Barkow, J. H. (2005) - Missing The Revolution
Barkow, J. H. (2005) - Missing The Revolution
Barkow, J. H. (2005) - Missing The Revolution
Jerome H. Barkow,
Editor
2006
Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further
Oxford University’s objective of excellence
in research, scholarship, and education.
Oxford New York
Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto
With offices in
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contributors vii
1. Introduction: Sometimes the Bus Does Wait 3
Jerome H. Barkow
Part I. Gender 61
2. Feminism and Evolutionary Psychology 63
Anne Campbell
3. The Male Flash of Anger: Violent Response to Transgression as an
Example of the Intersection of Evolved Psychology and Culture 101
Daniel M. T. Fessler
Index 295
CONTRIBUTORS
vii
This page intentionally left blank
Missing the Revolution
This page intentionally left blank
1 Introduction: Sometimes the Bus
Does Wait
Jerome H. Barkow
The human sciences have been preoccupied, in recent years. Both sociology
and sociocultural anthropology have been ever more concerned with issues
of equity and power, with learning to hear the voices of minorities and of
women, with seeking to understand macro-level phenomena such as glob-
alization and micro-level phenomena such as the negotiation of social
identity. Anthropology’s core concept of culture and sociology’s claims to
empiricism and objectivity have become suspect. The scientific programs of
Auguste Comte and of Bronislaw Malinowski have been largely discarded,
and both natural and social scientists1 who present themselves as searchers
for the essential truths of human life are now likely to be seen as primarily
pursuing their own power and influence. “Objective” is embarrassed to be
seen without its quotation marks. Perhaps the only assumption beyond chal-
lenge is that of the social-cultural construction of a reality no longer held to
be “out there” but instead understood to be consensual, with hegemonic col-
lectivities self-interestedly striving to control that consensus. But while social
scientists have been learning the vocabulary of “hermeneutics” and “gazes”
and “narratives,” of “discourses” and “texts,” of “trope” and “power,” of
“othering” and “alterity” and “imagined communities,” of “essentialism”
and “agency” and “embodiment,” of “hybridity” and “translocality” and “glob-
alization,” other disciplines have been having their own revolution: Darwin’s
4 in t r o d u c t i on
cumulative social science that is not utterly isolated from the other human
sciences.
Missing’s perspective is not just that we need both the social and bio-
logical sciences but that they are so intertwined that the one without the
other is at best incomplete; at worst, in error. It comes at a point in history
when many social scientists seem to be defining their interests and identities
in opposition to the biological (Bauerlein, 2001), and at a time when much
of the debate seems to involve the torching of conveniently constructed
straw houses in which no one ever really lived (see Kurzban & Haselton, this
volume). Missing presents some applications of evolutionary psychology
(and related approaches) in a manner intended to illustrate their relevance
to current concerns of social scientists. It hopes to be a bridge. Its goal is to
persuade social scientists to put aside preconceptions and think about the
likely links between what they are doing and what evolutionists are doing.
That is, after all, what is happening both for the general reading public
and in most non–social science academic disciplines. First, though, what
Darwinian field are we talking about?
In a New York Times review of David Buss’s (2000) The Dangerous Passion,
Courtney Weaver writes: “Is Darwin replacing Freud as the spokesman for
a millennium? Judging from the recent publication by evolutionary scien-
tists of decidedly politically incorrect theories, it certainly seems that way”
(Weaver, 2000). Yes, and however belatedly, Darwin is replacing not only
Freud but perhaps Marx and Max Weber as well, for the reading public, as
the source of insight into human nature and society.
If physics was the preeminent field of most of the twentieth century,
biology is queen of the first part of the twenty-first. Parsing the human
genome was only the opening round, with proteomics (the study of the pro-
teins produced by the genes) likely to compete with space weaponry in
scope of funding requirements. The media are filled with stories of cloning
and of the genetic engineering of food crops, while biomedicine promises
imminent cures for a host of illnesses. Explainers of biology such as Helen
Fisher (1992, 1999, 2004), Helena Cronin (1992), Richard Dawkins (1976,
1989, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 2000, 2003; Dawkins & Dennett, 1999),
Richard Wrangham (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996; Wrangham, McGrew,
de Waal, & Heltne, 1994), and the late Stephen Jay Gould (e.g., Gould,
1989, 1995, 2002) regularly find their work on the bestseller list, as do
those who, like Michael S. Gazzaniga (1992, 2000), Jean-Pierre Changeux
(1997, 2004), Changeux and Riocoeur (2000), Edelman and Changeux
(2000), Antonio Damasio (1995, 2000, 2003), Daniel Dennett (1995, 1997,
2003), Oliver Sacks (1990, 1995a, 1995b), and Steven Pinker (1993, 1997,
2002), explain to the reading public how the brain and its mind work. The
heroes of our time are not the anthropologists who study our own species,
as Margaret Mead did, but those who, like Jane Goodall (1990) and Dian
i n t r od u c ti on 7
Fossey (1983), have studied nonhuman primates. Science, the journal of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, allocates far more
space to biology and biomedicine than it does to any other fields. In psychi-
atry, Freud has moved to the margins, and a powerful pharmacopeia has
situated disorders not in the spirit or mind but in the brain and the bio-
chemistry. Literature, music, the arts, film, and journalism are being re-
vealed as structures that rest on a base of biology and evolution, thanks to
thinkers and researchers such as Joseph Carroll (1994); Hank Davis (Davis
& McLeod, 2003; Davis & Javor, 2004); Ellen Dissanayake (1992, 2000);
Pamela Shoemaker (1996); Nils Wallin, Bjorn Merker, and Steven
Brown (Wallin, Merker, & Brown, 2000); Robert Storey (1996); and Karl
Grammar and Eckart Voland (Grammar & Voland, 2003). In the media,
not nuclear war but bioterrorism and bioweaponry take pride of place
among our fears. For better or worse, we live in the Age of Biology.
a. Political Science
c. Law
Aside from psychology, the field that perhaps has most en-
gaged with evolutionary psychology and sociobiology is
psychiatry. Evolutionary psychiatry is a burgeoning field. A
few representative titles might include Stevens and Price’s
8
(1996) Evolutionary Psychiatry; McGuire and Troisi’s
(1998) Darwinian Psychiatry; Bruce Charleton’s (2000)
Psychiatry and the Human Condition; Gilbert, McGuire,
and Bailey’s (2000) Evolutionary Psychotherapy; and
Glantz and Pearce’s (1989) Exiles from Eden: Psychotherapy
from an Evolutionary Perspective. Any social scientist with a
focus on “deviant” behavior or mental health needs to keep
abreast of this exciting work.
(Nonpsychiatric) medicine and nutrition are also being
influenced by evolutionary thought, particularly (though
not exclusively) by “mismatch” or “discrepancy” theory—
the premise that many of our ills (social, psychological, and
physical) are due to the distance between our current envi-
ronment and the environments in which we evolved and to
which we presumably remain adapted. Good entries to this
field would be Trevathan, Smith, and McKenna’s (1999)
collection, Evolutionary Medicine; or Nesse and Williams’s
(1994) Why We Get Sick. Eaton et al. (1994) will be of
special interest to those concerned with the health of
women, with special reference to cancer of the breast,
ovary, and endometrium. A recurring theme of this field
is that physicians have often misunderstood the body’s
adaptive response to disease (e.g., by taking the body’s
raised temperature and decreased iron levels in response to
infection as illness to be treated rather than as adaptive de-
fense); or have pathologized evolved prophylactic mecha-
nisms such as (according to Profet [1992, 1993])
menstruation and pregnancy (“morning”) sickness. In nutri-
tion, Eaton, Shostak, and Konner’s (1988) The Paleolithic
Prescription remains a good popular introduction to using
the likely diet of our ancestors as a guide to healthy eating.
More recently, Loren Cordain (2001) has provided a simi-
lar argument and guide. (These authors are primarily scien-
tific researchers rather than popularizers). The underlying
assumption of these works is that our bodies are still
adapted to the diet of our forager/hunting-gathering ances-
tors, rather than to the very high carbohydrate diet preva-
lent since the beginning of agriculture. Evolutionists (and
others) argue that we are very poorly adapted to our cur-
rent industrial diet of highly processed foods.
9
10 i n t r od u c t i o n
f. Management
a. Misuse
We all know that the bad biology of the past has led to genuinely evil efforts,
from selective sterilization to wholesale genocide: hellish policies have been
conducted in the name of eugenics and of “racial” purification. The horror
of these atrocities, culminating in the Holocaust, led to a wholesale re-
pudiation of this pseudobiology and determinism and to a reshaping and
14 i n t r od u c t i o n
Ptolemy may be dead, but his spirit lives on. Yes, Copernicus was right
and the Earth is not the centre of the universe; yes, we have learned to
denounce the claims of racism and patriarchy and we struggle against the
ethnocentrism that lurks within us, but no, species-centrism, that last and
most pervasive of all the centrisms, still seems self-evidently right to many
people. Even some who consider themselves prejudice-free may speak
(and more importantly, think) of “humans and animals” rather than “hu-
mans and other animals.” Once, Descartes could preach that it was our
souls that separated us from all other living things, making of them mere
robots but of ourselves aspirers to the angelic; today’s discourse has evolved,
for now our separateness and superiority are due not to our esprit but to our
culture: applicable as the theories of the evolutionary biologists may be to
the sex of the praying mantis, the alarm calls of marmots, the plumage of
the peacock, and the parenting habits of the mouth-breeding cichlid,
surely they are irrelevant to the complexities of human culture and soci-
ety, divorced as these are from the genes and instincts that control the
actions of all others save ourselves. Surely, too, those who trespass by seek-
ing to apply evolutionary psychology to our species and our societies must
have dark motives: perhaps they seek to reduce glorious humankind to
mere animal status or, even worse, to support the manipulations of eu-
genicists and the claims of racists. Much of the opposition to applying evo-
lution to human behavior stems from this deeply conservative, even reac-
tionary impulse to maintain the mysteriousness of human behavior and, at
all costs, to keep a chasm between ourselves and the rest of “Creation.” So-
cial scientists and creationists are often strange allies in the campaign to
continue to exclude human behavior and society from the natural world.
What unites them is their Cartesianism.
i n t r od u c ti on 15
cognitive maps of the social behavior of others and of ourselves (or our selves)
(Barkow, 1989; see Damasio, 2000, for an essentially similar but neuro-
logically based approach to the problem of consciousness and self).9 Be
that as it may, we do have a brain that is amazingly able to understand and
to influence others but which nevertheless remains an organ of the body,
not a separate spirit or essence. One of the evolved attributes of the body of
a young human male, as Fessler (this volume) discusses, is the capacity for a
flash of rage. It is no more good or bad than, say, the ability to store extra
calories as adipose tissue—both capabilities are products of evolution that in
some environments have adaptive and in others deadly consequences; both
are at times unwelcome, but neither is utterly uncontrollable. Fessler is no
more excusing male anger by pointing to its evolutionary roots than a phys-
iologist is advocating obesity when discussing the formerly adaptive aspects
of lipid metabolism.
c. A Durkheimian Fallacy
representations and selves and surfaces and emotions and even shared
schemata—without being psychological. They explicate the confusions
found in theoreticians from Clifford Geertz (both early and late) to Judith
Butler and Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault, confusions that arise
because representations that are “external” or “public” necessarily have an
internal (psychological) counterpart: if they are not instantiated in the
brain, then where—the ether? Some schemata are more motivating than
others, and psychology is necessary to understand this; however socially
constructed emotions may be, they seem to have a core that is much the
same in society after society; public ideas are also private ideas and under-
standings; and so forth. For social behavior to take place, for meanings to
be inferred and identities to be negotiated, the human brain must be at
work—there are thoughts, perceptions, strategies, ideas, and emotions in
play. While much is public, much is not. But even that which is public must
be represented in the human brain, because where else can social knowl-
edge exist? Cultural transmission is only a metaphor, what Strauss and
Quinn refer to as the “fax” model. No direct transmission from brain to brain
takes place, only inference (Sperber, 1996) involving complex evolved
mechanisms.
Does the sociological concept of agency solve the problem of the
Durkheimian fallacy? “Agency” is the term social scientists use to recognize
that there is such a thing as human volition and choice and not just deter-
ministic structure. One can argue that it is a useful abridgment that per-
mits social scientists to get on with their work without having to go into
psychological detail. One could also argue that social scientists should
not be “getting on” with their work without, for example, first studying
the well-developed literature in psychology and economics on decision-
making (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2000; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). Certainly,
using “agency” can function to maintain an aura of the mysteriousness about
human choice. Sociologist Bernd Baldus (this volume) argues that evolu-
tionary psychology should be criticized for neglecting agency, which he
sees as a major source of the variation in human behavior.
based human nature, then totalitarian dictators can indeed succeed in re-
creating humanity according to their own designs, as both Stalin and Hitler
(among others) sought to do. However, Marx did teach and his more fun-
damentalist followers still believe that social inequality is the cause of most
of the evils of human nature, and that we are a perfectable species: once
social inequality has ended, the improved human nature that results will not
restore it. For those of this faith, arguing for a highly complex evolved psy-
chology is worthy only of anathema.
But if being on the Left has the core meaning of espousing a set of val-
ues having to do with equity and dignity, as the noted ethicist Peter Singer
(2000) argues, then the Left needs a solid theory of human nature in order
to achieve its goals. As we will see, evolutionary psychology may provide not
just theory but a potential praxis for social activists.
Many social scientists see their work as a sort of moral mission—first and
foremost, help the oppressed and protect our world. Very often, these indi-
viduals do estimable work both as serious scholars and as partisans of the
public interest (e.g., the research and writing of anthropologist Nancy
Scheper-Hughes on the trade in human organs (Delmonico et al., 2002;
Scheper-Hughes, 1998, 1999, 2000). From their perspective, would not a
focus on evolutionary psychology—a field whose goal is the accumulation
of knowledge of human nature and society and which emphasizes past
adaptations—draw attention away from the social inequality and oppression
that are the proximate causes of human suffering? Would not a social sci-
ence concern with our evolved psychology be at the expense of under-
standing and exposing the far more immediate cause of so much human
pain, the unequal distribution of wealth and power?
Consider that the field of medical epidemiology, which some of us may
naively imagine to epitomize benignity, has been strongly attacked by moral
mission social scientists. The deservedly eminent medical anthropologist
Paul Farmer (1998), for example, criticizes epidemiology for focusing on
individuals rather than on political economy and transnational factors. He
approvingly quotes (p. 103) McMichael’s (1995) portrayal of that field as
“oriented to explaining and quantifying the bobbing of corks on the surface
waters, while largely disregarding the stronger undercurrents that determine
where, on average, the cluster of corks ends up along the shoreline of risk.”
So, individual cases of disease are corks while political/economic forces are
the currents, and epidemiologists focus only on corks while ignoring cur-
rents. What would a Farmer or McMichael make of evolutionary psycho-
logy, with its focus not even on the cork but on what is happening within the
i n t r od u c ti on 19
cork and on the cork’s conjectural evolutionary history? Surely, for the moral
mission sociologist or anthropologist, advising social scientists to engage with
evolutionary psychology must appear akin to urging firefighters to take a
break from the current conflagration in order to study pyromancy.
But that analogy is utterly false: a more apt comparison would be advis-
ing firefighters to study the principles of combustion in order to help pre-
vent and more effectively extinguish fires. Evolutionary psychology is an
essential aspect of understanding the problems our species faces and finding
solutions to them. This is emphatically not because evolutionary thought is
some kind of moral guide (as some scholars hope and as others fear): we can-
not derive morality from biology.10 But we can use evolutionary psychology
as a tool in analyzing how capitalist systems function and why social prob-
lems, inequality in particular, recur. With the aid of social scientists, evolu-
tionary psychology can lead to an evolutionary praxis (Barkow, 2003). Let us
table that important possibility for the second time, for the moment, while
we return to the topic of what evolutionary psychology is and is not.
What is a gene?11 A gene is not a recipe book—it is closer to being one of the
ingredients in the stew. Perhaps the gene is the meat—no one denies the im-
portance of the DNA—but it is not some kind of executive, or master plan,
or anything like a blueprint. Information in a fertilized egg is generated, pro-
duced by cascades of interactions of mind-boggling complexity, with other
factors, particularly the makeup of the mother-supplied machinery in which
the gene finds itself, equally sine qua non. The gene-first approach—whether
the conceptual gene used by the mathematics of population genetics or the
distributed but physical gene of genomics—does have its virtues. But the mis-
leading image of an executive gene, single-codonly able to cause disease
or talent, has captured the popular imagination and helped to generate fund-
ing for gene-centered research. This approach has also drawn some thought-
ful criticism. Nelkin and Lindee (1995) show how the gene is often
presented as a sort of secular soul, the essence that ultimately determines in-
dividual behavior. The views of developmental systems theorists such as
Griffiths and Gray (1994) and Oyama (1991, 2000) are in sharp contrast,
seeing the gene as one ingredient among many. Evelyn Fox Keller (1999)
goes so far as to write that “The history of genetic programs bears the con-
spicuous marks of a history of discourse and power” (p. 289). Despite such
criticism, the gene-first assumption currently prevails. One hears people
saying not “she has the gift for that” but “she has the gene for that.”12 This
essentialistic/deterministic view feeds into biophobia because it presents
the gene as the controlling CEO responsible for everything—including our
20 i n t r od u c t i o n
most horrifying behaviors. If genes are so powerful then they must be dan-
gerous, they are destiny: the fault, dear Brutus, lies not in our stars but in
our genes! But though the myth of the executive gene13 contributes to
the anger social scientists often express when presented with evolutionary
accounts of human behavior, in fact evolutionary psychologists do not usu-
ally study genes or genetics, and genes have but a small place in the pre-
sent volume.
is no need for the social scientist qua social scientist to be concerned with
arguments over the molecular biology of reproduction, including the precise
definition and role of the gene. It is not even clear that the social scientist
need be overly concerned with the details of the arguments over mechanisms
(e.g., the “cheater-detection” mechanism posited by Leda Cosmides and
John Tooby [Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, 1992, 2001]). We do not need to
understand the biological bases of the mechanisms in order to understand
their social consequences.
Textbook after textbook informs the student that we human beings adapt
to different ecological settings through culture, while animal species do
so through genetic change. This commonplace observation tells us little
because it leaves out evolved mechanisms. The behavior of one species dif-
fers from that of another because their evolved mechanisms are different.
Ours have been designed by evolution to adapt us to a cultural environ-
ment. (“Culture” is defined below.)
Some evolved psychological mechanisms involve what can loosely be
termed “learning.” One can learn from one’s own experience (individual
learning) and from the experience of others (social learning). When a species
becomes capable of a sufficient degree of social learning, a new possibility
arises: local populations may develop pools of shared information that is
communicated both within and across generations. The total pool of such
information associated with a particular population can be termed a culture.
In this sense of culture it is quite common among social animals, including
whales and dolphins (Rendell & Whitehead, 2001). Our own species is
hypercultural (Barkow, 2000), so heavily dependent on total immersion in
a vast information pool that our central nervous system requires it to develop
properly (Geertz, 1962, 1973).
The informational items comprising human cultures go by many names,
including: ideas, beliefs, traits, instructions, representations, schemata, and
(for those who like near-rhymes) “memes.” The same or similar particles of
information may occur in many different pools that, in any case, usually
overlap with one another; the population(s) with which a pool is associated
may be distributed rather than tied to limited geographic regions. A single
individual may participate in more than one pool, given that pools are prop-
erties of populations and the same individual may be counted in multiple
populations (there are many ways in which to define a population). The
structure of information pools depends upon the brains of individuals at one
level and upon the social organization of its population(s) on the other (i.e.,
some castes or professions may specialize in certain kinds of information)
and is not a property of the pool itself. Note that this informational approach
to the culture concept avoids the various criticisms leveled at it during the
1980s and 1990s by critics such as James Clifford and George E. Marcus
i n t r od u c ti on 23
membership, for many social scientists, in spite of both mild (e.g., Hacking,
1999) and scathing (Bauerlein, 2001) philosophical criticism of their use of
the approach. If you are a sociologist or social-cultural anthropologist today,
you must be a social constructionist.
to do the same, such lapses are best viewed as an opportunity for sociologists
and social-cultural anthropologists to criticize evolutionary psychology in a
constructive rather than dismissive manner. (Social scientists are also needed
to protect psychologists, including evolutionary psychologists, from their
tendency to generalize to the human species on the basis of research done
on undergraduates in one or two countries.)
What vertical integration and evolutionary psychology do for the social sci-
ences is threefold: (1) they permit culling of impossible theories while iden-
tifying areas where further research and thought are needed; (2) they permit
a practical if strictly limited approach to the often-sought unification of the
life sciences with the social sciences; and (3) they can reveal serious defi-
ciencies in academic programs and training.
The first decade of this century is a fertile time for the social sciences, with
a thousand flowers blooming . . . along with a dismaying number of weeds.
Social scientists often think of career success in terms of founding a personal
school of thought, complete with partisans and critics and neologisms.
Training consists not of studying a sequence of topics (e.g., molecular biol-
ogy, genomics, medical implications of genomics, etc.) but of great indi-
vidualistic, relatively unintegrated thinkers (e.g., Karl Marx, Max Weber,
Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault,
Pierre Bourdieu, Judith Butler, G. H. Mead, Anthony Giddens, Bruno
Latour, etc.). How do we weed this overgrown garden by getting rid of at
least the weakest theoretical approaches? The compatibility requirement
of vertical integration suggests one way. Are the psychological/biological
assumptions made by the theory compatible with what we believe about our
evolution and psychology? After all, a theory involving chemistry that vio-
lated physics’ requirement for conservation of matter and energy would be
readily discarded. A theory in social-cultural anthropology or in sociology
that incorporated assumptions that are impossible in terms of modern biol-
ogy and psychology should at the least be considered suspect. For example,
suppose our implicit or explicit assumption is that human females and males
are psychologically identical except for matters directly touching on repro-
ductive physiology. As we see from Campbell’s contribution to this volume,
this assumption is incompatible with an immense amount of psychologi-
cal (and also neuroendocrinological) research. It is also incompatible with
32 i n t r od u c t i o n
as the social sciences but with new clarity and compatibility and a tendency
for ordered understandings to accumulate rather than for fashions to shift.
Vertical/compatible integration is an intellectually much less ambitious
goal than the total ending of dichotomies for which Latour (1993) calls in
We Have Never Been Modern—for followers of Latour and other philoso-
pher/anthropologists, its very simplicity will make it unacceptable.23 The ap-
proach is also far more modest than the “jumping together” of explanations
espoused by E. O. Wilson (1998) in his Consilience. I am sympathetic to the
goals of these authors and aware that for true unifiers vertical integration can
be no more than a first step. But it is a step we have not yet taken.
Will an evolutionarily informed, vertically integrated social science re-
semble the natural sciences?24 Perhaps it should not. The eminent biologist
(and critic of sociobiology) Richard Lewontin (1995, p. 28) warns: “Each
domain of phenomena has its characteristic grain of knowability. Biology is
not physics, because organisms are such complex physical objects, and
sociology is not biology because human societies are made by self-conscious
organisms. By pretending to a kind of knowledge that it cannot achieve, so-
cial science can only engender the scorn of natural scientists and the cyni-
cism of humanists.” In similar fashion, sociologist of science Bent Flyvbjerg
(2001, p. 166) urges us “to drop the fruitless efforts to emulate natural sci-
ence’s success in producing cumulative and predictive theory; this approach
simply does not work in the social sciences.” True enough, axiomatic physics
makes a poor model for the social sciences, but the pronouncements of
Lewontin25 and especially Flyvbjerg seem remarkably premature given that
few social scientists have ever attempted vertical integration. Human science
theory needs to be evaluated in terms of compatibility with adjacent levels
of analysis. I suspect that the eventual result will probably be a lot closer
to the multilevel, multidisciplinary field of natural history and to plant and
animal ecology than to chemistry or physics: but in the end, all sciences are
unique, and other fields have only limited applicability as models. (Adopt-
ing the formalisms of the natural sciences without their vertical integration
produced the kind of foolishness in which academic psychology, for much
of the twentieth century, ruled consciousness out of its subject matter in
order to be more “scientific,” straitjacketing itself by tailoring its theories to
fit its conception of “scientific” methodology.)
our focus, willy-nilly, to what for our ancestors would have been adaptation-
relevant information. The weather, physical danger from any source, scarce
resources—these topics readily capture our attention. But we are a social
species and apparently evolved in an environment featuring strong social
competition (Mithen, 1996). As a result, much of the apparently adaptation-
relevant information that pricks up our ears is social information such as
sexual activity, change in others’ reputation for honesty; alteration in
health, strength, or relative standing; creation and demise of friendships/
alliances, birth and death; and so forth. We constantly exchange such infor-
mation, often distorting it so that it is in our self-interest or the interest of
relatives and friends (cf. Buss & Dedden, 1990; McAndrew & Milenkovic,
2002). We call this phenomenon “gossip” (Barkow, 1992). A careful study
of 200 years of newspapers shows that these are also the kinds of topics that
we want to read about (Davis & McLeod, 2003).
Commercially successful Hollywood and Bollywood movies also focus
on these topics (Hejl, Kammer, & Uhl, in preparation). We seem to auto-
matically yet avidly attend to gossiplike information about, for example, the
reputations and sexual activities of fictional high-status individuals or of ac-
tual celebrities who, however, are for no practical purpose members of our
communities. Just as industrial food manufacturers exploit our evolved
sense of taste, other corporations exploit our evolved attentional mecha-
nisms to sell us newspapers, movies, and other media. Whether this flood of
often fictitious information is actually harmful has not yet been clearly es-
tablished, but it certainly is profitable for the interests producing it.
This is not the place in which to develop a full theory of the media ex-
ploitation of the brain’s attentional triggers: the topic is illustrative of the
point that the evolutionary perspective helps us understand the infrastruc-
ture of modern society and readily generates substantial research programs
with great relevance for social-cultural anthropologists and sociologists. Any-
one interested in “globalization” will find that Darwin is a good place to begin
in understanding how multinational corporations can be so successful in cre-
ating demand for their products worldwide. Evolution is always a good place
to begin but—remembering the lessons of vertical integration—seldom a
good place to end.
The infrastructural role of our evolved psychology is hardly limited to
film and food. For example, in the 1970s, in the city of Maradi in Niger,
I undertook a study based on the premise that human beings, as we grow
older, learn to substitute symbolic prestige criteria for the relatively agonis-
tic dominance hierarchies of young children and of other primates. I found,
in Maradi, that those shut out of other paths to high relative standing by the
ruling government fonctionnaires were turning to Islam. They were also dele-
gitimating status-claims of the French-language-educated élites, creating a
powerful resurgence of religion (Barkow, 1975). A project that began with
36 i n t r od u c t i o n
The great weakness of the Marxist and Marxian critique of capitalism and
struggle against oppression is their failure to predict the recurrence of in-
equality. History shows that after the revolution comes . . . another revo-
lution. Social problems recur, with each set of solutions leading to new
problems, while slow reforms often only palliate. There is a cliché that
youthful Marxist idealism gets replaced with middle-aged conservatism, a
veer to the political Right. Perhaps this is because the middle-aged have ex-
perienced the return of the reformed, that is, the restoration of old problems
in new guise, the endless recurrence of social inequality, of people wanting
i n t r od u c ti on 37
more resources and respect for themselves and their children and their
friends than they want for others. The old aristocrats and capitalists are over-
thrown only to be replaced by a “new class”—in the case of Soviet Commu-
nism, by the nomenklatura or bureaucratic élite (Djilas, 1957). Such
phenomena are generally discussed in moral terms, that is, in terms of be-
trayal. Unfortunately, moral condemnation, no matter how well deserved,
does not make for adequate social theory. It is the evolutionary perspective
that can provide not only a framework for analysis but at least a hope of ef-
fective praxis.
Social stratification is a reflex of the evolutionary fact that people do
want more for their own children than they want for the children of others
(Barkow, 1992; Tiger & Shepher, 1975): ideologically based efforts to cre-
ate social systems that ignore this evolutionary reality, as in the early Israeli
kibbuttzim, fail. In evolutionary terms, this is a no-brainer: Offspring re-
semble their parents, and we are the children of those who did more for their
own children and other kin than they did for others because by doing so they
had more surviving children and other relatives than did those others. Once
human societies became relatively sedentary and it became possible for us
to leave rank and wealth to our children, we did so (Barkow, 1992). But biol-
ogy is not destiny unless we ignore it (Barkow, 2003). An anti-nepotistic,
meritocratic ideology makes for far better-qualified administrators than does
a favor-your-children-and-other-relatives ethic. It also directly counters
our evolved psychology.27 Fortunately, by using our practical awareness of
human nature when we design bureaucracies, we can work around our ten-
dency toward nepotism. We can try to make sure that the system rewards
those who are not nepotistic and punishes those who are. Constant vigilance
will still be needed because we are indeed working around human nature
and also because one aspect of that nature is our tendency to believe that
rules and even moral principles apply only to others rather than to ourselves;
but relatively non-nepotistic bureaucracies can and do exist. Wise social
planners and designers of bureaucracies are constantly taking our evolved
psychology into account, sometimes working with it and other times work-
ing around it.
The term “work around” comes from the work of evolutionists Peter
Richerson and Robert Boyd (1999, 2001). How do we explain the
Wehrmacht, the Germany military forces of 1935–1945, when we obvi-
ously did not evolve to risk our lives on behalf of non-kin strangers running
a murderously aggressive modern state? Richerson and Boyd analyzed how
the German officer corps worked around our evolved psychology, manipu-
lating it to create an evolutionarily unanticipated social institution whose ef-
fects had nothing to do with genetic fitness (and which, in fact, was no doubt
maladaptive for a large proportion of its participants, particularly those who
were killed!). Our species’s evolved psychology is well adapted to mutual
38 i n t r od u c t i o n
defense on a local level, and given external threat we bond tightly on the
basis of kinship and community and their markers, such as accent, rallying
around a leader who takes the role of a senior relative.28 The German mil-
itary’s work-around involved: (1) organizing the army in terms of units
of men from the same region who shared a local dialect; (2) training of-
ficers to look after the men and to take responsibility for their welfare;
and (3) promoting strong bonding among the men and between enlisted
men and officers.
Military organization is hardly unique in having an evolutionary psy-
chology infrastructure: We could move from social institution to social in-
stitution and for each one identify the underlying evolutionary psychology.
This claim seems particularly plausible in connection with the advertising
and marketing industries, but there are no institutions without motivated in-
dividuals, and the study of those motivations ultimately leads to a study of
our evolved psychology. Capitalism itself (as was previously suggested) in-
volves a complex work-around of mechanisms having to do with social
standing, reputation, and resource control. The work-around concept helps
move us from evolutionary biology’s concerns with genetic fitness and the
evolutionary psychologist’s focus on individual-level evolved mechanisms to
the social scientist’s emphasis on society and culture. Work-arounds simply
are the way in which Boyd and Richerson chose to talk about how history
has channeled the expression of our evolved psychology. Note that work-
arounds do not ordinarily arise from a sophisticated understanding of Darwin
but out of experience and insight with what works, in the real world, and
probably also from a group-level selection process. That is, organizations and
even nations arise and dissolve in a (nonbiological) Darwinian process. We
mostly get to know and study only the successful societies, so it would be
surprising if we did not find that they utilized numerous effective work-
arounds. For example, societies with non-nepotistic civil services are
probably more likely to endure, historically (all things being equal), than
those with in which bureaucratic advancement is more a matter of kin-
ship than merit.
An evolutionarily informed praxis would look much like deliberately
designed work-arounds (Barkow, 2003). Could we develop a work-
around to correct the industrial food problem previously discussed? We
could and we should. Perhaps the attend-preferentially-to-the-high-in-
status mechanism previously discussed could be enlisted: high-status in-
dividuals would be presented as disdaining some industrial food products
in favor of more healthy foods. Perhaps the ethnocentrism response could
be harnessed if we taught children to associate fat, sweet, and salty foods
with out-group membership. Linking healthy foods to having a competi-
tive edge would be a likely tactic, as would associating them with sexual
attractiveness.
i n t r od u c ti on 39
than assuming that our intuitions are always correct (e.g., does shaming re-
ally lower status, and did Amy Alkon’s tactics effectively lower status, and
in whose eyes?—these are researchable questions). Finally, it could turn out
that some evolutionary insights are indeed genuinely novel.30
Still, an evolutionary praxis will often simply frame the familiar in
terms of the Darwinian metanarrative. Just that is satisfying for some of us
and should not be objectionable to the rest. The point is that evolution and
activism are definitely mutually compatible, and the association is likely to
strengthen the latter. The “moral mission” social scientists previously re-
ferred to will find the evolutionary approach largely comfortable (except,
perhaps, for the reflexivity aspect of it; examining one’s own motives and
actions is always disquieting and can be embarrassing).
Human beings apprehend the world through stories, and stories about sto-
ries, and the Darwinian metanarrative is one of the greatest stories about sto-
ries ever told. For the human sciences, it serves two purposes. One of these
is to provide a framework which “makes sense” to researchers, which per-
mits us to put human and nonhuman behaviors and societies in a framework
meaningful to ourselves and our students and readers. Is the framework
objectively true? That kind of question no longer has meaning. Does it
have competition, in its power and comprehensiveness? Marxism and neo-
Marxism leave out the natural world and are thus not competitors—only the
world’s great religions are comparable in scope. Do we need powerful, in-
tegrating metanarratives? Postmodernists would say no, for the postmod-
ernist stance is skepticism toward all grand theory (Lyotard, 1984), all
“totalizing” metanarratives. One could argue that postmodernism is itself a
metanarrative, an argument whose only point is that all or at least most of
us seem to need some kind of broad framework to understand the universe,
even if that framework involves the organized denial of that need. For many
of us, Darwin seems to work, constantly giving us the feeling of “now that
makes sense.” For those for whom a Darwinian framework does not work,
that fact provides license for thoughtful criticism and a reason to seek to de-
velop alternative frameworks leading to alternative predictions and defini-
tions of data, but it is certainly not grounds for contemptuous dismissal.
Regardless of whether the evolutionary framework provides some kind
of cognitive satisfaction, of “fitting together” for any particular individual, it
serves its second human science purpose for everyone: it is an incredibly
powerful generator of theories and hypotheses. These must be tested and
debated, alternatives considered, and so forth, in the usual business of sci-
ence. The so-called adaptationist program is about generating hypotheses
i n t r od u c ti on 41
and theory; it is first and foremost a heuristic stance. Only secondarily, be-
cause it is also a satisfying metanarrative for many, need its theories and data
and plain stories be linked to other Darwinian stories in a grand narrative.
