Wartime Expansion of The Nitrogen Industry

Chapter 8
Wartime Expansion of the Nitrogen

Industry
The industry of atmospheric nitrogen has become a German industry, a world problem has
been solved, and the most serious War danger of technical character had been prevented.
Walther Rathenau, 20 December 1915, before the German Society of 1914. Bruno
Waeser, The Atmospheric Nitrogen Industry: With special consideration of the production
of ammonia and nitric acid (trans. E. Fyleman). Philadelphia: P. Blakiston’s Son & Co.,
1926, vol. I, p 23.
World War I was a long, brutal, protracted calamity carried out on vast scale. Its
very nature, its total reliance on industry and the availability of raw materials, and
especially the need to overcome shortages, disrupted the peacetime pace, style and
scale of implementation of technological developments. Armies, and especially
those who managed them, invariably trained to fight earlier wars, were often
overwhelmed by situations that were completely unanticipated or unexpected. As
described in the previous chapter this was particularly the case for the critical
supply of modern explosives, for which the adaptability of industrial organizations
engaged in the supply of nitrogen products was of paramount importance. Each
nation faced a different challenge, according to its available resources or lack of
access to them as a result of breakdowns in the usual lines of communication. This
chapter provides an insight into the ways in which strategic industrial challenges
were pursued in efforts to maintain unprecedented levels of nitrogen output, starting
with the production of nitric acid from ammonia in Germany by a process that was
little practiced before 1914. We then examine the steps leading to the massive
growth of ammonia production in Germany and follow the tactics, not always
successful, adopted elsewhere in Europe and in the United States. Some technical
problems remained intractable until after 1918, none more so than the high-pressure
synthesis of ammonia.
© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 151

A.S. Travis, Nitrogen Capture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68963-0_8
152 8 Wartime Expansion of the Nitrogen Industry
8.1 Germany: Nitric Acid from Catalytic Oxidation

of Ammonia
Around 1912–1913, laboratory studies into the manufacture of nitric acid from
synthetic ammonia had been taken up by both Hoechst and BASF. The Bayerische
factory at Trostberg, as noted, already produced nitric acid from cyanamide, while the
coal industry used the Gerthe (Ostwald) process to make the acid from coke oven and
coal gas works ammonia. Both used platinum as the catalyst, as did the important
BASF contact process for sulphuric acid. The rare metal was in short supply after
August 1914, since the principal source was the Ural Mountains in Russia.
The main research into developing an alternative, low cost, readily available
catalyst for ammonia oxidation was undertaken at BASF, whose first patent, in
1913, made claim to a catalyst that might be “one or more oxides of metals in the
iron group.” Alwin Mittasch worked on improvements from early in 1914; he aimed
at the efficient and economical production of nitric acid and, in turn, of nitrates. In
collaboration with Christoph Beck (1887–1960), he came up with an iron oxide
catalyst containing a promoter. An efficient iron-bismuth catalyst was also discov-
ered. It was Mittasch’s success that enabled Carl Bosch in October 1914 to promise
that a new enlarged plant at Oppau would meet much of the needs of the military by
the following spring [1]. For the oxidation units, BASF scientists and engineers
introduced acid-resistant alloys containing silicon.
To start the exothermic ammonia oxidation, the catalyst was heated. Oxidation
of ammonia was rapid, giving 96–98% nitric oxide. The temperature rose to around
900 C; excess air prevented explosions from unwanted reactions.
4 NH3 þ 5 O2 Ð 4 NO þ 6 H2 O ΔH ¼ 909 kJ mol1
The nitric oxide combined with oxygen to give nitrogen dioxide.
2 NO þ O2 Ð 2 NO2 ΔH ¼ 115 kJ mol1
The dioxide, existing reversibly with its dimer, N2O4, was absorbed in water to
afford dilute (“weak”) nitric acid, not unlike a similar step in the electric arc
factories. The absorption towers used at the latter did not provide the level of
concentration required for most munitions grade nitric acid. Concentration by
distillation was not possible since nitric acid forms an azeotropic mixture with
water (a constant boiling mixture containing 68.5% acid by mass at 122 C).
As a result, and well into 1915, concentrated nitric acid continued to be made
from ammonia in four steps. In May 1915, however, BASF started production
of nitric acid from ammonia by its new catalytic oxidation process. Concentration
of the acid involved a counter-current operation in a tower packed with rings.1
1
At this time BASF was already using Raschig rings, invented by Friedrich August Raschig
(1863–1928).
8.1 Germany: Nitric Acid from Catalytic Oxidation of Ammonia 153
A mixture of nitric acid of 50–60% concentration and sulphuric acid of 95%

concentration, introduced at the top of the tower, met an upward flow of steam
injected at the base. Vapour of concentrated nitric acid exited from the top of the
tower. The sulphuric acid, now diluted, was collected at the bottom. This two-step
process, involving oxidation and concentration, completely overcame the wasteful
and long-winded four-step process and required less sulphuric acid. The resulting
99% nitric acid was ideal for use in several nitration processes.
Bayer’s Leverkusen factory in 1915 adopted a similar process. Bayer’s ammonia
oxidation catalyst was made up of iron oxide with a heavy metal oxide, an
innovation introduced by Mittasch and made available after Bosch agreed to
share the results of BASF catalyst studies with other firms. Concentration of nitric
acid up to 94%, was achieved by the addition of oil of vitriol and steam, and
blowing into the mixture hot burner gases. At first, ammonia came from coke
works.
In May 1915, Hoechst also became engaged in the manufacture of concentrated
nitric acid. In this case, the ammonia was derived from cyanamide at Knapsack.
Hoechst controlled almost half of this major cyanamide producer following acqui-
sition during November and December 1914 of shares in Aktiengesellschaft für
Stickstoffdünger from Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, Metallbank, and
Metallgesellschaft. Hoechst, with its supply of cyanamide now ensured, expanded
the Knapsack ammonia plant in 1915. The workforce was increased from 60 to
400, and new carbide furnaces were installed. New equipment for isolation of
nitrogen from the atmosphere for the cyanamide process by the Linde process
followed in 1916.
An improved process for the oxidation of ammonia was developed for the
Hoechst Nitrogen Department by a small group of chemists headed by Martin
Rohmer at Gersthofen, near Augsberg, a site that Hoechst had purchased around
1900 in connection with one of the indigo processes [2, 3]. This followed Rohmer’s
invention in 1913 of an ammonia oxidation process that gave mixed oxides [4].
Calcium cyanamide, though generally intended for agriculture, was now
diverted to munitions production. In 1916, the War Ministry authorized further
expansion at Knapsack, resulting in a facility capable of producing from cyanamide
the ammonia that Hoechst converted into concentrated nitric acid on an increasing
scale. In 1916, also, the Pauling process for the manufacture of concentrated nitric
acid was installed by Hoechst.
As an ammonia oxidation catalyst, Hoechst first used platinized asbestos, dia-
phragms of platinum, or a narrow tube of platinum—none of which were entirely
successful. In October 1917, a new acid plant in which platinum gauzes were used
was installed. This enabled Hoechst to manufacture 16,500 tons per month of nitric
acid using BASF ammonia liquor (20% ammonia) from Oppau and cyanamide
ammonia liquor (up to 27% ammonia) from Knapsack [5]. Bayer at Leverkusen
eventually relied on cyanamide ammonia liquor from Knapsack and gas and coke
works ammonia, as well as ammonia released from ammonium sulphate by its
reaction with lime [6].
A War Ministry report of a visit to the recently enlarged nitric acid facility at
Hoechst in July 1918 observed: “. . .in its efforts to manufacture concentrated acid,
Hoechst has been more successful than any other company. Hoechst has solved the
problem of the nitric acid and sulphuric acid concentration in a manner that
indicates that the required production output will be achieved also in future”
[7]. By the war’s end, Hoechst’s newer ammonia oxidation plant had 252 converters,
each fitted with a 20-in. gauze. The whole plant was supervised by one man per shift
[8]. The daily output in 1918 was the equivalent of 375 metric tons of 100% nitric
acid, considerably greater than at Oppau, where BASF produced 100 tons of 100%
acid [9]. The Hoechst ammonia oxidation process, while important to the war
effort, was far from economic, and much of it, as well as installations at Knapsack,
was shut down after the cessation of hostilities. In 1923, a comparison of costs for
the production of nitrogen compounds among the “IG” firms found that they were
highest at Hoechst. The nitric acid equipment, in particular, was outmoded—much
of it representing hasty wartime installations—and would remain so until well into
the 1940s [10].
During the war there were significant improvements in platinum catalysed
ammonia oxidation based on the independent investigations of Ostwald and Caro.
Multiple platinum gauzes replaced single gauzes, and electrical heating was
discontinued. “This type of plant supplied all the nitric acid required for explosives
in Germany during the later years of the war. . . A much greater catalyst life was
obtained in this design of plant, extending to six months, provided that conditions
were uniform and that the gases were free from impurities that might have a
poisoning effect” [11]. Supplies of platinum may in part have been restored after
the armistice with Russia on 15 December 1917, following the Russian Revolution,
and especially after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (3 March 1918). However Russian
industry was in total disarray. Meantime, platinum production in Columbia
increased considerably, though probably with little benefit to Germany.
The wartime emergency organization of a new sector of chemical industry in
Germany based on ammonia and nitric acid was the outcome of outstanding
research effort and commitment. It involved not only close integration between
the activities of laboratory, pilot plant and construction departments, as well as
manufacturers of specialized equipment—such as Krupp of Essen, and Bamag—
but also on negotiations with the state and its military arm, and substantial support
from the Reich Treasury [12].
8.2 France
The response in France to the nitrogen problem was not altogether different from
that taken by Germany, apart from the absence of the Haber-Bosch process. At
first, the French relied on imported Chile saltpetre, ammonium sulphate from
British gas and coke works, ammonium nitrate produced from Odda cyanamide,
and nitric acid and ammonium nitrate from Norsk Hydro. A small factory at
8.2 France 155
La Roche-de-Rame that worked the Pauling process, producing two tons of 50%
acid daily, was taken over by the government, which late in 1914 had moved from
Paris to Bordeaux.
Norsk Hydro held contracts with both German and Allied firms, and until 1915
supplied both sides with nitric acid and ammonium nitrate. In that year, the Rjukan
Railway carried 250,000 tons of freight, including nitrogen compounds destined for
the munitions factories of the opposing armies. Though Eyde was perceived by
French investors in Norsk Hydro to be pro-German, the French armed forces
received over half the output, mainly as nitrate, and the Germans just 13%, and
perhaps less after the German contracts were completed in 1915 [13]. In the same
year, as a result of the French investment in Norsk Hydro, and agreement with the
French War Ministry, the Norwegian firm became engaged in the construction of a
Birkeland-Eyde electric arc factory at Soulom, Hautes-Pyrénées. From 1916, the
factory produced 300 tons of nitric acid per month, converted mainly into ammo-
nium nitrate but also sodium nitrate. This was the only Birkeland-Eyde facility ever
worked outside of Norway. Hydro-electricity came from a Midi Railway power
station on the River Gave de Luz. In 1916, Rjukan produced 80,000 tons of
ammonium nitrate for supply to Britain and France.
In 1917, German U-boat attacks on Allied shipping and the threat to supplies of
Chilean nitrate encouraged the French to expand calcium cyanamide facilities at
Notre-Dame-de-Briançon, and Bellegarde, Rhône-Alpes, both dependent on abun-
dant hydro-electric power (Table 8.1). Ammonia derived from cyanamide was
converted into nitric acid. Licenses were issued to the French government for
working the cyanamide process of Nitrogen Products and Carbide, of London,
which worked the Frank-Caro process in Scandinavia and held a license for the
Ostwald process for the oxidation of ammonia. The intention was to produce both
nitric acid and ammonium nitrate. For the catalytic oxidation of ammonia derived
from cyanamide, a large plant was erected at Angoulême, in the Poitou-Chantres
region. The platinum-catalysed ammonia oxidation process was named by the
French the Kuhlmann-Ostwald process in honour of the Frenchman Frédéric
Kuhlmann, who had undertaken ammonia oxidation experiments in 1838. Problems
similar to those encountered in Germany had to be overcome, particularly corrosion
of the reactors, until an improved stainless steel was introduced. Ammonia oxida-
tion was in full production during 1917 at Angoulême, where the monthly output of
nitric acid was 3500 tons [14].
French cyanamide production was increased from an annual output of just
7500 tons in 1913, to 100,000 tons in 1917. Among the new cyanamide works
commissioned was Lannemezan, Hautes-Pyrénées, at the site of Le Société
Française des Produits Azotés, in which Henri Gall’s Société d’Electrochimie had
a one-third share. It was supplied with hydro-electricity from stations at Bordères-
Louron and Loudenvielle [15]. In November 1918, two enlarged cyanamide works
were in operation and others, including Lannemezan, were nearly completed. One
British observer remarked: “With all this plant in operation, France would have
been independent of outside supplies of nitre. In this branch of chemical industry
they got much ahead, and still remain far in advance of us” [16]. From 1917, the
Table 8.1 Calcium cyanamide factories at the close of 1917

