Sikkim: The Merger with India

Author(s): Ranjan Gupta

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 9 (Sep., 1975), pp. 786-798
Published by: University of California Press
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 SIKKIM: THE MERGER WITH INDIA

Ranjan Gupta

THE APRIL 1975 referendum in Sikkimapprovingthe

mergerwithIndia and abolishingthe monarchybringseventsin that
sensitiveeasternHimalayan state full circle.A seriesof constitutional
experimentsseekingto definethe statusof the countryhad been under-
way sincethe late 19thcentury.The problemof Sikkimhas been both
geopoliticaland ethnic.SandwichedbetweenIndia and China, it was
firstthe gatewayto Tibet and then,afterthe annexation of Tibet by
China, the passage to India. It was subject to varyingpressuresfrom
both sides,in the mid-19thcenturyby the Britishforleaning towards
theDalai Lama's courtand in the laterdecades of the same centuryby
the Tibetans forbeing too close to Britain. Sikkimesefidelitywas put
to strenuoustests during the 1903-05 Younghusband expedition to
Lhasa when it soughtto exercisethe only option it had-that of being
the honestbroker-but failed miserablyin the task.
Afterthe Chinese moved into Tibet in 1951 and the outbreakof
Sino-Indianhostilitiesin 1959-60,the questionbecame one of asserting
an autonomousSikkimeseidentity,a role that the ruler (Chogyal) saw
for the country.OfficialIndian effortswere directed to seeing that
autonomymeanttheabsenceof an internationalidentity,withfreedom
onlyin domesticmatters.While the Chogyal wanted Sikkimto attain
an internationalstature,several political organizations,and particu-
larly the SikkimNational Congressand the SikkimJanata Congress,
feltthatemphasisshould be placed on the internaldevelopmentof the
state.They also wanted greaterpolitical freedomwithin the country.
Adding a greatdeal of complexityto thisdifference of prioritieswithin
Sikkimwas the factthat the ruler'sancestorshad come to Sikkimfrom
Tibet in the 16thcenturyand were consequentlyBhutias of Tibetan
ancestory.The Bhutias accountedforunder 25% of the population of
SikkimevenwhengroupedwiththeLepchas, anotherminoritycommu-
nityand perhapstheoriginalinhabitantsof Sikkim.Most of theleader-
ship and thegeneralmembershipof the twoparties,on theotherhand,
wereSikkimeseof Nepalese origin-though ironicallythe leader of the
786

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 RANJANGUPTA 787

SikkimNational Congressand now theState'sChiefMinister,Lhendup

Dorji, is a Bhutia nobleman(Kazi) fromthe Chogyal'scommunity.Not
only did the strugglebetween the ruler and the politiciansbecome a
battleof personalitiesbut a conflictbetweenthetwomain communities
of the country.
The April referendum marksthe conclusionof the period of con-
stitutionalexperimentationwhich enteredits last phase in the spring
of 1973. In a quick sequence of eventsthe political parties,until then
largelyfragmented, closed theirranksand agitatedforelections,which
were held a yearlater in 1974. The resultswere particularlyfavorable
for the SikkimCongress,formedas a resultof the mergerbetweenthe
Sikkim National Congress and the Janata Congress. The National
Party,which claimed to representthe Bhutias and the Lepchas, fared
badly.The 1974electionswereheld forthefirsttimeunder themanage-
mentof theElectionCommissionof India. Previouselectionsin Sikkim
had been held under a systemof balanced representationof different
communitiesbased on the principleof "communal parity,"whichwas
bitterlyresentedby the Nepali Sikkimese.Under the parityformulaa
successfulcandidateforthe StateCouncil had to obtain at least a mini-
mum of 15% of thevotesfromthe communityotherthan his own. In
addition, under the electionrule proclaimedin March 1953, the Sik-
kim Council consistedof six Nepalese members,six Bhutias and Lep-
chas and fivemembersnominatedby the Chogyal "in his descretion."
The declared object of this systemwas to safeguardthe rightsof the
minorities.But the political partiesargued that it was reallyintended
to stop a predominantlyNepalese majoritygovernmentfromtaking
office.
Some of thepoliticalpartieshad also criticizedthe policyof group-
ing the Lepchas and the Bhutias togetheras a communalvotingunit.
While the groupingmay have been expedientfromthe constitutional
point of view,historicallytherehad been a traditionalrivalrybetween
the twocommunities.It has been suggestedthattheLepchas come from
the southernside of theHimalayas and not fromTibet as was the case
with the Bhutias. They were consequentlyoutside the Tibeto-Chinese
ethnicgroup and werelargelynatureworshipperssubscribingto what
has come to be knownas theBon religionratherthan to Buddhism.But
the firstseriesof battlesbetweenthe invadingBhutias and the Lepchas
was as much overpasturelands as religion.While the warlikewarriors
from Tibet triumphedover the Lepchas, there was continued resis-
tance against the Bhutias. In fact,therewas a serious clash as late as
1834-1835when theBritishwerecalled in to mediate.
Over the years,however,the Lepchas have embraced Buddhism
and therehas been a greatdeal ofintermarriage betweenLepcha women
and the Bhutias. But severalcustomsremaineddifferent and the Lep-
chas, whose birth rate had been declining,have been largelyconcen-

