Vietnam: The Effect of Grassroots

Democratic Regulations on Commune

Government Performance and Its Practical
Implications
----------------------------------------------------------
---------
Ngo Huy Duc and Ho Ngoc Minh
The Institute of Political Science, HCMNPA

I - Introduction: Grassroots Democracy in

Vietnam

Socio- political Context

For the last 20 yeas, Vietnam has experienced rapid
changes in both economic and social respects. This process
often was described as a transition from a centrally planned
economy to a market- oriented economy. The main interest
for the last 10 years, however, is focused not on the question
whether Vietnam would have a market economy, but rather
on the question what kind of market economy it would
develop: a bureaucratic market economy which would
increase a gap between the rich and the poor people, or a
more efficient one, which would distribute more evenly the
benefits among social classes. This question, apparently, will
be decided by the interaction between economic and political
forces in the country. An important aspect of this interaction
concerns the rural areas as it accounts for about 80% of
Vietnam population.
Indeed, during the late 1990s, due to weaknesses of local
governments, there were a numbers of social and political
1
unrests in several provinces (Thai Binh, Ha Tay, Thanh Hoa,
etc.), which would indicate the need to reconsider the role of
the government in a new environment – a market economy.
The reasons for the weak governance were attributed to the
unresponsiveness of local governments to the needs of
people as the government officials bears no direct pressure
from people. The essential problem here is how to control the
abuse of power and to enhance the responsiveness and
efficiency of local governance.
Thus, the Grassroots Democratic Regulation (GDR) – a
name used for Decree 29/CP - was implemented to address
these problems at the grassroots level, especially, in rural
areas (The GOV, 2003 and 2005).
The main purposes of the GDR is to specify and enforce
the rights of people in the relations to local grassroots
governments, i.e. at the commune level1. These supposedly
will increase people political participation and control the
power abuse by local officials, which in turn will lead to a
more efficient development policy and a higher social
cohesion. Thus, in a context of a one-party political system,
the GDR is essentially a legal document, by which the central
government make local governments must follow some
procedures in their everyday functioning. In other words the
GDR effectively limit the power of local officials to the extent
that some their decisions must follow people votes (direct
democracy), some decisions must be transparent or open to
the public scrutiny, and others must be discussed with people
1
Vietnam has 4 level of government: Central, Provincial, district and commune.
A commune normally has several villages, which do not have their own governments,
but have a kind of self-government with the village head, freely elected by village
people.
2
before final decisions are adopted .
Thus, according to the level of power limitation, we can
categorize this power-sharing into 4 groups of people
rights/government decisions as follows:
Group 1 – the right to be informed: includes those
decisions that the commune government must inform
people. (e.ge.g. Resolution of the People’s Council and
People’s Committee, policies and legal instruments of the
State, administrative fees, taxes or government charges,
annual financial records of the commune, )
Group 2 – the right to be consulted: includes those
decisions that the commune government must consult with
people before adopting it. (e.g. : plan for development, plan
for land use rights and divisions; commune social and
economic policies such as poverty-reduction or
unemployment reduction)
Group 3 – the right to inspect and supervise: includes
those implementations or decisions that the commune
government must allow people to inspect and supervise.
(e.g. : implementation of the resolution of the People’s
Council; activities of the President of the People’s Council and
People’s Committee; financial statements of communes;
administration of land use rights)
Groups 4 – the right to decide directly : includes those
decisions that the commune government must comply with
the decision of people, i.e. people will discuss and decide
directly by voting secretly or otherwise (e.g. the amount of
financial contribution to the building of commune’s road,
school, electricity network ..; members of the supervising
boards for these buildings)
3
 Clearly, the level of power limitation was increasing by
going from group 1 to group 4. That is, the group 4 includes
areas where the local government power was limited most.
Besides, at the village level, the GDR also stipulate that a
village head should be democratically (freely and
competitively) elected. The head of village, thus, is not a
government official but a representative of the village people.

Research Issues
The correlation between democracy and economic
performance was studied for a long time, especially during
the 1980s and 1990s when many Asian countries experience
rapid economic development. The conclusion was, however,
not clear-cut.
For Vietnam, many researches took its for granted that a
more democratic environment at the commune level will
positively affect the local development. However, by 2003,
after 5 years of implementation of GDR, , there was a general
realization at national level that the implementation of Decree
29 was slow and ineffective. (CPV, 2003). During the survey,
there were opinions such as the GDR were not implemented
properly, and in many cases, just formally as it does not
closely relate to the everyday needs of people.
Thus, in this research, we focus on 2 questions:
1. Over the past seven years, has the implementation of
GDR left any significant impact ( empirically measurable) on
the performance of commune government , especially in the
sense of addressing and solving problems of development?
2. Does the level of this impact vary significantly among
different commune governments? And if it does, why?

4
 Up to now, many researches took its for granted without
rigorous investigation, especially in term of quantification
these effects of GDR. Hence, the answers to these questions
can help to shed lights on future directions for
democratization process in Vietnam, especially at the lower
level of local government. The focus is placed on quantitative
analysis, complemented by a number of in-depth interviews.
In other words, while we do not question much the political
and social impact of GDR, its magnitude and specific
expression in every day life as well as its impact on people
perception and behaviour are of little concern in Vietnam.
Apparently, there is no simple way to separate the impact of
GDR from the impact of other factors (with out GDR) such as
economic growth or the growth of social information network
associated with, e.g., internet use in Vietnam. It would require
much more data to rigorously test the causal relationship
between GDR implementation and those indices as measured
in this paper. Nevertheless, the pattern of impact and the
attempt to measure it will give some idea about the way to
further democratization process in Vietnam, and may suggest
some useful direction for government policy.2
The research conduct survey of a representative sample
of communes to obtain data for quantitative analysis to test
whether institutional changes has significant impact on
performance of local government, as measured by a number
of most crucial indicators for development of people political
involvement and perception at the commune level.

2
In 2007, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly finally approved the
Grassroots Democracy Decree, which improved the legality status of GDR., while
essentially keeping the same content of GDR.
5
II - Survey description and issues
In order to collect the necessary data, we have conducted
15 waves of field study in 30 communes throughout the
country. These communes are chosen from three regions
( North, Central, South), which are different in many aspects :
economic development levels, cultural, and historical
traditions. The geographical distribution is summarized in
Table 1 below.
Table 1 – The list of surveyed communes
Commune District-Province Region
1 Giai pham Yen My- Hung Yen North
2 Tran cao Phu Cu- Hung Yen North
3 An vy Khoai chau- Hung yen North
4 Dang le An thi- Hung yen North
5 Lam ha Phu ly- Hanam North
6 Trung luong Binh luc- Hanam North
.
7 Tien ngoai Duy tien- Hanam North
.
8 Thach Khoi Gia loc- Hai duong North
.
9 Hung thang Binh giang- Hai North
duong
1 Cao son Cam giang- Hai North
0 duong
1 An tuong Yen son-Tuyen quang North
1
1 Tho binh Chiem hoa- Tuyen North
2 quang
1 Don nhan Lap thach-Vinh phuc North
3
1 Cam chau Hoi an- Quang nam Central
4
1 Dien duong Dien ban- Quang Central

6
5 nam
1 Hoa phong Hoa vang-Quang nam Central
6
1 Hoa tien Hoa vang- Danang Central
7
1 Hoa xuan Hoa vang-Danang Central
8
1 Phuoc duc Phuoc son- Quang Central
9 nam
2 Dong tam Dong phu- Binh South
0 phuoc
2 Loc thai Loc ninh-Binh Phuoc South
1
2 Dong tam Dong phu- Binh South
2 phuoc
2 An phu Thuan an- Binh duong South
3
2 An vinh Tan an- Long an South
4 ngai
2 An ngai Long dien- Vung tau South
5
2 An linh Tuy an- Phu yen South
6
2 Khanh binh Thu dau mot-Binh South
7 duong
2 Tien thanh Dong xoai- Binh South
8 phuoc
2 Tan chanh Can duoc- Long An South
9
3 Duc binh Song hinh-Phu yen South
0 tay

Note that there are 13 communes from the North, which

lived in a different political environment compared with 6
communes from the Central and 11 communes from the
7
South until 1975. This may suggest different impact and
implications for different regions.
From 6, 000 questionnaires delivered, we were able to
collect 4,357 .
We also have in-depth interviews with 75 commune
leaders to understand the political context as well as the
reliability of the data. This is more significant as the process
of so called “widening democracy” , under the CPV guidance
is relatively new. Open political criticism is not encouraged,
as it is regarded as harmful to the national solidarity.
The time span is from 1999 1998 to 2005 (as we
conducted the survey in 2006 and the main purpose is to
compare the period before 1998 with period after 1998).
Data before 2006 were either extracted from the official
records kept at commune government or from the survey
where applicable. Clearly, the accuracy of these data needs
to be improved much in the future with a more rigorous and
systematical research3 . Within the framework of this
reasearch and in present conditions, we could not find better
way to obtain better data.

