucianism and democracy are most incompatible

with one another? Supporters of the incompatible thesis point to the qualifications of
rulers and the role of the ruled in the political process as one discordant area. In
democracy, which is a form of collective self-rule, people rule themselves directly or
indirectly through the selection of their representatives. In Confucianism, only those
capable of discharging the responsibility of governing are allowed to serve as rulers
(Analects 4:14). It is moral elites, i. e., the wise and virtuous, who are charged with
ruling the state. Confucius and Mencius emphasized ordinary people as “the root of the
state,” meaning their interests are paramount (Mencius 7:9, 9:5), but neither Confucius
nor Mencius talked about self-rule. Nor were they willing to permit the masses to
participate directly in the process of making decisions.

According to early Confucians, only morally upright people called gentlemen and
sages, not the masses, have the capacity to grasp the Way (ethical living) and put it into
practice. The common people, therefore, are incapable of governing themselves, and thus
should not be entrusted with governance. Instead, they ought to be made to follow
1
Huang (1997) and Kang (1999) offer highly critical assessments of Huntington’s scholarship on Confucianism.

3
virtuous leaders as “the grass bends to the wind” (Analects 12:19). “Confucianism”,
therefore, “does not contain any fundamental democratic values or principles, such as
political equality or popular sovereignty” (Chan 2007, 191). In short, the Confucian
political world is a hierarchical political order in which the common people remain
passive. 2

Classical Confucianism, moreover, equates good government with paternalistic

meritocracy in which the relationship between rulers and masses are analogous to that
between parents and children (Murphy 2000). The role of government is, therefore,
analogous to that of a good father and mother, who make decisions on behalf of their
children. As mother and father to the people, moral elites make decisions concerning
their welfare. Although the Confucian government of moral meritocracy allows for some
degree of popular consultation, dissent, and remonstration, it is, at best, a form of
guardianship (Chan 2007, 187). This indeed is a stark contradiction to the Western notion
of democracy as government by the people, which requires their participation in
policymaking.

The second set of incompatible principles concerns the proper relationship

between rulers and the ruled. Confucius and his followers promoted an organic notion of
the state in which the family serves as a model for it. As in the family, therefore, its
structure and process are hierarchically organized. In this hierarchically organized state
structure, political powers are usually concentrated into the hands of a prime minister or a
president, a practice which contrasts sharply with the Western democratic state structures
with the powers divided into different branches of government (Subramanian 2000,
Robinson 1991).

In Confucian government, moreover, ordinary citizens must exhibit proper

conduct and loyalty to their political leaders (Hahm 2001, S. Lee 2001, Mahbubani 1995,
Pertierra 1999). By stressing their obedience to authority and discouraging them from
engaging in any behavior that undermines political stability. As Chenyang Li (1997, 185-
186) points out, Confucian norms of loyalty and propriety are known to make it
impossible for ordinary people to express their interests in the process of policymaking
and challenge their government policy.

In the past, political leaders especially in China, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan
often invocated Confucian values stressing national unity and welfare, and legitimized
their oppressive authoritarian rule as benevolent and inherently necessary (Kang 2006).
Rulers in such situations embody O’Donnell’s (1994) conception of “delegative
democracy,” identified by the firm entrenchment of political power within the executive
branch. Citizens are technically allowed to vote, but every decision of any importance is
made by executive leaders and is imposed on society from above. This is clearly
antithetical to Western democracy, which rests upon the existence of competing ideas –
political debates and political contestation, which are essential for preventing any type of

2
Tu (2002, 6) challenges this view, arguing that “In the Mencian tradition, min (the common people), is absolutely
not a passive element to be manipulated by rulers.”

4
authoritarian ruler from assuming control. In this regard, then, historical Confucian
values certainly appear to be antithetical to democratization and liberalization.

On the proper role the state ought to play for the people, Confucianism and liberal
democracy are also in conflict. In Confucianism, the state, like the family, is a
paternalistic institution in charge of the welfare of its members. It is supposed to fulfill
parental functions. In principle, therefore, there is no limit to what it should do to ensure
the welfare of the people by promoting economic prosperity, political stability, and social
harmony. It has the authority to intervene in the economic as well as moral affairs of its
citizens if such interventions are deemed necessary for the welfare of the people (Bai
2008, 24; O’Dwyer 2003, 45). Such an interventionist state runs counter to a liberal
democratic state, which is morally neutral and non-intervening in economic and private
affairs (Chan 2007).

The final irreconcilability between Confucianism and Western democracy

discussed here focuses on the role virtue plays in Confucian politics. Confucianism
deems virtue to be far more important than formal political institutions in governance,
stressing the need for moral leadership over institutional safeguards against official
behavior. Confucius, for example, portrayed virtuous leaders as north stars in the
Analects, for all are expected to turn towards them in search of enlightenment (Analects
2:1). As Shaohua Hu (1997) notes, there is a major shortcoming in such a Confucian
notion of political leadership, however. What should be done when morality fails?

While Confucianism’s optimistic notion of virtue would be useful for societies in

which leaders always place national welfare above their own, the ideology provides no
clear mechanism for resolving conflict when issues do arise (Nuyen 2000). Small
agrarian communities emblematic of Chinese life during Confucius’s era no longer exist.
In large urbanized and industrialized societies where values continue to shift, morality in
flux alone cannot motivate leaders to do what is right and avoid doing wrong. Confucian
countries must guarantee that the rule of law is upheld in order to make political leaders
and institutions work for the people. For those who view Confucianism and Western
democracy as fundamentally irreconcilable, it is strict adherence to the rule of law, not
virtuous political leaders, which historically Confucian societies urgently need to become
well-functioning democracies.

The Compatibility Thesis

The establishment of democratic institutions and processes in historically

Confucian East Asia has not always been an easy process. Yet those institutions and
processes are firmly established in three—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—of the seven
countries in the region. Throughout the region, moreover, democracy is championed by
an increasing number of ordinary citizens and political leaders. According to former
South Korean president Kim Dae Jung (1994), Confucianism enables the region to
expand democracy beyond Western standards. According to former Taiwanese president
Lee Teng-hui (2006), Confucian doctrine is capable of balancing the excess of

5
individualism and mending other shortcomings of democracy by enhancing the welfare
of individual citizens and the groups of which they are a part of at the same time.

There are also scholars who argue that Confucianism contains “democratic seeds,
and these seeds can serve as the very foundation of sustainable democracy in Confucian
East Asia (Hsu 1975, chap. 9; Murphy 2000; Xu 2006; Yung 2010). According to Joseph
Chan (2007), four leading Confucian scholars co-authored Manifesto to the World on
Behalf of Chinese Culture in the 1950s, and advocated the compatibility thesis. 3They
examined Mencius’ notion of the heavenly mandate and other Confucian principles of
social and political order, and emphasized their compatibility with those of democratic
government. The prominent aspects of Confucianism that are often considered
reconcilable with democracy include political accountability, equality, dissent, tolerance,
and social participation.

The first similarity noted by scholars proposing a compatible relationship

concerns political accountability. While Confucianism clearly values societal order and
civilian loyalty to the state, the doctrine’s basic tenets never approve of a ruler’s arbitrary
action against the ruled. Instead, a ruler’s accountability to the people is the core of those
tenets. At the root of such accountability are two principles of government, minben
(people as the root) and the Mandate of Heaven. The minben principle holds that “the
people are of supreme importance” (Mencius 7B:14), and the ruler ought to take care of
their welfare. The Mandate of Heaven holds that people’s acceptance or consent is the
basis of legitimate rule (Mencius 9:5). Although neither of these principles fully meets
the definition of democracy as government by the people, both are in agreement with its
definition as government for the people. The Confucian practice of selecting government
officials by public and open examinations, on the other hand, can be viewed as an
institutional alternative to the free and competitive elections of political leaders (Nuyen
2000, 143).4

Political constraint of leaders is also present in both Confucianism and democracy.

