RAND RR4412z2

Regional
Responses to
U.S.-China
Competition in
the Indo-Pacific
India
Jonah Blank
C O R P O R AT I O N
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Preface
The U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) National Defense Strategy highlights the
important role that U.S. allies and partners play in U.S.-China strategic competition. America’s
strong and enduring relationships with our allies and partners offer the United States unique
advantages in long-term competition with China—the United States is not competing with China
on its own, but can draw from allied and partner resources, capabilities, and strengths that far
exceed what China can bring to bear. As DoD focuses on long-term strategic competition with
China, understanding how U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region are responding and
adjusting their own approaches to China will be crucial to ensuring the success of U.S. strategy.
This report on India is part of a project that aims to understand the perspectives of U.S. allies
and partners in the Indo-Pacific as they formulate and implement their responses to China’s more
assertive foreign and security policy behavior in the region and a more competitive U.S.-China
relationship. The research also assesses how DoD, particularly the U.S. Air Force, can best
deepen and improve its ability to work with allies and partners to maintain U.S. advantage in
long-term strategic competition with China. The other reports in this series are available at
www.rand.org/US-PRC-influence.
The research reported here was sponsored by Brig Gen Michael P. Winkler (PACAF/A5/8)
and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part
of a fiscal year 2019 project titled “Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-
Pacific” that assists the Air Force in evaluating U.S. and Chinese influence and assessing
possible Air Force, joint force, and U.S. government options.
This report should be of value to the national security community and interested members of
the general public, especially those with an interest in U.S.-China competition in the Indo-
Pacific. Comments are welcome and should be sent to the project leader, Bonny Lin. Research
was completed in September 2019.
RAND Project AIR FORCE

RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the Department
of the Air Force’s (DAF’s) federally funded research and development center for studies and
analyses, supporting both the United States Air Force and the United States Space Force. PAF
provides DAF with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development,
employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, and cyber forces.
Research is conducted in four programs: Strategy and Doctrine; Force Modernization and
Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; and Resource Management. The research
reported here was prepared under contract FA7014-16-D-1000.
iii
Additional information about PAF is available on our website:
www.rand.org/paf/
This report documents work originally shared with DAF in September 2019. The draft report,
issued in January 2020, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and DAF subject-matter experts.
iv
Contents
Preface............................................................................................................................................ iii
Figures............................................................................................................................................ vi
Tables ............................................................................................................................................ vii
Summary ...................................................................................................................................... viii
Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................................... xi
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ xii
1. Introduction: India in the Context of U.S.-China Competition .................................................. 1
Applying the Project Framework to India ................................................................................................ 4
Organization of This Report ..................................................................................................................... 8
2. India’s Geostrategic Importance, Institutional Outlook, and Desire for “Strategic
Autonomy” in Diplomatic and Political Relations ................................................................... 9
India’s Geostrategic Importance ............................................................................................................... 9
Institutional Outlook ............................................................................................................................... 12
India’s Desire for “Strategic Autonomy” in Diplomatic and Political Relations ................................... 15
3. India’s Economic Relationship with China, and Country-by-Country Relationship
Sketches .................................................................................................................................. 24
China as Key Trade Partner for India ..................................................................................................... 24
Country-by-Country Sketches of India’s Relations with Key Asian Nations ........................................ 27
Partners in Southeast Asia ...................................................................................................................... 31
Partners in South Asia/Indian Ocean Region ......................................................................................... 36
4. India’s Defense Calculus vis-à-vis China ................................................................................. 42
China as a Direct Long-Term Security Challenge .................................................................................. 42
Pakistan as India’s Most Immediate Near-Term Security Threat........................................................... 45
China as Indirect Security Challenge via Pakistan ................................................................................. 48
5. Assessment and Outlook ........................................................................................................... 51
India Sees the United States as a Partner and China as a Rival—but Limiting Factors Remain ........... 51
India’s Distrust of the United States as Potentially Unreliable Partner .................................................. 52
India’s Inability to Compete with China Leads to Risk Aversion .......................................................... 54
Best Avenues for Partnership Include Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief, Maritime
Domain Awareness, and Education ................................................................................................. 55
Outlook for Overall U.S.-India Relations ............................................................................................... 60
6. Options for the United States, U.S. Department of Defense, and U.S. Air Force .................... 64
Options for the United States .................................................................................................................. 64
Options for the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Air Force..................................................... 66
Appendix A. Methodology for Project Framework ...................................................................... 69
Appendix B. Overview of India’s Military ................................................................................... 77
References ..................................................................................................................................... 82
v
Figures
Figure 1.1. Relative U.S. and Chinese Influence in India (2018) ................................................... 7
Figure 2.1. Indian Air Force Bases and Air Stations .................................................................... 10
vi
Tables
Table 1.1. Variables for Assessing Relative U.S.-China Influence ................................................ 5

Table A.1. Color Coding of Framework Variables....................................................................... 69
Table B.1. Active and Reserve Service Numbers ......................................................................... 77
Table B.2. India Defense Capabilities (2012 versus 2018) .......................................................... 80
vii
Summary
Issue
To manage China’s rise as a strategic competitor to the United States in the Indo-Pacific
region, the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) 2018 National Defense Strategy highlights the
importance of working with regional allies and partners. One of the key partners in this effort
will be India, which has the world’s second-largest active-duty armed forces and is already a
peer or near-peer competitor of China across a range of military capabilities. India’s self-defined
core national security interests, including the preservation of its sovereignty against
encroachment by any would-be hegemonic regional power, are in relatively close harmony with
those of the United States. But U.S. planners must be keenly aware of the constraints on both
India’s willingness to forge a partnership based on strategic competition with China and its
capacity to do so. These constraints include persistent aversion to any partnership that might be
characterized as “alignment” (reduced, but not eliminated, by a serious border clash with China
in June 2020); significant distrust of U.S. commitment and intentions; a highly risk-averse
structure for the making and implementing of security policy, particularly vis-à-vis China;
economic linkages with China, including potential for medical supply chains needed to deal with
the COVID-19 pandemic; historical and ongoing underfunding of basic military needs; and a
lack of military capability and interoperability sufficient for frictionless interaction with U.S.
forces. India will remain a key U.S. partner, but these challenges should moderate expectations
about the pace for increased engagement.
Approach
The research for this report draws from a range of primary and secondary sources, datasets,
and, most importantly, interviews with U.S., allied, and partner government and military officials
and academic experts. To understand regional responses to competition, we traveled to and
interviewed experts in India, as well as other nations in the region.
Conclusions
The United States and India share a basic assessment of China’s place in the Indo-Pacific
security order: Both regard China as a nation that seeks dominance over the region and is often
willing to violate international norms in pursuit of such dominance—but both India and the
United States would prefer a strategy that corrals China into compliance with global norms rather
than seeking military confrontation. Despite this harmony of analysis, U.S. planners should be
viii
keenly aware of several key factors that will temper the pace and extent of partnership between
the two nations:
• The concept of “non-alignment” did not die with the Cold War. It is more commonly
described now in such terms as “strategic autonomy,” but India remains fiercely opposed
to any partnership in which it would be seen as the junior partner. This opposition has
been softened by the most serious Sino-Indian military clash in decades (near the Galwan
Valley, in June 2020), but has by no means melted away.
• India regards China as its most significant long-term competitor, and Indian leaders are
particularly concerned about the strategic partnership of China with India’s near-term
rival Pakistan. But this does not mean that New Delhi has much appetite for
confrontation with Beijing—particularly outside the Indian Ocean Region. New Delhi
has little desire for more land engagements like that at Galwan, in which 20 Indian
soldiers were killed.
• Relations between India and the United States have been consistently warming over the
past two decades, but a deep pool of distrust remains. The United States will have to
work patiently to overcome this distrust.
• Many items in the U.S. playbook of security engagement will run into institutional
barriers in India. These include low levels of military funding, a security policymaking
bureaucracy that is not designed for speedy decisions, and a tendency to make security
policy on an ad hoc rather than a doctrinal basis.
Recommendations
For DoD and the U.S. Air Force:
• Increase emphasis on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions; this represents
perhaps the lowest-cost/highest-yield avenue for engagement.
• Enhance U.S.-India cooperation in the areas of cyber and electronic warfare; this
represents a threat for which India—despite its somewhat deceptive reputation as an
information technology powerhouse—is not well prepared.
• Encourage India’s growing cooperation and engagement with U.S. allies, such as
Australia and Japan, and emerging partners, such as Indonesia and Singapore.
• Increase military education programs.
• Encourage India to increase its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, including
participating in multilateral air and maritime activities and conducting operations in the
South China Sea—while being aware that such participation may be modest.
• Share satellite and other information with India about China’s problematic behavior in
disputed Himalayan areas, such as Galwan and other sites in the western portion, the
Doklam Plateau and other sites in the eastern portion, and elsewhere as needed.
For the U.S. government at large:
• Accept India’s deep-seated desire for “strategic autonomy.” Any efforts to make India
move more quickly than it wishes will be likely to backfire.
• Consult with India before making decisions affecting its interests.
• Increase engagement on maritime domain awareness.
ix
• Seek opportunities to work with India to prevent Chinese political interference and
influence operations, including in the cyber arena.
x
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank the numerous officials, analysts, and scholars in the United
States, India, Singapore, and other nations focusing on South Asian security issues who
generously shared their time and insights throughout the project. The author is also grateful to
Paula Thornhill, Bonny Lin, and Raphael Cohen for their helpful reviews of draft versions of the
report.
xi
Abbreviations
AAD Army Air Defence (India)

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party (India)
BRI Belt and Road Initiative (China)
C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance
CAA Citizenship Amendment Act
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
COIN counterinsurgency
COVID-19 coronavirus disease 2019
CPEC China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
DTTI Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (U.S.-India)
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
FDI foreign direct investment
FMF Foreign Military Financing
FONOPS Freedom of Navigation Operations
G-2 Group of 2
GDP gross domestic product
HA/DR Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
IAF Indian Air Force
IAS Indian Administrative Service
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies (London)
IN Indian Navy
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JeM Jaish-e Muhammad
LAC line of actual control
LOC line of control
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka militant group)
MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defense
MDA maritime domain awareness
MEA Ministry of External Affairs
MoD Ministry of Defence (India)
xii
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDRF National Disaster Response Force (India)
PACAF Pacific Air Forces
PACOM U.S. Pacific Command
PAF RAND Project AIR FORCE
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force (China)
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy (China)
PRC People’s Republic of China
RSAF Republic of Singapore Air Force
RSN Republic of Singapore Navy
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UN United Nations
USAF United States Air Force
USARPAC U.S. Army Pacific Command
USD U.S. dollars
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
xiii
1. Introduction: India in the Context of U.S.-China Competition
This report is part of a broader RAND project examining how the United States can work
better with Indo-Pacific allies and partners to compete against efforts by China to assert regional
domination. This report focuses on four key analytical questions, which will help U.S. planners
formulate a successful strategy for maximizing engagement with India in the coming five to ten
years within the confines of what is realistically feasible:
• What factors might mitigate expectations about India’s willingness to take sides in U.S.-
China competition?
• How do India’s formulators and implementers of security policy view India’s potential
relationship with a rising China?
• How does India view its relationships with other key nations in the Indo-Pacific arena,
and how might such relationships serve to advance or set back U.S. strategic interests,
including competition with China?
• What factors in India’s political arena might have an impact on India’s willingness to
take a more robust stance against Chinese attempts to exert regional dominance?
At first glance, few (if any) partners present more suitable opportunities for increased
engagement than India. By many metrics, India is the Asian nation best poised to offset China’s
regional positioning and assure a more even balance of strategic weight in this vital area. China
is the world’s most populous nation—but India is projected by the UN to overtake it in less than
a decade (by 2027).1 India’s active-duty military is the second-largest in the world, after China’s
Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA).2 Moreover, India has its own geopolitical rivalry with China,
dating back to a PLA multifront invasion in 1962.3 China and India have engaged in border
skirmishes and standoffs throughout the decades since, most seriously near the Galwan Valley in
1
United Nations, “Total Population, Both Sexes Combined (Thousands),” UNdata website, 2019.
2
An overview of India’s military is provided in Appendix B. China’s PLA encompasses all elements of the military.
The air component is referred to as the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), and the naval component as
the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
3
Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2001a, pp. 131–133.
1
June 2020,4 and the two countries have territorial disputes along the Line of Actual Control
(LAC) in the high Himalayas.5
India’s self-defined core national security interests, including the preservation of its
sovereignty against encroachment by any would-be hegemonic regional power, are in relatively
close harmony with those of the United States. Unlike firmly established U.S. treaty allies in
Asia, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, India has no such
relationship with the United States—and that provides considerable room for a deepened
partnership. Unlike many other nations in South and Southeast Asia, India has a sufficiently
antagonistic relationship with China to make the possibility of alignment with Beijing against
U.S. interests seem fairly remote.6
But many of the same challenges that have prevented closer partnership between the United
States and India in the past remain in effect today. Such significant challenges (discussed in more
detail in Chapters 2 and 5) include
• persistent aversion to any partnership that might be characterized as “alignment,” in the
interest of preserving the nation’s “strategic autonomy”
• significant distrust of U.S. commitment and intentions
• a risk-averse structure for the making and implementing of security policy
• historical and ongoing underfunding of basic military needs
• lack of military capability and interoperability sufficient for frictionless interaction with
the U.S. military and close partners such as Australia or Japan.
Such challenges should moderate U.S. expectations about the pace for increased engagement.
All parts of the U.S. government should treat India as a valuable partner for the future—but one
that should be permitted to increase engagement at a pace of its own choosing.
The barrier to increased cooperation with the United States is not a desire to balance
engagement with China. India regards China as a strategic competitor, so there is very little
substantive cooperation between the two militaries. A variety of factors have served to limit U.S.
4
The most serious confrontation in over half a century began in May 2020, along the Line of Actual Control at
various sites in both Sikkim and Ladakh. By early June, it appeared to be moving toward a diplomatic resolution,
but, for reasons that remain unclear, on June 15 troops on both sides engaged in a physical confrontation near
Galwan that resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian troops and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers. India claims that
China had been planning the confrontation for weeks, and ended up seizing 23 square miles of previously
undisputed Indian territory in order to prevent India from finalizing road construction that would have solidified
New Delhi’s control over key features. For discussion of the Galwan conflict, see M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s
Sovereignty Obsession: Beijing’s Need to Project Strength Explains the Border Clash with India,” Foreign Affairs,
June 26, 2020. For discussion of the prior Himalayan standoff on the Doklam Plateau three years earlier, see Jonah
Blank, “What Were China’s Objectives in the Doklam Dispute?” Foreign Affairs, September 7, 2017.
5
The LOC is the Line of Control, separating portions of the pre-independence state of Jammu and Kashmir
currently administered by India from those currently administered by Pakistan. The LAC is the Line of Actual
Control, separating Himalayan territories administered by India from those administered by China. Neither the LOC
nor the LAC is an international border. India does have mutually recognized international borders with both Pakistan
and China, at places other than the LOC and LAC.
6
Nations in South and Southeast Asia that have enough of a security relationship with China to cause U.S. planners
to accept a degree of balancing include Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
2
security engagement with India in the past, and (as discussed later in this report) these factors
continue to serve as a brake on such engagement in the future.
Perhaps the most noteworthy of these is India’s traditional, and still powerful, identification
with a policy goal variously referred to as “Non-Alignment,” “strategic autonomy,” or “strategic
independence.” For most of India’s history, Non-Alignment served as shorthand for purported
equidistance between the world’s superpowers, while in reality describing a barely disguised tilt
toward the Soviet Union. (The history of India’s concept of Non-Alignment is discussed in detail
in Chapter 2.) India has never written its security doctrine in a white paper or any other type of
formal document.7 It is noteworthy that perhaps the clearest and most comprehensive description
of what might be considered India’s current semi-official security doctrine is contained in a
document entitled NonAlignment 2.0.8
NonAlignment 2.0 was authored in 2012 by eight of the country’s most respected theorists
and practitioners in the fields of military science, political science, international relations, and
economics. Both the authors and the much wider group of experts with whom the named authors
consulted including retired military, diplomatic, and political leaders sympathetic to both of the
country’s major national parties (the Indian National Congress Party and the Bharatiya Janata
Party [BJP]). The goal was to lay out a broad strategic consensus stretching across the political
spectrum—and it has proven remarkably prescient: The positions espoused by NonAlignment 2.0
have been largely followed both by the Congress Party administration of Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh (who was in office when the document was released) and by the BJP
Administration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi (who assumed office in 2014 with an absolute
majority sufficient to adopt whatever policy changes he wished—and was returned to office in
May 2019 with an even larger majority).
NonAlignment 2.0 was co-published by the government’s National Defence College, so even
though it does not constitute the formal security doctrine of India, it comes closer to filling that
role than any other document. It will be referred to throughout this report as a stand-in for a
formal government-articulated doctrine.
With this context as background, it is instructive to quote NonAlignment 2.0 directly
regarding the key issue of how India views strategic competition between the United States and
China:
[T]he twenty first century is unlikely to be characterized by a world bifurcated
between two dominant powers. While China and the United States will
undoubtedly remain superpowers, it is unlikely that they will be able to exercise
7
On India’s lack of a formal security doctrine, and substitutions for this prior to publication of NonAlignment 2.0
(Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam
Saran, and Siddharth Varadarajan, NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty-First
Century, New Delhi, India: National Defence College and Centre for Policy Research, 2012), see Rollie Lal,
Understanding China and India: Security Implications for the United States and the World, Santa Barbara, Calif.:
Praeger Security International, 2008, pp. 38–44.
8
Khilnani et al., 2012; hereafter cited as NonAlignment 2.0.
3
the kind of consistent, full-spectrum global dominance that superpowers
exercised during the mid-twentieth century Cold War. Alongside the U.S. and
China, there will be several other centres and hubs of power that will be relevant,
particularly in regional contexts. This means that NonAlignment will no longer
be limited to avoiding becoming a frontline state in a conflict between two
powers. It will instead require a very skillful management of complicated
coalitions and opportunities—in environments that may be inherently unstable
and volatile rather than structurally settled. This also provides India with rich
opportunities.9
This formulation articulates several important points relevant to U.S.-China competition.
First, it makes clear that India simply does not want to be part of any alliance or security
cooperation bloc, even informally, without any treaty obligations. Second, India wants to balance
its engagements among its list of key partners.10 Third, India sees the transition from a bipolar
Cold War world to a multipolar geopolitical structure not as a reason to abandon Non-
Alignment—but as an opportunity to redefine and recommit to it for the 21st century.
Applying the Project Framework to India

This project developed a framework to be applied to each of the country case studies,
highlighting major diplomatic, economic, defense, and political factors relevant to understanding
the responses of key countries to China’s growing power and influence, and to U.S.-China
competition. The methodology of this framework is described in Appendix A.
Table 1.1 lists 14 variables we considered in assessing relative U.S. and Chinese influence. It
includes eight indicators of shared interests and six measures of relative capabilities.
9
The text further notes the potential utility of India’s parliamentary structure: “If it can leverage into the
international domain some of its domestically acquired skills in coalition management and complex negotiation”
(NonAlignment 2.0, p. 9).
10
Not stated here, but worth noting, is the fact that India’s preferred partners include many partners and allies of the
United States—including Australia, Britain, Singapore, Israel, and France—but they also include U.S. rivals (most
importantly, Russia).
4
Table 1.1. Variables for Assessing Relative U.S.-China Influence
Source of Influence Type Description

Diplomatic and political
Diplomatic and political ties Shared How diplomatically and politically important the United States
interest or China is to the partner and the extent of diplomatic ties
Support for U.S. versus Shared How the partner’s views of the ideal regional order aligns
Chinese vision for the region interest with the U.S. vision for the region and U.S. values versus
assessed Chinese vision and values for the region
Views of U.S. commitment to Shared How confident (or not confident) the partner is about U.S.
the region interest commitment or staying power in the region
Public opinion Shared Relative public perceptions of favorability of the United
interest States versus China
Economic
Economic dependence Relative The partner’s current economic dependence on the United
capability States versus China, measured by aggregating trade,
investment, and tourism
Economic opportunity Relative How much the partner believes the United States versus
capability China can provide future economic benefits
Threat perceptions of the United Relative How much the partner views U.S. or Chinese economic
States versus China (economic) capability influence as potentially threatening, subversive, or coercive
Willingness to work with the Shared Whether the partner’s economic threat perception
United States versus China interest encourages it to work more with the United States or China
based on economic threat to balance against the other economically
perceptions
Military and security
Threat perceptions of the United Relative How much the partner views the United States or China as a
States versus China (military) capability military or security threat
Willingness to work with the Shared Whether the partner’s military threat perception encourages
United States versus China interest it to work more with the United States or China to balance
based on military threat against the other militarily
perceptions
Support for major U.S.-led Shared How much the partner generally supports the United States
security efforts interest on security issues through its participation in or opposition to
major U.S.-led international or regional security efforts
Military cooperation Relative How much the partner is working closely with the United
capability States versus China militarily
U.S. versus Chinese military Relative How the partner views U.S. versus Chinese military
capability capability capability
Perception of U.S. willingness Shared How confident (or not confident) the partner is about U.S.
to aid partner in conflict with interest willingness to come to its military defense in a potential
China conflict involving China
NOTE: Variables measuring shared interests are displayed in gray, and variables measuring relative capability are
displayed in black.
Like the other reports that are part of this broader project, this report examines the evolution
of this set of variables over a period of roughly a decade and projects how developments in these
areas might unfold over the next five to ten years. The project focused on examining these
5
variables across these time periods to explore the impact of growing Chinese power and
influence and the intensification of U.S.-China competition on the views and policies of U.S.
allies and partners as they adjust their approaches to the United States, China, and the region.
Figure 1.1 provides our findings and displays these assessments with respect to India in 2018.
The assessments depicted are based on the information and analysis in the following sections.
Given the mix of qualitative and quantitative variables, the study uses five categories and
corresponding colors to capture the broad differences in influence:
• Significantly more U.S. influence (blue): The United States has significantly more
influence than China. For the quantitative variables, this is coded as at least a 20 percent
U.S. advantage in influence compared with China.
• More U.S. influence (light blue): The United States has moderately more influence than
China. For the quantitative variables, this is coded as a 3 percent to 20 percent U.S.
advantage.
• Similar U.S. and People’s Republic of China (PRC) influence (gray): The United States
has similar levels of influence as China. For the quantitative variables, this is coded as the
United States has influence within 3 percent of Chinese influence.
• More PRC influence (light red): China has moderately more influence than the United
States. For the quantitative variables, this is coded as a 3 percent to 20 percent PRC
advantage.
• Significantly more PRC influence (red): China has significantly more influence than the
United States. Quantitatively, this is coded as at least a 20 percent PRC advantage.
Please see Appendix A for more detailed coding of each variable.
Figure 1.1 presents the coding of relative U.S. versus Chinese influence. The figure
highlights the clear advantage enjoyed by the United States in the competition for diplomatic and
political influence: India regards the United States as a friend (albeit an imperfect and perhaps
unreliable one) rather than an adversary. The analysis in this report shows greater support for the
U.S. vision for the region than for the Chinese vision: India sees China as seeking regional
dominance, whereas it does not have similar concerns about U.S. goals. On the question of U.S.
commitment to the region, however, India remains highly conflicted: It regards the United States
as an often-unreliable partner, particularly vis-à-vis its rival Pakistan. Public opinion favors the
United States over China, but not to an overwhelming degree.
In the realm of economic influence, Figure 1.1 highlights China’s narrow-but-noteworthy
advantage over the United States. Unlike many other Indo-Pacific nations, India does not face
the prospect of economic dominance by China: All nations in Southeast Asia are sufficiently tied
to China economically to make confrontation a risky proposition. India’s economic ties are
significant, but not nearly as strong as those of its Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) neighbors. India regards China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) economic program as
a matter of strategic concern—but it also sees significant opportunity in Chinese investment.
This has been a central feature of discussions between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and
6
Chinese President Xi Jinping during their out-of-capital summits in Mamallapuram (October
2019), Gujarat (September 2014), Wuhan (April 2018), and on other occasions.
Figure 1.1. Relative U.S. and Chinese Influence in India (2018)
India
Diplomatic and Political
Diplomatic and Political Ties
Support for U.S. vs. Chinese Vision

for the Region
Views of U.S. Commitment to the Region
Public Opinion
Economic
Threat Perceptions of U.S. vs. China

(Economic)
Willingness to Work with U.S. vs.

China based on Economic Threat Perceptions
Economic Dependence
Economic Opportunity
Military and Security
Threat Perceptions of U.S. vs. China

(Military)
Willingness to Work with U.S. vs.