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788 SIKKIM'S MERGERWITHINDIA

tratedin Zongu in Northwestern Sikkimwheretheyworkon cardamom

plantations.The rigorsof such an existencehas takenits own toll,as it
has on theBhutiaswho also preferto live in thecolderclimateof north-
ern Sikkim. In contrast,the Nepalese preferthe warmer and more
thicklyvegetatedfoothillsof southernand westernSikkim.(The Nep-
alese firstbegan to migrateinto Sikkimaround 1865. The migrationat
thetimewas encouragedby the Britishrulersof India as it was thought
that the Nepalese would balance the pro-TibetanBhutias.) The tradi-
tional rivalrybetweenthe Bhutias and the Lepchas surfacedagain dur-
ing the 1974 electionswhen some Lepchas supportedNepalese candi-
dates. But it should not be assumedthat the Lepchas have any identity
of interestswith the Nepalese; in fact,in early 1975 therewere indica-
tions thatthe Lepchas were swingingback, sidingonce again with the
Choygaland the Bhutias.
April has been a crucialmonthforSikkimdevelopments-at least
duringthelast threehecticyears.It was in April 1973 thatthe agitation
formore representative governmentgot under way; in April 1974 the
crucial general electionswere held; and in April 1975 Sikkim termi-
nated a threehundredyear old monarchyand voted for mergerwith
India. The 1974 electionswere particularlyimportant.Not only did
theseend the old patternof electionsbut broughtIndia more directly
into Sikkim'sadministration.Until 1973, India had by and large left
the Sikkimeseon theirown as far as internaladministrationwas con-
cerned.If therewas a tug-of-war it was more in the realm of external
policyand here too theperimeterswerewell defined.
The eventsof 1973 and theelectionsof 1974have theirrootsin two
basic causes. Both relate to the ambitionsof two men and to the con-
flictinginterestsof two forceswithin the country.The Choygal,who
had been travelingextensivelyall over the world with his American
queen (Gyalmo),became aware of the factthat thisindeed was the era
of the smallernations.He saw the growthin United Nations member-
ship and, nearerhome,Bhutan'smembershipin firstthe Colombo Plan
and thentheUnited Nations.The Choygal,an intelligentand sensitive
man,saw no reasonwhySikkimshould not play a role in international
politicseven if thiswent againstIndian interests.The Chogyal began
to agitate for the revisionof the Indo-SikkimTreaty of 1950 under
whichIndia controlledSikkim'sexternalpolicy,defenseand communi-
cations.In 1967, therewere demonstrationsoutside India House, the
officialresidenceof the Indian representative(or Political Officer
as he
is known),in a countrywheretherewas littleor no traditionof political
demonstrations.
On June 15, 1967,the threeExecutiveCouncillorsrepresenting the
National Party,the National Congressand the State Congressissued
whatwas thendescribedas a "historicjoint statement"thatasked fora
revisionof the Indo-SikkimTreaty on the grounds that Sikkimhad
"gained her sovereignstatuson August 15, 1947,when India achieved