And always, the compatibility requirement is a rigorous test of what can be
retained and what must be rethought, a requirement largely lacking in non-
science metanarratives.
One can be deeply skeptical of the Darwinian metanarrative while still
seeking to understand and use it. Non-Marxists can and do read Marx and use
his insights. Non-Christians may learn from that religion. Non-evolutionists
may find much of value in Darwin and in the Darwinian perspective shared
by evolutionary psychology and sociobiology. Of course, if they know noth-
ing of these fields but the parodies produced by critics, then they will indeed
wonder what the fuss is about. But because so much of the intellectual life
of our period of history is heavily influenced by Darwin, they miss much.
For social scientists, who have largely been among the missing, they risk see-
ing their fields marginalized (Ellis, 1996; Lopreato & Crippen, 1999).
Of course, for many evolutionists, Darwinism is not a “metanarrative,”
it is simply the truth, and those who reject it are the heathen, the infidels,
the out-group. Enthusiastic evolutionists do at times forget about vertical in-
tegration, they do at times overgeneralize from data from a single society,
and they do at times create stories about past adaptive advantage that serve
only to account for current results rather than to generate new hypotheses:
In short, they do, at times, need and benefit from criticism. There is no good
reason for such criticism to be vicious or belittling or disrespectful, however,
even when it is badly needed.
The naturalizing project of the Darwinians has suffered badly from a
lack of criticism, a lack of informed criticism from social scientists. Social sci-
entists have no monopoly on expertise in human society and culture, true,
but their knowledge of this subject is massive. Psychologists and biologists
may present much theory and data on likely evolved mechanisms and human
commonalties, but without informed criticism from sociologists and social-
cultural anthropologists they may overlook even the need for theorizing dif-
ferences and contingencies, for appreciating the role of social structure and
economics—and history—in human action. If the work of sociologists and
social anthropologists suffers from the Durkheimian fallacy, that of psychol-
ogists in particular can suffer from a slighting of levels of organization above
that of the individual. But when evolutionary perspectives do encompass
both the individual and the socioeconomic context, wonderful things hap-
pen. We get, for example, the previously cited accounts of the nature of re-
ligion from Boyer and Atran. We get Barbara Smuts’s (1995) account of the
origins of patriarchy. We get the beginnings of a coherent framework for un-
derstanding both human psychology and sociology. We get social science dis-
ciplines in which knowledge is cumulative and accessible across the island
42 i n t r od u c t i o n
14. Conclusions
The brief “bridging” passages that precede each of the four sections of this
book are in effect continuations of this introduction. The chapters are il-
lustrative of current evolutionary approaches but are too few to represent
more than a sampling of ongoing work—a truly comprehensive overview
of Darwinian perspectives in the human sciences would require a trilogy!
Notes
12. I have even heard, “He just doesn’t have the genes for that.” In that
context, “genes” was apparently meant to be a euphemism for cojones.
13. Evolutionists must constantly battle against the idea of a su-
perdeterministic gene. For recent skirmishes, see Dennett (2003) and
Pinker (2002).
14. Segarstråle (this volume) suspects that this avoidance of genetics
represents an effort on the part of evolutionary psychologists to avoid con-
troversy, and this suspicion is shared by at least one behavior geneticist of
my acquaintance. My own research interests do not involve genes, but per-
haps Segarstråle is correct and this focus does reflect a desire for a quiet life.
I doubt that, in my own case, but of course I cannot speak for others.
15. Otherwise well-informed critics such as Ehrlich and Feldman
(2003), who see evolutionary psychologists as some kind of genetic reduc-
tionists, are very far off the mark because the field has little to do with ge-
netics or genes. The debate in which such critics need to engage involves the
nature, generality, limits, and of course ontological status of posited mech-
anisms and the claim that they constrain and enable the enormous diversity
of human societies.
16. More properly, polygenes, groups of genes that work together to
help produce a particular trait or mechanism.
17. Social constructivists differ from constructionists in focusing on the
individual, psychological level (Gergen, 1994, p. 67), while radical con-
structivists (von Glasersfeld, 1991, 1995) are careful not to posit any kind of
“objective” reality out there at all.
18. I am grateful to Dan Fessler for his insight into the relationship be-
tween Lutz’s work and evolutionary psychology. Any misunderstandings are
entirely my own, however.
19. For a more philosophical approach to reconciling social construc-
tionist and evolutionary psychology, with particular reference to the nature
of emotion and the work of Catherine Lutz (1988), see Mallon & Stitch
(2000) and Stitch (1996). These authors see the dispute over local rather
than core universal definitions of emotions as a misunderstanding about
metaphysics.
20. See also Borgerhoff Mulder, Richerson, Thornhill, & Voland (1997)
for a thorough discussion of the relationship between evolutionary psychol-
ogy and human behavioral ecology.
21. For discussion of how maladaptive cultural traits can become es-
tablished, see Aunger (2000), Barkow (1984, 1989, pp. 293–322), Edger-
ton (1992), Logan & Qirko (1996), Richerson & Boyd (2004), and Takahasi
(1998, 1999).
22. Jack Goody (1982, p. 8) describes “the emergence of new socio-
logical theory” as involving “the statement of opposition to the present es-
tablishment.” He adds that “this process is often ‘cyclical’ and ‘repetitive,’
more rebellion than revolution” (drawing on Max Gluckman’s distinction
between rebellions as opposed to revolutions). Changes are more substitu-
tions in approach than major changes in theory: “Rather than crystallizing
i n t r od u c ti on 47
existing knowledge and offering a model for future experimental and intel-
lectual work, such changes indicate any shift of emphasis between possibil-
ities that lie permanently embedded in the analysis of sociological material.”
Goody disputes that sociology and social anthropology are cumulative fields,
as opposed to cyclical fields, in which not so much theory as “approach”
changes over time. An approach provides a “plan of attack,” a general re-
search strategy about what “to look for” (p. 7). Poststructuralists would no
doubt disagree with Goody.
23. Complex ambiguity is the academic version of conspicuous con-
sumption. Geoffrey Miller (2000) explains conspicuous consumption as a
type of display behavior—items are frequently purchased by the wealthy
not in spite of their cost but because of their cost. Similarly, in academia,
obscure, convoluted, richly ambiguous theoreticians are often read not in
spite of their difficulty but because of their difficulty. The ostensible pay-
off in conspicuous consumption is utility, and that in conspicuous display
prose is intellectual insight, but in fact in both cases the payoff is primar-
ily a claim to status by the purchaser/reader. The philosopher Bertrand
Russell (1946) long ago demonstrated that the most abstruse of philo-
sophical ideas could in fact be presented with great lucidity—but Russell
was writing at a time when it was indeed clarity rather than its lack that
earned prestige and publication.
24. O’Meara (1997) and the accompanying commentaries on his posi-
tion make for a good entry to the debate within anthropology on this topic.
As of this writing, there is no sign of a consensus emerging.
25. Lewontin has been a powerful critic of efforts to understand the be-
havior of our species in the light of evolutionary biology (see Segerstråle,
[2000], this volume). While he appreciates that adopting an empty scien-
tific formalism (“scientism”) is not the solution to the problems of the social
sciences, he would apparently not agree that the solution is making the as-
sumptions of social scientists compatible with evolutionary biology and psy-
chology. Few, however, have made the attempt.
26. For a discussion of the sociological processes in the social sciences
that generate ignorance of and antipathy toward adjacent fields, see Barkow
(1989, pp. 11–14). The structurally generated insularity of the social sci-
ences is a significant factor in the movement of many social scientists to the
humanities, in recent years. Without the power of the vertically integrated
approach to winnow out impossible theory, and without the stimulation
that comes from cross-species comparisons, the student of social science is
faced with a bewildering variety of approaches and no easy way to differen-
tiate among them except, to be sure, the political (that is, in terms of al-
liances and career interests, factors important in all fields).
27. In 1968, while living in a small Hausa village in northern Nigeria, I
once attempted to explain to an ordinary farmer the idea that nepotism was
something bad and civil service examinations good. I knew the precise in-
stant when, in spite of my imperfect Hausa and the bizarreness of the idea,
he had grasped what I was saying because he suddenly looked at me in shock.
48 i n t r od u c t i o n
His instant and amazed reproach was: “You would favor strangers over your
own brothers?” It was clear that, for him, I was advocating a really unusual
kind of immorality.
28. These evolved mechanisms underlie the ethnocentrism phenome-
non, the tendency for human beings to readily form into in-groups that are
likely to compete with out-groups for status and resources and to face ex-
ternal threat with increased in-group solidarity. For discussion of ethnocen-
trism and also of how we may have been selected for this cluster of traits,
see (for example) Alexander (1979), Barkow (1989, 2000), Irwin (1987),
LeVine & Campbell (1972), Reynolds, Falger, & Vine (1987), and Shaw &
Wong (1988).
29. Amy Alkon, a journalist and syndicated columnist, placed cards on
the windshields of SUVs parked on Los Angeles streets. The cards read (to
quote from the account under her own byline that appeared in the Los
Angeles New Times of April 11, 2002 (http://www.newtimesla.com/
issues/2002-04-11/sidecar.html/1/index.html), and from the account in the
London Guardian of April 16, 2002 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/
Article/0,4273,4395102,00.html): “Road-hogging, gas-guzzling, air-fouling
vulgarian! Clearly you have an extremely small penis or you wouldn’t drive
such a monstrosity. For the adequately endowed, there are hybrids or
electrics. 310 798 1817.” Dialing that telephone number would result in a
voice saying, “Piggy, piggy, piggy. If you can afford one of those huge new
SUVs you can afford something that doesn’t suck all the air out of the planet
and spit it back black. . . . It’s really creepy that you drive that thing and I
just wanted to let you know.” Alkon (in a personal communication) explains
that she pressed the evolutionary psychology buttons that she believes
would create shame over driving an SUV because doing so meant that these
drivers were using up more than their fair share of resources. Though her
campaign is only a modest and simple beginning, and not necessarily the best
possible strategy to achieve her end of protecting the environment, it does
support the notion that an evolutionary praxis is possible. Presumably, more
subtle techniques are possible.
30. For example, the study of sperm competition and its implications
was quite unanticipated (e.g., Bellis & Baker, 1995; Birkhead, 2000; Low,
1999).
31. In part, though only in part, the larger context for the anti-evolution
stance of the human sciences is that of the “science wars” of the turn of the
twenty-first century. For an analysis of anti-biology and anti-evolutionism in
the humanities, see McBride (1998).
References
Daly, M., & Wilson, M. I. (1988). Homicide. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Damasio, A. R. (1995). Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human
Brain. New York: Pan Macmillan.
Damasio, A. R. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in
the Making of Consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Damasio, A. R. (2000). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in
the Making of Consciousness. San Diego, CA: Harcourt/Harvest Books.
Damasio, A. R. (2003). Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling
Brain. New York: Harcourt.
Davis, H., & Javor, A. (2004). Religion, death and horror movies: Some
striking evolutionary parallels. Evolution and Cognition, 19, 11–18.
Davis, H., & McLeod, S. L. (2003). Why humans value sensational news: An
evolutionary perspective. Evolution & Human Behavior, 24, 208–216.
Dawkins, R. (1976). The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dawkins, R. (1982). The Extended Phenotype: The Gene as the Unit of Selec-
tion. Oxford and San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
Dawkins, R. (1989). The Selfish Gene (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Dawkins, R. (1996a). The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolu-
tion Reveals a Universe without Design. New York: W. W. Norton.
Dawkins, R. (1996b). Climbing Mount Improbable. New York: W. W.
Norton.
Dawkins, R. (1996c). River Out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life. New
York: Basic Books.
Dawkins, R. (2000). Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion and the
Appetite for Wonder. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Dawkins, R. (2003). A Devil’s Chaplain: Reflections on Hope, Lies, Science,
and Love. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Dawkins, R., & Dennett, D. C. (1999). The Extended Phenotype: The Long
Reach of the Gene (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
De Waal, F. (1996). Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in
Humans and Other Animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
DeLamater, J. D., & Hyde, J. S. (1998). Essentialism vs. social construc-
tionism in the study of human sexuality. Journal of Sex Research,
35(1), 10–18.
Delmonico, F. L., Arnold, R., Scheper-Hughes, N., Siminoff, L. A., Kahn,
J., & Younger, S. J. (2002). Sounding board: Ethical incentives—not
payment—for organ donation. New England Journal of Medicine,
346(25), 2002–2005.
Dennett, D. (1997). Consciousness in human and robot minds. In M. Ito,
Y. Miyashita, & E. T. Rolls (Eds.), Symposium on Cognition, Compu-
tation, and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Mean-
ings of Life. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Dennett, D. C. (2003). Freedom Evolves. New York: Viking.
i n t r od u c ti on 53
Hull, D. A., & Ruse, M. (1998). The Philosophy of Biology (Oxford Readings
in Philosophy). New York: Oxford University Press.
Irwin, C. J. (1987). A study of the evolution of ethnocentrism. In V.
Reynolds, V. Falger, & I. Vine (Eds.), The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism:
Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism and
Nationalism (pp. 131–156). London and Sydney: Croom Helm.
Janicki, M. G., & Krebs, D. L. (1998). Evolutionary approaches to culture.
In C. Crawford & D. L. Krebs (Eds.), Handbook of Evolutionary Psy-
chology: Ideas, Issues, and Applications (pp. 163–210). Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Jasanoff, S., Markle, G. E., Petersen, J. C., & Pinch, T. (2001). Handbook
of Science and Technology Studies. Rev. ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (2000). Choices, Values and Frames. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Katz, L. D. (2000). Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Cross-Disciplinary
Perspectives. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic.
Keller, E. F. (1999). Elusive locus of control in biological development: Ge-
netic versus developmental programs. Journal of Experimental Zoology
(Mol Dev Evol), 285, 283–290.
Koslowski, P. (1999). Sociobiology and Economics: The Theory of Evolution
in Biological and Economic Theory. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Kroeber, A. L. (1917). The Superorganic. American Anthropologist, 19,
163–213.
Kuznar, L. (1996). Reclaiming a Scientific Anthropology. Walnut Creek,
CA: AltaMira Press.
Laland, K. N., Odling-Smee, J., & Feldman, M. (2000). Niche construc-
tion, biological evolution and cultural change. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 23, 131–146.
Laland, K. N., Odling-Smee, J., & Feldman, M. W. (2001). Cultural niche
construction and human evolution. Journal of Evolutionary Biology,
14(1), 22–33.
Lancaster, R. N. (2004). The place of anthropology in a public culture re-
shaped by bioreductivism. Anthropology News, 45(3), 4–5.
Lane, R. D., Nadel, L., & Ahern, G. (Eds.). (2000). Cognitive Neuroscience
of Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press.
Latour, B. (1993). We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Latour, B., & Salk, J. (1986). Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific
Facts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
LeVine, R. A., & Campbell, D. T. (1972). Ethnocentrism: Theories of Con-
flict, Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behavior. New York: Wiley.
Lewontin, R. C. (1995). Sex, lies, and social science. New York Review of
Books, 28.
Logan, M. H., & Qirko, H. N. (1996). An evolutionary perspective on
maladaptive traits and cultural conformity. American Journal of
Human Biology, 8(5), 615–629.
56 i n t r od u c t i o n
Lopreato, J., & Crippen, T. (1999). Crisis in Sociology: The Need for Dar-
win. Somerset, NJ: Transaction.
Low, B. (1999). Why Sex Matters: A Darwinian Look at Human Behavior.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lutz, C. A. (1988). Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Mi-
cronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge
(G. Bennington & B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Machalek, R., & Martin, M. W. (2004). Sociology and the second Dar-
winian revolution: A metatheoretical analysis. Sociological Theory
22(3), 455–476.
Malinowski, B. (1944). A Scientific Theory of Culture. Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press.
Mallon, R., & Stich, S. P. (2000). The odd couple: The compatibility of so-
cial construction and evolutionary psychology. Philosophy of Science,
67(1), 133–154.
Masters, R. D. (1989). The Nature of Politics. New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press.
Masters, R. D., & Gruter, M. (Eds.). (1992). The Sense of Justice: Biological
Foundations of Law (Vol. 136). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
McAndrew, F. T., & Milenkovic, M. A. (2002). Of tabloids and family se-
crets: The evolutionary psychology of gossip. Journal of Applied Social
Psychology, 32(5), 1064–1082.
McBride, T. (1998). Why academic humanists resist contemporary Dar-
winism. Human Ethology Bulletin, 13(3), 6–8.
McGuire, M. T. (1992). Moralistic aggression, processing mechanisms,
and the brain: Biological foundations of the sense of justice. In R. D.
Masters & M. Gruter (Eds.), The Sense of Justice: Biological Foundations
of Law (pp. 67–92). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
McGuire, M. T., & Troisi, A. (1998). Darwinian Psychiatry. New York:
Oxford University Press.
McMichael, A. (1995). The health of persons, populations and planets:
Epidemiology comes full circle. Epidemiology, 6, 633–636.
Miller, G. (2000). The Mating Mind: How Sexual Choice Shaped Human
Nature. New York: Doubleday.
Mithen, S. (1996). The Prehistory of Mind: The Cognitive Origins of Art, Reli-
gion and Science. London: Thames & Hudson.
Mysterud, I. (2004). One name for the evolutionary baby? A preliminary
guide for everyone confused by the chaos of names. Social Science Infor-
mation Sur Les Sciences Sociales, 43(1), 95–114.
Nelkin, D., & Lindee, M. S. (1995). The DNA Mystique: The Gene as a
Cultural Icon. New York: Freeman.
Nesse, R., & Williams, G. (1994). Why We Get Sick: The New Science of
Darwinian Medicine. New York: Times Books/Random House.
i n t r od u c ti on 57
Storey, R. (1996). Mimesis and the Human Animal: On the Biogenetic Foun-
dations of Literary Representation. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press.
Strauss, C., & Quinn, N. (1997). A Cognitive Theory of Cultural Meaning.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Takahasi, K. (1998). Evolution of transmission bias in cultural inheritance.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 190(2), 147–159.
Takahasi, K. (1999). Theoretical aspects of the mode of transmission in
cultural inheritance. Theoretical Population Biology, 55(2), 208–225.
Tiger, L., & Shepher, J. (1975). Women in the Kibbutz. New York: Har-
court Brace Jovanovich.
Trevathan, W. R., Smith, E. O., & McKenna, J. J. (Eds.). (1999). Evolu-
tionary Medicine. New York: Oxford University Press.
Van den Berghe, P. (1979). Human Family Systems: An Evolutionary View.
New York: Elsevier.
Van den Berghe, P. (1981). The Ethnic Phenomenon. New York: Elsevier.
Van den Berghe, P. (1990). Why most sociologists don’t (and won’t) think
evolutionarily. Sociological Forum, 5, 173–186.
Vandermassen, G. (2005). Who’s Afraid of Charles Darwin? Debating Fem-
inism and Evolutionary Theory. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Von Glasersfeld, E. (1991). Knowing without metaphysics: Aspects of the
radical constructivist position. In F. Steier (Ed.), Research and Reflex-
ivity (pp. 12–29). London: Sage.
Von Glasersfeld, E. (1995). Radical Constructivism: A Way of Knowing and
Learning. London: Falmer Press.
Wallace, A. F. C. (1970). Culture and Personality (2nd ed.). New York:
Random House.
Wallin, N. L., Merker, B., & Brown, S. (Eds.). (2000). The Origins of
Music. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Weaver, C. (2000). Heartburn. New York Times on the Web. Retrieved Feb.
13, 2000, from http://www.nytimes.com/books/00/02/13/reviews/
000213.13weavert.html
Weibull, J. W. (1995). Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Wilson, D. S. (2002). Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Na-
ture of Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wilson, E. O. (1998). Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York:
Knopf.
Wrangham, R., & Peterson, D. (1996). Demonic Males: Apes and the Ori-
gins of Human Violence. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Wrangham, R. W., McGrew, W. C., de Waal, F. B. M., & Heltne, P. G.
(1994). Chimpanzee Cultures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Wright, R. (1994). The Moral Animal: The New Science of Evolutionary Psy-
chology. New York: Pantheon.
Young, P. H. (2001). Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolu-
tionary Theory of Institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
This page intentionally left blank
PART I
Gender
Daniel Fessler begins by explaining why our species should have been
selected for the male “flash” of anger, how it apparently would have been
62 g en d er
Anne Campbell
In this chapter, I want to do three things: I will consider the light that has
been shed on our understanding of gender differences first, by social con-
structionists and second, by environmental liberals. In both cases, I will high-
light points of divergence and potential convergence with evolutionary
approaches. (Because of my own disciplinary background, many of the
stances and studies to which I refer are drawn from the psychological litera-
ture. Nonetheless, the positions that I discuss—interpretative and discursive
analysis of gender, the enculturation of the child into his or her gender role,
the division of labor in society as reproducing gender relations—are familiar
ones in other social science disciplines.) Finally, I will directly address the
criticisms of evolutionary psychology made by social constructionist and
environmental liberal feminists and question the “illusory correlation” that has
been promulgated between explanation and ideology.
In Table 2.1, I have tried to summarize the arguments adduced against pos-
itivism and in favor of social constructionism by social scientists from a va-
riety of disciplines (Burman, 1990; Burr, 1998; Clifford & Marcus, 1986;
Oakley, 1981; Strathern, 1987; Visweswaran, 1994; Wilkinson, 1986, 1996).
f em i n i s m a n d e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y c holog y 65
Methods
Seeks universal laws → Seeks socially and historically
situated subjectivities
Transcendent nature of truth → Provisional and changing subjectivities
Research quality judged by → Research quality judged against
validity criteria, e.g., experiential resonance,
control of confounding. researcher’s ideology, ability to
variables, replicability, improve women’s lives
generalizability
At least three broad areas of concern are woven together into this alternative
paradigm: relationships, politics, and methods.
First, at an interpersonal level, constructionist feminists seek to obliterate
boundaries between the researcher and the researched in order to remove (or
at least disguise) differential power in the relationship. This springs in part
from an appreciation of women’s greater connectedness to others, variously
called communion (Bakan, 1966), expressiveness (Spence, Helmreich, &
Stapp, 1974) and femininity (Bem, 1974), and from a rejection of mascu-
line interpersonal detachment, which is seen as quasi-pathological:
even in the nonhuman sciences; “If you want to understand about a tumour,
you’ve got to be a tumour” (Goodfield, 1981, p. 213). Allied to this is an ori-
entation toward the idiographic or at least an avoidance of generalization:
Each woman is unique, and sweeping statements about women in general
or classes of women are viewed with suspicion.
The second strand of thought is an explicit acknowledgment of the po-
litical nature of feminist research (Cole & Phillips, 1995). Its aim is to im-
prove the lives of women (“The information-gathering purpose of research
thus takes second place to a facilitative and liberatory one” [Burr, 1998,
p. 139]), rather than to serve existing patriarchal institutions. Because no
firm line is drawn between the researcher and the researched, the fruits of
feminist research benefit the former as much as the latter (“Inquiry, as I have
portrayed it, is an uncertain, vulnerable process with immense potential for
personal growth and intellectual creativity” [Marshall, 1986, p. 208]). It is
clear that the feminist political agenda takes precedence over “malestream”
social science. Psychologist Celia Kitzinger (1990, pp. 121–122) is blunt in
her denouncement: “Having identified psychology as incompatible with
feminism because of its refusal to deal with political realities, and its pre-
tence at objectivity, feminists with a professional involvement in the disci-
pline then sought to redefine and harness psychology for the feminist cause.”
In extremis, this has lead to the wholesale rejection of psychology as con-
flicting with feminist ideology: “The antipsychology approach [which grants
all psychological data and theories a severely limited validity, or even rejects
them completely] is the one which I shall argue offers most to feminist psy-
chology” (Squire, 1990, p. 79).
Third, and stemming from the previous two concerns, there is a post-
modern rejection of the possibility of objective truths and causal relations
and consequently of “grand” theories. The researcher should aim to docu-
ment the lived experience of women as it is told to her, but in so doing she
must avoid the trap of thinking that she has privileged access to the internal
lives of the participants: “The aim of the analysis is not to reveal what the
person truly thinks or feels . . . but to identify the discourses, representations
and ideologies which are flowing through a person’s talk in order to theorize
how our representations of ourselves are linked to inequalities and power re-
lations” (Burr, 1998, p. 142). Discourses are the tools that construct facts
and interpret experience. Because discourses are historically and socially
bound, no general statements can be made about the nature of women’s ex-
periences. Because facts about human behavior do not have an independent
existence, the traditional means by which positivistic scientists establish and
check them become not only irrelevant but burdensome: “Many researchers
use qualitative methods positivistically, trying to pin down and constrain
their data into incontestable, replicable, generalized, detached truths. This
approach limits the method’s potential and burdens qualitative research
f em i n i s m a n d e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y c holog y 67
Discourses of Patriarchy
With some trepidation, I would offer the following encapsulation of the so-
cial constructionist agenda. First, it is concerned with versions or interpreta-
tions of reality that are constructed through language. Second, it is concerned
with how these versions of reality are used strategically to enforce and con-
test power at both a macro-social level (by institutions such as governments
and media [e.g., Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984])
and at a micro-social, interpersonal level (to warrant, blame, excuse, and
so on [Edwards & Potter, 1992]). For feminist constructionists, the chief
focus of interest is in how these processes shape our understanding and
experience of gender. Can we find any points of commonality between these
interests and those of evolutionary psychology, a discipline often character-
ized by outsiders as a fundamentally biological and behavioral one?
Many evolutionary theorists acknowledge that “purely biological
models will not be able to supply a full account of human behavior with-
out references to cultural processes” (Janicki & Krebs, 1998, p. 202). For
evolutionists, culture is shared knowledge—knowledge that has not arisen
through the interaction of innate modules and the environment (e.g., our
universal tendency to break the electromagnetic spectrum into discrete and
consensual categories called colors) nor by individual trial-and-error learn-
ing and insight (an individual primate’s discovery that sweet potatoes im-
mersed in water are less gritty when eaten). Writing, reading, computer
literacy, driving cars, and eating with cutlery are all cultural in this sense. The
evolution, transmission, and selection of socially acquired knowledge (in
the form of representations, memes, or semantic memory nodes) has been
at the heart of a number of evolutionary formulations (e.g., Barkow, 1989;
Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Dawkins, 1989; Durham, 1991; Janicki & Krebs,
1998; Lumsden & Wilson, 1981; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). All agree that
the capacity for social learning evolved because its superiority over individ-
ual trial-and-error learning brought fitness benefits. Individual learning is
specific, costly, and potentially dangerous, while social learning is generaliz-
able, cheap, and safe. Technical knowledge can be passed on by simple ob-
servation and imitation, and much work has addressed these capacities in
our own and other primate species. Many motor skills that are vital for sur-
vival can be acquired in this way.
74 g en d er
But humans are able to do far more than merely imitate behavior. When
an apprentice watches a carpenter constructing a piece of furniture, she does
not copy her obvious mistakes. The observer does not assume that hitting
one’s thumb with the hammer is an integral part of the production process
(Dawkins, 1999). What allows the observer to understand the real goals of
the carpenter? To open up the problem more widely, what allows us to un-
derstand the beliefs and desires of others and to comprehend the intention-
ality of their behavior? Tooby and Cosmides (1992, p. 118) use the term
“epidemiological culture” to describe the process whereby “observation and
interaction between the source and the observer cause inferential mecha-
nisms in the observer to recreate the representations or regulatory elements
in his or her own psychological architecture.” This inferential mechanism
has received considerable scrutiny in recent years under the term “theory of
mind.” Developmentally, theory of mind starts with belief-desire reasoning
from manifest behavior, in the form “Sally is looking in the box because she
believes her toy is there and she wants to find it” (Whiten, 1991). From there
children progress to second-order and then third-order reasoning (“Sally [or
Ann] knows that Peter thinks that Sally believes that the toy she wants is in
the box”).
The concept has been of special interest to evolutionary psychologists,
who have argued that its universal, untutored appearance (at about the
age of four), independence from intelligence, and capacity for selective
impairment strongly suggests an evolved information-processing module
(Anderson, 1983; Baron-Cohen, 1997). The fitness advantages of such a
module are proposed to result from the highly social living arrangements of
primate species. The ability to read the mind of others allows for the ap-
praisal of others’ beliefs, the prediction of their likely behavior, and the
consequent possibility of tactical manipulation (Byrne & Whiten, 1988;
Dunbar, 1993; Humphrey, 1976; Jolly, 1966). Through the deliberate mis-
representation of one’s own or others’ beliefs or desires, third parties can
be led to behave in ways congruent with these “engineered” false beliefs. In
language and mind reading, we find the basic building blocks of dialectical
social construction: a piece of discourse alerts a listener to the internal rep-
resentation held by the speaker, and in understanding this, she is in a posi-
tion to manipulate it.
Deception is common in the animal world, evident in both mimicry and
camouflage. The fitness advantages of deception are clear. However, the
kinds of deception practiced by humans are of another kind in that they are
neither morphological nor long-standing and can be deployed at a linguistic
and therefore representational level. Social constructionists address how lan-
guage is used to create versions of reality that are advantageous to the com-
municator. Some of these versions of reality are tactically deceptive in the
f em i n i s m a n d e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y c holog y 75
sense that they are not veridical and may work to the disadvantage of the
receiver.
At a societal level, social constructionists are concerned with how pow-
erful groups transmit and sustain versions of reality that are congenial to the
maintenance of their power. Many beliefs that have historically been held
about gender (e.g., education will interfere with women’s childbearing ca-
pabilities, women’s superego is weaker than men’s) effectively oppose
women’s own fitness interests (their ability to garner resources indepen-
dently or to make their own moral decisions). Durham (1991) calls these
beliefs “oppositional” memes and proposes that they most often result from
imposition by the powerful. This chimes very directly with the analysis of-
fered by feminist evolutionary psychologists in terms of men’s control over
resources needed by women and their consequent ability to impose uni-
laterally advantageous memes. Barbara Smuts (1995) suggests that with the
advent of language a new weapon became available to men in their control
of women. Language could be used to develop myths and ideologies that
legitimated their power. Patricia Gowaty (1992, p. 237) writes of “society-
wide lies that foster sexist oppression” in the context of male control of
females’ reproductive opportunities and independent access to resources.
But where evolutionary psychology moves into the arena of deceptive
communication, it also takes on the need to establish truth as an anchor
point. If a man believes that women have poor spatial skills and communi-
cates this belief to his wife, then no deception has occurred even if his
premise is incorrect. His choice to “disclose” this fact to her might well be
tactical and manipulative, but it is not deceptive. If, however, he knows the
truth to be otherwise, then his communication is deceptive. This draws at-
tention firmly to the state of mind of the communicator and specifically to
representational thought—versions of the world that exist in the minds of
people prior to their expression in language. Constructionists are eager to
avoid reducing discourse (which they see as an emergent property of social
talk) to a psychological construct. Researchers are admonished to avoid any
tendency to reduce discursive findings to properties of individual people
(i.e., as reflecting “cognitivist” internal models of the world):
Shaping Gender
are encouraged to fight, climb trees, and play football. Girls are forced to
wear dresses, play with dolls, and share. The “Baby X” paradigm was hailed
as conclusive evidence of socialization differences (e.g., Will, Self, & Datan,
1976). A six-month-old baby was wrapped in a blue or a pink blanket, iden-
tified as a boy or a girl, then handed to a woman who was asked to look after
it for a few minutes. When told it was a girl, the women more often offered
the infant a doll in preference to other toys. Surely this showed that parents
treat infants differently as a function of their biological sex?
But there was a problem. Despite many attempts at replication, the ef-
fect seemed even weaker than it had on first sight appeared (and recall the
effect was found only for toy selection—there were no differences in social
behavior to the infant). It was certainly not strong enough to support the
whole edifice of sex differences (Stern & Karraker, 1989). And even if par-
ents gave their children different toys, such a finding would be trivial unless
it could be shown that the toys changed the child’s subsequent behavior. But
the real challenge came when Lytton and Romney (1991) collected from
around the world 172 studies that had examined the way in which parents
treat their sons and daughters. Considering them all together, the evidence
for differential treatment was virtually nil. Parents did not differ in the
amount of interaction with the child, the warmth they showed, their ten-
dency to encourage either dependency or achievement, their restrictiveness,
their use of discipline, their tendency to reason with the child, or the amount
of aggression that they tolerated. There was one area that showed a differ-
ence. Parents tended to give their children sex-appropriate toys. But sex-
differentiated toy preference has been found in infants from nine months of
age (Campbell, Shirley, Heywood, & Crook, 2000). Children play more
with sex-appropriate toys even when their parents do not specifically en-
courage them to do so (Caldera, Huston, & O’Brien, 1989). It is quite likely
that parents are not using toys to turn their children into gender conformists
but are simply responding to the child’s own preferences.
Anyway, if parents’ behavior toward their children was being guided by
their desire for them to conform to traditional gender stereotypes than we
would expect to find that the most sex-typed adults have the most sex-typed
children. Yet studies find that there is no relationship between traditional
household division of labor, parents’ attitudes to sex-typing, their sex-
typical activities, and their reactions to children’s behavior on one hand
and children’s degree of sex-typing on the other (Maccoby, 1998).
Following these early views of the child shaped by selective reinforce-
ment came social learning theory, which emphasized a hitherto neglected
(but altogether central primate) capacity—imitation. This was co-opted into
an explanation of sex differences by proposing that children selectively im-
itate their same-sex parent. Laboratory studies were done in which children
were exposed to adult “models” performing a variety of novel behaviors. If
78 g en d er
social learning theorists were right, then the statistical analysis would show
a significant interaction between sex-of-model and sex-of-child—girls would
imitate women and boys would imitate men. Dozens of such studies failed
to find such an effect (Huston, 1983; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). Perry and
Bussey (1979) devised an ingenious experiment that avoided the pitfalls of
the previous studies, where children had a one-off exposure to an adult
model. They showed children a film of eight adults selecting a preferred
fruit. In one condition all four men made one choice (e.g., orange), while all
four women made another (e.g., apple). In another condition, three men and
one woman chose an orange while three women and one man chose an
apple. In another condition half the men chose oranges and half the women
chose apples. They found that the extent to which children copied an adult
preference depended upon the proportion of their sex that made that
choice. In the first condition, there was a high degree of same-sex imitation,
in the second a much smaller amount, and in the third, there was no signif-
icant difference between the girls and boys in their choices. What this sug-
gested was that children were not slavishly imitating a same-sex adult but
rather judging the appropriateness of a particular (in this case wholly arbi-
trary) preference on the basis of the proportion of male or female adults who
made it. These results helped to make sense of previous work, which had
already shown that children tended to imitate activities that they already
knew to be sex-typed regardless of the sex of the model who was currently
engaged in it (Barkley, Ullman, Otto, & Brecht, 1977). What was important
was the child’s internal working model of gender and behavior.
