QST - EMP and The Radio Amateur 1-4

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The key takeaways are that amateur radio equipment can be damaged by lightning strikes and electromagnetic pulses generated by nuclear explosions. The article discusses ways to harden radio systems against these threats.

Some ways to protect equipment discussed in the article include using metal-oxide varistors, keeping spare equipment disconnected, turning equipment off when not in use, and properly grounding equipment.

The article states that VHF line-of-sight frequencies would be useful for local communications after an EMP event, and lower HF frequencies may allow for long-distance communications by ground wave propagation.

Electromagnetic Pulse and the Radio Amateur - Part 1

QST August 1986, pp. 15-20, 36

Copyright © 1986 by the American Radio Relay League, Inc. All rights reserved.

Part 1 appears in QST August 1986, pp. 15-20, 36 (http://www.arrl.org/tis/info/pdf/88615.pdf)


Part 2 appears in QST September 1986, pp. 22-26 (http://www.arrl.org/tis/info/pdf/98622.pdf)
Part 3 appears in QST October 1986, pp. 38-41 (http://www.arrl.org/tis/info/pdf/108638.pdf)
Part 4 appears in QST November 1986, pp. 30-34 (http://www.arrl.org/tis/info/pdf/118630.pdf)
Electromagnetic Pulse
and the Radio Amateur
Part 1: Will your station survive the effects of lightning strikes or
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generated by nuclear explosions? The
information in this series will help you harden your radio system.

By Dennis Bodson, W4PWF


Acting Assistant Manager, Technology and Standards
National Communications System
Washington, DC 20305-20t 0

adio amateurs have long been con- (ARES), the National Traffic System as a result of an above-ground nuclear

R cerned with protecting their radio


installations against lightning. Many
have applied lightning protection where re-
(NTS), the Radio Amateur Civil Emer-
gency Service (RACES) and the Military
Affiliate Radio System (MARS). 1
detonation. NEMP has an electric field
strength of 50 kY 1m horizontally and 20
kY 1m verticaUy, with a pulse rise time to
quired by local electrical codes. Tradition- Radio amateurs have provided commu- peak of 5 to 10 nanoseconds.
ally, the installed protection is designed to nications during natural disasters such as There are several different types of EMP
combat " slow" lightning strikes (having tornadoes, hurricanes, floods and blizzards resulting from a nuclear explosion. One of
rise times on the order of tens of micro- when other forms of communication have the more significant types is the High-
seconds) with protection from direct over- been inadequate. The amateur uses por- altitude EMP (HEMP) that results from a
head strokes obtained by sheltering table, mobile and fixed-station radio equip- nuclear explosion above 30 miles in
important conductors with a grounding ment that is not necessarily dependent on altitude. The HEMP is created by the in-
system. commercial power. In almost every com- teraction of high-energy photons (gamma
To address the transient threat, including munity large and small, there is a cadre of rays) with atmospheric molecules,
lightning-voltage surges and electro- experienced radio amateurs willing to res- producing Compton electrons. These elec-
magnetic pulse (EMP) , it is necessary to pond to the need for emergency commu- trons decay in the Earth's magnetic fields,
protect installations against electromagnetic nications. emitting photons in the process.
fields rising to a peak intensity of 50 kY 1m In addition to the role amateurs fill System-Generated EMP (SGEMP) is
in several nanoseconds. While some during natural disasters, the National Com- produced by the direct interaction of high-
modern lightning-protection devices are ef- munications System (NCS) has long energy photons with systems (equipment),
fective against a lightning transient threat, recognized that the Amateur Radio com- rather than through their interaction with
the majority of them will not act in time munity provides a great national resource. atmospheric molecules. SGEMP is impor-
to prevent the faster EMP from entering It is of value not only to the public, but also tant because of its effects on satellite sys-
the radio equipment. to augment civil and military agencies. To tems and in-flight missiles.
Protection of Amateur Radio installa- enhance the nationwide posture of telecom- The third. type, Magnetohydrodynamic
tions is becoming more difficult as circuit mun ications readiness for national EMP (MHD-EMP) is different because of
components become more sensitive to emergencies, the NCS and the ARRL have its distinct physical generation mechanism,
transients. ICs are susceptible to damage a written memorandum of understanding. later occurrence, smaller amplitude and
at transient levels smaller than those of dis- Its purpose is to establish a broad frame- longer duration. It is sometimes referred to
crete transistors, which are more sus- work of cooperation and a close working as late-time EMP. MHD-EMP poses a
ceptible than vacuum tubes. New relationship with volunteer radio amateurs threat for very long landlines (including
protection devices such as metal-oxide for national emergency-communications telephone cables and power-distribution
varistors (MOYs) offer protection within functions. Therefore, it is in the national lines) or submarine cables.
one nanosecond of the arrival of a transient interest to find ways to enhance the sur-
pulse such. When properly selected and in- vivability of the Amateur Radio system in EMP Description
stalled, such devices show promise of a nuclear environment. Of the three types of EMP, HEMP poses
providing protection against the universal the greatest threat to the Amateur Radio
transient threat. EMP Defined operator's equipment. Therefore, this
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) is defined report deals primarily with HEMP and
Background as a large, impulsive type of electro- lightning.
One of the primary reasons for the exis- magnetic wave generated by a nuclear ex-
tence of Amateur Radio is to provide a plosion. EMP commonly refers to a Generation Process
public service. Over many years, this service nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NEMP). In A major threat exists to every Amateur
has proven to be most valuable during this usage, it is a plane-wave, line-of-sight Radio installation in the US from the pos-
emergencies. At first, the amateur public electromagnetic phenomenon that occurs sibility of high-altitude nuclear explosions
emergency service existed spontaneously on over the central part of the country. One
an individual basis . Today, it has evolved such detonation at a height of 250 to 300
into a well-established system that includes miles could produce an EMP/transient ef-
the Amateur Radio Emergency Service , Notes appear on page 36. fect over the contiguous US. Significant

August 1986 15
electrons are deflected from their original
HOB = 300
MILES
path by the Earth's magnetic field and
spiral around the geomagnetic field lines.
HOB =486
They complete about one-third of a
MILES revolution before they decay and are
reabsorbed by the atmosphere. The current
generated by this magnetic deflection is a
major component of the deposition region
in a high-altitude nuclear blast.
Deposition Region
In a high-altitude nuclear blast (30 miles
or more above the Earth's atmosphere) the
gamma rays radiated in a downward direc-
tion travel through the near vacuum of
DC
space until encountering a region where the