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 RANJANGUPTA 789

her independence fromBritishrule." A round table conferencewas

suggestedto redefineSikkim'sstatus.The statementwas reprintedin
full in the Sikkin Herald, a governmentpublication. The paper ex-
pressed the hope that "India will not like to step into the shoes of
Britishimperialism."A certainanti-Indianismwas also being fannedby
a group called the SikkimStudyForum,consistingof youngergovern-
mentservants.The Chogyalgave theimpressionthathe identifiedhim-
selfwiththeirdemands.While the revisionof the treatywas a favorite
subjectin privateconversation, in May 1967 he statedpubliclythatthe
treatyshould be revisedand added "we await the convenienceof the
Indian government.They have more importantthingson hand than
we have."
There was also risingtensionbetweenthe Palace and India House
with evidentanimositybetweenthe Chogyal and the Political Officer.
Under the circumstances, almostall the politicianswho had sided with
the Chogyal in demanding a revision of the treatywere the firstto
change sides when the tide turned.1At the same time Kazi Lhendup
Dorji (the presentChief Minister),who along with his Belgian-born
wifehad a deep rootedanimositytowardsthe royal family,had begun
to tightenhis hold on the political movementin the country.Kazi
Lhendup Dorji comesfromthe same social backgroundas the Chogyal,
i.e.,one of the "noble" familieswho migratedto Sikkimat the timethe
Namgyal dynastyestablishedits authority.Like the Chogyal he had
spent some time in a Buddhist monasterytrainingto be a monk,and
both quite late in life had marriedforeigners.
At about the same time that the Chogyal began to agitate for
greaterautonomyfor Sikkimin internationalaffairs,the Kazi began
mobilizingpoliticalsupportfora party-based governmentalsystemand
a constitutionalruler. While the main supportfor the Chogyal came
fromthe Bhutia/Lepchasand some of the educated Nepali Sikkimese
civilservants,mostofthe Kazi's supportcame fromthe Nepalese middle
classwho wanteda greatersayin day-to-day administration.1-lewas the
ideal leader forthe Nepalese. As a Bhutia, he could be expectedto cut
somewhatinto the Chogyal's appeal in this community,while at the
same timehis politicalprogramwas exactlywhat the Nepalese wanted.
Because of thenatureof his demandsthe Chogyalbegan to embodythe
conceptof Sikkimesenationalism;the Kazi, on the otherhand, favored
a patternof politicsthatwas more Indian than Sikkimesein character.
The encouragementthat the Chogyal receivedin his discussionswith
friendsled him to conclude that he could shortlyinitiate discussions
withtheIndian government on thequestionofrevisingtheIndo-Sikkim

1 The difference led to infantileincidentsas whenduring

of opinionsometimes
the wedding of the then Crown Prince of Nepal (now King Birendra), the Chogyal
askedforHead of Statestatusat theweddingreceptionbut was onlyaccordedHead
ofGovernment ofIndia was to be present,
sincethePresident
representation withthe
resultthathe did notattendtheKathmandu wedding.

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790 SIKKIM'S MERGERWITHINDIA

Treaty to give Sikkimmore of an internationalpersonality.What the

Chogyalmisjudgedwas theamountof supporthe could musterfromall
sections of Sikkimesesocietyon this question, particularlyfrom the
Nepalese middleclass.The policiesofreservingcrucialcivil servicejobs
for Bhutia/Lephas (e.g., the Chief Secretaryand the Police Commis-
sioneror theAssistantPolice Commissionerand the main officer ranks
in theSikkimGuards) in addition to priorityin school admissionsand
technicalposts,engenderedincreasingresentmentagainstthe Chogyal.
While his "nationalist"programmay have appealed to the more edu-
cated and well-to-do Nepali Sikkimese,it meantlittleto themiddle and
lowerclasseswho weremoreconcernedwithimmediatepriorities.
The Chogyal'ssolid supportcame fromtheBhutia communityand,
to a somewhatlesserextent,the Lepchas. But togethertheyaccounted
forless than 25% of the population. By 1971 thingswere fardifferent
fromwhattheyhad been in 1967.India had emergedin a mood of new
confidenceafterthe victoriouswar against Pakistan. The new state of
Bangladeshhad been createdand Mrs. Gandhi had won impressivevic-
toriesin the 1971 and 1972 elections.Her governmentwas not inclined
to pampertheChogyalor enterinto extensivediscussionswithhim,par-
ticularlyas relationswithNepal and Bhutan had improved.
It was in this atmospherethat the agitationsof April-May 1973
werelaunched and it took little time to mustersupportfora popular
election.The agitationstook on an ugly turn,and therewere demands
forsurroundingthe Palace in Gangtokand forcingthe Chogyal to ab-
dicate. This was in some way a reenactmentof what had happened in
1949 when the Nepalese-backedSikkimState Congressand the Praja
Sammelan had surroundedthe Palace and had launched a "no rent"
and "no tax" campaign.These partieshad also demanded mergerwith
India and both the agitatorsand the late ruler, Sir Tashi Namgyal,
asked thegovernmentof India to use itsgood offices. This led to discus-
sions between political leaders and representativesof the Sikkimese
Court. In 1950 India and Sikkimsigneda new treatythat established
the protectoratewhile the SikkimAct of 1953 definedthe role of the
State Council and paved the way forgreaterpopular representationon
the basis of a communal parityformula.Both under the Indo-Sikkim
Treatyand the 1953 Act thespecial positionof the Chogyalwas recog-
nized and the State Council was denied the power to discuss"the Ma-
haraja and membersof the rulingfamily"(Article15, Clause One).
The agitation of April-May 1973 had been spearheaded by the
SikkimCongress.There were ratherugly incidentsparticularlyin the
districtswherehomes of some of the Chogyal'ssupporterswere looted
and burned.Palace officials chargedthat Communistand Indian Con-
gressparty workers had been broughtfromneighboringDarjeeling and
Kalimpongin India to organizethe demonstrations. The movementin-
tensifiedand theSikkimpolice wereunable to handle it. The 400 strong
SikkimGuards,mainlyentrustedwiththe securityof theChogyal,were