Though the Confucian belief in a “mandate of heaven” grants leaders considerable
authority, such power is fully contingent upon continued ethical leadership. Confucian
governance is a form of political stewardship – upon being deemed appropriately wise
and virtuous, leaders essentially become God’s representatives on Earth. Confucian
leaders are expected to respect public opinion, remain cognizant of societal demands,
provide for the national welfare, and maintain liberty, equality, and impartiality (Hsu
1975). If a leader fails to remain accountable to his subjects, his citizens need no longer
respect his rule. In this regard, Tu Wei-ming (1994) suggests that while state leaders do
enjoy a great deal of power in historically Confucian East Asia, their authority is often
checked by the citizens, who remain attached to the Confucian notion of government for
the people.

3
These four scholars are Carson Chang, Tan Junyi, Xu Fuguan, and Mou Zongsan. Albert Chen (2007) reviews
their analyses of linking Confucianism to democracy.
4
Another Confucian institution of accountability is the Censorate of the Chosun dynasty (1392-1920). For further
details, see Mo (2003).

6
 The provisions expected of an ideal Confucian leader are quite similar to values
associated with democratic polity. As Shaohua Hu (1997) notes, both Confucianism and
democracy oppose the despotic behavior of political leaders, and both belief systems
promote the right and ability of the people to remove malevolent leaders from power. If
leaders use their positions for personal gain rather than for the promotion of the national
welfare, citizens of both Confucian and democratic states are fully justified and
authorized to replace those rulers with better-qualified leaders. Democracy might
emphasize the protection of personal liberty from governmental oppression to a greater
degree than Confucianism, but both doctrines still maintain that citizens deserve leaders
who are accountable to the populace.

A similar concept of accountability is evidenced in Confucianism’s tradition of

remonstrance, in which a country’s residents maintain open dialogue with leaders on
pressing issues. According to Xu (2006), early Confucians viewed governance as an act
of mutual commitment on the part of rulers and the ruled. According to Mencius (4A:20),
the real loyalty of the former to the latter includes “rectifying the evils in the ruler’s
heart. ”“If the ruler made serious mistakes, they would remonstrate with him, but if
repeated remonstration fell on deaf ears, they would depose him” (Mencius 5B:20).

These Confucian ideas of criticizing authority and dismissing unresponsive

leaders are similar to the democratic political practices of conducting competitive
elections and impeaching those leaders peacefully. The divine obligation of political
leaders to serve and follow the people in Confucian societies can be, therefore, viewed as
equivalent to the Western rule of law – if either is broken, leaders must be held
responsible for their actions (Ackerly 2005).

Besides the domain of political accountability, Confucianism and democracy are

also deemed similar to each other in their views of equality. All Confucians believe in the
equality of man by nature (Analects 7:2; Mencius 6A:7). Confucianism emphasizes
universal education for citizens from all walks of life, and equal opportunity for political
appointment. The Confucian ideal of universal education is compatible with the principle
of democratic citizenship that requires the development of an informed citizenry (Collins
2008).

Although not all citizens possess the abilities needed to become political leaders,
everyone has an opportunity to take merit-based civil service examinations, and to be
appointed as a government official. Individual citizens in Confucian societies, as in
democratic societies, are expected to respect the rights and personal sovereignty of others,
for all residents of a country are equally integral components of their national network.
These norms certainly parallel democracy’s emphasis on equality and opportunity,
indicating that while East Asian societies today might not always impose such values in
actuality, Confucianism can be used to foster such democratic behavior.

A closer inspection of historical Confucian documents shows that tolerance of

diverse ideas is also encouraged by the doctrine. The very concept of harmony
incorporates diversity and the tolerance of diversity, as Confucius (Analects 13. 23)

7
admonishes “Exemplary persons [to] value harmony but not conformity; petty persons
value conformity but not harmony. ”In the ideal world of Confucianism, harmony refers
to the blending of diverse ideas, not the eliminating of opposing views. As Bell (2008b,
120) aptly points out, it is “harmony in diversity” that is sought after, though uniformity
and conformity are often championed in practice.

In principle, it is unnecessary to sacrifice pluralism in attaining societal harmony,

for harmony presupposes the existence of diverse views, and can be achieved by blending
those views. Healthy societies are possible only when individuality and harmony enhance
one another, benefiting both the individual and the nation (Nuyen 2000; Collins 2008).
The Confucian idea of social harmony and the historical practice of tolerating multiple
religions can promote the Western liberal tradition of tolerating and combining diverse
interests to help the state advance.

Emphasizing the importance of order and stability, Confucianism seems

inherently contradictory to liberal democracy’s championing of political contestation.
Yet, several scholars suggest that dissent, which can be expressed through the practice of
remonstration, is a fundamental element of Confucian values (Ackerly 2005; Tan 2003a;
Collins 2008). In principle, the Confucian notion of dao or ethical living, allows people
to speak out against any injustice or malice transgressing basic human values. And shared
communal problems ought to be solved only when all citizens participate in democratic
fashion, challenging existing ideas when necessary to ensure that the optimal outcome is
reached (Hsu 1975).

In practice, however, Confucianism permits popular opposition only when such

actions do not incite political mayhem or rebellion (Hall and Ames 1999). Order and
harmony are tantamount above all else for all Confucian states, and national peace should
not be disturbed. In both Confucianism and democracy, however, dissent can be an
important component of political procedure, although its expression is much more
restricted in the former.

A final domain of compatibility between Confucianism and democracy concerns

the issue of societal participation. Societal participation is certainly a hallmark of
traditionally democratic societies, for Western liberalism rests upon the notion of the
people choosing leaders and shaping policies through free and fair elections. While
widespread participation might not seem as emblematic of Confucianism, Confucian
values are still certainly utilized to promote robust civil societies. Mencius wrote of the
state’s responsibility to promote public participation through the provision of equal
education, a statement interpreted by some scholars as promoting societal mobilization
through instruction (Bai 2008). Education has always been one of the most fundamental
ways in which individuals fully develop themselves, and an intellectually advanced
population is apt to be more willing to place demands on state leaders (Yung 2010).

Strong civil societies have long played a role in East Asian history and culture,
though the most prominent civic movements in the region are found in Korea. While it is
difficult to identify the exact emergence of societal organizations in Korea, scholars

8
suggest that such groups first gained traction during the Choson dynasty of the early
nineteenth century (Cho 1997). As the Korean national identity faced serious threats from
Chinese and Japanese mercantilists at the time, progressive intellectuals formed
independent associations designed to prevent foreign influences from eroding traditional
norms. In Korea’s case, civil society was created to preserve the nation’s very identity.
Korea’s civil society also relied on the Confucian tradition of remonstrance, providing
citizens with greater opportunity to communicate with political elites. Contemporary
Korean scholars argue that the rising civic movements witnessed during this era were the
first instances of state capitulation to popular demand anywhere in East Asia (Cho 1997).

It is important to note that the similarity between Confucianism and Western

democracy promoted by scholars in this school of thought is concerned primarily with
societal, rather than political, participation. Civic organizations have a long history in
East Asia, and often serve as a mediating factor between the state and the family.
Confucianism’s historical view of political participation is a bit less established as the
preceding section indicates that if a state’s leader behaves virtuously and responsibly,
citizens are expected to remain content and loyal. Widespread political participation is a
much more recent phenomenon in the region, and is not as closely attuned to Confucian
ideals as is societal participation.