)
atmospheric density is sufficient to produce
the Compton Effect and the resulting
deposition region. The deposition region is
generally circular and is approximately 50
miles thick in the center and tapers toward
the outer edge, with a mean altitude of 25
MI,AMI
to 30 miles (Fig 2). The radius of the
deposition region is determined by the
height of the burst, the yield of the nuclear
device, and is limited by the curvature of
the earth. The deposition region is formed
quickly since the gamma rays and the
Compton electrons both travel at nearly the
Fig 1-EMP ground coverage for high-altitude, 10-megaton nuclear explosions at altitudes speed of light (186,000 mils) in a vacuum.
of 62, 186 and 300 miles. The rapid generation of the deposition

EMP levels can occur on the Earth's sur-


face at all points within line-of-sight from
the explosion. If high-yield weapons are MILES
used, the EMP field strength felt on the 90 _ _ __
earth will not vary significantly with the 80 50
MT
height of the explosion. Therefore, a high- 70
40
altitude explosion, which can cover a large 60
geographic area, will produce essentially 50 30
the same peak field strength as a low- 40 H08 300 km
..J
30 20
altitude explosion, which covers a small ('86 MILES)

geographic area. Fig I illustrates the areas 10


10
that EMP would affect based on height of
burst (HOB) above the US. o

KILOMETERS
The Compton Effect
(A)
During a nuclear explosion, gamma rays
(high-energy photons) are radiated in all
directions from the source. These gamma
rays react with the atmosphere to produce
large electrical charges and currents, which MILES
are the sources of the electric and magnetic 90
fields that comprise the EMP. The basic
80 10 MT 50
physical process that converts the gamma-
E 70
ray energy into EMP energy is known as 40
60
the Compton Effect. 50
o 30
When a gamma ray strikes an atom in 40 ..J

the atmosphere, it knocks an electron free 30


20
and drives it outward from the detonation. 20 .. 10
Since the electrons (Compton electrons) are
smaller, they are moved outward more o __
o 200 400 600 800 1000 f200 4400
rapidly than the remaining large positively KILOMETERS
charged portion of the atom. The results
(Bl
are a charge separation in the atmosphere,
and creation of a huge electric current. This ,--------------_._-------------,
charged region in the atmosphere is called Fig 2-At A, deposition regions for a 1-megaton nuclear explosion at altitudes of 31, 62,
the "deposition region." An additional 124 and 186 miles. Deposition regions for a 10-megaton nuclear explosion at the same
current is generated when the Compton heights are shown at B.
16 Q5T,.
since the pulse is of such short duration,
EARTH ' S GEOMAGNETI C FIELD LINES
the total energy received on the ground is

1
AND BETA-PARTI C LE PATH
only about 0.6 J/m 2 .'
NUCLEAR Radio Frequencies
The energy of a high-altitude EMP is
BETA - PARTICLE spread over a major part of the RF spec-
AND trum. Since the pulse has such a fast rise
GAMMA-RAY IONIZATION AREA
time and short duration, it covers a broad
/
/

I frequency range extending from JO kilo-


hertz to 100 megahertz. The electric field
strength remains fairly constant in the
I lQ-kHz to I-MHz band; it decreases by a
factor of 100 in the 1- to JOO-MHz band
and continues to decrease at a faster rate
\
for frequencies greater than 100 MHz.
I ...
GEOMAGNETIC EOUATOR
I Most high-altitude EMP energy is at fre-
quencies between 100 kHz and 10 MHz,
and 9 9 % lies in the frequency spectrum
Fig 3-Depiction of the magnetic conjugate.
below 100 MHz (Fig 5).

,- 45 I
surges. A high-altitude EMP rises to peak
voltage in approximately 10 nanoseconds
(ten billionths of a second) and has a
duration of approximately I microsecond
Coupling
Electromagnetic energy is radiated
downward from the deposition region to
the earth. Any conductor beneath or near
the deposition region will act as an antenna
I
E 40 I
(I millionth of a second); see Fig 4. A and pick up the electromagnetic energy .
I lightning stroke, on the other hand. rises Long power-transmission lines are effective
I
35 I to peak voltage in about 2 microseconds in picking up the low-frequency com-
30
01 0
z
0 J and lasts 100 times longer (I thousandth of
a second) than an EMP .
ponents of the EMP. Short metallic con-
ductors, including internal parts of
25
0
a: A significant difference between EMP electronic equipment, pick up the high-
0
...J 20
zl
1 JI and lightning is that EMP effects are felt
over a much larger area simultaneously, not
frequency components of the EMP. A list
of collectors is shown in Fig 6. The energy
15 just locally . Any conductor within the area on the conductor is in the form of a strong
of an EMP will act as an antenna and eQuId current and voltage surge that is trans-
pick up the electromagnetic energy. The mitted to the attached electronic equip-
...J voltages and currents induced in these con- ment. Table 1 illustrates EMP-induced
ductors are comparable to those produced surges on conductors .
by the largest lightning bolts. However, the Equipment does not have to be attached
total energy of the EMP current is not as directly to a collector (conductor) to be
large as a nearby lightning-current pulse be- damaged; EMP/ transient-pulse energy can
cause of the short duration of the EMP. be coupled to the equipment in other ways.
Lightning can be viewed almost as a For example, an electric current can be in-
Fig 4-Electric field strength of a typical steady current when compared with EMP. duced, or a spark can jump, from a
EMP wave. The instantaneous peak-power density for primary conductor that collects the EMP
an EMP is typically 6 MW / m 2 . However, energy to a nearby secondary conductor

region results in a pulse with a very fast rise .•.


time, covering a broad frequency range.
I
Magnetic Conjugate
A high-altitude detonation also generates EMP HF VHF I UHF I
beta particles, or free electrons, that spiral
along the Earth's magnetic field lines. This
creates an increase in the ionization of the I-

D layer of the atmosphere not only at the a


local area, but also in the area known as >-
I- a:
the magnetic conjugate-in the opposite
hemisphere! Fig 3 graphically depicts the
immensity of EMP's widespread effects. lD

Amateurs in both the local and opposite


hemisphere may find a sudden loss in their
ability to communicate.
0.1 10
Electromagnetic Spectrum Effects FREQUENCV (MHz)
Amplitude (Waveform)
An EMP has a fast rise time and a short
duration when compared to lightning Fig 5-The frequency spectrum of EMP.

