TTC
TTC
TTC
Total Transfer Capability (TTC) is defined as the amount of electric power that can be
transferred over the interconnected transmission network in a reliable manner while
meeting all of a specific set of pre- and post-contingency system conditions.
Due to the complexity involved, the assessment of transfer capability from one area to
another in an interconnected system is carried out with the help of computer simulation
studies. These studies are to be carried out for a particular scenario or snapshot, which
is based on certain assumptions and forecasts. The factors, inter alia that are to be
considered in these simulations are as below:
i. Planning criteria
ii. Forecasted demand- peak/off peak/transitions/four cardinal points.
iii. Generation despatch based on maintenance schedule for thermal and forecasted
hydro generation during peak/off peak.
iv. System Configuration—new lines expected or existing lines under outage
v. Base Schedule Transfers mainly intra regional transactions known in advance
vi. Credible System contingencies
Reliability Margins
Calculations of future transfer capabilities must consider the inherent uncertainties in
projecting such system parameters over longer time periods. These include projections
of system conditions, transmission system topology, projected customer demand and its
distribution, generation despatch, location of future generators, future weather conditions,
available transmission facilities and existing and future power transactions.
Margins in the form of Transmission Reliability Margin (TRM) and Capacity Benefit
Margin (CBM) must be kept aside to provide operating flexibility in real time.
The (n-1) criteria is applied while evaluating the first contingency transfer capability.
However a considerable difference exists between what is a (n-1) contingency in
planning horizon and a (n-1) contingency in operating horizon.
Therefore all such practical considerations call for an even higher reliability margin with
consequent further reduction in ATC.
Following synchronization of Northern grid with the Central grid (encompassing North-
Eastern, Eastern and Western regions), a very large inter-connected system has
evolved, in which, depending on the seasonal and diurnal variations of depatch pattern,
certain transmission corridors or flow-gates, comprising a group of transmission
elements, haul bulk power in a common direction. The total flow through each of these
corridors must be restricted within a certain limit to avoid cascade tripping and
consequent separation within the inter-connected system, under an N-1 contingency.
The subsequent commissioning of WR-NR synchronous link, leading to establishment of
a “delta” connectivity “ER-NR-WR-ER”, has further contributed to the complexity of
controlling the power flow in the inter-connected system. Any tripping of a critical
element in one region directly affects the security of the network in the other two regions.
The scheduling limits on inter-regional links are subject to over-riding constraints within
each region depending on the flow through the relevant critical cross-section within each
region. While such cross-sections within a region generally comprise of identified
elements of the regional ISTS, the intra-state system too may be involved.
With individual state demands growing progressively, apart from studying and debating
the base case and constraints at inter regional and then at intra regional ISTS under
skewed scenario at all India level, a time has come to assess the transfer capability for
intra-state systems also. Recently in Punjab, there was a voltage collapse near Bhatinda
leading to loss of 700 MW generation when 220 kV voltage dipped below 140 kV, while
the state was trying to meet its maximum agriculture load in-spite of warning from
NRLDC. This happened when freq was around 49.5 Hz, with no constraints in inter
regional or any 400 kV lines in any of the regions.
ATC & Open Access
In the present context of deregulated power market, more transactions are processed
across different control areas as the power system gets more stressed with increasing
loads. ATCs therefore need to be assessed with due prudence and are to be subjected
to continuous review. ATC is available for both Long Term Open Access (LTOA) as well
as Short Term Open Access (STOA, with the former having a higher priority. The priority
of various STOA transactions can logically be viewed as follows–
Advance Reservations – Received within 19th of a month, for implementation over a time
frame of upto the next three months
First-come-first-serve – For applications received after 19th, to be implemented within the
month
Day-ahead reservations – For implementation on the next day
Same-day applications – For implementation on the same day only
A related aspect is that after synchronous operation of Northern grid, link wise Open
Access approvals are gradually losing relevance. It needs to be appreciated that in the
synchronous ER-NR-WR-NER grid, the flow on ER-NR corridor is dependent inter alia
on ER-WR as well as WR-NR flow. Any change in WR-NR flow will have a bearing on
the ER-NR flow as well. Therefore only the total import or total export capability of a
region is more meaningful.
The consequences of scheduling the interregional links at the full TTC level without any
margin are as under:
1. Power shortages and compulsion to meet demand by most of the state utilities would
result in more load being connected in the Northern and Western grid. This would
lead to a drop in frequency, as there would not be commensurate increase in
generation in Eastern region. The line loadings would also increase above the TTC
levels and make the system insecure to even one element outage. A 1 Hz change in
frequency could result in inter regional line loading changes of the order of 1000 MW.
2. Tight control at the interregional level (no UI) would be completely inconsistent with
loose control at the inter state level (no limit on UI) and a floating frequency regime).
3. There would be frequent curtailments in real time, which would affect all the
RLDCs/SLDCs in the country. The effect on a single transaction due to curtailment
could be as low as 2 MW and the grid operators would be busy in rescheduling and
catering to this ‘private’ need of stakeholders at a time when the larger ‘public’ issue
of grid security is at stake. It also has the potential for creating disputes.
4. Unlike a safety net in the form of Under Frequency Relays (UFRs) available for low
frequency, there is no safety net in the form of System Protection Schemes (SPS) to
take care of cascade trippings and Under Voltage Relays to guard against voltage
collapse.
Thus reliability margins are absolutely essential and are non negotiable for providing a
reliable transmission services to all transmission system users under a broad range of
potential system conditions. These margins are reserved by grid operators and made
available for use by all the transmission users in real time.