EN

COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION
GENERAL SECRETARIAT

DG H
EU
Schengen Catalogue

External borders control,

Removal and readmission:
Recommendations and best practices

February 2002
 EU
Schengen Catalogue

External borders control,

Removal and readmission:
Recommendations and best practices
 PREFACE BY MARIANO RAJOY BREY,
FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR THE INTERIOR OF SPAIN,
PRESIDENT-IN-OFFICE OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Spain, which has held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union since 1 January this
year, is giving priority treatment to the enlargement of the European Union to include the candidate
countries, which is the cornerstone of European integration.

The building of a common area of freedom, security and justice and the creation of the Schengen
area occupy a prominent place in the process of consolidating and strengthening the Union and
raising the profile of its institutions, not only internally in relation to the citizens of Europe, but also
externally, in relation to the candidate countries, enabling them to acquaint themselves with the
legal and institutional framework which constitutes the acquis in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).

In the same effort to clarify and highlight the requirements which the candidate countries will be
called upon to meet on accession, we are presenting to them today, at this Joint Council meeting,
this "Catalogue of recommendations for the correct application of the Schengen acquis and best
practices".

The Catalogue has been drawn up by the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation, at the initiative of
Belgium and with the assistance of experts of various nationalities who have pooled their
knowledge so as to achieve a result which can be pronounced highly commendable. At present the
Catalogue refers exclusively to border control and expulsion and readmission procedures, without
prejudice to the work which successive Presidencies carry out in other fields such as visas,
SIS/SIRENE, police cooperation, etc.

The purpose of the Catalogue is explanatory and it has no legally binding status. It shows, set out in
separate columns, on the one hand, the levels which may be required in order to comply with the
acquis and, on the other, the best practices already being recorded in some of the Member States,
although, however desirable, they are not mandatory at present.

It is with great satisfaction that the Council of the European Union presents this working tool,
which is intended to dispel the uncertainties to which introduction of the Schengen acquis gives rise
in practice. The Spanish Presidency is confident that the Catalogue will constitute an additional
instrument for ensuring the successful integration of the Union's new members in due time and in
the appropriate manner.

Mariano Rajoy Brey

Brussels, 28 February 2002

3
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................7

PART ONE: BORDERS, BORDER SURVEILLANCE AND BORDER CONTROL

A. Integrated border security model (a mechanism of different tiers/filters).............................11

1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................................................11

2. The four tiers.............................................................................................................................................12

3. Key elements for the correct application of the Integrated Border Security Model ..........................16

B. Details of recommendations and best practices ......................................................................18

Recommendations/Best practices .......................................................................................................................18

1. Strategy and organisational structure ....................................................................................................18

2. Infrastructure............................................................................................................................................23

3. Staff............................................................................................................................................................27

4. Training .....................................................................................................................................................28

5. Equipment .................................................................................................................................................30

6. Internal coordination ...............................................................................................................................33

7. Different kinds of international cooperation..........................................................................................34

8. Rules and procedures ...............................................................................................................................36

9. Particular cases for certain types of border ...........................................................................................38

PART TWO: REMOVAL AND READMISSION

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................48

2. Removal measures ....................................................................................................................................49

3. Persons concerned ...................................................................................................................................50

4. Implementation of removal measures.....................................................................................................51

5
 SCHENGEN CATALOGUE

INTRODUCTION

1. At its meeting on 28 May 2001, the Council set as an objective for further work by the
Working Party on Schengen Evaluation the identification of "... best practices, particularly as
regards border controls, so that they can serve as examples for those States acceding to
Schengen but also those fully applying the Schengen acquis. These evaluations and the
identification of best practices shall serve as inspiration for the establishment of standards
defining the minimum application of the Schengen acquis (e.g. essential equipment at each
border post) in the relevant working groups" (mandate for the Working Party on Schengen
Evaluation) (8881/01 – SCH-EVAL 17, COMIX 371).

On the basis of this mandate, the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation worked out the
principles and procedure for drawing up the Catalogue of recommendations for the correct
application of the Schengen acquis and best practices, hereinafter referred to as the Catalogue
of recommendations and best practices, or Catalogue.

The purpose of the Catalogue is to clarify and detail the Schengen acquis and to indicate
recommendations and best practices, in order to provide an example for those States acceding
to Schengen and also those fully applying the Schengen acquis. With this in mind the
Catalogue gives a good indication to the candidate countries for accession to the European
Union (hereinafter referred to as the "EU") (at their request) as to what is expected of them,
particularly in practical terms, regarding Schengen. The aim is not to give an exhaustive
definition of the whole of the Schengen acquis but to put forward recommendations and best
practices in the light of the experience gained by the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation
in verifying the correct application of the Schengen acquis in Germany and in evaluating
Greece and the Nordic countries.

The text of the Catalogue does not seek to introduce new requirements but should also make it
possible to draw the Council's attention to the need where appropriate to amend certain
provisions of the Schengen acquis so that the Commission and, where appropriate, the
Member States take the recommendations and best practices into account when putting
forward proposals or formal initiatives. This exercise is inter alia the first stage of the process
of defining minimum standards by the Council.

7
 Moreover, the Catalogue will serve as a reference tool for future evaluations undertaken in the
candidate countries. It will therefore also serve as an indicator for these countries of the tasks
which they will be assigned and in this respect should be read in conjunction with the
Common Manual.

2. The Working Party on Schengen Evaluation adopted the following definitions to conduct this
exercise:
recommendations: non-exhaustive series of measures which should make it possible to
establish a basis for the correct application of the Schengen acquis and for monitoring it.
best practices: non-exhaustive set of working methods or model measures which must be
considered as the optimal application of the Schengen acquis, it being understood that several
best practices are possible for each specific part of Schengen cooperation.

3. Where the Catalogue mentions the Member States which apply the Schengen acquis, this is
currently to be taken as meaning the thirteen Member States of the EU referred to in Article 1
of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the EU annexed to the
Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community
(hereinafter the "Schengen Protocol"), to which must be added Iceland and Norway, pursuant
to the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union, the Republic of Iceland
and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters' association with the implementation,
application and development of the Schengen acquis, signed on 18 May 1999 (these 15 States
are hereinafter referred to as the "Schengen States").

The United Kingdom and Ireland expressed the wish to participate in certain provisions of the
Schengen acquis. The Council has not yet adopted a decision on Ireland's request to
participate. The arrangements for the United Kingdom's participation were adopted in the
Council Decision of 29 May 2000 (2000/365/EC). The Council has not yet decided on the
implementation of the provisions in question.

The Schengen acquis and the other measures taken by the institutions within the scope of the
acquis are, under Article 8 of the Schengen Protocol, regarded as an acquis which must be
accepted in full by all States candidates for accession.

4. The Schengen acquis was integrated into the EU framework by the Schengen Protocol. The
extent of the acquis is defined in Council Decision 1999/435/EC, published in OJ L 176 of
10 July 1999.