Understanding Gender
clined to tag information with gender labels. The cognitive revolution had
come to sex differences: it was not a matter of behavioral training, it was a
matter of mental categorizing, organizing, and recalling.
But gender schema theory was so cognitive that it left no room for an
adapted mind. The cracks inevitably began to appear. One problem was tim-
ing: sex differences in toy choice, play styles, activity levels, and aggression
are found as early as two years of age (Brooks & Lewis, 1974; Fagot, 1991;
Freedman, 1974; Howes, 1988; Kohnstamm, 1989; O’Brien & Huston,
1985; Roopnarine, 1986), but children are not able to correctly sort pic-
tures of boys and girls into piles until their third year (Weinraub, Clements,
Sockloff, Ethridge, & Myers, 1984). Children prefer sex-congruent toys
before they are able to say whether the toy is more appropriate for a boy or
a girl (Blakemore, LaRue, & Olejnik, 1979). They prefer to interact with
members of their own sex and show sex differences in social behavior before
they can label different behaviors as being more common among boys or
girls (Serbin, Moller, Gulko, Powlishta, & Colburne, 1994; Smetana &
Letourneau, 1984). Longitudinal studies confirm that sex-typed behavior
does not wait upon gender labeling (Campbell, Shirley, & Candy, under re-
view; Fagot & Leinbach, 1989; Trautner, 1992). A second problem was
correspondence: even when children’s gender stereotypes crystallize and
peak at about seven years of age, there is no relationship between a child’s
gender knowledge and how sex-stereotypic their own behavior is (Serbin
et al., 1994; Martin, 1994; Powlishta, 1995). Children seem to need neither
the ability to discriminate the sexes nor an understanding of gender stereo-
typic behavior to show sex differences.
Yet, problematic as they were, stereotypes were also invoked to form
the foundation for another explanation of sex differences—social role the-
ory (Eagly, 1987). According to this formulation the division of labor in so-
ciety, rather than the child’s natural tendency to form categories, is the
starting point for sex differences. Men occupy roles that require competi-
tiveness, autonomy, and aggression. Women occupy roles that require
nurturance, caring, and cooperation. These roles draw out of their occu-
pants the commensurate qualities and skills. These in turn set up stereotypes
that embody beliefs in the appropriateness of expected characteristics.
“Expectancy confirming behaviour should be especially common when ex-
pectancies are broadly shared in a society, as is the case for the expectancies
about women and men” (Eagly, 1987, p. 15). These expectancies are inter-
nalized, resulting in sex differences in both behavior and self-perception.
During the last twenty years there has been a significant change in the
nature of women’s labor, as women have moved into many arenas tradi-
tionally occupied by men. We might therefore expect to see a shift in both
stereotypes and self-perceptions by men and women. No such shift has
occurred (Helmreich, Spence, & Gibson, 1982; Lewin & Tragos, 1987;
80 g en d er
pline accepts the political motive of the researcher as a criterion for the qual-
ity of research produced, it becomes legitimate to apply the “politics” crite-
ria to other disciplines also. With considerable honesty, Fausto-Sterling
(1992, p. 212), for example, writes of the difficulty that she experiences in
distinguishing between “science well done and science that is feminist.”
Hence politics looms large in criticism of evolutionary psychology, as the fol-
lowing quotes show:
Among the allegedly gentle Arapesh, young men were initiated into adult-
hood only after they had committed homicide. Among the sex-role-
reversed Tschambuli, the makeup worn by men celebrates their killing
of an enemy, and the aggressive women were frequently beaten by their
gentle husbands.
It is hard to know what to make of Fausto-Sterling’s (1992, p. 199)
claim that “there is no single undisputed claim about universal human be-
havior (sexual or otherwise).” Presumably even the most ardent cultural rel-
ativist would accept that everywhere people live in societies, that they eat,
sleep, and make love, and that women give birth and men do not. Some fem-
inist biologists refuse to engage in any debate about the evolved nature of
psychological sex differences by denying that two sexes even exist. Muldoon
and Reilly (1998, p. 55) believe that “the objectivity of “hard science” in this
area can be questioned, so much so that the biological definition of sex itself
becomes untenable.” They suggest that there is no biological basis for our
belief in male and female as “dichotomous, mutually exclusive categories”
(see also Bem, 1993). Notwithstanding these authors’ uncertainty, most
feminists accept that the vast majority of the population belongs to one of
two biologically distinct sexes. Indeed, most feminists acknowledge that the
reproductive differences between them are the result of evolution.
The problems seem to arise when we move from biological functioning
of the body to the biological functioning of the brain—which are seen as
quite unrelated (Bem, 1993). Though everywhere women are the principle
caretakers of children, the fact that there may be variation in how that task
is fulfilled leads some anthropologists to conclude that mothering is not uni-
versal (Moore, 1988). This is analogous to arguing that because people eat
different food in different parts of the world, eating is not universal. Fortu-
nately, Donald Brown (1991), trained in the standard ethnographic tradi-
tion, has documented the extent of human universals. Of special interest to
the study of gender we find: binary distinctions between men and women,
division of labor by sex, more child-care by women, more aggression and
violence by men, and acknowledgment of different natures of men and
women.
Even though the brain is the most expensive organ in the human body
in terms of calorie consumption, even though feminists accept that hominid
brain size itself was a result of natural selection, and even though the pro-
duction of the very hormones that orchestrate bodily differences originate
in the brain, many social science feminists reject the notion that evolution
could have had an impact on the minds of the two sexes. Though success-
ful reproduction is the reason for our existence today and though the sexes
play vital and different roles in that process, they reject any notion that their
minds may have been sculpted by millions of years of evolution to set dif-
ferent goals or pursue different strategies.
f em i n i s m a n d e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y c holog y 83
Biological Determinism
Political aversion to biology springs from the mistaken belief that genetically
influenced traits are unalterable. For some feminists, evolutionary psychol-
ogy is the pinnacle of genetic determinism—the (erroneous) belief that
genes alone direct development and behavior. Take four examples culled
from many dozen similar pronouncements:
Sociobiologists argue that these strategies are given by biology and thus
imply that they are eternally fixed features of human sexual relations.
(Sayers, 1982, p. 60)
By reducing human behaviour and complex social phenomenon to
genes and to inherited and programmed mechanisms of neuronal firing,
the message of the new Wilsonian Sociobiology becomes rapidly clear:
we had better resign ourselves to the fact that the more unsavoury as-
pects of human behavior, like wars, racism, and class struggle, are in-
evitable results of evolutionary adaptations based in our genes. (Bleier,
1984, p. 15)
Genetic explanations of sex differences in behaviour are part of a
broader wave of opinion denying the importance of social forces in the
development of human behaviour. (Rogers, 1999, p. 50)
Evolutionary principles imply genetic destiny. They de-emphasise the in-
fluence of social circumstances, for there are natural limits constraining
individuals. The moral? No possible social system, educational or nur-
turing plan can change the status quo. (Nelkin, 2000, p. 22)
I can assure you that it is far harder to find examples of evolutionary psy-
chologists’ allegations that genes are unaffected by environment than it is to
find accusations of this caricature. Responsiveness to the environment is a
quality of all living things—a fact taught in high school biology courses.
Trees planted closely together must grow taller than their neighbors to reach
the sun. Animals packed too closely together must either compete or dis-
perse if they are to survive. Maternal aggression tracks gestation and lacta-
tion; it emerges and wanes in response to life history changes. If evolutionary
psychologists were in fact alleging that humans are different from the rest of
the natural world—insensitive to or immune from responding to environ-
mental change—it would be bizarre indeed. Evolutionary theory asserts that
natural selection operates on genes, but it operates through the phenotype,
which is the product of genes and environments. It is individuals that live or
die, out-reproduce their rivals or fail to.
When evolutionary theorists speak of interactions between genes and
environment, they mean it in a genuinely bidirectional sense. When critics
speak of genetic determinism, it is clear that they have in mind structural
84 g en d er
genes whose activity is largely unaffected by the environment. These are the
Mendelian structures that give us blue eyes or long legs. But most genes are
not structural but regulator genes that are able to interface with the envi-
ronment, affecting the way our mind works. There is nothing mystical about
this. Communication in the brain occurs chiefly between neurones, where
chemical messengers—neurotransmitters—convey the information across
the synaptic cleft. These neurotransmitters can communicate with the nu-
cleus of the cell, the home of the regulator genes that manage the sensitiv-
ity of receptors and the production of enzymes that create neurotransmitters.
The activation or deactivation of a variety of genes as a result of experience
can create differences between people who began life with exactly the same
genome. Post-traumatic stress disorder, a condition that has been studied in
American war veterans, clearly shows this. Exposure to intense and pro-
longed stress causes intracellular genetic change that results in acute neuro-
chemical hypersensitivity to the slightest threat (Niehoff, 1999).
But more mundane environmental experiences are necessary for the
normal emergence of many species-typical adaptations. Absence of contact
with a language-using community can severely disrupt the development of
language; early close contact with a reliable caretaker is important for op-
timal socioemotional functioning; and the neural structure of the visual cor-
tex depends upon the kinds of visual experiences to which the organism is
exposed. In addition, the manifestation of some species-typical adaptations
depends on contemporaneous environmental cues: for example, sexual
jealousy may be a human universal, but it is activated only when people ex-
perience a deep attachment to an exclusive romantic partner and perceive
(rightly or wrongly) a threat to that exclusivity.
Nor do all members of animal species respond to environmental con-
tingencies in the same way. They possess alternative strategies. Some male
fish pursue a “sneaker” strategy; dwarf males are small enough that they do
not elicit concern from normal-sized males and in consequence are able to
sneak up on females and fertilize their eggs. In our own species, men’s choice
of mating tactics depends on what women want and on men’s ability to pro-
vide it (Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). In societies where assistance with pro-
visioning is more crucial to infant survival, women prefer men who may be
of lesser genetic quality but who can offer greater resource commitment. In
societies with high pathogen loads, women look for signs of male physical
symmetry as an index of their genetic quality and disease resistance that can
be passed to offspring. Men’s ability to meet women’s facultative prefer-
ences depends on their own resources (physical symmetry and material).
Early developmental events may be especially important in channeling in-
dividuals into different pathways by setting different expectations about the
environment. Father-absent children, raised with the expectation that pa-
ternal investment is a statistically rare event, reach puberty earlier and are
f em i n i s m a n d e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y c holog y 85
Reductionism
species have the ability to take either route and the one that is selected is a
function of environmental factors such as crowding, stress, status, and deve-
lopmental experiences. Even discounting environmental effects, the bio-
logical (to say nothing of psychological) development of a single trait could
not be a straightforward mapping exercise because of pleiotropy (where
a single gene affects two or more apparently unrelated traits), polygenics
(where a single trait is controlled by many genes), nonadditivity (where
genes at different loci interact) and switch genes (higher-order genes control
the action of many others). These complexities aside, evolutionary psychol-
ogists are not geneticists, and it is unreasonable to expect them to be. But
this does not mean that psychologists must remain gagged until then. When
we see universal complexities of psychological design that suggest an adap-
tation, it is reasonable to test such a proposal—just as alternative formula-
tions (e.g., sex differences are absent where children possess no cognitive
categories for male and female) are free to test theirs.
The next objection, championed by Gould (2000) and Fausto-Sterling
(1997), is the “Prove it’s an adaptation” argument. These critics accuse evo-
lutionary psychology of being too free and easy in identifying aspects of
human behavior as adaptations. We are rebuked for failing to consider fac-
tors other than natural selection that can result in change in the gene pool.
Evolution is composed of two processes—natural selection and random
genetic drift. As an antidote to “ultra-Darwinism,” Gould (2000) and Steven
Rose (2000) believe that we need to accord a greater role to the second of
these. Crudely, if we accept the predominance of drift over selection, then
humans got to be the way they are as a result of chance.
Drift works this way. Imagine a bag holding six white balls and six
black balls, the colors corresponding to two different alleles in a gene pool
(Majerus, Amos, & Hurst, 1996). Put in your hand and randomly select six
balls to go into the next generation of the game. You pull out four white
and two black. The population is now reset at a new value for allelic diver-
sity. Next time around, you select two white and two black; the population
drifts back to equilibrium. The random process provides a backdrop of ris-
ing and falling genetic noise upon which is imposed the directional force of
natural selection. But there is a chance that on the second round you might
have pulled out nothing but white balls. The white allele would have gone
to fixation—as a result of chance deaths, not selection. When individuals
die before reproduction, they take their genes with them, and this is as true
when they die as a result of random misfortune (being struck by lightning)
as when there is a genetic vulnerability (they are not resistant to a common
pathogen).
The effects of drift are most pronounced in very small populations.
Imagine a small group of individuals who migrate away from their commu-
nity and become the “founders” of a new population. They might take with
f em i n i s m a n d e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y c holog y 89
levels of stress and pathology argues for the fact that we have constructed a
world that matches, in most important respects, the environment in which
we evolved (see Crawford, 1998). Some believe the dispute will be resolved
by archaeological and anthropological evidence that will ultimately provide
a clearer picture of our ancestral lifestyle. Others argue that the most-needed
information—about psychological mechanisms underlying social practices
such as cooperation, altruism, jealousy, mate choice, and cheat detection—
does not fossilize (Hampton, 2000). Still others argue that we can work
backward from the present because contemporary evidence of adaptations
will allow us to reconstruct the nature of the EEA (Tooby & Cosmides,
1992). Gould (2000, p. 88) appears to agree with this latter position, argu-
ing that we “must therefore try to infer causes from results—the standard
procedure in any historical science, by the way, and not a special problem
facing evolutionists.” But we must go further. In the first instance we can
generate accounts of the specific problem that was solved by a putative adap-
tation. If these are clearly specified, we can develop empirical tests of their
adequacy. An adaptation (such as fever) designed to produce a particular
beneficial outcome (parasite destruction) should occur when the body de-
tects pathogens and not at other times. Psychological mechanisms like at-
tachment should wane as the child reaches the age at which she has the
social and motor skills to explore the world. If we have conserved a herding
response to danger, we should prefer to be with others when we face threat-
ening uncertainty. If guilt is an emotion signaling unpaid obligation, we can
make clear predictions about the likelihood of altruism when it is aroused.
If symmetry reflects good genes, then symmetrical people should be health-
ier as well as more attractive. The more novel the prediction, the more
satisfying the empirical test. However, that should not debar us from ex-
plaining known facts about the world—a criticism uniquely leveled against
evolutionary psychologists. All branches of psychology (as well as all other
sciences) account for known facts—there is little point in generating an ele-
gant theory of why working memory is limitless or how infants are able to
do calculus. A good theory, in any discipline, explains what we know as well
as correctly predicting what we do not yet know.
Conclusion
At the risk of stating the obvious, feminists of all persuasions aim to ame-
liorate the position of women in society. In the early years, there was a far
more prescriptive agenda for women that emphasized the emulation of male
attitudes, roles, and behavior. The happiness of women was supposed to be
increased by their full participation in work, their rejection of the sexual
double standard, the deferment or abandonment of motherhood as a con-
fining role, and, in extremis, the rejection of heterosexual sex as a form of
92 g en d er
rape. Since that time, the tendency to tell women what they should want
has declined in favor of a commitment to removing inequality (in, for ex-
ample, wages, opportunities for promotion, social control, and law) and to
opening up avenues of opportunity (higher education, childcare provision).
This more liberal agenda rests on a moral commitment to maximizing hap-
piness while not preaching a single route to women’s fulfillment. In short,
inequality should be removed in order to increase women’s choices, but the
choices that they make must lie beyond politics and legislation.
When constraints are removed, my bet is that we will not see a sea
change in what women choose to do with their lives. My bet is that, all other
things being equal, they will continue to work (as women always have de-
spite some localized historical anomalies) and that they will seek ways to
combine motherhood with that work (Hrdy, 1999). My guess is that they
will prefer a long-term partner who contributes financially and emotionally
to the lives of their joint children (Geary, 2000). As a sex, they will remain
far behind men in their rates of violence and crime (Campbell, 1999), and
will exceed them in their sensitivity to the emotional states of others (Hall,
1984). I may be mistaken. It could be that the removal of constraints will
reveal a female nature utterly different from the one that has existed
heretofore, showing that our notions of womanhood have been the result
of imposed social constructions, stereotypes, and repressive socialization.
Let’s finish this social experiment, for the sake of justice, and find out.
References
Daly, M., & Wilson, M. (1988). Homicide. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Dawkins, R. (1989). The selfish gene (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Dawkins, R. (1999). Foreword. In S. Blackmore, The meme machine. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, D. (1995). Darwin’s dangerous idea: Evolution and the meanings
of life. New York: Touchstone.
Dickemann, M. (1997). Paternal confidence and dowry competition: A
biocultural analysis of purdah. In L. Betzig (Ed.), Human nature: A
critical reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1993). Coevolution of neocortical size, group size and
language in humans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 681–694.
Durham, W. (1991). Coevolutionary theory. Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press.
Eagly, A. (1987). Sex differences in social behavior: A social role interpreta-
tion. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Eagly, A., & Wood, W. (1999). The origins of sex differences: Evolved dis-
positions versus social roles. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 223–224.
Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (1992). Discursive psychology. London: Sage.
Fagot, B. (1991). Peer relations in boys and girls from two to seven. Paper
presented at the biennial meeting of the Society for Research in Child
Development, Seattle.
Fagot, B., & Leinbach, M. (1989). The young child’s gender schema: Envi-
ronmental input, internal organisation. Child Development, 60, 663–672.
Farnham, C. (Ed.). (1987). The impact of feminist research in the academy.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Fausto-Sterling, A. (1992). Myths of gender: Biological theories about women
and men (2nd ed.). New York: Basic Books.
Fausto-Sterling, A. (1997). Beyond difference: A biologist’s perspective.
Journal of Social Issues, 53, 233–258.
Freedman, D. (1974). Human infancy: An evolutionary perspective. Hills-
dale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Freeman, D. (1983). Margaret Mead and Samoa: The making and unmaking
of an anthropological myth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gangestad, S., & Simpson, J. (2000). The evolution of human mating: Trade-
offs and strategic pluralism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 573–644.
Geary, D. (2000). Evolution and proximate expressions of human pater-
nal investment. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 55–77.
Goodfield, J. (1981). An imagined world. New York: Harper and Row.
Gould, S. J. (2000). More things in heaven and earth. In H. Rose & S. Rose
(Eds.), Alas, poor Darwin: Arguments against evolutionary psychology.
London: Cape.
Gowaty, P. A. (1992). Evolutionary biology feminism. Human Nature, 3,
217–249.
Gowaty, P. A. (Ed.). (1997). Feminism and evolutionary biology: Boundaries,
intersections and frontiers. New York: Chapman and Hall.
f em i n i s m a n d e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y c holog y 95
Gray, P., & Feldman, J. (1997). Patterns of age mixing and gender mixing
among children and adolescents at an ungraded school. Merrill Palmer
Quarterly, 42, 67–86.
Hall, J. A. (1984). Nonverbal sex differences: Communication accuracy and
expressive style. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Hampton, S. J. (2000). Evolutionary social psychology, natural history and
the history of ideas. PhD diss., Durham University.
Haraway, D. (1988). Situated knowledges: The science question in femi-
nism as a site of discourse on the privilege of partial perspective. Femi-
nist Studies, 14, 575–600.
Harding, S. (1986). The science question in feminism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Harding, S. (Ed.). (1987). Feminism and methodology. Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press.
Harris, J. R. (1995). Where is the child’s environment? A group socializa-
tion theory of development. Psychological Review, 102, 458–489.
Helmreich, R., Spence, J., & Gibson, R. (1982). Sex role attitudes,
1972–1980. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 8, 656–663.
Henriques, J., Hollway, W., Urwin, C., Venn, C., & Walkerdine, V. (Eds.).
(1984). Changing the subject: Psychology, social regulation and subjec-
tivity. London: Methuen.
Holcombe, H. R. (1998). Testing evolutionary hypotheses. In C. Craw-
ford & D. L. Krebs (Eds.), Handbook of evolutionary psychology: Ideas,
issues and applications. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Hollway, W. (1984). Gender difference and the production of subjectivity.
In J. Henriques, W. Hollway, C. Urwin, C. Venn, & V. Walkerdine
(Eds.), Changing the subject: Psychology, social regulation and subjectivity.
London: Methuen.
Howes, C. (1988). Peer interaction of young children. Monographs of the
Society for Research in Child Development, serial number 217, 53(1).
Hrdy, S. B. (1997). Raising Darwin’s consciousness: Female sexuality and
the prehominid origins of patriarchy. Human Nature, 8, 1–49.
Hrdy, S. B. (1999). Mother Nature: Natural selection and the female of the
species. London: Chatto and Windus.
Humphrey, N. (1976). The social function of intellect. In P. P. G. Bateson
& R. A. Hinde (Eds.), Growing points in ethology. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Huston, A. (1983). Sex typing. In P. Mussen & M. Hetherington (Eds.),
Handbook of child psychology: Volume 4. Socialisation, personality and
social behavior (pp. 387–467). New York: Wiley.
Janicki, M., & Krebs, D. L. (1998). Evolutionary approaches to culture. In
C. Crawford & D. L. Krebs (Eds.), Handbook of evolutionary psychol-
ogy: Ideas, issues and applications. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Jayaratne, T. E. (1983). The value of quantitative methodology for femi-
nist research. In G. Bowles & R. D. Klein (Eds.), Theories of women’s
studies. London: Routledge.
96 g en d er
Weinraub, M., Clements, L. P., Sockloff, A., Ethridge, T. E., & Myers, B.
(1984). The development of sex role stereotypes in the third year: Re-
lationships to gender labeling, gender identity, sex-typed toy prefer-
ence and family characteristics. Child Development, 55, 1493–1503.
Whiten, A. (Ed.). (1991). Natural theories of mind: Evolution, development
and simulation of everyday mindreading. Oxford: Blackwell.
Whiting, B. B., & Edwards, C. P. (1988). Children of different worlds: The for-
mation of social behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wilkinson, S. (1986). Feminist social psychology: Developing theory and prac-
tice. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
Wilkinson, S. (Ed.). (1996). Feminist social psychologies: International per-
spectives. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Will, J. A., Self, P. A., & Datan, M. (1976). Maternal behavior and per-
ceived sex of infant. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 46, 135–139.
Williams, G. C. (1996). Plan and purpose in nature. London: Phoenix.
Williams, J., & Best, D. (1982). Measuring sex stereotypes: A thirty nation
study. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Wilson, M., & Daly, M. (1992). The man who mistook his wife for a chattel.
In J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: Evo-
lutionary psychology and the generation of culture. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Wilson, M., Daly, M., & Scheib, J. E. (1997). Femicide: An evolutionary psy-
chological perspective. In P. A. Gowaty (Ed.), Feminism and evolutionary
biology: Boundaries, intersections and frontiers. New York: Chapman and
Hall.
Wright, R. (1996). The dissent of woman. Demos, 10, 18–24.
This page intentionally left blank
3 The Male Flash of Anger: Violent
Response to Transgression as an
Example of the Intersection of
Evolved Psychology and Culture
Daniel M. T. Fessler
Scope of Inquiry
A great deal of scholarly attention has been devoted to three questions: why,
in general, men are more violent than women; why some individuals are
more violent than others; and why some societies are more violent than oth-
ers. Traditionally, these questions have constituted contested turf in the
struggle between explanations focusing on nature and those emphasizing
nurture. However, like the other authors in this volume, I believe that evo-
lutionary psychology can constitute the foundation for vertically integrated
analyses that take account of multiple levels of causality (Barkow, 1989). In
the following essay I will attempt to demonstrate that central questions in
the study of violence are usefully addressed using multiple, mutually com-
plementary forms of explanation.
At first glance, broad questions as to the causes of violence seem to be
unanswerable, since specific instances can plausibly be explained by refer-
ence to factors as disparate as, say, the presence of attractive women in a bar
or the rising price of crude oil. However, this wide variation is reduced if we
adopt the position that (contrary to some popular portrayals) there are crit-
ical differences between spontaneous, face-to-face aggression and calculated,
organized combat, particularly at the level of the nation-state. While in some
instances powerful leaders may initiate international combat in response to
interindividual events akin to those that lead to a barroom brawl, it is nev-
ertheless likely that most large-scale wars are fought for other reasons. More-
102 ge n d er
over, in such warfare the soldiers doing the fighting lack personal conflicts
with those whom they are directed to kill.1 A useful first step in the investi-
gation of violence is therefore to draw a distinction between events in which
actors are spontaneously motivated to respond to the actions of a specific in-
dividual and those in which actors participate because of the influence of
complex political institutions.2 I will focus exclusively on the former. I take
as a starting point the following observations: (a) subjective experience is im-
portantly influenced by evolved predispositions; (b) subjective experience is
an important locus of culture’s influence on individuals; and (c) subjective
experience is the source of raw materials in the creation of cultural ideas. In
short, it is at the psychological level that evolutionary and cultural processes
most importantly interdigitate.
A wide variety of sources, from ethnographic accounts (cf. Gladwin & Sara-
son, 1953; Lee, 1993; Burbank, 1994; Chagnon, 1997; Otterbein, 2000) to
police reports (see Daly & Wilson, 1988; also, Ghiglieri, 1999), suggest that
in cases of spontaneous violent conflict, the emotion which English speak-
ers label “anger” is a principal feature of the actors’ subjective experiences.3
Although there are important cross-cultural differences in both its eliciting
conditions and its nuanced associations, it is likely that anger is one of the
most universally identifiable emotions (Ekman, 1994; Haidt & Keltner,
1999). Moreover, while eliciting stimuli vary, many share a common theme:
Notions of goals, rights, property, and even the definition of a person are cul-
turally variable; but howsoever these things are defined, when they are trans-
gressed, people react with anger. While it may take many forms, the most
common behavioral outcome of anger is an attempt to inflict some kind of
harm on the transgressor.
Often, when people are very angry, they act in ways that seem to make
no sense to observers, or even to the actors themselves when reflecting on
their behavior later—in English we speak of being “blinded by anger,” while
the Bengkulu of Sumatra with whom I worked metaphorically described the
state as kemasukan, possession by an evil spirit. Inspection reveals that
the “irrationality” of the angry person’s behavior has two components: risk
indifference and disproportionality. First, angry individuals may seek to in-
flict costs on transgressors that greatly outweigh the costs suffered as a result
of the transgression—murderous assaults may stem from a disrespectful
glance or gesture, or even a quick lane change on the freeway. Second, when
attempting to inflict harm on the transgressor who elicited the emotion,
the angry person often seems indifferent to the potential costs entailed by
t h e m a l e f l a s h o f a ng er 103
their actions. Actors may confront opponents who are much more power-
ful than themselves, or may risk costly social sanctions ranging from ostra-
cism to execution.
Generations of philosophers have dismissed anger, like other emotions,
as a primitive mental state with no utility, a crude limitation that detracts
from, rather than promotes, the individual’s ability to cope with the world.
However, evolutionary psychologists take a different approach, asking in-
stead what adaptive function this feature could have performed in the past
such that this capacity would have been uniformly selected for among our
common ancestors. Consider first the utility of aggressive response to trans-
gression, the behavioral outcome resulting from anger. Prompt responses
that inflict high costs on the transgressor are likely to deter future transgres-
sions, both from the original transgressor and, to the extent that others learn
of the response, from other potential transgressors as well. Moreover, the
greater the costs inflicted on the transgressor, the greater the resulting de-
terrence effect (Daly & Wilson, 1988). Hence, while the reaction to trans-
gression may seem disproportionate to the costs suffered as a result of the
transgression, this inequality disappears when one considers the sum of the
costs that would occur were future transgressions not deterred. Seen in this
light, anger, the compelling desire to inflict significant harm on transgres-
sors, is highly functional (see also Trivers, 1971; McGuire & Troisi, 1990;
Edwards, 1999, pp. 140–141). Lastly, this functionality would have been es-
pecially marked in the small-scale, face-to-face communities characteristic
of most of our species’ history, as reputations have much greater impact in
such groups than they do in the mobile, largely anonymous social world of
contemporary industrialized nation-states.
As lawmakers and insurance salespeople know only too well, in every-
day thinking, immediate costs loom larger than future potential costs—
people often choose not to wear seat belts or buy auto insurance because
the costs (hassle, expense, etc.) are immediate, and these overshadow po-
tential future costs (injury or liability resulting from an accident). Although
responding to transgressions in an apparently disproportionate fashion may
protect the actor from large potential future costs, it entails incurring more
salient immediate costs, something that people would normally avoid. There
is therefore great utility in a biasing mechanism that overcomes reticence to
incur immediate costs, and anger serves exactly this purpose (Frank, 1988).
have poorer prospects should be more willing to gamble (as the song says,
“If ya got nothin’, ya got nothin’ to lose”) (Daly & Wilson, 1988). Moreover,
no two individuals face exactly the same future prospects, and individuals
are not born knowing their futures—experience is the only grounds for prog-
nostication. Accordingly, we can expect that individuals should be equipped
to use past experiences in order to assess their future prospects, and they
should adjust their risk-taking behavior in light of this (ongoing) assessment.
In otherwise healthy humans, highly traumatic experiences often produce a
syndrome characterized by impulsiveness, aggressivity, and reduced sero-
tonergic functioning (Southwick et al., 1999). Experimental modification of
rearing conditions in a nonhuman primate model indicate that adverse early
experiences result in subnormal levels of serotonin, a neurotransmitter im-
plicated in impulsive risk-taking (Rosenblum et al., 1994; see also Higley &
Linnoila, 1997). Similar patterns characterize boys raised in families char-
acterized by frequent parental physical punishment and anger (Pine et al.,
1996). Among incarcerated adult male violent offenders, recidivism is pre-
dicted by indices of low serotonin levels, and this in turn is correlated with
a childhood history of paternal alcoholism and violence, paternal absence,
and the presence of (presumably similarly aggressive) brothers in the home
(Virkkunen et al., 1996).
The greater the stakes to be won or lost in transgressions, the more impor-
tant defensive measures become. In a (mildly) polygynous species such as
our own, the variance in male reproductive success is greater than that in fe-
male reproductive success: that is, in the EEA, or environment of evolu-
tionary adaptedness, the difference in the number of offspring between
highly successful and highly unsuccessful men was larger than the corre-
sponding difference among equivalent women. As a result, in our ancestral
state, males had more at stake in defending against transgressions than did
females.4 Furthermore, unlike all other apes, human males often invest sig-
nificantly in their mates and offspring. As a consequence, being cuckolded
poses a grave threat to a man’s fitness, for he risks wasting his investment on
another man’s genes. The advent of hominid paternal investment thus raised
the potential costs of transgressions, further increasing the selective advan-
tages of male psychological attributes that function to deter transgression
(Wilson & Daly, 1992; Buss et al., 1992). Together, these factors are likely
to have selected for a sex difference in the subjective response to transgres-
sion. Because the stakes to be won or lost in transgressions are likely to have
been consistently higher for males than for females, it is plausible that se-
t h e m a l e f l a s h o f a ng er 105
lection favored males who, in comparison with females, were both more eas-
ily and more dramatically blinded by anger. This psychological difference
corresponds with morphological differences, as the greater size and muscu-
larity of men is reasonably explained as the product of intrasexual selection
(i.e., men are in part designed for combat).5 This combination of psycho-
logical and morphological differences corresponds with manifest differences
in behavior: around the globe, spontaneous murderous violence is largely the
domain of men (Daly & Wilson, 1988, 1990; Ghiglieri, 1999; Campbell, this
volume; Walsh, this volume).6
inherent flexibility opens the door for cultural influence via two paths. First,
by indirectly shaping the behavioral environment in which an individual
matures, culture patterns the inputs processed by evolved calibration mech-
anisms, thereby increasing the likelihood that some evolved propensities
will be enhanced, while others will be dampened. Of direct relevance here,
culturally shaped parental attitudes and prescribed socialization practices
are likely to interact with the serotonergic risk sensitivity mechanism de-
scribed earlier, resulting in a partial patterning of the degree of impulsivity
across members of a single culture-sharing group. Second, because human
mental experience is profoundly shaped by socially acquired information,
the process of enculturation can influence the subjective salience and moti-
vational significance of different evolved propensities. In particular, both
lexical labels and the organized, hierarchically embedded information
structures called cultural schemas which accompany such labels provide in-
dividuals with cognitive tools that make it easier to anticipate, identify, and
reflect on given types of mental events (D’Andrade, 1995). Such cultural
marking, or hypercognizing (Levy, 1973), increases the impact of the la-
beled mental events. By the same token, the selective absence of cultural
information regarding a given type of experience (hypocognizing, in Levy’s
terms) decreases its significance. Third, those subjective experiences that
are culturally marked may be either pre- or proscribed, with the result that
individuals may strive to prolong or curtail them, and may seek out or avoid
circumstances that elicit them. Finally, it is important to recognize that,
because cultural understandings are not uniformly distributed within a
population, all three of these processes can lead to both similarities and
differences between individuals within any one group. However, because
individuals within a given society are often influenced by a larger number of
the same understandings than are individuals in different societies, variation
within societies is expected to be generally lower than variation between
societies.
I suspect that the male flash of anger, with its overwhelming subjective
change and drastic behavioral outcome, is both sufficiently dramatic and suf-
ficiently far-reaching in its social consequences as to preclude its ever being
hypocognized—I would be greatly surprised if any culture were to be found
to lack lexical labels for “anger,” or to not contain cultural schemas describ-
ing the potential for aggressivity and risk-taking characteristic of men. How-
ever, a predicted absence of hypocognizing in no way means that we should
expect uniformity in the manner and degree to which cultures influence
both the experience and the manifestation of this evolved propensity. Quite
t h e m a l e f l a s h o f a ng er 107
reality, it is not the male flash of anger per se that is elaborately hypercog-
nized but, rather, the social integrity which that response protects, with the
result that the male flash of anger is both more easily elicited and more vio-
lently acted upon.