III - Measuring the Impact of GDR

In measuring the impact of GDR on commune
governance, we developed two groups of indicators :
objective and subjective. The main idea is to obtain a
balance in judgement of the GDR impact. While the objective
group will look at the facts (which are assumed to express
most clearly the impact of GDR), the second group will try to
3
A methodology similar to the Living Standard Survey of the World Bank in
Vietnam can be used, where a set of indicators were measure periodically (5 years)
and under a more rigorous surveillance .
8
get some insight into people perception (which may be
contrary to empirical evidence). This is something similar to
the relation between economic growth and happiness : the
democratization should be measured not only in terms what
people can do, but also in terms of what people are thingking
and perceiving of.
The group of objective indicators try to lookmeasure the
factual impact at the facts, which may indirectly reflect the
changes took place under the GDR implementation. The idea
is that these objective indicators will measure some most
important aspects of people involvements in local decision-
making process.
In order to capture the real effects, we have to identify
the most important elements of power – sharing at the
grassroots level in Vietnam. Theoretically, these elements
reside in the rights to choose the leaders, to control armed
forces and police, to spend the budget, and to supervise
everyday important activities of government.
Thus, the first indicator – nonparty members in local
government – may seem unusual but, in the political
conditions of Vietnam , is very indicative of the people
involvement due to the characteristics of the one-party
system as it is supposed to be the most important reason for
unresponsiveness of commune governments, since the
officials are accountable not directly to the people, but to the
party. This indicator, however, is far from perfect. The reason
is that the underlying assumption here is that the party
members in local government are “bad” (or inefficient)
members, so the replacement by non-party members will
reflect the positive change in government response to people
9
needs. This needs not to be true in general, but as pointed
out by CPV, there is not a “small number” of party members,
who abused power for the personal gains. (CPV, 2001, and
2006)
The second indicator touch another sensitive activity of
the local government – the budget spending. Obviously,
waste and corruptions were the main reasons for social unrest
during 1990s, therefore, if the GDR has any impact, it must be
reflected in the transparency of financial matters, the
regularity of budget auditing and inspecting.
The third and the fourth indicators may seem less
important but if taking into account the main (and time
consuming) activities of communes and villages, the dispute
solving and the numbers of projects subject to people
supervisions are good measures as they all closely related to
main concerns of people in everyday life.
The subjective indicators try to capture the impact of GDR
on the perception and behavior of people. So in this sense,
they are perception indices. The assumptions behind these
measures are if the GDR had real impact, i.e. people has real
power in decision making, then the decisions and their
implementation should have higher level of consensus. Also,
through the practice of collective decision-making, they
should learn to be tolerated towards others opinions and
values.
A more detailed explanation for each index will be
considered in each section below.

10
 A. Objective indicators

Indicator 1 - Non-Party members in Local Governments

The local political system at the commune level consist of

People Council, which elect from its members People
Executive Committee to carry out the Council’s directions
and resolutions. Under the GDR, there were also village
heads, who were competitively elected by people.
The GDR, as analyzed before, is essentially a limitation to
the power of local government, which traditionally was
dominated by members of CPV. If the ultimate goal of GDR
implementation is to bring ordinary people peasants into
public affairs , allowing them to play a more active role in
addressing and solving problems most related to their daily
life, then , the number of non- party member peasants
officially elected into People Council and Village Board of
Heads is a meaningful indicator.
This number varies significantly from commune to
commune and from time to time within one commune.
Our hypothesis here is that the number of non-party
members have been increasing over the last 7 years since
GDR was put into practice in 1998. We divided the process of
GDR implementation into four periods :before 1998, 1998-
2000, 2001-2004, and 2005, showing how the number of non-
party members has changed. Our metric here is the average
number of non-party members ( in Commune People Council
and Village Board of Heads) of 30 communes ( under this
study) during that four periods-which is shown in the table 2
and Figure 1 below.

11
 Table 2 – The number of non-party member in local CPC
and VBH (Unit: Number of people)
1
Befor 998
Commun 2001- 20
District- Province e -
e 2004 05
1998 200
0
Giai
Yen My_ Hung Yen 6 9 11 15
Pham
Tran Cao Phu Cu_ Hung Yen 6 10 10 15
Khoai Chau- Hung
An Vy 3 5 7 10
Yen
Lam Ha Phu ly- Ha Nam 4 9 11 11
Trung
Binh Luc- Ha Nam 3 6 8 12
Luong
Tien
Duy Tien- Ha Nam 4 5 8 11
Ngoai
Dang le An Thi- Hung Yen 4 8 10 14
Thach
Gia Loc_ Hai Duong 4 10 12 13
Khoi
Hung Binh Giang- Hai
5 4 7 11
Thang Duong
Cam Giang- Hai
Cao Son 3 4 8 8
Duong
Chiem Hoa- Tuyen
Tho Binh 3 8 10 12
Quang
Yen Son- Tuyen
An Tuong 3 5 9 11
Quang
Lap Thach- Vinh
Don Nhan 2 2 4 4
Phuc
Hoa Vang- Quang
Hoa Qui 2 6 8 13
Nam
Hoa Xuan Hoa Vang- Da Nang 4 3 6 8
Hoa Vang - Da
Hoa Tien 5 9 10 14
Nang
Dien Dien Ban_ Quang
6 8 12 12
Duong Nam
Cam
Hoi an -Quang Nam 4 10 12 12
Chau
Hoa Hoa Vang - Quang
6 8 10 14
Phong nam
Phuoc Phuoc Son- Quang
2 3 2 4
Duc Nam

12
 Dong Phu- Binh
Dong tam 4 7 10 15
Phuoc
Tien Dong Xoai- Binh
2 2 3 5
Thanh Phuoc
Loc Ninh - Binh
Loc Thai 3 8 10 13
Phuoc
Tan
Can Duoc - Long An 3 2 5 5
Chanh
An Vinh
Tan An- Long An 4 7 9 15
Ngai
Long Bien- Vung
An Ngai 3 7 9 11
Tau
An Linh Tuy An- Phu Yen 4 6 6 10
Thuan An - Binh
An Phu 5 9 11 14
Duong
Khanh Thu Dau mot- Binh
3 4 4 3
Binh Duong
Duc Binh
Song Hinh- Phu Yen 2 6 7 9
Tay
1
Average 3.7 6.3 8.3
0.8

Note that due to different population size, the absolute

number do not mean the same proportion of non-party
members across communes. Moreover, the impact should be
reflected by the changes over the years of GDR
implementation. In general, this is captured by the average
increase as in the Figure 2.
Figure 2 The average number of non-party members over
the years of GDR implementation

13
 We can see the increase after the GDR was introduced
was quite significant. By 2005, the non-party members were
increased markedly by almost 300% compared with the
period before 1998. The changes happened in the periods
1998-2005 were also significant. By 2005 , this was more or
less steady as expected.
This, however, should be interpreted carefully as the
increased number does not have 1-1 correlation with the
decision power increase, as the key positions still belongs to
the party members. However, this undoubtedly increase the
accountability of the officials as well as the transparency of
decision making process.

Indicator 2 - Budget inspection

Of the most concerned issues among folks at commune

level, commune expenditure always ranked the first. This is
not surprised since the income level of people in rural areas
are extremely low, the poverty level is highest in the country.

14
(See World Bank, 1999). Moreover, the abuse and wrong
spending of public funds (contributed by village population for
local infrastructure building) was the main cause of many
rural unrests during late 1990s such as in Thai Binh province.
See Nguyen Van Sau and Ho Van Thong 2003, and 2005)
Budget inspection ( generally regulated by GDR and done
by a small independent group of 5 to 7 people chosen from
villages and mass organizations ) has provided commune
people an institutional access to all financial document
proceeded by commune government. In practice, however,
budget inspection has been interpreted and applied
differently across time and space.
We assumed that the frequency of budget inspection has
been increased since 1998. Our metric here is the average
number of budget inspections done by all 30 communes
during three periods : before 1998, 1998-2002 and 2003-
2005. See The Table 2
Table 2: Budget inspection (Unit: Number of cases)
Commun <199 2002
District- Province 98-02
e 8 - 2005
Giai Pham Yen My_ Hung Yen 3 4 5
Tran Cao Phu Cu_ Hung Yen 3 4 5
Thach Khoi Gia Loc_ Hai Duong 3 5 5
Dien Dien Ban_ Quang
2 5 4
Duong Nam
Hoa Tien Hoa Vang - Da Nang 3 6 5
Thuan An - Binh
An Phu 2 4 6
Duong
Lam Ha Phu ly- Ha Nam 2 4 5
Cam Chau Hoi an -Quang Nam 3 5 6
Hoa Vang - Quang
Hoa Phong 2 5 5
nam
Dong Phu- Binh
Dong tam 3 4 5
Phuoc
An Vinh Tan An- Long An 3 4 5
15
 Ngai
Loc Ninh - Binh
Loc Thai 3 5 5
Phuoc
Hoa Vang- Quang
Hoa Qui 3 4 5
Nam
Trung
Binh Luc- Ha Nam 3 3 6
Luong
An Ngai Long Bien- Vung Tau 1 4 5
Chiem Hoa- Tuyen
Tho Binh 2 4 5
Quang
Dang le An Thi- Hung Yen 3 4 5
Khoai Chau- Hung
An Vy 2 3 3
Yen
Hung Binh Giang- Hai
1 2 3
Thang Duong
Cam Giang- Hai
Cao Son 2 2 3
Duong
Yen Son- Tuyen
An Tuong 2 2 3
Quang
Tien Ngoai Duy Tien- Ha Nam 2 1 3
An Linh Tuy An- Phu Yen 1 3 5
Hoa Xuan Hoa Vang- Da Nang 3 3 4
Dong Xoai- Binh
Tien Thanh 3 2 4
Phuoc
Tan Chanh Can Duoc - Long An 3 1 3
Khanh Thu Dau mot- Binh
3 2 3
Binh Duong
Duc Binh
Song Hinh- Phu Yen 2 3 3
Tay
Phuoc Son- Quang
Phuoc Duc 1 3 4
Nam
Lap Thach- Vinh
Don Nhan 2 3 5
Phuc
Sum 71 104 133
Average 2.4 3.5 4.4