8
 Since its integration into the EU, the Schengen acquis has undergone developments and
amendments which lend it an evolutionary character.
The Schengen acquis has also taken on board the results of the evaluations which have been
conducted within the framework of the Standing Committee for the application and evaluation
of the Schengen acquis, now called the "Working Party on Schengen Evaluation". Under the
Working Party's mandate, reports are submitted to the Council to establish whether the
conditions required for the entry into force of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in a
country wishing to participate in those provisions (or in some of them) have been met and,
secondly, to monitor the correct application of the Schengen acquis by the Schengen States, in
particular by detecting problems and proposing solutions.

5. The current Catalogue deals primarily with the issues of borders and removal. Free
movement as introduced within the territory of the Schengen States (this term and the
expression "Schengen States" refer to the territory of the Schengen States in which the
Schengen acquis applies) is a freedom which as a counterpart requires the strengthening of the
external borders of that area and a policy for the removal of illegally resident aliens which is
effective and dissuasive. The fight against illegal immigration is a major preoccupation for
the whole of the EU. It is indeed this double axiom which guides EU action in this sphere.
Accordingly, the measures adopted in this context seek to strengthen European integration
and in particular to enable the EU to become more rapidly an area of freedom, security and
justice.

6. The Catalogue refers to ideas or concepts connected with the administration of borders, the
terms of which are not uniformly defined or codified in the Schengen States. In the interests
of ease of understanding, the following definitions apply to the terms used:

a. Integrated Border Security Model: name of the system covering all aspects of border
policy. This system is spread over four complementary tiers (filters) which are:
activities in third countries, countries of origin and transit, bilateral and international
cooperation, measures at the external borders and further activities inside the territory.

9
 b. Border Management: this concept covers both the surveillance of borders and checks,
the latter being defined in Article 6 of the Schengen Convention:

• Border checks: checks carried out at authorised crossing points. It should be

noted that checks on persons shall include not only the verification of travel
documents and the other conditions governing entry, residence, work and exit but
also checks to detect and prevent threats to the national security and public policy
of the Schengen States. Such checks shall also be carried out on vehicles and
objects in the possession of persons crossing the border.

• Border surveillance: surveillance carried out between authorised crossing points.

7. In the Catalogue the reader will find the following sections: the Catalogue currently comprises
two main chapters, one on borders and the other on removal. A general section describes the
basic concepts underlying the policy and is followed by recommendations and best practices
presented in tabular form, with recommendations on the left and best practices on the right,
alongside the relevant recommendations. Where one of these recommendations applies only
to one or two types of border this is mentioned in the text.

* * *

10
PART ONE : BORDERS, BORDER SURVEILLANCE AND BORDER CONTROL

A. INTEGRATED BORDER SECURITY MODEL (A MECHANISM OF DIFFERENT

TIERS/FILTERS)

1. INTRODUCTION

An overall border model is an important tool to safeguard internal security and in particular
prevent illegal immigration. It means in simplified terms that a set of complementary
measures has to be implemented on different tiers. In this respect four tiers can be identified.

(1) Activities in third countries, especially in countries of origin and transit, including the
collection of information by liaison officers as well as the key role of the consular post
abroad in the process of issuing visas.

(2) International border cooperation.

(3) Measures at external borders: border management (border checks and border
surveillance).

(4) Further activities inside the territory of the Schengen States and between Schengen
States.

The coherence between these measures and the way they are applied by Schengen States is a
key to the success of the general border model.

11
2. THE FOUR TIERS

2.1. Activities in third countries, in countries of origin and transit

(a) The first measure required in terms of time and place is advice from liaison
officers and document experts in third countries of origin or transit which are the
source of the risks generated by illegal immigration (Article 47 (4) of the 1990
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (hereafter the "Schengen
Convention") and SCH/Com-ex (98) 59 rev). Officials working abroad for the
Schengen States' consular posts and carriers will be trained by specialists in order
to detect document forgeries before actual travel has started.

When visas are issued and when passengers are transported by air and sea, it is of
great importance to detect false and falsified documents in order to prevent
unauthorised entry into the territory of the Schengen States. The training given by
document advisers makes a vital contribution to the detection of such forgeries by
officials working for the Schengen States' consular posts and for carriers.

(b) In the second stage, a thorough inspection of the application documents submitted
should be carried out by the Schengen States' consular representations when
issuing visas (see Articles 15 and 17 of the Schengen Convention and the
provisions of the Common Consular Instructions on Visas). This includes
inspecting documents and making database queries pursuant to Article 96 of the
Schengen Convention. Consulates should guarantee that sensitive information
and blank documents are adequately protected and stored.

The systematic implementation of EC/Schengen visa regulations should enable

the phenomenon of illegal immigration to be effectively tackled at its roots. The
importance of intensive consular cooperation should be stressed in that context.

12
 (c) Carriers are also obliged pursuant to national legislation on the basis of
Article 26(1)(b) of the Schengen Convention to take all necessary measures to
ensure that third-country nationals carried by air, sea or land, (see Article 26(3) of
the Schengen Convention), have the travel documents necessary for entry into the
territory of the Schengen States. If third-country nationals are set down in a
Schengen State without the prescribed documents, the carriers will be subject to
sanctions and compelled in principle to take back those passengers. Staff of
carriers should be trained. This article of the Schengen Convention has been
supplemented by Directive 2001/51/EC of 28 June 2001 – L 187, 10.7.2001,
p. 45.

2.2. Bilateral and international border Cooperation

(a) International co-operation in the field of border security can be divided into
multilateral, bilateral and local cooperation. In this respect, agreements with
neighbouring countries on the cooperation in the field of border management are
an efficient tool to increase border security. This can be realised by establishing
appropriate working mechanisms such as exchange of information, establishing
appropriate communication channels, local contact points, emergency procedures,
handling incidents in an objective manner in order to avoid political disputes, etc.

Regional cooperation structures across external borders should also be established

in sea areas. These initiatives should bring together all countries in the region.

(b) As regards cooperation with adjacent states, it is considered necessary that transit
states lend their active assistance by ensuring that their borders are thoroughly
secure and by taking measures away from the border, i.e. consistent repatriation
practice – if there is no right of admission and there are no impediments based on
serious humanitarian grounds or international law (e.g. the Geneva Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees, European Convention on Human Rights).

13
2.3. Measures at the external borders

The core area of general border strategy is a functioning border management consisting
of border checks and border surveillance, based on a risk analysis. Article 6 of the
Schengen Convention sets out clearly the framework to be implemented by the
Common Manual, the two being complementary. Essential elements of border
management are: (1) that all persons crossing the external borders are checked
systematically and (2) effective border surveillance is ensured between border crossing
points.

