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 2015 report
executive summary

pathways to
deep decarbonization
SLOVAKIA

COLOMBIA
 

Published by the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and

the Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI),
September 2015
This executive summary and the country reports supporting this analysis are available
at www.deepdecarbonization.org

Copyright © 2015 SDSN - IDDRI

This copyrighted material is not for commercial use or dissemination (print or electronic). For personal,
corporate or public policy research, or educational purposes, proper credit (bibliographical reference
and/or corresponding URL) should always be included.
Cite this report as
Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (2015). Pathways to deep decarbonization 2015 report -
executive summary, SDSN - IDDRI.

The Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI) is a non-profit policy
research insti­t ute based in Paris. Its objective is to determine and share the keys for analyzing and
understanding strategic issues linked to sustainable development from a global perspective. IDDRI
helps stakeholders in deliberating on global governance of the major issues of common interest:
action to attenuate climate change, to protect biodiversity, to enhance food security and to manage
urbanization, and also takes part in efforts to reframe development pathways

The Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) was commissioned by UN Secretary-

General Ban Ki-moon to mobilize scientific and technical expertise from academia, civil society, and
the private sector to support practical problem solving for sustainable development at local, national,
and global scales. The SDSN operates national and regional networks of knowledge institutions,
solution-focused thematic groups, and is building SDSNedu, an online university for sustainable
development.

Disclaimer
This report was written by a group of independent experts who have not been nominated
by their governments. Any views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the
views of any government or organization, agency or program of the United Nations.

Publishers : Teresa Ribera, Jeffrey Sachs

Managing editors : Jim Williams, Henri Waisman, Laura Segafredo
Layout and figures : Ivan Pharabod, Christian Oury
 The Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP) is convened under the
auspices of the Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations
(IDDRI) and the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN).
The project is led by:
Teresa Ribera, Director, IDDRI
Jeffrey Sachs, Director, SDSN
Michel Colombier, Scientific Director, IDDRI
Guido Schmidt-Traub, Executive Director, SDSN
Henri Waisman, DDPP Director, IDDRI
Jim Williams, DDPP Director, SDSN
Laura Segafredo, Senior DDPP Manager, SDSN
Roberta Pierfederici, DDPP Manager, IDDRI

This report was jointly prepared by the members of the 16 DDPP Country Research Teams:
Australia. Amandine Denis (ClimateWorks Australia); Frank Jotzo (Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian
National University); Anna Skrabek (ClimateWorks Australia). Brazil. Emilio La Rovere (COPPE, Federal University, Rio
de Janeiro, UFRJ - COPPE); Claudio Gesteira (COPPE); William Wills (COPPE); Carolina Grottera (COPPE) . Canada.
Chris Bataille (Navius Research, Simon Fraser University); Dave Sawyer (Carbon Management Canada); Noel Melton
(Navius Research). China. Fei Teng (Institute of Energy, Environment, Economy, Tsinghua University - 3E); Qiang
Liu (National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation, NCSC); Alun Gu (3E); Xi Yang
(3E); Xin Wang (3E); Yi Chen (NCSC); Chuan Tian (NCSC); Xiaoqi Zheng (NCSC). France. Patrick Criqui (Université
Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, EDDEN, PACTE) ; Sandrine Mathy (Université Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, EDDEN, PACTE);); Jean
Charles Hourcade (Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le Développement, CIRED). Germany.
Katharina Hillebrandt (Wuppertal Institute - WI); Saschsa Samadi (WI) ; Manfred Fischedick (WI). India. P.R. Shukla
(Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad - IIMA); Subash Dhar (UNEP DTU Partnership); Minal Pathak (Centre
for Urban Equity and Faculty of Planning, CEPT University, Ahmedabad - CEPT); Darshini Mahadevia (CEPT); Amit
Garg (IIMA). Indonesia. Ucok W.R. Siagian (Center for Research on Energy Policy-Band­ung Institute of Technology,
CRE-ITB); Retno Gumilang Dewi (CRE-ITB); Iwan Hendrawan (CRE-ITB); Rizaldi Boer (Centre for Climate Risk and
Opportunity Management-Bogor Agriculture University, CCROM-IPB); Gito Eman­nuel Gintings (CCROM-IPB).Italy
Maria Rosa Virdis (Italian National Agency for New Technologies,Energy and Sustainable Economic Development
– ENEA); Maria Gaeta (ENEA); Isabella Alloisio (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei) Japan. Mikiko Kainuma (National
Institute for Environmental Studies, NIES); Ken Oshiro (Mizuho Information and Research Institute, MIRI); Go Hibino
(MIRI); Toshihiko Masui (NIES). Mexico. Daniel Buira (Instituto Nacional de Ecología y Cambio Climático, INECC);
Jordi Tovilla. Russia. Oleg Lugovoy (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration,
RANEPA); Georges Safonov (High School of Economics, Moscow); Vladimir Potashnikov (RANEPA). South Africa.
Hilton Trol­lip (The Energy Research Centre, ERC, University of Cape Town, UCT); Katye Altieri (ERC, UCT); Alison
Hughes(ERC, UCT); Tara Caetano (ERC, UCT); Bruno Merven (ERC, UCT) ; Harald Winkler (ERC, UCT). South Korea.
Soogil Young (School of Public Policy and Management, Korea Development Institute, KDI); Chang-hoon Lee (Korea
Environment Institute); Yong-sung Cho (Korea University College of Life Sciences and Biotechnology); Jae-hak Oh
(Korea Transport Institute). United Kingdom. Steve Pye (University College London, UCL, Energy Institute); Gabrial
Anandarajah (UCL, Energy Institute). United States of America. Jim Williams (Energy + Environmental Economics,
E3); Ben Haley (E3); Sam Borgeson (E3).
The following Partner Organizations contribute to the DDPP:
German Development Institute (GDI) ; International Energy Agency (IEA) ; International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (IIASA) ; World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD).