August 1986 17
Typical Collectors of EMP Energy Table 1
Long runs of cable, piping or conduit EMP-Induced Surges on Conductors
Large antennas, antenna feed lines,
guy wires, antenna supports (towers) Conductor EMP Rise Time Peak Voltage Peak CUffent
Overhead power and telephone lines Type (Microseconds) (Volts) (Amperes)
and supporting towers Long, unshielded wires 0.01-0.1 100 k-5 M 1 k-l0 k
Long runs of electrical wiring, conduit, (power lines, large
and so forth in buildings antennas)
Metallic structural components, girders, Unshielded telephone 0.01-1 100-10 k 1-100
reinforcing bars, corrugated roofs, wires at wall outlet
expanded metal lath, metal fences Ac power lines at wall outlet 0.1-10 1 koSO k 10-100
Railroad tracks HF antennas 0.01-0.1 10 k-1 M 500-100 k
Aluminum aircraft bodies VHF antennas 0.001-0.01 1 k-l00 k 100-1 k
UHF antennas 0.001-0.01 100-10 k 10-100
Shielded cable 1-100 1-100 0.1-50
Fig 6

_- --- -------------- - - - - .
..

Table 2
that is connected to the equipment , but not Effects of Nuclear Detonations on Radio Systems
to the primary conductor.
There are three basic ways to couple the Frequency Degradation Spatial Extent and
EMP energy from a high-altitude nuclear Range Mechanism Duration at Effects Comments
explosion to a conductor on the earth: elec- VLF Phase and amplitude Hundreds to thousands Ground wave not aHected ,
changes of miles; minutes to lowering of sky-wave reflection
tric induction, magnetic induction and hours. height causes rapid phase
resistive coupling (direct-charge deposi- change with slow recovery.
tion). Electric induction occurs when a cur- Significant amplitude degrada-
rent is induced in a conducting element by tion of sky-wave modes
possible.
the electric-field component that is in the
LF Absorption of sky Hundreds to thousands Ground wave not aHeeted;
same direction as the conductor's length. waves, defocusing. of miles; minutes to eHects sensitive to relative
Magnetic induction takes place in conduc- hours. geometry of burst and
tors that are in the form of a closed loop . propagation path
The magnetic-field component moving per- MF Absorption of sky Hundreds to thousands Ground wave not aHected
pendicular to the plane of the closed loop waves. of miles; minutes to
causes a current to flow in the conducting hours.
loop. Resistive coupling occurs when a con- HF Absorption of sky Hundreds to thousands Day1ime absorption greater than
waves, loss of of miles, burst region night-time, F-region distur-
ductor is located in another conducting support for F-region and conjugate; bances may result in new
medium, ie, the earth, water or the air. reflection and/or minutes to hours. modes, multipath interference
When a current is flowing in the conducting multipath interference.
medium, the conductor provides an alter- VHF Absorption , multipath A few miles to hun- Fireball and D-region absorption ,
native current path and shares the current interference, or false reds of miles; minutes circuits may experience
with the medium. Resistive coupling can be targets resulting to tens of minutes. attenuation or multipath
from resolved multl- interference
generated as a by-product of electric or path radar signals.
magnetic induction. UHF Absorption . A few miles to tens Only important for IineoOf-sight
of miles; seconds to propagation through highly
Nuclear Weapons Effects on Radio Signals a few minutes. ionized regions
Nuclear weapons can degrade and black
out radio signals far from the immediate
blast zone. Degradation of radio signals by
nuclear weapons varies with the explosion
yield , distance and altitude. Signal
degradation may include high noise levels,
absorption , attenuation, ionization and reports indicate that lightning effects can er disruption and equipment damage.
partial or complete blackout. The effects be equal to or exceed those of EMP in the Typically, the upper portion of the thun-
may extend hundreds to thousands of miles lower-frequency spectrum , while EMP ef- der cloud carries a greater positive charge
and last from minutes to hours. Normal fects are more severe in the higher- while the lower part of the cloud carries a
HF ionospheric propagation paths (below frequency spectrum. large negative charge. In a cloud-to-ground
the Maximum Usable Frequency-MUF) lightning discharge, the negative charge in
may be disrupted at the same time that new Lightning Description the cloud is lowered by the dissipation of
paths that were not previously available are Lightning is a natural, transient, high- the electrons into the earth. A typical cloud-
created in the upper HF or low VHF bands. current electrical discharge occurring in the to-ground lightning discharge can last from
It is by no means certain, however, that HF atmosphere. Lightning occurs when a 1/5 to l/2 of a second and is composed of
communications will be completely dis- region of the atmosphere attains a huge several discharge components . The total
rupted under all circumstances (Table 2). electric charge with the associated electric discharge occurrence is called ajlash. The
fields large enough to cause electrical typical lightning flash is composed of three
Lightning breakdown of the air, creating a discharge to four high-current pulses called strokes.
Lightning and EMP have similar charac- path for the charge. Each stroke lasts about I millisecond with
teristics. Both take the form of a fast -rising The most common lightning path is the a delay between strokes of 40 to 80 ms. The
electromagnetic pulse that can generate intracloud discharge path. From an elec- first stroke is initiated by a preliminary
large currents in conductors. Earlier studies trical equipment standpoint, however, the breakdown in the cloud, which channels a
generally stated that the effects of EMP ex- cloud-to-ground lightning discharge path negative charge toward the ground in a
ceeded those of lightning, but more recent has the highest potential for causing pow- series of short luminous steps called the step
18 05T~
leader. As the step-leader tip approaches cause major structural damage to antennas electrical-power lines; to a lesser extent by
the ground, the electric field beneath it be- and towers, as well as electronic equipment. remote-control, telephone, microphone
comes large and causes one or more and speaker lines, and so on. The trans-
upward-moving discharges to be initiated Physical Effects on Equipment ceiver would be damaged primarily where
from the ground. When the downward- The primary effects of EMP that are of these lines enter it at the antenna match-
moving leader contacts one of the upward- interest to the Radio Amateur are those ing network, internal power supply,
moving discharges, the leader tip is con- that would produce direct damage to the telephone-patching equipment, micro-
nected to ground potential. The leader path sensitive electronic components of the sta- phone and speaker connections, and so on.
ionizes the air making it a conductive plas- tion. The amateur is also interested in the If the transceiver case is metallic, it may
ma that is luminous. The return stroke, a temporary blackout caused by disruption provide enough shielding to prevent