The Convergence Thesis

In the scholarly works reviewed so far, there is a tendency to evaluate the

relationship between democracy and Confucianism as dichotomous – Confucian values
are perceived as either compatible or incompatible with democracy. Such dichotomous
perceptions often overlook the existence of the similarities between the two phenomena,
and fail to take note of their potential to overlap. Their relationship actually becomes
much more complex with each of them being transformed by a host of other factors.
When they focus exclusively on the democratic or undemocratic of Confucian values,
scholars are likely to ignore the intricacies of the relationship between Confucianism and
democracy, and overlook the areas of their potential linkage as well.

An increasing number of scholars have recently begun to note that Confucianism

and democracy can be reformulated in such a way that new and hybrid regimes can be
built throughout the region (Bai 2008; Bell 2006; Y. Kim 1997; Tan 2003a). Proponents
of this perspective, on the one hand, perceive traditional Confucian values of order and
efficiency as helpful for building stronger democracies, because such norms promote
societal stability and cooperation. On the other hand, they recognize that the introduction
of democracy into East Asia can encourage the growth of liberal thought and self-reliance,
while still respecting the Confucian ideals of the common good and mutual responsibility.
This final section surveys scholarly work, while evaluating possible convergences
between Confucianism and democracy, and studying ways in which each might build
upon the other to create potential paths in the future.

Though democracy and Confucianism clash on several significant points, many

scholars have identified elements of each doctrine that can benefit both doctrines. One of

9
the most prominent linkages between the two doctrines concerns the Confucian
conception of human rights (de Bary 1991; Chan 1999; Freeman 1996 Tu 2002). The
Confucian principles of benevolence and reciprocity stress humanism, or consideration of
other people in society. Governmental leaders might find it desirable to limit certain
liberties in order to maintain political power, but they can reformulate these principles of
humanism to promote democratic government for the people, not just by the people, in
East Asia today. Confucianism could also be used to strengthen existing democracies in
East Asia. Yung Myung Kim (1997), for example, points out that the Confucian emphasis
on societal order and respect for authority might indeed aid the survival of burgeoning
democracies.

Institutionally, what features might a fusion of Confucian and democratic

governance possess? Daniel A. Bell (2006) argues that government solely by the people
is inappropriate for historically Confucian societies, for democratically elected
representatives might not be fully able to measure long term consequences of their
decisions. He proposes instead a system combining Confucian ideals of government by
intellectual elites with liberal ideals of electoral accountability of government to citizens,
utilizing both traditional and modern institutional frameworks. More specifically, his
model of Confucian democracy consists of two chambers of policymakers – one elected
by the people, one selected on the basis of competitive examinations. Shielded from the
demands of voters concerned with their short-term interests, the upper chamber would be
able to serve the interests of the people as a whole. Bell’s ideal upper chamber would also
be able to protect unpopular individuals and vulnerable minorities from the verdicts of
majorities in the lower house (Bell 2006).

It is entirely possible that Confucian values might be used to amend the less
desirable aspects of Western liberal democracy. Confucian norms can remedy problems
such as rampant individualism and lack of commitment to family and community.
Democracy, when forged with Confucian ideals, could produce a uniquely regional
system of democracy that combines the principle of government by the people with that
of government for the people. In Confucian Democracy, for example, Sor-Hoon Tan
(2003) proposes an alternative to liberal democracy. Tan argues that unlike a liberal
democracy that operates under the constraints of interest groups, Confucian democracy is
capable of promoting both individual freedom and the common good. Further, Tu Wei-
ming (2000a, 211) points out: “democracy with Confucian characteristics is not only
imaginable but may also be practicable.” To put such a notion of Confucian democracy
into practice, however, we have to find out how Confucianism can be democratized and
how democracy can be Confucianized. This is because “the present institutional forms of
Asian Confucianism and Western democracies are sufficiently distinct to preclude a
marrying of the two (Hall and Ames 2003, 124).

Ensuring the mutual existence of liberal democracy and Confucianism in East

Asia, therefore, requires a great deal of effort, but scholars in this third and final school of
thought believe that such goals are entirely achievable. Electoral democracy and
Confucian practices both possess some innate flaws, and arriving at a convergence

10
between the two may be the best way to prevent any future problems. Sor-HoonTan’s
promotion of Confucian democracy and Daniel A. Bell’s notion of a legislature based on
both democratic principles and Confucian ideals serve as important theoretical steps on
the path to implementing such systems in the future. It is, however, difficult to predict the
actual developmental passage that democratic governance will experience in East Asia,
but the growing convergence between history and modernization will certainly be an
interesting and dynamic journey.

Why is there so much debate and division over the compatibility or incompatibility
between Confucianism and democracy? Why has the debate persisted for so long? To begin with,
disagreements originate over which concepts of Confucianism and democracy are used in
analyses and how they are conceptualized. The opposing conceptualizations of Confucianism
and democracy have contributed to different interpretations of their relationships (Chan 2007;
Collins 2008; S. Hu 1997; Xu 2006).

Specifically, democracy is conceptualized procedurally as government by the

people or substantively as government for the people. Similarly, Confucianism is
conceptualized liberally in terms of benevolence, reciprocity and other humanistic values
or illiberally in terms of conformity, duty, and other authoritarian values. Those who
define democracy substantively and/or Confucianism liberally tend to promote the pro-
democratic argument of compatibility (de Bary 1991; Hsu 1975; Tu 2002). Those who
conceptualize democracy procedurally or liberally and/or Confucianism illiberally tend to
advocate the anti-democratic argument of incompatibility (Huntington 1996; X. Kang
2006). Those who define either democracy procedurally and Confucianism liberally or
democracy substantively and Confucianism illiberally are likely to subscribe to the
convergence argument (Bell 2006; Hahm 2004; Tan 2003a, 2007). Such divergent
conceptualizations are at the heart of the compatibility debate.

Empirical Studies

How does Confucianism affect democracy? Can Confucianism accommodate

democratic politics? To date, the debate on the relationship between Confucianism and
democracy has been mostly in theoretical conjecture terms, and lacks empirical validation.
Undoubtedly this debate has helped to identify the important components that underlie
each of the three different types of their relationship. Remaining largely speculative
without empirical support, theoretical interpretations need to be tested against the patterns
of the relationship that actually exist in the minds of the people of historically Confucian
societies.

Scholars have only recently begun to use public opinion data from East Asia to
assess the impact of Confucian values on the democratization process taking place among
individual citizens. Russell Dalton and Nhu-Ngoc Ong (2006) examined how social
authority orientations in six historically Confucian countries affect popular support for
democracy. Their analysis of the World Values Surveys revealed no strongly significant

11
relationship between the two variables. Contrary to what is expected from the
incompatibility thesis, a belief in parental respect, obedience, and deference to authority
is not a powerful force deterring people in those countries from supporting democracy.

By contrast, Joel Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper (2007) found that among the
Taiwanese, valuing family loyalty actually increases support for democracy and women’s
rights. This finding that Confucianism strengthens support for human rights confirms the
compatibility thesis. Among South Koreans, Chong-Min Park and Doh Chull Shin (2006)
found that adherence to the Confucian norms rejecting adversarial politics detracts from
support for democracy. Among the people in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Yu-Tzung
Chang, Yun-han Chu and Frank Tsai (2005) also found that Confucian family values
detract significantly from popular support for the democratic values of political freedom
and equality. These negative findings between Confucian and democratic values support
the incompatibility thesis.