1 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary

 

Acknowledgements
The DDPP is grateful for generous financial support received from many supporters,
including the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF), Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Internationale Zusamme­narbeit (GIZ), the German Environment Ministry, the
Gross Family Foundation, The European Climate Foundation (ECF), Agence de l’En-
vironnement et de la Maîtrise de l’Énergie (ADEME), IDDRI, and the SDSN. Many
others have provided direct assistance to individual Country Research Partners.

Critical support in the preparation of this report was provided by Léna Spinazzé,
Pierre Barthélémy, Delphine Donger and all the IDDRI team; the SDSN team; Ivan
Pharabod, Christian Oury, Eva Polo Campos; Miguel Lopez, Caty Arevalo.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary 2

 What is the DDPP?

1 1 What is the DDPP?

Purpose: The Deep Decarbonization Pathways to reduce emissions consistent with the 2°C
Project (DDPP) is a collaborative global research limit. The research teams develop “deep decar-
initiative to understand how individual countries bonization pathways” (DDPs)—sector-by-sec-
can transition to a low-carbon economy con- tor blueprints of changes over time in physical
sistent with the internationally agreed goal of infrastructure such as power plants, vehicles,
limiting anthropogenic warming to less than 2 buildings, and industrial equipment—that in-
degrees Celsius (°C). Staying within this limit form decision makers about the technology
requires global net emissions of greenhouse gas- requirements and costs of different options
es (GHG) to approach zero in the second half for reducing emissions. DDPs are n ot fore-
of this century. This will entail, more than any cas ts of fut ure outcomes, but “backcas ts”
other factor, a profound transformation of en- that begin with an emissions target in 2050
ergy systems, through steep declines in carbon and determine the steps required to get there.
intensity across all sectors, a transition we call Country teams are autonomous in defining
“deep decarbonization”. their targets, choosing their analytical meth-
ods, and incorporating national aspirations for
Organization: The DDPP consists of research development and economic growth in their
teams from 16 countries representing 74% of scenarios, along with other feat ures of na-
current global CO2 emissions from energy: Aus- tional context such as existing infrastructure,
tralia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, In- technology preferences, and natural resource
dia, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South endowments. At the same time, the DDPP is
Africa, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and highly collaborative, with transparent sharing
the United States. The teams consist of scholars of methods, tools, data, and results among the
from leading research institutions in their respec- country teams.
tive countries, who are acting independently and
do not represent the official positions of their Results: Formed in October 2013, the DDPP
national governments. The DDPP is convened issued a report on the first phase of its work at
by the Sustainable Development Solutions Net- the United Nations Climate Summit in Septem-
work (SDSN) and the Institute for Sustainable ber 2014, at the invitation of Secretary General
Development and International Relations (IDDRI) Ban Ki-moon. This report summarized the ini-
and coordinated by a joint secretariat of these tial research of each country team. In the fall of
organizations. 2015, all 16 teams are publishing stand-alone
reports describing in greater detail their research
Approach: The DDPP fills a gap in the climate into national DDPs. In addition, a new synthesis
policy dialogue by providing a more concrete report provides a cross-cutting analysis of the
understanding of what is required for countries aggregate results.

3 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary

 Is limiting global warming to 2°C achievable?

2 Is limiting global warming

2

to 2°C achievable?