In this respect all appropriate measures should be taken in order to safeguard internal
security and prevent illegal immigration:

Coherent legislation based on the EC/Schengen requirements in the area of border

management is needed (for example: border guard act, data protection rules). With
regard to infrastructure, appropriate facilities for carrying out border checks and
surveillance have to be available. Officials carrying these tasks have to be professional
and specially trained. Adequate human resources are required. Exact requirements
depend on several factors (geographical situation, volume of border traffic, etc.).
Moreover, a clear concept of training (basic and further) is required covering
operational skills, knowledge of legislation, languages, etc.

Equipment should be appropriate to the border situation. Functioning internal

coordination is needed at all levels (which authorities are competent for which task, no
competence "black holes"). Information exchange between competent authorities
(border guard, customs, police, judicial authorities, prosecutors) is essential, including a
mechanism to solve possible disputes of competence between the authorities.
Furthermore, operational issues should be covered (for example use of compatible
communication equipment).

14
 Agreed international/bilateral cooperation should be implemented in practice on the
spot (examples: exchange of information, joint controls, handling of readmission
situations). The special requirements for the three different types of border (air,
sea, land) should be fulfilled (for example: at airports a separation of passenger flows –
extra Schengen and intra Schengen flights – should be made by physical means or, for
minor airports, by a systematically monitored and accompanied flow of passengers).

2.4. Further activities inside the territory of the Schengen States

(a) Measures to prevent illegal immigration and cross-border crime should be pursued
inside the territory of the Schengen States by enhanced search, checks and
surveillance measures based on national information and in accordance with
national law, where possible on the basis of police cooperation agreements
pursuant to Article 39(4) and (5) of the Schengen Convention. Given that the
problems of migration and crime are not subject to geographical restrictions,
international traffic routes should in future become main areas of activity for
national police forces in accordance with domestic law. However, where public
policy or national security so require, a Schengen State may, after consulting the
other Schengen States, decide that for a limited period national border checks
appropriate to the situation shall be carried out at internal borders.

(b) The last stage in the geographical and time sequence is repatriation in accordance
with national law (see Article 23 of the Schengen Convention and Directive
2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 - L 149, 2.6.2001, p. 34) of third-country nationals
who have entered the Schengen territory without authorisation, if no right to stay
exists and if there are no obstacles based on compelling humanitarian grounds or
international law (e.g. the Geneva Convention on Refugees, European Convention
on Human Rights).

15
3. KEY ELEMENTS FOR THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE INTEGRATED BORDER SECURITY
MODEL

Emphasis should be placed on the coordination of duties between the responsible government
bodies in dealing with information, reports and training and in responding to irregularities.
Coordination in these fields should extend to regional and local levels too.

Another key element of the method is to pay attention to the assessment of the situation.
Thus, the performance of a border management system should be adjusted in accordance with
the prevailing conditions along all its borders. Valid and reliable data should form part of a
permanent evaluation which could be shared by other Schengen States. Where necessary, the
allocation of resources should be adapted accordingly.

As a general rule, persons performing border police duties should be specialised trained
professionals. Persons with less experience can be used only for auxiliary duties assisting
professionals temporarily. No exception is allowed in respect of duties that require any use of
personal data, making searches in confidential registers or decisions interfering with an
individual's physical integrity or freedom.

To facilitate mutual trust, any Schengen State should be able to provide valid and reliable data
concerning the situation at all its borders and also the border checks and surveillance
measures applied. Knowledge of the situation at the border relies on knowledge of the
performance of border management systems. Reliable estimates concerning border checks
and surveillance measures should be based, among other things, on complete knowledge of
regional and local circumstances. To attain the above aims and to facilitate cost-effective use
of resources, various methodologies should be applied at the borders. Terms such as risk
analysis, intelligence, data-flow management, situational awareness, reaction capability and
information exchange with other Schengen States can be used when evaluating and
developing these methods.

16
Risk analysis can be seen as a tool for optimisation of border management and a way of
providing reliable information on the border situation. It should be adapted to the type of
borders.

At practical level this means evaluation of the persons, vehicles, vessels or flights to be
checked. This evaluation is made in the context of a real time tactical situation and thus the
methods can be called tactical risk analysis. At the external border, all persons should be
checked according to the Common Manual. To detect cross-border crime, extra emphasis
should be placed on the checking procedure for suspect objects. Personnel should be
provided with knowledge of risk indicators, risk profiles and typical modi operandi of
cross-border crime. Named special targets of surveillance and checks should also be known
to personnel. The risk analysis and management of borders need to be backed by systematic
intelligence. Border management systems should be able to gather intelligence, analyse it
and, finally, utilise the products in field work.

To have a realistic picture of prevailing irregularities for the purposes of medium and
long-term operative management, estimates should be made of:

● the level of risk defined by the authorities in respect of illegal crossing of the border
● the level of detected irregularities
● the level of estimated undetected irregularities.

This is to ensure that resources will be allocated optimally along the border in order to
maintain a reasonable risk level in respect of illegal crossing of the border. Further, at all
managerial levels, the management system should be evaluated in order to find out
shortcomings or gaps in the system. These exist where a border can predictably be crossed
illegally with very low risk or no risk at all.

17
B. DETAILS OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES

RECOMMENDATIONS/BEST PRACTICES

Recommendations Best practices

1 Strategy and organisational structure

1.1 general strategy for border

management + risk assessment

- establishing a national plan defining the

steps to be taken in the countries of
origin and transit, at external Schengen
borders and inside the individual
Schengen States

- border management is a task which

requires a high level of professionalism

- streamlined and functional ministerial

competences for border management.
Centralised supervision and instructions
for border checks and surveillance
under the auspices of a ministry - the competent public authority is a
working in the field of justice and home specialised Police/Border Guard force
affairs. (not a military force)

- effective border management is ensured - border checks and surveillance should be

by supplementing strategy with executed by professional officials of the
technology, equipment and staff; same administration organising border
mobile and stationary, airborne or on management if possible under a single
land/sea, uniformed or plain clothed. national ministry.

18
Recommendations Best practices
- permanent analysis determines the
allocation of personnel and technical
resources;

- an evaluation is to be made to ensure

that border management matches the
requirements of Article 6 of the
Schengen Convention and to consider
whether border management has to be
adapted. Article 7 requires exchange of
all relevant information.

- at international level border

management should be governed by
bilateral agreements

These agreements/Acts should cover the

- cooperation and coordination of the
whole spectrum of cross-border cooperation,
responsibilities of the different bodies
i.e. joint risk analysis, exchange of
should be regulated by an official Act
experience, cooperation on training,
cooperation on investigation
1.2 Intelligence and data-flow
management

- a two-way information exchange A secure database is established to exchange

should be arranged between central and experience between units and to distribute

local levels of the border management information on intelligence objects. This

authority. database is available for use in border

management.
- the local authorities should be
instructed to gather information on For specified analysis and exchange of
illegal immigration and other cross- information, a network of intelligence liaison
border irregularities, analyse it locally, officers is established to connect different
and pass it on to central level. units and different organisational levels.