All in all, the results of previous empirical studies are not consistently supportive
of any of the three contrasting theses discussed above. The direction and magnitude of
the relationships between Confucian and democratic values vary considerably from one
study to another and from one country to another. As discussed earlier, these differences
are largely due to the divergent conceptions of the two variables, and the divergent
measurements of the selected components of each variable. More notably, these studies
have failed to consider how all or most of the core norms and values of Confucianism are
distributed throughout the entire region of historically Confucian Asia. They have also
failed to examine the effects of those norms and values on the various dimensions of
democratic citizenship, including the most fundamental cognitive dimension of
democratic citizenship.

Conceptual and Theoretical Foundations

My study was designed to conclusively settle the age-old Asian Values debate by testing
all three intellectual perspectives on the relationship between Confucianism and
democratization empirically. To this end, I first distinguished Confucian values from
Asian values by rejecting the equation of Confucian values with Asian values which the
Asian Values Thesis has often implied. Conceptually, therefore, Confucianism was
regarded in my study as a phenomenon covering the region of East Asia identified as
historically East Asia.

Theoretically, the study is based on the assumption that the installation of

competitive elections and multiple political parties alone do not make for a fully
functioning democratic political system. As Rose and his associates (1998, 8) aptly point
out, these institutions constitute nothing more than “the hardware” of representative
democracy. To operate the institutional hardware, a democratic political system requires
“software” that is congruent with the various hardware components (Almond and Verba
1963; Eckstein 1966). Both the scholarly community and policy circles widely recognize

12
that what ordinary citizens think about democracy and their reactions to its institutions
are key components of such software.

To build such an effectively functioning democracy, moreover, ordinary people

have to develop “the social ability to collaborate for shared interests” through norms and
networks of civic engagement (Putnam 1993, 182; see also Nuyen 2002; Tan 2003b).
They also have to develop the political ability to appreciate the virtues of democracy and
then must commit themselves to those. Civics and politics are, therefore, assumed to
constitute two distinct arenas where individual citizens can democratize and contribute to
the building of an effective democracy.

This perspective that the civic and political spheres of life are interdependent
comes from the Confucian ethic that individuals are not autonomous but are social beings
defined and refined through their relationships with others and with their communities
(Nuyen 2002). Rights, duties, and responsibilities, therefore, cannot be defined in terms
of the individual but must be defined in terms of the relationship between the individual
and his or her community (Fox 1997). Citizenship is, therefore, always a reciprocal and
social idea; it requires a strong sense of solidarity and active participation in social
networks where rights and responsibilities are mutually supportive (Park and Shin 2006;
Putnam 1993).

This broad and deep notion of citizenship, which Charles Tilly (1996)
characterizes as “thick citizenship,” contrasts sharply with the liberal notion of “thin”
citizenship in which a citizen’s responsibilities are minimal and subordinate to any
concern about rights. In the liberal notion of the West, citizenship refers primarily to the
right for autonomous individuals to pursue their conceptions of the good life freely. In
such an atomized vision of human existence, there is little room for self-interested
individuals to reflect about the importance of community in terms of their social
responsibilities and role. As Xinzhong Yao (1999, 34) points out, “freedom without
responsibility would result in the collapse of the social network and in the conflict
between individuals and between individuals and society.”

To avoid such conflicts, early Confucians advocated civic life as a crucial component of
citizenship in the belief that any polity, either democratic or non-democratic, cannot be sustained
without citizens caring for each other and their community. Following this Confucian notion of
“thick citizenship”, I broadly defined democracy as a community of mutual caring and
considered citizens’ engagement in civic affairs together with their commitment to democratic
politics. I also broadly defined Confucianism as a system of social and political ethics, which
Confucius and other early Confucians advocated for the achievement of datong shehui, a
community of grand harmony.

As civic life plays a vital role in educating people about the art of democratic
politics (Putnam 1993), I examined how Confucian social ethics of familism and
communitarianism affect the way in which people in Confucian Asia engage with their
fellow citizens behaviorally and psychologically and how these ethics affect how people
in Confucian Asia become members of a civic community. Specifically, we measure

13
civic engagement in psychological terms—how civic-minded are they—and behavioral
terms—how are they interacting with other people.

As traditional political values influence how people orient themselves to or away

from the democratization process (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Putnam 1993; Nathan and
Chen 2004), I examined how Confucian political ethics of paternalism and ethical
meritocracy affect the ways in which people react to the process cognitively and
affectively and become democrats, with a small “d”. Specifically, becoming a democrat
requires an accurate understanding of democracy as a distinctive system of government
and unconditional endorsement of it as the preferred regime structure and policymaking
process.

In a nutshell, my study aimed to offer a comprehensive account of the roles

Confucianism plays and can play in making democratic citizens by investigating its
effects on the civic and political life of individual citizens. To analyze the effects on civic
life, I chose civic engagement as a key conceptual tool and examine it in both behavioral
terms, for example, joining voluntary associations, and psychological terms, for example,
placing trust in other people. To analyze the effects on political life, I chose democratic
enlightenment and commitment as a key conceptual tool and examine its cognitive and
affective characteristics in terms of understanding democracy as a distinct political
system and embracing it as “the only game in town.”

The Prevalence of Confucian Values

How broadly and deeply do people in historically Confucian countries, which include
China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Vietnam, uphold the legacies of Confucian
political and social ethics? Which of the legacies do they uphold most broadly and deeply?
Across the region are Confucian East Asians more united or divided in upholding those legacies?
If they are divided, what are the fault lines separating them?

To address these questions, I analyzed the attachment ordinary citizens of these countries
have to the social and the political legacies identified in the Asian Values Debate as most
incompatible with the ideals and practices of liberal democracy. The social legacies are
hierarchal collectivism, familism, and communitarianism, while the political legacies are
paternalism and elitism. Analyses of the surveys conducted by the Asian Barometer and World
Values Survey projects suggest four points about the prevalence of these legacies.

In historically Confucian East Asia today, popular attachment to Confucianism is miles

wide but only inches deep, as most of the population reports attachment, but shallow attachment,
to Confucian legacies. Even in the wake of socioeconomic and political transformations,
majorities in all of the region’s countries remain at least partially attached to what Confucius and
his followers taught about the good life and good government more than two millennia ago.
However, none of the legacies considered draw unqualified support from a majority of the
Confucian Asian population.

14
 In the informal and formal spheres of civic life, for example, people in every country
remain far more attached to the Confucian model of interdependent and cooperative civic life
than the Western liberal model of independent and competitive civic life. Those who are attached
exclusively to the Confucian model form a small minority in all six countries. In every country,
however, more people support it in the informal sphere than in the formal sphere.

In the region, people are less attached to Confucianism as a model of conduct, or way of
life than as a source for politics, or a system of government. They are less attached to the social
norms of civic life than those of family life. It appears that socioeconomic modernization, which
impacts how people go about their lives, has been a more powerful force than democratization in
eroding Confucian legacies. Also, socioeconomic modernization has affected the public sphere
of life more powerfully than the private sphere.

Historically Confucian East Asia is no longer a single cultural zone in regards to the mass
public’s commitment to the legacies of Confucian social and political ethics. The region is
divided into two cultural sub-regions: in one, there is broad, though not deep, support for
Confucian legacies; in the other, support is neither broad nor deep. Because these two cultural
sub-regions fall roughly along the same lines separating authoritarian and democratic regimes—
and because both the authoritarian and democratic regimes have similar Confucian legacies—
this finding of two cultural sub-regions also suggests that non-democratic rule promotes
continued orientation toward the Confucian model, while democratic rule promotes a turning
away from it.