Deep decarbonization of today’s highest below 2010 levels (Figure 1). These scenarios take
emitting economies is technically achieva- into account expected population growth of 17%
ble and can accomodate expected economic on average across the DDPP countries during the
and population growth. Each country team pro- 2010-2050 period, and also accommodate ag-
duced multiple technically feasible pathways that gregate GDP growth of 250%—an average rate
resulted in deep decarbonization of their econo- of 3.1% per year—during the period. In the most
mies. Across all scenarios, by the year 2050 ener- ambitious set of scenarios, average per capita
gy-related CO2 emissions for the 16 DDPP coun- emissions in 2050 were reduced to 2.1 t CO2/
tries were reduced to 9.8-11.9 Gt CO2, or 48-57% person across countries, while average emissions

Figure 1. Emissions trajectories for energy CO2, 2010-2050, showing most ambitious reduction scenarios
for all DDPP countries. 2050 aggregate emissions are 57% below 2010 levels.
GtCO2 26

 Canada 24
 UK
 Italy 22
 Korea
20
 Australia
 France
18
 Germany
 Japan
16
 Russia
 Mexico 14
 South Africa
 Brazil 12
 Indonesia
 USA 10
 India
 China 8

2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary 4

Is limiting global warming to 2°C achievable?

per unit of GDP were reduced 87% relative to the 16 countries analyzed. In the first phase
2010, with a range of 80-96% across countries of the DDPP, the research teams have focused
(Figure 2). This order of magnitude decrease in primarily on understanding technical options
carbon intensity of GDP shows the scenarios to and enabling conditions for deep decarboni-
be truly transformative. The clustering of carbon zation by mid-century within their countries,
intensity trajectories shows similar levels of am- but did not necesssarily design their pathways
bition across DDPP countries even while absolute to minimize cumulative emissions. However,
emissions trajectories reflect different stages of the analysis has already revealed opportunities
economic development. for deeper reductions and earlier timing of the
low-carbon transition. These opportunities will
These results do not represent an upper be explored further during the next phase of
limit on emissions reduction potential for DDPP research.

Figure 2. (L) Energy-related CO2 emissions per capita for DDPP countries,
(R) Energy-related CO2 emissions per unit of GDP for DDPP countries 2010 to 2050, indexed to 2010.

tCO2/cap 20 1.2 (index 1 = 2010)

1.1
 Canada 18

1.0
 USA
16
 Australia
0.9
14
0.8

12
0.7
 Korea
 Russia
10 0.6
 Germany
 Japan 0.5
8
 UK
 South Africa 0.4
 Italy 6
 China 0.3
 France
4
 Mexico 0.2

 Indonesia 2
0.1
 Brazil
 India 0 0.0

2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Emissions per capita Emissions per unit of GDP

5 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary

 Is limiting global warming to 2°C achievable?

DDPP cumulative emissions are n ot in- result in cumulative 2011-2050 emissions of

consistent with the 2°C limit, in compar- 805 to 847 Gt CO 2 from energy during 2010-
ison to an IPCC benchmark. However, since 2050. A context for assessing these emissions
only 16 countries were covered by the DDPP levels is found in the Fifth Assessment Report
analysis, demonstrating that staying within of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
2°C is likely will require understanding the Change (IPCC), which defines ranges of CO 2
decarbonization opportunities in non-DDPP emissions associated with different likelihoods
countries, and may well require deeper emis- of limiting global warming to 2°C (Table 1). The
sions reductions than in the current pathways difference between these benchmark values
in the DDPP countries. The DDPP scenarios and DDPP cumulative emissions must allow for
1
emissions from sources that were not analyz-
ed, including land use and industrial process
Table 1. Comparison of DDPP emission levels to IPCC benchmarks emissions, and most notably energy CO 2 from
for different likelihoods of limiting global warming to 2°C, as a function
non-DDPP countries. Many of these are low-in-
of cumulative and 2050 emissions levels
come, low-emissions countries for which deep
Likelihood of staying below 2°C during DDPP emissions
the 21 century (IPCC benchmark)
st
(energy-related CO2
decarbonization has not been explored in this
Likely As likely as not for DDPP countries) analysis. It is not implausible that non-DDPP
Cumulative CO 2 emissions 550* 1130* 805** countries can achieve their economic devel-
to 2050 (GtCO 2) 1300* 1530* 847**
opment objectives while following emissions
CO2 emissions in 2050 -72% -55% -57%
relative to 2010 -41% -25% -48% pathways that, in combination with DDPP
* (2011-2050) ** (2010-2050) cumulative emissions, result in total global
emissions in the probability range of “as likely
Likelihood of staying below 2°C during the 21st century DDPPasemissions
not” for limiting warming to 2°C. Explicit
Figure 3. (L) Average energy intensity of (IPCC GDP benchmark)
for DDPP countries (energy-related CO2
as a whole, 2010 and 2050. (R) Changes Likely in energy intensity, As likely 2010
as notto analysis
for DDPP of non-DDPP countries will be required
countries)