Next, consider the “street” culture of North Philadelphia described by
Anderson (1994). For the young men of the street, wealth and prestige are
advertised in the form of jewelry and clothing, items that are easily taken by
force. Money is acquired through activities that require only minimal social
connections. Chaotic family lives, neighborhood entropy, and police apathy
(or overt hostility) add up to an absence of mechanisms of social control.
Here, the highest value is placed not on “honor” but on “respect,” a reifica-
tion of the behaviors that indicate an awareness of another’s propensity to
react violently to transgression: young men crave “respect” and are fero-
ciously angry if they believe that others are questioning or testing their abil-
ity to respond to transgressions. Risk-taking and reputational conflict are an
inherent part of daily life. Men who live to maturity either struggle to main-
tain the same degree of ferocity or essentially withdraw from male-male so-
cial competition; public space generally belongs to young men. Finally,
childhood experiences are congruent with those of later life: Aggression
within the family is overt, economic needs are inconsistently met, and fam-
ily structure is highly labile. Hence, once again we find a cultural meaning
system, functionally congruent with the socioenvironmental context, that
enhances both the ease of elicitation and the behavioral intensity of the male
flash of anger.
In contrast to the utility of the male flash of anger for societies in which
individual defense against transgression is paramount, this same evolved
propensity constitutes a significant hazard in societies where adverse cir-
cumstances both necessitate cooperation and entail vulnerability to revenge.
Consider the Scandinavian-derived inhabitants of the Faeroe Islands, an iso-
lated archipelago in the North Atlantic. As described by Gaffin (1995), the
principal male economic activities consist of team fishing in turbulent
waters, shepherding (which is communal due to frequent absences while
fishing), and the harvesting of sea birds from steep sea cliffs. All of these
endeavors put men in considerable danger, and many require cooperation.
It is therefore not surprising that the Faeroe Islanders place a premium on
the ability to avoid becoming angry. Indeed, this is a defining characteristic
of proper adult masculine behavior. So central is this feature to the male
ideal that Faeroe Island culture contains an elaborate schema concerning the
type of man who fails in this regard. Villagers constantly taunt one another,
testing each others’ capacity to control anger. Men who fail such tests are
pejoratively labeled and taunted at length, thereby repeatedly demonstrat-
ing both their own inability to conform to the cultural ideal and the explo-
sive danger inherent in giving in to anger.
t h e m a l e f l a s h o f a ng er 109
Notes
References
Anderson, Elijah. (1994). The code of the streets. Atlantic Monthly 273(5),
80–94.
Aunger, Robert. (1999). Against idealism/contra consensus. Current An-
thropology 40(supplement), S93–S101.
Barkow, Jerome H. (1989). Darwin, sex, and status: Biological approaches
to mind and culture. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Belsky, Jay. (1999). Modern evolutionary theory and patterns of attachment.
In J. Cassidy & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), Handbook of attachment: Theory, re-
search, and clinical applications (pp. 141–161). New York: Guilford.
Boyd, Robert, & Peter J. Richerson. (1992). Cultural inheritance and evolu-
tionary ecology. In E. A. Smith & B. Winterhalder (Eds.), Evolutionary
ecology and human behavior (pp. 61–92). Foundations of human behav-
ior. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Briggs, Jean L. (1970). Never in anger: Portrait of an Eskimo family. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Burbank, Victoria K. (1992). Sex, gender, and difference: Dimensions of ag-
gression in an Australian Aboriginal community. Human Nature 3(3),
251–278.
Burbank, Victoria K. (1994). Fighting women: Anger and aggression in Abo-
riginal Australia. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Buss, David M., Randy J. Larsen, Drew Westen, & Jennifer Semmelroth.
(1992). Sex differences in jealousy: Evolution, physiology, and psy-
chology. Psychological Science 3(4), 251–255.
Cates, David S., B. K. Houston, C. R. Vavak, M. H. Crawford, & M. Uttley.
(1993). Heritability of hostility-related emotions, attitudes, and behav-
iors. Journal of Behavioral Medicine 16(3), 237–256.
Chagnon, Napoleon A. (1997). Yanomamö. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace
College.
t h e m a l e f l a s h o f a ng er 115
Haidt, Jonathan, & Dacher Keltner. (1999). Culture and facial expression:
Open-ended methods find more expressions and a gradient of recog-
nition. Cognition & Emotion 13(3), 225–266.
Higley, J. D., & M. Linnoila. (1997). Low central nervous system serotoner-
gic activity is traitlike and correlates with impulsive behavior: A non-
human primate model investigating genetic and environmental
influences on neurotransmission. In David M. Stoff & J. John Mann
(Eds.), The neurobiology of suicide: From the bench to the clinic (pp. 39–56).
New York: New York Academy of Sciences.
Hollan, Douglas. (2000). Constructivist models of mind, contemporary
psychoanalysis, and the development of culture theory. American An-
thropologist 102(3), 538–550.
Hur, Yoon-Mi, & Thomas J. Bouchard Jr. (1997). The genetic correlation
between impulsivity and sensation seeking traits. Behavior Genetics
27(5), 455–463.
Lee, Richard B. (1993). The Dobe Ju ‘hoansi. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace
College.
Levy, Robert I. (1973). Tahitians: Mind and experience in the Society Is-
lands. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McGuire, Michael T., & Alfonso Troisi. (1990). Anger: An evolutionary
view. In Robert Plutchik & Henry Kellerman (Eds.), Emotion, psy-
chopathology, and psychotherapy (pp. 43–57). San Diego, CA: Acade-
mic Press.
Nisbett, Richard E., & Dov Cohen. (1996). Culture of honor: The psychol-
ogy of violence in the South. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Oliver, Chad. (1962). Ecology and cultural continuity as contributing factors in
the social organization of the Plains Indians. Berkeley: University of Cal-
ifornia Press.
Otterbein, Keith F. (2000). Five feuds: An analysis of homicides in east-
ern Kentucky in the late nineteenth century. American Anthropologist
102(2), 231–243.
Pine, Daniel S., G. A. Wasserman, J. Coplan, J. A. Fried, Y. Y. Huang, S.
Kassir, L. Greenhill, D. Shaffer, & B. Parsons. (1996). Platelet sero-
tonin 2A (5-HT-sub(2A)) receptor characteristics and parenting fac-
tors for boys at risk for delinquency: A preliminary report. American
Journal of Psychiatry 153(4), 538–544.
Plavcan, J. Michael, & Carel P. Van Schaik. (1997). Intrasexual competi-
tion and body weight dimorphism in anthropoid primates. American
Journal of Physical Anthropology 103(1), 37–68.
Richerson, Peter J., & Robert Boyd. (1998). The evolution of human ultra-
sociality. In I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt & F. K. Salter (Eds.), Indoctrinability, ide-
ology, and warfare: Evolutionary perspectives (pp. 71–95). New York:
Berghahn Books.
Richerson, Peter J., & Robert Boyd. (1999). The evolutionary dynamics of
a crude super organism. Human Nature 10, 253–289.
Robarchek, Clayton A., & Carole J. Robarchek. (1992). Cultures of war
and peace: A comparative study of Waorani and Semai. In J. Silverberg
t h e m a l e f l a s h o f a ng er 117
References
Segerstråle, U. (2000). Defenders of the Truth: The Battle for Science in the
Sociobiology Debate and Beyond. New York: Oxford University Press.
4 Evolutionary Explanation: Between
Science and Values
Ullica Segerstråle
critics’ own agenda? And why have the critics continued their attacks de-
spite the efforts of evolutionary psychology to be politically correct? Has
anything changed after more than a quarter century?
I will argue that the sociobiology debate, which has often been inter-
preted as a political controversy between conservative hereditarians and
progressive culturalists (or environmentalists), in fact represented a clash
between two total scientific-cum-moral worldviews. What was at stake was
the nature of science and the moral responsibility of the scientist, especially
when it came to “telling the truth” about the biological foundation of human
nature. It was fundamentally a debate about the nature of evolutionary ex-
planation of human behavior and what ought to count as “acceptable knowl-
edge” at a particular time—a conflict with deep metaphysical underpinnings.
Finally, the views and strategies of the participants in the debate reflected
different beliefs in the relationship between science and values, and the
merits of pursuing these together or apart. Rather than between traditional
Left and Right, the dividing line went between a type of New Left acade-
mic activist and a traditional type of scientist.
The real attack on Wilson’s book started in the fall of 1975 with a letter from
the Sociobiology Study Group to the New York Review of Books (Allen et al.,
1975). In that letter, Sociobiology was being connected to nazism and racism,
and Wilson was said to support a conservative agenda by emphasizing the
genetic underpinnings of human behavior. Actually, though Wilson’s book
was more than 500 pages long, only the last chapter was devoted to the
human species. There he argued that a number of behaviors, including sex
roles, aggression, altruism, and even moral and religious beliefs, could well
have a biological basis. To boost this argument, he drew parallels to the
behavior of other primates and invoked research on selected traits from be-
havioral genetics and twin studies, suggesting that additional traits may turn
out to have a similar genetic foundation. The critics, however, argued that
Wilson had no evidence and that his statements supported a biological de-
terminist view of humans. For them, such a view implied that social in-
equality was “in our genes,” which would make social measures to diminish
inequality futile.
Wilson had defined sociobiology as “the systematic study of the biolog-
ical basis of all social behavior.” The idea was that, just like other features,
behavior was undergoing evolution. His book was intended as an encyclo-
pedia of all the new information about animal social behavior, both theories
and empirical studies, that had accumulated over several decades. In this en-
deavor Wilson saw himself as continuing the work of the neo-Darwinian or
e vo l u t i o n a r y e x p l a na t i on 123
According to the Sociobiology Study Group, Wilson’s real aim was to pro-
mote a conservative political agenda by defending social inequality as a nat-
ural state of affairs. In fact, the members were so sure about the political
nature of Wilson’s book that they challenged the readers of Science to see for
themselves, assuring them: “There is politics aplenty in Sociobiology, and we
who are its critics did not put it there” (Alper et al., 1976). Wilson himself
has steadfastly denied that he was considering these kinds of political con-
sequences when he wrote his book. Wilson explained that his primary goal
was to provoke the social sciences into taking biology seriously (e.g., Wilson,
1981, 1991, 1994). Wilson saw (and sees) himself as a taboo breaker, and
that is what he was with Sociobiology. His provocation only succeeded
too well.
Wilson soon responded to his critics in kind, insisting that their criticism
of sociobiology was purely political, dismissing them as “tabula rasa Marx-
ists.” Wilson has persisted in this view till today, in various presentations and
publications (e.g., Wilson, 1995). With this, the terms of the debate were
set. Over the next quarter century the protagonists went on accusing each
other. Meanwhile, both parties used the controversy for furthering what I
call their moral-cum-scientific agendas.
What exactly did the critics mean when they said that Sociobiology was
political? It seems they relied solely on textual analysis, not on empirical
evidence. But clearly their interpretation was not the only possible one. In
1980 a quick overview of the actual politics of some leading sociobiologists
gave grounds for treating sociobiology as a movement closer to the Left than
the Right—even a communist conspiracy (van den Berghe, 1980). Histor-
ically, too, biological foundations have often been invoked by the Left
(e.g., the 1930s British leftist biologists, such as J. B. S. Haldane). Also, poli-
e vo l u t i o n a r y e x p l a na t i on 125
tically it is not obvious that a culturalist position is the better leftist alterna-
tive; one reason being that a socialist society needs a vision of human nature
and the needs of humans (Chomsky in talk to Science for the People
1976). And if we try to find political connotations by examining the na-
ture of sociobiological theory, it is not obvious that an atomist or individu-
alist approach (such as used in sociobiological models) is conservative and
a “holistic” perspective (hankered for by the critics) is progressive; individ-
ualist approaches can be radical (e.g., Rousseau) and holistic ones conserv-
ative (e.g., Durkheim) (Masters, 1982).
Finally, for left-wing academics at the time, joining the critics of socio-
biology was not the only game in town. Several high-profile political ac-
tivists, such as Noam Chomsky, Salvador Luria, and George Wald, did not
join the Sociobiology Study Group. Chomsky disagreed with the group’s
attack on the study of human nature, Luria did not think sociobiology was
a good enough cause for political mobilization, and Wald thought the Left
should focus on better things, such as nuclear disarmament.
The members of Science for the People were genuinely convinced that so-
ciobiology was, indeed, evil. (Of course, for academic activists, the fight
against sociobiology was also a welcome cause to rally around after the IQ
controversy.) The working logic of the critics is worth examining more
closely. It involved a type of “cognitive coupling” between three things: bad
science, ideological influences, and bad consequences. Moreover, there was
a clear connection between the critics’ criticism of sociobiology and their
conception that “bad,” and only “bad,” science would be socially abused.
What, then, was “bad” science? It turned out to be the kind of science
that the critics disliked: sociobiology, behavioral genetics, IQ research. Bad
science was never the kind of science that the critics did themselves in their
own labs. Bad science was science that involved working with models and
statistics of various sorts, not science at the molecular, reductionist level.
For many critics, the molecular level was where the “real” truth lay. Mod-
eling would never really yield reliable, serious science—only objective-
seeming, dangerous pseudoscience. This was Lewontin’s (1975a) position.
As Lewontin had already declared about those who studied cognitive traits,
they “could not” be interested in genuine science, because real science had
to do with the molecular level. Therefore they “must” be pursuing their re-
search for ideological reasons—which could also explain the “shoddiness” of
their science (Lewontin, 1975b).
In other words, in their zeal to combat “biological determinism,” the op-
ponents of sociobiology took a very strict view of what counted as “good
126 c o n t r ov er s i e s
What, then, to do with all this bad science? It was not safe to have it around!
So the critics appointed themselves weeders of bad science, debunking it as
it was produced, so that this science would not be around to mislead the in-
nocent layman and social policy makers. We then had a rather paradoxical
situation of a new group of scientific workers, taking it upon themselves to
weed out, in the name of public safety, what their colleagues had planted.
These weeders trusted neither the scientific process to sort out good science
from bad, nor the democratic process to reach sound decisions when it
came to the uses of scientific knowledge. As a result, traditional scientists—
e vo l u t i o n a r y e x p l a na t i on 127
the “weed planters”—were cast in a strange role as evil scientists for just
doing what they and their professional colleagues considered “normal sci-
ence” in their own fields.
Where did the weeders get this negativistic style of reasoning? The be-
liefs of weeders often coincided with the New Left ideology and with the
political tenets of the American 1960s student movement and peace move-
ment. The American left-wing radicals had been influenced by the thinking
of the European Critical School, which saw a power-elite manipulating the
members of a mass society. Meanwhile, and ironically, the radical students
in Europe adhered to a more traditional Marxist class analysis (Bouchier,
1977; Segerstråle 2000a, chap. 11). In other words, from a European Marx-
ist point of view, most members of Science for the People could hardly be
called “Marxists”; rather, they represented concerns typical of American rad-
icalism. Wilson, meanwhile, used the blanket label “Marxist” for all his rad-
ical opponents.
A police officer’s task is not an easy lot. Here is a trio of critics re-
flecting on the need for constant vigilance. The critics describe themselves
as firefighters:
As part of their task as guardians of the innocent layman against bad science,
Lewontin and his fellow-weeders further warned the public not to trust ex-
perts (“experts are servants of power, by and large” [Lewontin, 1975c]). In
contrast, planters emphasized the possibility and desirability of objective sci-
entific expertise (Wilson, 1977; Davis 1975, 1978, 1986). For them, the so-
cial responsibility of a scientist consisted in acting as an objective and rational
authority for the public.
The two camps had completely different views of the best way of keep-
ing science pure—that is, free from ideology. Take Bernard Davis, Wilson’s
Harvard ally and a scientific traditionalist. For him, Nazi science (just like
Lysenkoism in the Soviet Union) was an example of what happens when sci-
entific objectivity is abandoned to serve ideological causes. That is why sci-
ence needed to be objective, and objectivity in science was, according to
128 c o n t r ov er s i e s
him, achievable. For the Sociobiology Study Group, again, Nazi science was
the prime example of how bad, racist science led to bad consequences.
Therefore, it was important to guard against bad science at any specific
time; they noted especially that bad science may well be masquerading as
objective-sounding biological claims about humans (which would then be
used by evil politicians for discriminatory purposes). This is why the ideo-
logical underpinnings of objective-sounding, bad theories had to be found
and exposed. (In a 1981 interview, Davis expressed sadness that he and the
critics so profoundly disagreed about science, since they had equally good
reason to abhor the Nazis. He explained the difference by the fact that they
represented two different generations of Jewish academics.)
We see here how emphasizing or deemphasizing objectivity were actu-
ally alternative strategies for reaching the same goal of keeping science pure!
Both sides in the sociobiology controversy were, in their own way, “defend-
ers of the truth.” At the same time, neither side acknowledged the possible
scientific legitimacy of the other side’s position. This situation appears quite
typical in the world of science. In the sociobiology debate each participant
believed that he himself was pursuing “good science” and the truth, while
the opponent’s incorrect position could obviously not be scientifically based
and must therefore be explained by some bias interfering and clouding the
Truth.
realistic range for social and cultural experimentation, and help with social
planning. Wilson had no small goal: he wanted to save mankind.
Moreover—and this was something that served both his larger program
and his more personal protest against the Church—Wilson hoped to bio-
logize ethics. In this way, there would be no arbitrary moral rules imposed
on us by “theologians.” This had been Wilson’s concern ever since he left the
Southern Baptist Church as a teenager and became an evolutionist instead
(see discussion in Segerstråle, 1986). For Wilson, morality was merely one
of the many products of evolution, generated by ‘epigenetic rules’ and tai-
lored to our particular human species nature (e.g., Ruse & Wilson, 1985;
Wilson, 1980).2
There was no doubt that Wilson blatantly committed the so-called nat-
uralistic fallacy, going from is to ought, and that is what the critics picked up
on. Although Wilson sometimes equivocated on this point, it seems that for
him there actually existed no naturalistic fallacy; it was his way of reasoning
about man and nature. He saw “a genetically accurate and therefore com-
pletely fair code of ethics” as a rational alternative to the arbitrary and un-
grounded teachings of religious leaders.3 In 1982 he actually wrote that we
ought to get rid of the is-ought distinction as soon as possible!
There is a profound misunderstanding of Wilson’s ambitions, due to a
“generation gap” of sorts. Both in his problem definition and his preferred bio-
logical paradigm, Wilson can be seen as being one academic generation “off”
in relation to the critics. His liberal critics on the East Coast were far removed
from this tradition of deriving values from nature (still represented by peo-
ple like C. H. Waddington at the time of the sociobiology controversy,
and earlier by Lorenz, Teilhard de Chardin, and others). They interpreted
Wilson’s value statements as his championing a political program instead.
Scientifically, Sociobiology was Wilson’s great attempt to extend the
Modern Synthesis to the field of behavior, using the mathematical formu-
lae and methods of population genetics (augmented with ecological and
other considerations). It seems that early on he hoped to capture the very
trajectory of mankind in this way, using evolutionary biology as a substitute
for divine prophecy (see Segerstråle, 1986). Philosophically, a grand ambi-
tion of Wilson’s was to unite the social and natural sciences. He believed
that sociobiology, the most mathematized area of evolutionary biology,
would be central in this effort. The solution was to make the social sciences
scientific (here he meant partly putting them on a quantitative statistical
basis, employing population genetic formulae similar to the kinetic gas laws
in physics). But Wilson had not asked the social sciences what they them-
selves thought about this. Vehemently resisting such promised “cannibal-
ization,” sociologists and anthropologists became immediately suspicious of
sociobiology.
130 c o n t r ov er s i e s
This is what Gould told a meeting for Science for the People in the spring
of 1984:
But just like Wilson, Gould and Lewontin were pursuing a complex, com-
bined moral and scientific agenda. Inside their scientific objection to adap-
tationism there was hidden another Trojan horse: a moral/political concern.
If everything is optimally adapted, there is no point in changing society. But
if you instead of adaptation emphasize discontinuity, contingency, and
chance, you indicate that in a radically new environment new types of indi-
viduals will flourish. It is not a question of the selection of the fittest; every-
body gets a chance. Lewontin (whose anti-adaptationism preceded Gould’s)
had found an apt biblical quote (from Ecclesiastes) to illustrate their posi-
tion: “The race is not to the swift, nor yet bread to the wise . . . but time and
chance happeneth to them all” (Lewontin, 1981a).
On this view, Gould’s continuous search for theoretical alternatives to
the adaptationist program can be seen as one long argument for social re-
form and social justice. Punctuated equilibria was his (and Eldredge’s) first
dent in the adaptationist bulwark: long periods of gradualism and adaptation
were interrupted by unpredictable events, which could even give rise to new
species (Eldredge & Gould, 1972; Gould & Eldredge, 1977). Later Gould
emphasized chance and contingency even more, arguing, for instance, that
in the Cambrian explosion many different phyla existed that later went ex-
tinct. The organisms that humans come from are traceable to only a single
132 c o n t r ov er s i e s
one of these simple organisms. In other words, humankind may never have
come about. We came here entirely by chance. Gould also protested against
the idea that evolution has a direction (going, for instance, toward greater
complexity). Some simple organisms are perfectly well adapted, he noted,
and in some cases evolution has even gone one step backward rather than
forward! He suggested making the humble bacteria the biological model
species (Gould, 1992, 1994).
Lewontin, unlike Gould, does not have an alternative scientific theory
to offer. Rather, he is promoting a philosophical research program, where
organisms are seen as subject and object, wholes as implying parts and parts
as implying wholes, and other types of dialectical ways of looking at reality
(e.g., Lewontin, 1981b, Levins & Lewontin, 1985).5
Gould and Lewontin’s overall strategy, then, seems to have been to de-
velop those kinds of scientific arguments which, if taken as social belief and
if acted upon, will conceivably have politically desirable social implications
(e.g., everybody getting their chance). They are simply taking the nasty
social-implications bull by the horns by providing “correct” science for the
people. (I am not implying that they do not believe in what they say. Ac-
tually, I believe that it is typical for leading American participants in the
sociobiology controversy to combine genuine belief with strategic consid-
erations, all the while establishing multiple links between science and val-
ues. They thus are able to do everything simultaneously, including pursue
their political impulses within science. These scientists could be classified
as “super-optimizers.”)
Interestingly, Wilson, too, has pursued a similar agenda of “politically
correct” science, at least part of the time. For instance, already in Socio-
biology he played down the significance of IQ and dismissed race as a useful
biological concept. In his next book (Wilson, 1978), he discussed “the car-
dinal value of the survival of the human gene pool” and the need for ge-
netic diversity. He also argued for universal human rights, “because we are
mammals,” and even observed that “the long-term consequence of in-
equity will always be visibly dangerous.” He topped this off by advocating
a more liberal sexual morality and defending homosexuality as socially use-
ful. All this was based on the values that he saw as connected to facts from
evolutionary biology. And note that, in blatant contrast to the critics’ ac-
cusations, the social implications Wilson derived from his own theories
were always liberal.
One problem with predicting the social consequences of certain scien-
tific claims is, of course, that people may not agree about one’s assessment
(as we saw with many of Wilson’s suggestions); in addition, one may simply
be factually wrong. Finally, the facts themselves may change over time as
science develops, and the social meaning of the facts may change with a
changing social climate.
e vo l u t i o n a r y e x p l a na t i on 133
When it comes to coping with facts and values, and the social impli-
cations of science, the dividing line does not go neatly between the socio-
biological and the critical camp. Instead, we have scientists who believe in
keeping scientific and moral truth apart and scientists who regard it as de-
sirable and/or necessary to pursue scientific and moral/political truth to-
gether. This line often coincided with the Atlantic divide.6
As we have seen, the American protagonists in the sociobiology debate
followed various types of normative strategies, pursuing science and values
together (deriving values from science, criticizing undesirable science,
putting science in the direct service of values by producing “politically cor-
rect” science, and so on). In contrast, the participants from the United King-
dom typically coped by adopting the exact opposite strategy: a strictly
objectivist one, striving to keep science and values apart (e.g., Dawkins and
Maynard Smith). (There was a good precedent for such a stance, going all
the way back to “Darwin’s bulldog,” Thomas Henry Huxley [1898], who
hoped that the perceived message of evolution could be counteracted by
education and culture.)7
Wilson, although clearly normative when involved with his moral-
cum-scientific agenda or when writing in a visionary style, shifted into an ob-
jectivist mode when writing as a scientist (or defending sociobiology against
political critics). In other words, Wilson had two hats, and it was not always
clear which one he was putting on. (Incidentally, one problem with the in-
famous last chapter of Sociobiology may exactly have been the mixing of
these modes).
There are obviously arguments to make in favor of both strategies for
evolutionary biologists, the normative and the objectivist one. What is in-
teresting is that the strategies seem to be based on different images of the au-
dience for evolutionary ideas. The normative alternative is utility-oriented,
based on the belief that evolutionary biological claims will directly affect
the actions of people or policy makers, in the short or the long run. It sees
evolutionary biology as a type of applied science. In contrast, the objec-
tivist alternative is connected to a vision of evolutionary biology as pure
science: knowledge that does not necessarily have consequences, mere
wonder at the workings of nature. We have here two different underlying
visions of science (which presumably also have their different sociopoliti-
cal correlates).
But if we ask what people in general will typically believe, it may be
that it is the critics of sociobiology who have the more realistic assessment.
People will jump to conclusions based on even tentative knowledge. And
they may, indeed, take scientific facts (even tentative ones) as a guide for
values, unless they have other, stronger belief systems in place (say, systems
that say that scientific facts have no bearing whatsoever on the social
value of human beings). Huxley’s belief in education as counteracting
134 c o n t r ov er s i e s
More than a quarter century has passed since the beginning of the sociobi-
ology debate. The “environmentalist” or culturalist paradigm that used to be
so prevalent has come under increasing attack. Anthropology, with its em-
phasis on cultural differences, got into hot water with Derek Freeman’s
attack on Margaret Mead’s study of adolescence in Samoa and the reeval-
uation of similar case studies of cultural peculiarities. What is being
stressed now, instead, is human universals, to an extent that would have
been unfathomed some 25 years ago. The mind is in, and cognitive science
is riding high, broadening the definition of science in a way that adherents
to the 1950s and 1960s behaviorist paradigm could not have imagined. Pri-
mate studies, too, have changed: we are now far away from the “killer apes”
of the 1960s. The emphasis is not on aggression and territoriality but instead
on moral behavior (see, e.g., de Waal, 1996, 2001). Clearly, if chimpanzees
have such good features, it is easier to acknowledge that they are our cousins.
The same goes for language. Research on chimpanzee language resumed
after the controversies in the 1970s and early 1980s (Savage-Rumbaugh
et al., 1993), and there are studies of proto-language in a number of animals
(e.g., Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Evans & Marler, 1997).
It is in this climate that evolutionary psychology has emerged. Indeed,
it might be said that evolutionary psychology has actually helped create
some of this climate. I have in mind especially Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby’s
The Adapted Mind (1992), which not only presents the logic of the new dis-
cipline and a number of supportive studies from different scientific disci-
plines but also engages in a deliberate demolition job of what it calls “the
Standard Social Science Model” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). That standard
model, which, according to the authors, regards culture as preeminent and
sees humans as in principle capable of learning anything, is said to underlie
social science reasoning and be responsible for the wrongheadedness of
much of anthropology and sociology.
The evolutionary psychologists have hit hard theoretically while col-
lecting a number of existing “counter studies” to famous anthropological
studies, showing how earlier cultural relativist anthropologists were mis-
taken. In this way they have prepared the terrain for the onslaught of their
own paradigm, which presents a biologically grounded universal human
mind with specific modules dedicated to solving specific types of problems.
In the world of evolutionary psychology, cultural differences are played
down in favor of a common humanity. The only difference allowed is the
e vo l u t i o n a r y e x p l a na t i on 135
But in view of the trouble its proponents have taken not to fall into various
political traps, why has evolutionary psychology not been received with
open arms by the former critics of sociobiology? I can offer five reasons;
there may be more.
First, there is the continuing fear of genetic determinism. The general
climate has changed toward more acceptance of genetic explanation. There
is great prevalence of “gene-talk” in the general culture. The gene, seen as
the emblem of DNA, appears as a cultural icon (Nelkin & Lindee, 1995).
At the same time there is little discussion of what exactly “the gene” is, or
how it is actually expressed. In the early stages of the human genome pro-
ject, leading figures presented the gene as a blueprint. Together with the
DNA emblem, and the phrase “the selfish gene,” the picture of the gene as
immutable and deterministic may be hard to resist, especially as there are no
compelling counter-icons (so far) emphasizing the importance of such things
as development.
Worry about these developments has spread beyond the critics of socio-
biology. According to a number of scientific critics, the computational
model of the mind does not cover many important aspects of the mind and
living systems, such as internal regulation, coordination, and feedback mech-
anisms. Among these critics are developmentally oriented biologists and
psychologists (e.g., Bateson & Martin, 2000), developmental systems theo-
rists (e.g., Oyama, 2000), researchers and theorists of cognitive processes
(e.g., van Gelder & Port, 1995; Hutchins, 1996), and even a developmental
cognitive neuroscientist (Johnson, 1997).
Second, although the idea of a universal human mind is arguably dif-
ferent from the universal human nature that caused Wilson so much
trouble (because it involves neither behavioral genetics nor emphasis on
individual variation), this universal mind is still presented as adaptive.
This raised a red flag for people like Gould,8 whose moral-cum-scientific
agenda demanded anti-adaptationism. For him, the idea of a mind con-
sisting of modules, each adapted for a specific task in the ancestral envi-
ronment, appeared like a Panglossian anathema.
Moreover, the evolutionary psychologists’ emphasis on design and “re-
verse engineering” is directly associated with Gould’s arch enemy, Dawkins.
Over the last two decades, it is largely Dawkins who has taken up Wilson’s
e vo l u t i o n a r y e x p l a na t i on 137
when we know about our tendencies can we know how to counteract them
(e.g., Buss, 2000). Feminists have been up in arms about such suggestions
that women should avoid wearing short skirts.
Fourth, a theme that emerges again is the one about models and real-
ity. Evolutionary psychologists have joined forces with cognitive neuro-
science but are now being rebutted by affective neuroscientists, who argue
that their modular model of the brain cannot hold. The reason is that it does
not take into account the brain’s anatomical structure or its evolutionary his-
tory. Why postulate modules in the neocortex? they say. Why not in the
more ancient emotional brain that we share with other mammals? Why pos-
tulate massive modularity, and why not emphasize the processes of on-
togeny? (See, for instance, Panksepp & Panksepp, 2000).
Interestingly, in the felt need to go to the anatomical level, at least one
critic of sociobiology, Steven Rose (2000), has recently discovered ethology,
which he now surprisingly invokes against evolutionary psychology! This is
paradoxical, since the critics saw sociobiology as a direct continuation of the
late 1960s ethological arguments about an innate human nature, which were
at the time vehemently refuted by the Left.
Fifth, the metaphysical issue of free will and determinism will not go
away. This was an important matter underlying the critics’ opposition to
sociobiology, and it is also underlying the critique of evolutionary psychol-
ogy. Again, the critics’ concern has to do with the worry that biological facts
will be taken as legitimations for people’s actions. I believe that this is an im-
portant reason that Gould, for instance, disliked evolutionary psychology,
just as he disliked sociobiology. The critics of sociobiology seemed to believe
in a “totally free” free will, not in any way influenced by genetic constraints.
Because of culture—a totally separate realm—there were no constraints on
our human potential or our social and cultural arrangements (see, for in-
stance, Gould, 1976).
But what was the real issue behind this talk about genes and free will?
Chorover (1979) formulated the concern of the critics when he argued that
explanations that linked human behavior to evolution were in fact a bio-
logical version of the old idea of original sin. If behavior could be “explained
away” as due to a type of sociobiological original sin, then individuals could
not be held morally responsible for their actions and no guilt could be at-
tributed. In other words, biological determinist explanations seemingly ex-
onerated individuals; it was “all in the genes.” Therefore, in order to sustain
the idea of individual responsibility (and moral guilt!), free will had to be
postulated. (Incidentally, the critics also disliked Skinner’s behaviorism, be-
cause the idea of total conditioning was seen as another determinism taking
away individual responsibility; see, e.g., Miller [1978]).
But there is irony in history. Toward the end of the millennium, as the
climate changed from “environmentalism” (culturalism) toward better ac-
e vo l u t i o n a r y e x p l a na t i on 139
ceptance of “the gene,” the worst may have happened from the point of view
of the critics of sociobiology. Some believe that we may now be entering a
new era of “genetic essentialism” (Nelkin & Lindee, 1995). That is, in the
public’s mind, genetics may become increasingly connected to questions of
good and evil. According to Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee, a whole new
excuse may be developing: “It’s not me, it’s my genes,” as a substitute for an
earlier time’s “the devil made me do it.” In this worst-case scenario, people
would be shamelessly referring to original sin of the sociobiological type—
and get away with it! Little would be left of the notions of free will and in-
dividual responsibility that many critics of determinist ideas fought so hard
for during the second part of the twentieth century.10
(The late) Dorothy Nelkin was a sociologist, and Susan Lindee is an anthro-
pologist. And obviously, in order to understand what meaning scientific find-
ings have for people and the real connection between facts and values, we
need to know how people think and react. Social scientists are not only
needed for helping understand meaning in everyday life, but also to help
contextualize science itself. How a particular scientific claim is received has
to do with many factors, including the particular academic climate at the
time and the overall political situation. The meanings of biological argu-
ments change over time.
Social scientists are indispensable, too, when it comes to providing crit-
ical interpretations of what to scientists may seem like a neutral fact, and for
experimenting with various hypothetical futuristic scenarios. These kinds of
exercises obviously should not be left to left-wing biologists, who may have
their own particular agenda tagged on to their moral outrage. But in order
to be effective mediators between scientists and the public, social scientists
will need to understand the nature of scientific reasoning and possess basic
knowledge in the relevant field (e.g., evolutionary biology).
I mention this against an impression of a mood of increasing scientism
and natural science chauvinism after the so-called Science Wars in the mid-
1990s. The Science Wars revolved around the (partly justified) charges that
(parts of) the social sciences and humanities were turning increasingly “anti-
science” (for an overview and analysis, see Segerstråle, 2000b). As a solution
to a widely perceived Two Cultures problem, Wilson (1998) has suggested
the establishment of universal “consilience” (unity of knowledge between
the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities), which would also
manifest itself in education. Still, this unity of knowledge seems to be on
the terms of the natural sciences and not take into account the special con-
tributions that social scientists can make (on this, see Segerstråle, 2000a,
140 c o n t r ov er s i e s
chap. 18). The nature and value of social science may not be clear to natural
scientists, and some may have the mistaken reductionist assumption that so-
cial science is not needed, because the solutions to the world’s problems lie
in the realm of natural science (though the events of September 11 should
lay such preconceptions to rest). The various social sciences need to reassert
themselves as respected partners in the academic enterprise. But for this, we
need to get our act together.