Original affiliation,
or licensing
arrangement with: Company Place Notes
Cyanid-Gesell- Bayerische Stickstoff- Trostberg, Bavaria
schaft (1899); La Werke AG (Frank-
Societa Generale Caro)
per la Cianamide
(1907)
La Societa Nitrogen Products and Odda, Norway Successor, with
Generale per la Carbide Company Alby United Car-
Cianamide (1907) (Limited), London bide Company, to
North-Western
Cyanamide
Company
Nitrogen Products and Meraker, Norway Carbide
Carbide Company manufacture
(Limited), London
Nitrogen Products and Alby, Sweden
Carbide Company
(Limited), London
Societa Italiana per il Papigno, near Terni,
Carburo di Calcio/ Italy
Societa Italiana
Prodotti Azotati (SIPA)
Societa Piemontese per San Marcel, Aosta
il Carburo di Calcio Valley, Italy
Le Société Française Martigny, Switzerland
des Produits Azotés
Gotthardwerke Bodia, Switzerland
Le Société Française Notre-Dame-de
des Produits Azotés Briançon, Hautes-
Alpes, France
Le Société Française Bellegarde, Rhône-
des Produits Azotés Alpes, France
Ost-Deutscher Bromberg, Province of
Stickstoffcalc und Posen, Prussia (today
Chemische Werke Bydgoszcz, Republic
of Poland)
Reichsstickstoffwerke Piesteritz, near Witten- Managed by
(German government) berg, Saxony Bayerische
Stickstoff-Werke
Reichsstickstoffwerke Chorzów/K€onigshutte, Managed by
(German government) Upper Silesia (today Bayerische
Chorzów, Republic of Stickstoff-Werke
Poland)
Aussiger Verein Falkenau, Bohemia,
Austria-Hungary
(today Sokolov, Czech
Republic)
(continued)
8.2 France 157
Table 8.1 (continued)

or licensing
Societa per Cernica, near Sebenico,
l’Utilizzazione delle Dalmatia, Austria-
Forze Idrauliche della Hungary (today
Dalmazia Croatia)
Societa per Dugi Rat, near
l’Utilizzazione delle Almissa, Dalmatia,
Forze Idrauliche della Austria-Hungary
Dalmazia (today Dugi Rat,
Croatia)
Japan Nitrogenous Fer- Minamata, Kagami,
tilizer Co. (Nitchitsu) Kyushu
Nitrogen Products and Dagenham Docks, near Ammonia from
Carbide Company London Odda cyanamide;
(Limited) then gasworks
liquor. Late in the
war joined with
Alby United Car-
bide Company to
enlarge the Odda
works. Some work
at Trafford Park,
Manchester.
Licensee of Ostwald
process for oxida-
tion of ammonia
American Cyanamid Niagara Falls, Ontario
Company
Deutsche Karbid AG für Knapsack, Westphalia
Gesellschaft Stickstoffdünger
(1906); AG für
Stickstoffdünger
(1909, Polzenius)
Electrizitäts-Werke Visp (Viège),
Lonza Switzerland
Österreichische Maria Rast, Steiermark Commenced manu-
Stickstoffwerke (Lower Styria), facture July 1918
Austria-Hungary
(today Slovenia)
Ungarische Dics€oszentmárton, Completed during
Stickstoffdünger AG Austria-Hungary the war, but not
(today Tărn^aveni, operational until
Romania) 1919
Mitteldeutsche Groß-Kayna, near Subsidiary of AG
Stickstoffwerke Merseburg, Saxony für
Stickstoffdünger.
Limited production.
Lonzawerke Waldshut, Baden-
Elektrochemische Württemberg
Fabriken
(continued)
Table 8.1 (continued)

or licensing
Other
Oscar Fredrik Stockholms Near Alby, Sweden
Svante Carlson’s Superfosfat Fabriks
process Aktiebolag/
Nitrogenium
Electro-Chemical Tomakomai, Hok-
Co. (Denka) kaido; Ōmuta, Ky
ush
u
Electro-Chemical Fushun, Manchuria
Co. (Denka)
Frank-Caro; under French government Minor factories
license from Nitro-
gen Products and
Carbide Company
(Limited)
French government Lannemezan, Hautes- Not operational at
Pyrénées the Armistice
Sources include: Adolf Bräuer and J. D’Ans (editors), Fortschritte in der anorganisch-chemischen
Industrie an Hand der Deutschen Reichs-Patente, Erster Band 1877–1917, Zweiter Teil. Berlin:
Verlag von Julius Springer, 1922, p. 2103. Air Nitrates Corporation (American Cyanamid Com-
pany) started construction of “US Nitrate Plant No. 2,” at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, in December
1917. The Indre Ålvik works in Norway commenced carbide manufacture in 1919, but was then
abandoned
French became increasingly dependent on explosives imported from the United

States. Meantime, Georges Claude was undertaking experiments into high-pressure
ammonia synthesis.
8.3 Italy
In 1916, Carlo Rossi commenced calcium cyanamide manufacture at Domodossola,

in northern Italy, at the foot of the Alps. He had in 1911 been responsible for
introduction of the Pauling electric arc process at the Legnano site and investigated
improvements, probably at a small facility near Rome. An explosion almost
destroyed the Legnano works, and it was not rebuilt.
Italian production of calcium cyanamide grew from 114,000 quintals in 1913 to
289,000 quintals in 1915. In an effort to improve the supply of food, increased use
of gas and coke works ammonium sulphate and cyanamide as fertilizers was
encouraged, including through decrees. One of these in 1917 offered agricultural
societies and farmers in Puglia (Apulia), Calabria, and Sicily, as an inducement,
reimbursement of up to one-quarter of the purchase cost. Another decree was aimed
8.5 The Secret of Synthetic Ammonia 159
at combatting adulteration through the use of a special seal to close sacks of

fertilizer [17].
As in France wartime investigations were undertaken into high-pressure ammo-
nia synthesis, in this case by Luigi Casale.
8.4 Great Britain
In Britain by early 1916, losses to German submarine attacks stimulated efforts to