16
 Figure 2 Average number of budget inspections per year

10
9
8
7
6
5 4.4
4 3.5
3 2.4
2
1
0
before1998 98-2002 2002-05

Indicator 3 - Dispute solving

In rural life, disputes over the problems of “land, human

management and money” lie at the core of all commune
government’s working agenda. With the implementation of
GDR since 1998, these disputes remarkably emerged in
number ( especially those coming from bottom up)
challenging the problem-solving capacity of commune
government. Our metric here is the average number of
disputes coming from Village’s meetings ( held by 30
communes during three periods : before 1998, 1998-2002,
and 2002-2005) which were recorded in written document ,
put into commune’s working agenda and successfully solved .
Table 3 – Dispute Solving (unit: number of cases)
Befor
Commun 1998 2003 -
District- Province e
e -2002 2005
1998
Giai Pham Yen My - Hung Yen 4 5 8
Tran Cao Phu Cu - Hung Yen 4 5 8
Thach
Gia Loc - Hai Duong 3 6 6
Khoi
Dien Dien Ban - Quang
4 6 7
Duong Nam
Hoa Tien Hoa Vang - Da Nang 3 5 7

17
 Thuan An - Binh
An Phu 2 5 7
Duong
Lam Ha Phu ly- Ha Nam 4 5 8
Cam Chau Hoi an - Quang Nam 4 6 8
Hoa Vang - Quang
Hoa Phong 4 6 6
nam
Dong Phu- Binh
Dong tam 2 5 6
Phuoc
An Vinh
Tan An- Long An 3 4 6
Ngai
Loc Thai Loc Ninh - Binh Phuoc 1 4 5
Hoa Vang- Quang
Hoa Qui 4 4 6
Nam
Trung
Binh Luc- Ha Nam 2 3 5
Luong
An Ngai Long Bien- Vung Tau 2 5 7
Chiem Hoa- Tuyen
Tho Binh 2 5 7
Quang
Dang le An Thi- Hung Yen 4 5 6
Khoai Chau- Hung
An Vy 4 4 6
Yen
Hung Binh Giang- Hai
3 4 6
Thang Duong
Cam Giang- Hai
Cao Son 2 3 4
Duong
Yen Son- Tuyen
An Tuong 4 5 7
Quang
Tien Ngoai Duy Tien- Ha Nam 3 4 5
An Linh Tuy An- Phu Yen 3 3 3
Hoa Xuan Hoa Vang- Da Nang 3 5 6
Tien Dong Xoai- Binh
2 5 7
Thanh Phuoc
Tan Chanh Can Duoc - Long An 2 4 6
Khanh Thu Dau mot- Binh
3 4 5
Binh Duong
Duc Binh
Song Hinh- Phu Yen 1 2 2
Tay
Phuoc Son- Quang
Phuoc Duc 1 2 4
Nam
Don Nhan Lap Thach- Vinh Phuc 2 3 2
Sum 85 132 176
Average 2.8 4.4 5.9

18
 Figure 3 Disputes solving

10

5.9

4.4

2.8

0
before1998 1998-2002 2003-2005

Indicator 4 - People participation

Building infrastructure ( electricity station, irrigation

system, road, school , village cultural house , healthcare
center, and day-care center ) is the main task performed by
all commune governments. To build most of this projects , a
considerable part of financial source comes from peasant
households, not to mention that these projects affect directly
all peasants’ life.
With the implementation of GDR, peasants’ participatory
role ( what to be built, where to build, and how to build) has
changed significantly. Our metric here is the average number
of projects ( built at 30 communes over three periods: before
1998, 1998-2002, 2003-2005) in which commune people : a/
were just informed (J) ; and b/ both informed and discussed,
decided and supervised.
Table 4 – People Participation in decision to develop local
infrastructure (Number of building projects)
Commune District- Province Before 1998- 2003
1998 2002 -2005
a b a b a b
Giai Pham Yen My_ Hung Yen 3 1 4 3 5 3

19
 Tran Cao Phu Cu_ Hung Yen 3 1 4 2 3 3
Thach Khoi Gia Loc_ Hai Duong 3 0 4 2 5 2
Dien Duong Dien Ban_ Quang 2 2 3 3 4 3
Nam
Hoa Tien Hoa Vang - Da Nang 3 2 4 3 4 3
An Phu Thuan An - Binh 1 1 4 2 5 3
Duong
Lam Ha Phu ly- Ha Nam 3 1 2 2 3 3
Cam Chau Hoi an -Quang Nam 3 1 3 2 3 2
Hoa Phong Hoa Vang - Quang 2 0 3 2 4 2
nam
Dong tam Dong Phu- Binh Phuoc 1 0 3 1 2 2
An Vinh Tan An- Long An 2 0 2 3 2 2
Ngai
Loc Thai Loc Ninh - Binh Phuoc 2 2 2 2 4 2
Hoa Qui Hoa Vang- Quang 3 2 2 2 4 3
Nam
Trung Luong Binh Luc- Ha Nam 1 2 4 1 4 3
An Ngai Long Bien- Vung Tau 1 1 4 1 3 3
Tho Binh Chiem Hoa- Tuyen 2 1 3 1 3 3
Quang
Dang le An Thi- Hung Yen 2 2 3 1 2 2
An Vy Khoai Chau- Hung Yen 2 2 1 2 3 3
Hung Thang Binh Giang- Hai 0 1 1 2 4 3
Duong
Cao Son Cam Giang- Hai 0 2 2 2 2 2
Duong
An Tuong Yen Son- Tuyen Quang 2 0 1 3 2 2
Tien Ngoai Duy Tien- Ha Nam 2 2 2 2 2 2
An Linh Tuy An- Phu Yen 3 1 2 1 3 2
Hoa Xuan Hoa Vang- Da Nang 3 1 0 1 3 2
Tien Thanh Dong Xoai- Binh 0 0 2 1 4 2
Phuoc
Tan Chanh Can Duoc - Long An 0 0 2 2 2 3
Khanh Binh Thu Dau mot- Binh 0 1 1 2 2 2
Duong
Duc Binh Song Hinh- Phu Yen 2 1 3 1 2 3
Tay
Phuoc Duc Phuoc Son- Quang 1 0 1 1 3 3
Nam
Don Nhan Lap Thach- Vinh Phuc 1 0 1 1 2 2
Sum 53 30 73 54 94 75
Average 1.8 1 2.4 1.8 3.1 2.5

Obviously, value of column (b) reflect the real decision

power of people. However, the value in column (a) is also
important since the fact that people are informed about the

20
project makes the decision making process more transparent.
And transparency is important factor for democracy
promotion. In general, both growth of (a) and (b) would show
the positive impact of GDR. More over, the real power of
people, as reflected by column (b), increase higher, compared
with (a). (See Figure 4)

Figure 4 - People Participation

3.1
3 just informed
2.4 2.5 discuss, decide, supervise
2 1.8 1.8

1 1

0
before1998 1998-2002 2002-05

B. Subjective Indicators
Has the implementation of GDR left any impact on the
way commune leaders think about politics and of doing
politics? To measure this impact, we devised 4 indicators
which are following:

Indicator 5: Bottom-up thinking vs. centralism

Before the introduction of GDR in 1998 ( and especially

before market economy was put into effect in 1986),
centralism was the absolute dominant mode of thinking and
doing politics at all levels of government. Accordingly, there
21
was almost no space for local autonomy and citizens’
activeness in deciding what were their most basic needs and
how to fulfill them.
But within only more than a decade of applying market
mechanism, when social forces were liberalized –bringing
about ever-seen achievements- “ back to the roots and local
community” became the slogan of the day. This main tongue
of social life has been echoed -and to a very important extent-
institutionalized by the implementation of GDR since 1998.
The most striking metamorphosis in local politics to appear in
our repeated talks with commune leaders is a remarkable
thinking depolarization , coupled with a strong trend toward a
more pragmatic approach to public affairs.
Political thinking depolarization is attributable primarily to
a rightward convergence of different views on a whole series
of most controversial issues, sparked by a powerful trend
toward moderation among politicians. The net effect of this
change is summarized in figure 5, based on questions about
market economy, local autonomy , and collective action. (See
box below)

Components of Political Thinking Depolarization Index

1. Market Economy & Individual Capital Accumulation
represent a threat to the country ?
2. In solving social and economic problems , it is essential
that technical considerations should have most
important weight ?
3. For the most important development projects at
commune level to be successful and sustainable, having
the widest consensus among commune people is the
22
 key ?
4. Commune government should be given more autonomy,
especially in term of financial and personnel
management ?
Note. Respondents “ agree completely ” and “ disagree completely” are
coded “extremists” while the rest two categories are coded “ moderates”.