ground potential wave, propagates up the to the ionosphere. A nuclear detonation damage from EMP energy collected
ionized leader path discharging the leader causes intense changes in the ionosphere directly by the transceiver's internal wiring
channel. The return stroke produces a peak that increase or decrease the amount of and circuits.
current of typically 30 kA in its lower por- ionization within a particular layer of the Where EMP energy does enter the trans-
tion, with a rise time of from zero to peak atmosphere. This change can result in the ceiver, it may burn out ICs and FETs.
in about 2 The return-stroke energy absorption of the radio signal or change the More hardy components, when not
heats the leader channel to temperatures signal path (refraction) to the extent that destroyed completely, may have degraded
approaching 60,000 of and produces a high- communication is not possible. The fireball performance because of changes in their
pressure channel that expands to generate itself can disrupt communications because electrical properties. All solid-state
a shock wave that is heard as thunder. If it generates an opaque area that radio sig- components may experience a change in
a residual charge is available at the top of nals cannot penetrate. state that causes temporary signal errors or
the channel, a charge called a dart leader More widely known disturbances such as that requires resetting. Vacuum tube equip-
may propagate down the first stroke chan- blackout (the complete disruption of ment has shown little vulnerability to EMP.
nel. The dart leader initiates the second, electromagnetic signals for a short period) Small VHF radios contained in metal
third and fourth return strokes, if any. and scintillation (the scattering of signal cases are not vulnerable if the external
energy caused by fast-changing ionization microphone and antenna are disconnected.
Lightning Energy irregularity) should not be confused with Also, the radio must be physically removed
The normal peak current in a single EMP. Neither of the foregoing can damage from other external conductors such as
return stroke will range from 10 to 4 0 kA equipment like EMP can. Radio propaga- power cords and telephone lines.
with 175 kA for a severe stroke and with tion degradation, through refraction and
a charge transfer of 2.5 C (coulombs). J The absorption, usually lasts for a few minutes Antennas
total lightning discharge, when composed to a few hours, depending on the frequen- Antennas are designed to be efficient col-
of several strokes, can transfer a charge of cy. It is important only where continuous lectors of electromagnetic energy at their
25 C. The energy associated with a typical communications are of vital importance, design frequency. An antenna designed to
lightning stroke wiII vary depending on the because blackout and scintillation are only operate in that part of the RF spectrum
dynamic resistance of the conducting chan- temporary and produce no permanent where EMP energy is high will exhibit a
nel, with values estimated to range from damage to primary or ancillary radio equip- high coupling efficiency for EMP. It is pos-
250 J to 10 MJ. ment. EMP, however, produces almost sible for high voltages and currents to be
instantaneous and possibly perma,n ent coupled into these efficient EMP antennas.
Lightning and EMP Compared damage to sensitive electronic components. Equipment attached to these antennas will
A direct or nearby lightning strike can Fig 7 shows how signal propagation may likely be damaged by the resulting energy.
equal or exceed the electromagnetic field be affected. Antennas designed to operate at frequen-
strength of EMP. To compare a direct The components of the amateur's radio cies outside the EMP energy spectrum will
lightning strike with EMP, 35 kA will be system that can be most affected are those be less likely to act as efficient couplers and
used as an average value of the peak cur- directly attached to a primary collector may not collect high voltages and currents.
rent of the first return stroke and 175 kA (conductor) of EMP energy. The amateur's Since most high-altitude EMP energy is
as the value of the peak current of a severe transceiver is most sensitive where it is con- concentrated between IOO kHz and
first return stroke. At I meter from a direct nected to the commercial power lines and 10 MHz, antennas in this frequency range
lightning ground strike, the magnetic-field the antenna transmission line. Other sen- will be subject to the strongest EMP-
energy for the average return stroke is equal sitive connection points include the micro- induced voltages and currents. All anten-
to the EMP at a frequency near 10 MHz phone, telephone lines and any nas designed to operate between 10 and
and exceeds the EMP at frequencies below remote-control lines. 100 MHz will also be subject to high EMP-
10 MHz. At I meter from a direct light- There is a large number of electronic and induced voltages and currents; however,
ning ground hit, the energy of a severe electrical components that can be perma- the EMP energy decreases steadily as the
lightning return stroke exceeds the EMP to nently damaged by the voltage and current frequencies increase. In general, all anten-
frequencies above 10 MHz. At 50 meters surges induced by EMP!transients. As a nas designed to operate at frequencies be-
from a severe lightning stroke, the energy general rule, smaller components are more low 100 MHz will be subject to strong EMP
of the total electric field exceeds that of susceptible to damage than larger ones. The coupling, since 99% of the EMP energy is
EMP at frequencies below about I MHz; most susceptible components are ICs, then found below 100 MHz. Unfortunately for
and for the average first return stroke, the discrete transistors. Somewhat less sus- the radio amateur, the HF bands fall within
total lightning electric-field energy exceeds ceptible components are capacitors, resis- that part of the spectrum that contains a
that of EMP below about 300 kHz. tors and inductors. Least susceptible are the great amount of EMP energy and a high
The major difference between lightning large components such as solenoids, relays, coupling efficiency. On the other hand,
and EMP is the area affected. EMP can af- circuit breakers, motors and transformers. amateur VHF antennas are less efficient
fect an area of thousands of square miles, collectors of EMP energy since they operate
while lightning can affect an area of only Transceivers above 100 MHz.
a few square miles, with severe effects nor- The typical amateur transceiver is sub- When exposed to a high-altitude EMP
mally within a few hundred feet from the ject to EMP/transient damage and tem- event, the amateur's HF antenna could col-
lightning discharge path. EMP can damage porary effects from a number of sources. lect a potential of several thousand volts.
small electronic components and transmis- The primary sources are EMP energy col- These high voltages could physically
sion lines, while a direct lightning strike can lected by antennas, transmission lines and damage the antenna line, balun and any at-

