6 Tangan V CA
6 Tangan V CA
6 Tangan V CA
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
9. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY. — This Court correctly imposed on petitioner the proper
penalty for Homicide, without the attendance of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, maximum.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p
Petitioner Eladio C. Tangan led a Motion for Reconsideration, invoking the rule that
factual ndings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. Thus,
he argues that this Court erred in disregarding the mitigating circumstances which were
appreciated by the lower courts and in raising the indeterminate penalty imposed on him
from a maximum of two years and four months of prision correccional to a maximum of
fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal. This, he claims, exposed
him to the "horrifying reality" of being re-incarcerated after having been preventively
confined for more than four years. 1
It bears stressing that at no time during the trial of the case did petitioner raise self-
defense. Nevertheless, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the attendance of the
mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense, su cient provocation, and passion
and obfuscation.
When petitioner appealed the decision, he threw open the whole case for review. It
became the duty of this Court to correct any error as may be found in the appealed
judgment, whether it was made the subject of assignment of errors or not. 2
Thus, this Court reviewed the records of the case and found that the evidence fails
to support or substantiate the lower court's ndings and conclusions. Clearly, therefore,
this case falls within the recognized exceptions to the rule that an appellate court will
generally not disturb the assessment of the trial court on factual matters considering that
the latter, as a trier of fact, is in a better position to appreciate the same. 3
First of all, the physical evidence belies petitioner's version of the incident. As we
clearly explained in our assailed Decision:
The medical examiner testified that the distance between the muzzle of the
gun and the target was about 2 inches but de nitely not more than 3 inches.
Based on the point of exit and trajectory transit of the wound, the victim and the
alleged assailant were facing each other when the shot was made and the
position of the gun was almost perpendicular when red. These ndings disprove
Tangan's claim of accidental shooting. A revolver is not prone to accidental ring
because of the nature of its mechanism, unless it were uncocked, then
considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver. 4
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in
the hierarchy of our trustworthy evidence. 5 For this reason, it is regarded as evidence of
the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses. 6
The physical evidence is amply corroborated by the eyewitness accounts of Rosalia
dela Cruz and Mary Ann Borromeo to the effect that petitioner took a gun from his car and
suddenly fired it at the deceased. 7
Likewise, this Court found that the mitigating circumstances appreciated by the trial
court are not present. Petitioner refutes this and insists on his version of the facts.
However, the testimony of his witness, on which he heavily relies, suffers from material
inconsistencies which render it unworthy of belief.
It was shown that defense witness Nelson Pante was 10 meters away when he saw
the incident, and his line of vision was blocked by petitioner's car. 8 From that distance and
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vantage point, he could not have heard anything or have had an unobstructed view of the
events. Sure enough, the details of his statement betray the falsity thereof. He testi ed
that petitioner was hit on the eyebrow, while petitioner said he was hit on the jaw. 9 Pante
was also unable to identify Manuel Miranda, the person whom he supposedly saw punch
petitioner. 10
All of these, and the incredibility of petitioner's account when compared with the
physical evidence, belie self-defense. From the established facts, it can be plainly gleaned
that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. What merely transpired
before petitioner's gun went off was a heated exchange of words between the
protagonists. This does not qualify as unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression
presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof. The
person defending himself must have been attacked with actual physical force or with
actual use of weapon. 11
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has
committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. 12
By the same token, the evidence does not show the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of su cient provocation on the part of the offended party. As stated, the
provocation must be su cient to excite a person to commit a wrong and must
accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. In this case, all that the deceased did
immediately before he was shot was shout expletives and slap petitioner's hand when the
latter pointed it to his face. These acts, while offensive, were grossly disproportionate to
petitioner's act of drawing and firing of a gun.
Furthermore, there was no sudden and unexpected occurrence that could have
naturally produced a powerful excitement in petitioner's mind causing him to lose his
reason and self-control. As shown by the facts, no passion and obfuscation could have
clouded his mind.
On the whole, therefore, this Court correctly imposed on petitioner the proper
penalty for Homicide, without the attendance of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, maximum.
While his Motion for Reconsideration was pending, petitioner led with the Court an
"Omnibus Motion to Re-Ra e/Transfer and/or to Recuse." He alleged, among others, that
the ponente of the assailed Decision is biased in favor of respondents and, therefore, must
recuse herself from this case. Petitioner's accusation, however, is based on nothing more
than this Court's own evaluation of the evidence and departure from the rule that ndings
of facts of lower court are not to be disturbed.
Petitioner should bear in mind that the Decision, although penned by a member of
the Court, is a decision of the whole Court. Hence, any attack on the integrity of the
ponente, or any member of the Court for that matter, is an attack on the entire Court. More
importantly, petitioner fails to establish with concrete proof his amputations of bias. Such
irresponsible and unfounded statements will not be taken lightly by this Court. Hence,
petitioner and his counsel should be admonished for making such baseless and
unsubstantiated accusations of bias against the Court. Moreover, the Omnibus Motion
should be denied for lack of merit.
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Petitioner faults the Court for increasing the penalty ve times such that, despite
having served the penalty imposed by the trial court, he now faces the "intolerable specter
of reincarceration." 1 3 It should be recalled that petitioner, by consciously and deliberately
ring his gun, snuffed the life out of a 29-year old optometrist. Su ce it to state that
petitioner should bear the consequences of his felonious act. TAcSaC
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for
lack of merit. The Omnibus Motion to Re-Ra e/Transfer and/or to Recuse is likewise
DENIED. This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, G.R. No. 105830, pp. 296-297.
2. People v. De Leon , G.R. No. 126287, April 16, 2001; People v. Lucero , G.R. Nos. 102407-08,
March 26, 2001; People v. Taguba, G.R. Nos. 112792-93, October 6, 2000.
3. People v. Balano , G.R. No. 138474, March 28, 2001; People v. Naag , G.R. No. 136394,
February 15, 2001; People v. Limon, 306 SCRA 367, 372372-373 [1999].
4. Decision, p. 11.
9. Ibid., p. 68.
10. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
11. People v. Caguing, G.R. No. 139822, December 6, 2000.
12. People v. Flores, G.R. No. 138841, April 4, 2001.
13. Omnibus Motion to Re-Raffle/Transfer and/or to Recuse, p. 2.