2050, for individual
Cumulative DDPP countries.550
CO 2 emissions 1130 to805
characterize these emission pathways and
2011-2050 (GtCO 2) 1300 1530 847
their ena bling conditions. Deeper emission
Average
CO across
emissions the 16 countries
in 2050 -72% Variation 2010/2050,
-55% by country -57%
2
relative to 2010 -41% -25% reductions
-48% in DDPP countries will also increase
MJ/$
the likelihood of staying below 2°C.
10
Australia
9 Brazil
-65% All deep decarbonization pathways incor-
Canada
8 China
porate “three pillars” of energy sys tem
7 France transformation: energy efficiency and con-
Germany servation, decarbonizing electricity and fuels,
6 India and switching end uses to low-carbon supplies.
5 Indonesia
These measures were all implemented using
Italy
4 Japan technologies that are commercially available or
3 Korea expected to be in the time frame of the analysis.
Mexico The DDPs show multiple ways of implementing
2 Russia
the three pillars, with country-specific strate-
South Africa
1
UK gies, technology mixes, and sequences of action.
0 USA However, because of the interactive effects
2010 2050 -100% -80% -60% -40% -20% 0% between them—for example, using low-carbon
electricity in combination with the electrifica-

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary 6

Is limiting global warming to 2°C achievable?

tion of vehicles—deep decarbonization cannot

be achieved if any of the pillars is absent or Figure 4. (L) Average carbon intensity of electricity for DDPP
implemented at insufficient scale. countries as a whole, 2010 and 2050. (R) Carbon intensity of
electricity in 2050, for individual DDPP countries.

Energy efficiency reduced the energy inten- Average across the 16 countries 2050 value, by country
sity of GDP by an average of 65%, with nearly gCO2/kWh gCO2/kWh
all countries making their economies two to four 600
Australia
times more energy efficient in 2050 than in 2010 550 -93% Brazil
(Figure 3). This was accomplished through meas- 500 Canada
ures such as improving vehicle fuel economy, 450
China
better building design and construction materi- France
400 Germany
als, and more efficient appliances and industrial
350 India
processes and machinery, along with conserva- Indonesia
300
tion measures such as urban design to encourage Italy
250
walking and bicyling. Japan
200 Korea
150 Mexico
In all DDPs, electricity becomes nearly carbon Russia
100
free by 2050, with average emissions per kWh South Africa
50
reduced by a factor of 15 below the 2010 val- UK
0 USA
ue (Figure 4). This was accomplished by pro-
gressively replacing most uncontrolled fossil 2010 2050 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

fuel-based electricity generation with varying

mixes of renewable energy such as wind, solar,
geothermal, and hydropower; nuclear power; and
Figure 5. Share of different fuel types in final energy consumption.
fossil fuel generation with carbon capture and
storage. In addition, liquid and gas fuel supplies 50 %
were decarbonized using biomass fuels with low 45
embedded carbon emissions and synthetic fuels
40  2010
such as hydrogen produced from decarbonized
35  2050
electricity.
30

The dominant trend in final energy consumption 25

is to replace coal and petroleum with electricity 20

and lower carbon fuels, including a coal to nat- 15
ural gas shift in some DDPs. Much of the direct
10
combustion of fossil fuels in end-use equipment
5
such as automobiles, hot water heaters, and in-
0
dustrial boilers is replaced by decarbonized elec-
tricity, which more than doubles the share of coal liquids gas electricity direct combustion
+hydrogen of biomass
electricity in final energy consumption in 2050,
to more than 40% (Figure 5).

7 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary

 Is deep decarbonization compatible with development and economic growth?

3 Is deep decarbonization
3

compatible with development
and economic growth?

Deep decarbonization accomodates the en- if enabling conditions are met, the infrastructure
ergy services needed to meet countries’ eco- transformation required for deep decarbonization
nomic growth targets and social priorities. In can be done in a way that provides multiple eco-
the DDPs, the energy systems were designed to nomic and environmental benefits and opportu-
support all the energy services needed to meet nities for raising living standards.
national objectives, including expanded access to
energy in developing countries. Economies con- For these benefits to be fully realized by
tinue to transport passengers and ship freight, developing countries, low-carbon technol-
provide similar or better housing and public ogies must be affordable and energy plan-
amenities, and support high levels of industri- ning must take social priorities into account.
al and commercial activity. The lowest income This is illustrated by the South Africa DDP, which
countries assumed the GDP growth rates needed shows that it is possible to deeply decarbonize
to meet their development objectives, and per while improving income distribution, alleviating
capita energy consumption increased with the poverty, and reducing unemployment. India’s
population’s access to energy services and higher DDPs are also structured around the question
living standards. The scale of infrastructure re- of how deep decarbonization can support sus-
quired to support these services is indicated by tainable development.
cumulative technology deployments over time
aggregated across all the DDPs. For example, by The aggressive energy efficiency required for
2050 the DDPs show a cumulative deployment deep decarbonization is a key strategy for
of 3,800 GW of solar electricity generation and reducing energy poverty and improving en-
4,100 gigawatts of wind, along with 1.2 billion ergy access. Energy efficiency reduces the cost
electric, fuel cell, and plug-in hybrid passenger of energy supply, thereby lowering household
vehicles and 250 million alternative fuel freight energy costs, which are often a large share of
vehicles. household expenses for the poor. With supply
costs reduced, households can afford to increase
DDPs show that deep decarbonization can their utilization of energy services. The impor-
support sustainable development and has tance of energy efficiency as a strategy for ad-
many potential benefits, The most fundamen- dressing energy poverty was highlighted not only
tal benefit is avoiding dangerous climate change. in developing countries DDPs but also in those
Unabated climate change threatens to undermine for the UK, France and Germany.
well-being in all countries, with the most vulner-
able populations being the most at risk; in devel- Reduction of uncontrolled fossil fuel
oping countries it jeopardizes many development emissions has significant public health
goals. On the other hand, the DDPs show that, benefits, as seen in the China and India cas-