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 RANJANGUPTA 791

also ineffective.The Indian Army,whichhas a large deploymentpar-

ticularlyalong the sensitiveSikkim-Tibetborder,was called in to bring
the situationunder control.But the armydid not spend long handling
the civil commotion,possiblyfearingthat weakeningof frontierposi-
tionsmightbe takenadvantageofby the Chinese.As soon as somesem-
blance of normalcywas restoredthe maintenanceof law and orderwas
entrustedto Indian detachmentsof the armed constabularywho had
been moved in fromIndia. The Sikkimpolice were asked to returnto
dutyand stepsweretakento preventtheransackingof foodstoreswhich
had occurredduringthe demonstrations. The demonstrationappeared
to be spontaneouswith villagersfromoutlyingdistrictsmarchingto
Gangtok to presstheirdemandsforfreeand earlyelectionsand the re-
moval of the parityformula.Some of the more radical demonstrators
demanded theremovalof the Chogyalor at least a constitutionalmon-
archy.
Electionsweredemandedby the SikkimCongressand the Govern-
mentof India was asked to make the necessaryarrangements. The Gov-
ernmentof India had assumedimplicitobligationsfororderlyinternal
administrationduring the discussionsbetween Sikkimeseand Indian
representatives leading to the signingof the 1950 Indo-SikkimTreaty.
A pressnoteissuedbytheIndian Ministryof ExternalAffairson March
20, 1950,had notedthatthestatewould enjoy autonomy"subjectto the
ultimateresponsibility of theGovernmentof India forthemaintenance
of good administration and law and order."
It was this clause of the understandingbetween the two govern-
mentsthatwas apparentlyevokedby Kazi Lhendup Dorji. The Govern-
mentof India respondedquicklyand agreed that the modalitiesof an
election should be workedout by the Election Commissionof India.
This implied that the old patternof electionswould no longer hold
good. For thefirsttimeIndian officialswould delimitthe constituencies.
and the parityformulawould be modified.The latterpoint was a sub-
ject of intensedebate and discussionbetweenthe Chogyal,the political
partiesand the Governmentof India during the year that lapsed be-
tweenthedemonstrations and theelections.Henceforthit would be this
triangularpatternthatwould characterizeall talkson the SikkimQues-
tion. The Chogyal wanted adequate safeguardsfor the minoritycomn-
munities,and he did not see how thiscould be broughtabout without
the parityformula.The SikkimCongressand the Janata Congressdid
not want electionsunder theparityformula.The Election Commission
of India was asked to resolvethe impasse.
Finallya plan was evolvedunderwhichthe32 seatsin theAssembly
were divided as follows:15 reservedforBhutia/Lepcha candidates; 15
for Nepali candidates; one for the Sangh (monasticcommunity);and
one forthe ScheduledCastes.This constitutedcommunalparity,as the
Sangh seat was in realitya Bhutia constituencyand theScheduledCaste
seata Nepali constituency. The significant
differencefrompreviouselec-

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792 SIKKIM'S MERGERWITHINDIA

tions was the changein the votingsystem.In 1974, the "one man one
vote" principle,as utilizedin theIndian patternforreservedconstituen-
cies,was introduced.Under thissystem,the candidatemustbe fromthe
communityforwhich the seat is reserved,but the contenderreceiving
the largestnumberof votes cast by the entireelectorateis considered
elected.No longerwas it requiredthata candidateobtain at least 50%0
of thevote fromhis own communityand 15% fromthe othercommu-
nityto win election.
This appeared to be the only formulathatcould safeguardthe in-
terestsof theminorityBhutia and Lepcha communitiesand at the same
timesatisfythe majorityNepali Sikkimese.The idea of adult suffrage
on a freeand fairbasis was also endorsedby the Chogyal,and theagree-
mentbetweenthe Chogyal,the Governmentof India, and the leaders
of the political partiesprovided the basis for the 1974 elections.The
agreementof May 8, 1973,moreover,also called fordrasticchangesin
the systemof governmentand was ultimatelyresponsibleforthe elimi-
nationof Sikkimeseroyalty.In addition to thesystemof electionsbased
on adult suffrage"which will give equitable representationto all sec-
tionsof the people on the basis of the principleof one man one vote,"
it also vestedthe Governmentof India with the "responsibilityforthe
establishmentof law and orderand good administrationin Sikkimfol-
lowingthebreakdownof all three"(Articletwo,clause one). The agree-
ment envisageda SikkimState Assemblyelected fora fouryear term.
The electionswereto be conductedby theElectionCommissionofIndia
who were to be appointedby the Governmentof Sikkim(Clause four).
The agreementalso laid down the fourteensubjectsthatcould be
discussedby the Assembly,six more than thoselisted in the 1953 Act,
which had also specifiedthe subjects that could be discussedby the
Council.2Under the 1973Agreement,as under the 1953Act,theAssem-
bly could not discussthe Chogyal"and membersof the royal family,"
matterspending beforethe court of law and those subjectsforwhich
the Governmentof India was responsibleunder the 1950 Treaty. The
Agreement also providedfortheformationofan ExecutiveCouncil and
included provisionsintended to protectthe interestsof the minority
communities.The role of the Chogyalwas also defined.He was to per-
formhis functionsin "accordance with the Constitutionof Sikkim."
While the Constitutionwas only promulgateda yearlater,even in the
1973 Agreementtherewere strongindicationsthat henceforththe role
of the Chogyalwas to be no more than that of a constitutionalruler.
The Chief Executive,for example, was henceforthto hold the reins
ofgovernment and undertheAgreementhe was to submitall important