19
Recommendations Best practices
- the central level should compile all
information country-wide, process it
into usable form and deliver it to local
authorities to be used as a tool for
tactical risk analysis and operational
planning.

- data-flow management can be used as a Information in the intelligence database is

means of evaluating the effectiveness of hidden, until a specific inquiry is made. The
information exchange within and right to make searches is controlled by a
between authorities involved in border supervisory unit.
management. Availability of and
access to vital data and data protection
are also elements to be evaluated.

1.3 regional or local strategy

- where appropriate, establish regional

plans based on risk assessment

intensive cooperation between all law

enforcement agencies in the national
border region

- cooperation with law enforcement

agencies of neighbouring states

- reception of information from the - creating access points for information

population should be encouraged and from and to the public (Internet, etc.)
transformed into risk analysis and
operational activities if necessary

20
Recommendations Best practices
1.4 organisational (functional) structure

- coordination of all activities at central, - creating a local and regional

regional and local levels coordination mechanism or organisation

- establishing capabilities to fight - establishing specialised

successfully against illegal crossing of officers/teams/units to fight illegal
the border crossing of the border crime at different
levels if needed
- the organisation should provide highly
specialised services required for border - the organisational structure provides for
checks/surveillance - for example on a specialised officer for false and
false documents falsified documents and one with the
necessary linguistic skills to be available
on every shift or at every border crossing
- specify a lapse of time within which the point (hereafter "BCP")
squad should reach the border in the
event of an alarm

1.5 availability and permanency

- depending on the situation, ensure

availability and permanency of staff

1.6 Situational awareness and reaction

capability

In green and blue border management, terms At land borders, the border is subject to
of situational awareness and reaction constant monitoring (human or technical
capability can be used to define the level of devices). Where this is not feasible,
risk to be confronted with illegal border specialised sniffer dogs may extend
crossings. surveillance time. The dogs should not be
Situational awareness measures how the aggressive or uncontrolled when meeting

21
Recommendations Best practices
authorities are capable of detecting illegal border crossers.
cross-border movements and finding
reasoned grounds for control measures.
In practice, situational awareness depicts how
the authorities define the lapse of time and At sea a VTMIS (or compatible) system
area for three functions: covers the entire maritime area and ports
- detecting movements that could under evaluation. All vessels are detected
possibly be attempts to cross the border and identified by the system. Once
illegally identified, a vessel remains constantly known
- identifying the detected targets by the system. The system is backed up by
- analysing the previous identifications in offshore craft and airplanes. These mobile
due time units make close identification, fill in gaps
and retrieve information from outside the
system. At ports, based on a risk analysis,
the port area may be fenced off and
monitored constantly. In such cases all
persons entering or leaving the port area are
checked.

- deploy stand-by squads

At sea, constant readiness to dispatch a

mobile unit, in order to maintain any vessel
The reaction capability at sea or land trying to reach the coast under constant
measures the lapse of time required to reach surveillance.
any cross-border movement to be controlled
and also the time and the means to react
adequately to unusual circumstances. The
latter also applies also to the situation at
airports.

22
Recommendations Best practices
2 Infrastructure

2.1 entrance and exit checks

- facilities should be in place to carry out

the compulsory entrance and exit
checks.

- at land borders, entering and exiting

cross-border traffic of all kinds should
be separated. This applies also to sea
borders between the vessel and the
border checks.

2.2 organisation of border surveillance

- border surveillance can be carried out

by human resources (supported by
technical means) or mainly by highly
sophisticated man-operated techniques.
To ensure efficiency, the means are
adapted to the density of population,
number of personnel, equipment and
migration risk.

- deployment and spread of infrastructure

facilities (buildings, etc.) adapted to
mobility, number of staff, regional
traffic infrastructure and migration risk

23
Recommendations Best practices
2.3 organisation of the border crossing
point

- exchange of information with the - building BCP installations with the

neighbouring country on building a neighbouring country in a coordinated
BCP, aiming at a certain degree of way to achieve adequacy of means
coordination (land) (dimensions, lanes, installations) (land)

- constructing border crossing points,

using common experience among
Schengen States, depending on regional - signposts to provide information for
conditions, in perhaps two versions, one users in different languages (depending
large model and another a small BCP. on type of BCP and neighbouring
Travellers should be made familiar with country) or by internationally used
similar procedures drawings (pictograms)

- the delimitation of the BCP and the - a fence around the BCP (land)
applicable regulations should be readily
visible to all

- border checks to be carried out in

special control booths or at desks or, - these installations to be provided to all
where appropriate, with mobile relevant national services/authorities
equipment.

- inside buildings special dedicated desks

or booths shall be provided for the
different tasks and be built accordingly

24
Recommendations Best practices
Outside buildings, control booths
containing the necessary equipment

- unauthorised observation (especially of

computer systems) should be prevented - control booth from which officers can
oversee the queue of passengers waiting
- to define standardised criteria for the
manufacture of control booths (having
regard to security; technical equipment)

- control booth should be facing the

passengers (air, sea)

- communication

a suitable communication system

should provide instant information on
each important situation at any time for
all units

2.4 separation of passenger flows

Structure

Separation at ports

Ferry passengers to be separated so that

external border traffic can never mix with
internal traffic between the vessel and the
border check. As a general rule, this must be
guaranteed by means of physical fixtures
(walls, fences, etc.). In minor ports with only
a limited amount of passengers, constructions
can be supplemented by surveillance.

25
Recommendations Best practices

Separation at airports

Airports should be (re-)arranged in order to Separate terminals for Schengen and

avoid the possibility of persons or documents, non-Schengen traffic
passing from the non-Schengen zone to the Separate and dedicated levels for Schengen
Schengen-zone and vice-versa by physical and non-Schengen traffic
separation. Watertightness may be obtained by walls,
glass, metal grid, ..., reaching from the floor
to the ceiling

- checks at the gate for high-risk flights

Aerodromes where the volume of traffic

allows to do so may separate flows by
organising systematically monitored and
accompanied flow of passengers.

Procedures

Identify Schengen and non-Schengen flights

Cooperate as closely as possible with third Monitor the flights accordingly through a real
parties at airports, with special attention to time system, agreed upon with the civil
connecting flights aviation authority

Provide the necessary information in due time Plan buses for transporting passengers from
for the border management authorities. remote parking areas to the dedicated area of
Establish a link with the flight aviation the airport.
information system

26
Recommendations Best practices
2.5 lanes for checks

Separation between (a) EU and EEA - separate lanes for checks on EEA
nationals and (b) non-EU/non-EEA nationals nationals, for third-country residents and,
(airports and sea) depending on the situation, a third lane
for citizens of the neighbouring country
Number and capacity of lanes should fulfil can be provided in order to facilitate
the need for fluid and quick but traffic. Where possible adapt the
Schengen-compliant checks and surveillance situation to the required checks on EEA
and non-EEA nationals.
- hand-in-hand management of traffic
flows by all competent authorities of Lanes must be marked clearly for use of
both neighbouring States. travellers (private cars, pedestrians, lorries,
buses, CD/CC if necessary. Markings may be
- flexible organisation of lanes for checks adapted to needs in a flexible way.
and securing a quick and effective
reaction. Separate lanes for the
different types of traffic crossing the
border

- organisation of border checks with

priority on entry into the State

3 Staff

3.1 Adequacy

- effective border checks and surveillance - study comparable situations in other

require that the number of staff must be Schengen States which could serve as an
adapted to risk assessment, based on example
analysis

3.2 selection criteria for recruiting new

staff

27
Recommendations Best practices

- written rules for recruiting new staff

- physical suitability
- meet moral and legal requirements
(criminal (judicial, legal) records, etc.)