It seems inevitable for the social sciences to have a serious reassessment
of the ways in which they are both similar to and different from the natural
sciences.11 This is part of a very old discussion, but the current quest for in-
tegration of all the sciences has undoubtedly put pressure on the social sci-
ences. So have the new developments in evolutionary biology. Some kind of
response is needed, and traditional knee-jerk biophobia not acceptable any
longer.12 At the same time, an important aspect of the discussion ought to
be renewed respect for different levels of explanation—the social, the psy-
chological, the physiological, the genetic, and so on—and renewed respect
for the particular insights and intuitions about the human condition offered
by the humanities. These are all important for the understanding of com-
plex reality; there is no reason to make the evolutionary level the primary
explanatory one. Finally, one of the most powerful reasons for the difficul-
ties in rapprochement between biology and the social sciences is the acade-
mic reward structure. Can something be done about that, so that researchers
may get proper credit for interdisciplinary initiatives—which for social sci-
entists may involve, among other things, learning to look at the world
through the glasses of the purported “enemy”?
Notes
of these reasons and more in van den Berghe, 1990, and Segerstråle &
Molnar, 1997).
Sociobiology, with its suggestion to cannibalize social science, certainly
made itself unpopular as soon as it emerged. The reaction was especially
strong in anthropology (e.g., Sahlins, 1976), but that did not prevent the
emergence of evolutionary anthropology as a field (Chagnon & Irons, 1979;
see Betzig, 1997, for a history and assessment). And already before the so-
ciobiology controversy, there was the field of biosocial anthropology, estab-
lished by Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox (1971 and later). The long-standing
conflict between biological and cultural anthropologists has had more recent
manifestations as well: Freeman’s attack on Mead (1983, 1988), and the
“response” by cultural anthropology to the vicious attack on Napoleon
Chagnon’s sociobiologically inspired Yanomamo research (e.g., Tierney,
2000; see current Web sites documenting the evolving conflict, including
the American Anthropological Association’s handling of the matter).
In political science there was an early interest in evolutionary ideas
(e.g., Wiegele, 1979); later examples are Masters (1989) and Somit &
Petersen (1997, 2005), who study, among other things, how evolutionary
dominance hierarchies underlie political systems. However, this interest is
limited to a minority of the profession. Sociology as a field has been among
the most resistant, although a few sociologists (e.g., Collins, 1975, 1981;
Giddens, 1984; Scheff, 1990) have used ethological and nonverbal theory
in their theory-building efforts (following in the footsteps of sociologists
such as G. H. Mead and Erving Goffman). One book trying to systemati-
cally connect classical sociological theory to evolutionary theory is Lopreato
& Crippen (1999).
There are few books bringing an evolutionary perspective to bear on the
social sciences as a whole. A recent effort is Barkow (1989), pioneering the
approach of evolutionary psychology as a unifying perspective for the so-
cial sciences (for later examples, see Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992).
Segerstråle & Molnar (1997) strive to bring the social sciences and life
sciences together around the interdisciplinary field of nonverbal communi-
cation under the motto “biology with a human face.” Sanderson (2001) pre-
sents a synthesis of cultural materialist anthropology, classical sociological
theory and neo-Darwinism from a conflict-theoretical perspective.
References
Alper, J., Beckwith, J., Chorover, S. L., Hunt, J., Judd, T., Lange, R. V., &
Sternberg, P. (1976). The implications of sociobiology. Science, 192,
424–425.
Barkow, J. H. (1989). Darwin, Sex and Status. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press.
Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992). The Adapted Mind: Evo-
lutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Bateson, P., & Martin, P. (2000). Design for a Life: How Behavior Develops.
London: Vintage Paperbacks.
Berghe, P. van den. (1980). Sociobiology: Several views. Bioscience, 31, 406.
Betzig, L. (Ed.). (1997). Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bouchier, D. (1977). Radical ideologies and the sociology of knowledge.
Sociology, 11, 29–46.
Buss, D. (1994). The Evolution of Desire. New York: Basic Books.
Buss, D. (2000). The Dangerous Passion: Why Jealousy Is as Necessary as
Love and Sex. New York: Free Press.
Callebaut, W. (Ed.). (1993). Taking the Naturalistic Turn; or, How Real
Philosophy of Science Is Done. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Chagnon, N. A., & W. Irons (Eds.). (1979). Evolutionary Biology and
Human Social Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective. North Scitu-
ate, MA: Duxbury.
Cheney, D., & Seyfarth, R. (1990). How Monkeys See the World. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Chorover, S. (1979). From Genesis to Genocide. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Collins, R. (1975). Conflict Sociology. New York: Academic Press.
Collins, R. (1981). On the micro-foundations of macro-sociology. Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology, 86, 984–1014.
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992). The psychological foundations of cul-
ture. In J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The Adapted
Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2005). Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer. Re-
trieved February 10, 2005, from http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/
cep/primer/html.
Davis, B. D. (1975). Social determinism and behavioral genetics. Science, 26,
189.
Davis, B. D. (1978). The moralistic fallacy. Nature, 272, 390.
Davis, B. D. (1986). Storm over Biology: Essays on Science, Sentiment, and
Public Policy. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.
Dawkins, R. (1982). The Extended Phenotype: The Gene as Unit of Selection.
Oxford and San Francisco: Freeman.
Dennett, D. (1995). Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. New York: Simon and
Schuster.
De Waal, F. B. M. (1996). Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in
Humans and Other Animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
144 c o n t r ov er s i e s
(Ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (pp. 48–73). Salt Lake
City: University of Utah Press; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, E. O. (1981). Interview with the author. Cambridge, MA.
Wilson, E. O. (1991). Sociobiology and the test of time. In M. H. Robinson
& L. Tiger (Eds.), Man and Beast Revisited. Washington, DC: Smith-
sonian Institution Press.
Wilson, E. O. (1994). Naturalist. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Wilson, E. O. (1998). Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York:
Knopf.
This page intentionally left blank
5 Making Hay Out of Straw?
Real and Imagined Controversies
in Evolutionary Psychology
Straw Men
Genetic Determinism
The doctrine of genetic determinism holds that the behavior of organisms
depends in no way on the environment; the organism’s genes wholly de-
termine the organism’s behavior. In the realm of evolutionary psychology,
this is often portrayed as the belief that human brains are “hard-wired,” de-
veloping in particular ways independent of the environment in which they
mature.
Do critics portray evolutionary psychology as genetically deterministic?
Nelkin (2000) says, “Evolutionary principles imply genetic destiny. They de-
emphasize the influence of social circumstances” (p. 27). Herrnstein Smith
(2000) echoes this remark, claiming that evolutionary psychologists “dis-
miss” cultural, historical, and individual variables (p. 167); she singles out
Pinker’s supposed claims of human sexuality’s “definitive determination (in
150 c o n t r ov er s i e s
presumably all senses)” (p. 171) and immunity from social influences.
Shakespeare and Erikson (2000) agree, suggesting that “[i]n these [evolu-
tionary] approaches it is possession of a specific set of genes, or a particular
configuration of a hard-wired brain, constituted via evolutionary mecha-
nisms, which explains any given social phenomenon” (p. 231). Karmiloff-
Smith (2000) also cautions that, in contrast to the evolutionary view,
“behaviors are not simply triggered from genetically determined mecha-
nisms” (p. 174), and later, that evolutionary psychologists should consider
the developing organism’s myriad interactions with the environment in con-
trast to “their one-sided approach” (p. 184).
More generally, critics equate biology with fixedness. H. Rose (2000)
refers to “biological imperatives” and “biology-as-destiny” (p. 149), while
Jencks (2000) talks about “built-in genetic program(s) . . . hard-wired into
our brains by natural selection” (p. 34). Fausto-Sterling (2000) is skeptical
about evolutionary psychology’s “hard-wired view of the inflexibility of
social arrangements” (p. 221).
Compare the positions attributed to evolutionary psychologists with
the published views of evolutionary psychologists on this topic:
Cross-Societal Variation
Hyperadaptationism
reverse criticism. She takes issue with Don Symons’s (1979) speculation that
the female orgasm might be a by-product rather than an adaptation (Fausto-
Sterling, 2000, p. 211), existing only because of the male orgasm, with the
design “carried over” to the other sex. Whichever view proves to be correct,
Fausto-Sterling here seems guilty of precisely the sins of which evolution-
ary psychologists stand accused, while Symons is as pluralistic as Gould
could ask.
Gould (2000) also questioned whether adaptation need be invoked for
understanding why human males invest in their offspring. His explanation is
this: “A man may feel love for a baby because the infant looks so darling and
dependent and because a father sees a bit of himself in his progeny. This feel-
ing need not arise as a specifically selected Darwinian adaptation” (p. 122).
Interestingly, in a very entertaining piece 20 years earlier, Gould (1979)
showed how Disney’s Mickey Mouse takes advantage of humans’ prefer-
ences for neotenous features, changing over the course of his own evolution
from his slightly shady start in “Steamboat Willie” to the modern, more
neotenous Mickey Mouse. In Gould’s own words: “When we see a living
creature with babyish features, we feel an automatic surge of disarming ten-
derness. The adaptive value of this response can scarcely be questioned, for
we must nurture our babies” (Gould, 1979, p. 33).
For Gould, the human preference for neoteny is adaptive (1979), yet
not necessarily an adaptation (2000). And if not adaptation, the only alter-
native is a spandrel, or by-product. Gould’s suggestion, then, is that parental
love for babies is an accident, mere happenstance—a phenomenally im-
probable and obviously lucky state of affairs. If this claim were made of
any other species, we doubt the idea would be entertained for a moment:
is it possible that penguin dads care for penguin chicks by accident, rather
than design?
In this chapter we are not attempting to elaborate evidence for parental
investment adaptations in human males. Our point is simply that peoples’
requirements differ in terms of how unlikely complex functional design
must be before the case for adaptation is made. Stephen J. Gould (2000) is
as skeptical as one could ask of a scientist, allowing for the possibility of un-
fathomably unlikely scenarios.
Steven Pinker (1998) used the example of an olive pitter to discuss the value
of considering design. Imagine what critics of evolutionary approaches might
say were someone to come across an olive pitter and speculate that it was
good at pitting olives because it was designed to do so. Gould might claim
m a k i n g h a y o u t o f s tra w? 155
that this was an unfounded and possibly unfalsifiable “just so” story, em-
phasizing that there was no evidence of the history of the artifact, as noth-
ing whatsoever was known about the factory in which it was produced.
Others would claim that a more “parsimonious” explanation would be that
it was good at pitting olives because it had a little plunger mechanism here,
a sharp point there, and so forth. Finally, as discussed above, they might claim
that it could very well be that the olive pitter is an incidental by-product,
the leftover material from a factory that makes, for example, sewing ma-
chines. This particular by-product, it would be argued, just happens to be
good at pitting olives.
These arguments—insufficient historical data, the sovereign status of
proximate explanations, and by-product hypotheses—are common criti-
cisms of evolutionary psychology.
Gould asks, “How can we possibly obtain the key information that
would be required to show the validity of adaptive tales about the EEA? . . .
We do not even know the original environment of our ancestors” (p. 120).
Note that for Gould this information seems to be a requirement to show de-
sign. Benton (2000) is similarly concerned about the “fragmentary sources
of evidence available from the fossil record” (p. 262), and Fausto-Sterling
(2000) suggests that because we know so little about the ancestral past,
“evaluating competing hypotheses becomes very difficult” (p. 214). Gould
concludes that “the key strategy proposed by evolutionary psychologists for
identifying adaptation is untestable and therefore unscientific” (Gould,
2000, p. 120).
Evolutionary psychologists do indeed use what is believed to be true of
our species’ evolutionary history to generate hypotheses. However, devel-
oping evidence of adaptation does not require precise knowledge of the his-
tory of selection because evidence of adaptation in evolutionary psychology is
exactly the same as it is in evolutionary biology: evidence of special design. A hy-
pothesis about design should lead to testable predictions (for extended dis-
cussions of this issue, see Buss et al., 1998; Holcomb, 1998; Ketelaar & Ellis,
2000). The question is not whether we can know for certain what our an-
cestral past was like; the question is whether or not we can use what we do
know about ancestral environments to develop new hypotheses (Barkow,
1989). Consider that with each feature of the olive pitter the chef demon-
strated, each exquisitely tuned to its function, an observer would become
increasingly convinced as to its purpose, knowing nothing at all about the
artifact’s history.
Does a description of the mechanics of the olive pitter replace an expla-
nation in terms of its design? S. Rose suggests that evolutionary psychologists
“insist on distal (in their slightly archaic language, ‘ultimate’) explanations
when proximate ones are so much more explanatory” (p. 3), and again later,
that “proximal mechanisms . . . are much more evidence-based as
156 c o n t r ov er s i e s
There are areas of debate in which there are genuinely different points of
view. Some of these debates are between evolutionary psychologists and
those who endorse alternative non-evolutionary hypotheses (e.g., Buss,
Larsen, Westen, & Semmelroth, 1992; Harris, 2000), while other debates
take place within the field, among practitioners. Disagreements can take
place on logical grounds (e.g., Pinker, 1998, vs. Fodor, 2000), differing
interpretations of existing data (e.g., Buss & Duntley, 2000, vs. Daly &
Wilson, 1988), or, the largest category, as-yet-unknown answers to ques-
tions that will ultimately be decided empirically.
The single most critical arena of legitimate debate in evolutionary psy-
chology is the extent to which the human mind is “modular” or “domain
specific.” These terms are used differently by different authors, but very gen-
erally, modularity refers to the extent to which the mind consists of a large
number of very functionally specific and relatively isolated information-
processing devices as opposed to a smaller number of more general sys-
tems. Another way to put this is to ask how many mental “organs” there
m a k i n g h a y o u t o f s tra w? 157
are, and the extent to which the organs themselves are composed of spe-
cialized subsystems.
Most evolutionary psychologists favor some variation of the view that
the mind is likely to possesses many functionally distinct mental organs, with
some anchoring each pole of a continuum from extreme (Sperber, 1994) to
modest (Mithin, 1996) modularity. This debate ranges across disciplines,
discussed by philosophers, neuroscientists, psychologists, and anthropolo-
gists. Recently, Pinker’s (1998) How the Mind Works, which defended a
modular view, was challenged by Fodor’s (2000) cleverly titled The Mind
Doesn’t Work That Way.
The critical point is that challenges to domain-specific hypotheses in the
form of hypotheses about more general mechanisms are thoroughly legiti-
mate. In fact, these challenges are welcome alternatives to arguments cen-
tering on the false dichotomies of the past: biological versus cultural, innate
versus learned, genetic versus environmental. Any given psychological
mechanism can be more or less domain specific, but all mechanisms must
result from an interaction of genes and environment. As discussed above, it
is on this latter point that all reasonable parties agree, despite protestations
of the critics to the contrary.
Challenges to domain-specific hypotheses have spawned productive
debates. The question of whether face recognition is performed by a mech-
anism specialized for this task is one example, and here progress has been
made, with experimental and neuropsychological evidence accumulating
in favor of the domain-specific view (Kanwisher, 2000). Certainly the
debate surrounding the question of the specificity of language learning
has been a fruitful one (Pinker, 1994), as has the controversy surrounding
specificity in the mechanisms underpinning children’s acquisition of
knowledge in the areas of biology, folk psychology, and physics (Hirschfeld
& Gelman, 1994).
Nowhere is this debate more vivid than in discussions of culture.
Ideas, norms, and rules that differ between societies are all acquired by
some kind of learning mechanism. In the case of religion, for example,
Boyer (2001) has shown that the religious ideas observed across societies
share certain important properties. He argues that because domain-
specific mechanisms generate religious ideas out of an alphabet of pos-
sible components, certain ideas—such as a deity that exists only on
Wednesdays—either do not arise or do not get widely transmitted. In con-
trast, ideas about entities that violate intuitive ontologies—such as arti-
facts with humanlike qualities—continuously appear in religious traditions.
Other researchers have similarly addressed transmission of cultural ideas,
postulating various degrees of specificity (e.g., Barkow, 1989; Boyd &
Richerson, 1985).
158 c o n t r ov er s i e s
Conclusion
We thank Jerry Barkow, Clark Barrett, and April Bleske for helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
References
Buss, D. M., Haselton, M. G., Shackelford, T. K., Bleske, A. L., & Wake-
field, J. C. (1998). Adaptations, exaptation, and spandrels. American
Psychologist, 53, 533–548.
Buss, D. M., Larsen, R. J., Westen, D., & Semmelroth, J. (1992). Sex dif-
ferences in jealousy: Evolution, physiology, and psychology. Psycho-
logical Science, 4, 251–255.
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange.
In J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: Evo-
lutionary psychology and the generation of culture (pp. 163–228). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Daly, M., & Wilson, M. (1988). Homicide. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin’s dangerous idea: Evolution and the mean-
ings of life. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Eagly, A. H. (1987). Sex differences in social behavior: A social-role interpre-
tation. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Eagly, A. H., & Wood, W. (1999). The origins of sex differences in human
behavior: Evolved disposition versus social roles. American Psycholo-
gist, 54, 408–423.
Ellis, B. J., & Garber, J. (2000). Psychosocial antecedents of variation in
girls’ pubertal timing: Maternal depression, stepfather presence, and
marital and family stress. Child Development, 71, 485–501.
Ellis, B. J., McFadyen-Ketchum, S., Dodge, K. A., Pettit, G. S., & Bates,
J. E. (1999). Quality of early family relationships and individual dif-
ferences in the timing of pubertal maturation in girls: A longitudinal
test of an evolutionary model. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 77, 387–401.
Fausto-Sterling, A. (2000). Beyond difference: Feminism and evolutionary
psychology. In H. Rose & S. Rose (Eds.), Alas, poor Darwin: Arguments
against evolutionary psychology (pp. 209–247). New York: Harmony
Books.
Fodor, J. (2000). The mind doesn’t work that way: The scope and limits of
computational psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gangestad, S. W., & Buss, D. M. (1993). Pathogen prevalence and human
mate preferences. Ethology and Sociobiology, 14, 89–96.
Gangestad, S. W., & Simpson, J. A. (2000). The evolution of human mat-
ing: Trade-offs and strategic pluralism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
23, 573–644.
Gould, S. J. (1979). Mickey Mouse meets Konrad Lorenz. Natural History,
88, 30–36.
Gould, S. J. (1997). Evolution: The pleasures of pluralism. New York Re-
view of Books, June 26.
Gould, S. J. (2000). More things in heaven and earth. In H. Rose & S. Rose
(Eds.), Alas, poor Darwin: Arguments against evolutionary psychology
(pp. 101–126). New York: Harmony Books.
Gould, S. J., & Lewontin, R. (1979). The spandrels of San Marco and the
Panglossian program: A critique of the adaptationist program. Pro-
ceedings of the Royal Society of London, 250, 281–288.
160 c o n t r ov er s i e s
While all evolutionists share a basic Darwinian framework, there are vari-
ous schools of thought as to how that framework is to be applied to
human beings. Historically, at least, behavioral ecologists and evolutionary
psychologists have often diverged sharply (Barkow, 1984, 1990; Symons,
1989). The emphasis for evolutionary psychology is on the evolved psy-
chology, the disposition or mechanism underlying actual behavior. The
human behavioral ecologists have often focused on whether patterns of
observed social behavior in actual human societies could be a means by
which individuals enhanced their genetic fitness, and/or whether the be-
havior was in accordance with evolutionary theory. A vertically integrated
perspective strengthens the behavioral ecology approach: We need to
know both the extent to which a pattern of social behavior is enhancing
fitness, and the underlying evolved psychological mechanisms that enabled
individuals to generate this pattern (Barkow, 1989; Borgerhoff Mulder
et al., 1997, p. 272; Richerson, Thornhill, & Voland, 1997). The great
strength of behavioral ecology has always been its use of ethnographic and
other naturalistic data and its focus on a wide variety of human societies.
In recent years the boundaries among the various schools of evolutionary
thought have become somewhat blurred, and Cronk’s chapter reflects this
praiseworthy tendency toward overlap. He begins by discussing work that
one might consider “classical” behavioral ecology, but he soon goes on to
include authors (such as Buss and Daly & Wilson) who are deeply con-
cerned with the psychological level. Cronk also emphasizes the “feminist
164 human and nonhuman primates
social organization that can develop in human societies. Its implication for
psychologists is that research on human same-sex/cross-sex bonding ca-
pacity, and on how this ability relates to the development of sociality in
children, is needed. For social scientists, the question raised by the
Rodseth/Novak finding is dual: what factors lead individuals and societies
to favor one type of bond rather than the other? Rodseth and Novak’s in-
sights need to be integrated across the human sciences.
For primate females (including our ancestors) to be able to sustain en-
during bonds with one another, there must have been reduced competi-
tion among them for food (as among bonobos). Rodseth and Novak
speculate that this reduction of female-female competition came about
not because male hunters were providing meat but because of the cooking
of tubers. (Their early date for the use of fire, however, is controversial.)
References
Lee Cronk
Human behavioral ecologists share not only a distinct body of theory, but
also a general method for deciding what questions are interesting to ask and
how best to answer them. Human behavioral ecology’s modus operandi can
b e h a v i or a l e c o l o g y a n d t h e s o c i a l s c i enc es 169
human behavioral ecologists have great admiration for the elegance and re-
finement that is now routine in nonhuman behavioral ecology, they also
heed the advice of evolutionary theorist Alan Grafen that “a good field-
worker is nobody’s poodle” (1987, p. 221). Rather than limiting them-
selves to things that have already been studied among other species,
human behavioral ecologists often use evolutionary thinking to shed light
on a wide variety of human behaviors that have no clear parallels among
nonhumans. For example, Borgerhoff Mulder (1988) herself has con-
ducted what may be the best single study of intrasocietal variations in
bridewealth payments, using them as a window onto the mate preferences
of Kipsigis men.
As behavioral and social scientists, human behavioral ecologists also
must consider a variety of methodological and epistemological issues that
nonhuman behavioral ecologists do not worry about at all. One such issue
is the dichotomy that runs throughout the social sciences between method-
ological collectivism and methodological individualism. Human behavioral
ecologists are methodological individualists, meaning that they analyze so-
cial phenomena as a product of the actions of individuals. An interest in the
individual has deep roots in anthropology, going back at least to the work of
Bronislaw Malinowski (1939) and running through such British anthropol-
ogists as Raymond Firth (1936) and such Americans as Melville Herskovits
(1940). Inspired in part by the work of such sociologists as George Homans
(1967), methodological individualism experienced a brief fluorescence in
anthropology in the 1960s thanks to such political anthropologists as F. G.
Bailey (1969) and Fredrik Barth (1965) and such economic anthropologists
as Harold Schneider (1974). Another strain of methological individualism
has influenced anthropology through psychological anthropology. This tra-
dition of methodological individualism contrasts with a Durkheimian tradi-
tion of methodological collectivism in the social sciences that gives primacy
to forces external to the individual such as society, culture, and power.
Methodological individualism does not deny that social pressures, cultural
traits, and power relationships influence individual behavior, but it consid-
ers explanations of individual behavior that rely upon such concepts to be
begging the question. If all social and cultural phenomena arise fundamen-
tally from the actions of individuals, then explanations of individual behav-
ior that refer to collective phenomena are, by necessity, incomplete and, by
extension, unsatisfying. On the other hand, some human behavioral ecolo-
gists are interested in the collective phenomenon of culture and do appreci-
ate that social and cultural phenomena can have emergent properties that
cannot be entirely predicted from a knowledge of the behaviors of the indi-
viduals involved (Cronk, 1988, 1995, 1999, pp. 50–51). Reconciliation of
these two approaches may be found in a vertically integrated approach, such
as that advocated by Barkow (1989; see also Winterhalder & Smith, 1992
b e h a v i or a l e c o l o g y a n d t h e s o c i a l s c i enc es 171
societies from around the world, including the Kalasha of Pakistan (Parkes,
1990), the Slave Athabaskans of Canada (Spencer et al., 1977, p. 110), and
the Saramaka of Suriname (Price, 1993). These and other practices sur-
rounding menstruation have received a lot of attention from cultural an-
thropologists, particularly feminist ones (e.g., Buckley & Gottlieb, 1988),
reflecting the cultural significance given to menstruation in many societies.
Strassmann spent two years among the Dogon conducting a detailed study
of their economic and reproductive patterns, including their use of men-
strual huts.
Although ovulation itself in humans is not accompanied by the sorts
of swellings and other outward signs common in other species, menstrual
huts and other menstrual taboos have the effect of advertising women’s re-
productive status. Strassmann suggests that such public information about
the timing of a woman’s monthly cycle may make it difficult for women
to obfuscate the timing of the onset of pregnancy, which may be useful to
men if, as evolutionary theory would predict, they are concerned about
impregnating their wives and about being cuckolded. Such information
might be especially important in a group like the Dogon, where women
spend most of their reproductive years not cycling owing either to preg-
nancy or postpartum amenorrhea. During the 29 months of Strassmann’s
study, women aged 20 through 34 years spent 29% of the time pregnant,
56% of the time in postpartum amenorrhea, and only 15% of the time cy-
cling. Thus, while a woman in an economically developed society with
widespread birth control and low fertility might cycle nearly every month
during a typical 30-year reproductive career (i.e., from menarche to
menopause), women in societies like the Dogon may ovulate relatively few
times during their entire lives.
Based on this line of reasoning, Strassmann suggests that menstrual
taboos among the Dogon are anticuckoldry tactics. A variety of types of data
support this interpretation. Dogon men themselves report that they are
greatly concerned with cuckoldry, and they told Strassmann that they think
that the seclusion of menstruating women does help husbands and patri-
lineages to avoid cuckoldry. Furthermore, visits to the huts are not fully vol-
untary on the part of the wives; rather, wives are obligated to visit the huts
in order not to ritually contaminate the men’s religious altars, and Dogon
women actually prefer, ceteris paribus, to marry men who have converted
to Islam or Christianity because then they will not need to visit the huts.
Given that women would prefer not to visit the huts and that such vis-
its may help to constrain their sexual behavior, it is reasonable to suppose
that they may try to mislead others about their reproductive status by visit-
ing the huts when they are not really menstruating and by not visiting the
huts when they are. Strassmann studied the honesty of women’s hut visits
by comparing the pattern of their visits with the hormonal patterns found
b e h a v i or a l e c o l o g y a n d t h e s o c i a l s c i enc es 173
The central precept of human behavioral ecology is that human beings are
organisms designed by natural selection. Because natural selection is driven
by differential reproduction, a straightforward expectation is that humans
and other organisms should behave in ways that help their offspring to sur-
vive and reproduce. The fact that both human and nonhuman parents are
known sometimes to neglect, abuse, and even kill their own offspring is an
obvious challenge to this perspective, and a great deal of human behavioral
ecological research has been done on these topics as a result (e.g., Gelles &
Lancaster, 1987; Hausfater & Hrdy, 1984). The findings may help efforts
to help identify children at risk for abuse and neglect and develop social re-
forms that might help reduce their risk.
Behavioral ecologists often pose questions about adaptive design in
terms of the costs and benefits of a behavior to an organism’s inclusive fit-
ness (Hamilton, 1964). The phrase “inclusive fitness” refers to the number
of copies of its genes an organism is able to get into the next generation.
Thinking about the genetic costs and benefits of particular behaviors often
helps to clarify why they occur. For example, it would indeed be a contra-
diction to evolutionary theory if it were routine and widespread for parents
to kill their biological offspring. But homicide of one’s own biological chil-
dren is, in most societies, rather rare. In American and Canadian societies,
for example, psychologists Martin Daly and Margo Wilson of McMaster
University have shown that a child is much more likely to be abused or killed
by an unrelated adult living in the same home (often, though not always, a
stepfather or a friend of the child’s mother) than by a biological parent (Daly
& Wilson, 1988). Although the legal penalties for the abuse or murder of a
child are so severe that this can in no way be seen as adaptive, evolutionary
theory does help to shed light on the pattern. On the one hand, it makes
sense that humans would have been designed by natural selection to be
highly tolerant of and solicitous toward their own offspring. On the other
hand, because in the past there would have been a weaker selection pressure
174 human and nonhuman primates
(if any) in favor of being tolerant of the demands and annoyances of unre-
lated infants, some people may find it particularly difficult to control their
rage when they are unrelated to the child provoking it.
Elsewhere, however, it is clear that parents do sometimes neglect,
abuse, and even abandon their children (see Hrdy, 1999 for many exam-
ples). Often, one sex of offspring is more likely to be neglected, abused, or
even killed than the other. Female infanticide is the most common pattern
(see Dickemann, 1979b for an evolutionary analysis), but male-biased in-
fanticide has also been reported (e.g., among the Ayoreo of Bolivia by
Bugos & McCarthy, 1984). Much of my own research has focused on a pat-
tern of daughter favoritism among the Mukogodo of Kenya, an impover-
ished and low-status group of Maasai-speaking pastoralists (Cronk, 1989,
1991b, 2000). Although there is absolutely no evidence that the Mukogodo
abuse their children or have ever practiced infanticide, I have documented
in a variety of ways a broad tendency on the part of Mukogodo parents to
favor their daughters over their sons. For example, Mukogodo mothers and
other caregivers tend to hold infant girls more often than infant boys and to
remain closer to them when not holding them. In addition, girls are nursed
longer and more frequently and are more likely to be taken for medical care
than boys. The results of this favoritism include better growth performance
by Mukogodo girls than boys (measured as height-for-age, weight-for-age,
and weight-for-height). Survivorship among young girls is so much better
than among boys that the sex ratio of children ages 0–4 years is 67 boys to
every 100 girls.
A number of explanations for this daughter favoritism are possible. For
example, it might be that Mukogodo parents favor their daughters because
of the bridewealth payments, usually consisting of several head of cattle and
some sheep and goats, that they attract. However, there is no correlation
between how many daughters a man has married off and either his herd
size, the number of wives that he himself is subsequently able to marry, or
the number of wives that his sons are subsequently able to marry. Further-
more, although all of the groups surrounding the Mukogodo also demand
bridewealth payments, they show no signs of daughter favoritism. A better
explanation is that the Mukogodo are responding to the relatively good
prospects of their daughters compared to their sons. Mukogodo women vir-
tually all get married, often to wealthy men from neighboring ethnic
groups. Mukogodo men, on the other hand, often have a hard time accu-
mulating the necessary bridewealth and frequently must delay marriage
until middle age or forgo marriage entirely because of their general poverty
and low ethnic status.
The Mukogodo pattern of daughter favoritism fits predictions made
by evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers and mathematician Dan Willard
(1973). They noted that if the reproductive prospects of male and female
b e h a v i or a l e c o l o g y a n d t h e s o c i a l s c i enc es 175
offspring differ in a way that is predictable from the parents’ condition dur-
ing the time of investment, natural selection would favor parents who invest
more heavily in that sex with the better reproductive prospects. Because in
many species the variance in reproductive success is greater for males than
for females, the conditions faced by an individual during development will
typically have a greater impact on the reproductive success of males than
females. The net result is often that males reared when conditions are good
will outreproduce their sisters, while females reared when conditions are
bad will outreproduce their brothers. The Mukogodo appear to be in the
latter situation: Due to their poverty and low status, girls’ prospects are
much better than boys’, and it makes sense for Mukogodo parents to favor
their daughters. Although this pattern of daughter favoritism increases
Mukogodo parents’ numbers of grandchildren, this is not simply a demon-
stration of the common folk wisdom that people like to have many grand-
children. In two surveys of Mukogodo women’s reproductive goals and
preferences, I have found that they express a bias in favor of sons, not daugh-
ters, and Mukogodo parents appear to be entirely unaware of the daughter
favoritism in their behavior. Mukogodo daughter favoritism seems to be not
a conscious strategy for enhancing one’s number of grandoffspring but,
rather, a deeply rooted evolved predisposition shared by a wide variety of
species that is triggered by specific environmental circumstances. This
demonstrates the value of an evolutionary approach in identifying circum-
stances that lead to patterns of child neglect of which even the parents them-
selves may not be aware.
One way that a new theoretical approach can make a contribution is by re-
vealing previously undetected patterns in well-known data. Human behav-
ioral ecology has had this kind of effect on our understanding of status
striving and social competition across human societies. In the social sciences
generally and cultural anthropology specifically, emphasis is placed on the
tremendous variability in culture and behavior across societies. In the area
of social competition, it is easy to see that this traditional approach makes a
real contribution in that the determinants of status and rank do indeed vary
widely across human societies. In some, wealth is the key, while in others,
personality characteristics, hunting skills, success in warfare, or ability to
keep the peace are more important. The conclusion of most social scientists
is that this variability is evidence of how human motivations are social con-
structions rather than biological endowments. What behavioral ecologists
see when they examine these same data, on the other hand, is a certain con-
stant: Everywhere we look, status and rank are important to many people,
176 human and nonhuman primates
and they routinely compete for status and prestige in ways that are locally
appropriate and acceptable.
In the 1970s, anthropologist and behavioral ecologist William Irons sug-
gested that the widespread tendency for people across cultures to consider
high status an important goal, combined with the diversity of ways in which
people attempt to accomplish this goal, might help link the new approach
with existing traditions of cross-cultural research in anthropology. Specifi-
cally, he proposed a simple hypothesis: “In most human societies cultural
success consists in accomplishing those things which make biological success
(that is, high inclusive fitness) probable” (Irons, 1979, p. 258). If this is true,
then we ought to be able to detect a correlation between the success of in-
dividuals in achieving success as it is defined in their own societies and in
achieving reproductive success or, more broadly, inclusive fitness. It should
be noted that this hypothesis is in no way contingent on anyone being aware
of the connection between cultural and reproductive success. If culture is
serving to guide people to behave in ways that in their particular local cir-
cumstances enhance reproduction, it should do so even if people are un-
aware not only of the goal of reproduction but even of how biological
reproduction works.