introduce the new synthetic nitrogen processes. This was the remit of the Nitrogen
Products Committee, an advisory panel of the Munitions Inventions Department,
Ministry of Munitions, created in June 1916, following recommendations taken by
the Council of the Faraday Society [18–20]. The committee was sanctioned by the
then Minister of Munitions, David Lloyd George, and was supported by Sir William
Crookes. The main interest was in the Haber-Bosch process. But how to cope with
its severe working conditions was a complete mystery. This challenge was taken up
by the Ministry of Munitions, but without success. However, the post-war outcome
of the research, carried out from 1916 mainly at University College London, would
lead, in the hands of a band of talented chemists and engineers, led by George Pollitt
and Herbert Humphrey, to the establishment in Britain of a viable imitation of the
Haber-Bosch process. This would have a lasting influence on the direction of the
country’s chemical industry. Its importance is such that British wartime and post-
war research and development, mainly in industry, deserve special treatment and
are brought together in a separate chapter (Chap. 9). Since nothing was achieved on
an industrial scale before the early 1920s, with either synthetic ammonia or
cyanamide, it is appropriate here to review wartime and post-war reactions by
British observers and commentators to the impact of the German Haber-Bosch
process. This is often closely linked to Haber’s role in the development of gas
warfare.
8.5 The Secret of Synthetic Ammonia
Interest in Haber’s novel ammonia synthesis outside of Germany was considerable

even before its introduction as the Haber-Bosch process, and it would continue to
grow, particularly during the war years. However, despite the wartime efforts of
individuals and groups of researchers in Europe, Japan, and the United States, it was
not possible to bring about the industrial high-pressure combination of nitrogen
with hydrogen. The practical constraints were enormous.
The Haber-Bosch process, an ingenious, elegant example of chemical engineer-
ing, and of the application of science to industry, is still viewed with awe today,
even if not as much as in the past. It is perhaps that awe and the remarkable and
unprecedented success of the industrial synthesis that exaggerated the role of the
process, and in turn the role of Haber, in enabling Germany to wage extended
warfare—as observed in the British parliament on 28 June 1917 by Liberal politi-
cian and chemical manufacturer Sir William Pearce (1853–1932) of Spencer,
Chapman & Messel, Ltd [21].
To-day Germany is making the whole of her high nitrogen explosives from nitrogen
extracted from the air, and also a large portion of her fertilisers, and she is able to do this
without any importation of nitrate of soda. If she had not been able to do this, the War
would have been over more than eighteen months ago. That was an industrial achievement
which was effected in Germany during this War. . .Germany has solved another pressing
problem. German manufacturers had taken a very large interest, an almost controlling
interest, in sources of supply in various parts of Europe and abroad. They proceeded to get
rid of their interest and developed their chief power from low-class coal in their own
country. . . To my mind, the German achievement is one of the most remarkable things in
the whole War, and it is a lesson to us that it is by these ways that a nation can inherit the
earth rather than by frightfulness and by cruelty. If Germany had been content to use her
great brains and her great practical organisation in this way, I think that the countries would
have had peace to-day and this awful War might have been avoided.
One thing was clear: the mystique associated with the Haber-Bosch process
abroad contributed to BASF’s unrivalled prestige, which it would retain for
decades.
Not untypical of responses to the vital role played by the Haber-Bosch process in
the German war effort was that of Major Victor Lefebure (1891–1947). Lefebure,
who had studied chemistry at University College London, during 1915–1919,
served with the British Army in France, specializing in gas warfare work. After
the war he spent time in occupied Germany, including at Oppau and
Ludwigshafen [22].2 In 1921 he published The Riddle of the Rhine: Chemical
Strategy in Peace and War, subsequently reworked for the United States Chemical
Foundation, which lobbied for a powerful and strategic dye industry [23, 24]. The
book was widely read and influential [25].
Lefebure opined, in connection with Article 172 of the Treaty of Versailles—
signed by Germany on 28 June 1919—that: “probably the most important point in
the clause is its interpretations with regard to the Haber process. Its critical
importance in the manufacture of explosives is so great that our neglect to use the
Treaty to remove the monopoly is a direct menace to peace. This process undoubt-
edly saved Germany in 1915 and is largely responsible for the three years of war
agony which followed” [26].
Then there was British physical chemist Brigadier-General Harold Brewer
Hartley (1878–1972), who before the war was at Balliol College, University of
Oxford. He was an important post-war investigator of German developments, as the
leading member of the “British Mission Appointed to Visit Enemy Chemical
Factories in the Occupied Zone Engaged in the Production of Munitions of War,”
2
Lefebure led a gas cylinder attack near Nieuport in 1916 and was subsequently rewarded with the
rank of major. In 1917, he co-organized an inter-allied gas conference to which American
observers were invited. He joined the British Dyestuffs Corporation at Blackley near Manchester
in 1919.
8.5 The Secret of Synthetic Ammonia 161
sent out under the auspices of the Explosives Supply Department in late January
1919. Following the visit, which covered both British and French zones, Hartley
reported—with the usual somewhat exaggerated reference to the role of the Haber-
Bosch process, as well as with more than a hint of admiration—that [27],
the key to Germany’s war production of explosives was the Haber process for the produc-
tion of ammonia from atmospheric nitrogen. It is significant that large scale production by
this process only began at the end of 191[3], and that [late in] 1914 great pressure was put
on the Badische Co., to increase its output. . ..Without such a process Germany could not
have made the nitric acid required for her explosives programme, nor obtained fertilizers
for food production after the supply of Chile saltpeter had been stopped by our blockade,
and it is probable that she could not have continued the war after 1916.
During Hartley’s on-site survey of the German chemical industry he was accom-
panied by seven British colleagues, in addition to delegates from the United States,
France (four), Italy (five), and Belgium (one). The secretary of the mission was
chemist Stanley Isaac Levy (1890–1968), whose letter drawing attention to the
purported ignorance shown by a minister in the British war cabinet of the nitrate
problem was published in Chemistry and Industry during March 1924. Levy had
served as research assistant at the Ministry of Munitions during the war, which
perhaps suggests that he had reasonable evidence of such ignorance [28].
Hartley opined, much in the same way that Ostwald had drawn attention in 1903
to the then critical role of Chilean nitrate: “In the event of another war we might be
cut off from supplies of saltpetre.” The implications were far reaching. Blocking the
export of Chilean nitrate, as the recent war had demonstrated, threatened the ability
to maintain a modern army. It was the German chemical industry’s tradition of
focusing on priority projects, and their successful outcomes, as so recently applied
to synthetic ammonia, that emphasized the need to ensure independence in strategic
nitrogen products. At the same time this particular endeavour had brought about a
distinct shift to a new style of industrial research and development that was more
akin to chemical engineering.
8.5.1 The “Haber” Myth
In February 1923, Chemistry and Industry, emphasizing the role of synthetic

ammonia in agriculture rather than in war following a survey solicited among
readers, could only add to the praises for this remarkable achievement [29]:
THE FIXATION OF ATMOSPHERIC NITROGEN receives the first place in this week’s
letters. . .Pre-eminent, . . . [among chemical innovations], stands the synthetic ammonia
process for the brilliance of the application of physical chemistry to its solution, and for the
wonderful engineering skill displayed. But greatest of all we must recognise the profound
influence which a cheap source of ammonia will exert on the most vital problem of the
feeding of the rapidly growing population of the world by the intensive cultivation of the
land with the aid of fertilizers.
That observation served to press home the importance of the Haber synthesis in
both peace and war. Other observations, however, singled out, erroneously, the role
of the Haber-Bosch process in enabling Germany to conduct the recent war from
almost the first months. British chemist and industrialist Herbert Levinstein
(1878–1956), who had managed to replicate the German synthetic indigo process
during the war, had this to say of the ammonia synthesis: “Germany must have
collapsed after the Marne but for Oppau. We [Britain] could not have carried on if
the German blockade had cut off our Chile saltpetre” [30]. In a similar vein, Victor
Lefebure observed [31]:
It must be remembered that, after the first Battle of the Marne, the German Government
turned to the I.G. [the community of interests of 1916] for a large part of its explosives and
practically all its poison gas, and, as has been stated on many occasions, and with reason,
Germany would not have been able to continue the war after the summer of 1915 but for the
commercial development of the Haber process by the I.G.
Lord Moulton drew attention to the purported vital role of the “Haber factories”
in Germany’s preparations for war prior to 1914, and went so far as to claim that the
Germans had deliberately waited for the factories to be got ready prior to embarking
on war [32].
The myth was also perpetuated in Germany. In 1960, Nobel laureate Otto Hahn
apparently remembered that on 29 January 1935, at a Kaiser Wilhelm Society
gathering honouring the late Fritz Haber—a meeting from which civil servants
were excluded by the National Socialists—the society’s president, Max Planck, in
the opening address pointed out that “had not Haber made his magnificent discov-
ery, Germany would have collapsed, economically and militarily, in the first three
months of World War I” [33].
These and similar statements continue to provide the basis for unsubstantiated
claims that the Haber-Bosch process sustained the German munitions industry
throughout the war, at least from 1915. Less controversial is the role of Fritz
Haber in leading Germany’s chemical warfare effort. This was a response to the
stalemate from the latter part of 1914 and the shortage of nitrogen products for
filling shells, both then and later. Toxic gases acted as both substitutes and supple-
ments for conventional nitrogen explosives. Moreover, no account of Fritz Haber’s
life, particularly during 1914–1918, can omit a summary of this episode in “The
Chemist’s War.”
8.6 Gas Warfare
For most people, Fritz Haber’s name is synonymous with either synthetic ammonia
or gas (chemical) warfare, and occasionally with both. In war, Haber was a loyal
patriot of the Fatherland. On 4 October 1914, Haber, and Emil Fischer, were among
93 signatories, men of arts and sciences—including Carl Engler, Paul Ehrlich,
Walther Nernst, Wilhelm Ostwald, Richard Willstätter, Max Planck, and Philip
8.6 Gas Warfare 163
Lenard—of Ludwig Fulda’s “Der Aufruf der 93: ‘An die Kulturwelt’” (Manifesto
of the 93: To the Cultural World) that was published in German newspapers. Jointly
they affirmed loyalty to the German Reich and rejected claims of German aggres-
sion and barbarism against Belgium and its citizens [34].
Haber’s main role during the war was however in the mobilizing of science to
the needs of the military [35, 36]. His outstanding organizational skills were
increasingly harnessed in the service of the state through the laboratories of his
own institute. This included research into gas warfare. However, he was not the
initiator. In October 1914, the German military, by then fully aware of the danger
posed by shortages of nitrogen products, began to take an interest in other products
made by the synthetic dye industry. Carl Duisberg, head of Bayer, was encouraged
to test toxic chemicals, particularly dye intermediates, in shells. On 27 October
1914, 3000 shells carrying a lachrymatory agent, the chlorosulphate salt
of dianisidine, were fired at British and Indian troops near Neuve-Chapelle. In
January 1915, shells filled with mixed xylyl bromide and explosive (T-shells) were
fired at Russian troops. Both had little impact. The contents of the T-shells froze due
to the cold weather.
By March 1915, there were severe shortages of explosives for shells on both
sides, which encouraged the use of toxic gases. Haber, who originally suggested
firing shells containing toxic chemicals from mortars, came up with a simpler
method, release of compressed liquid chlorine from steel cylinders placed in
trenches. He supervised the installation by mid-April 1915 of 6000 chlorine cylin-
ders at Langemarck, near the Flemish town of Ypres. On 22 April 1915, the
direction of the wind was in favour of the Germans; the valves of the cylinders
were opened to release the yellow-green gas. It enveloped French and Algerian
soldiers who suffered the effects of the first large-scale release of an effective war
gas. Among the 5000 casualties, including 1000 dead, were a few German soldiers
who found themselves in the way of the gas cloud in this Second Battle of Ypres.
Just two days later a similar attack caused 10,000 casualties, with 4000 dead [37–39].
Though no breakthrough was achieved, in part because German commanders
had no confidence in the tactic, a new type of warfare was introduced, particularly
in frontal offensives.
On May 2, Haber’s wife, Clara, committed suicide, though probably not alto-
gether, as is often stated, in protest at her husband’s new role in warfare, nor of his
neglect for her (depression and suicidal tendencies were not unknown in her family;
Hermann took his life in 1946, as did, later on, the oldest of his three daughters).
Two-and-a-half years later Haber remarried, on 25 October 1917, to Miss Charlotte
Nathan, who managed the German Society, a gathering place in Berlin frequented
by influential men from government, industry, the arts, and sciences.
Fritz Haber’s Kaiser Wilhelm Institute became the centre for war-related work
involving toxic agents. His colleagues included Otto Hahn, James Frank, and
Hans Geiger. Studies included the development of gas masks and suitable fillers,
in which work organic chemist Richard Willstätter was involved. In February
1916 the institute’s new role was formalized. A coordinating body was
established, at the suggestion of Haber, who was backed by Koppel and Friedrich
Schmidt-Ott (1860–1956) of the Prussian Ministry of Education. This Kaiser