Finally, none of the Confucian legacies analyzed in this study constitute a unique set of
cultural characteristics found only in historically Confucian East Asia, where the teachings of
Confucius and his followers served as the ideological and institutional foundations of political
and social life. Certainly, the finding that these legacies are equally or more prevalent in other
non-Western regions indicates that it is unsound to attribute the lack of democratization in
Confucian East Asia exclusively to Confucian legacies, as the Asian Values Thesis does. It also
suggests that some of the values long considered “Confucian” might be better labeled as “non-
Western traditional values”.

Confucian Legacies as an Influence on Democratic Citizenship

How do the political and social legacies of Confucianism affect the way Confucian
Asians understand democracy and embrace it? Analyses of the surveys conducted in Confucian
Asia and other regions reveal that contrary to the Asian Values thesis, not all Confucian legacies
considered to be incompatible with democratic politics have a significant effect on each
important component of citizenship, and not every significant impact that does exist is negative.

While we found significant direct consequences of Confucian civic norms on the breadth
of informal and formal associations, the norms of familism, together with communitarianism,
contribute significantly to interpersonal trust and tolerance, two foundational components of
democratic civic life. This finding, linking the two Confucian social norms to the making of
civic-minded citizens, supports the Confucian tenet that “filial piety and fraternal duty are the

15
roots of humanness” (Analects 1:2) and that family relations thus serve as the foundation for
social life. This finding also confirms the counterclaim of the Asian Values Thesis that
Confucianism contains the seeds of democratic politics. It also disputes Francis Fukyuma’s
(1995) claim that Confucian familism is a sort of amoral familism, which limits the extending of
trust to those outside the family and thereby hinders economic development.

The legacies of Confucian social ethics contribute significantly to the development of

hybrid or non-liberal misconceptions of democracy. For example, of the four types of culture
considered—hierarchal, individual, egalitarian, and fatalist—Confucian hierarchal culture is the
one most often associated with a misconception of the distinctive characteristics of democracy
and its alternatives, even when the influences of socialization and modernization variables are
statistically removed. As a result, a misconception of democracy as a hybrid regime is most
prevalent among upholders of Confucian culture.

The political legacies of Confucianism, like its social legacies, remain a significant
influence on the way in which people conceive of democracy and government. Specifically,
attachment to paternalistic meritocracy contributes significantly to understanding democracy in
substantive terms, while it has an equal negative effect on understanding democracy in
procedural terms. Further, those attached to paternalistic meritocracy are very reluctant to
understand democracy merely in liberal terms. Authentic liberal democratic conceivers, who
equate democracy exclusively with freedom and who prioritize freedom as its most essential
characteristic, constitute a very small minority (6%) of the Confucian East Asian population. As
compared with their peers, even in non-Confucian East Asia, moreover, people in historically
Confucian East Asia remain less attached to the notion of liberal democracy (6% vs. 11%).
Undoubtedly, such non-liberal conceptions of democratic politics have a lot to do with the
Confucian legacy of good government that prioritizes economic well-being.

Equally notable is the finding that the legacies of Confucian ethics neither orient people
away from the democratic system of government nor toward its authoritarian alternatives, at least
at the abstract, regime level. Most people in Confucian East Asia desire to live in a democracy,
rather than in an authoritarian regime, regardless of their attachment level to Confucian legacies.
Even among those who are strongly attached to those legacies, a large majority of nearly four-
fifths (79%) prefer to live in a democracy, while a very small minority (2%) prefer to live in an
authoritarian regime. Contrary to what is expected from the central claim of the Asian Value
Thesis—that Confucianism is incompatible with democracy—attachment to Confucian legacies
turns out to be compatible with democratic regime preferences and incompatible with
authoritarian regime preferences.

When people are attached to the legacies of paternalistic meritocracy, however, they feel
differently about the two different types of democratic systems: they are favorably disposed
toward non-liberal democracy, characterized by democratic regime structure and authoritarian
mode of governance, and unfavorably disposed toward liberal democracy, characterized by
democratic regime structure and democratic mode of governance. In the minds of people in
Confucian East Asia, therefore, it is a non-liberal democratic system, not an authoritarian
political system, which is most compatible with Confucianism. It is, moreover, liberal democracy,
not electoral or delegative democracy, which is incompatible with Confucian legacies.

16
 Finally, it should be noted that attachment to Confucian political legacies constitutes one
of the two most powerful forces shaping regime orientations. They shape both cognitive and
affective orientations to democracy more powerfully than does either of the two core
components of socioeconomic modernization: education and income. Specifically, the political
legacies of paternalistic meritocracy have more than twice as much influence over liberal and
non-liberal democratic orientations as does each of the two socioeconomic resources. To put it
differently, Confucianism detracts from liberal democratic support more powerfully than the two
resources that promote that support enhance it. Because attachment to Confucian legacies is a
very powerful force, this finding indicates that Confucian legacies are capable of offsetting the
liberalizing effect of socioeconomic modernization on cultural democratization. It also suggests
that liberal democracy is not likely to become the only political game in Confucian East Asia in
the near future.

Unlike Confucian political traditions, however, we found attachment to Confucian social

legacies to have no significant effect on democratic orientations, either liberal or non-liberal,
although Confucian hierarchal culture, as compared to the three other types of culture, is least
likely to foster liberal democratic orientations and most likely to foster non-liberal democratic
orientations. This suggests that the Confucian way of life, featuring hierarchism and collectivism,
affects popular reactions to democracy indirectly by orienting people toward the Confucian
notion of good government featuring paternalism and meritocracy.

Confucian legacies, when considered as a whole, cannot be judged to deter the general
process of cultural democratization, i.e., building a nation of democratic citizens. Their effects,
instead, represent a mixed bag. Political legacies appear to be inimical to the particular process
of orienting citizens to liberal democracy in which individual freedom and interests matter above
the community’s. Social legacies, on the other hand, are compatible with the process of orienting
citizens toward communitarian democracy in which individual members cooperate with each
other instead of competing against each other.

These and other findings presented in the book contradict the central claim of the Asian
Values Thesis that people in Confucian Asia remain broadly and deeply attached to the legacies
of Confucian political and social ethics, and their attachment to these legacies discourage them
from embracing democracy.

Reassessments of the Asian Values Debate

The Asian Values Thesis maintains that the political and social legacies of Confucianism are
incompatible with the norms, values, and structures of democratic politics and are instead
compatible with those of authoritarian politics. Supporters of this thesis thus conclude that a
democratic system of government is unsuitable for historically Confucian East Asia, where it is
assumed ordinary people and their leaders remain attached to Confucian ethical norms and
values. In view of the survey findings presented above, we first evaluate these claims of the
thesis empirically. Then we recast the thesis in the framework of Harry Eckstein’s (1966)

17
congruence theory, and examine the Asian Values Thesis’s limitations as a theory of democratic
underdevelopment in view of the recent fine tunings of Eckstein’s theory.

As a theory of democratic underdevelopment, the Asian Values Thesis bases its claim of
an incompatibility between a Confucian heritage and full democratization on three highly
dubious premises. The first is the premise that Confucianism constitutes a well-unified or
integrated system of thought, with all of its components mutually supportive of one another. The
second premise is that the key components of Confucianism are all pro-authoritarian and anti-
democratic and thus consistently or uniformly negative in their effect on democratic politics. The
third premise is that all Confucian legacies influence democratic politics, but none are influenced
by it. Confucianism is, therefore, considered exclusively exogenous to democracy; the two
phenomena are not endogenous to each other.