3.3 professionalism

- high level of professionalism based on

successfully completed training. (The
requirements for this topic are
presented under "Training", see 1.4)

- provide for regular evaluation in which

e.g. job satisfaction, effectiveness,
social conditions and liability are
measured - provision for rotation of staff. This is
considered most useful at the beginning of
the career for reasons of effectiveness

4 Training

4.1 basic training

Operational staff should have successfully

completed a training course covering their
future tasks, which should include:

- knowledge of relevant Schengen and

EC/EU provisions
- basic rules and procedures - programmes should adapt flexibly to risk
- document checks (valid, falsified assessment
documents)
- rules for entry, stay and exit

28
Recommendations Best practices
- coordination and cooperation with other
agencies
- special cooperation between Schengen
States in the internal border zone
(Dublin, readmission, etc.)
- police cooperation
- Schengen Information System
- judicial cooperation

4.2 further continuing education

- a training programme must be The organisation should provide programmes

established with a regular training/briefing and facilities at central and local level to
hours for officers as part of working hours accompany officers during their career by
offering them education and training on
issues which are relevant to their work
4.3 linguistic training

- ability to speak a foreign language encourage staff to learn other languages

useful for their work necessary for their work, languages of the
neighbouring countries or the countries of
origin

4.4 specialised technical training

counterfeits and forgeries

- specialised training in recognising false Specialist officers should train officers at all
travel documents BCPs

4.5 Specialised training for management - international experience of a similar

levels responsibility is an asset
- participation in the CEPOL training
programme will in future be advisable

29
Recommendations Best practices
5 Equipment

5.1 Recommended equipment

5.1.1. Introduction

The following paragraphs will mention

equipment which is deemed necessary and
should be permanently optimised in the first
line and additional requirements in the second
line, in trains as well as mobile equipment. It
should be stressed that SIS connection and
stamps are considered to be key equipment

5.1.2. In the first line:

Upon entry and exit at the BCPs access to the

following equipment should be provided:
- terminal for consulting SIS and national
systems. There will be mobile
terminals at ground checks on Car numberplate imaging system
passengers in vehicles in sea ports with - truck scanning facility
ferry traffic and in airports with limited - radioactivity sensors
traffic; otherwise fixed terminals. - mobile/stationary X-ray machine
- document examination instrument, with
UV light, white overhead light,
transmitted light, etc.
- magnifying glass x 8/10
- retro-reflective lamp Number of stamps should be listed for the
- stamps. Pursuant to the Common different officers
Manual, Schengen entry and exit
stamps will be provided to all BCPs.
Information on lost or stolen stamps
must be given as quickly as possible to

30
Recommendations Best practices
Schengen States

5.1.3. For in-depth checks in the

second line

Questioned Document Examination System

for authentication of travel documents with
infrared and ultraviolet light, filters, etc. - image transmitting device

- stereo magnifying glass, for example

x 40
- identification equipment and material
(including template to compare stamps)
- Common Manual - availability by electronic means of the
- handbook containing genuine and false Common Manual
passports and ID documents
- availability by electronic means of
communications equipment images of genuine, false/falsified
documents
- availability of sets and telephones to
communicate during border checks to
consulates or other authorities in the
Schengen States

5.1.4. Mobile equipment

Mobile equipment should be used at border

crossing points where there are no fixed
positions. The mobile equipment should
contain:
- hand-lamp with UV light
- mini-microscope x 30
- magnifying glass x 8/10
- retro-reflective lamp (3M.laminate)

31
Recommendations Best practices
- hand-lamp for overhead light,
transmitted light (Mini Maglite or
similar)
- template to compare stamps, etc.
- stable access to SIS should be provided - mobile SIS terminal
- mobile document readable device

5.2 Border surveillance

Observation and detection material which

provides adequate surveillance of terrain in A highly centralised technical surveillance
all seasons and weather conditions (day and system that detects and identifies (camera)
night) the target and enables immediate reaction
(patrol). The system is based on sensor fields
that consist of different types of sensors
(stable and portable) such as active and
passive IR-beams, radars, cameras, seismic
sensors, etc. The sensor fields and/or
individual sensors are installed in accordance
with the existing local situation. The system
itself is controlled centrally with or by a
computer in the OP centre that is capable of
commanding and controlling active patrols
and requesting reinforcements when
necessary.

thermographic cameras (portable, stationary

and/or vehicle-based)
binoculars, short and long-range versions

depending on the local situation, compatible

devices based on radio transmission,
telephone system and/or data connection are
advisable with the neighbouring country

32
Recommendations Best practices
5.3 Transportation/Mobility

Providing transportation depending on local

infrastructure, regional conditions (weather,
topographic situation, density of population)
manpower and migration flows

Transportation services should be available

day and night

5.4 Communication and encryption

Make provision for procedures for secured

communications between services

6 Internal coordination

- coordination between different

national services
(police-customs-border guard,
transportation authorities)
- direct and immediate interchange of - meeting between heads of services, at all
information between BCPs and border levels especially at international airports,
surveillance force regular meetings between heads of
services, including airport authorities
and civil aviation authorities
- joint database
- joint risk analysis
- joint training
- integrated approach involving all
authorities for tackling the problems of
illegal immigration
agree on a decision-taking mechanism
at the appropriate level

33
Recommendations Best practices
common operations with joint
leadership

7 Different kinds of international

cooperation

According to the type of borders (land, sea,

air) international cooperation can be shaped
through bilateral or multilateral agreements,
regional cooperation, liaison officers and
networks as well as transportation authorities.
These agreements should preferably be
concluded in a written form.

7.1.1 At international level,

border management should be regulated
in bilateral agreements (land borders)

7.1.2 information exchange with

other Schengen States on maritime
borders (sea)

7.1.3 information exchange with

the immigration authorities at the
airport of origin/transfer - Document advisors/Liaison officers to
detect false or falsified documents in the
consulate or airports of origin and transit (cfr.
SCH/Com-ex (98) 59 rev)

Participation in the IATA Control Authority

Working Group
Build up a working group of specialised
immigration officers at the main international
airports for tackling illegal immigration by

34
Recommendations Best practices
air.

In order to allow a better cooperation and a

better exchange of information between the
Border Guard services and the air travel
companies, as well the services that have to
ensure the security of the air space it is
advisable that Airport Border Guard Units
participate in the ECFALIS system
(European Civil Aviation Conference
Facilitation Information System on Illegal
Immigration). In this context, it must be
stressed that all information with police
interest should be diffused to friendly
agencies after sensitive or classified items
have been erased.