These 4 components represent a wide range of issues,

from a very general and ideological (question 1) to a very
specific, close to everyday life (question 4). In reality, the
debate about the market economy and related issues such as
capital accumulation, private ownership is quite common
even among uneducated people. This due to many reasons.
Essentially, Marxism and Leninism are officially declared as
the theoretical foundation of the CPV. The compatibility of
private ownership right, or of market in general, with the
socialism lies at the heart of many debate, and despite its
ideological and theoretical nature, its directly affect people
daily life, especially their economic activities.
The second question touched another aspect of political
life in Vietnam. There is no clear distinction between
politicians and technocrats (professional careers).
Government position in Vietnam have both political and
professional requirements. In the past, political requirements
are dominated. Appointments were based more and more on
party membership rather than on merit. The assumption was
that party members are professionally better.
Our metric here is the numbers of 30 communes’ leaders
(Chairman of commune People Committee) who responded
“agreed completely” (AC) , “ more or less agreed” (MLA),

23
“more or less disagreed” (MLD), “disagree completely” (DC)
with each item during two periods: 1999, 2005.
Table 5: Bottom-up thinking vs. centralism (the number of
agreement with 5 questions)
Commu District- 1999 2005
ne Province
AC ML ML DC AC ML ML DC
A D A D
Giai Yen My_ Hung 3 0 0 2 1 3 1 0
Pham Yen
Tran Cao Phu Cu_ Hung 2 1 0 2 1 3 1 0
Yen
Thach Gia Loc_ Hai 3 0 1 1 1 2 2 0
Khoi Duong
Dien Dien Ban_ 1 0 1 3 1 2 2 0
Duong Quang Nam
Hoa Tien Hoa Vang - Da 2 0 1 2 0 2 3 0
Nang
An Phu Thuan An - Binh 2 1 0 2 1 3 1 0
Duong
Lam Ha Phu ly- Ha Nam 2 1 1 1 0 2 3 0
Cam Hoi an -Quang 3 0 0 2 0 2 3 0
Chau Nam
Hoa Hoa Vang - 3 1 0 1 1 2 1 1
Phong Quang nam
Dong Dong Phu- Binh 2 0 0 3 1 1 3 0
tam Phuoc
An Vinh Tan An- Long An 2 2 1 0 0 2 3 0
Ngai
Loc Thai Loc Ninh - Binh 3 0 1 1 1 3 0 1
Phuoc
Hoa Qui Hoa Vang- 1 0 1 3 1 3 1 0
Quang Nam
Trung Binh Luc- Ha 2 1 0 2 1 2 2 0
Luong Nam
An Ngai Long Bien- Vung 3 2 0 0 0 2 2 1
Tau
Tho Binh Chiem Hoa- 2 0 1 2 0 3 1 1
Tuyen Quang
Dang le An Thi- Hung 3 1 0 1 1 3 1 0
Yen
An Vy Khoai Chau- 2 1 1 1 0 2 3 0
Hung Yen
Hung Binh Giang- Hai 3 0 2 0 1 3 1 0
Thang Duong
Cao Son Cam Giang- Hai 3 0 0 2 1 1 2 1
Duong
An Yen Son- Tuyen 2 0 1 2 0 3 2 0
24
 Tuong Quang
Tien Duy Tien- Ha 2 0 1 2 0 3 2 0
Ngoai Nam
An Linh Tuy An- Phu Yen 3 1 0 1 1 3 0 1
Hoa Hoa Vang- Da 3 0 1 1 0 3 1 1
Xuan Nang
Tien Dong Xoai- Binh 2 0 1 2 0 2 3 0
Thanh Phuoc
Tan Can Duoc - Long 1 1 0 3 1 1 3 0
Chanh An
Khanh Thu Dau mot- 3 0 0 2 1 0 3 1
Binh Binh Duong
Duc Binh Song Hinh- Phu 2 0 1 2 0 3 1 1
Tay Yen
Phuoc Phuoc Son- 3 1 0 1 1 2 1 1
Duc Quang Nam
Don Lap Thach- Vinh 2 0 1 2 1 3 1 0
Nhan Phuc
Sum 70 14 17 49 18 69 53 10
Averag 2.3 0.5 0.6 1.6 0.6 2.3 1.8 0.3
e

Note: the survey is conducted for the chairman of People

Committee only, so there are 30 respondents. Each
respondent will have 5 question, which must be marked as
either 1 of the 4 level predefined.
Figure 5 - Political thinking depolarization

2.5

Agreed completely
1.5
Moreor less agreed
1 Moreor less diagreed
Disagreed completely
0.5

0
1999 2005

Remarkably, the political opinions and thinking were

diversified, more independent. The U-shape in 1999, which
represent the “common thinking” was reversed into inverted-
U-Shape in 2005, which indicated the fact that people are
25
more informed and more responsible for their own activities.
As a result people hold more balanced views on a wide range
of issues

Indicator 6 - Tolerance

As political thinking distances narrowed, tolerance

developed. In our surveys, we asked commune leaders to
indicate their sympathy toward conflicts, opponents, and
individual values. Our metric here is the percentage of 30
communes’ leaders agreeing with our statement during three
periods : 1999, 2002 and 2005.

Statements with which commune leaders agreed

1. Reconcilable conflicts and disputes are typical of
contemporary society.
2. In political controversies, one should avoid extreme
positions because the proper solution usually lies in the
middle.
3. In the final analysis, merit system provide the best
mechanism for promotion rather than any other protagonist
one.

Table 6 Tolerance (Number of commune leaders agreed)

Commune District- Province 1999 2003 2005
Giai Pham Yen My_ Hung Yen 3 2 4
Tran Cao Phu Cu_ Hung Yen 3 3 4
Thach Khoi Gia Loc_ Hai Duong 3 3 3
Dien Ban_ Quang
Dien Duong 2 3 4
Nam
Hoa Tien Hoa Vang - Da Nang 2 2 4
Thuan An - Binh
An Phu 3 3 4
Duong
Lam Ha Phu ly- Ha Nam 2 2 4
Cam Chau Hoi an -Quang Nam 2 2 3
Hoa Phong Hoa Vang - Quang 3 2 2

26
 nam
Dong Phu- Binh
Dong tam 3 3 4
Phuoc
An Vinh Ngai Tan An- Long An 1 2 4
Loc Thai Loc Ninh - Binh Phuoc 2 2 4
Hoa Vang- Quang
Hoa Qui 2 2 3
Nam
Trung Luong Binh Luc- Ha Nam 2 2 3
An Ngai Long Bien- Vung Tau 2 2 3
Chiem Hoa- Tuyen
Tho Binh 3 2 4
Quang
Dang le An Thi- Hung Yen 2 3 3
An Vy Khoai Chau- Hung Yen 3 3 4
Binh Giang- Hai
Hung Thang 1 2 3
Duong
Cam Giang- Hai
Cao Son 3 3 3
Duong
Yen Son- Tuyen
An Tuong 1 2 4
Quang
Tien Ngoai Duy Tien- Ha Nam 1 2 4
An Linh Tuy An- Phu Yen 2 3 4
Hoa Xuan Hoa Vang- Da Nang 2 3 3
Dong Xoai- Binh
Tien Thanh 2 2 3
Phuoc
Tan Chanh Can Duoc - Long An 1 2 3
Thu Dau mot- Binh
Khanh Binh 3 3 2
Duong
Duc Binh Tay Song Hinh- Phu Yen 1 2 4
Phuoc Son- Quang
Phuoc Duc 2 2 3
Nam
Don Nhan Lap Thach- Vinh Phuc 1 2 4
Sum 63 71 104
Average 2.1 2.4 3.5