Confucianism does not represent a well-integrated system of exclusively authoritarian

social and political ethics. Instead, it is one of many multi-vocal systems of political doctrines
and social ethics (Stepan 2000). Being loosely structured, it consists of many conflicting
elements. On religious and spiritual matters, for example, Confucius told his students not to
“serve the spirits” (Analects 11:12), while preaching the virtue of practicing ancestor worship
(Analects 1:11). As suggested in the following passage, he even emphasized the importance of
understanding the spirit of Heaven: “Without understanding the ordinance of Heaven, it is
impossible to become a superior man” (Analects 20:3); “Wealth and honor depend upon Heaven”
(Analects 7:5).

Contrary to what is expected from the thesis, moreover, the legacies of Confucian
political and social ethics are not uniformly detrimental to the development of democratic
citizenship. Some key norms of interpersonal relationships, such as familism and
communitarianism, are found to contribute to, rather than detract from, democratic citizenship.
Other Confucian norms such as meritocracy and paternalism are found to be compatible with
popular preference for non-liberal democracy. As discussed earlier, democracy, not its
authoritarian alternatives, is the most preferred system of government among residents of
Confucian East Asia, even among those who are unqualified in their commitment to Confucian
norms of paternalistic meritocracy.

Equally notable is the finding that Confucian legacies and democratic political practices
have a reciprocal and highly dynamic relationship: each influences the other. Attachment to the
Confucian principles of ethical meritocracy and paternalistic government motivates people to
prefer non-liberal democracy over liberal democracy. A continued experience of liberal
democratic rule, on the other hand, motivates people to dissociate themselves from those
Confucian political principles, while a continued experience of authoritarian rule discourages
them from doing so. The survey findings of such highly complex and dynamic reciprocal
relationships between the two phenomena directly challenge the Incompatibility Thesis’
fundamental premises: (1) Confucianism is exogenous to democratic politics, and (2) its effect
on democracy is always negative.

Theoretically, the central claim of the Thesis can be recast as that of the congruence
theory advocated much earlier by political scientist Harry Eckstein (1966). Unlike the original

18
congruence theory, the Asian Values Thesis, as a model of democratization, is deeply flawed on
conceptual and theoretical grounds. Conceptually, it is flawed because it is based on a
misconception of democratization or democratic development. Theoretically, it is flawed because
it fails to take into account the positive role that non-democratic values and their incongruence
with democratic structure play in the process of democratization.

Conceptually, both advocates and critics of the Asian Values Thesis are concerned
exclusively with the problems of maintaining the stability of democratic political order by
keeping it from reverting back to authoritarian rule. Consequently, they failed to consider the
problems of transforming non-democracies into democracies and of deepening and expanding
limited democracies into fully democracies. As widely known in the voluminous literature on the
third wave of democratization, democratization is a multi-phased phenomenon. And the stability
of the democratic polity is not always the most coveted goal that democratic reformers pursue
(Haerpfer et al. 2009; Huntington 1991; Rose and Shin 2001; Shin 1994).

More notably, a democratic polity cannot achieve stability solely with the cultural values
that are considered intrinsic to its functioning or with the dissociation of the citizenry from non-
democratic values. Instead, other competing values also play an important, balancing role in
promoting democratic development (Almond and Verba 1963; Wildvasky 1993). For this reason,
the congruence theory incorporates the two conflicting notions of congruence and disparities in
specifying and prescribing a stable democratic political system.

While the cultural values most often associated with democracy sustain its institutions,
competing cultural values keep those institutions in check. This is why Eckstein characterized a
democratic culture as a culture of “balanced disparities.” For the same reason, Gabriel Almond
and Sidney Verba (1963) emphasized the role of a mixed and balanced culture, which consists of
parochial, subject, and participant orientations in democratic development. Likewise, Aaron
Wildvasky (1993) characterized democracy as “a coalition of cultures” including those of
hierarchism, individualism, and egalitarianism. For all the important contributions that various
norms and values not normally associated with democracy can make to democratic politics,
however, both proponents and opponents of the Asian Values Thesis have dismissed those values
and norms as inimical to its development.

In analyzing the relationship between culture and democracy, moreover, those proponents
and opponents of the thesis are alike in failing to note that even in the world of democratic
polities, an incongruence or a gap often develops between the level of democracy supplied by
institutions and the level demanded by the citizenry (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Mattes and
Bratton 2007; Norris 2011; Rose and Shin 2001; Shin 2008). When demand outstrips supply, this
form of democratic incongruence does not deter the process of democratization, as assumed in
the Asian Values Thesis. Instead, it contributes to the process.

Instead, it supports the further democratization of limited democratic rule by occasioning

institutional reform (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; Shin 2008;
Welzel and Klingemann 2008). When democratic demand and supply are in congruence or in
equilibrium at a low level, moreover, democracy is known to remain “broken-back” (Rose and
Shin 2001). In the world of newly emerging democracies, therefore, democratic progress is more

19
likely to take place when democratic structure and culture are more incongruent than congruent.
The failure to consider the potentially positive role of such incongruence is another major
limitation of the Asian Value Thesis as a cultural theory of democratic development.

Critics of the Asian Values Thesis including Amartya Sen (1999) and Francis Fukuyama
(1995b) challenged its claim that the norms and values Confucius and other early Confucians
advocated for the building of a harmonious community called datong shehui are uniquely Asian.
Specifically, these critics have pointed out that harmony, order, paternalism, and family values,
which in the thesis have been promoted as uniquely Asian, are also valued in other parts of the
world. Further, these critics have argued that freedom and equality, the two core values of
democracy, are universal values superseding country and race, and these liberal values are
respected in all societies, regardless of the level of their culture and socioeconomic
modernization.

Many critics of the Asian Value Thesis claim that there are no quintessentially Asian
values, which are uniquely and pervasively shared only among the entire population of Asia or
East Asia and which therefore can be responsible for Asia’s unique response to the third wave of
democratization. There are two serious limitations with the claim. First, these critiques fail to
take into account that values are a multidimensional phenomenon, consisting of preference and
priority (Inglehart 1977, 1997). Of these two dimensions, these critics examined the Asian
Values Thesis exclusively from the perspective of citizens’ value preferences. As a result, they
completely overlooked the prioritization of those preferences among the Confucian Asian
population.

Second, the critics failed to recognize that how people prioritize their values varies
considerably across different societies as this prioritzation depends on what Abraham Maslow
(1943) called the hierarchy of human needs, which has its roots in the Confucian conception of
human nature. As suggested in the following passage from the Mencius (6A:15), people even
within the same society prioritize their values differently, not much differently in what they
value. 5 The differences in their value priorities motivate them to engage in different patterns of
thinking and behavior.

Our survey analyses have exhibited distinctive patterns of democratic conceptions.

People in historically Confucian East Asia do not value the liberal democratic core value of
freedom as much as their counterparts in the West do (Shin 1999, 61). As compared to their
peers in non-Confucian Southeast Asia, moreover, people in historically Confucian East Asia
rank political freedom as less essential, while ranking economic welfare as a more essential
component of democracy. This pattern of prioritization of political and economic values among
Confucian East Asians is distinctively different from the pattern observed among non-Confucian
East Asians and Westerners. These differences in value priorities do have significant
implications for the building of democracy, especially democracy in culturally Confucian East
Asia.

5
According to Mencius (6A:13), moreover, people can avoid the act of “unthinking to the highest degree” only
when the person gets priorities right.