China based on Military Threat Perceptions
Support for Major U.S.-led Security Efforts
Military Cooperation
U.S. vs. PRC Military Capability
Perception of U.S. Willingness to

Aid Country in Conflict vs. China
Significantly more Similar U.S. and Significantly more

U.S. influence PRC influence PRC influence
In military and security terms, Figure 1.1 illustrates the area in which the United States
enjoys its most significant advantage. Although India retains significant aversion to any
relationship that might be characterized as an alliance (as discussed in Chapter 2, under the
rubric of “strategic autonomy”), it views the United States as a security partner and China as its
most serious long-term security challenge. This view, however, does not translate into eagerness
7
to work closely with the United States on security issues, or to join U.S.-led security initiatives,
such as Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea. India sees the
United States as being far more militarily capable than China (and naturally a preferable partner
for military cooperation), but it harbors significant doubts about whether the United States could
be relied on in the event of a Sino-Indian conflict.
Organization of This Report

The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes India’s geostrategic
importance, its institutional outlook in foreign relations, and its strong desire to maintain
“strategic autonomy” in its diplomatic relationships with the United States, China, and the other
countries in the region. Chapter 3 outlines China’s economic importance to India (which
constrains, but does not dominate, Indian decisionmaking), and provides brief country-by-
country sketches of India’s relationships with its key regional neighbors. Chapter 4 considers
India’s defense priorities vis-à-vis China itself and vis-à-vis China as the primary strategic patron
of India’s historical military adversary Pakistan. Chapter 5 presents an analysis of the outlook of
how the issues discussed in prior chapters—in the diplomatic/political, economic, and security
arenas—are likely to play out over the next five to ten years; it assesses the key facts that U.S.
policymakers will need to take into account when formulating strategy, including the factors
limiting closer engagement between the United States and India, and areas where engagement
might be more feasible. Chapter 6 offers options for the U.S. government as well as for DoD and
the U.S. Air Force (USAF).
8
2. India’s Geostrategic Importance, Institutional Outlook, and
Desire for “Strategic Autonomy” in Diplomatic and Political
Relations
India’s Geostrategic Importance
Size, Geography, Democracy

For at least a decade and a half, India has been seen by many U.S. policymakers as a prime
candidate for drastically increased security engagement. A few data points show why:
• India, with a population of 1.4 billion, is projected to overtake China as the world’s most
populous nation by 2027.11
• India’s geography is strategically significant for competition with China in the land, sea,
and air domains. On land, India is one of only two nations (Vietnam is the other) that has
fought a land war with the PRC unsupported by foreign military troops, and the only one
(apart from India’s de facto protectorate Bhutan) with which Beijing has unresolved
territorial land disputes.12 On sea, India is the only nation with the force capability and
political intent to prevent China from extending its “hard power” dominance from the
Pacific Ocean into a similar dominance of the Indian Ocean Region. In the air, India has
numerous air bases that do not currently provide access to USAF aircraft but could
conceivably do so under the right conditions in the future; the most noteworthy of these
are Indian Air Force (IAF) stations at Port Blair and Car Nicobar in the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands and nine IAF stations in the Northeastern states of Assam, Tripura,
Meghalaya, and Arunachal Pradesh near the Chinese-administered province of Tibet
(Figure 2.1).
• India has by far the largest economy in South Asia. Its gross domestic product (GDP) is
$9.47 trillion when measured by purchasing power parity (PPP)—making it the third-
largest in the world (behind only the United States and China) by PPP. Because of its
enormous population, however, India’s GDP per capita is only $7,200 (in PPP)—156th
out of 228 nations ranked.13
11
United Nations, 2019.
12
In the maritime domain, China has unresolved territorial disputes with Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Brunei. (Taiwan’s maritime claims cannot be classified as territorial disputes per se, since the PRC
and Taiwan do not recognize each other as sovereign nations.) Before the creation of the PRC, China was invaded
by various modern and pre-modern nations (including Japan in 1937). The PRC’s participation in the Korean War
(1950–1953) may qualify South Korea as a nation that has fought a land war against modern China (depending on
how one defines PRC support for North Korea), but in this conflict South Korea—unlike India and Vietnam in their
conflicts with the PRC—was supported by troops from the United States and other nations.
13
Central Intelligence Agency, “World Factbook: Country Comparison, GDP—Per Capita (PPP),” website, undated.
All figures are from 2017.
9
Figure 2.1. Indian Air Force Bases and Air Stations
In addition to demographics and geography, India offers a shared commitment to democratic

government. Both U.S. and Indian government officials routinely cite the partnership of “the
world’s oldest democracy” and “the world’s largest democracy”—indeed, this formulation has
been used by both Democratic and Republican U.S. presidents and by both BJP and Congress
Party prime ministers.14 It has been used so often that it has become cliché. And some analysts
question the utility of such a distinction: For example, Eric Heginbotham and George Gilboy
challenge the conventional wisdom of what is sometimes termed the “democratic peace theory,”
arguing that “the practicability and safety of pursuing a foreign policy based on these values is
14
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President to the Joint Session of the Indian
Parliament in New Delhi, India,” November 8, 2010; “Bush Vows Support to India, Says Terror Won’t Have Final
Word,” Economic Times, November 30, 2008; Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Prime Minister’s
Office, “PM’s Address to Joint Session of the US Congress,” July 19, 2005; “Modi-Trump Meet: US President to
PM Modi, You Have Done a Great Job; I Would Like to Congratulate You,” Financial Express, June 27, 2017.
10
questionable.” Specifically in the context of a discussion of Indian and Chinese strategic
cultures, they contend that “there is no empirical basis at all for claims that democracies fare
fundamentally more peaceful than other regimes, or that the security interests of democracies in
different regions facing different challenges will tend to converge simply because they share
similar domestic political institutions and values.”15
But most scholars of international relations and security strategy—such as John
Mearsheimer,16 Rudolph Rummel,17 John M. Owen,18 and Christian Welzel19—do tend to view
the basic institutions of an open, democratic nation as providing at least some measure of shared
interests and guarantors of predictable, transparent policymaking. The core ideas of what has
come to be known as “democratic peace theory” go back to the French and German
Enlightenment and have been outlined by (among others) Michael Doyle.20 For U.S.
policymakers, the importance of working with a mature, firmly rooted democratic political
system can hardly be overstated. Democratic government ensures that the makers of security
decisions will not be too far out of step with the core sentiments and desires of the populace: In
nations without such popular support, any security arrangement struck today might well
evaporate tomorrow with a coup d’état or sudden shift in regime priorities.
Such sudden swings are not unknown in democratic nations, but any such fluctuations
sufficiently important to a critical mass of voters is likely to be reversed in a subsequent
election.21 Perhaps equally important, since the passage of the Leahy Law in 1998,22 the U.S.
government has been legally prohibited from security cooperation with units of foreign militaries
that have engaged in unremediated abuse of human rights. Such abuses are not absent in
democratic states, but there is a correlation between democratic systems and respect for basic
15
Eric Heginbotham and George Gilboy, Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2012, p. 263.
16
John Mearsheimer, “Why Is Europe Peaceful Today?” European Political Science, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2010.
17
Rudolph J. Rummel, “Libertarianism and International Violence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, 1983.
18
John M. Owen, “Give Democratic Peace a Chance? How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International
Security, Vol. 19, No. 2, Autumn 1994.
19
Christian Welzel, Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation, Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2013.
20
Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, New York: W.W. Norton, 1997.
In this work, as in others published over the preceding decades (Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and
Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1983), Doyle emphasizes the historical
philosophical routes of this idea.
21
As recent fluctuations in the foreign policy of nations including the Philippines, India, and the United States
demonstrate, such events are not unknown in democratic nations. The key point here is that if such policy-shifts are
important enough to the voters, then they are likely to be reversed.
22
The first version of the Leahy Amendment was passed in 1997, but referred only to counternarcotics assistance.
This prohibition was extended the following year to all assistance funded by the State Department, which includes
such forms of security assistance as Foreign Military Financing and many types of military education and training.
11
human rights.23 Moreover, remediation of abuses that do occur (a provision provided by Leahy
legislation) is easier in a democratic civilian-run country than one without institutionalized
systems of civilian oversight of the military.24
A similarity of political structure does not necessarily lead to a harmony of interests. As
Sameer Lalwani and Heather Byrne note, “the convergence of strategic interests between the
world’s two largest democracies has been more limited and slower than many estimated two
decades ago and still imagine today.” They note that the bonds of democracy can, in fact, serve
merely to camouflage (rather than overcome) the very real differences that “are obscured by
often repeated shibboleths like ‘natural allies,’ and ‘defining partnerships of the twenty-first
century.’”25
Institutional Outlook
Shared Interest in Maintaining a Rules-Based International Order

The U.S. case for assembling a broad array of partners and allies in its competition with
China is not grounded in power politics. Instead, the U.S. argument is typically grounded in
defense of a peaceful global order and upholding a system for adjudicating interstate disputes
through a rules-based set of international mechanisms rather than through military force. When
the United States tries to enlist partners in such ventures as South China Sea Freedom of
Navigation Operations (FONOPS), the effort is grounded in a defense of shared interest in free,
lawful navigation—not in an effort to assemble a coalition against China as part of a new Cold
War.26 (It is important to note, however, that India’s own view on FONOPS is less expansive
than that of the United States, largely out of concern that other nations might conduct FONOPS
in Indian Ocean waters that New Delhi would prefer remain its own preserve.27)
This is precisely the argument most in harmony with India’s own concept of its strategic
interests, and its place in the 21st century world order. Indeed, any effort to enlist India in
23
Nilanjana Jain, “Human Rights Under Democracy,” Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 67, No. 1, January–
March, 2006; Samantha Besson, “Human Rights and Democracy in a Global Context: Decoupling and Recoupling,”
Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2011.
24
For a more complete discussion of the history, implementation, and effectiveness of the Leahy Law, see Michael
J. McNerney, Jonah Blank, Becca Wasser, Jeremy Boback, and Alexander Stephenson, Improving Implementation
of the Department of Defense Leahy Law, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1737-OSD, 2017.
25
Sameer Lalwani and Heather Byrne, “Great Expectations: Asking Too Much of the US-India Strategic
Partnership,” Washington Quarterly, Fall 2019, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 42.
26
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Freedom of Navigation Report: Fiscal Year 2017, Washington, D.C., 2017,
p. 3.
27
Iskander Rehman, India, China and Different Conceptions of the Maritime Order, Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 2017. Former Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon notes, “Freedom of navigation and
security in the Indo-Pacific is critical to India’s wellbeing and future prosperity. But it is not the answer to our
continental security issues” (Shivshankar Menon, “Security Strategies for India as an Emerging Regional Power
with Global Ambitions,” lecture at United Service Institution of India, December 5, 2018).
12
competition with China that was not based on defense of a global rules-based order would
encounter significant opposition in the name of “strategic autonomy.” NonAlignment 2.0 notes
that the nation’s entwined development and national security goals rest on a foundation of
international rules-based order, and “India therefore has to strive to maintain an open global
order at many different levels.”28
India’s Security Policymaking

India’s armed forces are entirely under civilian control and have been ever since the nation’s
independence in 1947; even during India’s sole break from democratic governance (the 1975–
1977 “Emergency”), the armed forces made no attempt to challenge the chain-of-command,
instead keeping civilian authorities in charge at all levels. This stands in sharp contrast to the
political place of the armed forces in India’s rival Pakistan, where the military (specifically, the
Army) has governed for much of the nation’s history and dominated its security policymaking
process even during times of civilian rule.
India’s military enjoys considerable societal respect, but the firewalled civil-military divide
makes the formulation of security policy more complicated. Exceptionally few politicians or
career civil servants in India have ever served in the military, and the number of top-level
policymakers who have served in uniform is almost negligible. This lack of direct experience
among top political leadership and their aides one rung down creates a policy formulation
process that frustrates both U.S. and Indian officials, uniformed and civilian alike.
Civilian bureaucrats maintain an iron control over even the smallest decisions: As a U.S.
military official in New Delhi noted (with only a mild hyperbole), a U.S. commander of any of
the services in the Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility “can do just about
anything he wishes short of starting a war.”29 India’s four-star counterparts, by contrast, are not
even able to decide where or when to travel without bureaucratic approval.
This lack of authority by uniformed officials to green-light engagements has huge logistical
ripple effects.30 Many decisions are refused by civilian authorities for specific policy reasons—
but many others are simply delayed so long that they become logistically impossible. An
unknowable number of engagement requests are never even submitted by commanders, due to
the overly cumbersome nature of the approval process. With a decision matrix so complicated, it
is always easier for officials at every level to deny an activity request than to approve one.
Indian uniformed officers (U.S. military officials in New Delhi report) almost always want to
expand engagement with the United States: They want more training, more exercises, and to take
28
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 8. Not all observers see this theoretical convergence as leading to a true harmony of interests
between the United States and India. For a counterargument, see Dinshaw Mistry, “Aligning Unevenly: India and
the United States,” East West Center Policy Studies, Vol. 74, 2016.
29
Interview with U.S. military official on May 14, 2019, New Delhi (Source 2).
30
For a historical discussion of India’s civil-military relations, see Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army, Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2001b, pp. 170–180.
13
more courses in the United States (particularly in niche specialties and those building technical
expertise).31 A U.S. military official reported that when he visited the Indian Army’s school for
Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare in Mizoram, he found that the highest-ranking officer, in
his own spare time, “had studied everything he could get his hands on about U.S. Special
Forces—he knew more about our training and operations than I did!”32
There are institutional roadblocks at several points in the decision tree.33 The first is at the
Ministry of Defence (MoD), which is staffed largely by career bureaucrats from the Indian
Administrative Service (IAS), rather than by officials with specific military skill sets. If a request
successfully passes through the barriers at MoD, it must be vetted for potential diplomatic impact
by IAS officials at the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). A U.S. official in New Delhi
reported that the MEA, rather than MoD, presented a greater obstacle for increased
engagement.34 If a proposal manages to make its way through MoD and the MEA, it still may
fall prey to the competing priorities in the Prime Minister’s Office—the ultimate locus of
decisions on truly important matters. NonAlignment 2.0 implicitly acknowledges the difficulty of
getting all stakeholders in the government to work harmoniously in advance of national
objectives, both in the security arena and throughout government.35
Even when all the bureaucratic stars are aligned, there is the overarching issue of cost.
India’s security budget is quite low for a nation dealing with such significant current and future
challenges. Few nations are confronted with the sort of existential threats that India regularly
faces: a determined and active nuclear-armed rival that regularly launches asymmetric attacks, a
militarily superior neighbor with active irredentist claims on its territory, and a full slate of
internal insurgencies and serious terrorist campaigns. Even fewer nations, when confronted with
such threats, would keep military spending at only 2 percent of GDP—almost exactly the global
average, and a benchmark that includes many nations facing virtually no realistic security threat.
As a matter of national pride, India generally refuses to take advantage of training, exchange,
and exercise opportunities unless it can pay its own way—which it often cannot. A U.S. military
official in New Delhi noted that India refuses to accept Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to
fund many training courses for which it would be legitimately eligible: “Their view is that they
want to foot the bill for everything—even when they can’t afford it. Which means they often stay
31
32
33
For a discussion of these roadblocks, from the perspective of a U.S. government official who has dealt with them
firsthand as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the area including India, see Cara Abercrombie, “Realizing
the Potential: Mature Defense Cooperation and the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership,” Asia Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1,
January 2019.
34
35
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 30. For a nondoctrinal Indian analysis of why civilians at MoD are responsible for bringing
“jointness” to the nation’s military forces—and failing to do so—see Anit Mukherjee, “Fighting Separately:
Jointness and Civil-Military Relations in India,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 40, Nos. 1–2, July 2016, pp. 13–
16.
14
home.”36 Another U.S. official noted that India doesn’t even send personnel to conferences and
forums such as the U.S. Army Pacific Command’s (USARPAC’s) annual conference,
LANDPAC, which brings together key officers from armies all across the Indo-Pacific and
provides the opportunity to forge bonds among many potential partners: “We invite them every
time, but they don’t come. They miss the chance not only to get to know us better, but to build
relationships across the whole region.”37
According to U.S. military officials in New Delhi, the total number of engagements each
year is significantly lower than those offered by the United States. “India isn’t even using all of
the IMET [International Military Education and Training] slots reserved for them—we increased
the number, but the billets are going unfilled.”38 Another U.S. official noted that just about every
U.S. officer has some personal experience in training alongside British, Australian, or other
partners, but very few have ever trained or exercised with Indian counterparts: “We’re just not
touching many people.”39
Some of these bureaucratic roadblocks can be overcome with creative approaches—for
example, a more streamlined decision process on both sides. Others, however, will require top-
level political leadership—for example, concerns about loss of India’s independence or stature
can only be addressed at the highest levels of India’s civilian government.40
India’s Desire for “Strategic Autonomy” in Diplomatic and Political Relations