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary 8

 Is deep decarbonization affordable?

es, since fossil fuel combustion is the major Reducing fossil fuel demand can increase
source of air pollution. In the Ch ina DDP, the energy security of energy-importing
deep decarbonization resulted in reductions countries, and reduce their exposure to vola-
of 42-79% of primary air pollutants (e.g., tile international fuel prices, as seen in the Italy
SO2, NO¬x, PM2.5, VOCs, and NH3), suffi- and Japan DDPs, while diversification of energy
cient to allow major cities to meet air quality supplies also has economic benefits for resource
standards. exporting countries such as Russia.

4 4 Is deep decarbonization affordable?

Deep d ecarbonization is essentially the ongoing process of technology improvement

process of improving infrastructure over and cost reductions in which policy will play
time by replacing ine fficient and car- a pivotal role.
bon-intensive technologies with efficient
and low-carbon technologies that provide Under deep decarbonization, the scale of
the same (or better) energy services. In investment in low-carbon technologies will be
developing economies with rapid population orders of magnitude higher than current levels,
growth, this means avoiding investments in creating major economic opportunities for for-
carbon-intensive technologies and ‘leap-frog- ward-looking countries and businesses (Table 2).
ging’ the development patterns of the past With money to be made, global finance can and
century. At the global scale, this will require will provide the necessary investment, provid-
the deployment of vast amounts of new equip- ed adequate long term signals are in place to
ment based on clean techn ologies ranging manage risk and maintain the value of the in-
from LED lighting to electric heat pumps, from vested capital over time. Because it emphasizes
hydrogen production to solar electricity gener- end-use efficiency (which is enabled by many
ation. Achieving the required level of consumer types of technologies) and low-carbon energy
adoption
3 of these technologies will require an sources (which can be more widely distributed),

Table 2 Annual investment in key low-carbon technologies and their share of GDP
for DDPP countries
2020 2030 2040 2050
Low-carbon power generation 270 514 701 844
Annual investments Low-carbon fuel production 57 117 124 127
in the 16 DDPP
scenarios Low-carbon transport vehicles
157 333 626 911
(Billion US $) (passenger+freight)
Total 484 963 1452 1882
Annual investments in low-carbon technologies as a share of GDP (%) 0.8% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3%

2020 2030 2040 2050

Low-carbon power generation 270 514 701 844
9 Pathways
Annual to deep
investments decarbonization
Low-carbon — 2015 executive
fuel production 57 summary
117 124 127
in the 16 DDPP Low-carbon transport vehicles
scenarios (B$) 157 333 626 911
(passenger+freight)
Total (Billion US $) 484 963 1452 1882
 Is deep decarbonization affordable?

