Name: Jocelle Rodriguez G. Sec: Sbent-3S

Name: Jocelle Rodriguez G.
Sec: Sbent-3S
I. Title
ALVIN PATRIMONIO, Petitioner,vs. NAPOLEON GUTIERREZ and OCTAVIO
MARASIGAN III, Respondents.
II. Antecedent Facts Of The Case

The facts of the case, as shown by the records, are briefly summarized below.
The petitioner and the respondent Napoleon Gutierrez (Gutierrez) entered into a
business venture under the name of Slam Dunk Corporation (Slum Dunk), a
production outfit that produced mini-concerts and shows related to basketball.
Petitioner was already then a decorated professional basketball player while Gutierrez
was a well-known sports columnist.
In the course of their business, the petitioner pre-signed several checks to answer for
the expenses of Slam Dunk. Although signed, these checks had no payee’s name, date
or amount. The blank checks were entrusted to Gutierrez with the specific instruction
not to fill them out without previous notification to and approval by the petitioner.
According to petitioner, the arrangement was made so that he could verify the validity
of the payment and make the proper arrangements to fund the account.
In the middle of 1993, without the petitioner’s knowledge and consent, Gutierrez went
to Marasigan (the petitioner’s former teammate), to secure a loan in the amount of
₱200,000.00 on the excuse that the petitioner needed the money for the construction
of his house. In addition to the payment of the principal, Gutierrez assured Marasigan
that he would be paid an interest of 5% per month from March to May 1994.
After much contemplation and taking into account his relationship with the petitioner
and Gutierrez, Marasigan acceded to Gutierrez’ request and gave him ₱200,000.00
sometime in February 1994. Gutierrez simultaneously delivered to Marasigan one of
the blank checks the petitioner pre-signed with Pilipinas Bank, Greenhills Branch,
Check No. 21001764 with the blank portions filled out with the words "Cash" "Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos Only", and the amount of "₱200,000.00". The upper right
portion of the check corresponding to the date was also filled out with the words
"May 23, 1994" but the petitioner contended that the same was not written by
Gutierrez.
On May 24, 1994, Marasigan deposited the check but it was dishonored for the reason
"ACCOUNT CLOSED." It was later revealed that petitioner’s account with the bank
had been closed since May 28, 1993.
Marasigan sought recovery from Gutierrez, to no avail. He thereafter sent several

demand letters to the petitioner asking for the payment of ₱200,000.00, but his
demands likewise went unheeded. Consequently, he filed a criminal case for violation
of B.P. 22 against the petitioner, docketed as Criminal Case No. 42816.
On September 10, 1997, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Loan and Recovery of Damages against
Gutierrez and co-respondent Marasigan. He completely denied authorizing the loan or
the check’s negotiation, and asserted that he was not privy to the parties’ loan
agreement. Only Marasigan filed his answer to the complaint. In the RTC’s order
dated December 22, 1997,Gutierrez was declared in default.
III. Issues & Results By Trial Court

Reduced to its basics, the case presents to us the following issues:
1. Whether the contract of loan in the amount of ₱200,000.00 granted by respondent
Marasigan to petitioner, through respondent Gutierrez, may be nullified for being
void;
2. Whether there is basis to hold the petitioner liable for the payment of the
₱200,000.00 loan;
3. Whether respondent Gutierrez has completely filled out the subject check strictly
under the authority given by the petitioner; and
4. Whether Marasigan is a holder in due course.
The petition is impressed with merit.

We note at the outset that the issues raised in this petition are essentially factual in
nature. The main point of inquiry of whether the contract of loan may be nullified,
hinges on the very existence of the contract of loan – a question that, as presented, is
essentially, one of fact. Whether the petitioner authorized the borrowing; whether
Gutierrez completely filled out the subject check strictly under the petitioner’s
authority; and whether Marasigan is a holder in due course are also questions of fact,
that, as a general rule, are beyond the scope of a Rule 45 petition.
The rule that questions of fact are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari, as
a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law, is not an
absolute rule that admits of no exceptions. One notable exception is when the findings
off act of both the trial court and the CA are conflicting, making their review
necessary.5 In the present case, the tribunals below arrived at two conflicting factual
findings, albeit with the same conclusion, i.e., dismissal of the complaint for nullity of
the loan. Accordingly, we will examine the parties’ evidence presented.
IV. Pieces Of Evidence Adduced

The petitioner argues that: (1) there was no loan between him and Marasigan since he
never authorized the borrowing of money nor the check’s negotiation to the latter; (2)
under Article 1878 of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is necessary for an
individual to make a loan or borrow money in behalf of another; (3) the loan
transaction was between Gutierrez and Marasigan, with his check being used only as a
security; (4) the check had not been completely and strictly filled out in accordance
with his authority since the condition that the subject check can only be used provided
there is prior approval from him, was not complied with; (5) even if the check was
strictly filled up as instructed by the petitioner, Marasigan is still not entitled to claim
the check’s value as he was not a holder in due course; and (6) by reason of the bad
faith in the dealings between the respondents, he is entitled to claim for damages.
V. Provision Of The Law Applied By Trial Court And Appeals