Despite the strong foundation for a deepened security partnership between the United States
and India in the context of increasing competition with China, significant challenges remain in
place. Perhaps the most significant of these is India’s deep-seated desire to maintain “strategic
autonomy”—an ideological predisposition growing out of, and often closely tied to, the idea of
Non-Alignment.
In formal terms, the Non-Aligned Movement only came into being at the Belgrade
Conference of 1961—by which point the member nations had already begun to migrate away
from any coherent bloc of decolonized states providing a third pole to the U.S.–Soviet Union
dyad. But in India, the idea of Non-Alignment had roots going back decades earlier—indeed,
both of India’s political ideologies (Nehruvian secularism and Hindu nationalism) can be said to
have had rival versions of Non-Alignment baked in from their respective inceptions.
36
37
38
39
40
For a more complete discussion of India’s strategic culture, and particularly with how it compares to that of
China, see Andrew Scobell, “Himalayan Standoff: Strategic Culture and the China-India Rivalry,” in T. V. Paul, ed.,
The China-India Rivalry in the Globalization Era, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2018, pp. 165–
186.
15
The Nehruvians, who governed the nation for its first half-century, reveled in the thought of
an India sitting at a serene distance from ideologies of both capitalist West and communist North
(as the crow flies from New Delhi); this owed much to the views of Mahatma Gandhi, the moral,
spiritual, and—at least in theory—ideological lodestone of the Indian National Congress Party,
which was the vehicle for Nehruvian politics. While Jawaharlal Nehru himself was attracted to
the economic elements of Soviet-style socialism,41 Gandhi’s main influence from Russia was the
decidedly un-Soviet Leo Tolstoy.42 On the other side of the coin, both figures had devoted their
lives to gaining India’s independence from Great Britain and were understandably loathe to
substitute a de jure colonial relationship with one English-speaking nation for a de facto one with
another.
The Nehruvians’ ideological rivals in the Hindu Nationalist (or Hindutva) movement came to
political power through the BJP from 1998 to 2004 under Prime Minister Atul Bihari Vajpayee,43
and again from 2015 to the present under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The Hindutva groups
out of which the BJP grew—most directly the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and more
obliquely the Hindu Mahasabha—were founded during the last decades of colonial rule and
espoused a form of proto-Non-Alignment throughout their formative years. In Hindutva
ideology, India must stand apart from—and eventually above—both the upstart West and the
delusionally godless Communists. After Gandhi’s assassination by a Hindu nationalist gunman
in 1948, both the RSS and the Mahasabha were banned for a time, and neither they nor any other
Hindutva group played a major role in politics until the 1980s. But when the BJP eventually
came to power, Hindutva’s ideological distaste for alliances that it regarded as impinging on
India’s dignity would translate into a continuation of Nehruvian Non-Alignment regardless of
which power was in office.
India put its desire for equidistance into practice almost from the start of its history as an
independent nation. At first, Nehru tried to keep his nation genuinely free of alignment with
either Cold War bloc. In 1955, he joined with Indonesia’s founding president, Sukarno, and other
leaders of newly decolonized nations to convene the African-Asian Conference (more commonly
called the Bandung Conference, after the Indonesian city where it was held).44
In Bandung, more than two dozen new nations assembled to create what would soon be
called the Non-Aligned Movement. Although the actual language of the conference communique
41
Surjit Mansingth, “Indo-Soviet Relations in the Nehru Years: The View from New Delhi,” in Surjit Mansingh,
Rolad Popp, Anna Locher, and Shana Goldberg, eds., Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security, Zurich:
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, February 2009.
42
Kenneth Rivett, “Gandhi, Tolstoy and Coercion.” Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1988.
43
Vajpayee also served as prime minister for 13 days in 1996, but was unable to form a stable coalition.
44
For a more complete discussion of India’s role at the Bandung Conference, see John Garver, Protracted Contest,
Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 2001, pp. 118–120, 188–189. The ideology codified at Bandung is
occasionally retroactively referred to as “Non-Alignment 1.0.”
16
was rather vague,45 the movement and its putative ideology (equidistance from both Cold War
superpowers) remained India’s rhetorical touchstone until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In
India’s narrative, the entire concept of Non-Alignment was due primarily to Nehru, and partly
for this reason even many Indians who disown other parts of Nehru’s legacy claim implicit
ownership of the concept as an element of national pride.46
The difficulty of maintaining equidistance was clear from the very beginning: One of the
Bandung Conference’s key figures was Zhou Enlai, premier of the PRC, which was at that time
still a de facto ally and ideological partner of the USSR.47 Over the subsequent seven years, the
relationship between India and China soured. Matters took a serious turn for the worse in 1959
when India gave sanctuary to the Dalai Lama, infuriating China by permitting the establishment
of a Tibetan government-in-exile in the Himalayan town of Dharamsala. By 1962, things had
grown so toxic that India and China—two of the three linchpins of the original Non-Aligned
bloc—fought the only war in their postcolonial history.48
As India’s relations with China soured in the late 1950s and early 1960s, its relations with the
USSR grew warmer.49 This owed more to geopolitics rather than ideology. The Communist
world split into rival camps in the years following the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in
1953, with Nikita Krushchev denouncing his predecessor in 1956. This was a step that PRC
leader Mao Zedong, a wartime comrade and ideological soulmate of Stalin, refused to take.
When India began to see China as a foe rather than a comrade, it was only natural that it would
be drawn closer to China’s new adversary, the USSR.50 India bitterly resented the failure of the
United States to come to its aid in the 1962 war, even after a landmark visit by President Dwight
Eisenhower in 1959 and high hopes for the new President John F. Kennedy (who had his hands
more than full at the time with the Cuban Missile Crisis). China’s speedy invasion badly
45
“The Asian-African Conference considered the problems of common interest and concern to countries of Asia and
Africa and discussed ways and means by which their people could achieve fuller economic, cultural and political
cooperation” (Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung, Bandung, Indonesia, April 24,
1955, p. 2).
46
The same is true in Indonesia—with the substitution of Sukarno for Nehru.
47
In 1950, the USSR and the PRC signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (also known as the Treaty of
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance). In 1954, India and China signed the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence, or Panchsheel Agreement. These principles were mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal matters, equality, and harmonious co-
existence.
48
Garver, 2001, pp. 48–49.
49
For discussion of how India fit into a “triangle” relationship with China and the United States during this period,
with particular reference to China’s “dual adversary” policy vis-à-vis the United States and the U.S.S.R, see Harry
Harding, “The Evolution of the Strategic Triangle: China, India and the United States,” in Harry Harding and
Francine Frankel, eds. The China-India Relationship: What Every American Needs to Know, New York: Columbia
University Press, 2004, pp. 321–350.
50
Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2010, pp. 43–45.
17
damaged India’s standing with other members of the Non-Aligned Movement,51 providing
further incentive to edge closer to Moscow.
Throughout the Cold War years, therefore, it is not surprising that Non-Alignment often
served as a thinly veiled de facto Indian tilt toward the Soviet Union.52 But even a quarter-
century after the demise of the USSR, Non-Alignment remains very much alive. The United
States and other interlocutors based in New Delhi report this as a constant refrain in
discussions.53 The quasi-doctrinal document NonAlignment 2.0 seeks to update the concept and
to situate it at the center of the nation’s security strategy:
Strategic autonomy has been the defining value and continuous goal of India’s
international policy ever since the inception of the Republic. Defined initially in
the terminology of NonAlignment, that value we believe continues to remain at
the core of India’s global engagements even today, in a world that has changed
drastically since the mid-twentieth century.54
The document spells out a modern-day rationale for strategic autonomy: Instead of keeping
the nation free of dangerous commitment to either of the Cold War blocs (the argument for
NonAlignment 1.0, as it is implicitly called in retrospect), the new version seeks to preserve
India’s freedom of action largely to advance its development goals—which its security strategy
both serves and is based on: “The core objective of a strategic approach should be . . . to enhance
India’s strategic space and capacity for independent agency—which in turn will give it
maximum options for its own internal development.”55 This line of thought would be
championed by the Congress-led government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who had
himself the served as architect, during an earlier stint as Minister of Finance, of India’s first
moves toward economic liberalization in the early 1990s. It would be continued under the BJP
government of Prime Minister Modi.56 As Modi’s Minister of External Affairs Subramanyam
Jaishankar put it in 2019:
51
Cohen, 2001a, p. 245.
52
For a more complete discussion, see Steven A. Hoffmann, “Perception and China Policy in India,” in Harding and
Frankel, 2004, pp. 33–74.
53
54
NonAlignment 2.0, p. iv.
55
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 8. It continues:
This policy can therefore be described as ‘NONALIGNMENT 2.0’—a re-working for present
times of the fundamental principle that has defined India’s international engagements since
Independence. The core objectives of Non Alignment were to ensure that India did not define its
national interest or approach to world politics in terms of ideologies and goals that had been set
elsewhere; that India retained maximum strategic autonomy to pursue its own developmental
goals; and that India worked to build national power as the foundation for creating a more just and
equitable global order.
56
Not all observers see Modi as having lived up to the economic side of the equation. Abhijnan Rej and Rahul Sagar
say “The picture around a presumed Modi doctrine is that of inertia tempered by a few distinct innovations”
(Abhijnan Rej and Rahul Sagar, “The BJP and Indian Grand Strategy,” in Milan Vaisnav, ed., The BJP in Power:
18
The first phase from 1946–62 could be characterized as an era of optimistic non-
alignment. Its setting was very much of a bipolar world, with camps led by the
United States and the USSR. India’s objectives were to resist the constraining of
its choices and dilution of its sovereignty as it rebuilt its economy and
consolidated its integrity. Its parallel goal, as the first of the decolonized nations,
was to lead Asia and Africa in a quest for a more equitable world order.57
The authors of NonAlignment 2.0 see a multipolar world as one that offers many options to
India.58 This argument for strategic autonomy is, perhaps, a straightforwardly transactional one:
India should maintain its independence from any formal or informal alliance in order to extract
the best possible set of concessions from all potential suitors: “[I]t is undoubtedly in India’s best
interests to have a deep and wide engagement with as many powers as are willing to engage with
it.”59 The argument would appear to rest on the premise that if the United States and any
potential rivals are constantly competing for India’s favor, they will be forced to offer better
terms for engagement than they might grant to an ally whose commitments are permanently
locked in. (This runs counter to a complaint sometimes made by Indian interlocutors about
excessive transactionalism in U.S. circles—but such a complaint mirrors that of Pakistani
interlocutors, often in reference to precisely the same policy points.)
Both the positive case (opportunities in autonomy) and negative one (dangers in alliance) for
Non-Alignment are likewise advanced by Indian policymakers across the board. Shivshankar
Menon, for example, served as BJP Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Ambassador to China and
subsequently as Congress Prime Minister Singh’s National Security Advisor. He advocated a
version of NonAlignment 2.0 in terms of realpolitik:
We are now in a far more dangerous world, where the Westphalian state has
collapsed or vanished to our immediate West, but where traditional great power
rivalry between strong and rising states is the norm to our East. Alliance seems to
me to be exactly the wrong answer. We should retain the initiative with ourselves
and not get entangled in other’s quarrels, keep our powder dry and ourselves free
to pursue India’s national interest.60
In addition to realpolitik arguments, NonAlignment 2.0 makes an argument based on a
foundation of deeply engrained cultural values rather than shallow transactional calculations.
India (this argument runs) cannot and should not ally with any nation or group, because India’s
Indian Democracy and Religious Nationalism, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
April 4, 2019).
57
Subramanyam Jaishankar, “Speech at the Fourth Ramnath Goenka Lecture,” New Delhi: Ministry of External
Affairs, November 14, 2019.
58
NonAligment 2.0, p. 31: “The structures of competition in the global system will present India with a range of
partnership choices. For a start, India will be sought after in great power competition. This presents a great historical
opportunity for India.”
59
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 33, further: “This engagement is important for developing our own technology and military
capabilities, as well as for spreading economic risks and for benefiting from flows of ideas and innovation
distinctive to particular cultural traditions and contexts.”
60
Menon, 2018.
19
political system, culture, and society set it apart from any other country or grouping of countries.
In essence, this argument says that this is not a matter of choice—India fundamentally is, and has
no choice but to be, Non-Aligned: “In terms of constitutional vision, India is the most ‘Western’
and liberal among the non-Western powers. But we are rooted in Asia. . . . India can be a unique
bridge between different worlds. Indeed, India’s bridging potential is one we must leverage and
turn to our active benefit.61
One result of this desire for strategic autonomy is India’s desire to balance its security
engagements among a range of partners. This range is not as broad as those of other countries—
Indonesia, for example, actively seeks the widest possible array of security partners. India’s
desired range of partners does, however, include both allies and rivals of the United States. “The
Indian government likes to keep everything as equal as it reasonably can, right across the board,”
says a U.S. military source interviewed in New Delhi. “Exercises, training—they like to maintain
rough parity between the U.S. to other partners, particularly Russia.”62 Another U.S. military
official interviewed in New Delhi noted that American policymakers need to factor India’s desire
for balance into any requests for cooperation: “Anything we ask India to do,” he said, “we’ve got
to be OK with them doing it with Russia too.” He noted, however, that the same dynamic can
work in reverse: In at least one instance he was able to remember, the United States succeeded in
getting permission for an activity on the rationale that India had granted the same type of
engagement to Russia.63
An Indian security analyst described a creative method that one U.S. ally uses to deal with
the issue of partner-balancing: stealth engagements. “The British send an innocuous message,”
he explained, “something like, ‘Oh, we’ll be transiting the region en route to the Pacific—mind
if we have a stopover to refuel?’ And while they’re doing that, they have substantive
conversations and exchanges with their IAF or IN [Indian Navy] counterparts.”64
61
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 31. The text between these two statements elaborates further:
As a poor and developing country, we also have an enormous global footprint. We have the
potential to become a technological powerhouse yet remain an informal economy. We are
committed to democratic practices and are convinced that robust democracies are a surer
guarantee of security in our neighbourhood and beyond. Yet we do not ‘promote’ democracy or
see it as an ideological concept that serves as a polarizing axis in world politics. It follows that
there are few ‘natural’ groupings—whether defined by political vision, economic profile and
interests, or geopolitical security challenges—into which India can seamlessly fit. This diverse
identity and the multiple interests that it underpins are actually our greatest strategic assets at the
global level.
62
Interview on May 14, 2019, New Delhi (Source 1). The source, a U.S. military official, noted that India’s desire to
maintain a wide array of partnerships (whether in the security or diplomatic sphere) extends even to North Korea.
The possibility of maintaining overall balance rather than an individual service one—that is, permitting a U.S.
imbalance in areas of U.S. advantage such as the naval arena, and countering this with a special effort to give Russia
an advantage in (say) land warfare—does not appear particularly attractive to either Indian or U.S. interlocutors.
63
64
Interview with Indian security analyst on May 16, 2019, New Delhi (Source 3).
20
In addition to the need for balancing, a desire to maintain “strategic autonomy” means that
India’s military hardware remains a mishmash of Western, Russian, and other incompatible kit.
“India wants mix-and-match technology,” said one U.S. military official. “They want to put
American technology on Russian frames. But that doesn’t work—not just because we don’t
permit it, but because the systems aren’t designed to cooperate.”65 This will make operational
interoperability with the United States (or any other security partner) an ongoing challenge.
Some Indian observers see the desire for Non-Alignment as an anachronism, or even as an
intellectual dodge. “Our policy leaders hate making difficult decisions,” said one Indian security
analyst. “Non-Alignment, strategic autonomy, whatever you want to call it—it’s just a fig-leaf
for avoiding tough choices. We want all the trappings of leadership, with none of the
responsibility.”66
Most Indian policymakers and scholars of security policy, however, do have a genuine,
deeply seated view that the nation’s core interests are best served by keeping balancing
competing nations against each other.67 This applies not only to superpower competition but
even to the competition of nations less militarily capable than India itself. NonAlignment 2.0
urges that “We should try and steer clear of the escalating rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
We have major interests in our relationships with both these countries and need to strike a careful
balance in our dealings with each.”68
This recommendation has been put into action—and it may be part of what is sometimes
termed a strategy of “multialignment.”69 Traditionally, India has regarded Saudi Arabia with
suspicion, due partly to Cold War politics and partly to the Saudis’ extremely close (and
extremely opaque) relationship with India’s archrival, Pakistan.70 Relations began to warm in
2006,71 and the full extent of the rapprochement was seen in February 2019 when Saudi Crown
Prince (and de facto ruler) Muhammad bin Sultan stopped over in India directly after a visit to
Pakistan. Whereas Prince Sultan had signed a memorandum of understanding for $20 billion in
support for Pakistan’s faltering economy, in India he made no firm commitments of
65
66
67
C. Raja Mohan, “India: Between “‘Strategic Autonomy’ and ‘Geopolitical Opportunity,’” Asia Policy, No. 15,
2013.
68
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 24.
69
Ian Hall, Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy, Bristol, UK: Bristol University Press, 2019, pp. 21–
40. See also Ian Hall, “Multialignment and the Indian Foreign Policy Under Narendra Modi,” Round Table: The
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 105, No. 3, 2016.
70
Jonah Blank, “Defining the Relationship: What Pakistan and Saudi Arabia Want from Each Other,” Foreign
Affairs, June 16, 2015; Jonah Blank, Richard Girven, Arzan Tarapore, Julia Thompson and Arthur Chan, Vector
Check: Prospects for U.S. and Pakistan Air Power Engagement, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-
2107-AF, 2017, pp. 54–58.
71
In 2006, King Abdullah became the first Saudi ruler to visit India in over half a century. This was followed by a
2010 visit to Saudi Arabia by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and a 2016 visit by Prime Minister Modi.
21
investment.72 When Modi greeted the crown prince at the airport in New Delhi, he greeted him
with a hug—providing conspicuous diplomatic support at a particularly critical time.73
India’s relations with Iran have traditionally been cordial and go back centuries: Only about
one-fifth of India’s Muslim population are Shi’a (the dominant denomination in Iran), but the
cultural impact of Islam in India has had more of a Persian than Arab cultural influence.74 India’s
investment in Iran’s Chabahar port is New Delhi’s most significant financial and political
commitment to any nation in the Middle East, and one of its most significant such commitments
anywhere in the world.75 In February 2018, a year before the Saudi crown prince’s visit, Iran’s
President Hassan Rouhani paid his first state visit to India—and inked at least nine substantive
documents on concrete elements of cooperation.76
In this context—that is, a genuine desire to update strategic independence for a 21st century
geopolitical environment—it is useful to note that NonAlignment 2.0 even posits the possibility
of the United States and China forming an alliance hostile to India.77 From an American
perspective, it might seem far-fetched that the U.S.-China competition might turn into a new
“G-2” strategic bloc. From an Indian perspective, however, such a possibility is a matter of
history: In 1972—less than a decade after the PLA invaded India, and only two months after
India concluded its most significant war with China’s security partner Pakistan—U.S. President
Richard Nixon shocked the world by traveling to Beijing for a paradigm-shifting summit with
China’s leader Mao Zedong.78
72
His statement said only, “We expect the opportunities we are targeting in India in various fields to exceed $100
billion.” See Sanjeev Miglani, “Saudi Prince Expects Investment Worth More than $100 Billion in India,” Reuters,
February 20, 2019.
73
The visit came four days after the Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-e Muhammad launched the deadliest attack
on Indian forces in years—and three months after global outcry arose following a CIA assessment that Prince Sultan
likely ordered the murder of dissident Jamal Khashoggi at a Saudi consulate in Turkey. See Michael Hirsh, “What
Happened to Trump’s Khashoggi Report?” Foreign Policy, November 20, 2018; Sanjay Kumar, “Greeted with a
Hug: Saudi Crown Prince Welcomed to India by PM Modi,” Arab News, February 19, 2019.
74
Throughout the pre-colonial era, Persian was the language of government and administration in most Muslim
polities in India, whether Sunni or Shi’a. Well into the colonial period, a fluency in both Persian language and the
more refined elements of Persian culture (including Persian poetry, music, and art) were essential requirements for
public officials at most courts—often including individuals practicing Hinduism, Sikhism, or even (in the case of a
few British colonial officials) Christianity. See William Darymple, White Mughals, New York: Penguin, 2004.
75
Geeta Mohan, “India Committed to Chabahar Port Despite Budget Slash from Rs 150 Crore to Rs 45 Crore:
Diplomats,” India Today, July 9, 2019; Press Trust of India, “US Says Chabahar Project Won’t Be Impacted by Iran
Sanctions,” Economic Times, April 24, 2019b.
76
Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “India-Iran Joint Statement During Visit of the President of
Iran to India,” February 17, 2018.
77
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 33: “Given that the future of Sino-U.S. relations is uncertain, and that the likely evolution of
China’s own foreign policy remains unclear, India must be prepared for a contingency where, for instance,
threatening behaviour by one of the major powers could encourage or even force it to be closer to another.”
78
Even more galling, perhaps, from an Indian perspective: Nixon’s 1972 visit to China was arranged through the
channel of archrival Pakistan (Geoffrey Warner, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China, 1969–
1972,” International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 4, July 2007).
22
As Harry Harding noted, during a period (2004) of relative harmony in the India-China-U.S.
triangle, historically “the linkages among the three [have] changed relatively frequently, without
ever leading to enduring alignments of any two against the other.”79 Stephen P. Cohen observes,
“Changes in the U.S.-China relationship also affected Washington’s perception of India.” He
notes that during the administration of President Bill Clinton, attempts at normalization of
relations with Beijing “proved hard to define and difficult to maintain in the face of increased
Chinese domestic repression. . . . When added to the usual tensions over trade and security
issues, these concerns suddenly made India more attractive.”80 Since 2017, the United States’
stance toward China has displayed considerable volatility: Even as the two nations were locked
in a mutual tariff duel, the U.S. president said that he and China’s leader “love each other” and
the two nations’ relationship “has never, ever been better.”81 While a Washington-Beijing
rapprochement might seem unlikely to American (and likely Chinese) observers, it is
understandable if Indian policymakers feel obliged to factor this possibility into their
calculations.
79
Harding, 2004, p. 324.
80
Cohen, 2001a, p. 286.
81
Zhou Xin, “Donald Trump Says He and China’s Xi Jinping ‘Love Each Other,’ Phase Two Trade Talks to Start
‘Very Shortly,’” South China Morning Post, January 21, 2020.
23
3. India’s Economic Relationship with China, and Country-by-
Country Relationship Sketches
China as Key Trade Partner for India

China is by far India’s largest source of imports, making up 16.2 percent of the total: This is
triple the amount of the second-ranking importer (the United States, at 5.4 percent) and more
than the next three top-ranked importers combined (the United Arab Emirates at 5.2 percent,
Saudi Arabia at 4.8 percent, and Switzerland at 4.6 percent).82 Moreover, if imports of oil, gas
and financial services were stripped out of the equation, China’s position as supplier of tangible
goods for India’s economy would be even more dominant. As India faces the challenge of
recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, it will require continued availability of supply chains
from China for medical equipment and other items vital for public health and economic growth.
On the export side of the ledger, China’s position as a key market is too large for India to risk
alienating. While the PRC on its own ranks fourth as a market for Indian goods and services
(with 4.2 percent of the total), when it is combined with Hong Kong (5.1 percent) it is nearly tied
with the United Arab Emirates (9.7 percent) for second place;83 the United States (15.6 percent)
is by far the largest market for Indian goods and services—but no policymaker in New Delhi
could safely ignore the economic impact of a trading partner as large as Beijing.84 As a U.S.
military official put it, “China has the power to punish India both militarily and economically.”85
NonAlignment 2.0 treats this economic relationship as a vital part of the security equation,
with both positive and negative aspects. “India-China economic relations also present a complex
and somewhat ambiguous picture,” the document states.86 On the positive side, the authors see it
“reasonable to expect that growing economic interdependence might help make the political
relationship more manageable and less subject to oscillations.”87 Moreover, the document
(perhaps counterintuitively) treats India’s intense need for infrastructure investment as leverage
in favor of India rather than China: “We could respond by trying to limit Chinese penetration of
our market, particularly our infrastructure market.”88
82
World Bank, “India Imports, Tariff by Country and Region 2017,” World Integrated Trade Solution webpage,
undated. All figures are for 2017, the latest year for which World Bank data are available.
83
While Hong Kong’s trade figures are broken out separately, the former British colony is formally a Special
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.
84
World Bank, 2017.
85
86
87
88
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 14. The text continues:
24
The authors portray Chinese investment as both a threat and a blessing. On the threat side of
the ledger, the authors note “the potential for espionage and intelligence gathering through
software means, which was evidenced by the banning of import of Chinese telecom
equipment.”89 They note that “Chinese banks are often able to offer preferential financing to
Chinese companies because of their scale and because they are not driven solely by market
forces,” a fact which gives such companies a competitive advantage but “could also be a useful
asset in terms of the volume of infrastructure financing we need.”90
Close observers of the Sino-Indian relationship have likewise seen economic ties as being
both a potential challenge and a possible long-term bond. James Clad, who would later serve as
the DoD official responsible for policy involving India and Southeast Asia during the
administration of Prime Minister Singh, acknowledged the building commercial tensions
between India and China. But globalization and economic interdependence, he wrote in 2004,
also suggest “a more optimistic view of future India-China relations based on converging
fortunes and steadily widening common interests as both countries engage ever more deeply in
the international trading economy.”91
The same ambivalence toward China’s economic weight is expressed by Indian security
analysts in recent interviews. “China’s economic power is state-driven, multipronged, and
always serving the interests of the state,” said one analyst. “Part of it is above-board, getting
technology transfer by legal means, patiently building up capabilities. Part is below-board—
basically, theft. And they always play hardball.”92 Another Indian scholar, during the Shangri-La
Dialogue in Singapore (an annual conference drawing security analysts and policymakers from
across the region) expressed a similar sentiment: “China has far more resources than India can
hope to match,” he said. “But equally important is how they use them—the state and commercial
firms working together. India has no means of replicating that.”93
Or, we could allow access but with various conditions that safeguard and promote Indian interests
in other areas. Given the fact that India’s infrastructure market is likely to be in the region of a
trillion dollars in the next few years, China would obviously have a keen interest in expanding
access to it. We should see this Chinese economic interest as a point of leverage for trade-offs
favourable to us in other sectors, including political concessions in areas of interest to India.
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 15. The document highlights the negative impact as well:
The growing trade surplus between India and China has been a cause for concern owing both to its
degree and composition. Not only is the degree of dependence of Indian industries on Chinese
imports on the rise. But India’s main exports seem to be natural resources, whereas its imports are
largely higher end manufactured goods.
89
90
91
James Clad, “Convergent Chinese and Indian Perspectives on the Global Order,” in Harry Harding and Francine
Frankel, eds. The China-India Relationship: What Every American Needs to Know, New York: Columbia University
Press, 2004, p. 268.
92
93
Interview with Singapore-based Indian security analyst on June 2, 2019, Singapore (Source 6).
25
At the same time, Indian analysts expressed a deep admiration for China’s legitimate
economic successes—and for the state’s role in fostering the expertise necessary for long-term
growth. One scholar noted that process by which China had developed its own railway system:
first hiring Japanese and German firms to do the work, then gaining technology transfer, and
only decades later becoming adept enough to start building railways (at considerable profit) for
other nations. “China is very generous in the funding of scientists,” he said, admiringly. “They
send the best students to the U.S. or elsewhere, and then offer them secure, well-paid jobs to
persuade them to come back home. In India, we don’t do anything like that.”94 Said another: “In
China, scientists are treated like national heroes.”95
This investment, both in yuan and expertise, has enabled China to exert influence over nearly
all of the nations in the Indo-Pacific. The clearest expression of this is China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), which has established footholds for Beijing throughout the neighborhood that
India sees as its natural domain.
Some of the BRI infrastructure projects, particularly ports, are potentially dual use: India
regards port projects in Gwadar (Pakistan), Chittagong (Bangladesh), Kyauk Pyu (Myanmar),
and Hambantota (Sri Lanka) as potential basing or access sites for the PLAN. Indeed, Indian
planners have already been taken by surprise when PLAN submarines unexpectedly surfaced in
Sri Lanka and Pakistan (Colombo and Karachi, respectively).96
The BRI and security cooperation work hand-in-hand: China uses its economic leverage to
open the door for both port calls and the sale of military hardware, and it uses the sales of its
hardware to make the case that investment in dual-use infrastructure will be a useful investment.
China has used infrastructure projects to strengthen its ties to Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and the
Maldives (with some back and forth in the latter two), as well as several African nations on the
western littoral of the Indian Ocean. It sold two submarines to Bangladesh and, according to a
U.S. military observer, “is really ramping up its security relationship.”97 China also used its
combined economic and security clout with Bangladesh to broker a deal over the settlement of
Rohingya refugees from Myanmar—“that was really humiliating to India,” another U.S. official
noted, “which considers Bangladesh its own junior partner.”98
94
95
Interview with Indian security analyst on May 16, 2019, New Delhi (Source 4). Not all analysts, however, see
Beijing as being so successful in leveraging U.S. training and technology. For a counterargument, see Andrea Gilli
and Mauro Gilli, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of
Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage,” International Security, Winter 2018/2019, Vol. 43, No. 3.
96
97
98
26
Country-by-Country Sketches of India’s Relations with Key Asian Nations
Given the enduring strength of “strategic autonomy” as a guiding principle of India’s
unwritten doctrine, India has no formal security alliance with any nation. Even Bhutan—a tiny
Himalayan nation that is a de facto protectorate of India—is not an ally.99 If India is this cagey
about a country on whose behalf it deployed troops to prevent a PLA incursion on disputed
territory at Doklam in 2017, it is unlikely to forge any alliance (formal or informal) with other
nations in the near future. Indeed, this resistance to alignment is regarded by India as a strategic
benefit. As NonAlignment 2.0 puts it:
India’s great advantage is that, barring certain perceptions in our immediate
neighbourhood, it is not seen as a threatening power. The overseas projection of
Indian power has been very limited; in its external face, India’s nationalism does
not appear belligerently to any country, nor as expansionist or threatening in any
way. . . . This is an asset that we have rather taken for granted, and it behooves us
now to leverage that global consensus as effectively as we can.100
This assessment may be self-congratulatory, but for nations east of the Strait of Malacca, it
would be hard to find much evidence of particular fear of India’s intentions. As one U.S. military
official stationed in Indonesia noted, “Policymakers here see India as unthreatening.”101 This is
due to a combination of perceived lack of hostile intent—and (at least to some degree) perceived
lack of power-projection beyond the Indian Ocean Region. While India has territorial defense
and other goals in relation to its immediate neighbors, for countries at even a slight remove the
most important mission of security policy is providing the basis for economic growth.102
Russia
Russia is by far India’s largest supplier of military hardware over the past decade, with more
than 70 percent of the overall budget ($23.4 billion, out of a total spending on military hardware
of $33.9 billion). This is not merely a distortion due to the winding down of Cold War–era
spending patterns: Between 2008 and 2018, India spent more than $1 billion each year on
purchases from Russia—and did not buy $1 billion in arms from any other nation (except the
USSR) in any year of its history.
99
Bhutan is not even technically a “protectorate”: On the distinction between a “protectorate” and a “protected
state,” see Niels van Willigen, Peacebuilding and International Administration: The Cases of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Kosovo, London, UK: Routledge, 2013, p. 16. The 1949 Treaty of Friendship between the two
nations permitted India to “guide” Bhutan’s foreign policy, while in a 2007 updating both countries merely commit
that they “shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests” (India-Bhutan
Friendship Treaty, February 8, 2007). For discussion of how Bhutan has factored into the Sino-Indian relationship,
see Garver, 2001, pp. 167–170, 175–185.
100
101
Interview with U.S. military official on April 1, 2019, Jakarta (Source 7).
102
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 38: “India’s hard power has as its instrumentalities the Armed Forces. . . . Their main
political objective and purpose is to ensure the creation of a stable and peaceful environment in order to facilitate
maximum economic development concurrent with equitable growth.”
27
The first year India spent more than $1 billion (in constant 2018 dollars) on arms purchases
was 1968, and its purchases from the USSR remained generally in the $1–2 billion range
annually (with a few dips into the mid-hundred millions and peaks above $3 billion in some
years) until the collapse of the Soviet Union. After that, India picked up with Russia where it left
off with the USSR: Its first $1 billion year was 1995, and its pattern since then has mirrored its
pattern with the USSR: purchases of $1–2 billion most years, with some years dropping to the
mid/high hundreds of millions, and some peaking above $3 billion. The peak years for India’s
military spending on Russian/Soviet gear were 2012 and 2013, when it spent $3.8 billion and
$3.9 billion, respectively.103 Moreover, the type of gear transferred includes much of India’s
largest and most strategic systems and often involves a significant amount of technology transfer.
Such systems include nuclear submarines (Chakra/Akula II–class), the aircraft carrier INS
Vikramaditya (Kiev-class), the Indian-built variant of the Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jet, and the
BrahMos cruise missiles (based on the P-800 Oniks).104
There are several reasons that India favors Russian hardware. The first is history: Throughout
the Cold War era, India was nominally not aligned with either superpower bloc—but in security
matters, it tilted decidedly toward Moscow. Many of the weapon systems in India’s present-day
arsenal date back to that time: They are approaching (or have long exceeded) their optimal
operational lifetime, but they remain in service. And even now-obsolete pieces of hardware are
compatible with slightly more modern pieces of equipment, which in turn are compatible with
relatively up-to-date gear. Switching from Russian systems to Western ones would require an
enormous shift in compatibility across the entire Indian military, with all of the costs and
dislocations that such a massive shift would entail. Simply retraining military personnel on
Western hardware would require a significant investment of time and expense.
Second, even setting aside transition costs, Russian gear tends to be less expensive than its
Western counterparts. India’s MoD is perpetually strapped for funds and is reluctant to approve
any proposal with too high a bottom line. “A lot of Russian gear is rugged and affordable,” said a
U.S. military officer in New Delhi. “An M-16 helicopter gets the job done. For India, rugged and
cheap is often better than state-of-the-art.”105
Third, and perhaps most important: Russia is seen as a reliable and flexible partner. The
“reliable” part is of key significance: It is a great fear of Indian planners that they might be
engaged in a conflict with Pakistan and be unable to keep their equipment operational because of
restrictions placed by Western nations, or simply unavailability of gear. “Spare parts are a huge
issue,” said the U.S. military observer. “Why buy expensive tanks from the U.S. or Israel when
you can buy cheaper ones from Russia with a guaranteed huge backlog of spare parts?”106 There
103
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Armstrade” website, undated-a.
104
The author is grateful to Sameer Lalwani for this observation (personal communication, January 2020).
105
106
28
are enormous warehouses throughout Russia, fully stocked with every spare part one could
wish—and dozens of nations around the world using Russian gear from whom India might
purchase such supplies easily on the secondary market.107
Added to this is Russia’s willingness to let India create indigenous versions of many of its
products, both for its own use and to sell to third parties. “They’re really ramping up sales,
especially in Africa,” said one U.S. military officer. “They can already do good knock-offs of
simple Russian parts. The main thing they can’t yet do is high-tech metallurgy and integrated
circuits.”108 On top of these factors, a lack of any obvious threat from Russia makes India’s
preference for Russian hardware seem like a relatively straightforward choice. India is moving in
the direction of the United States—but at an Indian pace.
The Quad: India, Japan, Australia, and the United States