Wilhelm Foundation for Military and Technical Sciences (Kaiser-Wilhelm-
Stiftung für kriegstechnische Wissenschaften) became part of the War Ministry
in 1917 [40]. The ministry’s Department 8 was devoted to chemical warfare under
the management of Haber’s institute.
Despite the 1899 Hague Convention, in which the signatories agreed to refrain
from using projectiles to disperse asphyxiating or deleterious gases in warfare, as
ratified in 1907, at which time poisons were banned, retribution for the use of
chlorine in war was axiomatic. The British (and French), though without facilities
for compressing chlorine, which the Germans had taken into account while plan-
ning the use of the gas, were not slow in responding. A consignment of gas
cylinders filled with chlorine was on its way to France by early July 1915
[41]. The gas was released on 25 September 1915, but the retaliation did not go
well as the wind shifted direction, inflicting considerable casualties on both sides.
During the following years, the Allies and Central Powers developed ever more
toxic and debilitating chemicals. The French called on the services of Victor
Grignard, the British on Harold Hartley and William J. Pope at the University of
Cambridge, and the Americans on Arthur B. Lamb, one of Haber’s former assis-
tants, at Harvard. Captain Hartley in 1915 had joined the Royal Engineers to work
on gas warfare, taking on the role of chemical adviser to the Third Army in France.
In 1917, as lieutenant-colonel, he was assistant director of Gas Services, General
Head Quarters, France, and late in 1918, as brigadier-general, Controller of the
Chemical Warfare Department, Ministry of Munitions. Toxic agents included
phosgene, and mustard gas (yperite, introduced in summer 1917). Theories of
meteorology guided the attacker. In the end the artillery barrages of toxic agents
played hardly any role in determining the outcome of the war. They did however
leave many casualties, suffering the long-term effects. There were also laboratory
casualties among those engaged in gas warfare work, including Haber’s colleagues
at his Kaiser Wilhelm Institute. Gerhardt Just lost a hand, and Otto Sackur was
killed as the result of an explosion when working with a bromine compound.
Notwithstanding the widespread condemnation of gas warfare, in public at least,
and misgivings among some chemists, there were those in the military, including
scientists, who believed in its potential for bringing about a quick end to battles.
They included Victor Lefebure, Harold Hartley, and Major General Amos Fries of
the US Chemical Warfare Service.
8.7 War Work: Ammonia Converters and Merseburg
The wartime Haber-Bosch facility at Oppau was “the last word on the subject,”
according to an American delegation from the Nitrate Division, Ordnance Depart-
ment, U.S. Army, that visited Ludswigshafen-Oppau in June 1919. They were
advised that “the German Government advanced something over 200,000,000
marks” towards its construction [42]. Another figure was 20 million pounds
8.7 War Work: Ammonia Converters and Merseburg 165
sterling. Carl Bosch, for his contribution to the nitrogen work and expansion of
ammonia production, in addition to his skills as an organizer, was in 1916 appointed
a director of BASF (and chairman in 1919).
Wartime developments had led to the introduction of a highly efficient, robust
manufacturing facility. In 1913, the ammonia converters were 8 metres long. In
1915, Oppau began producing ammonia in ten 12-metre long converters, each one
75 tons in weight, and assembled from two 6-metre sections bolted together. The
maximum size of forgings from solid ingots dictated the length of each section.
Inner diameters of ammonia chambers were increased from an initial 500 to
800 mm. With the larger converters, pressures of 300 atmospheres were introduced.
Outputs of converters increased from 20 tons a day in 1913 to 85 tons a day in 1915.
Improvement of internal heat exchange closely followed the design of reactors
devised by Rudolph Kneitsch for the BASF sulphuric acid contact process.
In order to maintain high production levels changes were made in the prepara-
tion of reactant gases. This included an improved process for preparing hydrogen
from water gas, as developed by Wilhelm Wild during 1910–1912. It was intro-
duced into the Oppau factory, in collaboration with Bosch, in 1915 [43]. Steam
blown over red hot coke gave water gas, comprising equal volumes of hydrogen and
carbon monoxide. The Bosch-Wild modification involved a further steam treatment
at 350–450 C over an iron-chromium catalyst. The result was a mixture of carbon
dioxide and more hydrogen. This is called the “shift reaction.”
H2 O þ CO ! CO2 þ H2 ΔH ¼ 41 kJ mol1
The reaction was also called the Bamag process after the engineering firm
responsible for supplying the special equipment. The ammonia process steps
were now modified, as follows: A nitrogen-hydrogen mixture was made up from
producer gas and water gas. Sulphur compounds were removed, originally over
activated carbon. The carbon dioxide formed in the shift reaction was absorbed, and
subsequently recovered, by physical solution, or scrubbing, in water. Then, starting
at 25 atmospheres pressure, the gas mixture was compressed in stages to 200 atmo-
spheres, final traces of carbon monoxide were removed, and the hydrogen-nitrogen
mixture was made up in the correct stoichiometric proportions, 75% hydrogen and
25% nitrogen.
Late in 1914, Oppau ceased the manufacture of ammonium sulphate fertilizer
and produced instead ammonium nitrate for munitions manufacture, eventually at
the rate of 60,000 tons a year. The Ammonia Laboratory continued to deal with
design problems, including investigation of novel steel alloys. Bamag collaborated
closely with Bosch in the development of ammonia oxidation plant [44]. By the end
of the war, the 175-acre Oppau site was equipped with fifteen 12-metre ammonia
converters, in addition to eight of the earlier type. Ten double-acting pumps
continuously circulated the gas mixture. Gas engines drove all the compressors.
There were 6000 workmen on the site, not counting prisoners of war brought in to
undertake various manual tasks.
Until 1917, in the complete absence of Chile saltpetre, the production of nitrogen
products relied on cyanamide, coal gas and coke works ammonia, and BASF
synthetic ammonia. It was only then that the Haber-Bosch process came well to the
fore with the opening of a new works on a green-field site in central Germany.
Based on the success of Oppau, Bosch at the end of 1915 lobbied for the German
government to fund construction of a new Haber-Bosch facility. In this he was
successful. The site chosen was at Leuna, near Merseburg, on the River Saale,
20 km south-east of Halle, on the route of the railway connecting Berlin with
Frankfurt. The location was in part chosen to ensure that the factory was out of the
range of Allied aerial bombardment (the French had bombed Oppau on 27 May
1915, in what was the first ever strategic air raid on an industrial facility). Nearby
were sources of water, brown coal, and gypsum (later used to make ammonium
sulphate). Hydrogen was produced from water gas. Thirteen large boiler houses, for
power and other utilities, each with a 120-metre tall chimney, extended almost the
whole length of the factory. During this period Bosch had to deal with the AEG
engineer Wichard von M€ollendorff, then director of Kriegschemikalien AG, and
subsequently head of the Reichsstickstoffwerke (August 1915–April 1916). There
was another factor in the choice of location, in common with all major German
nitrogen works constructed during World War I [45]. It was in Prussia, rather than
Bavaria, which played a relatively small role in the war. The Merseburg facility,
ultimately covering thirteen square kilometres, was later known as the Leunawerke
(Figs. 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7).
An arrangement similar to that already in operation for the Reichsstickstoffwerke
cyanamide factories was proposed by Karl Helfferich at the Reich Treasury. This
would have meant government ownership of Merseburg, creating a state monopoly
on nitrogen production. BASF, however, objected to this proposal. An agreement
was finally reached on 10 April 1916 in which BASF accepted the cost of construc-
tion, with loans and subsidies from the Reich, that pledged to purchase the entire
output. Construction at Merseburg, directed by Carl Krauch, commenced on
19 May 1916.
It was a critical time in the conduct of the war. The Germans had launched the
long Verdun offensive against the French in February, leading to a series of attacks
and counterattacks, with losses of around 70,000 or more men every month
(by December the French managed to recover lost ground). On 1 July 1916, the
British began their Somme attack, also with massive losses. The Germans were
forced to move men and equipment from the Verdun sector (to face a Russian
offensive). At the end of August, Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff,
following their successes since 1914 on the Eastern Front, were appointed joint
chiefs of staff, replacing von Falkenhayn, whose Verdun offensive, suffering from
the transfer of resources, and heavy casualties, was falling apart.
In August 1916, the Hindenburg programme for state controlled industrial
reorganization, in which Carl Duisberg played a prominent role, was brought into
operation. The industrialized war economy was conducted on an unprecedented
scale, with centralized control of the production of armaments. It dictated urgent
doubling and even tripling of war production [46, 47]. This required increased
outputs of ammonia, cyanamide, nitric acid and ammonium nitrate, and toluene and
other aromatics, as well as the war gases. Germany in 1916 produced 36 million
shells, a fourfold increase on 1915.
8.7 War Work: Ammonia Converters and Merseburg
Fig. 8.1 The BASF Merseburg factory, c. 1920. From a painting by Otto Bollhagen. Note the pipe and utility bridges, moving cranes, coal conveyors,
extensive railway network, and gasometers. The sheer size of the facility symbolized the scale of the German wartime nitrogen programme from mid-1916.
(BASF Unternehmensarchiv)
167
Fig. 8.2 Germany, including the provinces of Posen and Silesia, showing locations of operating
Haber-Bosch BASF ammonia and calcium cyanamide factories, in 1917
Fig. 8.3 The BASF Merseburg factory, showing pipe bridges, and the gas plant, with the capacity
for producing up to 80 million cubic feet every day. (Bild-Nr XIV/3 Haber, Archiv der
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Berlin-Dahlem)
On August 18, the two groups of major German dye-making firms had created
the IG (Interessengemeinschaft der deutschen Teerfarbenfabriken), which included
Weiler-ter Meer and Griesheim-Elektron. Three areas excluded from their joint
Fig. 8.4 Machining a hollow forged ammonia converter at the Fried. Krupp AG works, Essen.
The holes in the flanges enabled connections between vessels to be made with bolts and studs.
(Edelstein Centre)
Fig. 8.5 Compressor room, BASF Merseburg. Several reciprocating compressors were required
since there were technical restrictions on the volume of gas that each one could handle. (Edelstein
Center)
interests were BASF synthetic ammonia, the Hoechst interest in acetylene chemis-
try, and the Griesheim-Elektron light metals business [48]. However, the merging
of interests strengthened the financial standing of the chemical industry and enabled
better working relationships, such as in the supply of BASF ammonia to the other
partners (for production of nitric acid), and compliance with the needs of the
Hindenburg programme.
On 15 September 1916, at the Battle of the Somme the British introduced the
tank in an effort to clear the German trenches, something that gas warfare in 1915
Fig. 8.6 Ammonia