This provision applies to an incomplete but delivered instrument. Under this rule, if
the maker or drawer delivers a pre-signed blank paper to another person for the
purpose of converting it into a negotiable instrument, that person is deemed to have
prima facie authority to fill it up. It merely requires that the instrument be in the
possession of a person other than the drawer or maker and from such possession,
together with the fact that the instrument is wanting in a material particular, the law
presumes agency to fill up the blanks.16
VI. Dis Positive Portion Of Supreme Court Decision

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING
the petitioner Alvin Patrimonio's petition for review on certiorari. The appealed
Decision dated September 24, 2008 and the Resolution dated April 30, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals are consequently ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Costs against the
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jun2014/gr_187769_2014.html
Rebadulla, Charl’s Micheal I.
SBENT-3S
I. Title
Enrique P. Montinola vs. The Philippine National Bank, et al.

G.R. No. L-2861, 26 February 1951 Respondents
II. Antecedent Facts Of The Case

Ubaldo Laya, as Misamis Oriental's regional treasurer, granted Mariano Ramos a
P100,000.00 Philippine National Bank (PNB) check in May 1942. Ramos, as the US
forces' disbursing officer at the time, was to use the check for military purposes. For
the intent of Ramos was taken prisoner of war by the occupying Japanese forces
before he could cash the check. When he was finally released in December 1944, he
needed money, so he went to a man named Enrique Montinola and made plans.
Ramos wrote on the back of the check:

"Pay to the order of Enrique P. Montinola just P30,000." The balance is to be
deposited in M. V. Ramos' account at the Philippine National Bank.
Montinola agreed to pay 85,000 in Japanese banknotes in exchange. He was only able
to pay Ramos 45k in Japanese banknotes.
Then, Montinola attempted to get the check cashed, but PNB refused.
It appears that an insertion was made. The words "Agent, Philippine National Bank"
were put under Laya's signature, making it seem that Laya disbursed the funds. Check
as a PNB agent, not as Misamis Oriental's provincial treasurer.
The lawsuit against the PNB, the Provincial Treasurer of Misamis Oriental, was
rejected by the Manila Court of First Instance. As a result, Montinola has filed a direct
appeal with the Supreme Court.
III. ssues & Results By Trial Court
Is Montinola entitled to the importance that an altered instrument represents?
IV. Pieces Of Evidence Adduced
No. Inserting the terms "Agent, Phil. National Bank," which alters the bank's
responsibility by converting it from a mere drawer to a drawer, constitutes a material
modification of the instrument without the agreement of the parties liable thereon.
The instrument is discharged under Section 124 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
The check had not been legally settled under the Negotiable Instruments Act.
V. Provision Of The Law Applied By Trial Court And Appeals
The same law states in section 32 that "The endorsement must be a complete
instrument endorsement. An endorsement that purports to pass only a portion of the
balance payable to the endorse is not considered a negotiation of the instrument." As a
result, Montinola cannot be considered an endorse. At most, he can be considered as a
mere assignee of Ramos' P30,000, in which case, as such assignee, he is entitled to all
protections applicable to the drawer Provincial Treasurer of Misamis Oriental and
against Ramos. Montinola cannot even be called a holder in due course because
section 52 of said statute describes a holder in due course as a holder who has taken
the instrument under certain circumstances, one of which is that he became the holder
before the instrument was overdue. When it comes to the check was long overdue for
Montinola. Montinola is also not a holder since section 191 of the same law
distinguishes a holder as the payee or endorse of a bill or note, which Montinola is
not.
VI. Dis Positive Portion Of Supreme Court Decision
He is therefore not an endorse and, as previously said, he may only be called an

assignee. He himself could not be said to have accepted it in good conscience.
SO ORDERED.
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1951/feb1951/gr_l-2861_1951.html

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II. Antecedent Facts Of The Case

Marasigan sought recovery from Gutierrez, to no avail. He thereafter sent several

III. Issues & Results By Trial Court

The petition is impressed with merit.

IV. Pieces Of Evidence Adduced

V. Provision Of The Law Applied By Trial Court And Appeals

VI. Dis Positive Portion Of Supreme Court Decision

Enrique P. Montinola vs. The Philippine National Bank, et al.

II. Antecedent Facts Of The Case

Ramos wrote on the back of the check:

III. ssues & Results By Trial Court

Is Montinola entitled to the importance that an altered instrument represents?

IV. Pieces Of Evidence Adduced

V. Provision Of The Law Applied By Trial Court And Appeals

VI. Dis Positive Portion Of Supreme Court Decision

He is therefore not an endorse and, as previously said, he may only be called an

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