One of the most discussed, yet least developed, pieces of strategic architecture in the Indo-
Pacific region is known as “The Quad”: a four-way partnership between the United States, Japan,
Australia, and India. On paper, this should be a mutually beneficial development: All four
nations have shared strategic interests, and (perhaps more importantly) all are sufficiently distant
from each other to avoid the overlap of territorial interests, which can often turn otherwise-
friendly nations into rivals. On a bilateral basis, India has good relationships with all three Quad
members. India’s partnership with Japan is characterized as a Special Strategic and Global
Partnership, put in place in 2014. The two nations conduct “2+2” talks—that is, formal
consultations of both nations’ defense and foreign affairs ministers.
Three of the four are treaty allies: Japan and Australia are not allies themselves, but each is a
treaty ally of the United States. This means that three of the four members of the Quad already
operate on a compatible range of military equipment and use a compatible and familiar set of
procedures for operations. By assembling a “mini-lat” with four highly capable partners, the
theory goes, India can be lured into closer cooperation than might otherwise be the case. Instead
of a broad coalition that India might construe as “a superpower and a bunch of followers,” the
Quad could be portrayed as a power club of Asia.109
So far, at least, that is not how it has worked.110 All the talk has resulted in relatively little
concrete engagement. “So many man-hours,” said a U.S. military official based outside of India,
“and still no action.”111 Another U.S. military official, also based in Asia and from a different
service, noted that any attempt to beef up the Quad “will be driven by political policymakers, not
107
108
109
Interview with U.S. military official on May 9, 2019, Singapore (Source 9).
110
For a discussion of the difficulties of making the Quad work, see Abhijnan Rej, Reclaiming the Indo-Pacific: A
Political-Military Strategy for Quad 2.0, Occasional Paper 147, New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, March
2018.
111
29
by military ones.” He noted that the uniformed officers in all four militaries are eager to engage,
but on India’s side any acceleration of pace would be decided “at the policy level—perhaps even
at the 2+2 level.”112
India and Japan have major bilateral ground (Dharma Guardian) and sea (JIMEX) military
exercises, and both participate in multilateral exercises for ground (Force 18), air (Pitch Black,
Red Flag), and sea (RIMPAC, Malabar, Kakadu, Komodo). In 2015, they signed an Agreement
Concerning Security Measures for Protection of Classified Military Information. NonAlignment
2.0 portrays this relationship as being particularly irksome to Beijing: “China remains suspicious
of India’s partnership, and in particular sees improved Indian ties with America and Japan in
simple zero-sum terms.”113
Australia is mentioned only twice in NonAlignment 2.0, and both references are in passing
rather than substantive discussions. Both lump Australia in with other countries.114 But this
understates the strength of the relationship. India and Australia signed a Strategic Partnership in
2009 and expanded it to a Framework for Security Cooperation in 2014. They conduct military
exercises together, including ground (AUSTRA HIND) and sea (AUSINDEX),115 as well as
multilateral exercises, including those for ground (Force 18), air (Pitch Black, Red Flag), and sea
(RIMPAC, Kakadu, Komodo, and Milan). Although Indian interlocutors sometimes seem less
than enthusiastic about the notion of the Quad (and Australia as a partner),116 at least according
to Australia this is a partnership on the rise.117 After Beijing objected to the inclusion of
Australia (along with Japan and Singapore) in the 2007 of the Malabar naval exercise, however,
this event was turned from a multilateral to a bilateral U.S.-India exercise for several years;
Japan has been reintroduced, but at the time of writing Australia has remained outside the fold.118
Former Ambassador to China Shivshankar Menon (who is familiar with Beijing’s concerns in
this role, and also through his service as National Security Advisor) notes, India’s “continental
security issues . . . are not shared by any of the other members of the Quad.”119
112
113
114
Australia is mentioned along with Indonesia and Bolivia in a bulleted point on energy and mining; it is mentioned
along with Indonesia and Vietnam in reference to maritime equities (NonAlignment 2.0, pp. 13, 53).
115
Australian High Commission New Delhi, “Australia’s Largest Defense Force Deployment in India to Further
Deepen Defense and Strategic Relationship,” webpage, March 28, 2019.
116
117
Australian High Commission New Delhi, 2019; Christopher Pyne, “Fullerton Forum Keynote,” January 28, 2019.
118
Rajat Pandit, “India May Invite Australia for Malabar Naval Exercise with US & Japan,” Times of India, January
29, 2020.
119
Menon, 2018.
30
Partners in Southeast Asia120
Singapore
Perhaps India’s firmest security partnership in Southeast Asia is with Singapore.121 In 2003,
the two countries signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement, under which Defense Policy
Dialogues to discuss security cooperation and other matters of mutual concern would be held
annually.122 The commitments for joint military training made in this agreement were renewed at
the Eighth Defense Policy Dialogue in July 2012.
The cooperation is perhaps most noteworthy in the arena of airpower: Singapore is the only
nation that India permits to conduct regular exercises of its own air force (rather than bilateral or
multilateral exercises) in Indian airspace. Under a 2007 agreement, the Republic of Singapore
Air Force (RSAF) is permitted to train at the IAF’s Kalaikunda Air Base and to station RSAF
aircraft there. Air-to-air firing exercises are conducted over ground-to-ground artillery ranges,
over a 40-kilometer stretch of terrain along the Bay of Bengal coastline and extending an
additional 40 kilometers out to sea.123 In addition to these exercises by the RSAF alone, the
RSAF and IAF conduct an annual bilateral exercise called SINDEX: For this exercise, the RSFA
has in the past flown its F-16 C/D fighter-jets alongside India’s MiG-27 multirole aircraft.124
The two nations’ armies have traditionally held two annual exercises together: Bold
Kurukshetra for armor, and Agni Warrior for artillery.125 As is the case for its air force,
Singapore’s small geographic size makes finding space for artillery training a challenge; such
ranges are provided by India.126 In the naval arena, India and Singapore share a core security
120
Much of the information for this section is drawn from Jonah Blank, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Angel Rabasa, and
Bonny Lin, Look East, Cross Black Waters: India’s Interest in Southeast Asia, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
Corporation, RR-1021-AF, 2015, pp. 82–133. Additional detail and sourcing can be found there: Singapore, pp. 82–
88; Vietnam, pp. 88–96; Indonesia, pp. 123–133.
121
When Prime Minister Modi presented the keynote speech at the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue (a regional security
conference held in Singapore annually), he waxed poetic about ties between India and his host country:
For India, though, Singapore means more. It’s the spirit that unites a lion nation and a lion city.
Singapore is our springboard to ASEAN. It has been, for centuries, a gateway for India to the East.
For over two thousand years, the winds of monsoons, the currents of seas and the force of human
aspirations have built timeless links between India and this region. It was cast in peace and
friendship, religion and culture, art and commerce, language and literature. These human links
have lasted, even as the tides of politics and trade saw their ebb and flow. (Narendra Modi, “Prime
Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue,” New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry
of External Affairs, June 1, 2018.)
122
Government of Singapore, Ministry of Defence, “Permanent Secretary (Defence) Visits India for 8th Defence
Policy Dialogue,” July 10, 2012.
123
Interview with retired Indian military official on April 10, 2013, New Delhi (Source 16).
124
Indian Air Force, 2007.
125
“India and Singapore Carry Out Joint Naval Exercises,” DefenceNow, March 22, 2011.
126
Pankaj Jha and Rahul Mishra, “Defence Cooperation: A Case Study of India and Singapore,” Air Power Journal,
Vol. 5, No. 2, Summer 2010.
31
interest in defending the sea lanes of communication (including the potential choke point of the
Strait of Malacca), and in combating threats such as piracy. Since 1994, they have conducted
annual naval exercises together under the rubric of the Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral
Exercise. These exercises alternate in location and have expanded from antisubmarine warfare to
complex operations involving major surface vessels. In addition to these bilateral exercises,
Singapore participates in India’s multilateral MILAN naval exercise. The submarine crews of
Singapore’s navy receive training from their Indian Navy counterparts.127 As one U.S. military
official puts it, “The Indian Navy and the RSN [Republic of Singapore Navy] have the most
robust bilateral relationship of all the services. The IAF-RSAF relationship is more
transactional—the Singaporeans see it as necessary to get a place to fly.”128
Other observers are doubtful about the potential for deepening the engagement. “It’s all talk
and no action,” said a U.S. military officer based in Singapore. “At the operator level, there’s no
problem. But how do we get [India’s] MEA and MoD to take their foot off the brake? Even four-
star officers don’t have the juice to make things happen.”129 In the air power arena, another U.S.
officer noted the capabilities gap between the two air forces: “The RSAF doesn’t feel it has much
to learn from India: It is more capable and uses more advanced equipment than anything their
Indian counterparts can bring,” he said. “The RSAF doesn’t really get anything from India other
than airspace, there’s not much meat on the bones. They prefer to train with us, or with Japan or
Australia.”130
Moreover, the relationship must be carefully managed to avoid a backlash from China. The
same U.S. military observer noted that Singapore pays very close attention to the optics of any
engagement with India: In a recent discussion of flying P-8 Orions together, he noted, the
exercise was called off out of concern for how Beijing might interpret it. In 2019, India and
Singapore signed a deal for logistics linkages, and “so far as expansion goes, that might in the
near-term be about as much as we can expect.”131 Two other Singapore-based U.S. officials (one
civilian, one military) noted possible intelligence sharing, particularly in the counterterrorism
arena: They noted that Singapore may be especially open to such intelligence sharing in the wake
of the April 21, 2019, bombings in Sri Lanka: That set of terrorist attacks was carried out by a
previously obscure cell of ethnic Tamils linked to ISIS, and, given both India’s intelligence
expertise on this group (New Delhi flagged the attack to Sri Lanka’s government ahead of time)
and Singapore’s own large Tamil population, stepped-up counterterrorism cooperation seems
like a natural next step.132
127
Interview with Singapore-based Indian security analyst on June 2, 2019, Singapore (Source 6).
128
129
130
131
132
Interview with U.S. military official on May 9, 2019, Singapore (Source 10); interview with U.S. government
official on May 9, 2019, Singapore (Source 11).
32
Indonesia
India tends to regard itself as a regional near-superpower, balancing the dominance of China
with a variety of Southeast Asian nations, including Indonesia.133 This view is not shared by
Indonesia, the largest nation in Southeast Asia and an underutilized partner for India. Indonesia’s
latest formulation of its security doctrine is the Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia 2015 (Bahasa
version)134/Defence White Paper 2015 (English version).135 In this document, India is not
portrayed as being a “strategic partner” (like the United States and China),136 an “important
partner” (like Russia, South Korea, France, Spain, and Singapore),137 or even “a partner” at all. It
is simply described as a nation with which Indonesia has “friendly relations”—precisely the
same term as that applied to India’s rival (and nation not sharing a maritime border with
Indonesia), Pakistan.138
The Defence White Paper outlines the areas of cooperation set forth in an agreement ratified
in 2006:
The cooperation includes increasing the production and field support services,
projects related to defense equipment and components; improving cooperation
between defense industries, technology transfer, technical assistance, training and
joint production, [and] cooperation in defence science and technology through
the exchange of personnel and joint projects.139
Unsurprisingly, the most robust area of security engagement is maritime. The nations have
overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the Bay of Bengal and therefore have a strong
incentive for cooperation.140
In 2018, Indonesia was granted the Indian Navy access to the port of Sabang, and Indian
sailors have been reportedly seen there.141 According to U.S. observers, Indonesia has no real
concern about India’s intentions, but “the relationship is surprisingly underdeveloped—lots of
rhetoric, but very little substance.”142 Prime Minister Modi and Indonesian President Jokowi
have exchanged official visits, but a fairly light security relationship is bolstered by relatively
little bilateral trade.
133
For a more detailed discussion, see Blank, Moroney, Rabasa, and Lin, 2015.
134
Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia 2015, Jakarta, 2015. Hereafter
cited as Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia.
135
Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Defence, Defence White Paper 2015 (English version), Jakarta, Indonesia,
2015. Hereafter Defence White Paper.
136
Defence White Paper, p. 89 (United States) and p. 83 (China).
137
Defence White Paper, p. 92 (Russia), p. 85 (South Korea), p. 90 (France), p. 85 (Spain), and p. 81 (Singapore).
138
Defence White Paper, pp. 85, 87.
139
Defence White Paper, pp. 85–86.
140
The maritime border is between India’s southernmost piece of land (the island of Grand Nicobar) and the
northernmost piece of Indonesian territory (the island of Rondo, in the province of Aceh).
141
142
Interview with Western diplomat on April 4, 2019, Jakarta (Source 13).
33
Indian interlocutors highlight the partnership of their respective founding leaders Nehru and
Sukarno in creating the Non-Aligned Movement at the Bandung Conference of 1955, and
frequently remind Indonesian counterparts that their country was perhaps the first to recognize
Indonesia’s independence. But for most Indonesians, such talk has little modern-day relevance.
A noteworthy data point: Prior to the COVID-19 shutdown of regular air travel, Indonesia had
direct commercial air linkages to Australia, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand,
the Philippines, Timor Leste, Brunei, and even Russia—but none to any city in India.143
When interviewed in Jakarta, Indonesian military officers downplayed the importance of
India in their calculations. On the topic of Indian aftercare and upgrades for Russian military
hardware (which forms a large part of Indonesia’s own arsenal), interlocutors said that this was
not a matter of superior quality, merely distance. “The distributor for Sukhoi is in India,” one
officer said. “If it were located in Malaysia, or East Timor, we’d go there just as easily.”144 Such
an assessment may be unduly harsh: It is a bit of an outlier among other sources interviewed. It is
worth bearing in mind, however, since it highlights the significant gap between India’s
perception of its importance to Southeast Asian partners and the perceptions of these partners
themselves.145
Vietnam
Vietnam is one of India’s longest-running security partners, and security ties between the two
countries remain vibrant.146 Military engagement between the two nations rests on the foundation
of shared Soviet/Russian platforms, and India’s future role in the Southeast Asian security
structure may rest in part on its unique capabilities in operating, repairing, and upgrading
military hardware compatible with Soviet or Russian models.
Cold War politics drew India and Vietnam together: At the 1970s peak of India’s Non-
Alignment-in-name-only tilt toward the Soviet Union, Vietnam was embroiled in military
conflicts with both the United States and China. For both Vietnam and India, the USSR
represented both a superpower benefactor and reliable supplier of military hardware. In 1978,
Vietnam invaded Cambodia (then called Democratic Kampuchea) and ousted the genocidal
Khmer Rouge regime; this action was opposed by the United States, China, and ASEAN, which
continued to recognize the Khmer Rouge shadow representation at the UN and other fora for
many years after. India, by contrast, lent its diplomatic support to Vietnam—causing friction
with the rest of Southeast Asian states for over a decade.
143
There were direct commercial flights linking Jakarta (and other Indonesian cities) to Australia, South Korea,
Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei. There were also direct flights from Bali to
Russia, Timor Leste, and other nations.
144
Interview with Indonesian military official on April 5, 2019, Jakarta (Source 14).
145
Blank et al., 2015, p. 212. This was one of the key analytical conclusions of the study.
146
These ties were specifically highlighted by Prime Minister Modi at the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue (Modi, 2018).
34
To some degree, India regards Vietnam in the same light that China regards Pakistan: a state
neighboring its most powerful regional rival, with its own deeply seated interest in keeping that
rival challenged and off-balance.147 For its own part, Vietnam, lacks major allies and feels
relatively isolated in its own competition with China; it remembers that no nation came to its aid
when its more powerful neighbor attempted to invade in 1979. It sees considerable value in
strengthening its ties to regional powers such as India.148 One manifestation of this is Vietnam’s
granting oil and gas stakes in South China Sea territory claimed by Vietnam to India’s state-
owned firm ONGC Videsh; this provides India with a clear self-interested rationale for
involvement in the South China Sea dispute.149 It is noteworthy, however, that this ONGC stake
has not proved sufficient to draw India significantly more deeply into South China Sea issues.
The collapse of the USSR removed a superpower patron for both nations, giving them an
additional reason for bilateral cooperation. Vietnam was one of the few countries in the world to
support India’s 1998 nuclear tests. Vietnam supports India’s candidacy for a permanent seat at
the UN Security Council, advocated for India’s inclusion in the East Asia Summit in 2005, and
for a time helped block Pakistan’s inclusion in the ASEAN Regional Forum (Pakistan joined in
2004). India supported Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade Organization, and helped
Vietnam secure a nonpermanent seat in the UN Security Council in 2007.150
While informal security ties date back at least to the 1970s, a defense cooperation agreement
was only negotiated in 1994—and not formally signed until Indian Minister of Defense George
Fernandes visited Vietnam in 2000. This agreement institutionalized a framework for regular
discussions between the two nations’ defense ministries and provided for naval exercises and
training of Vietnamese pilots by the Indian Air Force.151
India’s role as a provider of aftercare for Soviet and Russian military equipment has led to
servicing and maintenance agreements for Vietnam’s military hardware, including MiG-21s.
India supplies spare parts to submarines and surface vessels for Vietnam’s Navy. Since 2011,
India has been training Vietnam’s crews operating Kilo-class submarines—a type of vessel that
India has been operating since 1986. In 2013, New Delhi provided a $100 million credit line to
enable Vietnam to purchase military equipment from India, the first of such offers by India to a
147
Iskander Rehman, “The Indo-Vietnamese Strategic Partnership,” BBC World’s Vietnam, September 16, 2009.
148
Le Hong Hiep, “Vietnam’s Strategic Trajectory: From Internal Development to External Engagement,” Strategic
Insights 59, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 2012.
149
Rudroneel Ghosh and Sanjay Dutta, “In Tussle with Vietnam, China parks vessels near ONGC Videsh site,”
Times of India, August 22, 2019.
150
Rehman, 2009. Additionally political developments are outlined in Nhan Dan, “India, Vietnam Pledge Closer
Strategic Ties,” Vietnam Communist Government News, July 7, 2007; Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia, “Statement at the
Inaugural Session Seminar on ‘India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: Future Directions,’” Hanoi, July 17, 2012;
“Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership in Spotlight,” VietNamNet, July 18, 2012.
151
Subhash Kapila, “India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: The Convergence of Interests,” South Asia Analysis
Group Paper 177, November 2, 2012.
35
country outside of India’s “traditional sphere of influence.”152 Vietnam has agreed to provide
berthing facilities to Indian naval ships at Nha Trang.
Partners in South Asia/Indian Ocean Region

A full discussion of India’s strategic relationships with the other nations of South Asia would
fill a library’s worth of books.153 As Ashley Tellis noted, shortly after the 2019 electoral victory
of Prime Minister Modi’s BJP:
If the primary objective of Indian foreign policy within and around its
subcontinent has been to translate its familiar dominance into a political
hegemony that commands the consent, if not the obedience, of its smaller
neighbors, that aim has been frequently frustrated by the simple reality that India
does not as yet possess the requisite power to shape their strategic choices.154
This section briefly outlines a few of the issues most relevant for U.S. competition with
China, as it affects the nations of South Asia apart from Pakistan.
NonAlignment 2.0 highlights the central importance of South Asia to India’s overall
geostrategic strategy: “Within the Asian theatre no region is more vital for India than South Asia.
India cannot hope to arrive as a great power if it is unable to manage relationships within South
Asia.”155 The document situates the region at the heart of India’s competition with China—and
points out India’s historical lack of follow-through on promises of commitment.156 It makes an
important point about how this might be accomplished: A great deal of success or failure in
every region, and certainly in South Asia, is based not on money or high-tech avionics, but on
simple demonstrations of respect and patience.157
152
“Global Insider: India Shows Willingness to Defend Economic Interests in Southeast Asia,” World Politics
Review, August 7, 2013.
153
Any such library would have included Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign
Policy, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2016; Šumit Ganguly, India as an Emerging Power, London, UK:
Routledge, 2003; and Cohen, 2001a. Pakistan, of course, would require a separate reading-room in such a library.
Since Pakistan falls into the category of adversary rather than partner, its antagonistic relationship with India is
addressed separately in Chapter 4.
154
Ashley J. Tellis, “Troubles Aplenty: Foreign Policy Challenges for the Next Indian Government,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, May 20, 2019.
155
156
NonAlignment 2.0, pp. 16–17:
South Asia is a region where other great powers, particularly China, are trying to expand their
influence. . . . [W]e must recognize that strategic advantage is a consequence of what we do, not
what we say. The only way to counter Chinese economic engagement is to have a credible
engagement plan of our own. But most importantly India has lagged behind because of its inability
to follow through—whether on aid, or border infrastructure—on its promises.
157
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 16:
Since politics in South Asia is as much about self-esteem as interest, political discourse matters a
great deal. India is a factor in the domestic politics of most of its neighbours. It will have to live
with—and address the fact—that politicians in neighbouring countries will bait India. But we need
36
Bangladesh
India’s state of West Bengal shares cultural, historical, linguistic, and economic ties to
Bangladesh. India used its decisive force to defeat Pakistan’s military in 1971 and enable the
creation of Bangladesh as an independent nation. In June 2015, Prime Minister Modi made a
state visit during which 22 bilateral documents were negotiated, including the ratification for the
1974 India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement and 2011 Protocol enabling the two nations
to exchange enclaved territories along their border.
Security engagement between India and Bangladesh focuses primarily on cooperation along
the 2,500-mile border—the longest land border that India shares with any nation. In 2011, the
nations signed a Coordinated Border Management Plan enabling more effective control over
cross-border illegal activities and violence. In July 2014, a key maritime boundary in the Bay of
Bengal was settled via UN arbitration.158 India and Bangladesh also cooperate on
counterterrorism and counter-extremism efforts, “sharing information about groups and persons”
engaged in terrorism and committing to prevent their respective territories from being “used for
any activity inimical to the other.”159
India and Bangladesh have common terrorist threats, particularly groups such as ISIS, Al
Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and more localized groups either affiliated with such groups
or sharing similar ideology. One area of cooperation in urgent need of increased attention is
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In 2017, a severe monsoon season caused at least
1,200 deaths from flooding throughout South Asia, and the worst impact was felt in India and
Bangladesh. Climate change is likely to exacerbate the destructive impact (and possibly the
frequency) of hurricanes, cyclones, and other types of severe weather events. Every time a
natural disaster strikes, New Delhi will have decide how much to offer Bangladesh in the way of
immediate relief (often provided by Indian Navy ships, Indian Air Force planes, and Indian
Army helicopters and medical personnel)—assets that, in many such emergencies, may be sorely
needed to assist India’s own citizens.
Relations between India and Bangladesh took a turn for the worse in 2019–2020, following
New Delhi’s passage of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), and its potential impact on the
National Register of Citizens (NRC). The CAA explicitly grants privileged status to non-
Muslims with ancestral ties to Bangladesh and other Muslim-majority nations. The act has
caused widespread protests in India, based partly on the fear (fueled by explicit statements from
figures such as Home Minister Amit Shah160) that the NRC would be similarly linked to religious
a strategic culture and public discourse that is willing to keep its eye on the long term and not get
distracted by the ‘noise’ generated by our democracies.
158
Haroon Habib, “Bangladesh Wins Maritime Dispute with India,” The Hindu, July 9, 2014.
159
Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Joint Declaration Between Bangladesh and India During
Visit of Prime Minister of India to Bangladesh- ‘Notun Projonmo—Nayi Disha,’” June 7, 2015.
160
Press Trust of India, “Govt Won’t Budge an Inch on CAA: Amit Shah,” Economic Times, January 3, 2020.
37
identity, and Indian Muslim residents unable to document family residency dating back to 1947
might be stripped of their citizenship. Given the close ties of ethnicity, culture, and history
between the Bengali populations of India (approximately 90 million) and Bangladesh
(approximately 165 million), the issue has caused tension in the relationship between New Delhi
and Dhaka.161
Sri Lanka
Premodern political entities in what are now the nations of India and Sri Lanka have been
intertwined for millennia, and in the post-colonial era India has often tried to play the role of
security provider for its southern neighbor. Due to domestic politics in the Indian state of Tamil
Nadu, governments in New Delhi have often had little choice but to be involved in the internal
conflict between Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority. India’s failed 1987 attempt
at “peacekeeping” intervention in Sri Lanka’s civil war soured relations for years: Between July
1987 and March 1990, Indian troops tried to enforce a ceasefire agreement and disarm the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Some 1,200 Indian troops (and far more Sri Lankans)
were killed in the operation, which is often referred to as “India’s Vietnam.”162 A year after
Indian troops withdrew, an LTTE bomber assassinated former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi (who had ordered the initial operation).
During the tenure of President Mahinda Rajapaksa (2005–2015), Sri Lanka veered sharply
away from India and toward China. In 2015, Rajapaksa was ousted by a former member of his
own party, and India saw in President Maithripala Sirisena a chance to put the relationship back
on its traditional ground.163 In March 2015, Narendra Modi made the first Indian prime
ministerial bilateral visit to Sri Lanka since the 1987 intervention. Political instability returned to
Sri Lanka in October 2018, however: Sirisena joined forces with his old rival Rajapaksa in a
short-lived attempt to oust his own prime minister, the India-friendly Ranil Wickremasinghe.164
In security terms, Sri Lanka’s Indian Ocean location makes it of key strategic importance to
India’s defense interests. Defense cooperation began to grow (albeit modestly) during the
Rajapaksa presidency, and accelerated after his ouster by Sirisena. The 2016 Dialogue included
discussions on enhancing cooperation in training, military and defense exchanges, joint
exercises, and maritime domain awareness.
161
Saqib Sarker, “Impact of CAA on Bangladesh: Despite Dhaka’s Efforts, Anti-India Sentiment on the Rise
Among Its Citizens,” FirstPost, December 18, 2019.
162
For discussion of why the Indian military intervention failed to accomplish its mission, and particularly of how a
lack of “jointness” contributed to this failure, see Mukherjee, 2016, pp. 18–20.
163
P. K. Balachandran, “New Dawn for India-Sri Lanka Relations,” New Indian Express, October 11, 2016.
164
Press Trust of India, “Rajapaksa Resigns as Sri Lanka’s PM, Wickremesinghe to Be Reinstated,” Times of India,
December 15, 2018b.
38
In the view of some Indian security analysts, Sri Lanka can be a key component in an Indian
Ocean “security net” to counter Chinese influence across the region.165 India remains concerned
over Sri Lankan relations with China, and its continuing place in China’s “String of Pearls”—a
set of ports and other infrastructure projects stretching across the Indo-Pacific.166 Indian analysts
have expressed concerns over Chinese investments in Sri Lankan infrastructure, Chinese arms
sales to the Sri Lankan military, and PLAN vessels’ calls at Sri Lankan ports despite Indian
objections. After a Chinese submarine and warship docked in Colombo in 2014, Indian National
Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Defense Minister Arun Jaitley reportedly met with Sri Lankan
Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa to convey Indian concerns.167 Only seven weeks prior to
this visit, a long-range deployment patrol submarine had called at the same port ahead of Chinese
President Xi Jinping’s visit to South Asia.168 According to an Indian analyst interviewed for this
project, “We have no visibility on PLAN subs. They’ve popped up in Karachi and Colombo,
without us noticing until they’re already in the port.”169
The degree to which India might aggressively move to replace China as Sri Lanka’s patron
remains unclear: Will the rhetoric and the political desire be matched with the funding and
commitment to make it happen? Will India bid to take over the major infrastructure projects left
largely abandoned with the political defeat of Rajapaksa and his Chinese patrons? From a
security standpoint, the most significant of these are Hanbantota Port (which could be used to
service PLAN naval vessels, as well as civilian traffic) and the Mattala Rajapaksa International
Airport 11 miles away (which could provide access to PLAAF aircraft). There may well be no
good economic or security rationale to justify the expense: Access to these facilities would be
largely duplicative of ports and airfields in India itself, and India may decide that investing in
them solely as a blocking move is not worth the cost. But if India is serious about competing
with China, it will not be able to cede influence in a nation only 60 miles off its southern coast.
Nepal
The 1950 India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship provides for defense and foreign
policy cooperation, as well as open borders and freedom of movement. Article 7 of this treaty
stipulates that both countries “grant, on reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the
territories of the other the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property,
165
Suhasini Haidar, “Knitting the India-Sri Lanka Relationship Closer,” The Hindu, March 13, 2015.
166
The term String of Pearls has been in wide use among Indian analysts since the first decade of the 21st century.
An early example of its use in Indian academic circles is Gurpreet S. Khurana, “China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the
Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 1, February 2008.
167
Meera Srinivasan, “India Conveys Concern at Chinese Presence in Sri Lanka,” The Hindu, October 25, 2014.
168
Shihar Aneez and Ranga Sirilal, “Chinese Submarine Docks in Sri Lanka Despite Indian Concerns,” Reuters,
November 2, 2014.
169
39
participation in trade and commerce, movement and other privileges of a similar nature.”170 As
of 2015, roughly 6 million Nepalese were living and working in India.171
India tends to regard Nepal as a “little brother” state—a status that many Nepalis bitterly
resent. In 2015, following a series of irritations on both sides, Nepal adopted a new constitution
to which India objected:172 In India’s view, the lack of a provision specifying “support a federal,
democratic, republican, and inclusive” state could risk disenfranchising ethnic Madhesis—a
group extending across the border to the Indian state of Bihar, where they are a significant voting
constituency.173 India instituted an unofficial blockade on landlocked Nepal, causing shortages of
basic supplies including food items and fuel.174 China used this opportunity to increase its
influence over Nepal’s political structure.175
The August 2016 election of Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist Centre) served to break the stalemate. Despite Dahal’s background as a
committed Maoist insurgent, Dahal (more commonly known by his nom du guerre of
Prachanda—The Fierce One) is not particularly close to Beijing.176
In India’s view, its long and open border makes Nepal’s security and stability an Indian “core
interest.”177 India is the lead exporter of arms to Nepal; since 2000, it has supplied nearly half
($42 million of the total $91 million) of the nation’s arms transfers.178 In 2014, the Indian
government agreed to help fund a National Police Academy at Panauti to help “develop quality
human resources” and “maintain law and order in the country.”179
In terms of competition with China, Nepal could potentially provide India with a mechanism
to force Beijing to play defense rather than offense. China has no interest in direct control of
Nepal: Its interests are served by maintaining the Himalayan nation as a buffer state, with its
main requirement of Kathmandu being strict prevention of political mobilization by the nation’s
indigenous and migrant Tibetan communities. Since India retains more influence over Nepal
than China does, however, the potential remains for increased political actions that could require
a redeployment of PLA resources.
170
Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the Government of
India and the Government of Nepal, Kathmandu, July 31, 1950.
171
Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “India-Nepal Relations,” October 2015b.
172
Sanjoy Majumder, “Why India Is Concerned About Nepal’s Constitution,” BBC.com, September 22, 2015.
173
Šumit Ganguly and Brandon Miliate, “India Pushes Nepal into China’s Arms,” Foreign Policy, October 23,
2015.
174
Ganguly and Miliate, 2015.
175
Ganguly and Miliate, 2015.
176
Rajesh Singh, “Bringing India-Nepal Ties Back on Track,” IDSA Comment, September 5, 2016.
177
Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 2015.
178
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Total Trend-Indicator Value (TIV) of Arms Exports
to Nepal, 2000–2016,” SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, March 2, 2017.
179
Embassy of India Kathmandu, “About Development Partnership,” webpage, undated.
40
Maldives
The relationship between India and the Maldives dates to 1966: India was among the first
nations to recognize its independence, and to establish security, economic, and diplomatic ties.
The Indian Navy has maintained a presence in the Maldives since 2009.180 The Maldives has
benefited from Indian humanitarian assistance/disaster relief support, most notably after the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami.
The Maldives has been the site of proxy contest between India and China for much of the
21st century. In an ongoing struggle between two dueling Maldives’ leaders, India has supported
Mohamed Nasheed, while China has supported Abdulla Yameen.181 The India-China
competition over the Maldives plays out in the political more than the security arena.
Given the Maldives’ strategic importance as a potential part of China’s “String of Pearls,” the
contest for influence goes beyond any specific geographic benefit India might achieve here. If
India can retain its traditional place as the Maldives’ primary patron, it will gain increased
credibility in bidding for influence throughout the Indo-Pacific region.182 But if China succeeds
in supplanting India from this role—or even in forcing New Delhi to accept a status of jointly
shared influence over a nation so much closer to India’s own shores—India will be hard-pressed
to present itself as a genuine competitor to China.
180
K. Deepalakshmi, “India Maldives Relations at a Glance,” The Hindu, April 1, 2016.
181
Before Nasheed replaced Yameen in the 2018 election, India Navy Chief Admiral Sunil Lanba said,
Maldives is a challenge at the moment. The present government in Maldives is more inclined
towards China. The constitution has been tweaked and some islands have been given to the
Chinese for development. There is no news at the moment of any listening post in the Maldives.
[But] There is some development that is going on. (Press Trust of India, “Maldives More Inclined
Towards China: Navy Chief ADMIRAL Sunil Lanba,” Economic Times, May 23, 2018)
182
Lee Jeong-ho, “Why Are China and India So Interested in the Maldives?” South China Morning Post, September
25, 2018.
41
4. India’s Defense Calculus vis-à-vis China
For the decade after India won its independence in 1947, its leaders saw themselves as
natural partners with the People’s Republic in forging a bloc of newly decolonized nations.
During this time, the relationship was often short-handed with the Hindi phrase Hindi-Chini
bhai-bhai—Indians and Chinese are brothers.183 The relationship began to sour in the late 1950s
and took a clear turn for the worse after India provided sanctuary to the Dalai Lama when he fled
Chinese-administered Tibet in 1959. In 1962, the two nations fought a brief war, in which the
PLA invaded Indian-administered territories across several fronts in the Himalayas. Since that
time, India has regarded China far more as a threat than a partner. This perception was reinforced
in June 2020, when a PLA incursion into Indian-held territory near the Galwan Valley resulted in
the first combat casualties between the two armies since 1975, and the first double-digit fatalities
since 1967.
Despite this history, however, the People’s Republic does not fall neatly into the category of
adversary for India. In economic terms, India is—like most other nations in Asia—deeply reliant
on China as a trade partner. Moreover, China’s considerable military superiority has made Indian
planners’ risk-averse about taking positions that could provoke full-scale warfare. In India’s
eyes, China is too threatening to be considered a friend, but too dangerous to be treated as an
enemy. These complications should inform U.S. policymaking: India might have good reason to
support the United States in any competition with China, but strategic planners should keep
expectations modest about New Delhi expressing such support in concrete ways.
China as a Direct Long-Term Security Challenge