2 Permissiblesubjects in the Agreementof 1973 were education, public health,

excise, press and publicity,transport,bazars, forests,public works,agriculture,food
supplies, economic and social planning, including state enterprises,home and estab-
lishment,finance and land revenue. Under the 1953 Act the State Council could
discuss education, public health, excise, prcss and publicity,transport,bazars, forests
and public works.

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 RANJANGUPTA 793

mattersto theChogyal"forhis informationand forhis approval of the

actionproposedto be taken,exceptwhereimmediateaction is required.
In the lattercase, he shall obtain the Chogyal'sapproval as soon after
the action has been taken." The Chief Executive,who was an Indian
civilservant,in additionhad therightto decidehow fundsforsocial and
economicdevelopmentsin Sikkimwere to be used. Moreover,any dif-
ferenceof opinion betweenhim and the Chogyalwas to be referredto
in Sikkim(the officialIndian representative)
the Political Officer "who
shall obtain theadvice of theGovernmentofIndia whichshall be bind-
ing." Several of theseprovisionstook clearershape in the new Sikkim
Constitutionbut thebasic principlewereclearlylaid in the 1973Agree-
ment.
Soon afterthe Agreementwas signed,the election campaign got
underway.Despite theproblempresentedby thepromiseto protectthe
interestsof minoritycommunitiesin the delimitationof constituencies,
an electoralroll was prepared.Several Sikkimeseand officials fromthe
ElectionCommissionofIndia workedjointlyto preparethegroundfor
the elections.The campaign was livelier than had been the case in
earlier elections with extensiveuse of party symbols,speeches and
money-in fact all the paraphernalia that characterizeelections in
India. The Chogyaland the Kazi exchangedaccusationsthat the other
spentlarge sumsof moneyon theircandidates.While the Chogyaldid
not directlyparticipatein electioneering,some membersof the royal
family,particularlyhis brother-in-law, were reportedlyactive in select-
ing and backingNational Partycandidates.EarliertheSikkimNational
Congress and the Janata Congresshad merged with Kazi Lhendup
Dorji as theleader.The SikkimCongresswon an overwhelming victory,
capturingall but one of the seats it contested,including those consti-
tuenciesin whichthe Bhutia and Lepchas were the majoritycommuni-
ties.In theseareas theLepcha and Bhutia candidatesof theSikkimCon-
gressdefeatedcandidatesfromthe same communitybelongingto the
National Party.The electionsgenerallyset the stageforthe showdown
betweenthe Chogyaland his rival of manyyears.
While the electionsindicated the overwhelmingdesireof the Sik-
kimeseto have a morerepresentative government, withperhapsa popu-
larlyelectedChiefMinister,fewthoughtthatit would lead to anything
more than that. Kazi Lhendup Dorji, the undisputedleader afterthe
elections,immediatelydemanded a new constitutionpromulgatedfor
the country.This was a foregoneconclusion because once the 1973
Agreementhas been accepted by the three concerned parties-the
Chogyal,the political partiesand the Governmentof India-it was ob-
vious thattherewas to be a new typeof Assembly,witha new role for
the electedgovernmentand perhapsa more constitutionalpositionfor
theChogyal.
Afterthe electionswere over, long parleysbegan once again be-
tween the Governmentof India and the SikkimCongresson the one
hand and the Chogyal on the otherover the typeof constitutionbest