One of the first tests of this hypothesis was Irons’s own study of Yomut
Turkmen pastoralists of northern Iran. He found that wealth correlated well
with men’s lifetime reproductive success (Irons, 1976, 1979). Similarly,
Monique Borgerhoff Mulder (1987) found the same correlation among
Kipsigis agropastoralists in western Kenya, as did I among Mukogodo pas-
toralists in north central Kenya (Cronk, 1991c). In all of these cases, the cir-
cumstances are somewhat similar: local definitions of male status and
definitions of success are mainly determined by wealth, livestock are a large
part of what constitutes wealth, substantial bridewealth must be paid by
grooms to their in-laws in order to marry, and polygyny is allowed. Given
these conditions, it may not seem surprising that men’s wealth would cor-
relate with both their numbers of wives and their reproductive success. But
the situation is not as obvious as it might seem at first glance. If the local de-
finitions of “success” were arbitrary cultural constructions and nothing more,
then it would be surprising indeed to find so many societies in which success
is defined largely in terms of wealth accumulation. The fact that wealth is a
major determinant of status and prestige in so many societies in so many dif-
ferent parts of the world suggests that local definitions of success may be de-
signed for a purpose rather than arbitrary.
But what about societies in which wealth is either not accumulated at
all or not the sole or even a major correlate of status or prestige? In some so-
cieties, for instance, certain personality traits might be more important than
wealth accumulation. The editor of this volume, Jerome Barkow, conducted
an early test of this idea among two culturally distinct groups of Hausa-
b e h a v i or a l e c o l o g y a n d t h e s o c i a l s c i enc es 177
Guided by their shared body of theory and method, human behavioral ecol-
ogists have done a large amount of high-quality empirical work over the
past 20 to 30 years in many different societies on a wide variety of topics.
Virtually every area of traditional concern in the social sciences, including
marriage, kinship, economics, and politics, has been touched by the be-
havioral ecological approach (for reviews, see Borgerhoff Mulder, 1991;
Cronk, 1991a; and Smith, 1991a, 1991b). Human behavioral ecology has
matured enough over the past 20 years or so that many practitioners now
feel that it is ready to expand both empirically to cover new topics and the-
oretically to incorporate new concepts. One promising and rapidly devel-
oping area is the conjunction between human behavioral ecology and
evolutionary psychology.
178 human and nonhuman primates
models. Simon suggested that because of time constraints and the limits of
the brain’s computing power, it is usually not possible for decision makers
to calculate optimal strategies. Rather, they may use heuristics or rules of
thumb to make a quick decision based on only a small subset of the infor-
mation potentially available. In some situations, it is clear that some heuris-
tic must be in use or a behavior could not occur as quickly as it routinely
does. For example, when a ball is hit in cricket or baseball, a fielder is ex-
pected to try to intercept it. One way to do this would be to calculate where
the ball will land using a set of differential equations using information about
the curvature of the ball’s flight path and its acceleration. Clearly, most field-
ers do no such thing. Rather, there is evidence that they use a couple of sim-
ple heuristics. One, the linear-trajectory hypothesis, holds that a fielder
should adjust his speed and direction so that the apparent trajectory of the
ball seems straight from his point of view (McBeath, Shaffer, & Kaiser,
1995). When the ball is hit directly at the fielder, the zero-acceleration hy-
pothesis predicts that he will run so as to keep the apparent speed of the ball
constant (McLeod & Dienes, 1993).
Animals also face the need to make quick decisions, and to do so with
much less computational power than humans have at their disposal. Rüdiger
Wehner (Wehner, Michel, & Antonsen, 1996; see also Wehner, 1997) has
shown that Cataglyphis ants of the Sahara Desert accomplish difficult nav-
igational tasks not by developing a detailed and information-rich mental
map of their surroundings but rather by using a set of simple rules, in-
cluding a system for keeping track of the angle of the sun in the sky. This
computational machinery allows the ant to wander in search of food as
much as 200 meters from its home and then to return home on a very
straight and direct path.
Ball-catching fielders and navigating ants face a strikingly similar prob-
lem: how to navigate across a plane while lacking either the time or the com-
putational power to calculate the optimal route. But even in situations
where time and computational power are abundant, the simple heuristics
predicted by bounded rationality may be used in place of complex calcula-
tions of optimality. For example, German psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer and
his colleagues have demonstrated the power of the very simple heuristic of
familiarity or recognizability in the selection of stocks. During a recent bull
market, they were able to beat the market index by about 13% simply by in-
vesting in a set of companies that were most familiar to German pedestrians
(Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999). Human behavioral
ecologists might make use of bounded rationality to shed light on such de-
cisions as how foragers select foods to eat. A study of foraging that combines
human behavioral ecology, cognitive anthropology, evolutionary psychol-
ogy—and perhaps a dash of the study of the evolution of the sense of taste
(e.g., Hladek & Simmen, 1996)—would seem to be the logical next step.
180 human and nonhuman primates
Conclusion
A new field may develop best by setting aside potential problems and
doggedly pursuing its particular research agenda in order to find out how far
it can go in explaining a particular set of phenomena. Both evolutionary psy-
chology and human behavioral ecology have done that, and each has amply
demonstrated the fundamental merit of its approach. Evolutionary psy-
chology has demonstrated that a great deal of light can be shed on the brain
and mind through the application of the concept of adaptation. More specif-
ically, evolutionary psychologists have made a strong case that the human
mind is particularly adept at certain tasks, such as monitoring compliance
with social rules, learning language, and selecting mates, that are likely to
have been especially important in human evolution. Human behavioral
ecology has shown that the tremendous variations in human behavior across
societies largely reflect adaptive responses to variable environments, con-
ceived of as including not only physical elements but also a people’s social,
political, and economic situation and their history. More specifically, human
behavioral ecology has shown that human behavior largely conforms to the
predictions of models derived from evolutionary theory, particularly in areas
crucial to an individual’s inclusive fitness, such as food choice and acquisi-
tion, social behavior, mate choice and acquisition, parental behavior, and so-
cial behavior.
Having accomplished these things, both fields should now be ready to
enter a more experimental phase. For human behavioral ecology, this would
include dealing with topics usually set aside, such as culture and psycholog-
ical mechanisms. For evolutionary psychology, it might include an increased
interest in cross-cultural studies. Happily, these are complementary goals,
and the future relationship between human behavioral ecology and evolu-
tionary psychology is sure to be even richer and more mutually beneficial
than in the past.
I would like to thank Jerome Barkow, William Irons, Beth Leech, John
Patton, Beverly Strassmann, and Larry Sugiyama for their helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this chapter and Thomas Seeley for a key reference. I re-
tain responsibility for any errors or shortcomings.
References
(Eds.), Natural Selection and Social Behavior: Recent Research and New
Theory (pp. 417–438). New York: Chiron.
Emlen, S. T., & L. W. Oring. (1977). Ecology, sexual selection and the
evolution of mating systems. Science, 197, 215–223.
Firth, Raymond. (1936). We, the Tikopia. London: Allen and Unwin.
Fisher, Helen. (1999). First Sex: The Natural Talents of Women and How
They Are Changing the World. New York: Random House.
Gelles, Richard J., & Jane B. Lancaster. (1987). Child Abuse and Neglect:
Biosocial Dimensions. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
Gigerenzer, Gerd, Peter M. Todd, & the ABC Research Group. (1999). Sim-
ple Heuristics That Make Us Smart. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gowaty, Patricia Adair. (1992). Evolutionary biology and feminism.
Human Nature, 3(3), 217–249.
Grafen, Alan. (1987). Measuring sexual selection: Why bother? In J. W.
Bradbury & M. B. Andersson (Eds.), Sexual Selection: Testing the Al-
ternatives (pp. 221–233). New York: Wiley.
Hames, Raymond B. (1979). Relatedness and interaction among the
Ye’wana: A preliminary analysis. In Napoleon A. Chagnon and William
Irons (Eds.), Evolutionary Biology and Human Social Behavior: An An-
thropological Perspective (pp. 238–249). North Scituate, MA: Duxbury.
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The evolution of social behavior. Journal of The-
oretical Biology, 7, 1–52.
Hartung, John. (1976). On natural selection and the inheritance of wealth.
Current Anthropology, 17, 607–622.
Hausfater, Glenn, & Sarah Blaffer Hrdy (Eds.). (1984). Infanticide: Com-
parative and Evolutionary Perspectives. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine.
Hawkes, Kristen, Kim Hill, & James O’Connell. (1982). Why hunters
gather: Optimal foraging and the Aché of eastern Paraguay. American
Ethnologist, 9, 379–398.
Herskovits, Melville. (1940). The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples. New
York: Knopf.
Hladek, Claude Marcel, & Bruno Simmen. (1996). Taste perception and
feeding behavior in nonhuman primates and human populations. Evo-
lutionary Anthropology, 5(2), 58–71.
Homans, George. (1967). The Nature of Social Science. New York: Harcourt,
Brace.
Hrdy, Sarah Blaffer. (1981). The Woman That Never Evolved. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Hrdy, Sarah Blaffer. (1997). Raising Darwin’s consciousness: Female sexual-
ity and the prehominid origins of patriarchy. Human Nature, 8(1), 1–49.
Hrdy, Sarah Blaffer. (1999). Mother Nature: A History of Mothers, Infants,
and Natural Selection. New York: Pantheon.
Irons, William. (1976). Emic and reproductive success. Paper presented at
the 75th annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association,
Washington, DC.
Irons, William. (1979). Cultural and biological success. In N. A. Chagnon
& W. Irons (Eds.), Evolutionary Biology and Human Social Behavior:
184 human and nonhuman primates
can be collected and the same theoretical problems can be addressed in the
study of other species. A good many animals, as Alfred Kroeber (1952,
p. 118) noted, live in “cultureless societies.” The addition of culture obvi-
ously complicates the analysis of social relationships, but it does not elimi-
nate the common “design space” within which human and other animal
societies can be compared (cf. Dennett, 1995, pp. 143–144).
Along with the complexities of language and cultural symbolism comes
the unprecedented diversity of human social arrangements. In fact, based on
ethnographic comparison alone, we may be left with the impression that
human social variation is virtually unlimited and that nothing (or nothing
very interesting) is characteristic of human societies as a set. With the ben-
efit of comparison across species, however, it can be shown that human so-
cieties form not just a scatter but a distinctive cluster within a wider range of
social possibilities (Rodseth et al., 1991; Rodseth & Wrangham, 2004).
To sharpen the focus in the present context, human societies are com-
pared in particular with those of orangutans, gorillas, common chimpanzees,
and bonobos, the four living apes (or hominoids) with whom we share a com-
mon ancestor less than 15 million years ago. After surveying the recent his-
tory of ideas about human society, we summarize how human patterns of
transfer between groups, affiliations between females, and competition be-
tween foraging parties seem to diverge from the comparable patterns ob-
served in our closest evolutionary relatives. In the concluding section, we
return to the role of culture in human behavior and argue the case for an in-
tegrated science of human and other primate societies.
In taking on this task, we might first consider how human sociality has tra-
ditionally been understood among social scientists and philosophers. What
is the fundamental form of the human group? Most observers have tended
to assume what we call a “band-and-bond” model of human society. The
band or other local group, according to this model, is an aggregation of
households, each of which is based on a conjugal bond.
Foreshadowed in the writings of Aristotle (1981, pp. 57–58), the band-
and-bond model was first developed in anthropology by A. R. Radcliffe-
Brown (1930, 1931, p. 435) and Ralph Linton (1936, p. 209). In surveying
the social organization of hunter-gatherers around the world, Julian Stew-
ard (1936, 1955) helped to establish an image of the foraging band as a pa-
trilineal unit composed of several conjugal families. Variations on this theme
appeared in writings of Murdock (1949), White (1949), Lévi-Strauss (1956),
Sahlins (1959), and Service (1962), among many others.
The general trend in these analyses was to emphasize that some ele-
ments of human society, such as the family, might be continuous with those
of nonhuman primate societies, but other elements, such as interfamily or
190 human and nonhuman primates
All of this theorizing about human social organization was based on precious
little knowledge of what makes people different from other primates. In the
1950s, however, biological anthropologists began to reconceptualize their
enterprise, shifting away from static typologies of anatomical patterns and
toward the analysis of evolutionary processes within living populations. The
movement’s leader was Sherwood Washburn, who argued that adaptive
context and way of life were fundamental to an understanding of biological
traits. In the case of humans, hunting was seen as the hallmark of the an-
imal’s adaptation, as reflected in morphological characteristics such as
bipedalism and expanded cranial capacity (Washburn & Avis, 1958). The
growing influence of Washburn’s views led in 1966 to a landmark confer-
ence titled “Man the Hunter” (on the historical significance of this meeting,
see Kuper, 1994, pp. 68–69; Stanford, 1999, pp. 37–39). Here biological
and sociocultural anthropologists were brought together to discuss and in-
tegrate their findings about hunter-gatherer populations, both in the ethno-
graphic record and in the course of human evolution. When the conference
proceedings were published two years later (Lee & DeVore, 1968), both the
foraging band and the conjugal bond were cast in a rather different light.
First, the band was reconceptualized as an extremely flexible commu-
nity, with no consistent preference for patrilocal residence or for patrilineal
kinship (Murdock, 1968, pp. 19–20). This image replaced Steward’s “neat
formulation” with what seems at first a “confusing and disorderly picture”
(Lee & DeVore, 1968, p. 9): “Brothers may be united or divided, marriage
t h e i m p a c t o f p r i m a t olog y 191
may take place within or outside the local group, and local groups may vary
in numbers from one week to the next.” The new concept of the band was
based on mounting ethnographic evidence from studies of Kalahari Bushmen
(Lee, 1968), Mbuti Pygmies (Turnbull, 1968), and Hadza (Woodburn,
1968), among other foraging peoples. Over time, however, one case in par-
ticular—the !Kung San of the Kalahari (e.g., Marshall, 1976; Lee, 1979)—
came increasingly to exemplify hunter-gatherers in general. The !Kung
followed an extremely variable residence pattern, with a married couple liv-
ing near the parents of either the husband or the wife depending on cir-
cumstances or personal choice. The assumption that any one ethnographic
example could be seen as representative of most hunter-gatherers would
eventually fall into serious doubt (Ember, 1978; Kent, 1996, pp. 3–4), but
in the meantime the !Kung case by itself seemed to discredit Steward’s
model of the patrilocal, patrilineal band.
If the band was now seen as a much more fluid and disordered group-
ing, there remained within the band the universal and predictable unit of the
nuclear family. The second revision emerging from the 1966 conference was
a specific account of the evolution of the family—the so-called hunting hy-
pothesis. The hunting way of life, according to this hypothesis, had trans-
formed primate mating into human marriage. In a sense, the emphasis on
hunting was “deeply ironic,” as Stanford (1999, p. 37) notes, because most
of the conference participants came away convinced that “the importance
of meat in the diets of foraging people had been exaggerated.” At the same
time, the single most influential idea to emerge from “Man the Hunter” was
presented in this passage by Washburn and Lancaster (1968, p. 301):
When males hunt and females gather, the results are shared and given
to the young, and the habitual sharing between a male, a female,
and their offspring becomes the basis for the human family. Accord-
ing to this view, the human family is the result of the reciprocity of
hunting, the addition of a male to the mother-plus-young social group
of the monkeys and apes.
What was uniquely human about the family, then, was not merely a stable
sexual bond but an economic alliance based on the male provisioning of fe-
males and young through hunting.
Debuting on the heels of bestsellers such as The Territorial Imperative
(Ardrey, 1966) and The Naked Ape (Morris, 1967), the hunting hypothesis
was easily blended with the popular ethology and sociobiology of the day
(Tiger & Fox, 1971; Ardrey, 1976). At the same time, the emphasis on male
provisioning as the driving force of human social evolution provoked a back-
lash among feminist anthropologists, who answered the hunting hypothesis
with their own “gathering hypothesis” (Linton, 1971; Tanner & Zihlman,
1976; Zihlman, 1978). In light of the evidence that some “hunters” relied
more on plant resources than on game animals (Lee, 1968), these feminists
argued that the productive activities of women had been systematically ne-
glected or ignored in models of human evolution. Gathering rather than
hunting was argued to be the key human adaptation leading to technologi-
cal innovation and increasing brain size. In some versions of the gathering
hypothesis, women were seen as largely self-sufficient producers, and the
sexual division of labor that Washburn and Lancaster had cast as the hall-
mark of the family was all but eliminated from the story of human origins
(Fedigan, 1986, p. 34).
Yet the idea that marriage is a fundamentally economic institution was
hardly touched by this critique, and an emphasis on “the cooperation of man
and wife” (Radcliffe-Brown, 1931, p. 435) soon resurged in several new ac-
counts of human evolution. One response, then, to the gathering hypothe-
sis was “to superimpose the new model on the older hunting scheme, and to
emphasize a mixed economy in which early hominid men and women were
mutually interdependent” (Fedigan, 1986, p. 35). In the influential scenario
presented by Isaac (1978, 1980), for example, males and females were ar-
gued to range widely in pursuit of different kinds of food, then to rendezvous
at a home base where their products could be shared (see also Isaac &
Crader, 1981). In another prominent account (Lovejoy, 1981), vegetation
rather than meat is assumed to have been the crucial element in the early
hominid diet, yet the family still depended on male provisioning because
childrearing females were relatively sedentary, while males could range
much farther in search of food.
It is . . . certain that unlike other Great Apes, women must have lived
in families and relied on other group members to help provision chil-
dren who took unusually long to become independent. But beyond
these points, relatively little about these early social environments is cer-
tain. We cannot know . . . what kind of families women lived in (whose
“in-laws,” for example, they lived nearest to). . . . Men’s ability to con-
trol where women in their group went and what they did would have
varied a great deal, depending on who else was there to back the women
up. Who else was there would depend on local subsistence patterns and
history, for apart from a universal tendency for primate females to avoid
mating with close kin, women exhibit no clear and consistent predis-
positions either to leave or to remain near kin.
Just how well the patrilocal model fits the ethnographic evidence is a ques-
tion to which we will return.
As for the origin of the family, the scenario proposed by Washburn and
Lancaster (1968) is by no means out of contention in recent debates (e.g.,
Stanford, 1999; Kaplan et al., 2000, p. 173), though it is on the defensive
against a range of new arguments (e.g., Wrangham et al., 1999; Hawkes
et al., 2000). The mechanism of male provisioning still plays a pivotal role
in many recent accounts, even when the authors do not explicitly endorse
the hunting hypothesis (e.g., Foley & Lee, 1996, p. 63; Foley, 1999, p. 381,
emphasis added):
resources, and general coercion by outside males have all been singled out
as the crucial risk to females. Taken together, however, these “bodyguard”
explanations form a distinct cluster in opposition to the hunting hypothesis
and other forms of what have been called “male-provisioning” hypotheses
(Wrangham et al., 1999).
In short, if the chimpanzee community provided a model for new think-
ing about the human band, the other African ape—the gorilla—helped stim-
ulate new thinking about the evolution of the human pair bond. Even as
male bonding and female dispersal were seen as patterns shared by humans
and chimpanzees, relatively stable sexual bonds based on male protection
were seen as patterns shared by humans and gorillas. The ironic result, then,
was to confirm the combination of band and pair bond as the hallmark of
human social organization, even if each of these social units taken by itself
was now seen as analogous to a unit in one of the African apes.
Male-Male Bond
Unstable/ Stable/
Attenuated Extended
Stable/ GORILLA
Extended HUMAN HUMAN
Female-Female Bond
Unstable/ Stable/
Attenuated Extended
Stable/ GORILLA
Extended HUMAN HUMAN
primate social systems in addition to the human band are generated by dif-
ferent combinations of the same underlying relationships.
To streamline our presentation, we have made a number of simplifying
assumptions. First, all relationships have been assigned a binary value, either
stable/extended or unstable/attenuated. This is obviously an artificial char-
acterization, but it allows the broad patterns of relationships to be more eas-
ily grasped and compared. Second, only relationships among adults are
considered; parent-child and other relationships involving juveniles are left
out of the analysis. Third, all opposite-sex relationships are for our purposes
considered to be sexual relationships, while same-sex relationships are con-
sidered to be nonsexual—homosexuality, in other words, is left out of the
analysis. These assumptions are especially unrealistic, of course, but they
allow us to capture broad patterns that would otherwise be obscured.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, what we have called “relationships” are
to be understood in a very specific way. A “relationship” involves some de-
gree of advantage to the participants, who gain more by coordinating their
action than they would by acting alone (Wrangham, 1982, p. 270; see also
van Schaik, 1989). This is not to be confused with friendly affiliation or even
spatial proximity. Merely exchanging pleasantries, even on a routine basis,
does not make a relationship in our sense. Female gorillas often live in close
proximity and remain tolerant of each other over long periods, yet do not
form relationships. Ongoing interaction is not even necessary to a relation-
ship. Taking turns cooking or watching each other’s children implies a mu-
tualistic relationship, even if little or no interaction goes on between the
partners. Furthermore, as should be obvious from these examples, relation-
ships do not necessarily involve residential proximity. Those who live to-
gether may or may not be in relationships, and those in relationships may or
may not live together.
Figure 7.1 represents the social space defined by sexual bonds in com-
bination with male-male bonds. This allows us to classify the typical situa-
tions faced by human males and their counterparts among the four great
apes. What is immediately apparent about this matrix is the way in which
the nonhuman cases are confined to only one or two cells while the human
patterns are distributed across all four. Elsewhere we have described varia-
tion in the social modes of men and discussed examples of the patterns
found in each of the four cells (Rodseth & Novak, 2000). For present pur-
poses, our classification is intended to capture patterns that are regularly
found in human societies, even if these patterns are not typical or dominant
in those societies. Thus, what we call “satellites”—males whose sexual and
same-sex relationships are unstable or attenuated—are common in many
human populations, even if they always remain in the minority. One of the
cells in Figure 7.1, furthermore, is occupied by humans only. Human males
are apparently capable of combining relationships in a way that no great ape
t h e i m p a c t o f p r i m a t olog y 199
modern humans show the typical great ape pattern of female dispersal
away from kin (although there are important exceptions). This pattern
of female dispersal is particularly significant when it is remembered that
the opposite pattern holds in many other primates and mammals
in general.
The portrait of social organization that emerges from these analyses is sur-
prisingly inflexible and static over long stretches of hominid evolution. Yet it
must be remembered that the original reconstruction of the common ances-
tral pattern was based in part on a controversial characterization of the con-
temporary human pattern. Before we conclude that female dispersal or male
kin bonding is “an irreversible strategy” in human social evolution, we should
be sure that contemporary humans have not reversed the strategy already.
Human residence patterns, as O’Connell, Hawkes, and Blurton Jones
(1999, p. 477) rightly note, are not only extremely variable but “evidently
sensitive to local ecological conditions, especially as they affect female sub-
sistence.” Even granting, then, the predominance of patrilocal residence in
the ethnographic record (Rodseth et al., 1991, p. 230), the question persists
of whether humans in general can be characterized as female dispersing and
male philopatric (e.g., Knauft, 1991, pp. 405–406; Davis & Daly, 1997,
p. 408; Hawkes, O’Connell, & Blurton Jones 1997, pp. 561–562). In the
case of chimpanzees, no such question arises in the first place for the sim-
ple reason that chimpanzee dispersal patterns are invariant—all known
chimpanzee populations, despite significant variations in other aspects of
their social organization, follow a pattern of male philopatry. In fact, there
is no confirmed case of an adult male chimpanzee transferring to another
community (cf. Goodall, 1986, pp. 86–87).
Against this standard, the cross-cultural pattern of human male philopa-
try is quite inconsistent (Alvarez, 2004; Marlowe, 2004). Even if we accept
202 human and nonhuman primates
tween females quite rare in the East African sites of Gombe, Mahale, and
Kibale but much more common in the West African sites of Bossou
(Sugiyama, 1988; Sakura, 1994) and Taï (Boesch, 1991, 1996). Without in-
fants, furthermore, adult females are as gregarious as adult males, suggest-
ing that asociality is a result not of gender but of motherhood (Wrangham,
2000). Yet the relatively solitary existence of female chimpanzees and their
lack of social alliances are consistent with their pattern of dispersal from their
natal groups—females, in other words, “migrate at least partly to reduce
feeding competition” (Sterck, Watts, & van Schaik, 1997, p. 294), and this
same competition precludes them “from forming the cohesive groups nec-
essary for the maintenance of female kin bonds” (Strier, 1999, p. 301). Pat-
terns of residence, gregariousness, and kinship, then, tend to coincide in
common chimpanzees.
When we turn to humans, however, the situation is quite different.
Even when they transfer to unrelated groups, women everywhere tend to
be far more gregarious than female chimpanzees. Because human mothers
with infants usually have access to food and company at a home base, they
are not forced to forage in a relatively solitary manner as chimpanzee moth-
ers are (see below). Moreover, even unrelated women in the most extreme
patriarchal societies regularly form close and enduring friendships (e.g.,
Abu-Lughod, 1986). How often such friendships are genuine alliances for
purposes of competition against others is difficult to demonstrate empir-
ically, but there is some ethnographic evidence to suggest that this is the
case (e.g., Kyakas & Wiessner, 1992). Women’s sociality, then, would
seem to resemble neither the semisolitary pattern of female chimpanzees
nor the pattern of association without bonding seen in female gorillas
(Rodseth et al., 1991, p. 231).
Stable bonds between females regardless of residence pattern seem
to be characteristic of only one great ape—the bonobo. Sometimes called
“pygmy chimpanzees,” bonobos are distinguished from common chimps by
their somewhat smaller heads and less robust bodies. As closely related
species of the same genus (Pan), the two chimpanzees are similar in many
ways, yet they inhabit distinct geographic ranges and apparently form quite
different kinds of societies. While common chimps are found in both East
and West Africa, bonobos live only in Central Africa to the south of the
Congo (or Zaire) River (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996, p. 222). Here, in the
mid-1970s, Takayoshi Kano took up residence in the village of Wamba and
began the first systematic study of bonobos in the wild (Kano, 1992; see also
F. J. White, 1992, 1996; de Waal, 1997).
What Kano and his associates discovered about bonobos would change
the way primatologists think about the social behavior of all the hominoids,
including humans. Like common chimpanzees, bonobos consistently follow
a pattern of female dispersal. Yet among bonobos, an immigrant female is
204 human and nonhuman primates
soon incorporated into the resident female network by way of elaborate ho-
mosexual relationships. All the females in this network cooperate to defend
against threats by resident males. The communitywide scale and cohesive-
ness of female bonds in bonobos makes them distinct from the individually
differentiated and situational bonds typically found among women (but see
the Igbo case discussed by van Allen, 1997). Bonobos and humans, in form-
ing stable female alliances at all, are clearly running against the general homi-
noid trend, a fact that has not always been recognized in comparative
primate sociology.
In fact, women’s bonding patterns, like their patterns of dispersal and
residence, have often been equated with the respective patterns of com-
mon chimpanzees (e.g., Foley & Lee, 1989, p. 905; cf. Rodseth et al.,
1991, p. 229, n. 4). But the view that women, like female chimpanzees,
exhibit “weak” bonds and only “limited cooperation” (Ghiglieri, 1987, p. 343,
1989, p. 373) is difficult to sustain unless these words are given very special
definitions. And definitions are indeed at issue in any attempt to charac-
terize women’s (or men’s) relationships precisely. Consider the fine dis-
tinction drawn by Wrangham (1987a, p. 62) between “friendships” and
“alliances”:
Note: Reproduced from Wrangham (1987). “Common Ancestor” refers to the fossil
hominoid from which the living apes and humans are descended.
206 human and nonhuman primates
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes a change from Wrangham (1987). “Common Ancestor” refers
to the fossil hominoid from which the living apes and humans are descended.
I have not found data on whether [human] males are more gregarious
than mothers, but it is clear that, as in other infant-carrying primates,
the travel costs of motherhood are substantial (Blurton Jones, Hawkes,
& O’Connell, 1989). The comparison suggests that intense scramble
competition may have constrained the potential for female bonding in
human foragers, as in chimpanzees.
Peterson, 1996, chap. 3). Eaten raw, however, USOs would have served at
best as an important supplement to hominid diets, according to Wrangham
et al. (1999). What transformed roots from a supplement to a staple in
human diets was cooking, which Wrangham et al. (1999) estimate was being
practiced by early Homo by 1.9 million years ago. Cooking, in effect, would
create the artificial “patch” at the home base that would allow more cohe-
sive groups to be sustained, despite fission-fusion foraging during the day. By
the same reasoning, cooking might have served as the mechanism by which
gregariousness and social bonding were promoted among hominid females.
Whatever the precise mechanism, if scramble competition were re-
duced, another important change in hominid social behavior would tend to
follow: a shift away from the ancestral, chimpanzee-like pattern of consis-
tent male philopatry and toward a mixed pattern of patrilocal, matrilocal,
and bilocal residence. Such a shift would reflect the increasing benefits under
some circumstances of women remaining together in their natal groups—
what Hawkes, O’Connell, and Blurton Jones (1997, p. 561) call “the ad-
vantages of proximity for matrilineally related females.” Noting that female
chimpanzees do sometimes stay with their mothers, Hawkes et al. predict
that as the benefits of cooperation between mothers and daughters increase,
“patterns of female sociability and sex-biased dispersal [would] be altered as
a consequence” (1997, pp. 561–562). Reliance on deep underground tubers,
for example, or other resources that young juveniles cannot exploit on their
own might favor the evolution of female philopatry, especially if grand-
mothers can carry infants or otherwise provide assistance to mothers
(Hawkes, O’Connell, & Blurton Jones, 1987, 1997; Hawkes et al., 2000).
Whether or not the “grandmother hypothesis” is correct in detail, what is
important for present purposes is the serious challenge it poses to the now
widely held view that human social organization is based on male kinship
bonding through patrilocal residence (O’Connell, Hawkes, & Blurton Jones
1999, p. 477).
a male kinship network to which females are attached through sexual bonds.
This proviso runs counter to the tendency in some recent evolutionary analy-
ses to reduce human social organization to the formula of “male bonds + sex-
ual bonds = the local community” (e.g., Ghiglieri, 1987, p. 343, 1989, p. 373;
Foley & Lee, 1989, 1996; Maryanski, 1996, p. 83). Any adequate charac-
terization of human social organization must recognize that women’s so-
ciality is more elaborate than any other female hominoid’s, with the possible
exception of bonobos, and that the band or other local community is always
a “high-density network” (Maryanski, 1996, pp. 76–78) constituted by mul-
tiple overlapping alliances between women as well as between men and be-
tween sexual partners.
The traditional band-and-bond model was a convenient first approxi-
mation of “the unusual human social system in which pair-bonds are em-
bedded within multi-male, multi-female communities” (Wrangham et al.,
1999, p. 567). This nesting of pair bonds within communities is enough by
itself to make human societies quite odd among most other animal group-
ings (Rodseth et al., 1991, p. 235). Yet the nesting of social units in human
societies usually goes beyond this two-level hierarchy, with descent groups,
sodalities, religious cults, and other groupings uniting members of different
families within the same community. Relationships between communities,
furthermore, are uniquely elaborated in human societies. And all of this is
true despite the fact that human traveling parties are not stable herds or
troops but quite variable subgroups that usually break up and recombine
many times over during daylight hours. When such “fission-fusion” parties
are found in other primates, such as chimpanzees and spider monkeys, the
social network is always quite low in density, to use Maryanski’s (1996)
terms, while in humans the same kind of subgroups are found within a very
dense network. Beyond the question, then, of how humans maintain pair
bonds within communities is the more formidable one of how humans
maintain such dense networks that combine multilevel social organization
with fission-fusion parties (Rodseth & Novak, 2000, p. 338).
The answer is likely to involve what was factored out of our analysis at
the start: language and other uniquely human cognitive abilities that tend to
uncouple social relationships from spatial proximity (Rodseth et al., 1991,
pp. 239–240). The human community is a primate society, to be sure, and
involves a medley of the simpler themes played by African apes in particu-
lar. Yet this “music” is especially strange not because of its component
themes but because of the way it plays in people’s minds even when others
are not around. Human society is, no doubt, what many social scientists have
always claimed it to be: a moral order based in part on cultural rules and un-
derstandings that are only occasionally reflected in social behavior “on the
ground.” Does this mean that the proper object of social scientific investiga-
tion is the moral order “behind” the behavior? And if monkeys and apes lack
210 human and nonhuman primates
such a moral order, does this obviate any comparison between human and
other primate societies? By way of conclusion, let us return to the topic of
culture and consider the special challenges it poses to a comparative pri-
mate sociology.
References
Allen, J. van. (1997). “Sitting on a man”: Colonialism and the lost politi-
cal institutions of Igbo women. In R. R. Grinker & C. B. Steiner (Eds.),
Perspectives on Africa (pp. 536–549). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
Alvarez, H. (2004). Residence groups among hunter-gatherers: A view of
the claims and evidence for patrilocal bands. In B. Chapais & C. M.
Berman (Eds.), Kinship and Behavior in Primates. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Ardrey, R. (1966). The Territorial Imperative. New York: Dell.
Ardrey, R. (1976). The Hunting Hypothesis. New York: Atheneum.
Aristotle. (1981). The Politics (T. A. Sinclair, Trans.). London: Penguin.
Barkow, J. H. (1989). Darwin, Sex, and Status: Biological Approaches to
Mind and Culture. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Barnard, A. (1983). Contemporary hunter-gatherers: Current theoretical is-
sues in ecology and social organization. Annual Review of Anthropology,
12, 193–214.
Barth, F. (1966). Models of Social Organization. Royal Anthropological In-
stitute Occasional Paper 23. London: Royal Anthropological Institute
of Great Britain and Ireland.
Barth, F. (1987). Cosmologies in the Making: A Generative Approach to Cul-
tural Variation in Inner New Guinea. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Björkqvist, K., K. Österman, & A. Kaukiainen. (1992). Indirect aggression:
Conceptions and misconceptions. In K. Björkqvist & P. Niemelä
(Eds.), Of Mice and Women: Aspects of Female Aggression (pp. 51–64).
San Diego: Academic Press.
Blurton Jones, N., K. Hawkes, & J. F. O’Connell. (1989). Studying costs
of children in two foraging societies: Implications for schedules of re-
production. In V. Standon & R. Foley (Eds.), Comparative Socioecol-
ogy of Mammals and Man (pp. 365–390). London: Blackwell.
Blurton Jones, N., F. W. Marlowe, K. Hawkes, & J. F. O’Connell. (2000).
Paternal investment and hunter-gatherer divorce rates. In L. Cronk,
N. Chagnon, & W. Irons (Eds.), Adaptation and Human Behavior: An
Anthropological Perspective (pp. 69–90). New York: Aldine.