a deeply decarbonized world is characterized by This is illustrated by the case of household energy
less concentration of energy investments (i.e. and transport costs in the Australia DDP, in which
in fossil fuel industries) and potentially a more net energy costs fall in absolute terms due to en-
prominent role for decentralized investment de- ergy savings. Energy costs fall even further as a
cisions by consumers. This calls for incentives share of average household income as GDP grows.
to guide energy investment decisions towards
low-carbon solutions especially in cases of high Deep decarbonization in developing coun-
capital costs offset by lower operating costs, and tries can be accelerated by large global
in early stages of deployment before economies markets for low-carbon technologies. Deep
of scale have been achieved. decarbonization in developing countries is lim-
ited by the rate at which efficient and low-car-
Energy investment under deep decarboni- bon technologies are adopted. Because of the
zation does not represent a large increase relatively high capital cost of many of these
in the toal energy investment required in technologies, developing country DDPs gener-
the absence of climate policy, but a shift ally assume later adoption, and lower penetra-
in investment away from fossil fuels toward tion rates, than in industrialized countries. In the
low-carbon technologies. The gross investment meantime, they are building durable infrastruc-
requirement for low-carbon technologies in the ture that locks in fossil fuel consumption. A po-
DDPs constitute 1-2% of GDP for the DDPP tential solution to reducing cumulative emissions
countries, or 6-7% of total annual investment from developing countries is for high income
activity in these economies, which constitutes countries to take the lead in developing, deploy-
on average about one-quarter of GDP (Table 2). ing, and buying down the cost of low-carbon
When done with foresight, the economic story technologies, so that they become affordable
of energy sector decarbonization is primarily one earlier in developing countries relative to the
of investment displacement, in which invest- cost of conventional technologies. Where initial
ment in the energy sector transitions away from markets for these technologies are in develop-
fossil fuel extraction as demand decreases, and ing countries, for example concentrating solar
towards low-carbon technologies. power in South Africa, high-income countries
can assist in local technology development and
The net cost of supplying and using en- manufacturing. This can accelerate uptake, stim-
ergy under deep decarbonization typical- ulate economic development, expand markets
ly includes higher costs for efficient and and promote international trade in low-carbon
low-carbon equipment relative to conven- technologies, while avoiding a situation in which
tional equipment, offset by fossil fuel and total developing countries become net importers of
energy savings. This is illustrated by U.S. case, in low-carbon technologies.
which the net cost of supplying and using ener-
gy for a deeply decarbonized scenario in 2050 International agreement to cooperate in
is equivalent to about 1% of GDP in that year deep decarbonization offers the promise
(Figure 6). of rapidly expanding markets and poten-
tially dramatic cost declines in many key
Modest increases in capital costs do not nec- low-carbon technologies. Historical experi-
essarily translate to increased final energy costs ence has shown that technology costs tend to
because of efficiency and conservation measures. decrease as a function of cumulative production,

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary 10

Is deep decarbonization affordable?

Figure 6. Net energy system cost in the United States.

USA. Net energy system cost (% GDP)

3.5%

3.0%

2.5%  Electricity

2.0%
 Pipeline Gas
1.5%
 Hydrogen
1.0%
Grand Total
0.5%

0.0%  End-Use Equipment

0.5%
 Gasoline Fuels
1.0%

1.5%  Other Fuels

2.0%  Diesel Fuels

2.5%  Jet Fuel

2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2036 2038 2040 2042 2044 2046 2048 2050

Figure 7. Average energy and personal transport costs per household in Australian DDP, 2012-2050.

Australia. Average annual energy and personal transport costs per household, 2012 A$

-13%
9,969
9,482
8,854 8,814 8,690 (2012 A$)
Energy and transport
costs per households
-13%

GDP per households

+55%

Energy costs
 Vehicle costs as a % of GDP
per households
 House energy costs
-44%
 Capital costs of house
energy efficiency upgrades
2012 2020 2030 2040 2050

current costs modelled costs

11 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary

 Is deep decarbonization affordable?

Figure 8. Annual investment requirements with vs without technological learning

(Left side, top to bottom) Annual investment requirements for decarbonized electricity generation, decarbonized fuel production,
and alternative vehicles without technological learning. (Right side, top to bottom) Annual investment requirements for the same
technologies with cost reductions due to technological learning taken into account.

Without Cost Reductions With Cost Reductions

$1500B $1 467B

$1250B  Geothermal
Decarbonized Electricity Generation

 Biomass
$1000B   Solar Thermal
$844B  Solar PV
$750B 
$696B
 Wind
 
 Wind
$500B $514B
  Hydro
 Nuclear
$250B $81B 
$81B
  Natural gas w CCS

  Oil w CCS
0 
 Coal w CCS
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

$250B
$215B
$200B 
Decarbonized fuel production

$171B 

$150B 
$127B
$117B  
$100B 

$50B  Electric Fuels (H2 and CH4)

$50B  $50B  Biogas Production - SNG
 

 Biorefinery - Ethanol
0  Biorefinery - Diesel
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

$2500B $2 454B


$2000B

$1500B
Alternative vehicles


$1000B $911B

$589B
$500B  $333B
  Hydrogen Vehicles

$28B   EVs & PHEVs

 $28B 
0
   Pipeline Gas Vehicles
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary 12

 Why are deep decarbonization pathways essential for climate policy?

as technologies mature and capture economies in developing markets for low-carbon technol-
of scale, and learn more efficient production ogies can reduce cost for all countries relative
methods from experience. Applying historical- to a go-it-alone approach, while providing large
ly-based assumptions about technological learn- markets for technology providers and large in-
ing to key low-carbon technologies for power centives for further innovation. Mobilizing in-
generation, fuel production, and transportation vestment in the development and widespread
shows dramatic reductions in the cost of these deployment of low-carbon technologies—from
technologies can be expected at the scale of pro- research and development, to early-stage de-
duction required by the country DDPs, relative ployment, to full-commercialization—is the key
to the cost without learning (Figure 8). Those to realizing cost declines along the pathway to
savings illustrate how international cooperation deep decarbonization.