August 1986 19
EMP protection to the amateur's radio
equipment because the damaging pulse will
pass through the circuit breaker before it
has time to react. However, internal arcing
in the breaker box and in normal house-
hold wiring may Limit the peak pulse to
about 6 kV.
The amateur should expect the local
commercial power system to be damaged
and experience outages from the EMP
transient. These outages could last for
several hours to several days . The power-
line EMP transients can cause component
damage.
Telephone Equipment
The commercial telephone system con-
sists, in large part, of unshielded telephone
switches and cable systems . Although a
o LAYER I' considerable amount of lightning protec-
tion has been built in, there is little
protection provided for EMP voltage and
current surges . An unshielded telephone
/ EARTH line may experience a peak voltage between
100 and 10 kV and a peak current of be-
tween I and 100 A. In recent years, the
telephone companies have started using
solid-state switching systems that could be
Fig 7-Atmospheric disruption and warping of the Earth's atmosphere caused by a highly sensitive to EMP. The older, exist-
nuclear explosion. Dashed lines show hypothetical signal propagation ing transient over-voltage protection for
telephone circuits is robust and can with-
stand repeated EMP transients without
damage. Even the typical telephone hand-
set is likely to withstand EMP without
tached electronic equipment. Other con- energy dissipated in the load depends on damage. Amateur telephone-patching
ductors associated with the antenna system the impedance of the load path to ground. equipment, however, is subject to EMP
can act as collectors of EMP energy. They Equipment that presents a large impedance damage and should be protected .
are the control cables to the antenna rota- will experience larger peak voltages than
tor, the antenna mast, guy wires and even equipment exhibiting a smaller impedance Computers
the ground system. These all can collect and therefore may experience more One price that modern users pay for the
high levels of energy and conduct it direct- damage. convenience of microelectronics is a greater
ly or indirectly to sensitive electronic equip- susceptibility to electrical transients. In
ment. These unintentional collectors are, Power-Line Transformers computers, particularly when lIsed with
in many instances, more efficient EMP an- Normal power-line transformers will Amateur Radio equipment, the same kinds
tennas than the RF antenna they support. pass a part of EMP-generated currents of vulnerability exist as with regular ham
Their coupling efficiency is determined through capacitive coupling across the gear, only more so. In a typical amateur
primarily by their length, which may be windings. Commercial power transformers setup, the program and data are input
long enough to allow them to operate as reduce the severity of the EMP by de- through a keyboard, cassette recorder or
an EMP antenna in the strongest part of creasing the peak voltage and extending the disk drive, and a video display terminal
the EMP energy spectrum . Energy from rise time of the pulse. In addition, the in- (VDT), printer, cassette recorder and disk
these collectors, when not directly connect- ternal inductive and capacitive reactances drive serve as output devices.
ed to sensitive radio equipment, can jump of the transformer make the transformer Microprocessors are especially sus-
or arc to conductors (even short ones) that act like a band-pass filter that attenuates ceptible to EMP and transient-voltage
arc connected to radio equipment. frequencies below I and above 10 MHz. surges. Damage to an amateur's computer
can run from simple logic upset or
Power-Phase Differences temporary memory loss to fused com-
Commercial Power Equipment
EMP currents that are generated in the ponents and permanent memory loss. In-
Transmission Lines three phases of a power line are similar, and creased voltage may destroy the
Power-transmission lines are extremely voltages in all three phases are nearly equal cathode-ray tube (CRT) and disrupt or
efficient collectors of EMP energy. The with respect to ground. The greatest danger otherwise impair disk drives and other
long runs of open, exposed wire can couple exists to equipment connected from one ancillary equipment.
large voltage and current transients . Long, phase to neutral or ground. Less danger
unshielded power lines can experience peak exists to equipment connected between Repeaters
EMP-induced surge voltages of between phases. The typical household wall outlet Microcomputers are having a large
lOOkV and 5 MV, and peak currents of be- supplies 117 V, single phase. Therefore, impact on FM repeater design and on an
tween 1 kA and 10 kA. amateur equipmenr using this 117-V power increasing number of automated systems
Power-transmission lines act as long cur- source is susceptible to receiving damage under program control. Repeaters are
rent conductors with the earth acting as a from EMP . subject to the same threats as any amateur
return conductor. The EMP-induced cur-
rent flows down the line through the load Household Circuit Breakers
(equipment) to ground. The amount of Household circuit breakers will not offer (continued on page 36)

20 QST
currents from EMP and lightning. The ac
Electromagnetic Pulse power supply for the rotators may fail,
(continued from page 20) leaving the antenna array useless or ex-
tremely difficult to aim. Marrying a com-
puter and satellite transceiver increases the
piece of equipment. Often, repeaters are station vulnerability. VirtuaUy aU stations,
collocated with other communications regardless of the type of equipment used,
equipment on a joint-use antenna tower. will be hostage to the commercial power
This makes them quite susceptible to supply unless, served by a separate,
receiving an EMP . emergency back-up power source.
Part 2 will discuss the testing of
Antenna Rotators EM PI transient protection devices.
Heavy-duty motors are less susceptible [Editors Note: This series of articles is condensed
to EMP than smaller, less-rugged electronic !rom the National Communications System report
components . Antenna rotators, although (NCS TIB 85 -10) "Electromagnetic
PulselTransient Threat Testing of Protection
fairly immune to EMP effects because of Devices for Amateur/Military Affiliate Radio Sys-
their normally heavy metal cases and large tem Equipment." A copy of the unabridged report
components , may be rendered useless if Is available from the NCS. Write (no SASE re-
quired) to Dennis Bodson , Acting Assistant
there is a line-vol!age surge to the rotator Manager, Office of Technology and Standards,
remote-control box. The line surge need not National Communications System, Washington,
be caused by an electromagnetic pulse. DC 20305-2010, or call 202-692-2124 between
8:30 AM and 5 PM Eastern Time.]
Satellite Transceivers and Antennas
Because of the sophisticated nature of
satellite transmitters and receivers, and es-
pecially of their antenna systems, EMP and
line-voltage transients remain serious Notes
problem s. As noted earlier, the satellite 'When the term "radio amateur" is used in this
report, it includes the MARS amateur volunteer.
itself is susceptible to SGEMP . 20ne joule (J) Is the energy expended during one
Satellite antenna systems require azimuth second by an electric current of 1 ampere flowing
through a 1-ohm resistance. One joule is equal
and elevation rotators. These rotators are to 1 watt-second . A 60-W light bulb burning
fairly resistant to EMP. However, the an- for 1 second expends 60 J of energy.
3The coulomb is defined as the ampere-second.
tenna tower or mast and the remote-control One ampere is the current intensity when
lines are very likely to pick up large surge 1 coulomb flows in a circuit for 1 second. QST