Boehm, C. (1992). Segmentary “warfare” and the management of conflict:
Comparison of East African chimpanzees and patrilineal-patrilocal hu-
mans. In A. H. Harcourt & F. B. M. de Waal (Eds.), Coalitions and Al-
liances in Humans and Other Animals (pp. 137–173). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Boehm, C. (1993). Egalitarian society and reverse dominance hierarchy.
Current Anthropology, 34, 227–254.
Boehm, C. (1999). Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Be-
havior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Boesch, C. (1991). The effects of leopard predation on grouping patterns
in forest chimpanzees. Behaviour, 117, 220–241.
Boesch, C. (1996). Social grouping in Taï chimpanzees. In W. C. McGrew,
L. F. Marchant, & T. Nishida (Eds.), Great Ape Societies (pp. 101–113).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
t h e i m p a c t o f p r i m a t olog y 213
Note
References
Anthony Walsh
Introduction
time when Gall was feeling cranial bumps, and today’s biology cannot be
countered with ad hominem arguments and straw men. As Sandra Scarr has
pointed out, the only way for behavioral scientists to allay their fears of bi-
ology and its place in social science is to learn some (1993, p. 1350).
Few social scientists balk at the notion that human anatomy and physiology
are products of evolution. We observe some aspect of complex morphology
and infer that it was selected over alternate designs because it best served
some particular function that proved useful in assisting the proliferation of
its owners’ genes. Although there is no other scientifically viable explana-
tion for the origin of basic behavioral design, most social scientists probably
dismiss the idea of human behavioral patterns as products of the same nat-
ural process. If we accept the notion that evolution shaped our minds and
our behavior, we have to accept that many of our less admirable traits such
as deception, cheating, and violence owe their present existence to the fact
that they were useful to the reproductive success (the total number of an or-
ganism’s descendants, and thus its genes) of our distant ancestors, as were
more positive traits such as altruism, nurturance, and love.
We do not, of course, display evolved patterns of behavior in order to
maximize genetic fitness: “Evolutionary psychology is not a theory of moti-
vation. . . . Fitness consequences are invoked not as goals in themselves, but
rather to explain why certain goals have come to control behavior at all, and
why they are calibrated in one particular way rather than another” (Daly &
Wilson, 1988a, p. 7). Parents nurture and love their children, for example,
not because a subconscious genetic voice tells them that if they do they will
have greater genetic representation in future generations. They do so be-
cause ancestral parents who loved and nurtured their children saw more of
them grow to reproductive age and pass on those traits. Parents who did not
love and nurture their children compromised the viability of their offspring,
and thus the probability of pushing their genes into the future.
altruistically (and tend to feel good when we do) because our distant ances-
tors who behaved this way enjoyed greater reproductive success than those
who did not, thus passing on the genes for the brain structures and neuro-
transmitters that presumably underlie the trait (Barkow, 1997).
Social living is characterized by conflict; i.e., by competition over scarce
resources such as food, status, and mates, as well as by cooperation and rec-
iprocal altruism. Because both cooperation and conflict occur among groups
of reciprocal altruists (genetically unrelated individuals who give with the
expectation of receiving the equivalent in return), it creates an obvious niche
for cheats (Alexander, 1987; Mealey, 1995; Trivers, 1991). Cheats are in-
dividuals in a population of cooperators who signal their own cooperation
but then fail to reciprocate after receiving benefits from others. If there are
no deterrents against cheating, it is in an individual’s fitness interests to ob-
tain resources and assistance from others under the assumption of reciproc-
ity and then to default, thus gaining resources at zero cost. Biologists have
studied such behavior (termed “social parasitism”) among a variety of non-
human animal species (Alcock, 1998; Wilson, 1975), and its ubiquity
implies that it has had positive fitness consequences (Machalek, 1996). Anti-
social and criminal behavior may be viewed as extreme forms of cheating,
or defaulting on the rules of reciprocity in the human species (Lykken, 1995;
Machalek & Cohen, 1991). But cheating behavior comes at the cost of the
likely refusal of others to assist the cheater in the future. Thus, before de-
ciding to default, the individual must weigh the costs and benefits of coop-
erating versus defaulting. This has been nicely illustrated in the famous
Prisoners’ Dilemma game outlined below.
Suppose two criminal accomplices—Bill and Frank—are being held in
jail for an alleged crime. They have both sworn that each would never “rat”
on the other. The evidence against both is weak, prompting the prosecutor
to approach each man separately and offer him a deal. If Bill testifies against
Frank, Bill will be released and Frank will get 10 years, and vice versa. If both
testify, both will be convicted and receive a reduced 5-year sentence because
of their cooperation with the prosecutor. If neither testifies—that is, if they
cooperate with each other as they had sworn to do—both will be convicted
of a minor crime carrying a sentence of only 1 year in prison. The dilemma
is that Bill and Frank are being held in separate cells so that they cannot com-
municate with one another and cement their agreement not to default on
their promise. Under these circumstances, Bill’s best strategy is to testify re-
gardless of what Frank does because it will either get him released (if Frank
does not testify) or 5 years (if he does). Both outcomes are better than the
10 years he will receive if he remains true to his promise but Frank does not.
The same holds true for Frank. Knowing that “honor among thieves” is a fal-
lacy, each testifies against the other and receives a sentence of 5 years. The
paradox is that although the payoff for cheating when the other actor does
e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y cholog y 231
not is high, if both cheat they are both worse off than if they had cooperated
with one another.
The Prisoners’ Dilemma, while illustrating that mutual cooperation
produces the best payoff, also illustrates how “rational” it is to cheat in cir-
cumstances of limited interaction and communication. With frequent in-
teraction and communication, which is the normal situation for social
species, cheating becomes a far less rational strategy. Cheats can prosper only
in a population of “suckers” (unconditional altruists). Suckers would soon be
driven to extinction by cheats, leaving only cheats to interact with other
cheats. A population of pure cheats is not likely to thrive either, and selec-
tion for cooperation is likely to occur rapidly (Machalek, 1996). “Pure” suck-
ers and “pure” cheats” are thus unlikely to exist in large numbers, if at all, in
any social species. The vast majority of human beings are “grudgers” who can
be suckered now and again because they abide by the norms of mutual trust
and cooperation, but they will not offer resources in the future to those who
sucker them (Raine, 1993). In the real world, cheaters interact with popu-
lations of “grudgers” in a repeated game of Prisoners’ Dilemma in which
players adjust their strategies according to their experience with other play-
ers in the past, and each player reaps in the future what he or she has sown
in the past (Machalek, 1996).
How do cheats manage to continue to follow their strategy given how
grudgers respond to them when they are unmasked? In computer simula-
tions of interactions between populations of cheats, suckers, and grudgers,
cheats are always driven to extinction, as evolutionary theory would predict
(Raine, 1993; Allman, 1994). The problem with such simulations is that
players are constrained to operate within the same environment in which
their reputations quickly become known. In the real world, cheats can move
from location to location meeting and cheating a series of grudgers who are
susceptible to one-time deception. This is exactly what we observe among
the more psychopathic criminals. They move from place to place, job to job,
and relationship to relationship, leaving a trail of misery behind them before
their reputation catches up to them (Hare, 1993; Lykken, 1995). In mod-
ern societies, cheats are much more likely to prosper in large cities than in
small traditional communities, where the threat of exposure and retaliation
is great (Ellis & Walsh, 1997; Machalek & Cohen, 1991; Mealey, 1995).
In common with Emile Durkheim (1982), evolutionary psychologists
view crime as normal, albeit regrettable behavior engaged in by normal in-
dividuals engaged in normal social processes (Cohen & Machalek, 1994). If
criminal behavior is in fact normal, it follows that the potential for it must
be in us all and that it must have conferred some evolutionary advantage on
our distant ancestors. Thus, there is nothing in evolutionary psychology that
posits that criminals possess a defective genome, or that they represent some
sort of evolutionary atavism à la Cesare Lombroso. The universality, and
232 so c i ol o g y a n d c r i m i n o l o g y
hence the normalcy, of the antisocial impulse may be gauged by noting that
when the carrying capacity of the cheater niche grows, more and more in-
dividuals will adopt the cheater strategy. The 300% increase in crime noted
in Hungary after the demise of communism (Gonczol, 1993), as well as
roughly similar figures reported in Russia (Dashkov, 1992), reflect social, po-
litical, and economic phenomena that provide an expanded niche for ex-
ploitation. The momentous change from a state-controlled economy to a
market economy experienced to varying degrees in these nations resulted in
anomic social deregulation. Social deregulation may serve as a “releaser” of
criminal behavior at various levels as it interacts with varying individual
thresholds for antisocial behavior. Individuals at the bottom of the social sta-
tus heap who perceive themselves as unable to secure resources legitimately
may thus view criminal behavior as an adaptive response to their predica-
ment. As Wright (1994, p. 244) points out, this is the sort of environmen-
talism supported by most sociologists, not the genetic determinism that
evolutionary psychology is so often falsely accused of supporting.
expressions, the “way” things are said, all provide a basis for judging the re-
liability and intentions of others. The social emotions “cause positive and
negative feelings that act as reinforcers or punishers, molding our behavior
in a way that is not economically rational for the short term but profitable
and adaptive in situations where encounters are frequent and reputation is
important” (Mealey, 1995, p. 525).
A number of theorists have viewed the tension between grudgers (rec-
iprocal altruists) and cheats as having provided the basis for the human sense
of justice (Beckstrom, 1993; Walsh, 2000a; Walsh & Hemmens, 2000;
Wilson, 1998). Victims of cheaters feel angry and hurt due to being treated
unfairly, and confusion and frustration due to losing the expectation of pre-
dictability (“I scratched your back, but you didn’t scratch mine!”). These
evolved emotions amount to what some people might call “moral outrage,”
without which there would be no motivation to react against those who vi-
olate the norms of reciprocity and we might all have become conscienceless
psychopaths (Daly & Wilson, 1988a). Negative feelings like these are as-
suaged by punishing violators because punishment signals the restoration of
fairness and predictability (cheaters may be less likely to cheat in the future,
and potential cheaters will be deterred). Nonhuman animal studies have
shown that dominant animals (and sometimes coalitions of nondominant
animals) punish the behavior of conspecifics (“retaliatory aggression”) that
reduce their fitness by cheating, stealing, or parasiting (reviewed in Clutton-
Brock & Parker, 1995).
It has even been suggested that cheating has been essential to the
evolution of reciprocal altruism (a mechanism so central to a social life
dominated by interacting nonrelated individuals) precisely because it has
strengthened the social emotions that demand justice and punishment. By
helping to extinguish the negative emotions associated with victimization,
punishment reinforces our sense of the justness of moral norms (Boyd &
Richerson, 1992; Machalek, 1996; Machalek & Cohen, 1991; Walsh,
2000a). Criminologists will recognize the affinity of this line of thinking with
Durkheim’s thoughts on the normality of crime and the function of pun-
ishment in maintaining social norms.
Gratuitous violence within the in-group was probably rare in hominid an-
cestral environments. Natural selection has not favored violent competition
for access to females as a dominant strategy in long-lived species. Males in
long-lived species have time to move up status hierarchies and acquire mates
relatively peacefully rather than risk their lives in desperate mating battles
early in their lives (Alcock, 1998). The selection for size and strength among
males resulting in males who are much larger (up to 100% or more in some
species) reflects a polygynous mating history in which dominance is estab-
lished by physical battles among males.
Early hominids (Australopithecus anemensis and afarenis) were also 50%
to 100% larger than females (Geary, 2000). The low degree of sexual di-
morphism among modern Homo sapiens (males are only about 10% larger
than females, on average) indicates an evolutionary shift from violent male
competition for mates to a more monogamous mating system and an in-
crease in paternal investment (Plavcan & van Schaik, 1997). However, there
e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y cholog y 235
tocracy of Europe and the American South until fairly recently in history.
These duels were often tied to trivial threats to self-esteem and were instru-
mental in enhancing the duelists’ honor and reputation, thus providing a
public validation of their self-worth (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996).
Experiments with a variety of nonhuman primates have shown that
serotonin-based mechanisms underlie the dominance hierarchies that are of
such concern among males (Zuckerman, 1990). Artificially augmenting
serotonin activity in male vervet monkeys typically results in their attaining
high dominance status in the troop (Raleigh et al., 1991). In drug-free nat-
uralistic settings, the highest-ranking males in a hierarchy typically have the
highest levels of serotonin (which, among other things, promotes confidence
and self-esteem), and the lowest-ranking generally have the lowest levels. In
established dominance hierarchies, low-ranking males typically defer with-
out much fuss to higher-ranking males over access to females and other re-
sources. When the hierarchy is disrupted or is in flux, which it frequently is,
these same lower-level males may become the most aggressive in the com-
petition for resources (the similarity with the various “social disorganization”
models in traditional criminology is obvious here). Those rising to positions
of status in the new dominance hierarchy tend to be those who most ag-
gressively seek it, which involves, above all, successfully forming alliances
with other high-status males and females (Raleigh et al., 1991; Wrangham
& Peterson, 1996). Serotonin levels of newly successful males rise to levels
commensurate with their new status (Brammer, Raleigh, & McGuire,
1994).
The same kinds of relationships between serotonin levels and self-
esteem, status, impulsivity, and violence are consistently found among
human males (Raine, 1993; Virkkunen & Linnoila, 1990; Virkkunen,
Goldman, & Linnoila, 1996). As indicated above, rising to a dominant po-
sition in a hierarchy is not simply, or even primarily, a matter of individual
combativeness among primates. As Raleigh and his colleagues (1991) point
out, confident and ambitious individuals in primate troops form alliances,
coalitions, and “gangs,” just as aspiring human leaders do, to help them to
achieve their aim. Given the reciprocal relationship between social status
and body chemistry, it may well be that serotonergic mechanisms have been
naturally selected to equip us for the social statuses we find ourselves in
within well-ordered groups, and also to equip those with little to lose with
the necessary mechanisms to attempt to elevate their status by taking risks
when social restraints are weak (Brammer, Raleigh, & McGuire, 1994;
Weisfeld, 1999; Wright, 1994).
Testosterone, which also fluctuates in response to environmental de-
mands, is another proximate mechanism forged by natural selection to help
us cope with situations that call for aggressive responses. Various studies
have shown African American males to have higher levels of testosterone
238 so c i ol o g y a n d c r i m i n o l o g y
than white males (Ellis & Nyborg, 1992; Rose et al., 1986). Although
evidence indicates that the heritability of plasma testosterone is about
0.60 (Harris, Vernon, & Boomsma, 1998), higher testosterone levels
among black males may reflect the greater status challenges black males
face in their “honor subcultures” rather than differences in “true” testos-
terone base rates (Mazur & Booth, 1998; Walsh, 1991). Significantly, no
black/white differences in testosterone levels are found among prepu-
bescent males, older males, males who have attended college, and males
raised outside honor subcultures (Mazur & Booth, 1998). Significant
black/white differences in testosterone are thus apparently not found
when black males not participating in honor subcultures are compared
with their white peers.
Some researchers suggest that testosterone is more directly linked
to dominance behavior than to aggressiveness per se (Bernhardt, 1997;
Mazur & Booth, 1998). Of course, aggressiveness of some sort is almost
required in order to achieve dominance, although it is seldom expressed
violently in modern state societies where formal and informal rules con-
strain it. Displays of self-esteem and self-assurance that signal the ability
(if not necessarily the willingness) to invest in offspring has replaced dom-
inance based on fighting ability in many primate species, where alliance
building and subtle displays of fighting ability rather than brute force sus-
tain dominance rankings (Barkow, 1989). Violent attempts to gain status
tend to be expressed most readily among nonhuman primates when al-
liances and coalitions break down and alpha males can no longer get away
with mere bluster.
It may be that elevated testosterone is most likely to result in violence
when it is present in conjunction with low serotonin (Bernhardt, 1997). Ad-
ministering testosterone to nondominant rats increases dominance behavior,
and administering serotonin reverses the process and returns the rats to non-
dominant status. Bernhardt postulates that individuals with high base rates
of testosterone are more inclined than those with lower base levels to engage
in dominance-seeking behaviors. The more dominance-seeking behavior a
person engages in, the greater the likelihood of that person experiencing a
frustrating event as he interacts with others seeking the same thing. If such
a person also has a low level of serotonin, he will likely interpret frustration
more aversively and impulsively, which increases the likelihood of respond-
ing too aggressively to frustration. Natural selection has provided us with the
necessary neurohormonal mechanisms that allow us to respond to challenges
to our reproductive efforts (either directly or indirectly) in ways dictated by
the environments we find ourselves in. All of this points to the futility of at-
tempting to explain criminal behavior exclusively in either biological or en-
vironmental terms, and to the importance of an evolutionary frame of
reference.
e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y cholog y 239
Rape
behavior genetics, and operant psychology. Ellis’s basic thesis is that rape be-
havior is learned via reinforcement principles (being “pushy” yields increas-
ing levels of sexual satisfaction, thus reinforcing “pushiness”), but the
motivation behind rape behavior is unlearned. According to Ellis, the moti-
vation behind rape behavior is the male sex drive coupled with the drive to
possess and control. Because of neurohormonal factors, these evolved drives
are stronger in some males than in others, and the stronger the drives, the
more easily males will learn the kinds of behavior that may lead to rape.
These same neurohormonal factors also tend to result in lessened sensitivity
to painful consequences—both their own and their victims’.
The evidence offered by biosocial theories of rape make it difficult to
maintain the position that rape is nonsexual, that it is motivated by hatred
of females or by attempts to maintain male social and economic privilege,
or that it is a product of differential gender socialization, as various social
learning theorists (Brownmiller, 1975; Gilmartin, 1994) have maintained.
Rape is obviously a violent and despicable act, but from an evolutionary
perspective, violence is usually a tactic used to achieve an end, not an end
in itself.
Domestic Violence
Evidence from many cultures around the world indicates that the single
most important cause of domestic violence (including homicide) is male
jealousy and suspicion of infidelity (Burgess & Draper, 1989; Daly &
Wilson, 1988a; Lepowsky, 1994). Males can only infer their paternity, while
females are always certain of their maternity. This fact has been responsible
for the almost universal double standard in adultery laws (punishing wives’
adultery more severely than husbands’ adultery) prior to the present time in
modern state cultures (Daly & Wilson, 1988a). Male paternal uncertainty
alone would lead us to predict that males will become more emotionally
aroused than females by their partner’s infidelity, either real or imagined.
This has been confirmed by laboratory findings indicating that males in
bonded relationships are more jealous (as measured by EEG readings and
self-reports) than females when told to imagine their mates engaging in sex-
ual intercourse with someone else. Females in bonded relationships were
more jealous when imagining their mates falling in love with another female
(Buss et al., 1992). Although both sexes became jealous when imagining
both scenarios, significantly, males were more emotionally upset by actions
carrying the threat of cuckoldry, and females by actions threatening the loss
of resources.
Males in several nonhuman animal species acting as if they claim pro-
prietary rights over females have been observed attacking females showing
242 so c i ol o g y a n d c r i m i n o l o g y
sexual interest in other males (Smuts, 1993; Ellis & Walsh, 1997). From an
evolutionary point of view, it is significant that nonhuman primates are par-
ticularly likely to be assaulted when they are ovulating and stray too far away
from the male who has claim to them (reviewed in Smuts, 1992). Given the
strong evidence of violence against females designed to control their sexual
behavior in other species, particularly in primates, we can assume with some
confidence that similar behavior among humans has the same ultimate goal.
With relatively rare exceptions, domestic violence worldwide is over-
whelmingly directed at females by males (Arias, Samois, & O’Leary, 1987;
Harrison & Esqueda, 1999).
Assaults against spouses or lovers are primarily driven by male fitness-
promoting mechanisms such as sexual proprietariness, jealousy, and sus-
picion of infidelity. To the extent that males invest resources in females
and their offspring, assaultive tendencies aimed (consciously or subcon-
sciously) at maintaining a mate’s fidelity will have been favored by natural
selection (Buss, 1994; Smuts, 1992, 1993). On average, males who were
least tolerant of threats of cuckoldry, real or imagined, would have left the
most offspring. We can be sure that males who were indifferent to the
adaptive problem of paternal certainty are not our ancestors. This intoler-
ance does not mean that males have a dedicated mechanism for domestic
abuse; it means they have evolved mechanisms such as jealousy and pos-
sessiveness and that sometimes these mechanisms prompt some men to
batter women in whom they have invested resources when they perceive
threats of infidelity.
There is little doubt that men everywhere tend to hold proprietary
views of their wives and lovers (Allman, 1994; Smuts, 1992). If male vio-
lence against spouses and lovers is a mechanism that evolved largely to pre-
vent real or imagined infidelity, it should be most common in environments
where the threat of infidelity (and hence cuckoldry) is most real. Such en-
vironments would be those where marriages are precarious, where moral re-
strictions on pre- and extramarital sexual relationships are weakest, and
where out-of-wedlock birth rates are highest (Burgess & Draper, 1989).
These are precisely the same environments in which intrasex assault and
homicide (often directly or indirectly over women) are most common
(Centerwell, 1995; Greenberg & Schneider, 1994). Domestic violence as-
saults are not only more prevalent in such environments; they also tend to
occur more frequently and to be more injurious (Clarke, 1998; Mann, 1995;
Rasche, 1995).
Although by no means limited to the lower classes, domestic violence
is most often committed by “competitively disadvantaged (CD) males”
(Burgess & Draper, 1989; Figueredo & McClosky, 1993). CD males have
low mate value because they have less to offer in terms of resources or
prospects of acquiring them, which, ceteris paribus, should make their mates
e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y cholog y 243
less desirous of maintaining the relationship with them, and thus more likely
to seek other partners. Lacking alternative means of controlling their part-
ners’ behavior (i.e., of assuring sexual fidelity), CD males may turn to vio-
lently coercive tactics to intimidate them (Figueredo & McClosky, 1993).
Despite male efforts to control sexual access to “their” women, DNA data
indicate that between 1% and 30% (depending on the culture or subculture)
of children are sired by someone other than the putative father (Birkenhead
& Moller, 1992; Brock & Shrimpton, 1991). Evolutionary psychologists con-
sider efforts to control the sexual behavior of females in whom they have in-
vested resources to be “normal” or “natural” under the circumstances, which
evokes anger from feminists and other social scientists. But, as is the case
with other violent behaviors discussed here, evolutionary psychologists join
their colleagues in condemning domestic violence as morally reprehensible
behavior deserving of punishment. In other words, behavior should be
judged by its consequences, not by its origins (thou shalt not commit the nat-
uralistic fallacy; nor shalt thou shoot the messenger).
genetic relatives. Citing studies from Canada, Denmark, the United States,
India, and thirteenth-century England, Daly and Wilson (1988a) find that
nongenetic cohabitants are approximately 11 times more likely to be mur-
dered by the person living with them than are genetic cohabitants. It has
been found in a number of studies in which the victim/offender relationship
was known that the perpetrator was a blood relative only in 2% to 6% of the
homicides of cohabitants (reviewed in Raine, 1993).
Evolutionary theory correctly predicts empirical findings that show that
close genetic relatives are extremely unlikely to kill one another. However,
there are environmental conditions under which the killing of infant off-
spring may have enhanced the killers’ inclusive fitness (personal fitness plus
the increased fitness of close genetic relatives) in ancestral environments.
The killing of offspring may increase inclusive fitness in several ways. When
our ancestral mothers had too many mouths to feed with available resources,
lacked a mate, or had children who were unlikely to be able to contribute to
the family well-being because of chronic illness or deformity, a “triage” strat-
egy may have been the best one available. Such a strategy increases the prob-
ability of the survival of the most reproductively viable of their offspring,
while a strategy of trying to nurture each offspring equally may have resulted
in the survival of none. Studies have found that the probability of abuse, ne-
glect, and infanticide among nonhuman animals increases when the food
supply is low, when the litter size is large, when an infant has low repro-
ductive viability, and, in biparental species, when the female lacks the assis-
tance of a mate (Allman, 1994; Ellis & Walsh, 1997). These are precisely the
conditions under which we find most human incidences of infanticide and
abuse and neglect: that is, under conditions of poverty, within large families,
in single-parent families, and against children who are physically or mentally
handicapped (Daly & Wilson, 1988a; Gelles, 1991; Ellis & Walsh, 1997).
Legalities and politics aside, these are often the very same conditions that
lead women to seek an abortion, which from an evolutionary point of view
may be considered the functional equivalent of infanticide.
A good proportion of infanticidal behavior is either performed or insti-
gated by males who are genetically unrelated to the victim. In many non-
human animal species, especially in nonhuman primate species, a new male
claiming a female commences to kill any offspring sired by the female’s pre-
vious mate (reviewed in Van Hooff, 1990). Killing infants puts an end to
breastfeeding, which prompts the female’s return to estrus and provides an
opportunity for the new male to produce his own offspring (Hrdy, 1999).
Needless to say, these infanticidal animals make no conscious connection be-
tween their behavior and their genetic fitness. Evolutionary logic simply
avers that ancestral males who behaved that way were more reproductively
successful than those who did not. In a number of pre-state cultures, human
males acquiring wives with dependent children may also kill any children
e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y cholog y 245
from a previous relationship (Daly & Wilson, 1988a). Although this in-
creases the genetic fitness of the killers at the expense of the fitness of the fa-
thers of the victims, males in these societies are no more aware of this fact
than are nonhuman primates. According to evolutionary psychology, the
mental mechanism behind much male-initiated infanticide is probably:
“Don’t waste precious resources on children for whom I have no warm
feelings.”
Children in state societies are at greater risk for maltreatment, includ-
ing homicide, when not raised by both biological parents. Although the vast
majority of stepparents do not maltreat or kill their stepchildren, the risk of
maltreatment of all kinds is greatly elevated in stepfamilies. In one study of
child abuse cases in Canada, Daly and Wilson (1985) found that step-
children between birth and 4 years old were 25 times more likely than chil-
dren residing with both biological parents to be abused. This fell to 9 times
more likely in the 11- to 15-year-old age category. It gets even worse for fatal
abuse, where again we find the risk to be greater the younger the child is.
Although the killing of children by parents (either biological or step) is an
extremely rare occurrence, a child living with a stepparent (typically a step-
father or live-in boyfriend) is approximately 100 times more likely to be fa-
tally abused than a child living with both biological parents (Daly & Wilson,
1988b, 1996). In Darwinian terms, stepparenting is a fitness reducer and is
a chore reluctantly undertaken as a condition for gaining access to the child’s
mother’s reproductive potential.
Stepparenting also significantly increases the risk of sexual abuse of
stepchildren, with stepfathers being at least five times more likely to sexu-
ally abuse their daughters than are biological fathers (Finkelhor, 1984;
Glaser & Frosh, 1993). Stepfathers or live-in boyfriends may find their step-
daughters to be every bit as sexually attractive and desirable as females who
are complete strangers—that is, the incest avoidance mechanism has not
been triggered. The close physical proximity of opposite-sexed individuals
early in life appears to be the evolved mechanism that triggers the incest
avoidance mechanism that dulls sexual attraction between them, genetically
related or not (Thornhill & Thornhill, 1987; van den Berghe, 1987).
The earlier in a child’s life the stepparenting, begins the less likely there
will be any sexual attraction between parent and child. Evolutionists argue
that stepparents and live-ins represent an elevated risk for physical and sex-
ual abuse, or even murder, an argument that is well supported empirically
(Glaser & Frosh, 1993; Ellis & Walsh, 1997; Daly & Wilson, 1988a, 1988b).
The stepparent-stepchild relationship is more tenuous than the biological
parent-child relationship because it does not rest on the firm basis of early
bonding, and therefore on the mutual trust, nurturance, and solicitude
that such a relationship engenders. In decrying the ever decreasing num-
ber of children who live with both biological parents, Robert Wright
246 so c i ol o g y a n d c r i m i n o l o g y
Cheater Theory
Cheater theory rests ultimately on the broad asymmetry between the re-
productive strategies of males and females. There is much more variability
in male reproductive success, with some males leaving no offspring, and oth-
ers fathering large numbers. This is particularly so in polygynous species and
polygynous human cultures, and possibly so in human evolutionary envi-
ronments. Females have a much lower potential reproductive ceiling than
males, although almost all females will probably reproduce. The major fac-
tor in female reproductive success has been to secure and hold on to the as-
sistance of a mate to raise her offspring. Given lower variation but greater
reproductive certainty, females have evolved a mating strategy inclining
them to be choosier about whom they will mate with than males are
(Badcock, 2000; Cartwright, 2000; Buss, 1994; Wright, 1994).
Male reproductive success is potentially greater the more females a male
can have sex with, and males have an evolved desire for multiple partners.
e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y cholog y 247
Males can respond to the more reticent female strategy in one of two ways:
They can comply with female preferences and help a single female raise their
offspring, or they can either trick or force a female to have sex and then
move on to the next female. These two strategies have been called Cad vs.
Dad (Cashdan, 1993). Just as almost all males have committed some form
of delinquent act during adolescence (Moffitt, 1993), almost all heterosexual
males have probably used cheater tactics (falsely proclaiming love and fi-
delity and the use of some form of coercion) to obtain sex in their youth.
The vast majority of males, however, will eventually settle down and help a
female to raise their young, just as the vast majority will desist from anti-
social behavior. This “dad” strategy is facilitated by the social emotions, par-
ticularly love (Fisher, 1998; Walsh, 1995b). The “cad” strategy, however, is
likely to be followed by males who are deficient in the social emotions, such
as chronic criminals and psychopaths, well after adolescence (Ellis & Walsh,
1997; Lykken, 1995). The basic point of cheater theory is that criminal ac-
tivity is facilitated by the same traits that make for the successful pursuit of
a cheater sexual strategy.
It is important to stress that cheater theory does not postulate that crim-
inal behavior reflects a defective genome; rather, it reflects a normal, albeit
morally regrettable, alternative adaptive strategy. That is, it has been sug-
gested that a small subset of individuals exist for whom cheating is an oblig-
atory rather than a conditional strategy. The continued presence of chronic
cheats among us indicates that we have a less than perfect ability to detect
and punish them. As previously indicated, because humans are trustworthy
cooperators they are vulnerable to cheats.
According to a number of theorists, a coevolutionary “arms race” simi-
lar to the coevolution of predator and prey has molded the sensibilities of
cooperators and chronic cheats alike. Just as cooperators have undergone
evolutionary tuning of their senses for detecting cheats, cheats have evolved
mechanisms that serve to hide their true intentions (Cartwright, 2000;
Mealey, 1995; Trivers, 1991). The posited mechanism aiding cheats is a
muting of the neurohormonal mechanisms that regulate the social emotions
so that cheats have little real understanding of what it is like to feel guilt,
shame, anxiety, and sympathy. Selection for self-deception (think of some
of the defense mechanisms in psychoanalytic theory) would even better en-
able the cheater to pursue his interests without detection (Alexander, 1987;
Dugatkin, 1992; Nesse & Lloyd, 1992). Because chronic cheats operate
“below the emotional poverty line” (Hare, 1993, p. 134), they do not reveal
clues that would allow others to judge their intentions. Lacking an emotional
basis for self-regulation, chronic cheats make social decisions exclusively on
the basis of rational cost-benefit calculations (Mealey, 1995; Trivers, 1991).
According to Mealey (1995), the traits conducive to cheating are
normally distributed in the population, but there is a small but stable
248 so c i ol o g y a n d c r i m i n o l o g y
As the name suggests, CAT proposes that people adopt different reproduc-
tive strategies conditionally—that is, according to the environmental condi-
tions they find themselves in, rather than genetic reasons. Draper and
Harpending (1982) suggested that a uniform reproductive strategy would
not be evolutionarily viable for every individual since environmental cir-
cumstances often vary drastically. They further postulated that early child-
hood is a sensitive period in which an individual’s future reproductive
strategy is calibrated, primarily by father absence. Blain and Barkow (1985)
further suggested that this calibration would include physiological processes
that affect the timing of the individual’s puberty; father absence would ac-
celerate the onset of puberty and sexual activity. Blain and Barkow’s pre-
diction has been supported by a number of studies (reviewed by Rossi,
1997). Although father absence was initially considered the primary stres-
sor, later work has tended toward more general childhood attachment
processes: “By the age of five to seven years children have usually developed
mental images or ‘internal working models’ of social-emotional relationships
based on the quality of their attachments” (Chisholm, 1993, p. 6).
According to the theory, children unconsciously monitor their envi-
ronments and will tend to adopt an unrestricted (promiscuous) sexual strat-
egy if they perceive that interpersonal relationships are ephemeral and
unreliable (as indexed by such things as parental divorce, witnessing others
engaging in short-term relationships, and lack of attachment to parents/
caregivers). Individuals who learned the opposite (experiencing stable
pair bonding and secure parental attachment) will tend to adopt a more
250 so c i ol o g y a n d c r i m i n o l o g y
AAT differs from CAT in that it proposes that humans are arrayed along a
continuum regarding where they have a tendency to focus their reproduc-
tive efforts, but largely for genetic rather than environmental reasons (Rowe,
1996). At one extreme is mating effort and at the other is parenting effort.
Rowe (1996, p. 270) states that “crime can be identified with the behaviors
that tend to promote mating effort and noncrime with those that tend to
promote parenting effort.” The best demographic predictors of where re-
productive effort is focused are gender and age, which are also the best
demographic predictors of criminal and other antisocial behaviors. Mid-
adolescence to early adulthood is a period of intense male reproductive
effort, replete with competitiveness, risk-taking, and violence aimed ulti-
mately at securing more mating opportunities than the next male (Mazur &
Booth, 1998; Weisfeld, 1999). As Martin Daly (1996, p. 193) put it: “There
are many reasons to think that we’ve been designed [by natural selection] to
be maximally competitive and conflictual in young adulthood.”
In general, males and the young emphasize mating effort and fe-
males and older persons emphasize parenting effort. In terms of indi-
vidual traits, the suite of traits useful for focusing on mating effort, such
252 so c i ol o g y a n d c r i m i n o l o g y
The major concern of feminist criminology has long been to explain the uni-
versal fact that women are far less likely than men to involve themselves in
criminal activity (Price & Sokoloff, 1995, p. 3). Whenever and wherever
e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y cholog y 253
records have been kept, it has been found that males commit the over-
whelming proportion of criminal offenses, and the more serious and violent
the offense, the more males dominate in its commission (Campbell, 1999).
This fact is not in dispute, although explanations of it are. The traditional
sociological view of gender differences in crime and other forms of deviant
behavior is that they are products of differential socialization: that men are
socialized to be aggressive, ambitious, and dominant, women to be nurtur-
ing and passive; and that women will be as antisocial and criminal as men
with female emancipation. The majority of studies relating to this issue,
however, actually support the opposite of the emancipation hypothesis: that
is, as the trend toward gender equality has increased, females have tended
to commit fewer rather than more crimes relative to males (Ellis & Walsh,
2000, p. 388).