While much of India’s operational military planning is focused on the challenge from
Pakistan (see below), strategists recognize that the neighbor to the west has little likelihood of
ever being a peer-competitor in conventional military terms. “They recognize that Pakistan is
yesterday’s fight, and they’re more concerned about their northern neighbor,” a U.S. military
official said in a recent interview. “This is a change: It used to be Pakistan all the time. But now
Pakistan is the known known, while India is still trying to understand the threat from China, and
how to respond to it.”184
China enjoys overall strategic (albeit not always tactical) conventional military superiority—
and this imbalance is likely to increase rather than decrease over time. In the long term, India
sees itself as a natural peer-competitor of China: They are the two most populous nations on
183
Claude Arpi, “The Years of Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai,” India Defence Review, July 3, 2015.
184
Interview on May 14, 2019, New Delhi (Source 1).
42
earth, and each has traditionally dominated its surrounding region for much of recorded history.
But India’s military is not currently on par with that of China and is upgrading its capabilities at
a much slower pace than China is upgrading its own.
NonAlignment 2.0 devotes considerable attention to the hard-power threat from Beijing.
“China will, for the foreseeable future, remain a significant foreign policy and security challenge
for India,” the document states. “It is the one major power which impinges directly on India’s
geopolitical space. As its economic and military capabilities expand, its power differential with
India is likely to widen.185 The proposed strategy for dealing with this anything but passive:
India’s unofficial doctrine calls for a robust conventional counterstrike in the event of any
attempt by China to replay the invasion of 1962:
Given the fact that the combat ratio and logistic networks favour China and that
the attacker will always have the advantage of tactical (if not strategic) surprise,
we will need a mix of defensive and offensive capabilities that can leverage the
advantages that the terrain offers. The better way of responding to limited land-
grabs by China is for us to undertake similar action across the LAC: a strategy of
quid pro quo.186
The document notes that any conflict with China will “be fought under a nuclear overhang,”
which “can be expected to impose caution on political decision makers on both sides.”187
Perhaps because of this (and in a paradoxical inversion of India’s own asymmetric
conventional/nuclear calculus with Pakistan), this is seen to enable a more robust response than
might be the case without such a nuclear deterrent to all-out conventional combat. The authors
propose actively preparing for guerrilla and paramilitary operations in Tibet.188 From an air
power perspective, it is important to note that Indian planners see the air power portion of any
response taking place above land and sea alike: NonAlignment 2.0 advocates significant
185
186
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 41, the text continues:
There are several areas where the local tactical and operational advantage rests with us. These
areas should be identified and earmarked for limited offensive operations on our part. More
importantly, such a strategy will need the creation of infrastructure for mobility and housing
troops.
For a nondoctrinal analysis of India’s conventional land-warfare power projection, see Shashank Joshi, Indian
Power Projection: Ambition, Arms and Influence, Abingdon, UK: Routledge Journals, 2015, pp. 76–95.
187
188
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 41, the text continues:
In the event of a major offensive by China, we cannot resort to a strategy of proportionate
response. Rather we should look to leverage our asymmetric capabilities to convince the Chinese
to back down. . . . First, we must be able immediately to trigger an effective insurgency in the
areas occupied by Chinese forces. This would require careful preparation in advance. We need to
induct locals into paramilitary and police units, and train them to switch to the guerrilla mode
when required . . . we must develop the capability to interdict China’s logistics and operational
infrastructure in Tibet.
See also Heginbotham and Gilboy, 2012, pp. 56–57, 84–87.
43
emphasis on maritime operations.189 Well in advance of any conflict, the document advises, “We
should be in a position to dominate the Indian Ocean region.” Doing so “will require the
development of our naval bases in the off-shore island chains (especially the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands) and of amphibious capabilities.”190 Such planning has clear implications not
only for naval aviation, but for land-based air power in support of maritime objectives.
China represents India’s most powerful direct threat and most significant long-term security
challenge (at least by conventional state-to-state criteria), but both nations have been quite
careful to avoid serious military conflict in recent decades. In 1967, there were clashes at the
passes of Nathu La and Cho La, which connect Tibet with what was then the independent Indian
protectorate of the Kingdom of Sikkim, resulting in several hundred casualties.191 A very tense
1987 standoff in Arunachal Pradesh was resolved without bloodshed,192 and rare casualties since
1967 have been primarily the result of accidents and altitude. All of these land-warfare scenarios
have relied on air power support.
The most serious confrontation since 1967 occurred on June 15, 2020. Twenty Indian
soldiers and an unknown number of PLA troops were killed in hand-to-hand combat near the
Galwan Valley, a site located between India’s territory of Ladakh and China’s Xinjiang and
Tibet Autonomous Regions. This clash followed five weeks of more-routine skirmishing at
various points along the LAC. The motive for what India describes as a PLA seizure of 23 square
kilometers of territory, as well as the PLA’s willingness to inflict casualties after decades of
restraint, remains unclear. One tactical rationale would be a desire to block military road
construction that would have solidified India’s control over strategically important features. A
potential strategic rationale might be Beijing’s desire to send the message that its overall goals
and power projection would not be impeded by the demands of domestic response to the
COVID-19 crisis.
The most recent prior crisis was a three-month standoff on the Doklam Plateau, territory
claimed by Bhutan (a de facto Indian protectorate) and China. This showdown was sparked by
Beijing’s apparent attempt to deploy the South China Sea strategy of building infrastructure on
189
[T]he fundamental design that must underpin the shaping of India’s military power should be the
leveraging of potential opportunities that flow from peninsular India’s location in the Indian
Ocean. . . . The development of military power must therefore attain a significant maritime
orientation. Presently, Indian military power has a continental orientation. To emerge as a
maritime power should therefore be India’s strategic objective.
190
191
For discussion of Sino-Indian skirmishing over Sikkim, see Garver, 2001, pp. 176–185. Seven years after these
clashes, the Kingdom of Sikkim was formally integrated to the Indian Union. According a parliamentary record of
the time (which must be taken with extreme caution), the 1967 clashes resulted in 88 Indian deaths and 163
wounded, with 340 PLA troops dead and 450 wounded. Lok Sabha Secretariat, Lok Sabha Debates, 1967, New
Delhi, India: Government of India, 1967, pp. 51 onward.
192
The 1987 skirmish took place at the Sumdorong Chu Valley, triggered by India’s decision to integrate Arunachal
Pradesh (part of which, centered on the Tawang Valley, is still claimed by China) as a state in the Union.
44
disputed territory (in this case, a road expansion), with the hope of creating a new set of facts.
The crisis was ended through diplomacy, with a return to the status quo ante—and a quiet build-
up by China, which may set the stage for a future conflict.193 For USAF planners, this conflict
has been merely paused, not ended.
How such a future conflict might play out is a matter of contention. While China’s military is
stronger overall, Indian strategists see the tactical advantages of geography at Doklam (and, for
the more optimistic of them, across the entire LAC) as favoring their position. “We’re pretty
strong along the disputed line,” said one Indian observer. He admitted, however, that in serious
conflict, China was likely to rely on standoff weaponry, cyberwarfare, electronic warfare,
ballistic missiles, and other 21st century forms of contactless combat.194
Another Indian scholar, with an expertise in air power, noted that land warfare along the
LAC is very manpower-intensive, and in this sense geography favors the PLA: The high, flat
Tibetan plateau permits greater lateral mobility, effectively multiplying the number of Chinese
troops available at any point. But in the sphere of air power (this expert said), the same
geographical facts favored India: The high altitude of Tibet results in thinner air, so PLAAF
aircraft must take off with less fuel and munitions than they would be able to carry at lower-
altitude air bases: “There’s a reason that Tibet has the longest runways in the world,” he said.
Indian aircraft, by contrast, can take off fully loaded from IAF bases near sea level. Moreover,
the ridge of the Tibetan Plateau provides cover from radar: “We’re in the shadow of the
Himalayas,” he said. “We’re not visible until we pop over the mountains. But we can see
PLAAF aircraft from the moment they take off.” He tempered his observation with a note of
caution: “We tend to overplay this advantage—in a shooting war, we cannot be
overconfident.”195
Pakistan as India’s Most Immediate Near-Term Security Threat

Perhaps more troubling to India, at least in the short term, is China’s strong and deepening
relationship with Pakistan—particularly in the air power arena. This is a relationship that
Heginbotham and Gilboy cite as a nested security dilemma complicating all other security
challenges India faces.196 In theory, India might seek to decouple China from Pakistan, or drive a
193
For more detailed discussion of the Doklam dispute, see Šumit Ganguly and Andrew Scobell, “The Himalayan
Impasse: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Wake of Doklam,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2018; Joshi, 2017;
and Blank, 2017.
194
195
Interview with Indian security analyst on May 16, 2019, New Delhi (Source 4). A U.S. observer backed up the
assessment of ease of logistics and communication providing superior lateral mobility—as well as resupply and
rapid reinforcement—to the PLA (interview with U.S. military official on May 14, 2019, New Delhi [Source 2]).
196
Heginbotham and Gilboy, 2012, pp. 275–277.
45
wedge between them, but in practice this has historically not proven successful.197 To understand
why this is of particular concern to India, it is necessary to look briefly at the long-standing
rivalry between India and Pakistan.
In 1947—one day apart—India and Pakistan achieved their independence from Great Britain,
and almost immediately went to war in Kashmir.198 The nations have fought two more wars since
then: in 1965 (primarily over the status of Kashmir) and in 1971 (when India supported a
rebellion in what was then East Pakistan, leading to that half of the nation attaining independence
as the nation of Bangladesh). The countries also fought a limited-but-intense conflict that lasted
nearly three months in the summer of 1999 in the Kashmiri district of Kargil; the Kargil Conflict
is sometimes referred to as a fourth Indo-Pakistani war, sometimes as a “half-war,” and resulted
in nearly 1,000 fatalities on both sides by official count. This conflict had added significance in
that it was the first large-scale combat between the two nations since both of them became
declared nuclear powers in 1998.199
In addition to these confrontations, India and Pakistan have engaged in smaller-scale armed
engagements on a continual basis throughout their history. They exchange artillery barrages
regularly across the LOC, as well as skirmishing in contested high-altitude areas such as Siachen
Glacier (at up to 18,000 feet, the highest battlefield in the world). NonAlignment 2.0 notes the
need for a full range of military options available, since the size and shape of the next conflict is
impossible to determine in advance.200
As a consequence of its lack of conventional military parity, Pakistan relies on asymmetric
warfare (support for terrorist/insurgent forces), under the implicit threat that any escalation from
the subconventional to the conventional arena might spiral into nuclear warfare. Indian
policymakers tend to portray all terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir (as well as in India proper)
as proxy warfare directed by Pakistan and often denounced the “hidden hand” of Pakistan in the
197
For discussion of India’s attempts to separate China from Pakistan on the key issue of Kashmir, see Garver, 2001,
pp. 227–234.
198
When British Colonial India (including some 560 nominally independent princely states) was divided into the
modern nations of India and Pakistan, the Maharajah of Jammu & Kashmir tried to turn theoretical independent into
the real thing. His territory was invaded by irregular troops from Pakistan, and he had little choice but to join the
Indian Union in order to get Indian troops airlifted in. When a ceasefire was agreed upon in 1948, the Maharajah’s
domains were effectively divided in two, with India controlling about two-thirds of the territory (integrated to the
Indian Union as the state of Jammu and Kashmir), and Pakistan controlling about one-third (technically as the
nominally-self-governing states of Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan). The ceasefire line is now known
as the Line of Control (LoC) and is not recognized by any party as an international border. Neither party accepts the
legitimacy of the other’s administration of its Kashmir territory.
199
For discussion of how India’s Air Force and Army attempted to achieve jointness at Kargil, see Mukherjee, 2016,
pp. 20–22.
200
The hard power strategy adopted by us will have to cover the spectrum. . . . The context of the
particular situation will determine the range of actions. At the high end of the spectrum of usable
military power we will need to review our prevailing operational doctrine and structures. The
capability that India should acquire is one that enables us to make shallow thrusts that are
defensible in as many areas as feasible along the International Border and the LoC.
46
insurgencies of the Northeast. Such an attitude overlooks the very real alienation of many
citizens in Kashmir,201 as well as the homegrown insurgencies in the Northeast and in the
Naxalite-dominated districts. But the role of Islamabad in fostering and sponsoring terrorism and
insurgency—primarily, but not exclusively, in Kashmir—remains quite real.
Islamabad has supported Punjab-based terrorist groups, such as Jaish-e Muhammad (JeM),
and indigenous Kashmiri militant groups, such as Hizbul Mujaheddin.202 The nation’s main spy
agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), continues to support and—to a large
degree—control the terrorist group Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT), which is responsible for the 2008
Mumbai terrorist attacks, among many other terrorist actions. Moreover, most Islamist terrorist
actions in India and Indian-administered Kashmir since the late-1990s have been carried out by
Pakistani citizens rather than Indian or Kashmiri ones (India’s own non-Kashmiri Muslim
population—perhaps 140 million strong—has almost never taken part in terrorist actions).
NonAlignment 2.0 argues for an increase in capabilities (and the will to use them) at the lower
end of the force continuum, including a willingness to respond to subconventional attacks with
air power.203
This recommendation for punitive use of air power has been discussed in detail by (among
other sources) Yogesh Joshi and A. Mukherjee,204 and by Shashank Joshi.205 It has also since
been put into practice. On February 26, 2019—in response to a terrorist action in Indian Kashmir
launched from Pakistani soil—the Indian Air Force conducted its first strike on uncontested
Pakistani territory since 1971: an airstrike on a suspected JeM terrorist camp near Balakot, in
201
This alienation was highlighted by the Modi government’s August 2019 revocation of Article 370 of the Indian
constitution, under which Kashmir (at least on paper) had been granted more autonomy than other parts of the
Union. Protests resulted in a heavy security clampdown, and restrictions on press and communications.
202
The dividing line between insurgent and terrorist groups is often a hazy one, see Seth G. Jones, Waging Insurgent
Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016; Christopher
Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan, “Moving Beyond Population-Centric vs. Enemy-Centric
Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 27, No. 6, 2016. Some groups, such as JeM and Lashkar-e
Taiba (LeT), would seem to fall squarely on the terrorism side of the diving line. Hizbul Mujaheddin is more
nebulous: Unlike the other two, its membership is largely Kashmiri, so it can claim to be an indigenous movement
rather than one created by a foreign power. In the early and mid-1990s, at least, it had widespread support among the
Kashmiri populace—something that further distinguishes it from groups like JeM and LeT. India contends that
Hizbul Mujaheddin is effectively a Pakistani proxy movement and has engaged in many acts of terrorism rather than
simply insurgency.
203
At the lower end of the options spectrum is the employment of cyber and/or air power in a
punitive mode . . . it could be swift, more precise, and certainly more amenable to being
coordinated with our diplomatic efforts. . . . The crucial choice here requires a decision to move
away from the paradigm focused on capture of territory to a paradigm based on destructive ability.
Destructive capability will include air power, missiles and long-range guns as the central vectors.
204
Yogesh Joshi and A. Mukherjee, “From Denial to Punishment: The Security Dilemma and Changes in India’s
Military Strategy Towards China,” Asian Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2019.
205
Shashank Joshi, Indian Power Projection: Ambition, Arms and Influence, Abingdon, UK: Routledge Journals,
2015.
47
Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The amount of damage inflicted is contested,206 but
this breached a significant redline. Until the Balakot strike, India had refrained from any attack
on Pakistani territory out of concern over possible nuclear escalation: Even its attacks on
disputed territory in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (most notably, the September 2016 “surgical
strike”207) were carefully calibrated and highly limited.208 After Balakot, however, the equation
changed: Prime Minister Modi has said that he will not be deterred from future punitive actions
out of concern over nuclear threats.
China as Indirect Security Challenge via Pakistan