synthesis, BASF
Merseburg. (Harold
Tongue, The Design and
Construction of High
Pressure Chemical Plant.
London: Chapman & Hall,
1934, Fig. 221. IG Farben
photograph)
had failed to achieve. A few days later, on September 20, Hindenburg’s office wrote
to the Reich Chancellor demanding that the Reich reduce the amount of nitrogen
allocated to agriculture. This would release sufficient nitrogen to maintain the
20,000 tons per month required for preparing 14,000 tons of propellant powder
(Treibpulver). The correspondence showed that monthly production of ammonia
then amounted to: 8000 tons from coke ovens, 5000 tons from Oppau, and
4700 tons from the cyanamide factories. Included was a cyanamide facility at
Waldshut (Lonzawerke), south-west Baden-Württemberg, with an annual capacity
of 60,000 tons. No further increase in coke oven ammonia was anticipated, the
planned Merseburg works would initially provide an additional 2500 tons, and
ammonia output from cyanamide would be increased to 6500 tons. Hindenburg
strongly recommended that the Reich Chancellor work with the Ministry of Agri-
culture, the KRA, and the Reich Treasury, to ensure the urgent reallocation of
nitrogen products.
On the same day the nitrogen situation was discussed at a meeting in Berlin.
The participants were Fritz Haber and Major Charles Garke (1860–1936), as
representatives of the Prussian War Ministry; Nikodem Caro, representing the
Reichsstickstoffwerke (managed by the Bayerische); Julius Bueb, commissioner
Fig. 8.7 Catalytic hydrogen plant at Merseburg. This process was based on the Bosch-Wild
modification in which steam treatment of water gas at 350–450 C over an iron-chromium catalyst
converted carbon monoxide into carbon dioxide and increased the hydrogen content (the “shift
reaction”). (Harold Tongue, The Design and Construction of High Pressure Chemical Plant.
London: Chapman & Hall, 1934, Fig. 73. IG Farben photograph)
for the nitrogen economy; Eberhard Ramm, of the Prussian Ministry of Agriculture;
and representatives of the Treasury, the War Food Office, the KRA, the Reich
Interior Ministry, and the Bavarian Interior Ministry. The meeting was charged
with a sense of considerable urgency. After allowing for additional needs of the
military, shortfalls in the agricultural sector were anticipated for the autumn of 1917
and spring of 1918, unless (and probably even if) the new capacities became
available. Agriculture required 50,000 tons of nitrogen per year, whereas only
30,000 tons were possible under the new arrangement. There was, overall, the
need for an additional 6000 tons per month and, it was observed, “This cannot be
achieved by one process alone” [49]. Suggestions for making up the shortfall
included increasing cyanamide capacity by 1500 tons per month through the new
carbide and power plant near Trostberg, and by 800 tons per month through
expanding Chorzów from 25,000 to 75,000 tons per year. Haber anticipated that a
further 2000 tons a month would become available from BASF by the end of 1917.
This had to come from Merseburg, since, as the representatives of the Royal
Bavarian Government pointed out, additional ammonia capacity could not be
achieved at Oppau. They did however encourage the increased cyanamide capacity
at Trostberg.
The figures given in the letter from Hindenburg’s office demonstrate the extent
to which even late in 1916 the Haber-Bosch process was by no means an overriding
factor in the production of essential nitrogen products required for both the military
and agriculture. Cyanamide-derived ammonia was still important, as demonstrated
by the new carbide and hydro-electric facilities close to Trostberg and the threefold
expansion of production at Chorzów. However preference was increasingly being

given to the Haber-Bosch process. This, as it was argued, required less labour for
construction and operation, power requirements were considerably lower than for
the cyanamide process, a critical aspect when there was reliance on coal-fired
power stations, and operation was less complicated than for cyanamide, insofar as
working up the product was involved. Cyanamide production, while it used far less
sophisticated equipment, required considerable manual work, including the sizing
of lime and coke with sledge hammers, and breaking up by hand of carbide pigs and
cyanamide ingots (until mechanical hammers were introduced). Coke oven ammo-
nia was assigned, as ammonium sulphate, to the farmers.
Though Merseburg suited the demands of the Hindenburg programme, there
were delays in construction caused by the general war situation, including shortages
of coal and an unusually cold winter. The severity of the weather affected the whole
chemical industry, as well as the population. Thus, on 7 January 1917, with the
temperature at 21 C, the Bayer Flittard TNT plant was completely wrecked by an
explosion when a foreman attempted to free a frozen pipe from ice [50]. The
situation was aggravated by severe shortages of food, particularly potatoes and
meat, arising from a poor harvest. There had already been extensive food riots in
Prussia early in 1916. The turnip became a substitute for other staple foods during
what was long remembered as the Turnip Winter of 1916–1917.
On the evening of 27 April 1917, the Merseburg facility first produced ammonia.
The next day it dispatched a train of tank wagons containing ammonia to Oppau
(where it was converted into nitric acid, for production of ammonium nitrate and
nitro compounds). Chalked on the tank of the first wagon were the words “Death to
the French” (Fig. 8.8). That was just three weeks after the United States declared
war on Germany. And just under three months before the British offensive in
Flanders began.
The original planned ammonia capacity of what was referred to as Merseburg I
was 30,000 tons per year, soon increased to 75,000 tons, then, in December 1916, in
line with the demands of the Hindenburg programme to 160,000 tons (Merseburg
II, but not in service at the Armistice) [51]. An Imperial Trade inspection of the
Merseburg facility on 15 December 1917 noted that: “The ammonia water is 20 to
22 per cent. It is of purity suitable for nitric acid production” [52]. In July 1918, plans
were drawn up for further expansion, to 240,000 tons per year (Merseburg III).
German ammonium nitrate production in 1917, described by one source as
“sulphate of ammonia (really ammonium nitrate),” was 700,000 tons, equal to
that of Great Britain and the United States combined [53]. In response to the severe
food shortages experienced in Germany, and considerable social unrest, in January
1918 the Prussian Minister of Trade and Business was advised that some Haber-
Bosch synthetic ammonia could be diverted to agriculture, as a result of expanding
output at both Merseburg and Oppau. Oppau alone had increased production
of ammonium nitrate from approximately 300,000 tons in 1916 to 500,000 tons
in 1917, mainly relying on ammonia from Merseburg [54]. Expansion in Haber-
Bosch ammonia enabled additional cyanamide to be released for agriculture.
However, shortages of cyanamide—since carbide was also required for other
Fig. 8.8 The first trainload of ammonia awaiting departure from the BASF Merseburg works on
28 April 1917, bound for Oppau. Written by workers in chalk on the tank of the first wagon are the
date, “Good Luck,” and “Death to the French.” Tree branches serve as decoration. (LHSA, MER,
1 525, Fotosammlung, Nr. 786. Landeshauptarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung Merseburg)
purposes and deliveries of coal were hampered by the overloaded railway net-
work—and other fertilizers contributed to an erosion of confidence among Germans
in the war effort [55].
Hartley’s February 1919 report of visits to chemical factories in the occupied
British and French zones engaged in the production of munitions indicates that in
1918 Germany produced 650 tons of synthetic ammonia per day: 250 tons at
Oppau, and 400 tons at Merseburg (Fig. 8.9). Significantly, and again despite
later views to the contrary, Hartley noted that [56]:
No arrangements appear to have been made prior to the outbreak of war to utilize the
resources of any of the dye factories for war purposes, and on mobilization their chemists
were called up for military service. After the battle of the Marne the Government realized
the need for expanding the output of explosives and most of the chemical works were
producing small quantities by the end of 1914. The demands made on them increased
during 1915, but it was not until 1916 that plant [at Merseburg] was laid down to assist in
the enormous production of explosives required by the Hindenburg plan. Most of the big
extensions of the synthetic ammonia and of the nitric and sulphuric acid plants date from
this time, many chemists being released from the army and the scientific staff of some of the
works being augmented.
From April 1918, Ludendorff, Supreme Commander of the German Army in