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794 SIKKIM'S MERGERWITHiNDIA

suitedfortheprotectorate. A constitutionalexpertwas sentto Gangtok

and a seriesof discussionstook place as to the exact natureof the new
Bill. A disputearose as to the positionof the Chogyalin the constitu-
tion. The Chogyal,arguingin the traditionalmanner,wanted the new
constitutionto flowfromthethronewhile theGovernmentofIndia and
the political partieswanted the positionof the Chogyal to be defined
in the Constitution.It was the old argumentover whetherthe ruler
should be thefountainheadof power or merelyanotherconstituentof
thepoliticalsystem.
The Governmentof SikkimBill of 1974, as the new Constitution
ofSikkimwas officially known,largelygave theChogyala constitutional
role withouttamperingwith precedenceor personal privileges.The
constitutioncreatedthreeimportantinstitutions-theChief Minister,
the Council of Ministers,and the Chief Executive-while also provid-
ing forthe associationof the SikkimeseGovernmentwith the Govern-
mentofIndia in day-to-day administration. The ChiefMinisterand the
Council ofMinisterswereto be "in chargeof theadministrative depart-
mentsalloted to them and shall advise the Chogyal in respectof all
matterswithintheirjurisdiction."The Council of Ministerscould dis-
cuss articlesalreadymentionedin the MIayagreementand redefinedin
the Constitutionbut defenseand externalaffairswere excluded since
theyfallwithinthe purviewof the Indian Governmentunder the 1950
Treaty.However,thenewrole oftheChiefExecutivecreatedin thecon-
stitutionand mentionedin the May Agreementwas the most crucial.
While therehad been administrative heads in thepast deputedfromthe
Indian civil service,thisinstitutionhad its rootsin the systemthathad
prevailedin the princelystatesduring the Britishperiod. The Chief
Executivewas a new post,the mostimportantin Sikkimwithpoweref-
fectivelyflowingfromhim to theChiefMinisteron theone side and the
Chogyalon the other.He was also the liaison body betweenthe Chog-
yal, the political partiesand the Governmentof India, with the deci-
sionsof theIndian governmentin anydisputeto be final.
ChapterFive of theBill definedtherole and functionsof the Chief
Executive.With authorityboth fromthe Governmentof India and the
Chogyal,he was to be "nominatedby the Governmentof India and
appointed to that post by the Chogyal." While responsiblefor the ef-
ficientrunningof the governmenthe had "all the powersnecessaryfor
the dischargeof his functionsand responsibilitiesand the executive
powerin Sikkimshall be so exercisedas to insurecompliancewith any
decisions taken or ordersor directionsissued by the Governmentof
India in the due dischargeof its responsibilities."The Chief Executive
consequentlywas to directthe runningof the administrationwhile at
the same timebeing effectively responsibleforexecutingthe directives
of theGovernmentof India in all matterspertainingto theinternalad-
ministration of Sikkim."Everyadvice tenderedby the Council of Min-
istersshall be communicatedto the Chogyal throughthe ChiefExecu-

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 RANJANGUPTA 795

tivewho mayifhe is of theopinion thattheadvice is likelyto affectany

of his special responsibilitiesor the responsibilityof the Government
of India . . . require the Council of Ministersto modifythe advice
accordingly."
The special position and associationof the Governmentof India
was also mentionedin theConstitution.In thiscontextit was significant
that the SikkimGovernmentcould request the Indian Planning Com-
mnission "to include the planned developmentof Sikkim within the
ambit of the Planning Commissionof India while that commissionis
preparingplans forthe economicand social developmentof India and
to appropriatelyassociate officialsfromSikkim in such work." The
SikkimeseGovernmentcould also ask New Delhi forfacilitiesforstu-
dents fromSikkimin Indian educational institutionsin addition to
employmentopportunities"on par with thoseavailable to the citizens
ofIndia," particularlyin public services.
The Sikkimn Constitutionshould be read both withthe 1973Agree-
mentand the 1950Indo-SikkimTreaty.The enlargedrole of theIndian
Governmentwas broughtabout both under the "ultimateresponsibil-
ity"clause in the 1950 Treaty and the May Agreement.The 1974 Con-
stitutionwas intended to bridge the conceptsof "protectorate"status
with provincialautonomy.It limited the scope of internalautonomy
that the Sikkimesegovernment,in the person of the Chogyal,had en-
joyed until 1973,but it did not at the same timegive Sikkima totally
provincialstatus.Though the powersof the Chogyalwere curbed,and
a Council of Ministersand theChiefMinisterwereentrustedwithmore
responsibility, both the presenceof a Chief Executive and a foreign
ministryapparatusin the formof the Indian political officecontinued
to give Sikkimsomekind of ambiguousinternationalstatus.The Con-
stitution,while respectingSikkim's separate character,gave greater
stressto thepoliticalpartiesand the ChiefExecutive.It also recognized
Sikkimesesovereignty only within the contextof Indian suzerainty-
leaving to the Indian Governmentthe prerogativeto decide how ex-
actlySikkimeseautonomywas to be defined.
The April 1975 referendumhas finallyprovided the answer.Sik-
kim will now be the 22nd state of India. The Indian Parliamentap-
proved a Bill amending the Federal Constitutionand providingfor
Sikkimto be a statewithintheIndian Union. The futureof the Chog-
yal stillhangsin thebalance. Accordingto currentindicationshe is still
in his GangtokPalace, but withrestrictions on his movements.
The developmentsfrom1973 to early 1975 raise some veryvalid
points. What happened in this period to explain changingthe entire
characterof Sikkimand alteringa patternof governmentwhich had
been in operationsince 1950?
Like manyrulers,the Chogyal and his immediatefamilythought
moreof nationalismthandemocracy,and of the protectionof theinsti-
tutionof themonarchy.This was indeed the Chogyal'sfault.But a cer-