Since the late 1960s, Beijing has been Islamabad’s most consistent international patron and
“all-weather friend.” In recent decades, both the economic and the military sides of this equation
have grown stronger. Both sides of this picture are worrisome to Indian security planners.
On the economic side, one of the most ambitious parts of the BRI is the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC).209 This set of proposed projects would encompass both
infrastructure and economic development zones. It is anchored by the Chinese-built, Chinese-run
port of Gwadar, in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. When road (and, at least aspirationally,
rail) improvements are completed, China will be able to transport goods from its Western interior
straight down to the Arabian Sea for onward shipping to Europe, Africa, and the Americas—
thereby cutting thousands of miles off current shipping routes that transit the Strait of Malacca.
China’s President Xi Jinping has publicly stated that Chinese investment in CPEC could total
$62 billion, although many observers believe that this figure is significantly overstated.210
India has separate concerns about the BRI in general and CPEC in particular. The general
concerns about the BRI are officially couched in terms of “international norms, good
206
India claimed to have destroyed a significant JeM camp, whereas Pakistan claims that no such camp existed or
was destroyed. Neither side has produced conclusive evidence to support its claim. For more discussion of impact,
see Ashley Tellis, “A Smoldering Volcano: Pakistan and Terrorism After Balakot,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, March 14, 2019.
207
For a detailed discussion of how this “surgical strike” may constitute a de facto blueprint for Prime Minister
Modi’s strategic decisionmaking, see Nitin A. Gokhale, Securing India the Modi Way: Pathankot, Surgical Strikes
and More, New Delhi, Bloomsbury, 2017.
208
On September 29, 2016, in retaliation for an attack on an Army base at Uri in Kashmir 11 days earlier, India
launched what it termed a “surgical strike” against terrorist “launch pads.” This attack was carried out by Special
Forces rather than aircraft and was limited to an area in the portion of pre-1947 Kashmir that India does not
recognize as Pakistani territory. These factors were considered key in limiting the potential for escalation. Sanjeev
Miglani and Asad Hashim, “India Says Hits Pakistan-Based Militants, Escalating Tensions,” Reuters, September 29,
2016.
209
For a discussion of the political ramifications of CPEC, see Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New
Geopolitics, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 171–178.
210
Arif Rafiq, “China’s $62 Billion Bet on Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, October 24, 2017.
48
governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality.”211 Such concerns, according to
Indian analysts interviewed, overlay a far deeper worry that BRI investment is powerfully
advancing China’s strategic rather than purely economic agenda.212 The objection to CPEC is
more specific and stems from the fact that a key portion of it (the Karakoram Highway
expansion) runs through territory disputed by India and Pakistan since 1947: “Regarding the so-
called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,’” India’s Ministry of External Affairs said in 2017,
“the international community is well aware of India’s position. No country can accept a project
that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.”213
On the security side of the equation, China has been Pakistan’s largest source of military
hardware for more than 65 years, supplying 40 percent of the nation’s arms during this period.214
Indeed, Pakistan is the only nation to which China has sold arms every single year since 1964—
and China is the only nation from which Pakistan has bought arms every single year.215 Much of
this gear is low-tech, but in the first decade of the 21st century the two nations began joint
production of the JF-17 Thunder multirole combat jet (China’s version is called the FC-1
Xiaolong).216 Pakistani generals speak openly of China replacing the United States as the high-
tech supplier of choice.217 Shortly after the JF-17 program was initiated, Pakistan and China in
2009 signed a deal for 36 Chengdu J-10 multirole combat aircraft. Pakistan is reported to be
cooperating with Chengdu in the development of a multipurpose fighter based on the MiG-33.218
While the JF-17 is used for counterinsurgency, its mission-set includes potential combat with the
Indian Air Force. Pakistan deploys JF-17s at Masroor Air Force Base (among other sites)—far
from potential counterinsurgency operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, but
instead on the eastern border with India.
211
Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Official Spokesperson’s Response to a Query on
Participation of India on OBOR/BRI Forum,” New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, May 13, 2017.
212
Interview with Indian security analyst on May 16, 2019, New Delhi (Source 3); interview with Indian security
analyst on May 16, 2019, New Delhi (Source 4); interview with Singapore-based Indian security analyst on June 2,
2019, Singapore (Source 6).
213
214
For discussion of the security relationship between Pakistan and China, and more detailed sourcing of the items
referred to here, see Blank et al., 2017, pp. 36–49.
215
Jonah Blank, “Thank You for Being a Friend: Pakistan and China’s Almost Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, October
15, 2015. Analysis of data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Importer/Exporter TIV
Tables,” SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, undated-b.
216
The date at which this truly became a joint production is debatable. Much has been written on the JF-17’s
capabilities and comparison with other aircraft such as the F-16. For a brief description, see, Farhan Bokhari,
“Pakistan Reveals Plans for JF-17 and J-10 Fighters,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 10, 2009; and Richard D.
Fisher, “Paris Air Show 2015: JF-17 Fighter Flying with Indigenous Chinese Turbofan,” IHS Jane’s Defence
Weekly, June 17, 2015.
217
Ehsan-ul Haq, “Jirga on Geo News (General (R) Ehsan ul Haq, Exclusive . . .) 1st June 2015,” interview on Geo
TV, June 1, 2015, translated from Urdu by Abdul Tariq, 28:00 mark.
218
J-10 deal: Siva Govindasamy, “Pakistan Signs Deal for Chinese J-10 Fighters,” FlightGlobal.com, November 13,
2009. Cooperation with Chengdu on MiG-33 variant: Syed Fazl-e-Haider, “Pakistan and China Prove Powerful
Combination in Aviation,” The National (Dubai), November 25, 2013.
49
Cooperation between China and Pakistan in the air power arena goes beyond hardware: The
two air forces exercise together regularly. The PLAAF typically refrains from exercising with the
air forces of most other countries, but conducts an annual multidimensional joint exercise with
Pakistan known as Shaheen; various iterations of this exercise have included such platforms as
the JF-17, Dassault Mirage III/5, F7/PG (flown by Pakistan), and the Chengu J-10 and J-7
multirole fighters (flown by China).219
It is unsurprising, therefore, that Indian planners look on China and Pakistan as presenting an
interlocked set of challenges. Each is seen as a potential adversary in its own right, and together
they are seen as forming a de facto alliance against India. NonAlignment 2.0 notes, “A China
which is raising its regional and global profile will provide a more effective shield to Pakistan.
. . . In consequence, we may need to think of Pakistan as a subset of the larger strategic
challenges posed by China.”220 This threat is seen as extending from the subconventional to the
conventional right up to the nuclear arena. “The continued growth and modernization of the
Chinese and Pakistan nuclear arsenals should be a matter of some concern to India,” the
document states, noting that “cooperation between China and Pakistan on nuclear matters further
complicates the situation for India.”221 Given the historical role that China has played in helping
Pakistan develop its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities,222 such a concern does not appear
to be ill-founded.
219
Franz-Stefan Gady, “China and Pakistan Air Forces Launch Joint Training Exercise,” The Diplomat, April 12,
2016; Mateen Haider, “Pakistan, China Air Forces Begin Joint Drills ‘Shaheen-III,’” Dawn, May 24, 2014.
220
221
222
Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices,” International
Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring, 1999; T. V. Paul, “Chinese‐Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and Balance of Power
Politics,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003.
50
5. Assessment and Outlook
This chapter presents an assessment of several key factors in the U.S.-India relationship
relevant to the issue of U.S.-China competition, and an outlook for the coming five to ten years.
The picture it paints is largely a positive one, as long as American expectations of India are in
realistic alignment with India’s own interests and capabilities.
India Sees the United States as a Partner and China as a Rival—but

Limiting Factors Remain
Non-Aligned rhetoric notwithstanding, there is no actual parity of threat perception between
the United States and China: India regards the United States as a partner (albeit a sometimes-
problematic one) and China as a rival (albeit one too close and too powerful to needlessly
alienate). “We need the U.S. to balance China,” an Indian scholar interviewed in New Delhi
noted. “There’s simply nobody else to do it.”223 Another Indian security analyst emphasized the
need for American help even in maintaining awareness and control over Chinese actions in the
Indian Ocean.224 The authors of NonAlignment 2.0—as the title suggests, not a group of
strategists sold on the idea of close partnering with any nation—write, “It is in our interest that
China remains preoccupied with its first-tier, more immediate maritime theatre.” They highlight
the desirability of “retention of strong U.S. maritime deployments in the Asia-Pacific theatre.”225
But this should not lead U.S. planners to overestimate the degree to which India is likely to
side with the United States in any competition with China.226 NonAlignment 2.0 articulates this
caution in very clear terms. A particular area of concern is that U.S.-China competition could be
replaced by U.S.-China rapprochement (sometimes referred to as a “G-2” arrangement)—that is,
a superpower entente that leaves India out in the cold.227
223
224
225
226
For a U.S. practitioner analysis, see Abercrombie, 2019. For analysis by scholars not associated with either
government (one currently based in the United Kingdom, the other a former Indian Army officer currently based in
Singapore), see Walter C. Ladwig III and Anit Mukherjee, “India and the United States: The Contours of an Asian
Partnership,” Asia Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1, January 2019.
227
Nor is it entirely clear how the U.S. might actually respond if China posed a threat to India’s
interests. The other potential downside is that India could prematurely antagonize China. . . . The
U.S. can be too demanding in its friendship and resentful of other attachments India might pursue.
The historical record of the United States bears out that powers that form formal alliances with it
have tended to see an erosion of their strategic autonomy. Both India and the U.S. may be better
served by being friends rather than allies.
51
Given the fact that India is facing a militarily and economically more powerful rival—one
that has invaded Indian territory in the past, continues to stake an actively articulated claim to
territory India now administers, and inflicted 20 fatalities on Indian forces in June 2020—how
seriously should concerns about Non-Alignment be taken? Quite seriously indeed. India’s fierce
attachment to its geopolitical independence goes beyond security considerations, into the realm
of national identity.228 In the view of many Indian planners, the rest of Asia is waiting for India
to step into its natural role as the pivot-point of the Indo-Pacific region. NonAlignment 2.0 states,
“Asia is likely to remain a theatre of great power competition . . . [and] many Asian powers are
looking to hedge their bets against excessive dependence on a major power.”229
India’s Distrust of the United States as Potentially Unreliable Partner

In addition to India’s ideological and identity-based reasons for maintaining strategic
autonomy, Indian planners have hard-nosed realpolitik rationales for such a policy as well. The
most salient of these is a profound distrust of U.S. reliability,230 as a provider of both protection
(whether military or diplomatic) and equipment (whether during a conflict, or at any time in the
procurement cycle).
NonAlignment 2.0 highlights the first of these rationales. It questions whether the United
States would actually risk a military conflict against a near-peer competitor in the case of a future
Sino-Indian war231 and notes that the United States has a long track-record of not coming to
India’s aid in the less-threatening (for the United States) case of conflict with Pakistan: “While
American, and more generally international, support is welcome in keeping pressure on Pakistan,
we cannot depend on this to dissuade Pakistan from pursuing what it regards as a time-tested and
successful foreign policy tool.”232 The document further notes what it describes as an undergoing
and inevitable deterioration of U.S. capability of serving as an effective defender of Indian
interests, even if U.S. policymakers could be trusted to do so. It notes the decline of the U.S.-led
228
See Blank et al., 2015, pp. 23–37.
229
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 12. The text continues:
Many countries are also looking to India to assume a more active strategic and economic role in
Asia. India has not often fully responded to the opportunities provided by the hedging strategies of
various Asian powers.
230
This distrust has historical roots in India’s disappointment at the lack of U.S. support during the 1962 war with
China; perceptions of being aligned in different blocs during the Cold War; and long-standing (albeit highly volatile)
U.S. security partnership with Pakistan (Cohen, 2001a, pp. 131–133; Harding, 2004, pp. 321–350; Blank et al.,
2017, pp. 11–24).
231
232
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 18. The document situates the likelihood of U.S. support for Pakistan in counterterrorism
and Afghanistan policy:
As long as Pakistan is seen as delivering, even if half-heartedly, on U.S. concerns over Al Qaeda
and the Taliban in Afghanistan, only lip service will be paid to Pakistan’s obligations to deliver on
its promises to prevent cross-border terrorism against India.
52
system of alliances—a phenomenon that has hardly become less evident since the document was
published in 2012.233
The Indian perception of the United States as an unreliable partner in security cooperation is
equally deep-set and articulated frequently to many U.S. interlocutors. “They bring it up
constantly,” said a U.S. military official interviewed in New Delhi. “Between Congress, the
White House, and a host of bureaucratic regulations, they see us as a somewhat challenging
partner.”234 Said another, “They can’t understand why we don’t give them the same access that
we give to treaty allies, like members of NATO. They don’t accept the fact that, without
foundational agreements in place, we legally can’t.”235
Foundational agreements are a key element of the disconnect between Indian and U.S.
interlocutors. These complex sets of documents set out the terms under which U.S. military
hardware or dual-use technology can be transferred to another nation. Depending on the country
in question and the preexisting commercial agreements, they might include the following:
• End-use monitoring: The United States, under binding legislation, insists on maintaining
control over the ultimate destination for any sensitive item of military hardware sold.
Without such monitoring, a trusted U.S. security partner (for example, India) would be
free to sell U.S. arms to a dedicated U.S. rival (for example, Iran).
• Copyright protection: The U.S. government often cannot “give” military technology to
India (or any other reason) for the simple fact that it does not own it. Much of the
technology that India desires to purchase for the purpose of developing its own arms
industries belongs not to the U.S. government, but to private firms, such as Boeing and
Lockheed Martin. Without an agreement ensuring the enforcement of copyright rules
(something India has been loath to grant, in the military arena as in many others), the
U.S. government is powerless to deliver on any promise of technology transfer.
• Operational conditions under which the items might be used: In many cases, the
purchaser of an item of military technology might wish to use it for purposes that run
counter to U.S. national interests. For example, the United States might be willing to sell
lethal hardware to a nation for the purposes of national defense, but not for the purpose of
suppressing internal dissent.
• Classified technologies, and procedures for maintaining and upgrading hardware:
Sometimes, particularly in cases where there is a significant risk of sensitive or classified
233
NonAlignment 2.0, pp. 31–32:
[T]he relative decline of the American alliance system is already evident. . . . [T]he world’s rising
powers now see greater opportunity in playing the polycentric field. . . . If a strong economy and
military and its alliance system were the two basic pillars of U.S. power in the earlier era,
America’s ability to ‘call the shots’ in finance and energy were its third and fourth pillars. These
pillars too now appear less steady and reliable.
234
235
Interview with U.S. military official on May 14, 2019, New Delhi (Source 2). Some of these foundational
agreements were signed in 2016 (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, or LEMOA), 2018
(Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement, or COMCASA), and 2020 (Basic Exchange and
Cooperation Agreement, or BECA), but at the time of writing their implementation remains a work-in-progress.
53
technology being transferred to a third party, the United States may outline a very
specific set of rules governing the maintenance and aftercare of American technologies.
Most countries selling arms or other sensitive technologies have some sort of arrangements
for at least some of the issues contained in foundational agreements—but few have as complex
and extensive rules as the United States. This is a sore point with many customers of American
military equipment—but few more so than India.
U.S. interlocutors often fail to explain the rationale clearly: Pentagon, White House, and
State Department officials (as well as defense industry executives) often shift the blame to
Congress; members of Congress and their staff generally have only a vague understanding of the
legal technicalities involved, or the role of foundational agreements in this process.236 This
failure to explain the system leaves Indian interlocutors feeling both distrusted and distrustful.
India’s Inability to Compete with China Leads to Risk Aversion

Indian planners see China as their most significant long-term security challenge, but they are
well aware that they are not yet peer-competitor. Most strategists interviewed see the gap
between the two nations increasing. “We don’t have the military-industrial complex that they
do,” said one Indian security analyst. “We can offer nothing like BRI. They are ahead of us
militarily, economically, in every way—and pulling further ahead all the time. What do we have
as the currency of power? We’re scrambling just to stay where we are.”237 Said another Indian
scholar: “We’re planning for today’s war, and we’ll be prepared for it in 20 years. China is
preparing for tomorrow’s war, and they’ll be prepared in five.”238
NonAlignment 2.0, while highlighting the challenges presented by China, is careful to avoid
portraying India’s neighbor in overly antagonistic terms. The emphasis of Indian strategy,
according to this quasi-doctrinal document, should be to avoid goading China into a conflict: “If
China perceives India as irrevocably committed to an anti-China containment ring, it may end up
adopting overtly hostile and negative policies towards India, rather than making an effort to keep
236
I spent 12 years as point-person on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for South and Southeast
Asia. In this role, I had oversight responsibility for arms transfer to India, as well as all other countries in these
regions. I freely confess that I did not fully understand the role of foundational agreements until after leaving
government.
237
238
54
India on a more independent path.”239 India’s primary means of insuring its safety against the
possibility of Chinese hostility will be diplomatic rather than military.240
Within such geostrategic constraints, U.S. planners should restrain their expectations about
Indian military participation in competition with China outside of the Indian Ocean region.
“Sending our navy to the South China Sea or elsewhere in the Pacific?” asked one Indian analyst
rhetorically. “That’s unrealistic—we’ve got our hands more than full with China here in our own
backyard, we really can’t compete beyond that.”241 Said another: “India may wave the flag on
FONOPS [Freedom of Navigation Operations]. But that’s about it.”242
Best Avenues for Partnership Include Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster

Relief, Maritime Domain Awareness, and Education
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

India’s military, unlike that of many other nations in the Indo-Pacific, is a “fighting
military”—that is, it regularly engages in combat, rather than merely trains for it. But given the
combination of climate change, rapid spread of pandemics, and environmental overstress due to
explosive population growth, untraditional missions are likely to take up an increasing share of
the Indian military’s mission set in the near future. Perhaps the most important of these will be
an increased emphasis on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). As NonAlignment
2.0 states, “it could be argued that the biggest challenge for relations in South Asia will be
managing the environment and natural resources. Environmental risks pose clear and present
threats. But they may also provide opportunities for new strategic alignments. India needs to give
these issues strategic priority.”243
After the April 2015 earthquake that killed 9,000 and caused widespread damage to Nepal,
India spearheaded international HA/DR efforts. Indian National Disaster Response Force
(NDRF) teams reached Nepal only six hours after the earthquake.244 Indian assistance included
239
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 14. Shortly before this, the document amplifies:
On the global canvas, China looks upon India not as a threat in itself, but as a “swing state” whose
association with potential adversaries could constrain China. The challenge for Indian diplomacy
will be to develop a diversified network of relations with several major powers to compel China to
exercise restraint in its dealings with India, while simultaneously avoiding relationships that go
beyond conveying a certain threat threshold in Chinese perceptions.
240
This will require considerable investment in diplomatic and intellectual capacity. For example,
India’s ability to engage with and shape international law is still relatively limited by the fact that
there are few Indians with expertise or training in international law.
241
242
243
244
55
16 NDRF teams, Indian medical personnel, and approximately 571 tons of relief material,
including rescue equipment, medical supplies, food, water, tents, and blankets.245 In June 2015,
India pledged $1 billion in reconstruction assistance, with Indian External Affairs Minister
Sushma Swaraj saying India had “reacted as if a disaster has struck India.”246
Increased U.S. cooperation with India in the HA/DR arena could help India not only better
protect its own citizens but accelerate its development into a reliable provider of HA/DR
throughout the region (and even further afield). According to U.S. military personnel interviewed
in New Delhi, and also U.S. military personnel interviewed in Singapore and Jakarta who had
previously served in India and continue to have HA/DR as a key part of their portfolios,247 an
increased focus on HA/DR cooperation with India would have a number of clear benefits for the
United States itself:
• Improve interoperability with India across all types of operations. The skill sets
necessary for HA/DR operations overlap significantly with those for combat. As several
interviewees noted, the most difficult parts of working with a partner do not typically
involve pulling triggers. In combat, as in disaster relief operations, the most difficult
elements of coordination with partners often involve logistics, communication, and
deconfliction of effort.
• HA/DR exercises could, and should, be multilateral—just like real HA/DR operations.
The skills necessary to coordinate a variety of partners, with an enormous range of
capabilities, is a natural pathway to other types of multilateral engagement.
• The skills built by HA/DR exercises will definitely be put to use. Unlike war, the ravages
of nature are an absolute certainty. There will be real-life requirements for HA/DR
operations in India and surrounding countries in the near future. In all past HA/DR
operations (for example, the Nepal earthquake of 2015), the United States, India, and
other partners had to create rules of engagement in the moments of crisis. That did not
make for seamless interaction.
• In HA/DR, the United States has a competitive advantage over China. Throughout Asia,
China has a dominant advantage in the economic arena, and at least a peer-competitive
status in most conventional military arenas. In HA/DR, however, there is no competition:
The United States has capabilities, particularly in air transport and logistics, that Beijing
cannot hope to match.
One U.S. military official noted the benefits to interoperability of HA/DR missions. Noting
that both India and Singapore use U.S. aircraft such as C-17s and C-130s for HA/DR missions,
he suggested looking for opportunities to train and exercise for HA/DR missions on a trilateral
245
246
Press Trust of India, “India Pledges USD 1 Billion Aid for Nepal’s Reconstruction Programme,” Indian Express,
June 25, 2015.
247
Interview with U.S. military official on April 2, 2019, Jakarta (Source 15); interview with U.S. military official
on May 9, 2019, Singapore (Source 9); interview with U.S. military official on May 14, 2019, New Delhi (Source
2); interview with U.S. military official on May 9, 2019, Singapore (Source 8).
56
basis.248 A U.S. military official interviewed in Singapore, but with prior experience throughout
the Indo-Pacific, noted that during the Nepal earthquake, India led coordination of the operation.
This was a new experience both for India and for many of the U.S. troops, who were not
accustomed to taking a backseat role. “You’ve got to get C2 [command and control] right, search
and rescue clicking, figure out refueling of air assets, both fixed-wing and rotary-wing. India
needs to learn how to lead, and we need to learn how to follow.”249
Maritime Domain Awareness

An underdeveloped aspect of security engagement between the United States and India is
maritime domain awareness (MDA). In the U.S. military, the mission is housed in the Navy, but
it has implications for the USAF as well. The most authoritative definition of MDA comes from
the UN agency responsible for international shipping, the International Maritime Organization:
“The effective understanding of any activity associated with the maritime environment that could
impact upon the security, safety, economy or environment.”250
A U.S. official responsible for coordinating MDA efforts throughout much of the Indo-
Pacific region noted that this involves the precise mapping of every meter of each nation’s
coastline and territorial waters. Neither India nor the United States has a current MDA capability
in the Indian Ocean Region that is anywhere close to either country’s ideal. Cooperation on
MDA is in harmony with India’s own national security goals as stated in NonAlignment 2.0:
Concurrent with the development of our naval capabilities should be a major
thrust to exploit the potential of our EEZ in the Indian Ocean. Ocean
development would not only include exploitation of the ocean resources but also
the development of the infrastructure of our ports, connectivity to the hinterland,
shipbuilding and ship repair capability among other things.251
In addition to mapping waters, MDA also involves tracking every naval vessel that enters—
or, ideally, even approaches—India’s territorial waters. “MDA is central to rule of law and
governance—the points that the U.S. makes constantly in competition with China,” the U.S.
official says. “Right now, we don’t have a clue what’s actually going on in most parts of the sea.
Are there Chinese fishing vessels? Or maybe PLAN? Right now, we usually don’t know.”252 As
a U.S. military official based in Southeast Asia noted, strengthening the MDA capabilities in
every nation would have clear benefits for U.S. Navy operations in the region—any U.S. vessel
248
249
250
International Maritime Organization, Amendments to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and
Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual, London, UK, May 24, 2010.
251
NonAlignment 2.0, pp. 41–42.
252
Interview with U.S. government official on April 2, 2019, Jakarta (Source 17).
57
transiting a particular stretch of ocean would have access to vital information about its
surroundings and any potential threats.253
MDA is primarily a maritime mission, but much of it is carried out by air assets—and has a
complementary air counterpart. As a civilian U.S. official based in Southeast Asia noted, of a
common term used in the region, “‘Maritime Fulcrum’ really should be called the ‘Air and
Maritime Fulcrum.’” He noted that Indo-Pacific nations had little more knowledge of the aircraft
transiting their airspace than the vessels transiting their territorial waters.254 In reference to both
aspects of domain awareness, the U.S. expert responsible for MDA throughout the region noted,
“This is one area in which we can offer a range of assistance programs that China cannot. In
MDA, there is no competition.”255
Military Education
Another low-cost high-value area for increased engagement would be education and
professional military training. The authors of NonAlignment 2.0 highlight the need for greater
attention to this gap as a necessity for India’s advancement in a variety of fields related to
national security:
The existing infrastructure of security-related knowledge (especially on matters
pertaining to hard power) is deeply deficient. The gap between the government
and the wider community of security studies remains large. Bridging this gap will
require action along two lines. First, we need to foster more study and research in
these areas. Institutions that were designed for these purposes have been unable
to make much of an impact on our knowledge base. Reorienting them will also
require addressing the quality of higher education in the areas of International
Relations and Security Studies.256
It is noteworthy that the document does not limit the knowledge gap to military education
and technical training per se but extends it to areas relevant to security issues. The lack of
educational opportunities is particularly severe (from a national security standpoint) in a number
of scientific fields related to technological innovation.257 The report notes that both national
security and the economic growth on which it rests rely on bringing India’s educational system,
especially in scientific and technical areas, up to an international standard.258
253
254
255
256
257
[O]ne factor is even more fundamental than access to resources. This is our ability to compete in
the field that is vital to defining national power in the twenty-first century: knowledge and
knowledge production, especially the capacity to innovate and to generate new forms of
knowledge.
258
NonAlignment 2.0, pp. 8–9. Innovation in both the military and civilian realms
58
This gap is noted in interviews conducted for this study as well. A recurrent theme was the
lack of a pipeline from universities to military-related research to private industry—essentially,
the system in place in both China and the United States. “India doesn’t value scientists, we value
hierarchy,” said one Indian analyst, with a specialization in air power issues. “We don’t have a
‘revolving door,’ whereby the best scientists can spend some time working for the government,
and some time making money on Silicon Valley or Wall Street. Instead, the ‘reward’ is just
seniority, and maybe a larger office.”259
This structure of incentivization in the fields of science and technology related to military
issues—rewarding seniority over innovation—leads to hidebound thinking. “We’re too
traditional in our planning,” another Indian analyst noted. “We think about how to replace a
hundred soon-to-be obsolete planes with another hundred planes. We should be thinking about
how to accomplish the same mission without a hundred planes.”260
This lack of indigenous capacity leads to unrealistic expectations of the United States and
other partners. A third Indian analyst cited aircraft engine technology—a field of cooperation
included in the U.S.-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) as an example. “We
should know that no country will give up its most advanced engine technology,” he noted.
“That’s the crown jewel! China would give its left arm and left leg for U.S. engine technology
that they could reverse-engineer. And we think that the U.S. would just give it to us?”261
The Indian air-power expert described India’s reputation for capability in the high-tech sector
as greatly overstated: “India fetishes low-cost—just look at how we bragged about how
inexpensive our Mars mission was. But you get what you pay for: Our scientists are poorly paid,
and you can’t expect the best people to work for free.” He noted that this same phenomenon
carries over to the aerospace industry, and all areas of air power: “The IAF is great at taking
junk, and making it work just good enough.”262
A U.S. military official interviewed in New Delhi made much the same point: “India needs to
decide whether it wants to have a 21st-century net-centric military, or a 20th-century old-
fashioned one.”263 To help India improve its capabilities, an Indian analyst noted, the United
States could send more American subject-matter experts on exchanges to India. It could also step
up training and information exchanges in Singapore or another third country.264
will depend ever more completely on scientific and technological progress, on developing human
capital, and on disseminating skills and expertise across the working citizenry. This will
necessitate the revitalization and expansion of India’s research and educational infrastructure, right
from the apex pure research institutes down to the access points for effectively imparting primary
education and vocational skills to wider citizenry.
259
260
261
262
263
264
59
Indian planners are aware of this shortcoming. NonAlignment 2.0 recommends the
establishment of an offensive and defensive Cyber Command.265 It notes that high-tech
capabilities are particularly necessary for air power but are at the heart of improved military
capability in every service: “Software is at the heart of almost everything—aircraft, ships,
vehicles, logistics, signals, command and control, and even the gear of the future soldier.”266
According to U.S. military personnel in New Delhi, the specific areas in which Indian
counterparts have requested increased training and education include artificial intelligence,
C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance), and any next-generation technologies that might help India compete directly or
asymmetrically with China.267
Increased Indian capability in a wide range of technical fields could have a multiplier effect
for other U.S. security partners. India seeks to be a teacher rather than just a student, and if its
own capabilities were increased it could shoulder an increased load of military education for
nations throughout the Indo-Pacific.268
Outlook for Overall U.S.-India Relations