36 QST
Electromagnetic Pulse and
the Radio Amateur
Part 2: This month, we present the method and results of the first of two
series of tests of EMP/transient-protection devices. t
By Dennis Bodson, W4PWF
Acting Assistant Manager
Office of Technology and Standards
National Communications System
Washington, DC 20305-2010

he inherent weakness of solid-state

T components to damaging transient


electrical energy has stimulated the
electronics industry to develop a large
Table 3
Peak Voltage and Current Values vs Conductor Type
Conductor Peak Voltage Peak Current Test
variety of transient-protection devices. In (Volts) (Amperes) Class
order to identify low-cost, commercially Power Connections 600 120 A
available devices capable of protecting Box interconnections 600 20 B
Amateur Radio equipment, an extensive Exterior Conductors 1000 C
market search was made and a repre-
sentative number of protective devices were
purchased. The protection devices pur-
chased were the most current types availa-
ble for use with Amateur Radio equipment voltage, were accepted for further testing. Conversely, in an Amateur Radio station,
where it connects to power lines, antenna the transients experienced, if limited at all,
systems, communications lines and other Test Program would be determined by the lengths and
potential transient sources. The test pro- Threat Definition configurations of conductors exposed to
gram was divided into two stages: First, the Other than in the case of a direct light- the fields, and the dielectric strength .
protection devices, then the Amateur Radio ning strike, EMP is generally considered a The peak values shown in Table 3 were
equipment. more stringent threat to electrical systems used in the protective-device qualification
than lightning . Consequently, the test tests for this program. These peak values
Test Objectives were used because they are representative
pulses approximated the characteristics
No common test procedure existed for of EMP, rising to full strength in approxi- of the transient pulses expected in a typi-
determining the effectiveness of different mately 10 ns and decaying exponentially in cal Amateur Radio system, and they could
types of protection devices. Therefore, we about 1 The waveform that is frequently be readily reproduced in a laboratory test
sought to develop a common test procedure used in unclassified work was used for this environment.
to ascertain the average performance of a test; it is expressed as: To test for insulation breakdown of the
wide variety of devices against the fast- protective devices, the highest pulse level
rising and powerful transient pulses that are E(t) = 5.25 x exp (-4 x 106 t) obtainable in the laboratory (25 kV) was
generated by lightning and EMP. Three - exp (-4.76 x 108 t) (Eq 1) used. Each protective device was subject-
standard electromagnetic pulses were used where ed to ten equal pulses in order to ensure
to simulate the expected transient wave- E is volts per meter that protection was not circumvented by
forms associated with ac power connec- t is time in seconds the first transient received. A cooling time
tions, short interconnecting wires and long of approximately one second was allowed
exterior conductors that are found in the The transient threat to electrical hard- between pulses.
typical Amateur Radio installation. ware does not come directly from the free
field, but from the interaction of the elec- Direct Testing
Protection devices that allowed a voltage
spike to exceed their rated clamping volt- tric and magnetic fields with electrical con- Direct device testing consisted of driving
age by 100070 (6 dB), or exhibited a signifi- ductors. Current peaks in excess of the device terminals with a differential-
cant delay in response time, were rejected. thousands of amperes are predicted as a mode signal from a pulse generator. The
The 6-dB overload level was selected response to EMP . Similarly, voltage levels test was conducted once with a source im-
because it is common to design electronic may reach hundreds of kilovolts. In prac- pedance appropriate to the voltages and
circuits to withstand such an overload for tice, however, the physical dimensions and currents listed in Table 3, and once with the
short durations. Those devices that sup- characteristics of the conductors themselves tabulated voltage and a source impedance
pressed the initial voltage spike to an ac- tend to limit current and voltage ampli- of 50 ohms. This impedance was chosen
ceptable level, less than twice the clamping tudes, although not always without physi- because it is encountered most commonly
cal damage to the conductors. For example, in house wiring and antenna circuits. The
it has been proposed that the highest tran- input- and output-pulse magnitudes were
sient voltage transmitted through a residen- recorded photographically. A comparison
tPart 1 appears in Aug 1986 QST. Part 3 tial power-distribution breaker box would was made of the input and output voltages
will appear in a subsequent issue. be limited by air-discharge breakdown. with and without the device in the circuit,
22
Again, data were photographically
OSCILLOSCOPE
& CAMERA recorded . Current and voltage were record-

VOLTAGE
PROBE
o CURRENT
PROBE
ed for the initial pulses of each device. The
voltage probe was attenuated by a flexible
copper-sulphate resistance of suitable
value. For repeated pulse requirements, the
MERCURY
WETIED COPPER
camera shutter was held open to record five
SWITCH LOAD
STORAGE
CAPACITOR
SULPHATE
RESISTOR
RESISTOR of the pulses and the reference in a manner
100 OHMS
similar to that of the lower-voltage mea-
SOURCE surements described previously. The polar-
IMPEDANCE
5 OHMS & ity of the second set of five pulses was not
50 OHMS
reversed, and the current trace was usual-
ly omitted from the second data set.
DEVICE
UNDER
TEST Small-Device Tests
For physically small devices, test mea-
surements were conducted inside a metal
enclosure. Penetrations of the enclosure
Fig 8-Low-voltage pulser; below 5 kV. were made by the high-voltage lead from
the mercury-wetted switch, the system
ground and the voltage probe. Currents
OSCILLOSCOPE
were measured by a sensor on the system
& CAMERA ground, but were not regularly recorded as
part of the test data. The voltage probe was
VOLTAGE PROBE 0 CURRENT PROBE run in solid-sheath coaxial cable to the
metal enclosure, and the internal probe was
shielded by a metal braid to within a few
millimeters of the probe tip.
SOURCE LOAD
IMPEDANCE RESISTOR Shunt-protective devices were connect-
5 OHMS 100 OHM S
ed between the high-voltage input terminal
and system ground. The voltage probe and
load resistor were also connected to the
same terminals. For device combinations
DEVI CE
containing series elements, the line side of
UNDER the device was connected to the input ter-
TEST
minal, and the voltage probe and load resis-
tor connected between the load side
terminal and ground .
Large Devices
Fig 9-High-voltage pulser; above 5 kV.
For devices with special connectors too
large to fit within the test chamber, con-
and a transient-rejection ratio (in decibels) citor was charged to the desired voltage necting adapters were made of straps and
was calculated using the relationship: level by a quick-recovery, high-voltage braid to provide the lowest-impedance cir-
power supply. Transients were fired across cuit available. In many cases, however, the
RR dB = 20 log peak in a loo-ohm load resistor protected by the inductance of the connection did affect the
10 peak sIgnal out
device under test. measurement, particularly in the case of de-
(Eq 2)
Data were recorded by photographing a termining the reference grounds.
From one to 15 devices of each type were properly calibrated oscilloscope display.
tested. When 10 identical devices of any For repeated pulse requirements, the Ac Power Tests
one type had been tested with forward and camera shutter was held open to record all To test the ability of the devices to func-
reverse polarity, the data were statistically (nominally 10) of the pulses of one polari- tion when connected in a 117-V ac circuit,
analyzed to determine if further testing was ty, and then, after removal of the device ac was provided by an isolation transform-
required. For statistical analysis, 10 items under test, to record the applied transient er connected to the device through a large
were considered to provide a representative with the same exposure. Reverse-pulse inductance. If the device continued to arc
sample of the device's performance, since measurements were obtained by reversing or pass current after the pulse, the trans-
the devices performed consistently. the leads of the device under test and former was manually disconnected (but not
repeating the photographic sequence. always before the device had melted).
Test Equipment
Two pulse generators were used. One Pulses Greater Than 5 kV Test Results
provided pulses below 5 kV (60o-V and Transient pulses for this test were gener- A total of 56 different devices were
4.5-kV tests), the other produced pulses ated by manually firing a 2-inch spark gap tested. All of the devices substantially
above 5 kV (25-kV test). to discharge a storage capacitor suppressed the test pulses. However, not all
through a 5-ohm copper-sulphate source of the devices suppressed the test pulse to
Pulses Below 5 kV resistance to generate the desired current an acceptable voltage level on every test.
Transient pulses for this test were genera- pulse (see Fig 9). The capacitor was charged Twenty-six of the 56 devices passed the
ted by manually firing a mercury-wetted to the desired voltage level by a quick- low-impedance drive tests and 40 passed the
switch to discharge a storage capacitor recovery, high-voltage power supply. The high-impedance drive test. To pass the
through a copper-sulphate source resistance transients were fired across a loo-ohm particular test, the device had to suppress
of the appropriate size to generate the load resistor protected by the device under the peak-voltage pulse to less than two
desired current pulse (see Fig 8). The capa- test. times its published, designed clamping