5 Why are deep decarbonization

5

pathways essential for climate policy?

DDPs are needed for increasing the am- ment that drive CO2 emissions—power plants,
bition of country commitments to reduce buildings, industrial boilers, heavy duty vehi-
their GHG emissions under the UNFCCC. cles—are long compared to the time remaining
In advance of COP-21, countries are submitting between now and mid-century (Figure 9). DDPs
Intended Nationally Defined Contributions (IN- support current policy and investment decisions
DCs), which contain national commitments to by making the long-term emissions consequenc-
emissions reductions, typically in a medium-term es of these decisions explicit. DDPs can help
time frame (e.g., 2025 or 2030). By describing avoid lock-in to “dead end” investments that
the full extent of the transformation required produce incremental emissions reductions in the
over a longer time frame, DDPs provide a unique short term, but are not compatible with deep
context for understanding the ambition of cur- decarbonization in the long term, posing the risk
rent INDCs, and the further measures that deep of early retirement of equipment or failure to
decarbonization will entail. While DDPs are best meet emissions targets.
seen as roadmaps of options and enabling condi-
tions, they can nonetheless play a critical role in DDPs are needed to coordinate policy and
increasing the ambition of future national com- investment across jurisdictions, sectors, and
mitments, and provide long-term benchmarks levels of government. By providing a trans-
for measuring short-term progress. parent and concrete understanding of what a
low-carbon transition entails—scope and timing
DDPs are needed for staying within carbon of infrastructure changes, technology options,
budgets and avoiding dead ends. Though investment requirements, RD&D needs, market
2050 may seem far away, the operational life- potential—DDPs and the informed policy choices
times of much of the infrastructure and equip- they enable can help align public and private sec-

13 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary

 Why are deep decarbonization pathways essential for climate policy?

tor interests and expectations. Since substantial Development, Demonstration and Deployment
parts of the energy system are under private or (RDD&D) organized using long-term technology
sub-national control in many countries, DDPs roadmaps. DDPs provide a framework for align-
can provide a framework for coordination of ing these roadmaps and partnerships with the
policy and investment between sectors, across objectives of deep decarbonization.
jurisdictions, and between jurisdictional levels
(e.g. federal, provincial, local). DDPs provide a framework for understand-
ing how deep decarbonization can work in
DDPs are needed for private-sector deci- harmony with other sustainable develop-
sion-making. DDPs will help businesses and ment priorities. Having DDPs as a public point
investors understand the implications of deep of reference can help countries ensure that the
decarbonization for their operations, helping energy transformation and other decarboniza-
them to identify market opportunities, develop tion measures (e.g. land use) also support long-
inves tment and techn ology s trategies, and term goals such as energy access, employment
plan for a smooth transition to a low-carbon opportuntities, environmental protection, and
economy. DDPs can provide a framework for public health.
s takehold er discussion of policy pro posals,
and identify potential areas for public-private DDPs clarify the enabling conditions for
partnerships. developing countries to incorporate deep
decarbonization into their development
DDPs are needed to inform long-term tech- s trategies, including the kinds of support
nology roadmaps. Our report underscores the need ed from the international community.
importance of accelerating the development and Some potential consequences of a deep de-
diffusion of low-carbon technologies. Success will carbonization strategy, such as foregone rev-
require public-private partnerships on Research enues from fossil-fuel exploitation, add to the

Figure 9. Typical lifetimes and opportunities for replacement of some important energy
supply and end-use equipment and infrastructure.

Technology Replacement

Lighting 6
Hot water heater 4
Light duty vehicule 3
Space heater 3
Power plant 2
Heavy duty vehicule 2
Industrial boiler 2
Residential building 1

2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary 14

 What’s new and what’s next?

economic challenges of developing countries. The DDPP itself demonstrates the value of
DDPs are an essential vehicle for understanding transparent, long-term pathways. When the
how international cooperation can help miti- project began in late 2013, most DDPP countries
gate these challenges and enable low-carbon had never developed pathways consistent with
development. 2°C, nor were they actively considering this ques-
tion. The initial results of the DDPP have changed
DDPs will increase trust in the internation- this, demonstrating that taking actions consistent
al climate policy process. DDPs represent with 2°C is possible and that there are different
a transparent approach to understanding the road maps for doing so in every country. As un-
long-term policy challenges, technology needs, derstanding of the value of the approach grows,
and cost structures of deep decarbonization more country-level discussions on deep decar-
in different countries. This can do much to bonization are taking place. Long-term pathways
change the tenor of the international climate are increasingly understood in the research and
discourse, and place greater focus on oppor- policy communities as a framework for cumula-
tunity-seeking and collective problem-solving. tive and collective problem solving, which can be
In contrast to a “black box” approach, DDPs presented and discussed with key constituencies
are about credible and transparent data and and revised and improved over time. As the DDPP
analysis, making long-term national aspirations experience demonstrates, this approach can lead
and the underlying assumptions that inform to a shared understanding of what staying with-
them clear to other countries. An open ap- in 2°C will require, what problems will arise, and
proach of this kind can lead to greater trust— what some of the options are for addressing them,
including trust in the credibility of INDCs—and including international cooperation. The DDPP
help to identify areas for policy cooperation, has created a collegial environment for learning
joint RD&D, market development, and mutual across and within countries, and the sharing of
­a ssistance. state of the art methods, data, and information.