For reasons discussed throughout this report, the outlook for relations between the United
States and India appears good in the five-to-ten-year timeframe. This is likely to carry over both
to the realm of U.S. competition with China and to the more general U.S.-India security
partnership—so long as American expectations are moderated by the factors discussed above.
On the Indian side of the equation, variables for the U.S. relationship—despite considerable
domestic volatility in India itself—seem likely to remain stable for the next five years. Prime
Minister Modi’s BJP began a new term in May 2019 and has a sufficient parliamentary majority
to make a change of government before May 2024 highly unlikely. The second-term Modi
government is off to a rocky start: In August 2019, it withdrew the special status of Kashmir
accorded by the Indian constitution, and in December 2019 it passed the controversial
265
India should set up a Cyber Command with offensive and defensive capabilities. This body should
also be responsible for setting domestic procedures to respond to such attacks, as well as
developing capacity in the various CIIIs [Critical Information Technology Infrastructure
Institutions] so that there is better system-wide knowledge of our capabilities and shortcomings.
266
267
268
We also need to increase the capacities of our training institutions to attract foreigners from
friendly countries especially in our strategic neighbourhood. Presently, for example we are unable
to meet the demand from foreign countries for vacancies in institutions like National Defence
College (NDC) and the Defence Services Staff College. Conversely, we need to meet the demand
especially from countries from our strategic neighbourhood and establish training teams in these
countries.
60
Citizenship Amendment Act that sparked fears of plans to strip unknown numbers of Indian
Muslims of their citizenship. In February 2020, the Modi government declined to send security
forces to stop rioting in New Delhi before dozens were killed (disproportionately Muslim) and
hundreds wounded.269
This domestic disorder, however, does not necessarily translate to a likelihood of disruption
to the relationship between India and the United States. Although the New Delhi riots took place
during a visit to the city by the U.S. president, this has not (as of mid-2020) affected relations
between the two nations. Regardless of whether the BJP, Congress, or a Third Front coalition
controls the central government after the 2024 elections, the general direction of India’s security
and foreign policy is likely to remain on its current trajectory: gradual easing (rather than sudden
abandonment) of the long-standing attachment to Non-Alignment/strategic autonomy, constant
tension (rising and ebbing, perhaps sometimes spilling over into large- or small-scale combat)
with Pakistan, and a cautious rivalry with China that policymakers in New Delhi will try hard to
prevent from turning into outright conflict.270 The difference between the various parties and
leaders will likely be one of pace and emphasis rather than overall orientation.
This is not necessarily the case, however, on the American side of the equation. The greatest
potential for disruption of the trajectory of U.S.-Indian relations lies in actions that might be
taken by a U.S. administration—whether directed at India or (more likely) at other nations and
affecting India indirectly.
Actions that the United States might take that could result in a significant disruption to the
U.S.-India relationship include the following:
• Levying tariffs on Indian products, as part of a hard-edged trade negotiation. In March
2019, the Trump administration announced that it would terminate India’s designation as
a “beneficiary developing country” under the Generalized System of Preferences.271 Such
a move might clear the way for a new array of tariffs, either to force concessions or to
remain in place in order to protect U.S. industries. Apart from any impact on the Indian
economy, such tariffs would be likely to provoke an anti-American reaction and make
security partnerships politically awkward for any government in New Delhi.
269
As of mid-2020, the names of only 26 victims (out of 42 killed) have been made public. Of these, 12 are Muslim
names, 12 are Hindu names, and two are names used by members of both communities. If the unknown victims
divide on the same ratio as those whose names are known, Muslims will comprise half of those killed, but only 14
percent of the population of India and 13 percent of the population of New Delhi. Even if all unknown victims are
Hindu, the percentage of Muslims killed (29 percent) would be double that of the Muslim population in New Delhi
or nationwide. (Tally by the author; names reported in “List of Those Killed in Delhi Communal Riots,” The Print,
February 27, 2020.) Population percentages are from India’s most recent census, in 2011: 80 percent Hindu and 14.2
percent Muslim nationwide, 82 percent and 13 percent in Delhi: Government of India, 2011 Census: Religion
Census 2011, 2011b; Government of India, 2011 Census: Delhi City Census Data, 2011a.
270
C. Raja Mohan, “Manifestos of BJP, Congress Indicate That When It Comes to Foreign Policy, Ambiguity Is
Better Than Clarity,” Carnegie India/Indian Express, April 9, 2019.
271
Office of the United States Trade Representative, “United States Will Terminate GSP Designation of India and
Turkey,” March 4, 2019.
61
• Imposing sanctions on India for dealing with Iran, Russia, or any other nation. India
maintains warm and friendly relations with both Iran and Russia and would feel highly
aggrieved if sanctions (as of mid-2020, not waived but not yet re-imposed272) were put
into effect. India relies on Iran for a significant portion of its oil and gas imports and has
made an $85 million capital investment in Iran’s Chabahar Port.273 Russia remains
India’s largest source of arms imports, and India relies on Russia for spare parts and
upgrades to most of its legacy Russian and Soviet weapon systems. Sanctioning India for
dealing with either of these countries would strike Indian policymakers as unfair.
• Taking actions toward Pakistan or Kashmir that India views as hostile. While the U.S.-
Pakistan relationship has been historically fraught, it is also historically volatile: Periods
of intense tension alternate with periods of deep cooperation.274 Given the U.S. strategic
reliance on Pakistan for any withdrawal from Afghanistan, whether a brokered deal with
the Taliban (as of mid-2020, in the process of being negotiated) or simply the use of
ground lines of communication and air lines of communication for any large-scale
movement of military equipment, it is not inconceivable that the United States might
make concessions to Pakistan in the next five years which run counter to perceived Indian
interests. Moreover, India would bitterly reject any U.S. attempt to interfere in the
Kashmir conflict, which could be a Pakistani request: When Pakistani Prime Minister
Imran Khan visited the White House on July 22, 2019, the U.S. president promised to
“mediate” a deal over Kashmir.275 Such foreign mediation is a long-standing Indian
redline.
• Demanding that India make an awkward choice in a military confrontation with China.
While India is keen to defend its own core interests from Chinese encroachment, it is not
at all eager to join a coalition against China for broader goals. It is possible that India
might be persuaded to participate in FONOPS or other relatively benign operations in the
South China Sea or elsewhere—but New Delhi would react very badly at the prospect of
a demand rather than an invitation. “You’re with us or you’re against us” rhetoric, even if
phrased more diplomatically, is likely to be counterproductive. If such an attitude were
the sustained policy of the United States rather than a once-off comment, the result could
be drastic.
• Launching an all-out trade war with China. There are mixed opinions in India about the
current (as of mid-2020) trade dispute between the United States and China. Many
commentators see it as bad for India’s economy, and therefore for its national security.
Some see it as an opportunity—a chance for India to step into the void created by a slow-
down of U.S.-China trade.276 If such a trade war resulted in a serious adverse impact on
272
Matthew Lee, “US Renews Iran Sanctions Waivers for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Work,” Associated Press, May
3, 2019.
273
Press Trust of India, “India Takes Over Operations of Part of Chabahar Port in Iran,” Economic Times, January 7,
2019. In February 2018 Iran’s president made the first head of state visit to India in ten years, and signed a dozen
agreements on topics ranging from tariffs to extradition and Chabahar Port. Government of India, Ministry of
External Affairs, 2018.
274
Blank et al., 2018, pp. 11–21.
275
Sanjeev Miglani, “Trump Touches Off Storm in India with Kashmir Mediation Offer,” Reuters, July 23, 2019.
276
C. Raja Mohan, “Raja Mandala: In His Second Term, Modi Must Deal with Turbulence Unleashed by Trump’s
Challenge to Global Trading Order,” Carnegie India/Indian Express, May 25, 2019.
62
India’s economy, however, and the United States was seen to be responsible, relations
with India would likely suffer considerably.
63
6. Options for the United States, U.S. Department of Defense,
and U.S. Air Force
Options for the United States

The U.S. government should consider the following options with respect to strengthening
defense and security cooperation with India in the Indo-Pacific region.
Accept India’s deeply seated desire for “strategic autonomy.” India is not going to
become an ally with the United States any time soon—not a formal treaty ally, and not a de facto
ally-without-a-treaty like Singapore or Sweden. Trying to force India into such a role will likely
produce a reaction exactly contrary to the one desired: a reassertion of India’s strategic
independence from any and all nations. It is vital to keep expectations of partnership within the
bounds of what is realistic for Indian policymakers.277
Instead of looking for rhetorical assertions of partnership, U.S. policymakers should focus on
unheralded actions. Instead of actions that India regards as overly confrontational toward China,
U.S. policymakers should seek actions within India’s comfort zone (or if beyond it, be willing to
accept a recalibration).
Consult with India before making decisions affecting its interests. The United States and
India will not agree on all policy issues—particularly those involving Pakistan, Iran, and
Afghanistan. But the U.S.-India relationship could benefit from greater transparency. Indian
planners regard their country as a global near-superpower and expect it to be treated as such. The
lack of a permanent Indian seat on the UN Security Council is a continual point of irritation with
the United States and the other four permanent members of the council. Any time that the United
States is perceived to be treating India as a second-tier nation will likely be remembered and
repaid in kind.
Many recent U.S. decisions in the Indo-Pacific region have had an effect on India, whether
directly or indirectly: the trade war with China; the threat of military confrontation with North
Korea, and the subsequent 180-degree turn to summit diplomacy; Countering America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions imposed on countries (including India)
purchasing arms from Russia; and second-degree sanctions imposed on countries (including
India) trading with Iran. In each of these cases, Indian authorities felt left out of the
decisionmaking process. Even if the United States ultimately decides on a course of action of
which India disapproves, treating New Delhi as a partner rather than a bystander would go a long
way.
277
For cautions from scholars and practitioners based in both nations on the need for realistic expectations of what is
achievable, see Lalwani and Byrne, 2019; Mistry, 2016; Harding, 2004; Abercrombie, 2019.
64
A related issue is the security-heavy U.S. approach to the Indo-Pacific. At the 2019 Shangri-
La Dialogue in Singapore, India (like most nations in the region) was hoping for the articulation
of a new vision of U.S. strategy that relied less on military power and more on economic
outreach to match China’s BRI program. “Please do not talk about competition with China!” said
one U.S. military official who attended the conference. “They want to hear what we’re doing to
prevent conflict—not how we aim to win it.”278 This attitude has softened, but by no means been
eliminated, since the June 2020 clash at Galwan.
Increase engagement on maritime domain awareness. MDA cuts across many branches of
government, both civilian and military. Only an all-of-government approach can address this
issue properly, bringing in not only the military (especially the Navy and Coast Guard), but also
civilian organizations, including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the
U.S. Agency for International Development. Creating conditions for seamless cooperation is
very difficult—both among U.S. government agencies and among foreign partners such as India.
But the position of the United States as a world leader provides an advantage in helping India
chart, govern, and police its territorial waters and airspace. “China can’t compete with us on
Maritime Domain Awareness,” says one American official.279 Moreover, improved MDA would
enable India to know exactly when Chinese vessels enter its territorial waters—or those of a
near-neighbor such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan (thereby avoiding embarrassments, such as PLAN
submarines surfacing near Colombo and Karachi without being detected by India). The drastic
drop in price of low-earth satellites (“tube-sats”) and other emerging technologies has made
MDA a more attractive proposition than in the past, and one on which India would welcome
engagement.
Seek opportunities to work with India to prevent Chinese political interference and
influence operations, including in the cyber arena. The challenge presented by Russian
interference to the political systems of the United States and other democracies is well
documented.280 In recent years, there is evidence of increased efforts by the People’s Republic to
apply similar techniques to the U.S. political system.281 In both the United States and India,
China has employed sophisticated cyber-infiltration as a tool for espionage—and may do so as a
future tool of cyberwarfare.
Expanding cooperation in this area could consist of enhanced information sharing, as well as
increased intelligence, cyber security, and law enforcement exchanges with other partners in the
region and globally. In addition, working more closely with government agencies with relevant
278
279
280
Manvi Singh and Joan E. Greve, “Mueller Warns of Russian Meddling in 2020: ‘They’re Doing It as We Sit
Here,’” The Guardian, July 25, 2019; Matt Apuzzo and Adam Satariano, “Russia and Far Right Spreading
Disinformation Ahead of EU Elections, Investigators Say,” The Independent, May 12, 2019.
281
Ellen Cranley, “Pompeo Suggests Woman Arrested at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago Resort May Have Been Spying for
China,” Business Insider, April 6, 2019.
65
intelligence, cybersecurity, and law enforcement responsibilities in India to help them counter
Chinese espionage and influence operations is an important area for greater cooperation given
the potential for Chinese cyber-interference in a democracy such as India.
Options for the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Air Force282
DoD and the USAF should consider the following options to deepen their relationship with
the Indian government.
Encourage India’s growing cooperation and engagement with U.S. allies such as
Australia and Japan, and emerging partners such as Indonesia and Singapore. While Indian
policymakers who are particularly sensitive about the need for strategic autonomy may have
qualms about increased engagement with the United States, some of these concerns may be
alleviated by facilitation of India’s engagement with U.S. allies and partners instead. The Quad
(the United States, Japan, Australia, and India) remains an underdeveloped and underutilized
grouping. India’s bilateral security relationship with Singapore is strong and can be an
increasingly useful avenue for encouraging India’s engagement with U.S. strategic architecture
and interoperability with U.S. equipment and procedures. India’s relationships with emerging
U.S. partners, such as Indonesia (but also perhaps including Malaysia, Vietnam, and other Indo-
Pacific nations), could be further encouraged and facilitated by the United States.
Engagements with U.S. partners should be seen as force multipliers for the United States,
rather than rivals for a limited pool of India’s available activities. The U.S. military should work
more closely with mutual partners of India to expand awareness of each other’s engagement
activities in the region and, where possible and appropriate, coordinate and deconflict their
regional outreach and cooperation initiatives. Doing so would help to ensure they will be able to
focus on key objectives and maximize the effectiveness of this growing web of activities. From a
USAF perspective in particular, the IAF has conducted exercises with Singapore, the United
282
NonAlignment 2.0, p. 39: When considering options for the USAF, it is useful to bear in mind the way in which
India itself sees its air power role. The description in NonAlignment 2.0 is worth quoting in its entirety:
Air power application in any war will first seek to neutralize the air assets of the adversary. It is
aimed to achieve as much freedom for one’s own aircraft to operate without interference, as also
to minimize the adversary’s ability to apply air power against one’s own assets. This process
cannot be confined to a limited geographical area and could encompass airfields, aircrafts and air
defence systems, among other targets. The geographical spread of the conflict is therefore difficult
to contain. Escalation can also be inadvertent due to political signals and military actions being
misinterpreted in the fog of war. Dual use assets complicate the danger of escalation as it is not
possible to distinguish a conventional armed aircraft or missile from a nuclear one. Consequently,
nuclear weapons constrict the traditional utility of military force and call for a redefinition of our
notions of ‘victory’. The challenge for the military establishment is to shape our hard power
capabilities in tandem with India’s political objectives, while remaining within the ambit of the
political and strategic logic imposed by nuclear weapons.
66
Kingdom, France, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Israel, Australia, and
Indonesia.283
Enhance U.S.-India cooperation in the areas of cyber and electronic warfare. The
growing challenges presented by China’s development of increasingly sophisticated cyber and
electronic warfare capabilities will make this an important area for enhanced cooperation
between the United States and key allies and partners.
Increase military education programs. Military education is an area where the United
States has an enormous advantage over China: Officers from many nations eagerly compete for
slots at U.S. institutions but view military education assignments in China as a hardship post
where they learn almost nothing of value.
Getting more Indian students in U.S. military education programs may be a short-term
challenge: According to U.S. officials, currently available billets are not always filled.284 DoD
and the USAF should explore creative ways of increasing educational exchanges. These might
include increased visits by American subject-matter experts to India, military exchanges held in
sites (such as Singapore) closer to India and therefore easier for Indian authorities to fund, and
distance-learning efforts through videoconferencing and other methods.
Place more emphasis on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). HA/DR
represents one of the most accessible and high-value areas of potential engagement with the
Indian military. From the USAF perspective, it would be challenging to integrate an HA/DR
element to fighter-focused exercises with the IAF, such as Red Flag and Cope India. It may,
however, be possible either to reconfigure an existing exercise as an HA/DR one, or to add an
HA/DR exercise to the existing set of activities.
Encourage India to increase its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, including
participating in multilateral air and maritime activities and conducting operations in the
South China Sea. The United States should encourage the IAF and the Indian Navy to consider
expanding operations in the region, as well as Indian participation in bilateral and multilateral
maritime exercises. U.S. planners should be aware that India is not eager to conduct U.S.-led
FONOPS, which they feel might expose them to multiple types of Chinese retaliation.
Share satellite and other information with India about China’s problematic behavior in
disputed Himalayan areas, including Ladakh, the Doklam Plateau, and elsewhere as
needed. During the Doklam Plateau standoff, there was little coordination or exchange of
information between U.S. and Indian military or civilian authorities; exchanges preceding the
Galwan clash remain publicly vague. To the degree that the United States refrained from
providing information that might have helped India avoid casualties and better prepare itself to
283
Past exercises with Singapore have included Sindex I, II, III, IV, and V; with the United Kingdom, Indradhanush
I, II, III, and IV; with France, Garuda I, II, III, IV, and V; with the United Arab Emirates, Desert Eagle I and II; with
Oman, Eastern Bridge I, II, III, and IV; with Thailand, Siam Bharat I and II; with Israel, Blue Flag; and with
Australia, Pitch Black.
284
67
repel military incursion by the PLA, this represents a missed opportunity: The complexities of
terrain and real-time data about respective PLA and Indian forces caused considerable confusion
to the public at large, which caused confusion about China’s actions and intentions. How much
of this confusion extended to the military and civilian authorities in India itself is a question that
cannot be answered in an unclassified format.
The U.S. military has satellite and other information-gathering capabilities far exceeding
those of India. In the next standoff with China, the U.S. military should make some of these
resources available to India, both for the situational awareness of the Indian military and civilian
authorities and potentially for public distribution as well.
68
Appendix A. Methodology for Project Framework
Table A.1. Color Coding of Framework Variables
Variable Coding
Diplomatic and political
Diplomatic and political • Blue: Partner has significantly closer diplomatic ties with the United States than
ties China and prioritizes its relationship with the United States.
• Light blue: Partner has slightly closer diplomatic ties with the United States
than China and places relatively more priority on ties with the United States.
• Gray: Partner has similar diplomatic ties with the United States and China and
attaches similar weight to relations with the United States and China.
• Light red: Partner has slightly closer diplomatic ties with China than the United
States and places relatively more priority on ties with China.
• Red: Partner has significantly closer diplomatic ties with China than the United
States and prioritizes its relationship with China.
Support for U.S. versus • Blue: Partner views the U.S. vision for the region as highly aligned with its own
Chinese vision for the interests and is concerned that China’s vision undermines its interests.
region • Light blue: Partner views the U.S. vision for the region as generally more
aligned with its own interests than China’s visions.
• Gray: Partner views both visions as similarly aligned with its interests, or the
partner views neither vision as aligned with its interests.
• Light red: Partner views the Chinese vision for the region as generally more
aligned with its own interests than the U.S. vision.
• Red: Partner views the Chinese vision for the region as highly aligned with its
own interests and is concerned that the U.S. vision undermines its interests.
Views of U.S. • Blue: Partner is very confident that the United States will remain committed to
commitment to the the region and will at least maintain its current level of attention to the region,
region and partner can rely on the United States.
• Light blue: Partner is cautiously optimistic that the United States will remain
committed to the region and will likely maintain its current level of attention to
the region; and partner can rely on the United States.
• Gray: Partner is uncertain whether the United States will remain committed to
the region, is uncertain that the United States will maintain its current level of
attention to the region, and is uncertain that it can rely on the United States.
• Light red: Partner is relatively pessimistic that the United States will remain
committed to the region, believes that the United States will have difficulty
maintaining attention toward the region, and does not believe that it can rely on
the United States.
• Red: Partner does not believe that the United States is committed to the region,
believes that the United States is likely to decrease its attention to the region,
and does not believe that it can rely on the United States.
Public opinion • Blue: Partner public opinion significantly favors the United States over China by
more than 20 percent.
• Light blue: Partner public opinion slightly favors the United States over China
by 3 percent to 20 percent.
• Gray: Partner public opinion has similar favorability views of the United States
and China.
• Light red: Partner public opinion slightly favors China over the United States by
3 percent to 20 percent.
• Red: Partner public opinion significantly favors China over the United States by
more than 20 percent.
69
Variable Coding
Economic
Economic dependence • Blue: Partner is significantly dependent on trade, investment, and (to a lesser
extent) tourism from the United States, compared with China (more than 20
percent).
• Light blue: Partner is moderately more dependent on trade, investment, and (to
a lesser extent) tourism from the United States, compared with China (3 percent
to 20 percent).
• Gray: Partner is similarly dependent on trade, investment, and (to a lesser
extent) tourism from the United States, compared with China.
• Light red: Partner is moderately more dependent on trade, investment, and (to
a lesser extent) tourism from China, compared to the United States (3 percent
to 20 percent).
• Red: Partner is significantly dependent on trade, investment, and (to a lesser
extent) tourism from China, compared with the United States (more than 20
percent).
Economic opportunity • Blue: Partner strongly believes that it will depend more on trade and investment
from the United States than China in the next 10–15 years.
• Light blue: Partner believes that it is likely to depend more on trade and
investment from the United States than China in the next 10–15 years.
• Gray: Partner believes that it is likely to depend as much on the United States
as on China for trade and investment in the next 10–15 years.
• Light red: Partner believes that it is likely to depend more on trade and
investment from China than the United States in the next 10–15 years.
• Red: Partner strongly believes that it will depend more on trade and investment
from China than the United States in the next 10–15 years.
Threat perceptions of • Blue: Partner has significant concerns regarding U.S. economic influence and
the United States views U.S. economic strength as threatening, subversive, or coercive.
versus China • Light blue: Partner has some, but limited, concerns regarding U.S. economic
(economic) influence and views U.S. economic strength as threatening, subversive, or
coercive.
• Gray: Partner does not view the United States and China as economic threats
or has equal concerns about negative U.S. and Chinese economic influence.
• Light red: Partner has some, but limited, concerns regarding Chinese
economic influence and views Chinese economic strength as threatening,
subversive, or coercive.
• Red: Partner has significant concerns regarding Chinese economic influence
and views Chinese economic strength as threatening, subversive, or coercive.
Willingness to work with • Blue: Partner seeks to work with the United States to counter or mitigate
the United States assessed Chinese economic threats and has taken significant measures to
versus China based on reduce economic dependency on China.
economic threat • Light blue: Partner seeks greater economic cooperation with the United States
perceptions and has taken some measures to limit or reduce Chinese economic influence in
key economic sectors.
• Gray: Partner seeks greater economic cooperation with the United States and
China and seeks economic diversification to avoid overdependence on either
country.
• Light red: Partner seeks greater economic cooperation with China and has
taken some measures to limit or reduce U.S. economic influence in key
economic sectors.
• Red: Partner seeks to work with China to counter or balance against assessed
U.S. economic threat and has taken significant measures to reduce economic
dependency on the United States.
70
Variable Coding
Military and security
Threat perceptions of • Blue: Partner views the United States as a significant military or security threat.
the United States • Light blue: Partner views the United States as a limited military or security
versus China (military) threat.
• Gray: Partner does not view the United States and China as military or security
threats or has equal concerns about both countries.
• Light red: Partner views China as a limited military or security threat.
• Red: Partner views China as a significant military or security threat.
Willingness to work with • Blue: Partner seeks increased cooperation with the United States to balance
the United States against assessed Chinese military or security threat and has taken actions to
versus China based on directly or indirectly balance against China’s military strength.
military threat • Light blue: Partner seeks increased cooperation with the United States to
perceptions strengthen its own military capabilities, has taken some measures to address
perceived Chinese military threat, and is cautious of directly balancing against
China.
• Gray: Partner seeks more military cooperation with the United States and China
or partner’s willingness to militarily cooperate with the United States or China is
not driven by U.S. or China military threat perceptions.
• Light red: Partner seeks increased cooperation with China to strengthen its
own military capabilities; has taken some measures to address perceived U.S.
military threat and is cautious of directly balancing against the United States.
• Red: Partner seeks increased cooperation with China to balance against
assessed U.S. military or security threat and has taken actions to directly or
indirectly balance against U.S. military strength.
Support for major U.S.- • Blue: Partner has participated or supported many key U.S.-led international and
led security efforts regional security efforts.
• Light blue: Partner has participated or supported some U.S.-led international
and regional security efforts.
• Gray: Partner has shown limited or no support to U.S.-led international and
regional security efforts.
• Light red: Partner has opposed some U.S.-led international and regional
security efforts.
• Red: Partner has opposed many U.S.-led international or regional security
efforts.
Military cooperation • Blue: Partner has significantly closer military ties with the United States than
China and engages in significantly more military activities and cooperation with
the United States.
• Light blue: Partner has slightly closer military ties with the United States than
China and engages in moderately more military activities and cooperation with
the United States.
• Gray: Partner has similar military ties with the United States and China and
attaches similar weight to defense and security cooperation with the United
States and China.
• Light red: Partner has slightly closer military ties with China than the United
States and engages in moderately more military activities and cooperation with
China.
• Red: Partner has significantly closer military ties with China than the United
States and engages in significantly more military activities and cooperation with
China.
U.S. versus Chinese • Blue: Partner believes that the United States currently has a significant military
military capability advantage over China in terms of military capabilities.
• Light blue: Partner believes that the United States currently has a modest
military advantage over China in terms of military capabilities.
• Gray: Partner believes that the United States and China have similar military
capabilities.
71
Variable Coding
• Light red: Partner believes that China currently has a modest military
advantage over the United States in terms of military capabilities.
• Red: Partner believes that China currently has a significant military advantage
over the United States in terms of military capabilities.
Perception of U.S. •
Blue: Partner is confident that the United States will provide military support or
willingness to aid aid if partner becomes involved in a potential military conflict with China.
country in conflict with • Light blue: Partner is cautiously optimistic that the United States will provide
China military support or aid if partner becomes involved in a potential military conflict
with China.
• Gray: Partner is uncertain whether the United States will provide military
support or aid if partner becomes involved in a potential military conflict with
China.
• Light red: Partner is pessimistic that the United States will provide military
China.
• Red: Partner does not believe that the United States will provide military
China.
NOTE: Variables measuring shared interests are roman, and variables measuring relative capability are italicized.
Variable: Diplomatic and Political Ties