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796 SIKKIM'S MERGER WITH INDIA

tain impatiencewas thrustinto thesituation.The Indian Government

could no longercount on him as a reliable ally in a sensitivebuffer
state.Soon afterIndia achievedindependencein 1947,therewereprom-
inentIndian leaders,Sardar Patel among them,who thoughtthat the
Himalayan kingdoms,and particularlySikkim,should be mergedinto
India, and thatNew Delhi should maintain its firstline of defensein
Tibet as the Britishhad done. The argumentby those who followed
thisline of thinkingwas thatSikkim,like the princelystates,had been
a memberof the Chamber of Princesin BritishIndia and to a large
extenthad been treatedby the Britishin much the same way as the
princelyStatesof India.3
Nehru had opposed Patel's plan and a plea by Sikkimnesepolitical
partiesin 1949 for the mergerof Sikkimwith India had been turned
down. Nehru saw in Sikkima certainvalue as a buffer,much in the
same way the Britishhad viewed the kingdom.The Sikkimese,more-
over,also had theirown culturalidentity.This did give Sikkiman op-
portunityto grow as a bufferstatewithin an overall Indian political
framework. The approach ran into troublewhen the presentChogyal,
on ascendingthe throneafterthe death of his father,decided thatSik-
kim should play a role in internationalaffairs.This objective ran
counterto the concept of Sikkimidentitywhich had been held both
by theBritish(who nevervestedSikkimwitha separateidentityas they
did Nepal and Bhutan) or the successorIndian Government.The
Chogyalalso soughtto use thisidea to gain credibilitywiththe popula-
tion, realizing that the demand for greaterSikkimeseindependence
woulddivertattentionfromthedemandfora moreequitable divisionof
powerdemandedby thepoliticalparties.What theChogyalperhapsdid
not alwaystakeinto considerationwas thatif the Governmentof India
and the political parties joined hands he had only limited room for
maneuver.This was exactlywhat happened.
Once the Indian Governmentrealized that the Chogyal was be-
comingan unreliable ally in a sensitiveregiontheydecided to remove
him. The argumentadvanced since 1950 fordealing with monarchies
ratherthan popularly elected governmentsin the Himalayan region
had been based on the assumptionthatit would be easier to deal with
one personratherthan a group of politicanswho would be replaced
periodically.However, underlyingthis approach was the assumption
thatthe King would be a reliable and stable ally. On both counts the
ChogyalfailedNew Delhi.
Sikkimhad also in thelast twodecades resistedbeing swallowedby a
newbrandof socialismwitha distinctively Indian flavor,whichin vary-
ing degreeshad also takenrootin severalof the otherSouthAsian coun-

3 This was in contrastto Bhutan and Nepal. Bhutan was not a member of the
Chamber of Princes and its affairswere handled by the Foreign Department of the
British administrationin India. The British had early in the nineteenth century
recognizedNepal's separate identity.