6 6 What’s new and what’s next?

What is new in the recent work of the DDPP? reported in 2014, and all describe in more detail
The 2015 Synthesis Report expands and deepens how deep decarbonization can be made con-
the analysis of the 2014 report, building off the sistent with national development objectives.
new work by the country resarch teams. All 16 For developing countries, the reports clarify
teams are issuing stand-alone reports on deep the enabling conditions, including the support
decarbonization in their countries. These reports needed from the international community, that
include new pathways that increase the robust- will allow them to fully incorporate deep de-
ness of the analysis by demonstrating multiple carbonization into their development strategies.
technical options for reaching deep decarboni- The 2015 Synthesis Report synthesizes the find-
zation goals. Many of the new country pathways ings of the country reports, and describes new
reach deeper emissions reductions than those cross-cutting analyses. These include analyses of

15 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary

 What’s new and what’s next?

aggregate annual and cumulative emissions and yyIn support of stakeholder discussions within
their relation to the 2°C limit, and the aggregate and across countries, the DDPP is developing a
investment requirements and their implications web-based portal for the display and analysis of
for global markets and cost reductions. decarbonization scenarios from many sources
and analytical exercises (not only the DDPP)
What’s next for the DDPP? Moving forward, in order to provide a platform for communi-
the DDPP is looking to expand its network, deep- cating and comparing different approaches to
en the DDPs already developed, and provide new the low-carbon transition.
public tools to allow greater participation in, and
dialogue on, deep decarbonization.

yyThe DDPP is already in discussion with research

teams from other countries wishing to join the
project, and welcomes others to contact us.
Our ambition is to support the development
of DDPs for every interested country. To this
end we are developing a freely-licensed, open-
source Pathways model that can be used by
any country, subnational government, NGO,
or business.
yyA priority area for expanded country coverage
is in low-income countries, where much of the
world’s economic and population growth over
the decades ahead is expected to take place. A
better understanding of the deep decarboniza-
tion potential and enabling conditions in these
countries is essential for determining what is
required to stay within 2°C.
yyThe next phase of the DDPP’s analysis will focus
on identifying options to reduce cumulative
emissions pathways, and further exploring how
global cooperation on low-carbon technolo-
gies can accelerate low-carbon transitions in
both industrialized and developing countries.
yyThe DDPP will support national stakeholder
discussions—with government, business, and
civil society—around deep decarbonization
strategies, how different pathways fit with
national priorities, and how they can be com-
municated and improved.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary 16

17 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2015 executive summary
 

COUNTRY RESEARCH PARTNERS. Australia. ClimateWorks Australia; Austral-

ian National University. Brazil. Instituto de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa de Engen-
haria - COPPE at Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro – UFRJ. Canada. Carbon
Management Canada; Navius Research Inc. China. Institute of Energy, Environment
and Economy, Tsinghua University; National Center for Climate Change Strategy and
International Cooperation (NCSC). France. UMR PACTE - EDDEN - Université de Gre-
noble; UMR Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le Développe-
ment (CIRED). Germany. Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy.
India. Indian Institute of Management of Ahmedhabad (IIMA); Faculty of Planning,
CEPT University, Ahmedhabad; UNEP Risoe Center (URC), Denmark. Indonesia.
Bandung Institute of Technology; Center for Climate Risk and Opportunity Manage-
ment, Bogor Agricultural University. Italy. Agenzia nazionale per le nuove tecnologie,
l’energia e lo sviluppo economico sostenibile (ENEA); Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
(FEEM). Japan. National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES); Mizuho Infor-
mation & Research Institute, Inc. (MHIR); Institute for Global Environmental Strat-
egies (IGES). Mexico. Instituto Nacional de Ecología y Cambio Climático (INECC).
Russia. Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
(RANEPA); Higher School of Economics, National Research University, Moscow. South
Africa. Energy Research Center, University of Cape Town. South Korea. KDI School
of Public Policy and Management; Korea Environment Institute; Korea University
College of Life Sciences and Biotechnology; Korea Transport Institute. UK. Energy
Institute, University College London. USA. Energy+Environmental Economics (E3).
DDPP PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS. German Development Institute (GDI);
International Energy Agency (IEA); International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (IIASA); World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD).

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