Figure 6 Tolerance

3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1999 2003 2005

27
 Indicator 7 - Public satisfaction with commune
governments .

How voters at commune level satisfy with the

performance of their direct government might be a good
indicator, if GDR is to leave any positive impact on politicians’
behavior. We surveyed opinion of 50 people randomly
chosen about their level satisfaction with local government
performance in various years. In the questionnaire, 4
different levels were identified as very satisfied (V),
Relatively Satisfied (R), Little Satisfied (L), Not Satisfied (N).
Table 7 summarizes the data collected, where each column
shows the number of people we specifyhas that specific 4
level of satisfaction. .
Table 7 – Public Satisfaction with Local commune
Governments (Number of people)
Commun District-
1999 2001 2003 2005
e Province
V R L N V R L N V R L N V R L N
Yen My_ Hung
Giai Pham 3 14 19 14 2 15 21 12 5 18 19 9 3 22 18 6
Yen
Phu Cu_ Hung
Tran Cao 3 12 19 15 1 16 21 12 5 18 19 8 2 21 18 6
Yen
Thach Gia Loc_ Hai
2 16 17 15 2 16 20 12 4 16 20 9 3 20 17 7
Khoi Duong
Dien Dien Ban_
5 14 17 14 0 15 20 14 3 16 20 9 2 20 20 7
Duong Quang Nam
Hoa Vang - Da
Hoa Tien 3 12 19 15 0 15 20 13 3 15 19 9 1 22 20 6
Nang
Thuan An - Binh
An Phu 4 13 18 14 0 13 19 15 2 15 18 8 1 21 17 6
Duong
Lam Ha Phu ly- Ha Nam 1 14 15 19 2 14 18 16 2 16 18 9 3 21 17 4
Cam Hoi an -Quang
3 12 19 16 1 14 19 14 1 17 19 7 0 20 18 7
Chau Nam
Hoa Hoa Vang -
1 13 21 15 1 14 19 14 0 17 20 7 2 21 20 6
Phong Quang nam
Dong Phu- Binh
Dong tam 1 13 20 16 2 14 18 13 0 18 20 9 3 19 20 7
Phuoc
An Vinh
Tan An- Long An 0 12 18 17 2 14 18 15 1 18 18 8 2 22 17 6
Ngai
Loc Ninh - Binh
Loc Thai 3 11 19 17 0 15 19 14 0 17 19 7 0 21 17 4
Phuoc
Hoa Vang-
Hoa Qui 4 13 18 14 0 16 20 12 0 17 20 7 3 19 16 6
Quang Nam
Trung Binh Luc- Ha
3 10 20 15 2 16 20 12 3 18 18 9 2 19 19 6
Luong Nam

28
 Long Bien- Vung
An Ngai 2 11 20 17 0 13 20 11 1 16 18 9 0 21 16 6
Tau
Chiem Hoa-
Tho Binh 3 13 19 15 1 13 21 13 4 16 19 8 2 18 16 7
Tuyen Quang
Dang le An Thi- Hung Yen 3 12 18 16 2 12 21 15 4 16 20 8 3 21 15 7
Khoai Chau-
An Vy 3 12 19 15 2 13 19 13 5 15 20 9 3 21 18 4
Hung Yen
Hung Binh Giang- Hai
4 10 16 17 0 13 20 13 3 17 18 9 3 22 18 4
Thang Duong
Cam Giang- Hai
Cao Son 0 13 17 17 1 15 19 16 3 17 18 9 2 21 16 6
Duong
Yen Son- Tuyen
An Tuong 2 12 17 18 1 15 19 15 4 18 19 9 0 19 16 4
Quang
Tien Duy Tien- Ha
1 12 18 13 2 14 18 13 3 15 19 8 3 19 17 5
Ngoai Nam
An Linh Tuy An- Phu Yen 4 11 20 14 0 13 19 14 3 15 20 8 1 22 17 7
Hoa Vang- Da
Hoa Xuan 2 11 21 14 1 14 21 13 2 16 20 9 3 18 19 5
Nang
Tien Dong Xoai- Binh
4 13 18 14 0 14 19 13 2 16 18 8 1 18 17 5
Thanh Phuoc
Tan Can Duoc - Long
2 11 19 13 0 12 20 12 1 17 16 7 0 22 16 7
Chanh An
Khanh Thu Dau mot-
3 12 19 15 2 12 21 12 0 18 19 7 3 19 16 4
Binh Binh Duong
Duc Binh Song Hinh- Phu
5 13 18 14 2 14 19 12 0 18 19 9 1 21 17 6
Tay Yen
Phuoc Phuoc Son-
5 14 17 14 1 15 18 11 3 17 18 8 3 21 17 6
Duc Quang Nam
Lap Thach- Vinh
Don Nhan 1 13 21 15 0 15 21 14 3 16 19 7 3 21 18 6
Phuc

1
8 37 55 45 3 42 58 39 7 49 56 24 5 61 52
Sum 7
0 2 6 7 0 4 7 8 0 9 7 7 8 2 3
3
2. 12 18 15 14 19 13 2. 16 18 8. 1. 20 17 5.
Average 1
7 .4 .5 .2 .1 .6 .3 3 .6 .9 2 9 .4 .4 8
Note: V – Very Satisfied, R – Relatively Satisfied, L – Little Satisfied, N – Not
Satisfied

Figure 7 compares voter satisfaction with commune

government over four periods: 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005.

29
Figure 7 Public satisfaction

45
40
35
30
Verysatified
25
Rather satisfied
20 Littlesatisfied
15 Not satisfied at all
10
5
0
1999 2001 2003 2005

30
 C. Index of GDR Impact
From all seven indicators, we build up an index of GDR
impact as follows:
1. For each indicator we calculate the absolute difference
between their average values in 2005 and 1998. For indicator
5, we will take the difference between average values of (MLA
+ MLD) as this measure the depolarization of political
thinking. For the indicator 7, we will take the difference
between average values of (L+N).
2. The biggest and smallest values will be assigned
coefficients (factor loading) 1 and 0 accordingly.
3. Each indicator will have factor loading (FL) calculated
by standardizing their value to the scale from 0 to 1
according to step 2 (i.ei.e. by the formula: FL = (Value –
Smallest)/(Biggest – Smallest)
The result is shown in Table 8 below:
Table 8 - Index of GDR Impact Coefficient
Indicator Impact of GDR (= Factor
Average Value in 2005 – loading
Average Value in 1998)
1 – Non party 7.1 0.62637
member
2 - budget 2 0.06593
inspection
3 - Dispute solving 3.1 0.18681
4 - People 1.5 0.01098
participation
5 - Political thinking 3 0.17582
6 - Tolerance 1.4 0
7 - Public 10.5 1
satisfaction

4. Based on this index coefficients (factor loading), we

can calculate the total (unified) GDR impact for each

31
communes from data of 7 indicators as shown in Table 9. The
main idea of such a total index is to preserve ranking order
and intensity degree of difference between communes. (See
also Appendix 1 for concrete calculations).
Table 9 – GDR Impact for each Commune
Commune District- Province GDR impact
Giai Pham Yen My_ Hung Yen 16.241
Tran Cao Phu Cu_ Hung Yen 17.066
Thach Khoi Gia Loc_ Hai Duong 14.879
Dien Duong Dien Ban_ Quang Nam 8.9887
Hoa Tien Hoa Vang - Da Nang 15.23
An Phu Thuan An - Binh Duong 16.384
Lam Ha Phu ly- Ha Nam 18.878
Cam Chau Hoi an -Quang Nam 16.767
Hoa Phong Hoa Vang - Quang nam 15.956
Dong tam Dong Phu- Binh Phuoc 17.494
An Vinh Ngai Tan An- Long An 19.956
Loc Thai Loc Ninh - Binh Phuoc 22.494
Hoa Qui Hoa Vang- Quang Nam 17.934
Trung Luong Binh Luc- Ha Nam 16.934
An Ngai Long Bien- Vung Tau 21.582
Tho Binh Chiem Hoa- Tuyen 18.318
Quang
Dang le An Thi- Hung Yen 19.296
An Vy Khoai Chau- Hung Yen 19.242
Hung Thang Binh Giang- Hai Duong 15.824
Cao Son Cam Giang- Hai Duong 16.098
An Tuong Yen Son- Tuyen Quang 21.362
Tien Ngoai Duy Tien- Ha Nam 14.527
An Linh Tuy An- Phu Yen 14.384
Hoa Xuan Hoa Vang- Da Nang 14.67
Tien Thanh Dong Xoai- Binh Phuoc 13.604
Tan Chanh Can Duoc - Long An 11.56
Khanh Binh Thu Dau mot- Binh 14.912
Duong
Duc Binh Tay Song Hinh- Phu Yen 14.186