20
 Consequently, we conclude that to date, both advocates and critics of the Asian Values
Thesis have failed to understand the essential components of democratic culture and the role
these components play in the process of democratization. Further they have failed to understand
the distinctive value orientations among the Confucian East Asian population and the impact of
those orientations on the preferred type of democratic regime. All in all, it should be noted that
Confucianism contains pro-democratic values and authoritarian values, and the conflict between
these values should not be assumed to create instability; instead, it should be recognized that this
conflict can “energize” and expand limited democracy into full democracy.

Theoretical Implications

In the literature on cultural democratization, there are three prominent sets of competing theories.
A first set concerns the relative importance of early socialization and adult learning as an
influence on mass orientations to democracy. While socialization theories of political learning
emphasize the importance of learning during an early period of childhood or adolescence,
institutional learning theories emphasize adult relearning in response to changing circumstances
regardless of early socialization (Mishler and Rose 2002).

A second set of competing theories concerns the direction of the relationship between
cultural values and democratic politics (Mueller and Seligson 1994). Cultural theories, such as
the Asian Values Thesis, cast cultural values as an independent variable with the dependent
variable being the reactions that masses of former authoritarian states have to the forces of
democratization. Institutional learning theories, in contrast, cast the practices of democratic
politics as the independent variable with the dependent variable being the transformation of
authoritarian cultural values into democratic ones (Anderson and Dodd 2005; Peffley and
Rohrschneider 2003; Rohrschneider 1999).

A third, final pair of theories offers two conflicting views concerning the consequences of
socioeconomic modernization on cultural change; the views differ in whether those
consequences are negative or positive. While modernization theories emphasize socioeconomic
modernization’s contribution to the liberalization and secularization of traditional authoritarian
values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005), indigenization theories emphasize its contribution to the
revival and strengthening of traditional values (Huntington 1996). In this section, we evaluate the
competing claims of these theories with what is known in Confucian East Asia.

In Confucian Asia, people were exposed to Confucianism as a way of life from early
childhood. Their attachments formed during this early socialization may contrast sharply with
their adult experience of democratic or authoritarian rule, which we measure by the type of
regime in which they have lived. How do these two types of contrasting life experiences compare
with each other as an influence shaping democratic support? We need to address this question to
evaluate the claims of the two competing theories of cultural democratization known as early
socialization and institutional learning.

In orienting Confucian East Asians away from liberal democracy and toward non-liberal
democracy, early exposure to the age-old tradition of paternalistic meritocracy is far more

21
instrumental than citizens’ current assessments of how the existing regime performs than a clear
understanding of what constitutes democracy. Early exposure to Confucianism, however, matters
far less significantly than the particular type of regime experienced during adulthood.

Gender and age, which are most often used to measure early socialization, also matter
much less than regime assessments and democratic knowledge. From these conflicting findings,
it is difficult to determine whether it is early socialization or adult learning that matters more in
the process of democratization taking place among individual citizens. What is clear from the
findings, however, is that learning is a lifetime process integrating what was learned in the past
with what is currently being learned (Mishler and Rose 2002).
Besides shaping popular reactions to liberal and non-liberal democracy, the experience of
democratic politics is found to affect how people react to Confucian legacies. In all the
Confucian political and social legacies we analyzed, upholders of Confucianism are far more
prevalent in democratic than non-democratic countries even when levels of their socioeconomic
resources are controlled. Between new and old democracies, attachment to Confucianism is more
prevalent in new democracies. The type of regime in which people in Confucian Asia live
significantly affects their adherence to Confucian political and social ethics. And the length of
democratic experience also affects commitment to Confucianism significantly by reducing
popular attachment to its legacies.

Institutional learning theory postulates that people are likely to become supporters of
liberal democracy upon experiencing democratic politics. Cultural theory, on the other hand,
postulates that people are unlikely to support liberal democracy as long as they remain attached
to non-democratic values such as paternalistic meritocracy. Obviously, there is a bidirectional
relationship between culture and democratic politics; neither of these two competing theories
offers a full and balanced account of the contours and dynamics of that relationship. In
Confucian East Asia, therefore, the two theories have to be considered together to understand
just how culture and regime experience affect each other in the process of democratization.

Do Confucian East Asians dissociate themselves from traditional Confucian ethical

norms when exposed to a modern way of life with greater income and education? Or does such
exposure lead to greater “indigenization” of traditional Confucian values? As expected from neo-
modernization theory, our analysis found people in Confucian East Asia were less willing to
abide by Confucian norms of hierarchal collectivism and paternalistic meritocracy if they had
achieved a higher level of education. Greater affluence, in contrast, was positively associated
with a greater willingness to abide by the norms of hierarchal collectivism and to conceive of
democracy as a hybrid regime.

With increased education, people in China and Vietnam become more supportive of non-
liberal democracy and less supportive of liberal democracy. Supporters of non-liberal democracy
are more numerous in highly modernized Singapore than in China and Vietnam, the two least
modernized countries in the region. Evidently, some indigenization of traditional Confucian
values is taking place in response to the rapid modernization of society; however, not all
Confucian values are finding equal favor in this Confucian revival.

22
 All these findings, when considered together, suggest that in the context of Confucian
East Asia, education and income, the two key components of socioeconomic modernization,
have divergent consequences on the liberalization of traditional values and the democratization
of political orientations. These findings also suggest that exposure to the same force of
modernization entails different consequences in different countries in the region. In short, the
indigenization and the liberalization of traditional Confucian ethics are both currently taking
place in the region.

23
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27
 Appendix Results of Survey Data Analysis:
The Asian Barometer and World Values Surveys

Table 3.4 The Most and Least Preferred Types of Culture

Types of Culture Individuals Favor

Country
Individualism Fatalism Egalitarianism Hierarchism
Japan 47.7% 4.4% 41.0% 6.8%
Korea 27.7 5.3 51.0 16.0
Taiwan 19.8 15.0 31.4 33.8
China 22.0 15.6 30.1 32.2
Vietnam 17.9 7.6 31.2 43.3
(Pooled) 25.5 9.7 37.2 27.6
Source: 2005-2008 World Values Surveys.

28
 Table 4.1 Attachment to the Principles of Paternalistic Meritocracy

A. Meritocracy

Moral Leadership Passive Citizenry No

Country Firmly Firmly Neither One Both Answer
Attached Attached Attached Attached

Japan 32.9% (3.4%) 49.9% (11.2%) 27.8% 39.3% 18.2% 14.7%

Korea 62.3 (13.7) --- --- --- --- --- ---
Taiwan 32.8 (2.5) 81.3 (19.3) 11.7 54.0 28.0 6.3
China 33.0 (1.9) 56.0 (2.8) 12.1 33.0 21.9 33.1
Singapore 56.7 (7.8) 84.2 (30.3) 6.1 41.7 48.3 3.9
Vietnam 59.9 (20.5) 47.8 (19.9) 13.8 37.0 30.2 19.0
(Pooled) 46.0 (8.3) 63.8 (13.9) 14.3 41 29.3 15.4

B. Paternalism

Parental Unconditional
Benevolence Deference No
Country Firmly Firmly Neither One Both Answer
Attached Attached Attached Attached

Japan 34.6% (5.0%) 23.9% (5.0%) 41.6% 33.4% 10.4% 14.6%

Korea 56.1 (12.7) 36.4 (12.7) 26.7 41.7 23.6 8.0
Taiwan 75.0 (12.0) 25.6 (12.0) 18.1 53.9 22.0 6.0
China 79.1 (8.3) 69.6 (8.3) 3.4 13.9 61.9 20.8
Singapore 62.6 (13.5) 56.5 (13.5) 20.4 34.0 41.6 4.1
Vietnam 70.0 (40.2) 73.7 (40.2) 12.3 15.8 61.1 10.8
(Pooled) 62.9 (15.3) 47.6 (15.3) 20.4 32.1 36.8 10.7

Source: 2004-2008 Asian Barometer Surveys.