7.2 Regional cooperation

support the neighbouring border
authority through exchanging
information and transmitting facts of
interest to it.

7.3 Liaison Officers

establishment of a liaison office for the - cooperation between liaison officers

exchange of information
on the basis of conventions or national Nordic cooperation between liaison officers
law could serve as an example for a future
network.

35
Recommendations Best practices
Use of EISICS is seen as a meaningful
practice.

8 Rules and procedures

8.1 General aspects

It should be stated that entry and exit checks

are to be performed systematically.
Exceptions to border checks are possible only
under special circumstances (this applies only
at sea and land borders)
National legislation to allow the relevant
authorities for border checks and surveillance
the legal possibility of patrolling, surveying
and investigating border-related crime,
without limiting it to the close border area

8.2 Rules for minor border traffic

Bilateral agreements are the basis of minor

border traffic between neighbouring
countries; in any event, information should be
communicated to other Schengen States.

8.3 Rules for issuing visas at the border

(B and C visas)

Visas should in principle be issued at • decision to be made by a senior officer

consulates. Only in exceptional or official of a higher authority
circumstances may they be issued at BCPs.
There should be a general manual valid for all In addition to the compulsory use of SIS and
BCPs describing the steps to be carried out the national database, recourse should be had

36
Recommendations Best practices
for a visa to be issued at the BCP. to information from other services

all available national and Schengen State

information should be used to make a proper
decision

the decision and the major reasons underlying

it should be placed on file

necessary contacts and participation

involving other Schengen States to be carried
through in a standardised way

8.4 Seamen in transit

The rules applicable for seamen in transit are
described in Schengen Com-ex decision
(96) 27

Operational aspects of fighting

cross-border crime

The operational dimension in fighting

cross-border crime is important in border
management.

It is therefore important to have legislation set up specialised multidisciplinary units for

which affords all relevant authorities fighting border-related crime

37
Recommendations Best practices
(Border Guard, police, customs, judiciary,
etc.) the legal possibility of preventing and
detecting border related crime, without
limiting it to the close border area.

Schengen States should describe the

framework they have adopted to fight
cross-border crime, which:

- should be based on an analysis of the

different types of crime and

- should include an overview of all relevant

factors, such as personnel, equipment and
training as well as cooperation between
national and international services

9 Particular cases for certain types of

border

9.1 Maritime borders

9.1.1 Risk analysis

The volume of vessel movement is usually VTMIS or similar system is used to cover
high in relation to the resources available for large maritime areas, where all major traffic
checks. Tactical risk analysis is therefore remains as identified targets. The authority
essential at blue border surveillance to meet responsible for maritime border police duties
the demands set out under the Common has real-time access to VTMIS. For details, it
Manual Part II, point 2.2. Vessel movements is referred to the best practice described under
should be monitored and vessels identified. 1.1.6. "Situational awareness and reaction
Identifications (names of vessels) should be capability"
checked against background information

38
Recommendations Best practices
containing knowledge on risky vessels. The
level of checks on each particular vessel
should be decided according to this reference.
The same procedure should be applied to
crew and passenger lists.
The command with operative responsibility
for a defined area should maintain reasonable
risk levels against known or possibly
prevailing irregularities. This should take
place in all areas and on all flows of traffic.
To this end, the performance of border
management authorities' duties should be
adjusted in accordance with fresh knowledge
of risk factors. This basically concerns
medium-term planning in the operational
command. Medium-term methods of
evaluating the situation and adjusting
countermeasures can be called operative risk
analysis.

The operational command should have a

realistic picture of prevailing irregularities in
the area of responsibility. To that end,
figures or estimates should be arrived at for
the following:

• type and volume of all vessel movements

between the open sea and coast
• volume of actual checks directed at
different types of vessel movement
• (based on above) the level of risk of being
caught illegally crossing a border Formalise where possible cooperation with

• volume and type of detected irregularities carriers in Memoranda of Understanding or in

Agreements

39
Recommendations Best practices
• volume and type of estimated undetected
irregularities.

Cooperation with third parties

Cooperation with all type of carriers should
be strengthened

9.1.2 Cargo ships

100% administrative checks should be carried Participation in the EISICS system

out in advance. Based on these checks and
available intelligence, a risk analysis should
be made. High-risk vessels to be checked
physically, immediately upon arrival.
Control duties consisting of face-to-face
checks of persons on board and/or physical
search of ship.

If information concerning the crew and

passengers is not available in advance, the
ship should be physically met immediately
upon arrival.

Passengers should always be checked face to

face.

In cases of special risk, vessel to remain

under constant control of authorities during
its stay in a Schengen port. All persons
boarding and leaving the ship to be checked
face to face. Information on high-risk vessels
to be relayed to the ship's next Schengen port
of destination through the CIREFI
early-warning system.

40
Recommendations Best practices
9.1.3 Cruise ships

In principle, the Schengen acquis requires a

face-to-face check to be made for all
passengers on board cruise ships at first and
last port of entry. As a general rule, the
passenger must meet all necessary entry or
exit preconditions. However, the regulations
concerning special circumstances will
warrant a lower level of checks if:
• there is a very large number of passengers
on board,
• only limited time is available for checks,
and
• there are good grounds for believing the
vessel with its passengers to be low-risk.

Under these conditions, administrative checks

only in the first and last Schengen port are
acceptable. This requires, at the very least,
that an SIS query is made on third-country
nationals and their passports stamped.

If the check shows on-board persons to be

refused entry to the Schengen territory,
special measures are necessary and in the
mutual interests of Schengen States and
shipping companies. The authorities should
ensure that the person remains on board and
leaves the port on the vessel. Information on
such persons should be relayed to the next
Schengen port of destination of the ship,
where a similar procedure will apply.

41
Recommendations Best practices
If a cruise ship is a risk in terms of illegal
crossing of the external border, special
measures are necessary and in the mutual
interests of Schengen States. Such a vessel
should remain under constant control by the
authorities during its stay in a Schengen port.
All persons boarding and leaving the ship
should be checked face to face. In order to
embark or disembark, each passenger should
meet all necessary preconditions of entry or
exit. Information on such ships should be
relayed to the next Schengen port of
destination of the ship, through the CIREFI
early warning system. In the next port, a
similar procedure will apply.

The lighter checks described above should in

no way prevent authorities from carrying out
more thorough checks anywhere in
subsequent ports.

Cruise passengers should hold a visa

complying with the same rules as other
persons when entering the Schengen territory.