September 1986 23
Table 4
Devices with Acceptable Clamping Voltages
Low-Impedance Drive Tests
Manufacturer Designed Meximum Average Acceptable Manufacturer Designed Maximum Average Acceptable
and Device Clamping Voltage Measured Clamping and Device Clamping Voltage Measured Clamping
(MCV) Peak Clamping Voltage (MCV) Peak Clamping Voltage
(Volts) Voltage at 600 V (APV = (Volts) Voltage at 600 V (APV =
and 4.5 kV <2 MCV) and 4.5 kV <2 MCV)
(APV) (Volts) (APV) (Volts)
Fischer
FCC-120-P 300 (1) 200 300 81-e90/20 90 (2) 6001938
FCC-250-300-UHF 300 1333 81-C145 145 (2) 600/880
FCC-250-300-UHF 350 1633 81-A230 230 600/960
FCC-4508-75-8NC 75 670 81-A350 350 (2 632/1020
FCC-250-150-UHF 150 1700 S8-e150 150 (2) 600/4500
FCC-250-120-UHF 120 1700 T61·C350 300 (2) 672/990
FCC-450-120-UHF 120 800
Alpha Delta Communications, Inc (4)
Joslyn LT 635 (1) 4500
2027-23-38 230 600 R-T 635 (1) 400 635
2027-35-8 350 1940
1270-02 190 400 General Semiconductor
1250-32 350 2300 587851 650 290 650
1663-08 66 ICTE-5 7.1 1121560 60 (3)
2027-09-B 90 1820 ICTE·15 20.1 116/580 60 (3)
2027-15-8 150 1620 ICTE-8C 11.4 119/510
2022-44 250 1460 LCE-6.5A 11.2 239/780
2031-23-8 230 1560 LCE-15A 24.4 158/590
2031-35-8 350 1360 LCE-51 91.1 188/770
LCE-130A 209 270/830 209
General Electric PHP-120 319
V39ZA6 76 132 76 GHV-12 8 155/590 80 (3)
V82ZA12 147 230 147 GSV-101 0.85 115/500 60 (3)
V180ZA10 300 428 300 GSV-201 1.7 120/570 60 (3)
V8ZA2 20 120/690 60 (3)
V36ZA80 63 120 63 (3) Electronic Protection DeVices, Inc
Lemon 300 (1) 380 300
PolyPhaser Corporation Peach 300 (1) 350 750 (3)
IS-NEMP 200 2 380 200
IS-NEMP-1 1
200 2)) 380 200 S. L. Waber
IS-NEMP-2 200 (1) 600 LG-10 300 (1) 550 300
TIl Archer (Radio Shack)
Model 428 280 350 280 61-2785 300 (1) 90 300
Siemens (1) Estimated or calculated
S10K11 40 120/690 (2) Dc break-down voltage
S20K25 80 1311720 80 (3) Acceptable above 2 MCV
S14K50 125 220/620 125 (4) Alpha Delta recently released new versions of their Transi-TrapTM
S10K60 160 265/710 160 These units are the Model R-T and LT having an "EMP" suffix. In
S14K130 340 464/1050 340 these units, the EMP clamping level is three times lower than previous
81-C75 75 (2) 600/910 designs.