29
 Table 4.2 Overall Levels of Attachment to Paternalistic Meritocracy
(on a 5-Point Scale)

Scale Points
High Attachment Scale
Countries 0 1 2 3 4 (3 and 4) Mean

Japan 16.1% 25.8% 22.2% 11.2% 4.1% 15.3% 1.5

Taiwan 3.6 17.3 37.9 21.6 10.5 32.1 2.2

China 0.8 4.3 15.3 24.9 17.8 42.7 2.9

Singapore 1.9 13.9 24.4 27.1 26.5 53.6 2.7

Vietnam 2.8 9.0 16.2 28.4 21.4 49.8 2.7

(Pooled) 5.0 14.1 23.2 22.6 16.1 38.7 2.3

Source: 2004-2008 Asian Barometer Surveys.

30
 Table 4.4 Cultural Preferences and Support for Confucian Political Traditions

Preferred Cultural Types

Country
Individualism Fatalism Egalitarianism Hierarchism (Entire)
Japan 8.0% 13.5% 18.8% 33.7% 15.2%
Taiwan 24.0 32.0 37.3 52.9 32.1
China 18.3 33.7 48.4 57.6 42.7
Singapore 36.8 45.7 55.0 70.5 53.5
Vietnam 22.3 30.2 60.6 62.1 49.0
(Pooled) 20.0 28.4 45.2 57.9 38.7

Source: 2004-2008 Asian Barometer Surveys.

31
 Table 6.1 Attachment to Familism

Obey Parents Sacrifice for the Family Levels of Attachment

Country
Firmly Firmly No
Attached Attached Neither One Both
Attached Attached Answer

Japan 45.9% (6.6%) 79.2% (16.1%) 9.9% 46.9% 37.6% 5.6%

Korea 39.9 (4.2) 78.3 (15.3) 14.0 48.0 34.2 3.8%

Taiwan 27.0 (2.6) 85.0 (12.6) 8.5 62.5 23.5 5.5%

China 50.5 (3.3) 84.9 (13.5) 2.8 40.7 44.1 12.4%

Singapore 48.0 (6.2) 91.5 (33.3) 3.1 52.4 43.1 1.4%

Vietnam 43.2 (15.3) 89.9 (49.5) 4.8 50.5 40.6 4.1%

(Pooled) 42.4 (6.4) 84.8 (23.4) 7.2 50.2 37.2 5.4%

Source: 2004-2008 Asian Barometer Surveys.

32
 Figure 6.9 Unadjusted and Adjusted Percentages of the Fully Civic-Minded

50%
44%
40%
40% 37%
35%
29% 29%
30%
24% 26%

20% 16%
14%

10%

0%
Lowest Low Middle High Highest
Levels of Familism
Unadjusted Adjusted

Source: 2004-2008 Asian Barometer Surveys.

33
 Table 7.6 Types of Democratic Conceptions

Types of Conceptions
Country
Authoritarian Authentic Hybrid Others*

Japan 1.7% 74.2% 13.5% 10.6%

Korea 1.9 69.1 24.9 4.1
Taiwan 0.8 65.8 31.1 2.3
China 1.6 41.2 38.3 18.9
Vietnam 0.4 15.5 80.3 3.8
(Pooled) 1.3 53.2 37.6 7.9
*Others include those who fail to rate all four regime characteristics and who rate none of those
characteristics as essential to democracy.

Source: 2005-2008 World Values Surveys.

34
 Table 7.10 Cultural Differences in Well-Informed and Hybrid Conceptions of
Democracy

A. Well-informed Conceptions

Individualism Fatalism Egalitarianism Hierarchism

Japan 46.4% 61.5% 51.3% 32.5%
Korea 51.8 53.8 53.4 47.5
Taiwan 62.4 69.1 52.6 58.5
China 19.0 13.8 12.4 13.8
Vietnam 10.3 10.0 5.9 4.3
(Pooled) 41.2 41.5 38.7 28.6

B. Hybrid Conceptions

Individualism Fatalism Egalitarianism Hierarchism

Japan 13.6% 7.7% 15.8% 22.5%
Korea 22.4 30.2 23.9 31.4
Taiwan 22.8 24.3 37.5 33.7
China 42.5 43.6 47.4 48.7
Vietnam 71.5 78.3 82.9 89.3
(Pooled) 30.6 38.4 39.3 55.0

Source: 2004-2008 Asian Barometer Surveys.

35
Figure 7.6 Fully Informed and Hybrid Conceptions of Democracy by Four Culture
Types (adjusted percentages)

Source: 2004-2008 Asian Barometer Surveys.

36
 Table 7.11 Procedural Conceptions of Democracy by Levels of Attachment to
Paternalistic Meritocracy

Country Lowest Low Middle High Highest (Eta)

Japan 55.3% 53.1% 50.5% 48.2% 34.1% .08

Taiwan 47.2 40.2 29.8 31.5 25.7 .10

China 37.5 39.5 38.2 32.9 27.7 .07

Singapore 73.7 60.4 57.4 45.0 36.6 .11

Vietnam 50.0 53.3 49.4 46.4 50.0 .09

(Pooled) 55.7 52.7 45.5 42.9 39.2 .10

Source: 2004-2008 Asian Barometer Surveys.

37
 Table 8.3 Types of Political Orientations

Country Non-democrat Non-liberal Democrat Liberal Democrat Indifferent

Japan 6.6% 20.4% 46.5% 26.5%
Korea 7.5 25.4 47.2 19.9
Taiwan 10.1 28.0 39.3 22.6
China 4.6 20.2 11.8 63.4
Singapore 6.9 59.3 18.3 15.5
Vietnam 6.1 44.1 11.1 38.7
(Pooled) 7.0 32.9 29 31.1
Source: 2004-2008 Asian Barometer Surveys.

38
 Figure 8.8 Adjusted Percentages of Non-liberal and Liberal Democrats by Levels
of Attachment to Paternalistic Meritocracy

60% 55% 54%

51%
50% 44%
41%
40% 35% 36%
29%
30% 25%
19%
20%

10%

0%
Lowest Low Middle High Highest
Levels of Attachment to Paternalistic Meritocracy

Non-liberal democrats Liberal democrats

Source: 2004-2008 Asian Barometer Surveys.

39
Figure 8.9 The Independent effect of Political Confucianism on Support for
Non-liberal Democracy in Democracies and Non-democracies.

70% 65%
62%
60%
53%
48%
50%
41%
40% 37%
35%
28%
30%
22%
20% 18%

10%

0%
Lowest Low Middle High Highest
Levels of Attachment to Political Confucianism

Democracies Non-democracies

Source: 2004-2008 Asian Barometer Surveys.

40
Figure 8.10 The Independent Effect of Political Confucianism on Support for liberal
Democracy in Non-democratic and Democratic Countries.

80%
70%

59%
60% 54%
48%

40%
32% 31%
23%
18%
20% 14%
6%

0%
Lowest Low Middle High Highest
Levels of Attachment to Political Confucianism

Democracies Non-democracies

Source: 2004-2008 Asian Barometer Surveys.

41
Figure 8.11 Adjusted Levels of Support for Non-liberal and Liberal Democracy
by Four Types of Culture

Source: 2004-2008 Asian Barometer Surveys.

42