9.1.4 Fishing vessels

Monitoring should be carried out to ensure Exchange of information is arranged between

that fishing vessels coming from third Schengen States and neighbouring third
countries follow the correct procedure. states. The third state reports inter alia
vessels that are leaving its territory and,
The Schengen acquis allows administrative especially, boats that have avoided exit
checks on crew members, if they can be checks when leaving Schengen territory.
regarded as seamen. Nevertheless, recourse

42
Recommendations Best practices
should be had to face-to-face checks and/or
physical search of the vessel whenever
deemed necessary by risk analysis.

In addition, coastal fisheries mentioned in the

Common Manual, Part II, point 3.4.4.4
should be checked occasionally in accordance
with proper risk analysis.

9.1.5 Pleasure boats

Monitoring should be carried out to ensure Exchange of information is arranged between

that pleasure boats coming from third Schengen States and neighbouring third
countries follow the correct procedure. states. The third state reports inter alia boats
that are leaving its territory and, especially,
boats that have avoided exit checks when
leaving the Schengen territory.

9.1.6 Ships with a large number of

illegal immigrants on board

Emergency plans should be set in place to A government body is nominated for inter-
handle ships with a large number of illegal ministerial and inter-agency coordination.
immigrants on board, covering the following This body possesses the necessary parallel
aspects: representative sub-bodies at regional and
• apprehending the persons responsible for local levels to facilitate coordination and the
illegal transportation with a view to clear division of responsibilities. Adequate
further judicial measures powers and resources are made available to
• apprehending all persons on board in this structure and especially to those regional
order to take responsibility for the bodies responsible for carrying out physical
immigrants with a view to repatriation measures.
and in order to guarantee their health and
This structure is held in readiness to facilitate

43
Recommendations Best practices
protection rights implementation of recommended practice.
• relaying information on high-risk vessels
to other Schengen States by EISICS and Local and regional authorities maintain
the CIREFI early warning system consistent plans for their participation and
cooperation. These plans are regularly tested
and developed as instructed by the
government coordinating body.

9.1.7 Stowaways

In order to combat the phenomenon of

stowaways, authorities should adopt
preventive measures against unauthorised
boarding/leaving of ships.

9.1.8 Fake crews

In order to combat fake crews as a means of

illegal entry, authorities should carry out
intelligence operations, exchanges of
information, investigative measures and
prosecution.

9.1.9 Seamen's identity document

When issuing seamen´s identity documents, The security features of the document are as
close attention should be paid to the security for national passports.
features of the document.

9.1.10 Transiting seamen

Under the acquis, the captain or the The captain or the shipowner's agent should
shipowner's agent should inform the inform the border management authorities as

44
Recommendations Best practices
authorities in charge of border management at soon as possible and always at least three
the port of entry of the arrival of seamen in days prior to the arrival of the seamen, in
need of a transit visa and any other changes in order to expedite procedures for issuing
crew composition. transit visas.

The border management authorities should A unit on duty 24 hours a day will be set up
check the accuracy of the data provided by to give swift, coordinated answers to requests
the captain or the shipowner´s agent. for transit visas for seamen made at the
border.
The authorities can issue transit visas to
seamen only after careful verification of the
data provided by the shipowner and
confirmation by the authorities of the place
where the ship is moored or is expected to
moor .

9.1.11 EISICS

Vessels and their crew and passengers should All Schengen States should join the EISICS
be thoroughly checked in the first port of system, which should be computerised, in
arrival in the Schengen territory. If the order to ensure that information is protected
vessel's next stop will also be in a port of a and sent on quickly to the relevant border
Schengen State using the EISICS system, management authority.
then the border management authority of the
first Schengen State should, when the vessel
is leaving that state, fax the EISICS form to
the next port. The EISICS form should list
all the relevant information gathered by the
border management authority on the vessel.
The border checks in the next port can be less
thorough, based on the information received
in the EISICS form.

45
Recommendations Best practices
Electronic data interchange
Schengen States should encourage the use of
electronic data interchange (EDI) at their
maritime borders. Electronic data, inter alia
to identify crew members, passengers,
stowaways – as well as their travel
documents – on board a vessel, transferred in
good time, should act as a binding substitute
for all paper documents in use at the border of
a Schengen State.

Use of EDI should be facilitated by

harmonising and standardising legislation on
binding force or consequences. Border
authorities of the Schengen port where a
vessel is leaving its berth should transfer the
updated electronic data in good time to the
authorities of the next Schengen port of
destination.

9.2 Air borders

9.2.1 Crews
Crews should be checked systematically have a special facility for priority checks on
crews
9.2.2 Cargo flights

Systematic check should also be applied for officers should go to cargo flights to meet the
crews of cargo flights staff

9.2.3 Procedure for transit passengers

(airport )
A separate transit area for non-Schengen Possibility to perform checks in the
passengers should be available (international) transit zone

46
Recommendations Best practices

9.2.4 General aviation

----------- -----------

9.3 Checking of trains

Trains should be under proper and continuous Trains should be under continuous
surveillance from border to border check surveillance from border to border check
point. Actual border checks may be carried point (e.g. patrols, technical surveillance,
out on the moving train, or at the railway video).
station either on board the train or in the fixed Platform area for external traffic trains to be
premises used specifically for those purposes. physically separated from internal traffic
Border management authorities should have ones. Possibilities of avoiding border checks
effective tools to check travel documents and should be prevented and arrival area should
consult online databases at their disposal in be under proper control.
all cases. All passengers and crew (and train) Pre-frontier checks together with border
should be checked according to Schengen authorities of neighbouring third countries
rules (Art. 6 of the Schengen Convention). may be effective, if the relevant jurisdictional
requirements are met and reciprocal trust
exists between (a) neighbouring countries
and (b) between the Schengen partners.
Agree on cooperation with train carriers.
This cooperation should, where appropriate,
be formalised by providing a list of
passengers to border authorities in good time
beforehand.

mobile SIS equipment on trains (checks

before crossing the border and on hotspots)

47
PART TWO: REMOVAL AND READMISSION

1. INTRODUCTION

The fight against illegal immigration is a major concern for all the Member States of the Union.
Freedom of movement within the Schengen territory requires a corresponding reinforcement of the
external borders around that territory, and an effective and dissuasive policy on the removal of
illegal aliens.

Article 23(1) of the Schengen Convention states that third-country nationals (ie non-EU and
non-EEA nationals) who do not fulfil or who no longer fulfil the short-stay conditions applicable
within the territory of a Schengen State shall normally be required to leave the territories of the
Schengen States immediately. When departure is not voluntary, or if the immediate departure of
the third-country national is necessary for reasons of national security or public order, removal is to
be carried out in accordance with the national law of the Schengen State in which he was
apprehended.

Thus, while the Schengen Convention clearly states the need for removal, the Schengen acquis on
the subject is very limited as the Schengen States are free to define the circumstances and
implementation of such measures.

Some harmonisation of legislation has taken place in the context of Directive 2001/40/EC, cited
above, on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third-country nationals, the aim of
which is to ensure more effective enforcement of these measures and better cooperation between
Member States.