Flanders, failed to hold back Allied forces along the coasts of Belgium and northern
France. Apart from German military failures, particularly in early August, followed
Fig. 8.9 Tables of German production of ammonia and nitric acid, 1914 and 1918. (Dyestuffs:
Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, on H.R. 2706 and
H.R. 6495, June 18–20 and July 14–18, 1919 [66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1919]. Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1919, p. 211)
by the Allied push in September, there were severe shortages of food resulting in
considerable part from the diversion of nitrogen products away from agriculture, as
demanded by Hindenburg in September 1916, and the general slowdown in man-
ufacture. The outcome of the war of attrition was increasingly dependent on
developments far away from the trenches and battlefields. These included the
British blockade; shortages of horses, farm labour, and coal; worn out machinery;
and transport difficulties, particularly on the railways. The burden of the war was
also taking a political toll, with strikes in factories, social unrest, riots, and other
domestic problems. Vladimir Lenin’s arrival at Finland Station, Petrograd (Saint
Petersburg until 1914) in early April 1917, after a train journey from Zurich through
Germany—the Germans ensured safe passage—across the Baltic Sea, and by train
again via Sweden and Finland, was meant to hasten Russian withdrawal from the
war, but the provisional government of Alexander Kerensky held out.
America’s entry into the war, also in April 1917, forced the Germans into a series
of major offences intended to bring the war to an end before the Allies could make
full use of their expanded numerical advantage in manpower and resources. Ger-
man chemist Hermann Staudinger (1881–1965), then at ETH, Zurich, predicted, on
the basis of his study of available raw materials—including coal and iron ore,
between 1860 and 1912—that Germany would be defeated. Staudinger opined that
modern war was a question of technology rather than manpower [57]. However
much German manufacturing technology had advanced, it would inevitably face a
crisis brought on by severe shortages of essential raw materials. Now that the
initiative had passed to the Allies, the defeat of Germany was inevitable.
Notwithstanding military failure, the shortage of food, and poor organization of
factories and railways, the German nitrogen industry had expanded tremendously. In
the final stages of the war, German calcium cyanamide production capacity, though
not output, was close to an annual rate of 600,000 tons: at Reichsstickstoffwerke
Piesteritz, operated by the Bayerische, 175,000 tons; at Chorzów, likewise operated
by the Bayerische, 150,000 tons; at the Hoechst-controlled Knapsack, enlarged
considerably during the war, 140,000 tons; at the Bayerische Trostberg works,
75,000 tons; and at Waldshut (Lonzawerke), unchanged at 60,000 tons [58]. Linde
nitrogen liquefaction plant was installed at four sites—Piesteritz, Chorzów, Knap-
sack, and Waldshut. Immediate post-war expansion near the Bayerische Trostberg
site included opening of the new Margarethenberg hydro-electric power station,
close to Hirten (14.5 km upstream of the Schalchen carbide facility); started during
the war, it was completed in 1919, and in 1924 named the Caro-Werk (Power station
III). Also in 1919, a new carbide works began operating at nearby Hart (Figs. 8.10
and 8.11). Schalchen ceased manufacture of carbide in 1925 (Table 8.2).
From 1919 the state treasury administered the various industries that the Reich
had sponsored during the war, particularly in the now important civilian areas of
nitrogen, aluminium and energy production. Nitrogen meant effectively calcium
cyanamide, and with it calcium carbide. In May the government established
the Stickstoff-Syndikat, or Stickstoff-GmbH, a cartel whose original purpose
was to support, through regulation of prices, the state’s production of cyanamide.
On 24 February 1920, the Piesteritz site became a state owned corporation,
Mitteldeutsche Stickstoffe-Werk AG. This was followed on May 20 with formation
of Bayerische Kraftwerke AG, incorporating the planned carbide factory at Hart
and the nearby hydro-electric power station just to the north of the Bayerische
Trostberg facilities. On 7 March 1923, the nitrogen, aluminium and energy con-
cerns were merged into a new state corporation, the holding company Vereinigte
Industrie-Unternehmungen AG (VIAG) of Berlin.
Cyanamide manufacture was cut back considerably in the early post-war period
due to shortages of coal, which was exported in settlement of reparations claims.
Once the cyanamide industry recovered the estimated annual output remained
consistent, at around a quarter of a million metric tons, mainly from Piesteritz,
Trostberg, and Knapsack. Chorzów was assigned to Poland, under Article 256 of the
Treaty of Versailles [59]. Increasing demand, in part due to the loss of Chorzów,
necessitated the completion of new carbide facilities at Piesteritz (1923), and at
Bayerische Kraftwerke AG (Hart II, 1922–1924).
Poland also received over half the coal production facilities, and all the sulphuric
acid plants, in Upper Silesia [60].
In 1920, the estimated potential in Germany for manufacture of fixed nitrogen
was 500,000 tons, all as fertilizer: 60% from the Haber-Bosch process, and 20%
each from the gas and coke works and cyanamide factories. From 1922, Merseburg
was managed by Ammoniakwerke Merseburg-Oppau GmbH, a subsidiary of
BASF. By the following year annual production of fixed nitrogen amounted to
Fig. 8.10 Diagrammatic map showing the River Alz and canal excavated from Trostberg, Upper
Bavaria, in the direction of Margarethenberg, showing locations of: the Trostberg factory, for
calcium cyanamide and ammonia, the Schalchen carbide factory, and the Trostberg and
Tacherting power stations of the Bayerische Stickstoff-Werke AG; and the Hart carbide factory
(later known as Hart II), and the Caro-Werk (Margarethenberg/Hirten) power station of the
Bayerische Kraftwerke AG. Railway connections are shown, including the 5-km long industrial
railway from the Hart II carbide factory to Garching. The railway from Mühldorf to Freilassing,
near Salzburg, was completed in December 1908. The community of Garching expanded consid-
erably with the opening of the new facilities from 1915 (Based on a map included in an album of
photographs of the Bayerische Stickstoff-Werke AG and Bayerische Kraftwerke AG dating from
around 1925, held with the Adolph and Albert Frank Collection of papers and correspondence,
Leo Baeck Institute, New York, AR 7176/MF772, series I: personal papers, 1857–1956, box 1,
folder 13)
Fig. 8.11 The Bayerische Kraftwerke AG hydro-electric power station near Margarethenberg,
close to the Hart carbide works. It was renamed the Caro-Werk in 1924, and was also known as
power station III. (Evonik Industries AG, Corporate Archives, Hanau/Marl)
8.8 The United States 177
Table 8.2 The power stations of the Bayerische Stickstoff-Werke AG, and the Bayerische
Kraftwerke AG, early 1920s
Construction Placed in
Location began operation Owner
Power Trostberg 1909 1911 Bayerische Stickstoff-Werke
station I AG
Power Tacherting 1909 1911 Bayerische Stickstoff-Werke
station II AG
Power Margarethenberg 1915 1919 Bayerische Kraftwerke AG
station III (Hirten) (Caro Werk)
The Bayerische Kraftwerke AG was a separate entity, based on wartime plants, established in
1920, that included the facilities north of Tacherting. It had been sponsored by the Reich during the
war; it worked closely with Bayerische Stickstoff-Werke
220,000 tons. The factory employed 11,000 labourers, 2500 craftsmen (over twice
the number employed at Oppau), and 150 chemists and engineers. By 1930, there
were 15,000 labourers, and 3000 technical and clerical employees. A quarter-of-a-
million-tons of ammonium sulphate, one-quarter of the annual output, could be
accommodated in a silo (Figs. 8.12 and 8.13). Every day, 12,000 tons of brown coal,
delivered by the works railway, was consumed in producing 460,000 horsepower in
95 steam boilers. These drove 45 gas engines, dedicated to compressing the
synthesis gas mixtures, made up from water gas (for hydrogen) and producer gas
(for nitrogen) to 200 atmospheres. A Linde liquefaction plant supplied nitrogen to
adjust the composition of the mixture so as to maintain the required proportions.
The site was also equipped with its own electricity generating power station.
Recently introduced, for the first time, was large-scale oxidation of ammonia
under pressure of 5 atmospheres in the nitric acid process. Nitric acid was reacted
with calcium carbonate to give calcium nitrate. The nearby “garden city
Neu-R€ ossen” provided homes for workers [61].
8.8 The United States
In the United States, interest in the synthetic ammonia and other nitrogen fixation
processes, as well as in oxidation of ammonia to nitric acid, was prioritized from
1916, following passage on June 3 of the National Defence Act. President
Woodrow Wilson’s remit was that investigations should be undertaken to “deter-
mine the best, cheapest and most viable means for the production of nitrates and
other products for munitions of war, and useful in the manufacture of fertilizers and
other products.” Twenty million dollars were allocated to nitrogen fixation and
oxidation of ammonia, under section 124, “Nitrate Supply.” On June 19, Wilson
formally requested that the National Academy of Science create the National
Research Foundation (later the National Research Council) to encourage scientific
Fig. 8.12 Interior of BASF/IG Farben silo for storage of ammonium sulphate. The surrounding
images indicate the advantages of various fertilizers. (Erzeugnisse unserer Arbeit. Frankfurt am
Main: I.G. Farbenindustrie, 1938, opposite p. 157)
Fig. 8.13 BASF advertisement for ammonium sulphate fertilizer, c. 1918–1920. (BASF
Unternehmensarchiv)
research in industry, specifically for purposes of strengthening the national defence.