32
 Phuoc Duc Phuoc Son- Quang 10.395
Nam
Don Nhan Lap Thach- Vinh Phuc 13.999

Using this result, we can rank 30 communes under the

study accordingly to the level by which they are influenced by
GDR. The relative impact (factor loading) can be calculated in
the same manner.
Table 10 – Ranking of communes by GDR Impact
R Commune District- Province GDR Factor
ank impact loading
01 Loc Thai Loc Ninh - Binh Phuoc 22.494 1
02 An Ngai Long Bien- Vung Tau 21.582 0.932471
03 An Tuong Yen Son- Tuyen Quang 21.362 0.916181
04 An Vinh Ngai Tan An- Long An 19.956 0.812074
05 Dang le An Thi- Hung Yen 19.296 0.763204
06 An Vy Khoai Chau- Hung Yen 19.242 0.759206
07 Lam Ha Phu ly- Ha Nam 18.878 0.732253
08 Tho Binh Chiem Hoa- Tuyen 18.318 0.690788
Quang
09 Hoa Qui Hoa Vang- Quang 17.934 0.662355
Nam
10 Dong tam Dong Phu- Binh Phuoc 17.494 0.629775
11 Tran Cao Phu Cu_ Hung Yen 17.066 0.598084
12 Trung Luong Binh Luc- Ha Nam 16.934 0.58831
13 Cam Chau Hoi an -Quang Nam 16.767 0.575944
14 An Phu Thuan An - Binh 16.384 0.547585
Duong
15 Giai Pham Yen My_ Hung Yen 16.241 0.536997
16 Cao Son Cam Giang- Hai 16.098 0.526408
Duong
17 Hoa Phong Hoa Vang - Quang 15.956 0.515894
nam
18 Hung Thang Binh Giang- Hai 15.824 0.50612
Duong
19 Hoa Tien Hoa Vang - Da Nang 15.23 0.462137
20 Khanh Binh Thu Dau mot- Binh 14.912 0.438591
Duong
21 Thach Khoi Gia Loc_ Hai Duong 14.879 0.436147
22 Hoa Xuan Hoa Vang- Da Nang 14.67 0.420672

33
23 Tien Ngoai Duy Tien- Ha Nam 14.527 0.410083
24 An Linh Tuy An- Phu Yen 14.384 0.399495
25 Duc Binh Tay Song Hinh- Phu Yen 14.186 0.384834
26 Don Nhan Lap Thach- Vinh Phuc 13.999 0.370988
27 Tien Thanh Dong Xoai- Binh 13.604 0.34174
Phuoc
28 Tan Chanh Can Duoc - Long An 11.56 0.190392
29 Phuoc Duc Phuoc Son- Quang 10.395 0.104129
Nam
30 Dien Duong Dien Ban_ Quang Nam 8.9887 0

Analyzing this table we can see some characteristics:

1. All communes experienced marked impact of GDR
although the impact were widely different among them, even
among those communes which belong to the same province
such as Tien Thanh (ranking 27 with GDR impact value =
13.60) and Loc Thai (ranking 1, GDR impact = 22.49) from
the Binh Phuoc province. Similarly, 2 communes from the
Quang Nam province : Dien Duong (rank 30) and Hoa Quy
(rank 9) are markedly different. Note that these communes
are from the South. For the North communes (in italic), the
GDR impact was more even distribute in the same province.
2. Unexpectedly, there is no significant difference in
GDR impact between region (especially between North and
South). In other words, the regional factor was not confirmed,
contrary to common belief among Vietnamese. Historically,
the South was under a different political regime for a long
time (relative autonomy under French rule for almost 100
years before 1945, then under the Vietnam Republic until
national reunification in 1975). Moreover, the level of
economic development, and especially , the market economy
with its private ownership are expected to leave a deep

34
impact on the people perception and values regarding the
political participation and social responsibility. Specifically,
the South people are commonly viewed as more responsible
to the relaxing political restriction as in the case with GDR.
The result of our measurement did not confirm this common
belief.
There is no easy way to explain this counter-intuitive
result. We suggest two factors which may shed light on this
result:
i) The fact that the first and biggest social protest did
happen in the North was actually consistent with the result.
This case of social and political unrest in Thai-binh province in
1997 (which was the most direct cause for the introduction of
GDR as many observers believed) may suggest that another
side of the democratization – the “supply side”. That is,
while, the demand for a more democratic regulation might be
higher and embedded in the social and political tradition of
the South, people in the South either are not ready to take
opportunity, either do not believe the real intent of the GDR.
Plainly speaking, they do not have such a political status (as
the North does) to minimize the risk of being victims of local
government officials.
ii) As the GDR was just a regulation and at the grassroots
level, its impact are severely restricted by the general
national political structure (especially at the central level),
which was uniform throughout the country. Therefore, the
impact can not be different, if the main restriction are the
same for all regions and provinces. In other words, the
expected difference will be obvious only in the case there is a
democratic regulation at all levels.
35
 These 2 suggestions are just hypotheses, a deeper
investigation are needed before we can have better reasons to
confirm or reject them.

IV - Explaining the difference in GDR impact

Why does GDR impact vary considerably across
communes? In this study, we assumed that there might be
two group of explaining factors : political culture and
economic development. Generally speaking, these two
group of variables are related, though not necessarily 1-1.
The assumptions here are the cultural variables are relatively
unchanged even in a quite long period, as it is depended also
on traditions, customs etc. Meanwhile, economic factors are
changing relatively fast. Especially, over the last 10 – 20
years, the income of individuals in rural areas were improved
markedly.
Economic development is measured by two indicators :
Annual income per capita and percentage of non-agricultural
sector income. We expected that with higher income and the
inter-related nature of industrial production may be the factor
lied behind the difference in GDR impact. The intuition here
is that with the higher level of economic development, the
need to be involved in decision making process will be higher.
Once GDR was introduced, those communes with higher
income level will experienced higher impacts of GDR as their
needs are revealed. Data on the economic development
variables are presented in Table 11.
Table 11 – Economic Development status of Communes
Commun Annual Factor Percentag Factor SUM
e Income loading e of non- loading
per agricultura

36
 l sector
income
(as % of
GDPtotal
capita(VN production
D) value)
Giai Pham 980,000 0.75 25 0.01 0.76
Tran Cao 1,000,000 0.77 27 0.04 0.81
Thach
Khoi 990,000 0.76 24 0 0.76
Dien
Duong 1,200,000 1 28 0.06 1.06
Hoa Tien 900,000 0.66 26 0.03 0.69
An Phu 920,000 0.68 27 0.05 0.73
Lam Ha 890,000 0.65 40 0.25 0.90
Cam Chau 786,000 0.53 28 0.06 0.59
Hoa
Phong 788,000 0.53 40 0.25 0.78
Dong tam 790,000 0.53 27 0.05 0.58
An Vinh
Ngai 742,000 0.48 44 0.31 0.79
Loc Thai 756,000 0.49 26 0.03 0.52
Hoa Qui 675,000 0.40 46 0.34 0.74
Trung
Luong 658,000 0.38 50 0.4 0.78
An Ngai 761,000 0.50 57 0.51 1.01
Tho Binh 654,000 0.38 50 0.40 0.78
Dang le 734,000 0.47 54 0.460 0.93
An Vy 578,000 0.29 40 0.25 0.54
Hung
Thang 586,000 0.30 61 0.57 0.87
Cao Son 475,000 0.17 35 0.17 0.34
An Tuong 389,000 0.70 75 0.78 1.48
Tien
Ngoai 465,000 0.16 40 0.25 0.41
An Linh 433,000 0.12 77 0.82 0.94
Hoa Xuan 424,000 0.11 35 0.17 0.28
Tien
Thanh 326,000 0 82 0.89 0.89
Tan
Chanh 337,000 0.10 40 0.25 0.35
Khanh
Binh 554,000 0.26 77 0.82 1.08
Duc Binh
Tay 534,000 0.24 83 0.91 1.15
Phuoc
Duc 467,000 0.16 80 0.87 1.03
Don Nhan 356,000 0.3 89 1 1.30

37
 Political culture is measured by fours indicators : voting
turnout, annual commune meetings, newspaper readership,
leisure time spending in sport and socio-cultural associations.
These measurements are not perfect, as we can see they are
somehow related to the income level. However, these 4
indicator also reflect the level of social involvement. For
example, the indicator newspaper readership, although reflect
the income level of the village, but not necessarily the
personal income level. In Vietnam, especially in villages,
there are so called the cultural houses (which can compared
to public library), where people can share their books,
newspapers, use internet etc. .. to save the costs. See table
12.
Table 12 Cultural Variables
Vo
tin
g
Attenda L
tur Nu
nce at eis F
no mbe
Facto commu Fact ure act
ut Factor r of
Commun r ne or tim or FL
(% loadin Aas
e loadi meeting load e loa SUM
of g soci
ng (as % of ing (ho din
tot atio
househ urs g
al ns
olds) )
vot
ers
)
Giai Pham 99 1 94 1 6 1 5 0.9 3.90
Tran Cao 99 1 90 0.94 6 1 4.5 0.8 3.74
Thach
78 0.38 92 0.97 5 0.8 4 0.7 2.85
Khoi
Dien
83 0.53 88 0.90 5 0.8 5.5 1 3.23
Duong
Hoa Tien 87 0.65 85 0.85 6 1 5 0.9 3.40
An Phu 84 0.56 87 0.89 5 0.8 4 0.7 2.95
Lam Ha 79 0.41 82 0.81 4 0.6 4.5 0.8 2.62
Cam
82 0.5 90 0.94 6 1 3 0.5 2.94
Chau
Hoa
86 0.62 84 0.84 4 0.6 4 0.7 2.76
Phong
Dong tam 81 0.47 79 0.76 6 1 5 0.9 3.13