• Coding method: Researchers coded based on interviews and analysis.
• Data sources in addition to interviews: U.S. Embassy, “Websites of U.S. Embassies,
Consulates, and Diplomatic Missions,” webpage, undated; U.S. Department of State,
undated-a, undated-b, undated-c; SIPRI, undated-d.
• Notes: The report does not use UN voting as an indicator of diplomatic interests. U.S.
interests go beyond issues voted on at the UN. Countries vote on a variety of issues in the
UN that are not of equal strategic importance to the United States. Among the subset of
UN votes that the U.S. Department of State categorizes as important for the United
States, a good proportion relates to Israel and Palestine, and the majority of the issues
relate to general development or foreign policy concerns that are not specific to security
issues in the Indo-Pacific. In 2017, for example, among the State Department–identified
important UN votes, there was only one vote—the situation of human rights in Burma—
out of 27 votes that was specific to the Indo-Pacific.285
Variable: Support for U.S. Versus Chinese Vision in the Region

• Coding method: Researchers coded based on interviews and data from various polling
sources.
• Data source in addition to interviews: Tang Siew Mun, Moe Thuzar, Hoang Thi Ha,
Termsak Chalermpalanupap, Pham Thi Phuong Thao, and Anuthida Saelaow Qian, The
State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report, Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute,
2019.
285
U.S. Department of State, Voting Practices in the United Nations 2017: Report to Congress, Washington, D.C.,
March 2018; and Sarah Rose, “Linking US Foreign Aid to UN Votes: What Are the Implications?” Center for
Global Development, May 4, 2018.
72
Variable: Views of U.S. Commitment to the Region
• Coding method: Researchers coded based on interviews and data from various polling
sources.
• Data sources in addition to interviews: Tang Siew Mun, Moe Thuzar, Hoang Thi Ha,
2019.
Variable: Public Opinion

• Coding method: Researchers coded based on interviews and polling data on whether the
country has favorable views of the United States or China. Calculated as U.S. favorability
(percentage) minus PRC favorability (percentage).
• Data sources in addition to interviews: Pew Research Center, “Global Indicators
Database: Opinion of the United States,” webpage, undated-b; Tang Siew Mun, Moe
Thuzar, Hoang Thi Ha, Termsak Chalermpalanupap, Pham Thi Phuong Thao, and
Anuthida Saelaow Qian, The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report, Singapore:
ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019; Yun-han Chu, Yu-tzung Chang, and Min-hua
Huang, “How East Asians View the Influence of United States vs. a Rising China,” Hu
Fu Center for East Asia Democratic Studies, National Taiwan University, 2016; Boo Su-
Lyn, “Malaysians More Positive About China Now, Studies Show,” Malay Mail, April 1,
2017; Johannes Herlijanto, Public Perceptions of China in Indonesia: The Indonesia
National Survey, Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, December 4, 2017a, No. 89,
December 4, 2017; Bruce Stokes, Dorothy Manevich, and Hanyu Chwe, “India and the
World,” Pew Research Center, November 15, 2017; Johannes Herlijanto, “Public
Perceptions of China in Indonesia: The Indonesia National Survey,” Belt and Road,
December 5, 2017b; Globe Scan, “Sharp Drop in World Views of US, UK: Global Poll,”
July 4, 2017.
Variable: Economic Dependence286

• Coding method: Researchers coded based on 65 percent trade (difference in the
country’s trade with U.S. versus China), 20 percent inward foreign direct investment
(FDI; difference in U.S. versus PRC FDI into the country), 10 percent outward FDI
(difference in country’s FDI in the U.S. versus the country’s FDI in China), and 5 percent
tourism (difference in U.S. tourism to the country versus Chinese tourism to the country).
Five percent is reflective of the economic importance of tourism to regional countries.287
• Data sources in addition to interviews: Researchers used the most recent year data
available (2017 or 2018) and partner reporting for trade. We used U.S. sources for U.S.
FDI and partner FDI in the United States and Chinese sources for Chinese FDI and
286
The study also examined trade imbalance, including dependency of particular import or export products. As
indicated in the main text, the study also explored placing more weight on partner exports compared to imports.
287
Yuwa Hedrick-Wong, “Asia’s Economic Ties Strengthen Amid Gathering GlobalStorm,” Forbes, September 30,
2018.
73
partner FDI in China. United Nations, “UN Comtrade Database,” webpage, undated;
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2018:
Investment and New Industrial Policies, Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations
Publications, 2018; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
“Direct Investment by Country and Industry,” webpage, undated-a; U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.:
Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Data,” webpage, undated-b;
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 2017 Statistical Bulletin of
China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, Beijing, October 2018.
Variable: Economic Opportunity

• Coding method: Researchers coded based on projected U.S. and Chinese economic
growth rates as well as researcher interviews.
• Data sources in addition to interviews: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, undated-a, undated-b; American Enterprise Institute, “China Global
Investment Tracker,” website, undated; International Monetary Fund, “World Economic
Outlook Reports,” multiple years; Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions
Index 2018,” website, 2018; Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China,
2018; PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Long View: How Will the Global Economic Order
Change by 2050? London, February 2017; Lowy Institute, Asia Power Index 2019,
Sydney, Australia, 2019; “The World’s Economic Powerhouses Are Going to Look Very
Different in Another Decade,” news.au.com, January 20, 2019; Martin, 2019; Janet
Henry, “The World in 2030,” HSBC, September 28, 2019.
Variable: Threat Perceptions of U.S. Versus China (Economic)

• Coding method: Researchers coded based on interviews, literature review, and polling
data.
2019; Natasha Kassam, “Lowy Institute Poll 2019,” Lowy Institute, June 26, 2019.
Variable: Willingness to Work with the United States Versus China Based
on Economic Threat Perceptions
• Coding method: Researchers coded based on interviews and literature review.
• Data sources: Tang Siew Mun, Moe Thuzar, Hoang Thi Ha, Termsak
Chalermpalanupap, Pham Thi Phuong Thao, and Anuthida Saelaow Qian, The State of
Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report, Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019;
Natasha Kassam, “Lowy Institute Poll 2019,” Lowy Institute, June 26, 2019.
74
Variable: Threat Perceptions of the United States Versus China (Military)
• Coding method: Researchers coded based on interviews, literature review, and polling
data.
Variable: Willingness to Work with the United States Versus China Based
on Military Threat Perceptions
• Coding method: Researchers coded based on interviews and literature review.
Variable: Support for Major U.S.-Led Security Efforts

• Coding method: Researchers coded an aggregate of data collected on how regional
countries support or participate in U.S.-led international or regional initiatives: if
countries supported major U.S. North Korea–related efforts, including efforts to disrupt
North Korean ship-to-ship transfers; participated in South China Sea (SCS) patrols,
operations, or major exercises with the U.S. in SCS international waters; engaged in
Taiwan Strait Transits; support U.S. FONOPS; participated in major U.S.-led military
operations (Operation Enduring Freedom, International Security Assistance Force,
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Inherent Resolve); and participated in the Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
• Data sources in addition to interviews: Various articles from the Council on Foreign
Relations, The Diplomat, Reuters, The Guardian, BBC, the Japan Times, Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, and foreign ministry websites.
Variable: Military Cooperation

• Coding method: Researchers coded an aggregate of six measures: if the United States or
China has a major military base or facility in the country; relative U.S. versus Chinese
arms sales to the country; whether the country has acquisition and cross-servicing
agreements with the United States versus a similar agreement with China; whether the
country has defense co-production and co-development agreements with the United
States compared to similar agreements with China; whether the country has an
information sharing agreement with the United States compared to a similar agreement
with China; and the quantity and quality of the country’s militarily training and exercises
with the United States compared with China.
75
• Data sources in addition to interviews: Various articles in the China Daily and
People’s Daily; relevant Chinese embassy websites; Kenneth W. Allen, Phillip C.
Saunders, and John Chen, Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and
Implications, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2017; Defense
Intelligence Agency, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win,
Washington, D.C., 2019; U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Military Training and DoD
Engagement Activities of Interest,” webpage, undated-a; Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, undated-d; U.S. Army Pacific,
homepage, undated; Pacific Air Forces, homepage, undated; Commander, U.S. Pacific
Fleet, homepage, undated; State Council of the People’s Republic of China, The
Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Beijing, 2013; State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy, Beijing, 2015; State Council of
the People’s Republic of China, China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation,
Beijing, 2017; State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Foreign Aid,
Beijing, 2014.
Variable: U.S. Versus Chinese Military Capability

• Coding method: Researchers coded based on comparisons of current U.S. versus PRC
military capability and regional interviews.
• Data sources in addition to interviews: Lowy Institute, Asia Power Index 2019,
Sydney, Australia, 2019; International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Six: Asia,”
in The Military Balance 2019, London, 2019, pp. 222–319.
Variable: Perception of U.S. Willingness to Aid Country in Conflict with

China
• Coding method: Researchers coded based on researcher interviews, literature review,
and polling data.
• Data sources in addition to interviews: Stafford Nichols and Zacc Ritter, “U.S. Defense
Promise Still Credible in Asia-Pacific,” Gallup, July 17, 2018; Tang Siew Mun, Moe
Thuzar, Hoang Thi Ha, Termsak Chalermpalanupap, Pham Thi Phuong Thao, and
Anuthida Saelaow Qian, The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report, Singapore:
ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019.
76
Appendix B. Overview of India’s Military
India’s military is nearly 3 million strong when active and reserve elements are both included
(each represents about 1.5 million troops). It is committed to missions and goals largely in
concert with U.S. interests, and thus represents a tantalizing potential partner for U.S.
engagement. Of all current U.S. security partners,288 only India has engaged in warfare against
China directly and without the assistance of the United States or other allies.289 India’s Air Force
and Army have been at the forefront of these confrontations: While the militaries of several
maritime nations of Southeast Asia are configured for potential naval combat as the first line of
defense, India’s standoffs with China have occurred primarily on and above land. India’s
military, therefore, offers a rare partner with experience, motivation, and a declared mission of
competing with China in the domains of air and land, as well as sea.
Table B.1 shows, according to publicly available figures (e.g., from Jane’s and the
International Institute for Strategic Studies), the numbers by service. Table B.2 summarizes
India’s defense capabilities.
Table B.1. Active and Reserve Service Numbers
Total
Army Air Force Navy Military
Active 1,237,000 140,597 67,2278 1,444,825
Reserve 1,500,000 0 0 1,500,000
Indian Air Force

The IAF flies a variety of aircraft (many of them near the end of their life-cycles), including a
combat fleet of MiG-21 “Bisons,” MiG-29 “Fulcrums,” SU-30MKIs, Jaguars, and the more
capable Mirage 2000Hs. The IAF’s transport aircraft include both U.S. and Russian assets:
C-130Js, C-17s, and a lot of Il-76MDs, An-32s, and Do-228s. For intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), India flies Israel’s A-50EI Phalcons and other craft. The IAF’s helicopters
include Mi-25s, Mi-35s, indigenous Druvs (all combat), and various configurations of Russian
Mi-17s for utility missions. Its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) include the Heron, Search, and
288
Vietnam engaged in land warfare against China in 1979, but the degree to which Vietnam can be considered a
present, rather than potential, “security partner” of the United States is a topic explored in other parts of this project.
289
South Korea engaged in warfare against China in 1950–1953, but only in conjunction with the United States and
other United Nations forces in 1950–1953. India, however, fought one full-scale, multifront, multidomain war
against China in 1962, followed by a second significant multifront, multidomain conflict in 1967 and smaller-scale
skirmishes throughout the decades since; in none of these conflicts has India been militarily assisted by other
nations.
77
Harop. The Indian military has announced plans to retire most of its MiGs and Su-30s by 2024,
but has not yet figured out what will replace them. After an eight-year public search for 126
Medium Multirole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) was officially ended in 2015, India signed a
controversial deal for 36 Rafale fighter jets; it is simultaneously attempting to co-develop a 5th
Generation fighter with Russia (based on the T-50 PAK-FA), and to create a number of
indigenous aircraft. Given India’s agonizing procurement process, all of these should be
considered notional until they are actually flying.
Indian Navy
The force-strength of the Indian Navy (IN) includes a 10,000-strong Coast Guard and a small
(2,000-strong) component of marine commandoes. It is one of only six nations (the United
States, China, Russia, Britain, and France are the others) to operate a “true” aircraft carrier of
more than 40,000 tons. India bought the 45,400-ton Kiev-class Admiral Gorshkov from Russia
and recommissioned it as the Vikramaditya in 2013. It is developing a second carrier, the
nominally indigenous 40,000-ton Vikrant. The IN’s submarine fleet includes nuclear-powered
Akula-class attack craft purchased from Russia, diesel Russian-adapted Sindhughosh (Kilo-
class), and the indigenous nuclear-powered Arihant-class ballistic missile submarine. It has
purchased six Scorpene attack submarines from France and commissioned the first of them in
2017. The IN also operates a wide variety of destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and other craft, many
of them indigenously built or adapted from Russian/Soviet craft. Air assets of the IN include
carrier-borne MiG-29K fighters, P-8I Poseidon reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, and Sea
King helicopters. The IN’s UAV assets include Israeli Searcher IIs and Heron 2s.
Indian Army
India’s Army is its dominant service, although not to the extent that it is in rival Pakistan or
some other regional states. In Pakistan, the Chief of Army Staff is the most powerful person in
the military and the most powerful individual in the country; other service chiefs are completely
subordinate to him. In India, this is not the case: The Army is first among equals, rather than an
unchallenged predominant branch.
The regular Army’s role is focused on external threats emanating from Pakistan and China,
but specialized units have an internal role in counterinsurgency. In the restive state of Jammu and
Kashmir (which India considers an integral part of the nation, and hence an internal defense
challenge), security operations are conducted by Army, police, and paramilitary forces in
tandem. The Army unit responsible for this mission is the Rashtriya Rifles, which was created in
1990 to deal with the unrest in Kashmir. It has 65 battalions and works alongside the Jammu and
Kashmir Police (operating under the direction of the civilian government of that state) and the
paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force (operating under the Ministry of Home Affairs—it
contains 239 battalions with an authorized troop strength of more than 300,000). The Rashtriya
78
Rifles serve in a part of the country which has seen combat with China decades before the unit
was created, and theoretically they could be called upon for service to repel a Chinese invasion
via Ladakh, but such a contingency is not currently part of their core mission.
In addition to the fully military Rashtriya Rifles, India has several paramilitary units involved
in internal security missions that are commanded by Army officers: The Assam Rifles
(approximately 60,000 strong, responsible for counterinsurgency operations in India’s seven
Northeastern states of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, and
Meghalaya) and the Special Frontier Force (10,000 strong, working at the direction of India’s
intelligence agencies). These units serve in parts of the nation at most risk of engaging in combat
with China.
In addition to these Army-led units and the Central Reserve Police Force, India’s
paramilitary units reporting to Home Ministry include the Border Security Force (approximately
250,000 troops), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (approximately 90,000—very active in sectors
most susceptible to Chinese incursion), the Central Industrial Security Force (approximately
75,000), and the Sashtra Seema Bal (also approximately 75,000—primarily tasked to perform
missions for India’s external intelligence agency, RAW [Research and Analysis Wing], which
has a mission comparable to that of the CIA). These paramilitary units deploy internally against
conventional insurgents and terrorist threats in Kashmir and/or the Northeast, and also (in some
cases) against the Maoist Naxalite insurgency active in parts of eight states (West Bengal,
Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra).
India’s ground forces include
• 18 regular infantry divisions (each containing an organic artillery brigade)
• 13 mountain divisions, largely for action along the LOC and LAC
• 8 independent infantry brigades
• 3 armored divisions (each containing organic artillery brigade)
• 4 RAPID divisions (Re-organized Army Plains Infantry Division). These are highly
mechanized divisions, tasked not with fighting on the LOC/LAC, but responding to
potential cross-border action against Pakistan on the flatter ground of Punjab, Haryana,
Rajasthan, and (theoretically, at least) Gujarat.
• 9 Special Forces battalions
• 4 division-equivalent COIN force
• 3 artillery divisions (mostly deployed along the LOC).
The main battle tanks used are the indigenously produced Arjun Mk I, old Russian T-72s,
and T-90s (aka “Bishma”). Most of these assets are reaching or past the end of their life cycles.
Artillery includes 105mm light field guns, 122mm D-30 towed howitzers, 130mm M-46 field
guns, 155mm FH 77 and self-propelled howitzers. Because of the Bofors scandal during the
prime ministership of Rajiv Gandhi (during which kickbacks were given in exchange for the
purchase of Swedish artillery pieces), India has refrained from significant artillery purchases
since 1986. As a result, much of India’s artillery assets are badly out of date.
79
India’s battlefield missile systems include the BrahMos cruise missile, the Shaurya tactical
surface-to-surface missile, and the Prithvi/Prahaar short-range ballistic missile.
India’s Air Defense is under the control of the Army, as the Corps of the Army Air Defence
(AAD). This includes a variety of surface-to-air missiles (S-300VM, indigenous “Akash”
systems, and 9K38 Igla/SA-18 MANPADS) and anti-aircraft artillery, such as 40mm L/70s and
ZSU-23s.
India’s Army operates UAVs including the Harpy (for combat) and Heron, Rustom, and
Nishant (for C4ISR).
The helicopters operated by the Indian Army include the AH-64E Apache and the
indigenously produced Dhruv (combat) and Cheetah/Cheetal (utility); most other rotary-wing
aircraft in the Indian military are operated by the Indian Air Force. The Indian military’s lack of
attack helicopters is a significant shortcoming.
Table B.2. India Defense Capabilities (2012 versus 2018)
2012 2018
Military size Army (1,129,000), Army (1,237,000),
Air Force (127,200), Air Force (127,200),
Navy (58,350) Navy (67,700)
Military spending as percentage of GDP 2.54% of GDP 2.49% of GDP (2017)
Submarines 15 16
Principal surface combatants 21 28
Patrol and coastal combatants 59 106
Combat-capable aircraft 904 (including 34 naval 899 (Including 75 naval aviation)
aviation)
Alliances and key partnerships United States, Japan, Singapore, Australia, China
Major priorities and threats Major territorial dispute and military rivalry with Pakistan
(including territorial disputes) (especially over the territory of Kashmir); unresolved territorial
disputes with China, which sometimes result in military
standoffs.
SOURCES: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, London, UK: Routledge, 2012 and
2018; SIPRI, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” webpage, undated-c.
Defense Budget/Spending, Trends

India spends a bit over 2 percent of its GDP (the global average) on national defense, and this
percentage is expected to drop slightly in the five years ending in 2023. Despite Prime Minister
Modi’s bellicose rhetoric, defense spending has been declining as a percentage of GDP since at
least 2016 (when it was 2.3 percent). Given India’s relatively healthy GDP growth, however, this
still translates to projected increases in real-dollar terms every year except 2019 (when it totaled
$44 billion). India now has the fifth-largest defense budget in the world, after the United States,
China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia.
80
Manpower is by far the military’s largest line item: The 2020 budget allocates about half of
its spending to personnel, with operations/maintenance and procurement each receiving slightly
less than one-quarter, and a relatively small slice going to research and development.
The Army receives the lion’s share of India’s defense spending (46 percent of the total), but
most of this is devoted to personnel costs; in 2017–2018, only 17 percent of the Army’s spending
went to capital expenditures (compared with 51 percent for the IN and 58 percent for the IAF).
Russia is by far India’s largest supplier of military hardware over the past decade, with more
than 70 percent of the overall budget ($23.4 billion, out of a total spending on military hardware
of $33.9 billion). Far behind Russia for the decade 2008–2018 are the United States ($3.1
billion), Israel ($2.7 billion), Britain ($1.4 billion), and France ($1.2 billion). Total arms
spending was $33.9 billion for this decade, with no significant purchases from China reported in
SIPRI.290
290
SIPRI, “Armstrade” website, undated-a.
81
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The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President to the Joint Session
of the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, India,” November 8, 2010. As of September 13,
2019:
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/remarks-president-joint-
session-indian-parliament-new-delhi-india
World Bank, “India Imports, Tariff by Country and Region 2017,” World Integrated Trade
Solution webpage, undated. As of September 18, 2019:
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/IND/Year/2017/TradeFlow/Import
“The World’s Economic Powerhouses Are Going to Look Very Different in Another Decade,”
News.com.au, January 20, 2019.
Xin, Zhou, “Donald Trump Says He and China’s Xi Jinping ‘Love Each Other,’ Phase Two
Trade Talks to Start ‘Very Shortly,’” South China Morning Post, January 21, 2020. As of
November 20, 2020:
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3047071/donald-trump-says-he-and-
chinas-xi-jinping-love-each-other
97
PROJEC T A I R FORC E
I
n long-term strategic competition with China, how effectively the United States works with allies and
partners will be critical to determining U.S. success. This report examines the potential benefits of, and
potential impediments to, partnering more closely with India. India is already a peer or near-peer competitor
of China across a range of military capabilities, and India’s self-defined core national security interests are in
relatively close harmony with those of the United States. However, U.S. planners must be keenly aware of the
constraints on both India’s willingness and capacity to forge a partnership based on strategic competition with
China. These include persistent aversion to any partnership that might be characterized as “alignment,” even
after a major 2020 border clash with China; significant distrust of U.S. commitment and intentions; a highly
risk-averse structure for the making and implementing of security policy, particularly vis-à-vis China; economic
linkages with China; underfunding of basic military needs; and a lack of military capability and interoperability
sufficient for frictionless interaction with U.S. forces. India will likely remain a key U.S. partner, but such
challenges should moderate expectations about the pace for increased engagement.
$30.00
ISBN-10 1-9774-0650-5
ISBN-13 978-1-9774-0650-7
53000
www.rand.org 9 781977 406507
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Regional

For more information on this series, visit www.rand.org/US-PRC-influence

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.

Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

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RAND Project AIR FORCE

Table 1.1. Variables for Assessing Relative U.S.-China Influence ................................................ 5

AAD Army Air Defence (India)

Applying the Project Framework to India

Source of Influence Type Description

Figure 1.1. Relative U.S. and Chinese Influence in India (2018)

Diplomatic and Political

Diplomatic and Political Ties

Support for U.S. vs. Chinese Vision

Views of U.S. Commitment to the Region

Threat Perceptions of U.S. vs. China

Willingness to Work with U.S. vs.

Military and Security

Threat Perceptions of U.S. vs. China

Willingness to Work with U.S. vs.

Support for Major U.S.-led Security Efforts

U.S. vs. PRC Military Capability

Perception of U.S. Willingness to

Significantly more Similar U.S. and Significantly more

Organization of This Report

India’s Geostrategic Importance

Size, Geography, Democracy

In addition to demographics and geography, India offers a shared commitment to democratic

Shared Interest in Maintaining a Rules-Based International Order

India’s Security Policymaking

India’s Desire for “Strategic Autonomy” in Diplomatic and Political Relations

China as Key Trade Partner for India

The Quad: India, Japan, Australia, and the United States

Partners in South Asia/Indian Ocean Region

China as a Direct Long-Term Security Challenge

Pakistan as India’s Most Immediate Near-Term Security Threat

China as Indirect Security Challenge via Pakistan

India Sees the United States as a Partner and China as a Rival—but

India’s Distrust of the United States as Potentially Unreliable Partner

India’s Inability to Compete with China Leads to Risk Aversion

Best Avenues for Partnership Include Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

Maritime Domain Awareness

Outlook for Overall U.S.-India Relations

Options for the United States

Table A.1. Color Coding of Framework Variables

Variable: Diplomatic and Political Ties

Variable: Support for U.S. Versus Chinese Vision in the Region

Variable: Public Opinion

Variable: Economic Dependence286

Variable: Economic Opportunity

Variable: Threat Perceptions of U.S. Versus China (Economic)

Variable: Support for Major U.S.-Led Security Efforts

Variable: Military Cooperation

Variable: U.S. Versus Chinese Military Capability

Variable: Perception of U.S. Willingness to Aid Country in Conflict with

Table B.1. Active and Reserve Service Numbers

Indian Air Force