The method used to draw up the document was firstly to establish a snapshot of existing national
practices and then to choose from this range those practices which seemed to be moving in the
direction of greater effectiveness. The list thus drawn up is indicative and non-exhaustive.

48
RECOMMENDATIONS BEST PRACTICES

2. REMOVAL MEASURES

These should comply with the rule of law and Effective removal from the territory.
be based on law. To achieve this, combine the measure, if
appropriate, with a ban on the third-country
These should be adopted in compliance with national returning to the territory for a
the provisions laid down in: sufficiently long period and incorporated into
the SIS in order to be dissuasive.

– the European Convention on Human Failure to comply with a ban on returning to

Rights of 4 November 1950, the territory could incur sanctions.

– the United Nations Convention against

Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10
December 1984,

– the Geneva Convention relating to the

Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 and the
Protocol of 31 January 1967,

– the International Convention on the Rights

of the Child of 20 November 1989,

– the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the

European Union of 13-14 October 2000.

− Objective: To achieve the return of the

third-country national subject to the
measure to his country of origin or to a
country which will admit him.

49
− Two types of decision:

− Administrative based on:

the failure to comply with rules on entry or

residence of third-country nationals,

a threat to public order or national security.

− Administrative or judicial sanction

in connection with criminal offences of a
certain level of seriousness.

Guarantees granted

Possibility for the detained third-country Allow the third-country national to exercise
national to appeal against the measures the rights granted to him.
imposed on him.

3. PERSONS CONCERNED

3.1. Illegal third-country nationals

If the third-country national does not comply In this case the decision requesting him to
with this decision, he should be removed. leave the territory may be followed up with a
check on departure from the territory.

If the third-country national does not comply

with the requirement to leave the territory, he
should be placed on both the national and, if
appropriate, SIS wanted persons lists.

To ensure the credibility of the system,

deliberate resistance to removal may be
subject to specific sanctions, which will

50
 obviously not affect the initial removal order,
which should be enforced.

3.2. Third-country nationals whose

presence constitutes a threat to public
order or national security

(1-2): Particular case of unaccompanied

minors

The following recommendations or best practices are only applicable to the extent that
they are allowed by the national legislation of each Schengen State.

- The removal of unaccompanied minors - The removal of unaccompanied minors as

while ensuring the best interests of the child soon as possible while preserving the interests
and respect for the provisions of the of the child. As far as possible ensure that
International Convention on the Rights of the minors are accompanied and taken charge of
Child of 20 November 1989. upon arrival.

4. IMPLEMENTATION OF REMOVAL
MEASURES

4.1. Identification

- Identification, particularly by the finger- Establishment of a national third-country

printing of third-country nationals subject to a nationals file.
removal measure.

- Inclusion in a data file of third-country

nationals who apply for a visa or
residence permit. To be implemented
in the future. (Conclusions of JHA
Council on 20 September 2001).

51
- For the purposes of non-admission,
complete the record by indicating grounds.

4.2. Detention
Third-country nationals who constitute a
threat to public order or national security must
be detained during the period preceding
implementation of the removal order.

This is necessary when the person cannot be

removed rapidly, in particular because he
does not possess a travel document.

Detention may be used to prevent the

third-country national avoiding a measure for
his removal and to prepare for implementation
of the measure.

- Need for specific premises

Third-country nationals subject to a removal
order must in principle be held in special
centres with a proper legal status
distinguishing them very clearly from prison
institutions, equipped with facilities which
guarantee accommodation and hygiene
conditions respecting human dignity. The
facilities should also allow those detained
there to exercise their rights (interpreters,
visits, health care, etc.).

- Guarantees
Possibility for the detained third-country
national to appeal against the measures
imposed on him.

52
- Minors
They can be detained only in specific cases It would be appropriate to provide for
and in compliance with the International alternatives to detention for minors.
Convention on the Rights of the Child of
20 November 1989.

- Duration
The duration of the period of detention of This objective justifies an appropriate period
third-country nationals is a decisive factor in of detention.
the removal measure, the aim being to allow
the service responsible for removal the time
strictly necessary for practical organisation of
the departure.

4.3. Issue of consular laissez-passers

Laissez-passers obtained from consular Use all appropriate means, including consular
authorities within time limits compatible with authorities visiting detention centres.
the periods of detention.

To this end, strengthen consular cooperation

4.4. Financing removals

Examination of the possibility of the costs of Examination of the possibility of the costs of
removal being borne by: removal being borne by:

- the third-country national himself; - the third-country national himself;

- the facilitators. - the person who provided accommodation for
the third-country national or by whoever
sponsored the third-country national in a
sponsorship declaration when the
third-country national was issued with a visa
or residence permit;
- the person employing the third-country

53
 national illegally;
- the facilitators.

Possibility of charging the removal and

detention costs to the abovementioned people.

- Possibility of sanctions if they do not pay.

4.5. Escort

Where necessary, escorts are provided by

officials specially trained for the task. The introduction of special European charters
could contribute to improving the removal
The removing State should conduct a risk arrangements.
assessment of the person being removed to
determine whether the use of escort is
required, and if so, the number of escorts
necessary.

The carrier involved in the actual execution of

the removal should be informed about the
results of the risk assessment in accordance
with the Chicago Convention of
7 December 1944 and the standards and
recommendations adopted by ICAO.
- Readmission

Readmission agreements generally provide Develop cross-border cooperation between all

for two categories of persons who may be of the competent authorities concerned.
readmitted: the country's own nationals, and
nationals of third countries. There may also
be provisions on transit.

54
Readmission makes the Member States and Introduce effective readmission policies using
the third States responsible for controlling all means available whether in legal
their borders efficiently. instruments (readmission agreements,
introduction of readmission clauses into other
This special procedure consists of removing kinds of agreement, etc.) or in practical terms.
illegal third-country nationals in State A to
State B which is their State of origin and/or
transit, and of requiring the latter to receive
them.

Readmission takes place at particular points Response to the readmission request as soon
determined in each agreement. It is as possible.
indispensable that the authorities of the
readmitting State should be physically
capable of accepting returnees as soon as the
decision of acceptance is taken.

55
Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175
1048 Bruxelles/Brussel
BELGIQUE/BELGIË
Tel. +32 22816111
www.consilium.europa.eu

NOTICE
This publication is produced by the General Secretariat
of the Council and is intended for information purposes only.
It does not involve the responsibility of the EU institutions or
the member states.
For further information on the European Council and the Council,
see the website:
www.consilium.europa.eu
or contact the Public Information Service of the General Secretariat
of the Council:

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel
BELGIQUE/BELGIË
www.consilium.europa.eu/infopublic

More information on the European Union is available on

www.europa.eu.
Brussels:
General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 2002.

PDF ISBN 978-92-824-7678-9

doi:10.2860/5066
QC-02-20-431-EN-N

© European Union, 2002

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.