38
 An Vinh
79 0.41 80 0.77 5 0.8 3.5 0.6 2.56
Ngai
Loc Thai 88 0.68 69 0.59 4 0.6 5 0.9 2.77
Hoa Qui 89 0.71 74 0.68 5 0.8 4 0.7 2.88
Trung
79 0.41 68 0.58 4 0.6 3 0.5 2.09
Luong
An Ngai 85 0.59 70 0.61 5 0.8 4.5 0.8 2.80
Tho Binh 78 0.38 66 0.55 4 0.6 3 0.5 2.03
Dang le 79 0.41 58 0.42 5 0.8 3 0.5 2.13
An Vy 86 0.62 60 0.45 3 0.4 2.5 0.4 1.87
Hung
79 0.41 52 0.32 3 0.4 3 0.5 1.63
Thang
Cao Son 78 0.38 49 0.27 3 0.4 2 0.3 1.36
An Tuong 8 0.53 44 0.19 4 0.6 2.5 0.4 1.72
Tien
79 0.41 48 0.26 5 0.8 1 0.1 1.57
Ngoai
An Linh 77 0.35 56 0.39 2 0.2 2 0.3 1.24
Hoa Xuan 81 0.47 49 0.27 4 0.6 2 0.3 1.64
Tien
76 0.32 58 0.42 3 0.4 1.5 0.2 1.34
Thanh
Tan
76 0.32 54 0.35 2 0.2 1 0.1 0.98
Chanh
Khanh
75 0.29 39 0.11 3 0.4 0.5 0 0.81
Binh
Duc Binh
68 0.09 42 0.16 1 0 0.5 0 0.25
Tay
Phuoc
65 0 32 0 2 0.2 1 0.1 0.30
Duc
Don Nhan 75 0.29 36 0.06 1 0 0.5 0 0.36

Treating GDR impact as dependent variable and political

culture and economics factors as independent ones, we
tested if there are any significant pattern of correlation
between them. The result is shown in two figures 8 and 9
below.

39
 Figure 8 Economic development and GDR impact

1.6

1.4

1.2

1.0

.8

.6
ECONOMIC

.4

.2
-.2 0.0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1.0 1.2

IMPACT

Note: Multiple R : 0 .04538 R Square : 0.00206

Contrary to our expectation, there is no clear pattern of

correlation between economic development and the level of
GDR impact. Moreover, if we remove some outliers, the
relation can be seen as reversed. That is, in the lower
income level communes, the GDR had tends to have thea
higher impact.
As for political culture variable, there are some clearer
patterns of correlation as revealed in Figure 9, where those
communes with traditions of community activities will
experienced higher impact of GDR.

40
 Figure 9 Political culture and GDR impact

1
CULTURE

0
-.2 0.0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1.0 1.2

IMPACT

Note : Multiple R : 0.51381 R Square 0.26400

41
V - CConclusion and Policy implications
This study tried to quantify the impact of GDR and its
relations with economic and cultural factors in rural areas of
Vietnam. The study conducted a survey of a range of
communes from the North, the Central, and the South regions
of Vietnam. The result showed some interesting facts:
1 – The GDR had a marked positive impact in all
communes over the period from 1998 to 2005. This showed
that the demand of the people for a more involvements in
public decision – making process is high, and GDR partly
satisfied this demand.
2 - Despite the similarity in local government structure,
there were significant difference in the level of GDR impact,
even among communes from the same province.
3 – The different regions, especially the North and the
South, having different historical political development, did
not show difference in GDR impact.
4 – Economic development level, contrary to our
expectation, did not reveal any clear pattern of correlation
with GDR impact. The difference in GDR impact is better
explained by differences in political and social traditions of
interaction
The results of the study also suggest direction for further
policy improvements regarding the democratization process
in Vietnam.
1) To increase the positive impact of GDR and limit its
undesirable effects in general, the focus should be placed
more on the access to information and the open exchange of
knowledge and opinion. It is true that with economic growth

42
and better income, the demand for and the access to
information will improve in general. However, in the current
conditions of rapid development of IT and internet, the access
to information and knowledge can be granted to even the
poorest village in the mountainous areas with low costs.
Since this may not be profitable financially, this should be
done by the government especially in rural, remote and
mountainous areas, where the people income is still at low
level, the private sector companies can not exploit the
economy of scale and economy of scope.

2) In order to narrow the difference in GDR impact among

different communes, the government should focus on several
things: a) to confirm the political will to promote democracy
at all level and in all areas of social life. This can be done by
promoting legal status of GDR, making process to change it
more difficult (e.g. require the approval of the national
assembly); b) As the logic of power conflict tell us, the
democracy at the grassroots level will depend importantly on
the power relations at higher levels. Therefore, if the
democracy at higher level is not improved (or even hindered
by the higher authorities, e.g. district and provincial officials),
the GDR impact at commune level will depends mostly on the
specific district or provincial government officials. In short,
while there is a need for a more rigorous and more
satisfactory investigation of the problem, we have some good
reasons to believe that democracy at the grassroots level can
have their full potential positive effect only if higher level
governments are also subject to the same regulations.

43
 In theory, both economic and political factors should
count for significant variance of GDR impact, but that is not
true in our case. While the political culture seem to be much
more influent, the economic development level seems to be
neutral to the magnitude of GDR impact. In other words, it is
contemporary civic engagement , not economic development,
that directly affect the capability of commune government to
make GDR work practically. More important, civic engagement
may have powerful consequences for economic development
, not vice-versa.
Finally, if evidence suggest that civic engagement counts
for the most important part of our story, answering the
question of how to develop civic culture among commune
community can be seen as the key for a sustainable GDR in
the future. The civic culture, in its turn, requires a long-term
perspective in social planning and development. Its would
need sustainable and system-wide reform programs at all
levels and all sectors. Despite that, in the short term, there
are many aspects the governments can do to improve the
situation, among which the most important are the
promotion of discussion and information sharing, the
promotion of transparency in decision making

VI - References
1. Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), 2001. Van kien Dai
hoi dai bieu toan quoc lan thu IX. (Documents of the
Ninth National Party Congress). Nxb CTQG, Hanoi.

44
2. Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), 2003. Tong ket 5
nam thuc hien Quy che dan chu o co so. (Report on 5
years of GDR implementation)
3. Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), 2006. Van kien Dai
hoi dai bieu toan quoc lan thu X. (Documents of the
Tenth National Party Congress). Nxb CTQG, Hanoi.
4. Nguyen Van Sau & Ho Van Thong (ed.), 2003. Thuc Hien
quy che dan chu va xay dung chinh quyen cap xa o nuoc
ta hien nay (Implementing grassroots democracy and
building commune authority in Vietnam today), Nha Xuat
Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia (The National Political Publishing
House), Hanoi.
5. -----, 2005. The che dan chu va phat trien nong thon
Vietnam hien nay (Grassroots democracy Institution and
development of Rural Vietnam today), Nha Xuat Ban
Chinh Tri Quoc Gia (The National Political Publishing
House), Hanoi
6. Government of Vietnam (GOV), 1998. Decree No.
29/1998/ND-CP dated 15 May 1998, Regulations on the
ExeciseExercise of Democracy in Communes
7. ----, 2003. Decree No. 79/2003/ND-CP dated July 7, 2003,
Promulgating the Regulation on the Exercise of
Democracy in Communes
8. World Bank, 1999. Attacking Poverty, Vietnam
Development Report 2000. Hanoi.
9. ------, 2000. Vietnam 2010 : Entering the 21st Century, Hanoi.