The formation of a Committee on Nitric Acid Supply was approved by the
Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker [62]. Apart from increasing the import of
Chilean nitrate, greater nitric acid capacity could be achieved only with the new
nitrogen capture technologies. While there was great interest in synthetic ammonia,
the Americans had little to draw on, excepting numerous BASF patents registered at
the United States Patent Office, and the far from perfect General Chemical process.
The Bureau of Soils of the Department of Agriculture investigated high-pressure
ammonia synthesis, as well as applications of the cyanamide process (Fig. 8.14).
Fig. 8.14 Barrels of military grade ammonium nitrate for mixing with trinitrotoluene to produce
the explosive amatol, which contained up to 80% of the nitrate. Here seen stored at “US Nitrate
Plant No. 2,” Muscle Shoals, Alabama, a calcium cyanamide facility completed just as World War
I came to an end. Though the plant did not contribute to the war effort, it demonstrated that calcium
cyanamide was an important source of ammonia suited to the production of munitions, as widely
adopted in Germany and France. Ammonia was released from the calcium cyanamide in auto-
claves based on those developed at the Bayerische Stickstoff-Werke. The photograph was taken on
17 July 1919. (Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, HAER [Historic American
Engineering Record] ALA, 17-MUSHO, 1–70)
A catalyst test plant was installed in 1917 at Arlington Experimental Farms,

Virginia [63]. However, little progress was made in developing suitable catalysts
and equipment for the ammonia synthesis. The US Bureau of Mines from 1916
investigated conditions for the catalytic oxidation of ammonia. The American
Cyanamid affiliate Ammo-Phos, at Warners, New Jersey, commenced the manu-
facture of nitric acid from cyanamide-derived ammonia, based on the autoclaves
imported from Germany at the start of the war in 1914. (Obtaining the platinum
catalyst, mainly from Russia, was less of a problem than for the Germans.) This
contributed considerably to the financial position of Ammo-Phos, which until then
had struggled to find a good market for its novel fertilizer [64].
Despite the emphasis on synthetic ammonia and its oxidation, American experts
were divided in their opinions when it came to nitrogen capture. It was not simply a
question of synthetic ammonia versus cyanamide. Thus, for example, there was the
cyanide process of John E. Bucher of Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island,
for which he filed various patents during 1914–1917. Bucher recognized the
important role of iron in catalysing the reaction. He also undertook research into
the synthesis of urea. Bucher described his cyanide process to the American
Institute of Chemical Engineers in January 1917 [65–67].
For large-scale production, Bucher proposed to heat briquettes of soda ash, coke
and iron in a vertical retort at around 1000 C, under which conditions atmospheric
nitrogen was captured as sodium cyanide. Ammonia could then be liberated from the
cyanide. Bucher’s process had been taken up by the Nitrogen Products Company, of
Rhode Island. A pilot plant was installed at Greene, Rhode Island. A young chemist
from MIT who joined Nitrogen Products in 1916 was Roger Williams (1890–1978).
In 1918, he joined Du Pont, where he was to become the principal research leader in
high-pressure chemistry, starting with synthetic ammonia, in the mid-1920s.
8.8.1 Three Opinions: Charles Parsons, the National

Research Foundation, and the Ordnance Department
In 1916, Charles Lathrop Parsons (1867–1954), a Cornell graduate and chief

chemist at the Bureau of Mines (1911–1919), was transferred to the War Depart-
ment’s Ordnance Department, as chief engineer. With fellow engineer Eysten Berg
he visited Europe in October 1916 to investigate nitrogen processes, both for
nitrogen fixation and the production of nitric acid. They were instructed not to
enter Germany. Together they visited cyanamide and nitric acid facilities in France
and Italy; Parsons then went alone to England, Norway, and Sweden to study
cyanamide and electric arc processes. Parsons summarized his findings in two
documents prepared for the Ordnance Department, a preliminary report of
17 January 1917 and a final report of 30 April 1917. His recommendations were
for development of a modified Haber-Bosch process (as commenced by General
Chemical) and, following a favourable report from the prominent chemist Charles
Holmes Herty (1867–1938)—recently retired president of the American Chemical
Society (1915–1916) and now editor of its Journal of Industrial and Engineering
Chemistry—the Bucher cyanide process of the Nitrogen Products Company. Par-
sons expressed far greater hope in the latter, considering it decidedly superior, from
a commercial point of view, to the Haber-Bosch process. Parsons had no time for
the cyanamide process, which was far too expensive to work, even though it was the
only viable process at the time [68].
Parsons’s recommendations were somewhat at variance with those of the
National Research Foundation’s committee. The committee produced three reports,
dated 2 June 1916 (preliminary), 6 January 1917 (summary), and 29 January 1917
(final) [69]. Its main recommendation was that the government support the produc-
tion of hydro-electric power for fixation of nitrogen, and make the electricity
available at preferential rates to companies engaged in this activity. The committee,
unlike Parsons, clearly preferred the cyanamide process.
Early in 1917, the Chief of Ordnance of the United States Army, General
William Crozier (1855–1942), created a Nitrate Division within the Ordnance
Department, directed from May 28 by Colonel John Warren Joyes. Now that the
United States had entered the war the nitrogen situation had become a matter of
some considerable urgency.
As a result of the quite different conclusions reached by Parsons and the National
Research Foundation’s committee, it was left to an Ordnance Department commit-
tee to decide on the best course of action. The initial emphasis of the committee was
on: oxidation of ammonia; the General Chemical Company’s synthetic ammonia
process; the Bucher cyanide process; the use of by-product coke ovens for supply of
ammonia and toluol (toluene); and maintaining a reserve of half a million tons of
Chile saltpetre. There was no mention of calcium cyanamide.3
Joyes and colleagues examined the experimental synthetic ammonia apparatus
of General Chemical in mid-August 1917. The process, based on the design of
Frederick de Jahn, was experiencing severe technical difficulties. Meantime, the
cyanide process was eliminated, at least from the manufacture of explosives. It
received support for producing cyanide that could be adapted to use in war gases
[70]. A plant with an intended daily capacity of 10 tons of cyanide, known as “US
Chemical Plant No. 4,” was laid down at Saltville, Virginia, in association with
Mathieson Alkali Works. It began operating on 4 September 1918. Many difficul-
ties were encountered, and after producing no more than a few thousand pounds of
cyanide it was closed down in December 1918 [71].4
In the autumn of 1917, the Ordnance Department’s committee authorized
construction of modified Haber-Bosch and cyanamide factories. The government
instructed General Chemical to build an ammonia plant at Sheffield, Alabama. This
was based on the ailing process that Joyes and colleagues investigated. Partly
completed in September 1918, what was called the “US Nitrate Plant No. 1”
never became fully operational, and was abandoned; there were problems with
the quality of the converters as well as with the catalyst. Wartime research on the
process was conducted at Laurel Hill, Long Island; Arlington Experimental Farms,
Virginia; and, from 1918, at Sheffield. Major Harry Curtis served at Arlington,
where a high-pressure ammonia apparatus, working at 100 atmospheres, was put
together, and at Sheffield.
Meantime, in September 1917, Crozier met in Washington with Frank
Washburn, whose recommendations, based on American Cyanamid’s offerings,
had earlier been rejected. There had been suggestions that he had much to gain
financially from a government contract, and that this was his main interest, partic-
ularly after Washburn claimed that the Haber-Bosch process was useless. Crozier
realized, however, that American Cyanamid was the only firm with the requisite
level of experience to bring about the rapid, large-scale production of nitrogen
3
During the war, the National Research Foundation functioned as the Department of Science and
Research of the Council of National Defense as well as the Science and Research Division of the
United States Army Signal Corps.
4
The Bucher process was investigated at the Solvay Process Company’s laboratories, until around
1924, with particular reference to formation of briquettes.
products required for munitions. Contracts were now drawn up with American
Cyanamid for the manufacture of calcium cyanamide, its conversion into ammonia,
and in turn oxidation to nitric acid. Efforts were concentrated on a new cyanamide
facility at Muscle Shoals, near Sheffield, “US Nitrate Plant No. 2,” to be erected for
the government by Air Nitrates Corporation, a subsidiary of American Cyanamid.
The intention was to convert ammonia derived from cyanamide into ammonium
nitrate, such that by 1919, producing ammonium nitrate at the rate of 110,000 tons
per year, it would account for 13% of all Allied explosives [72–74].
Apart from nitrogen products, major shortages faced by the United States
included of potash, previously imported from Germany. Solvay’s Louis Jones and
colleagues around 1910 had investigated Searles Lake in California as a possible
source and, following further investigations after the outbreak of war, a substantial
facility, based on collaboration with the Borax Company, extracted the mineral
from Searles Lake, from 1917 until early 1921 [75].
8.8.2 Muscle Shoals
According to Williams Haynes, American Cyanamid had been called upon to