Other efforts to account for gender differences aver that the greater
supervision of females versus males account for the gender gap (Mears,
Ploeger, & Warr, 1998). However, controlling for supervision level results
in the same large gap in male/female offending (Gottfredson & Hirschi,
1990, p. 148), and a meta-analysis of 172 studies found a nonsignificant ten-
dency for boys to be more strictly supervised than girls (Lytton & Romney,
1991). As Dianna Fishbein (1992, p. 100) summed up the issue: “Cross-
cultural studies do not support the prominent role of structural and cultural
influences of gender-specific crime rates as the type and extent of male ver-
sus female crime remains consistent across cultures.”
The primary evolutionary account of why females are much less prone
to criminal and other forms of antisocial behavior is provided by Anne
Campbell’s (1999) “staying alive” hypothesis. Campbell’s argument has to
do with evolved sex differences in basic biology relevant to parental invest-
ment and status striving. Because a female’s obligatory parental investment
is greater than a male’s, and because of the greater dependence of the infant
on the mother, a mother’s presence is more critical to offspring survival (and
hence to the mother’s reproductive success) than is a father’s. Given that a
female’s survival is more critical to her reproductive success (in terms of
maximizing the probability that her offspring will survive) than a male’s sur-
vival is to his, Campbell argues that females have evolved a propensity to
avoid engaging in behaviors that pose survival risks, which includes many
forms of criminal and antisocial behavior. The practice of keeping nursing
children in close proximity in ancestral environments posed an elevated risk
of personal injury to both mother and child if the mother placed herself in
risky situations (Beckerman, 1999).
The evolved proximate mechanism Campbell proposes is a greater
propensity for females to experience many different situations as fearful. She
surveys evidence showing that there are no sex differences in fearfulness
across a number of contexts unless a situation contains a significant risk of
254 so c i ol o g y a n d c r i m i n o l o g y
physical injury. Fear of injury accounts for the greater tendency of females
to avoid or remove themselves from potentially violent situations and to em-
ploy indirect and low-risk strategies in competition and dispute resolution
relative to males. Simply put, ancestral females who were most fearful of sit-
uations containing a high risk of physical injury or death were more likely to
survive. The survival of these females, in turn, increased the probability of
the survival of their offspring, thus passing on the genes underlying the fear
response to potentially dangerous situations.
This greater female concern for personal survival also has implications
for sex differences in status seeking. Recall that males exhibit greater vari-
ance in reproductive success than females but less parental certainty, and
thus have more to gain and less to lose than females by engaging in intra-
sexual competition for mating opportunities. Striving for status and
dominance can be a risky business, and because attaining status is less con-
sequential for females than for males, there has been less evolutionary pres-
sure for the selection of mechanisms useful in that endeavor for females.
Males’ reproductive success may often rest on involving themselves in risky
situations, so high fear levels would have handicapped them in this endeavor.
Campbell points out that although females do engage in intrasexual
competition for mates, it is rarely in the form of violence and aggression in
any primate species. Most of it is decidedly low key, low risk, and chronic,
as opposed to male competition, which is high key, high risk, and acute. The
female assets most pertinent to reproductive success are youth and beauty,
which one either has or does not. Male assets are the resources females de-
sire for their reproductive success, and unlike youth and beauty, these assets
can be achieved in competition with other males. Males are willing to incur
high risks to achieve the status and dominance that bring them resources and
thus access to more females.
Campbell also notes that when females engage in crime they almost
always do so for instrumental reasons, and the crimes themselves rarely in-
volve risk of physical injury. Both robbery and larceny/theft involve expro-
priating resources from others, but females constitute about 43% of arrests
for larceny/theft and only about 7% of arrests for robbery, a crime carrying
a relatively high risk for personal injury. There is no mention in the litera-
ture that female robbers crave the additional payoffs of dominance that male
robbers do, or seek reputations as “hardasses” (Katz, 1988). High-status,
dominant, and aggressive females are not particularly desirable as mates, and
certainly a woman with a reputation as a “hardass” would be most unattrac-
tive. Campbell (1999, p. 210) notes that while women do aggress and do
steal, “they rarely do both at the same time because the equation of resources
and status reflects a particularly masculine logic.”
It is important to realize that sex differences in aggression, dominance
seeking, and sexual promiscuity are related to parental investment, rather
e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y cholog y 255
than sex (gender) per se. It is the level of parental investment and its twin
process, sexual selection, that exert pressure for the selection of the neuro-
hormonal mechanisms that underlie these behaviors. Parental investment is
not greater for females in every species, however. In a number of bird and
fish species males contribute greater parental investment (e.g., incubating
the eggs and feeding the young), and in these species it is the female who
takes the risks, who is promiscuous and the aggressor in courtship, and who
engages in intrasexual competition for mates (Betzig, 1999). Males and
females in these species thus assume characteristics that are the opposite of
those of males and females in species in which the females assume all or most
of the burden of parenting. This sex-role reversal provides support for
Campbell’s thesis and underlines the usefulness of cross-species comparisons.
All three theories we have discussed make essentially the same predictions
regarding the correlates of criminal behavior. The major predictions have to
do with sexual behavior; the stability of pair bonds; and child care, supervi-
sion, and attachment. Table 8.1 presents 539 studies reviewed by Ellis and
Walsh (2000) pertaining to these issues. These studies include official and
self-report data of a variety of criminal and antisocial behaviors derived from
a number of different countries. Note that 481 studies were supportive of
the predictions made by evolutionary theories of crime, 51 were null, and
only 7 were nonsupportive. Null and nonsupportive studies were exclusively
self-report studies of relatively minor offenses.
Of course, a number of non-evolutionary theories would also predict
many of the same relationships. These theories would typically invoke
supraindividual factors such as social class, discrimination, status frustration,
or “subculture of violence” as explanations. Although these factors provide
part of the picture, they are descriptors rather than explanations, phenom-
ena that themselves require explanation. As with many phenomena in the
social and behavioral sciences, they are generic terms for a number of func-
tionally integrated biological and psychological structures and processes
that we call evolved adaptations. The explanatory shortcomings of non-
evolutionary criminological theories vis-à-vis these correlates of crime are
briefly addressed below.
Note: *Sup. = Number of supportive studies; n.s. = number of nonsignificant studies; Nonsup. = number of nonsupportive studies. From Ellis & Walsh, Criminology:
A Global Perspective (2000).
e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y cholog y 257
Conclusion
they are to develop theories that maintain vertical consistency with them. If
they do not they will become irrelevant, as Alice Rossi (1984) warned bio-
logically ignorant sex-role researchers in her 1983 presidential address to the
American Sociological Association. In this “decade of the brain” and in the
age of the Human Genome and Human Genetic Diversity Projects, biolog-
ical data relevant to understanding criminal behavior are pouring in at a re-
markable rate. Criminologists have an unprecedented opportunity to join
other scientists in interdisciplinary analyses of criminal behavior with these
data. If criminologists pass up this opportunity, we can be sure that the torch
will be passed to other disciplines—the study of criminality is too important
to remain mired in premodern science.
Notes
References
Adler, F., Mueller, G., & Laufer, W. (1998). Criminology (3rd ed.). Boston:
McGraw-Hill.
Alcock, J. (1998). Animal behavior: An evolutionary approach (6th ed.).
Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates.
Alexander, R. (1987). The biology of moral systems. New York: Aldine de
Gruyter.
Allman, W. (1994). The stone age present. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Amato, P., & Keith, P. (1991a). Parental divorce and adult well-being: A
meta-analysis. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 53, 43–58.
Amato, P., & Keith, P. (1991b). Parental divorce and the well-being of
children: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 110, 26–46.
Anderson, E. (1999). Code of the street: Decency, violence, and the moral life
of the inner city. New York: W. W. Norton.
Arias, I., Samois, M., & O’Leary, K. (1987). Prevalence and correlates of
physical aggression during courtship. Journal of Interpersonal Violence,
2, 82–90.
Badcock, C. (2000). Evolutionary psychology: A critical introduction. Cam-
bridge, England: Polity Press.
Barak, G. (1998). Integrating criminologies. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Barkow, J. (1984). The distance between genes and culture. Journal of
Anthropological Research, 37, 367–379.
Barkow, J. (1989). Darwin, sex and status: Biological approaches to mind
and culture. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Barkow, J. (1992). Beneath new culture is an old psychology: Gossip and
social stratification. In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The
e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y cholog y 261
Dugatkin, L. (1992). The evolution of the “con artist.” Ethology and Socio-
biology, 13, 3–18.
Durkheim, E. (1982). Rules of sociological method. New York: Free Press.
Edgerton, R. (1992). Sick societies: Challenging the myth of primitive har-
mony. New York: Free Press.
Ellis, L. (1977). The decline and fall of sociology: 1975–2000. American
Sociologist, 12, 56–66.
Ellis, L. (1991). A synthesized (biosocial) theory of rape. Journal of Con-
sulting and Clinical Psychology, 59, 631–642.
Ellis, L. (1996). A discipline in peril: Sociology’s future hinges on curing
its biophobia. American Sociologist, 27, 21–41.
Ellis, L. (1998). Neo-Darwinian theories of violent criminality and antiso-
cial behavior: Photographic evidence from nonhuman animals and a
review of the literature. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 3, 61–110.
Ellis, L., & Nyborg, H. (1992). Racial/ethnic variation in male testosterone
levels: A probable contributor to group differences in health. Steroids,
57, 72–75.
Ellis, L., & Walsh, A. (1997). Gene-based evolutionary theories in crimi-
nology. Criminology, 35, 229–276.
Ellis, L., & Walsh, A. (2000). Criminology: A global perspective. Boston: Allyn
& Bacon.
Ember, M., & Ember, C. (1998). Facts of violence. Anthropology Newsletter,
October, 14–15.
Figueredo, A. (1995). The epigenesis of sociopathy. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 18, 556–557.
Figueredo, A., & McClosky, L. (1993). Sex, money, and paternity: The evo-
lutionary psychology of domestic violence. Ethology and Sociobiology,
14, 353–379.
Finkelhor, D. (1984). Child sexual abuse: New theory and research. New
York: Free Press.
Fishbein, D. (1992). The psychobiology of female aggression. Criminal
Justice and Behavior, 19, 9–126.
Fisher, H. (1992). Anatomy of love: The natural history of monogamy, adul-
tery, and divorce. New York: W. W. Norton.
Fisher, H. (1998). Lust, attraction, and attachment in mammalian repro-
duction. Human Nature, 9, 23–52.
Geary, D. (2000). Evolution and proximate expression of human paternal
investment. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 55–77.
Gelles, R. (1991). Physical violence, child abuse, and child homicide: A
continuum of violence or distinct behaviors? Human Nature, 2, 59–72.
Gilmartin, P. (1994). Rape, incest, and child sexual abuse: Consequences and
recovery. New York: Garland.
Glaser, D., & Frosh, S. (1993). Child sex abuse. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press.
Gonczol, K. (1993). Anxiety over crime. Hungarian Quarterly, 129, 87–99.
Gottfredson, M., & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general theory of crime. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
264 so c i ol o g y a n d c r i m i n o l o g y
Grauerholz, E., & Koralewski, M. (1991). What is known and not known
about sexual coercion. In E. Grauerholz & M. Koralewski (Eds.), Sex-
ual coercion: A sourcebook on its nature, causes, and prevention (pp.
187–198). Lexington, MA: Lexington.
Greenberg, M., & Schneider, D. (1994). Violence in American cities: Young
black males is the answer, but what is the question? Social Science and
Medicine, 39, 179–187.
Griffiths, P. (1990). Modularity and the psychoevolutionary theory of emo-
tion. Biology and Philosophy, 5, 175–196.
Hare, R. (1993). Without conscience: The disturbing world of the psychopaths
among us. New York: Pocket Books.
Hare, R. (1996). Psychopathy: A clinical construct whose time has come.
Criminal Justice and Behavior, 23, 25–54.
Harpending, H., & Draper, P. (1988). Antisocial behavior and the other side
of cultural evolution. In T. Moffitt & S. Mednick (Eds.), Biological con-
tributions to crime causation (pp. 293–307). Dordrecht: Martinus Nyhoff.
Harris, G., Rice, M., & Quinsey, V. (1994). Psychopathy as a taxon: Evi-
dence that psychopaths are a discrete class. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology, 62, 387–397.
Harris, J., Vernon, P., & Boomsma, D. (1998). The heritability of testos-
terone: A study of Dutch adolescent twins and their parents. Behav-
ior Genetics, 28, 165–171.
Harrison, L., & Esqueda, C. (1999). Myths and stereotypes of actors in-
volved in domestic violence: Implications for domestic violence cul-
pability attributions. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 4, 129–138.
Hill, K., & Hurtado, A. (1996). Ache life history. New York: Aldine de
Gruyter.
Hooff, J. Van. (1990). Intergroup competition in animals and man. In J.
Van der Dennen & V. Falger (Eds.), Sociobiology and conflict: Evolu-
tionary perspectives on competition, cooperation, violence and warfare
(pp. 23–54). London: Chapman and Hall.
Hrdy, S. (1999). Mother nature: A history of mothers, infants, and natural
selection. New York: Pantheon.
Jeffrey, C. R. (1977). Criminology—Whither or wither? Criminology, 15,
283–286.
Jockin, V., McGue, V., & Lykken, D. (1996). Personality and divorce: A ge-
netic analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 288–299.
Kanazawa, S., & Still, M. (2000). Why men commit crimes (and why they
desist). Sociological Theory, 18, 434–447.
Katz, J. (1988). Seductions of crime: Moral and sensual attractions in doing
evil. New York: Basic Books.
Kendler, K. (1995). Genetic epidemiology in psychiatry: Taking both genes
and environment seriously. Archives of General Psychiatry, 52, 895–899.
Lepowsky, M. (1994). Women, men, and aggression in egalitarian soci-
eties. Sex Roles, 30, 199–211.
Lubinski, D., & Humphrys, L. (1997). Incorporating intelligence into epi-
demiology and the social sciences. Intelligence, 24, 159–201.
e v o l u t i o n a r y p s y cholog y 265
Bernd Baldus
Almost from the day it was published in 1859, Darwin’s The Origin of Species
was drawn into the politics of a turbulent century. Darwin, aware of the so-
cial implications of his theory, had limited his consideration of human cul-
tural evolution to the single remark that “much light will be thrown (by the
theory of natural selection) on the origin of man and his history” (Darwin,
1958, p. 449). But this did not prevent his theory from quickly becoming
embroiled in the political debates of the day.
Darwin’s theory of evolution arrived in a society whose “respectable
classes” were torn between euphoria over technical, scientific, and economic
progress on one hand, and profound fears of social conflict on the other. The
Origin of Species was published in the same year as Dickens’s Tale of Two
Cities, a book that captivated large audiences with its chilling image of rev-
olutionary women knitting while counting out the number of prisoners
climbing the scaffold on their way to the guillotine. To many readers it must
have appeared as if they were knitting the shroud of civilized society. The
revolutionary terror, personally experienced by Comte de Saint-Simon (one
of the founders of sociology) and subsequently embellished by literary li-
cense, cast a long shadow over the nineteenth century. Fears that it could
happen again were reinforced by repeated and widespread economic crises
and social conflict in industrializing countries.
Early social scientists and evolutionists phrased these concerns as a more
intellectual paradox. On one hand, the new market-based society had fought
and overcome the old feudal order by demanding more individual freedom
270 so c i ol o g y a n d c r i m i n o l o g y
and greater equality. But these very demands seemed to generate centrifu-
gal forces which, depending on one’s political leanings, promised further
radical social and political change or presaged social disintegration and chaos.
The origins of social order, not the origin of species, was the mystery of mys-
teries that topped the agenda of nineteenth-century social science.
Darwin’s theory was quickly drawn into these debates. To English rad-
icals, evolution suggested that individuals and entire classes could rise from
humble origins to better things, a view supported by those on the Darwin-
ian Left such as Alfred Russel Wallace and Thomas Henry Huxley. Darwin’s
cousin Galton found in the Origin the basis for the heredity of human abil-
ities and the potential of a eugenic “science of breeding the best,” an idea that
appealed to the Left because it seemed to oppose aristocratic privilege, and
to the Right because it seemed to confirm it. To social Darwinists the the-
ory of natural selection justified the position of the middle and upper classes
in the new industrial social structure.
Hitched to these agendas, Darwin’s theory was soon transformed be-
yond recognition. For Darwin, differential fitness led to differential repro-
ductive success which produced much diversity but no hierarchy; any
attempt to order its results would be “hopeless; who will decide whether a
cuttle-fish be higher than a bee” (Darwin, 1958, p. 331). Social Darwinists,
on the other hand, were interested in inequality in the here and now. For
them “fitness” was a matter of desirable or detrimental character traits which
explained wealth and poverty. Darwin had described a process of descent
with modification which could be traced back to ancestral events but could
not be reduced to an ultimate cause or essence and therefore followed no
predictable path. By contrast, early sociologists were very much interested
in ultimate causes and progressive advancement. Their “evolutionary” mod-
els of society drew not on Darwin but on the physiological functions of bod-
ily organs and the development of the embryo into a fully grown organism.
Darwin’s evolution included a large measure of chance, imperfection, and
lack of direction. Nineteenth-century sociologists, however, were looking for
“scientific” clarity, determinism, and laws. Marx saw in Darwin’s theory “a
natural-scientific basis for the class struggle in history,” Herbert Spencer the
law of progressive differentiation and functional specialization, Ernst
Haeckel proof of the nationalist destiny of the “master race.”
By the end of the nineteenth century, evolutionism was anything but a
unified body of thought. Numerous and often contradictory “evolutionary”
theories had emerged that differed significantly from Darwin’s ideas. The re-
sulting confusion marked the beginning of a long, uneasy, and sometimes
hostile relationship between sociology and evolutionary theory. Today, so-
ciologists may quietly concede some links between biology and social be-
havior. They may even admit that some of what we do, from prenatal
smoking to the global destruction of environments, bears risks for our re-
ev o l u t i o n , a g e n c y , a n d s oc i olog y 271
productive success and our long-term survival as a species (Beck, 1992). The
majority of sociologists, however, look upon evolutionary theory with a mix-
ture of ignorance and professional disdain.1
Two problems have proven particularly intractable for an evolutionary
study of human culture. One is the presence in social systems of numerous
adaptively redundant, suboptimal, or even dysfunctional traits which, by no
stretch of the biological imagination, can be explained in terms of their past
or present contribution to human reproductive fitness. The second is the
problem of agency. The process of natural selection, at least as it is under-
stood in most contemporary biology, seems to be a purely external force not
under the control of the individual organism. By contrast, human culture ap-
pears to be the product of intentional, purposive choice by individual actors.
Both the problem of “useless traits” and of the role of individual agency in
evolution and evolutionary design had been very much on Darwin’s mind.
In the Origin of Species he sketched a process in which variations, appearing
blindly (i.e., not caused by their eventual adaptive utility), were used by in-
dividual organisms interacting with their environment. Those variations that
proved advantageous in the competition for limited resources increased the
organism’s “fitness,” the chances of leaving offspring which inherited the fa-
vorable variation and benefited in the same way. The cumulative effect of
this natural selection of favored variations was their long-term increase in a
population and the eventual emergence of a new species.
Selection involved individual organisms in two very different roles. In
one, inheritance, they were passive carriers of traits: they inherited variations,
the raw material of natural selection, and passed favored variations on to fu-
ture generations. Between these two processes lay a second, equally impor-
tant role: the active internal adaptation of organisms during their lifetime. Here
variations that arose unconnected to adaptive needs were tried out in the or-
ganism’s actual ecological life context to find out how they could be put to
use. Inherited variations that were not used, and thus did not change the re-
lationship between organism and environment, remained without selective
consequence. Often the environment alone selected what was “useful”; no
active involvement by the organism was necessary. But there were also many
cases where the adaptive utility of a variation did not reveal itself automat-
ically. The potential value of an inherited variation had to be discovered
through trial and error and retained through day-to-day use and “habit” in
order to result eventually in increased reproductive success. Organisms
were active agents in this process; they “seized on the many and widely di-
versified places in the polity of nature” and “partook of the advantages
272 so c i ol o g y a n d c r i m i n o l o g y
which they inherited” (Darwin, 1958, pp. 112, 117). This activity required
mental faculties.
Much of the Origin was devoted to examining the effects of natural se-
lection on the physical characteristics of animals and humans. But from the
start Darwin was convinced that evolution also led from animal feelings and
cognition to human culture. As early as 1838 he had promised himself
“never [to] allow that because there is a chasm between man . . . and ani-
mals that man has different origin” (cited in Moore, 1985, p. 453). His early
notebooks contained many observations of animal behavior which suggested
emotions and intelligence. Animals could feel happy and sad; could be play-
ful or suspicious; could display terror and courage, magnanimity and re-
venge; and had powers of reasoning and imagination. The evolutionary
explanation of mind, agency, and morality was “the citadel itself,” and Dar-
win became increasingly bent on conquering it.
The first obstacle on the way was the problem of useless traits. Darwin,
a keen observer of nature, marveled at the often exquisite fit between traits
and environment. But he also noted the many barely serviceable “imperfec-
tions” and the “useless traits” of no recognizable adaptive value. Rudimen-
tary or vestigial organs were extremely common in nature. In mammals,
tailbone structures in tailless species, useless digits in the wings of birds, use-
less wings in flightless birds, or fetal teeth in toothless whales all bore evi-
dence to the fact that the products of natural selection were anything but
perfect. Most of these nonfunctional traits could be accounted for as rem-
nants of organs rendered useless by changes in the environment, as struc-
tures too small or too well hidden to be obliterated by the economy of
natural selection or, in the example of the functional sutures in the skulls of
mammals and the nonfunctional ones in the skulls of birds, as modifications
of ancestral anatomical forms.
That left a sufficient number of traits whose existence Darwin could not
explain by their adaptive value, including the peacock’s tail, cited in The De-
scent of Man as a prime example of a nonadaptive trait. A particularly dis-
turbing problem was partially formed components of complex organs, still
under construction by natural selection. Here the argument frequently
raised by Darwin’s critics was that it was easy to show the adaptive utility of
fully formed features such as feathers or eyes, but much more difficult to
demonstrate how natural selection could have preserved only partially
formed and functionally useless organ parts. This criticism, driven home by
the publication of Mivart’s On the Genesis of Species in 1871, gave Darwin
“a cold shudder.” The sixth edition of the Origin addressed these objections.
It offered numerous examples of the gradual evolution of body parts and
showed that the same organs could serve different functions and that incip-
ient wings could provide an adaptive advantage before being fully formed.
But Darwin knew that this was not the complete answer: in the same edi-
ev o l u t i o n , a g e n c y , a n d s oc i olog y 273
tion he also emphasized that selection by the blind forces of nature was not
the only process involved in evolutionary design:
To take as an illustration the case of the larger titmouse, this bird often
holds the seeds of the yew between its feet on a branch, and hammers
with its beak till it gets at the kernel. Now what special difficulty would
there be in natural selection preserving all the slight individual varia-
tions in the shape of the beak, which were better and better adapted to
break open the seeds, until a beak was formed as well constructed for
this purpose as that of the nuthatch, at the same time that habit, or
compulsion, or spontaneous variations of taste, led the bird to become
more and more a seed eater? In this case the beak is supposed to be
276 so c i ol o g y a n d c r i m i n o l o g y
He who admits the principle of sexual selection will be led to the re-
markable conclusion that the cerebral system not only regulates most of
the existing functions of the body, but has indirectly influenced the pro-
gressive development of various bodily structures and of certain mental
qualities. Courage, pugnacity, perseverance, strength and size of body,
weapons of all kinds, musical organs, both vocal and instrumental,
bright colors, stripes and marks, and ornamental appendages, have all
been indirectly gained by one sex or the other, through the influence of
love and jealousy, through the appreciation of the beautiful in sound,
color or form, and through the exertion of a choice; and these powers
of the mind manifestly depend on the development of the cerebral sys-
tem. (Darwin, 1981, part 2, p. 402)
The publication of the Descent touched a raw nerve. The suggestion that
evolution produced much that was imperfect, mediocre and even useless;
that evolutionary history was subject to spontaneous change and therefore
followed no predictable path; and—most important—that the mind had an
active, direction-giving role in evolution did not sit well with nineteenth-
century science.
Three powerful intellectual currents worked against Darwin’s theory.
One was the religious legacy of human beings as the pinnacle of creation, a
position that even Darwin’s secular contemporaries were reluctant to aban-
don. Wallace, the codiscoverer of natural selection, was one of the first to
uncouple human culture from evolution. Cultural evolution obeyed differ-
ent forces; “intellectual and moral faculties . . . must have another origin . . .
in the unseen universe of the Spirit” (Wallace cited in Gruber, 1981, p. 31).
Most sociologists, including Marx, followed suit. Darwinian evolution came
to an end with the beginning of human history. Human culture was a fun-
damentally different matter, initiated by a “moral flash” which bestowed the
gift of rational thought on humanity, much like the invisible spark from the
hand of God in the Sistine Chapel infused Adam with a soul.
The second obstacle was political: a deeply rooted fear of the destruc-
tive potential of unrestrained human agency. The overriding ideological
ev o l u t i o n , a g e n c y , a n d s oc i olog y 277
Autonomous man serves to explain only the things we are not yet able
to explain in other ways. His existence depends upon our ignorance,
and he naturally loses status as we come to know more about behav-
iour. The task of a scientific analysis is to explain how the behaviour of
a person as a physical system is related to the conditions under which
the human species evolved and the conditions under which the indi-
vidual lives. (Skinner, 1971, p. 12)
forces. Human choices were as often as not irrational, their outcomes far
from optimal, and their consequences far from predicted. The course of his-
tory resembled more a random walk than a fixed progressive path. In short,
the social reality reflected in sociologists’ data had the telltale properties of
an evolutionary process.2
Sociological theory could make no sense of these facts. The inability to
discover the hoped-for laws of behavior became “a source of embarrassment
and confusion to quantitative sociologists” (Turner, 1987, p. 15). Contem-
porary sociology is drowning in a sea of data for which it has no coherent
theoretical explanation, and faces unprecedented doubts regarding its basic
premises (Baldus, 1990; Bernard, 1993; Bryant, 1992; Collins, 1986; Turner
& Turner, 1990; Quadagno & Knapp, 1992). It foundered on the same ob-
stacles that had already preoccupied Darwin. The complexity and unpre-
dictability of human culture defied the search for social laws, and the role of
human agency became mired in seemingly interminable structure-agency
debates that forever reshuffled the conceptual deck one way or the other and
produced commonplace observations such as Anthony Giddens’s (1984)
observation that the “duality of structure” both constrains and enables social
action, or Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977, 1992) assertion that human action is
both “structured” and “structuring.”
Post-Darwinian biology fell under the spell of the same forces. Neo-
Darwinism disconnected Darwin’s views on the adaptive activity of organ-
isms during their lifetime from the rest of his theory. It focused instead on
the external sphere of variation and inheritance. The discovery of heritable
units of genetic information shifted biological interest from individual or-
ganisms to genes and, with the emergence of the New Synthesis in the
1930s, to populations. The Descent of Man was dismissed as “a strange book”
(Ruse, 1979, p. 247). Darwin’s interest in the role of cognition in evolution
was treated as a lapse into a never fully abandoned Lamarckism (Richards,
1987, p. 195). Numerous critics of sexual selection denounced the idea that
animals could make choices, and tried to prove that apparently redundant
characteristics such as the peacock’s tail were really adaptive after all (Cronin,
1991). Biology rejected internal mental operations such as consciousness,
awareness, or intent as anthropomorphic. They became a virtual taboo in
neo-Darwinist theory (Griffin, 1984, p. 22).
The most obvious casualty of this transformation was Darwin’s interest
in the role of mind and agency in evolution. Organisms became epiphe-
nomena of genes, controlled by exogenous forces. They no longer had any
independent role to play and were reduced to machines made of meat, com-
pelled by a few innate drives or needs (such as hunger, sex, and fear) to en-
gage in an unceasing search for adaptively optimal uses of given faculties in
given environments. A strict economy of external culling eliminated all sub-
optimal or redundant traits. Brains now appeared as fitness-maximizing spe-
280 so c i ol o g y a n d c r i m i n o l o g y
tural selection. While beliefs, values, and goals often profoundly influenced
human culture, they could not be compared or ordered in terms of an ab-
stract calculus of utility or progress.
Having reduced Darwin’s theory of evolution by half to a process of ge-
netic variation and external selection, and faced with an extraordinary com-
plex and “biologically frivolous” (Pinker, 1997, p. 531) human culture,
evolutionary analyses of human behavior had to resort to expedients. Non-
adaptive traits were interpreted as “perverted” or “hypersocial” expressions
of hidden adaptive interests (Barkow, 1989), as “runaway” or inflationary
processes (Boyd & Richerson, 1985) that exaggerated adaptive traits, or as
“cultural inertia” that preserved originally adaptive but now neutral or
harmful cultural characteristics (Alexander, 1979, p. 77; Cavalli-Sforza &
Feldman, 1981). Numerous “runaway” or “work-around” explanations were
proposed for the human brain. Wilson (1978) suggested that their rapid
growth resulted from a positive feedback loop where growing brains allowed
for greater cultural capacity, which in turn selected for even larger brains.
Alternatively, brains were the product of adaptive pressures for social intel-
ligence (Humphrey, 1976), for the need for social deception and manipula-
tion (Whiten and Byrne’s [1997] “Macchiavellian intelligence”), or for
greater strategic intelligence needed in endemic tribal warfare (Alexander,
1989). Still others saw the brain evolving from a runaway sexual selection
where mating favored a rapidly expanding range of cultural artifacts (Miller,
2000). Such notions were hard to reconcile with known principles of evo-
lution and raised the danger that the “entire enterprise of interpreting cul-
ture as enlarged inclusive-fitness-optimizing strategies must fall” (Barkow,
1989, p. 283).
The basic dilemma facing all these efforts was that as long as specific
cultural traits were related to their reproductive success or to the human ca-
pacity to “estimate subconsciously or consciously the probable fitness effects
of employing alternative behaviour patterns” (Wrangham, 1980, p. 174),
the flexibility and directedness of human culture could not be treated as a
characteristic in its own right, but only as an exception to, or side effect of,
genetic selection. The dilemma was essentially similar to that of sociological
functionalism: to the extent that lasting social institutions are considered
“functional,” it becomes difficult to consider change and creativity as any-
thing other than deviance or anomie. Even authors such as Campbell, Boyd
and Richerson, or Miller, who make considerable efforts to account for the
autonomy of cultural evolution, are hampered by the fact that they try to
continue to see this autonomy through the lens of the genetic inheritance
paradigm. Campbell’s internal vicarious selectors ultimately “represent” past
adaptation through natural selection and are merely its mental reflection in
the form of adaptive instincts or behavioral predispositions (Campbell,
1974, p. 146). Miller acknowledges the “frivolity” of culture and the human
282 so c i ol o g y a n d c r i m i n o l o g y
(2000) argued that an entirely new and unique dual replication process, one
genetic, one memetic, emerged with the evolution of human beings. Even
Gould, not usually keen to be seen in this company, suggested that “cultural
evolution can proceed so quickly because it operates, as biological evolution
does not, in the Lamarckian mode—by the inheritance of acquired charac-
teristics” (Gould, 1981, p. 325). The high rate of innovation, the variety of
adaptively redundant cultural traits, and the role of human agency in com-
bining them into cultural patterns could not be explained. Darwin’s “citadel”
remained unconquered.
integral aspects of the lived part of evolution. The adaptive benefit of agency
comes not from any particular action but from the overall gain in added value
derived from the flexible exploration and exploitation of environmental resources.
Our emergence and success as a species, at least until now, has been the
combined result of our inherited algorithmic rules of behavior and our gen-
erative ability to solve the problems of survival during our lifetime.
define, from the organism’s point of view, the range of what is possible. The
objective, external and subjective, internal sides of evolution are two faces
of the same coin.
An evolutionary sociology also follows Darwin in assuming that a sin-
gle theory should explain all evolution, including that of human beings and
their culture. But compared to the Comtian vision of a “science of society,”
its program of causal explanation and prediction is considerably more mod-
est. The basic flaw of the deterministic view was that the very act of “ex-
plaining and predicting” a social system in terms of a mechanical causality
forced the researcher to exclude the microdiversity and the nonaverage be-
havior that gave rise to social change and evolution. Sociologists conse-
quently saw the functionally redundant and unpredictable features of the
social world as a threat to the status of their discipline as an exact science.
Much of their methodological effort was devoted to reducing artificially the
spacial and temporal complexity of the social world in order to create ideal-
ized, quasi-experimental datasets that were immune to the “messiness of
time” (Griffin, 1992, p. 403) and supported the epistemological fiction of an
orderly social universe.
By contrast, indeterminacy is a feature of all evolution. The complex re-
lationship between external reality and internal evaluation adds an element
of unpredictability to evolutionary outcomes. Adaptive dilemmas often have
multiple solutions, and materials, ideas, and technical or cultural artifacts
can be put to multiple uses. What is an error in one goal context may be-
come an innovation in another. There is no telling which current cultural el-
ement will be drawn upon for future purposes, when, and with what effect
(Basalla, 1988; Pacey, 1990).
This suggests that Durkheim’s “social facts”—those permanent, decon-
textualized components with inherent, finite causal attributes, do not exist.
Instead, they are the warp and woof of a tapestry whose patterns are con-
stantly remade. Tracing the descent of similar effects may not lead us to the
same causes, and the same causes may have altogether different effects. Like
all evolution, social processes tend to be irreversible and unrepeatable.
They can be neither reduced to universal causes nor predicted by invari-
ant laws. The evolution of human culture, like all evolution, is perma-
nently poised between order and contingency, temporary stability and
unpredictable change.
An evolutionary sociology is therefore a probabilistic, nondeterministic
science. Its main focus is to reconstruct the evolutionary descent lines of so-
cial events by analyzing the blind material: the behavioral and intellectual
antecedents with which such sequences begin, the social construction of rel-
evance, the social forces that decide which of them are retained and which
rejected, and the long-term consequences of the selection process. Its “laws”
are like Parkinson’s, not like Newton’s: temporary social order emerges
ev o l u t i o n , a g e n c y , a n d s oc i olog y 291
Notes
References