45
APPENDIX 1 - DETAILED CALCULATION OF GDR IMPACT
IN EACH COMMUNE

GDR effect
District- GDR effect
Commune coefficient
Province value GDR impact
(standardized
to 0-1 scale)

15-6 0.62637 5.6373

5-3 0.06593 0.1318
8-4 0.18681 0.7472
Yen My_ Hung 3-1 0.01098 0.0219
Giai Pham
Yen (3+1)-(0+0) 0.17582 0.7032
4-3 0 0
(19+14)-(18+6) 1 9
Sum 16.241
15-6 0.62637 5.6373
5-3 0.06593 0.1318
8-4 0.18681 0.7472
Phu Cu_ Hung 3-1 0.01098 0.0219
Tran Cao
Yen (3+1)-(1+0) 0.17582 0.5274
4-3 0 0
(19+15)-(18+6) 1 10
Sum 17.066
13-4 0.62637 5.6373
5-3 0.06593 0.1318
6-3 0.18681 0.5604
Gia Loc_ Hai 2-0 0.01098 0.0219
Thach Khoi
Duong (2+2)-(0+1) 0.17582 0.5275
3-3 0 0
(17+15)-(17+7) 1 8
Sum 14.879
12-6 0.62637 3.7582
4-2 0.06593 0.1318
7-4 0.18681 0.5604
Dien Ban_ Quang 3-2 0.01098 0.0109
Dien Duong
Nam (2+2)-(0+1) 0.17582 0.5274
4-2 0 0
(17+14)-(20+7) 1 4
Sum 8.9887
14-5 0.62637 5.6373
5-3 0.06593 0.1318
7-3 0.18681 0.7472
Hoa Vang - Da 3-2 0.01098 0.0109
Hoa Tien
Nang (2+3)-(0+1) 0.17582 0.7032
4-2 0 0
(19+15)-(20+6) 1 8
Sum 15.230
14-5 0.62637 5.6373
6-2 0.06593 0.2637
7-2 0.18681 0.9340
Thuan An - Binh 3-1 0.01098 0.0219
An Phu
Duong (3+1)-(1+0) 0.17582 0.5274
4-3 0 0
(18+14)-(17+6) 1 9
Sum 16.384

46
 11-4 0.62637 4.3845
5-2 0.06593 0.1977
8-4 0.18681 0.7472
3-1 0.01098 0.0219
Lam Ha Phu ly- Ha Nam
(2+3)-(1+1) 0.17582 0.5274
4-2 0 0
(15+19)-(17+4) 1 13
Sum 18.878
12-4 0.62637 5.0109
6-3 0.06593 0.1977
8-4 0.18681 0.7472
Hoi an -Quang 2-1 0.01098 0.0109
Cam Chau
Nam (2+3)-(0+0) 0.17582 0.8791
3-2 0 0
(19+16)-(18+7) 1 10
Sum 16.767
14-6 0.62637 5.0109
5-2 0.06593 0.1977
6-4 0.18681 0.3736
Hoa Vang - 2-0 0.01098 0.0219
Hoa Phong
Quang nam (2+1)-(1+0) 0.17582 0.3516
2-3 0 0
(21+15)-(20+6) 1 10
Sum 15.956
15-4 0.62637 6.8901
5-3 0.06593 0.1318
6-2 0.18681 0.7472
Dong Phu- Binh 2-0 0.01098 0.0219
Dong tam
Phuoc (1+3)-(0+0) 0.17582 0.7032
4-3 0 0
(20+16)-(20+7) 1 9
Sum 17.494
15-4 0.62637 6.8901
5-3 0.06593 0.1318
6-3 0.18681 0.5604
2-0 0.01098 0.0219
An Vinh Ngai Tan An- Long An
(2+3)-(2+1) 0.17582 0.3516
4-1 0 0
(18+17)-(17+6) 1 12
Sum 19.956
13-3 0.62637 6.2637
5-3 0.06593 0.1318
5-1 0.18681 0.7472
Loc Ninh - Binh 2-2 0.01098 0
Loc Thai
Phuoc (3+0)-(0+1) 0.17582 0.3516
4-2 0 0
(19+17)-(17+4) 1 15
Sum 22.494
13-2 0.62637 6.8901
5-3 0.06593 0.1318
6-4 0.18681 0.3736
Hoa Vang- Quang 3-2 0.01098 0.0109
Hoa Qui
Nam (3+1)-(0+1) 0.17582 0.5274
3-2 0 0
(18+14)-(16+6) 1 10
Sum 17.934

47
 12-3 0.62637 5.6373
6-3 0.06593 0.1977
5-2 0.18681 0.5604
Binh Luc- Ha
Trung Luong 3-2 0.01098 0.0109
Nam
(2+2)-(1+0) 0.17582 0.5274
3-2 0 0
(20+15)-(19+6) 1 10
Sum 16.934
11-3 0.62637 5.0109
5-1 0.06593 0.2637
7-2 0.18681 0.9340
Long Bien- Vung
An Ngai 3-1 0.01098 0.0219
Tau
(2+2)-(2+0) 0.17582 0.3516
3-2 0 0
(20+17)-(16+6) 1 15
Sum 21.582
12-3 0.62637 5.6373
5-2 0.06593 0.1977
7-2 0.18681 0.9340
Chiem Hoa- 3-1 0.01098 0.0219
Tho Binh
Tuyen Quang (3+1)-(0+1) 0.17582 0.5274
4-3 0 0
(19+15)-(16+7) 1 11
Sum 18.318
14-4 0.62637 6.2637
5-3 0.06593 0.1318
6-4 0.18681 0.3736
2-2 0.01098 0
Dang le An Thi- Hung Yen
(3+1)-(1+0) 0.17582 0.5274
3-2 0 0
(18+16)-(15+7) 1 12
Sum 19.296
10-3 0.62637 6.2637
3-2 0.06593 0.0659
6-4 0.18681 0.3736
Khoai Chau- 3-2 0.01098 0.0109
An Vy
Hung Yen (2+3)-(1+1) 0.17582 0.5274
4-3 0 0
(19+15)-(18+4) 1 12
Sum 19.242
11-5 0.62637 3.7582
3-1 0.06593 0.1318
6-3 0.18681 0.5604
Binh Giang- Hai 3-1 0.01098 0.0219
Hung Thang
Duong (3+1)-(0+2) 0.17582 0.3516
3-1 0 0
(16+17)-(18+4) 1 11
Sum 15.824
8-3 0.62637 3.1318
3-2 0.06593 0.0659
4-2 0.18681 0.3736
Cam Giang- Hai 2-2 0.01098 0
Cao Son
Duong (1+2)-(0+0) 0.17582 0.5274
3-3 0 0
(17+17)-(16+6) 1 12
Sum 16.098

48
 11-3 0.62637 5.0109
3-2 0.06593 0.0659
7-4 0.18681 0.5604
Yen Son- Tuyen 2-0 0.01098 0.0219
An Tuong
Quang (3+2)-(0+1) 0.17582 0.7032
4-1 0 0
(17+18)-(16+4) 1 15
Sum 21.362
11-4 0.62637 4.3845
3-2 0.06593 0.0659
5-3 0.18681 0.3736
Duy Tien- Ha 2-2 0.01098 0
Tien Ngoai
Nam (3+2)-(0+1) 0.17582 0.7032
4-1 0 0
(18+13)-(17+5) 1 9
Sum 14.527
10-4 0.62637 3.7582
5-1 0.06593 0.2637
3-3 0.18681 0
2-1 0.01098 0.0109
An Linh Tuy An- Phu Yen
(3+0)-(1+0) 0.17582 0.3516
4-2 0 0
(20+14)-(17+7) 1 10
Sum 14.384
8-4 0.62637 2.5054
4-3 0.06593 0.0659
6-3 0.18681 0.5604
Hoa Vang- Da 2-1 0.01098 0.0109
Hoa Xuan
Nang (3+1)-(0+1) 0.17582 0.5274
3-2 0 0
(21+14)-(19+5) 1 11
Sum 14.67
5-2 0.62637 1.8791
4-3 0.06593 0.0659
7-2 0.18681 0.9340
Dong Xoai- Binh 2-0 0.01098 0.0219
Tien Thanh
Phuoc (2+3)-(0+1) 0.17582 0.7032
3-2 0 0
(18+14)-(17+5) 1 10
Sum 13.604
5-3 0.62637 1.2527
3-3 0.06593 0
6-2 0.18681 0.7472
Can Duoc - Long 3-0 0.01098 0.0329
Tan Chanh
An (1+3)-(1+0) 0.17582 0.5274
3-1 0 0
(19+13)-(16+7) 1 9
Sum 11.560
3-3 0.62637 0
3-3 0.06593 0
5-3 0.18681 0.3736
Thu Dau mot- 2-1 0.01098 0.0109
Khanh Binh
Binh Duong (0+3)-(0+0) 0.17582 0.5274
2-3 0 0
(19+15)-(16+4) 1 14
Sum 14.912

49
 9-2 0.62637 4.3845
3-2 0.06593 0.0659
2-1 0.18681 0.1868
Song Hinh- Phu 3-1 0.01098 0.0219
Duc Binh Tay
Yen (3+1)-(0+1) 0.17582 0.5274
4-1 0 0
(18+14)-(17+6) 1 9
Sum 14.186
4-2 0.62637 1.2527
4-1 0.06593 0.1977
4-1 0.18681 0.5604
Phuoc Son-
Phuoc Duc 3-0 0.01098 0.0329
Quang Nam
(2+1)-(1+0) 0.17582 0.3516
3-2 0 0
(17+14)-(17+6) 1 8
Sum 10.395
4-2 0.62637 1.2527
5-2 0.06593 0.1977
2-2 0.18681 0
Lap Thach- Vinh
Don Nhan 2-0 0.01098 0.0219
Phuc
(3+1)-(0+1) 0.17582 0.5274
4-1 0 0
(21+15)-(18+6) 1 12
Sum 13.999

50