undertake cyanamide manufacture at Muscle Shoals after difficulties were experi-
enced with the synthetic ammonia factory at Sheffield. General William Crozier,
apparently, “called Frank Washburn to Washington and said: ‘Unless the Cyanamid
Company can and will provide the plants and produce the materials within twelve
months, the plans for placing a great fighting force on the battlefields in France for
the spring offensive of 1919 cannot be carried out’.”
For this enormous factory, encompassing 348 acres, American Cyanamid placed
Walter Landis in charge of the design. Engineering work began on 17 December
1917. Ground was broken on 3 February 1918. The government constructed a
“coal-powered electric generating plant to provide the electricity for the carbide
furnaces.” The logistics were nightmarish, including temporary, segregated, hous-
ing for a vast army of workers. Twenty-five thousand men had been brought into the
four-square mile area. “And all the time the rain poured down. . .After the influenza
epidemic struck, man-power became critical” [76].
Despite labour and other difficulties, “US Nitrate Plant No. 2” was completed
just over eight months later, as the war came to an end. “The compressors in the
[Linde] liquid air unit [were] started up on October 23 and three days later the
electric current was turned on the carbide furnaces.” After break-in trials (with
nitric acid produced on November 19 and ammonium nitrate on November 25), and
some work early in 1919, the facility was shut down through lack of demand
(Figs. 8.15 and 8.16). Plans were drawn up for two other wartime cyanamide
factories, at Toledo, Ohio, and Cincinnati, Ohio, on which, according to Haynes,
work was started [77]. (In 1923, Landis, for his services to American Cyanamid,
was appointed vice president of the corporation, a post he would occupy until his
death in 1944.)
Fig. 8.15 Banks of cyanamide ovens, “US Nitrate Plant No. 2,” Muscle Shoals, Alabama,
2 March 1919. (Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, HAER [Historic American
Engineering Record] ALA, 17-MUSHO, 1–65)
Also from 1917, the Nitrogen Products Company at La Grande, Washington,

worked an electric arc oven developed in 1912 by the Norwegian inventor Franz
Henrik Aubert Wielgolaski. He filed several patents, one in the United States jointly
with Sch€onherr. Nitrogen Products was interested in producing sodium nitrite for
dye manufacture, but the process was not economically viable. The factory was
closed during 1921–1922, reopened in 1923, and abandoned after a few years, as
was a facility at Lake Buntzen, British Columbia. Interest increasingly moved
towards the high-pressure ammonia synthesis, particularly after more information
became available about the BASF process.
American visitors to Germany in 1919, technical and non-technical, generally
accompanied British and European experts on Allied missions, which helped to
counter German complaints that they were engaged in industrial espionage
[78]. Such was the case with the British-led mission in February 1919. An Amer-
ican account of the state of the German chemical industry supplemented those of
the British and French. Major Theodore W. Sill, attached to the US Chemical
Warfare Service, and though mainly interested in technical organic chemistry, in
his report of the visit to Germany, declared: “At Oppau we saw what is probably the
most phenomenal scientific development up to date, namely, the practical realiza-
tion on an operating basis of the Haber process for ammonia production.” Like his
British colleagues, Sill was puzzled by the fact that “Haber, to whom Germany
owes so much of her development in chemical products in warfare, had never
Fig. 8.16 Ammonia oxidation building, with ammonia spheres in the foreground, “US Nitrate
Plant No. 2,” Muscle Shoals, Alabama, 1919. (Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs
Division, HAER ALA, 17-MUSHO, 1–4)
Fig. 8.17 Extract from the report of a visit to Oppau in February 1919 by Major Theodore W. Sill,
US Chemical Warfare Service. (Dyestuffs: Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives, on H.R. 2706 and H.R. 6495, June 18–20 and July 14–18, 1919 [66th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1919]. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919, p. 175)
attained a higher rank than captain in German chemical warfare service, despite the
responsibility and immensity of his job” (Fig. 8.17) [79]. Sill, perhaps, had
overlooked the fact that Haber’s ethnic origins precluded him from attaining a
higher rank in the Kaiser’s army.
The vast Muscle Shoals cyanamide works, completed just as the war came to
an end, remained a symbol of the uncertainties facing the immediate post-war
American nitrogen industry. Charles L. Parsons, in giving testimony, as one of the

bidders for the Muscle Shoals facility, before the 67th US Congress on 8 May 1922
apparently believed that the end had come for the cyanamide industry [80].
The cyanamide process is in a state of obsolescence. The plants in France, in Italy, in
Dalmatia, in Silesia, in Norway, in Sweden are closed down. The plant in Canada is not
producing cyanamide for fertilizer purposes. . .The plant is running only on a very small
capacity. In the main the Cyanamide process is essentially already obsolescent.
He was, however, mistaken. New cyanamide facilities were opening in Europe

and the Far East, while American Cyanamid would ensure the future of cyanamide
in the United States through successful diversification into novel products. Maybe
Parsons was downplaying cyanamide in order to reduce the value of the Muscle
Shoals facility for his own benefit and those that he represented. In any case, in view
of his earlier negative pronouncements, it is not clear what future plans they had in
mind, apart from acquiring modern factory buildings and equipment, including an
ammonia oxidation plant. More significantly, however, American investigators
around 1920 were in general interested in acquiring, or mastering, the high-pressure
ammonia synthesis.
8.9 Summary
After war broke out in 1914, and especially after the loss of Chilean nitrate,
Germany at first relied on cyanamide for the production of ammonia, then increas-
ingly on the Haber-Bosch process. The catalytic oxidation of ammonia to nitric acid
was developed, as was a novel process for producing concentrated acid. By the last
phase of the war, the Haber-Bosch process had become critical to the supply of
nitrogen products. In contrast, the Allied nations continued to import and rely on
Chilean nitrate; two million tons in 1915, and around three million tons in each of
1916 and 1917. By 1916, however, U-boats were causing considerable losses
among Allied merchant ships, raising concerns over the reliability of Chilean
supplies, quite apart from Scandinavian nitrogen products. One in four merchant
ships that left Britain never returned. As a result, synthetic nitrogen processes
attracted considerable attention outside of Germany. The French invested in cyan-
amide, with considerable success. As for the electric arc process, apart from in
Norway and, for a time, the French Soulom plant, it was hardly viable.
The novel high-pressure ammonia technology was certainly realized to be a key
to a new industrial sector, if not the key to a new industry, both in war and,
especially, in peace. Therein lay its great significance. From 1916, considerable
efforts among the Allied nations were invested in research aimed at replicating the
Haber-Bosch process. The challenges were enormous, which alone attested to the
level of sophistication achieved by BASF, which jealously guarded its hard-won
advantage. No other major area of Allied wartime research was bedeviled by so
many drawbacks. High pressure synthetic ammonia production would not be
realized outside Germany until the 1920s.
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Wartime Expansion of The Nitrogen Industry

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Chapter 8

Wartime Expansion of the Nitrogen

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 151

8.1 Germany: Nitric Acid from Catalytic Oxidation

4 NH3 þ 5 O2 Ð 4 NO þ 6 H2 O ΔH ¼ 909 kJ mol1

The nitric oxide combined with oxygen to give nitrogen dioxide.

2 NO þ O2 Ð 2 NO2 ΔH ¼ 115 kJ mol1

A mixture of nitric acid of 50–60% concentration and sulphuric acid of 95%

Table 8.1 Calcium cyanamide factories at the close of 1917

Table 8.1 (continued)

Table 8.1 (continued)

French became increasingly dependent on explosives imported from the United

In 1916, Carlo Rossi commenced calcium cyanamide manufacture at Domodossola,

at combatting adulteration through the use of a special seal to close sacks of

8.4 Great Britain

In Britain by early 1916, losses to German submarine attacks stimulated efforts to

8.5 The Secret of Synthetic Ammonia

Interest in Haber’s novel ammonia synthesis outside of Germany was considerable

8.5.1 The “Haber” Myth

In February 1923, Chemistry and Industry, emphasizing the role of synthetic

8.6 Gas Warfare

Schmidt-Ott (1860–1956) of the Prussian Ministry of Education. This Kaiser

8.7 War Work: Ammonia Converters and Merseburg

H2 O þ CO ! CO2 þ H2 ΔH ¼ 41 kJ mol1

Fig. 8.6 Ammonia

expansion of production at Chorzów. However preference was increasingly being

From April 1918, Ludendorff, Supreme Commander of the German Army in

8.8 The United States

research in industry, specifically for purposes of strengthening the national defence.

A catalyst test plant was installed in 1917 at Arlington Experimental Farms,

8.8.1 Three Opinions: Charles Parsons, the National

In 1916, Charles Lathrop Parsons (1867–1954), a Cornell graduate and chief

8.8.2 Muscle Shoals

According to Williams Haynes, American Cyanamid had been called upon to

Also from 1917, the Nitrogen Products Company at La Grande, Washington,

American nitrogen industry. Charles L. Parsons, in giving testimony, as one of the

He was, however, mistaken. New cyanamide facilities were opening in Europe

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