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 RANJAN
GUPTA 797

tries.The Sikkimeseleadershiprefusedto accept thissocialismand con-

tinued to look westwards,towardsliberal capitalism,forits inspiration.
The ruling family,because of its exposnre to the BritishIndian ad-
ministration,continued to maintain a favorabledisposition towards
theUnited Kingdom.In facttheChogyal'stwosonshave been educated
in England. The Gyalmo,with her Americanbackground,reinforced
thisoutlookbybringingboth to the Court and therulingelite western
social codes and behaviorpatterns.Her verypresenceas the FirstLady
was symbolicof this.Sikkimconsequentlyhad a curiouslywesternori-
entationblended with traditionalnormsand customs.In this Sikkim
was different fromNepal and Bhutan. These countriesare not socialist
but rigidlytraditionalin outlook and orientation.Nepal with its or-
thodox Hinduism drew respectfrommany Indians and Bhutan has
maintainedits adherenceto a traditionalTibeto-Buddhistculturalpat-
tern.
Sikkimwas not only differentbut more modern. Its leadership
thoughtwithinwesternizedtermsof referenceand its contactson one
hand werewiththetraditionalnobilityin Britainand on theotherwith
self-madeprofessionalpeople in the U.S. In India Sikkimesecontacts
werebestwitholder westernizedelitesin Calcutta and to a much lesser
extentin Delhi and Bombay. While traditionalcontactswere kept up
with Indian princestherewas no undue obsessionwith them and, if
anything,therewas somecontemptfortheindulgentexistencethathad
characterizedtheiryearsof power.Similarly,Indian officials weremain-
tained and pamperedbecause theyhad to be tolerated,but therewas
littlelikingforthem.Sikkim'salternativemethodof developmentwas
oftendemocratic,in some instancesmoreso than similarinstitutionsin
India, Pakistanor Nepal. Most of the major industrywas stateowned
and whiletherewereprofessionalpeople, a nouveau richebusinessclass
was non-existent. These factorsfurther
limitedtheChogyal'scontactsin
New Delhi, bothwithMembersofParliamentand officials of thevarious
ministries.
The Chogyal'sincreasinghostilityto theIndian Governmentcame
at a timewhen New Delhi was engaged in a successfulexperimentof
fencemending.A borderdemarcationagreementhad been signedwith
Burma, relationshad considerablyimprovedwith Nepal and Bhutan,
theKachativuIsland disputehad been resolvedwithSri Lanka and new
bonds had been establishedwithAfganistan.Pakistanhad been reduced
in size and Bangladesh,heavilyrelianton India, had emergedas a new
nation on the subcontinent.Sikkimofferedthe only resistanceto an
otherwisesuccessfulfrontierpolicy.It was also thoughtin New Delhi
that the Chogyal was becomingincreasinglyarrogantin his dealings
with the Indian Governmentand relations touched an all time low.
The Chogyalin doing thismay have thoughthe would be takenmore
and may have been encouragedin thisby
seriouslyby Indian officials,
somemembersof his family.

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798 SIKKIM'S MERGERWITHINDIA

In any case,by 1973theIndian Governmenthad decided to change

horsesand back the politicalparties,particularlyKazi Lhendup Dorji.
It is reasonableto assumethattheKazi was promisedsupportifhe could
carrythe people withhim and establisha governmentthat was closer
to India. The Kazi accomplishedthistaskwell. He relied largelyon the
ethnicstructure of Sikkimesesocietyand rallied the powerfulNepalese
middle class around him. The Chogyal,who had been workingon the
assumptionthathe had the people withhim,had not realized that his
own positionwas ratherweak in a countrywherehe could only count
on 25% of thepopulationas a hard coresupportbase. It is ironicalthat
the Chogyal'sfirmest ally from1950 to 1973 had been the Indian Gov-
ernment,who in a way had protectedhim fromthe people forits own
pragmaticends. Without the Indian shield the Chogyalwas cast aside
in a tremendousupsurgeof anti-Bhutiaand anti-royalist feeling.
The greatesttragedyis thatthe Chogyalis both intelligentand tal-
ented and he deeply loves his country.It was his ill luck that he tried
to use his manytalentsin a small remotekingdom.Sikkimwas too tiny
to accomodatehis manyaspirations,particularlyhis strongdesireto see
himselfin a pivotal internationalrole. India should have drawnon the
Chogyal'snatural talentsand turnedthemto commonadvantage.In a
countrythe size of Sikkim his extensive internationalcontacts,his
natural art of negotiation,his graciousnessand his knowledge all
turnedinto a seriousliability,preventinghim frompaying adequate
attentionto daily affairs,to more immediate priorities,to the small
thingsthat matterin a small backwardarea. His dream of a greater
Sikkimblurreddismal reality.
But with or withouta Chogyal,Sikkimhad a rightto its identity.
Even when the Britishimprisonedthe presentChogyal'sgrandfather,
Thutob Namgyal,at Kurseongin 1893 because theythoughthim dis-
loyal to the British,Sikkim'sprotectoratestatuswas respected,and in
theRaja's absenceall workwas done by thePolitical Officer in thename
of therulerand the Council. Moreover,theAnglo-ChineseConvention
of 1890had recognizedSikkim'sprotectoratestatus,particularlyArticle
Two of the Conventionwhere the position of Sikkimwas recognized
both by Tibet and China, the otherinternationalpowerspartyto the
Convention.
The Indian Governmentas the suzerain power had the rightto
defineSikkim'ssovereignty. Sikkim,moreover,had a rightto a new and
liberal constitutionwherethe Chogyal'spositionwould be spelled out,
but he would have an effective role nevertheless.

RANJAN GUPTA was a Nieman Fellow at Harvard University,1974-75 and is cur-

rentlya Research Associate at the Institute of International Studies, Universityof
California,Berkeley.From 1967 to 1969 he was special correspondentto the Indian
Express in Sikkimand Bhutan and from1969 to 1971 in Nepal.

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