voltage, or exhibit an acceptable response the exception of certain General Semi- able device to use as the sole protection unit
waveform. 4 The manufacturer of the pro- conductor TransZorbs@ . for a low-voltage pulse with a slow rise time
tection device normally establishes the Twenty-six devices were considered to such as experienced with the 600-V pulse
maximum clamping voltage using a much have acceptable pulse-suppression charac- that had a rise time of only 60 VIns.
slower pulse (8 rise time and 20 decay teristics. The most consistent performer Twenty devices were considered to have
time) than the expected electromagnetic was the metal-oxide varistor (MOV)'. acceptable measured clamping voltages on
pulse and the test pulse (10 ns rise time and Varistors suppressed the leading edge of the the low-impedance test. Six other units had
a I decay time). In some cases, the de pulse wave to less than two times the a satisfactory response waveform and were
breakdown voltage is used as the reference designed clamping voltage. Table 4 shows accepted although their clamping voltage
clamping voltage. Therefore, the measured those devices that have acceptable clamping was over two times their published or
clamping voltage of the devices was ex- performance. The accepted devices have design clamping level. Not all of the devices
pected to be higher than the published rejection ratios that range from 0.75 dB to were tested at the 600-V level. Of the ones
figure. During the tests, these higher 16.47 dB for the 600- V test pulse, and from that were, the varistors and the ac power-
clamping voltages were found with few 13.06 dB to 21.47 dB for the 4.5-kV pulse. line protection devices were the best
exceptions. Gas-discharge tubes and devices con- performers.
taining only gas-discharge tubes did not
Low-Impedance Testing respond well to the 600-V pulse. The rise High-Impedance Testing
The low-impedance test was conducted time (10 ns) and the low voltage level were This test was conducted only at the
at two different voltage levels (600 V and not sufficient to cause the tube to ionize 4.5-kV level. The devices were tested with
4.5 kV). The devices were tested with and conduct the test pulse to ground within positive- and reverse-polarity pulses.
positive- and reverse-polarity pulses. There the rise time. With 10 pulses being injected Again, no significant response differences
was no significant difference in response at a I-second injection rate, the gas-tube were noted with the different polarity
caused by the different polarity pulses, with ionization was delayed for periods of up pulses, except with the TransZorbs. The
to 4000 ns for each pulse, and in some 4.5-kV, 50-ohm test pulse is considered to
cases, the measurements were off the be the most accurate simulation of the
observable scale. This slow response time expected EMP energy that will be im-
4Notes appear on page 26. makes the gas-discharge tube an unaccept- pressed on the ac power and coaxial-cable

24
Table 5
Devices With Acceptable Clamping Voltages
High-Impedance Drive Test
Manufacturer Designed Maximum Average Acceptable Manufacturer Designed Maximum Average Acceptable
and Device Clamping Voltage Measured Clamping and Device Clamping Voltage Measured Clamping
(MCV) Peak Clamping Voltage (MCV) Peak Clamping Voltage
(Volts) Voltage at (APV = (Volts) Voltage at (APV =
4.5 kV 50 Ohms <2 MCV) 4.5 kV 50 Ohms < 2 MCV)
(APV) (Volts) (APV) (Volts)
Fischer
FCC-120-P 300 (1) 420 300 B1-G90/2O 90 (2) 210
FCC-250-300-UHF 300 393 300 B1-G145 145 (2) 200 145
FCC-250-300-UHF 350 260 350 B1-A23O 230 (2) 218 230
FCC-450B-75-BNC 75 210 B1-A350 350 (2) 230 350
FCC-25o-15O-UHF 150 220 150 S8-G150 150 (2)
FCC-250-120-UHF 120 240 120 T61-C350 300 (2) 250 300
FCC-45o-12O-UHF 120 120 120
Alpha Delta Communications, Inc (4)
Joslyn LT 635 (1) 700 635
2027-23-3B 230 310 230 RT 635 (1) 720 635
2027-35-B 350 366 350
1270-02 190 600 500 (3) General semiconductor
1250-32 350 940 587851 650 600 650
1663-08 66 90 66 ICTE-5 7.1 134
2027-09-B 90 · 378 ICTE-15 20.1 146
2027-15-B 150 242 150 ICTE-8C 11.4 124
2022-44 250 294 250 LCE-6.5A 11 .2 250
2031-23-B 230 336 230 LCE-15A 24.4 200
2031-35-B 350 291 350 LCE-51 91.1 220
LCE-13OA 209 210 209
General Electric PHP-120 319 400 319
V39ZA6 76 254 150 (3) GHV-12 8 218
V82ZA12 147 254 147 GSV-101 0.85 168
V180ZA10 300 388 300 GSV-201 1.7 174
V8ZA2 20 174 100 (3)
V36ZA80 63 170 100 (3) Electronic Protection Devices, Inc
Lemon 300 (1) 580 300
PolyPhaser Corporation Peach 300 (1) 1000 750 (3)
IS-NEMP 200 (2) 140 200
IS-NEMP-1 200 (2) 150 200 S. L Weber
IS-NEMP-2 200 (1) 160 200 LG-10 300 (1) 600 300
TIl Archer (Radio Shack)
Model 428 280 410 280 61-2785 300 (1) 300 300
Siemens
(1) Estimated or calculated
S10K11 40 186 100 (3) (2) Dc break-down voltage
S20K25 80 190 150 (3) (3) Accaptable above 2 MCV
S14K50 125 234 125 (4) Alpha recently released a new version of their Transi-TrapTM. This
S10K60 160 232 160 unit has an EMP suffix. In these units, the EMP clamping level is three
S14K13O 340 436 340 times lower than previous designs.
81-G75 75 (2) 220

interfaces to the amateur's equipment. operating voltage of the proper level will current to ground while sharing the current
Therefore, the results of this test were keep the tube in the conductive state after with the varistor, then shut down without
expected to be the most significant of the the pulse has passed. This characteristic can being destroyed. It was concluded that gas
program. The devices tested are listed in result in the destruction of the tube, as was tubes could be used for their high power
Table 5. experienced during another phase of this handling capabilities, but only when used
test program. Several gas tubes were des- at the proper voltage levels or with another
Varistors troyed when attached to an isolated ac device to cut off the tube. This design adap-
Varistors performed adequately during power source and then exposed to a 25-kY tation is found in commercial ac-power
the test. The General Semiconductor, pulse. The pulse started the tube's conduc- protection devices and RF devices using gas
General Electric and Siemens varistors tion and the ac power sustained the tube's tubes.
performed consistently. The varistors tested ionization and conduction until the tube
had clamping voltages ranging from 0.85 V was destroyed. Coaxial-Line Protectors
to 350 Y. The average measured varistor In a special test, two gas tubes were con- Eleven RF protection devices from three
clamping voltage ranged from a low of 168 nected in series between the pulse source suppliers were tested. These devices are
Y to a high of 436 Y. Nine out of 12 varis- and system ground. An ac voltage was im- designed to be placed in the coaxial trans-
tors were found to have acceptable clamp- pressed across the source circuit and then mission line. All of the units, with the ex-
ing voltages. Three varistors exceeded their through a lOO-ohm resistor to ground. The ception of the one with the lowest clamping
designed clamping voltage, but performed gas tubes did not begin to conduct until voltage, were accepted . This exception, the
consistently and could be used at a higher they were puls~d . When pulsed, the tubes Fischer FCC-450B-75-BNC, is rated to
voltage level if desired. ionized and conducted the pulse to ground, clamp at 75 volts. It did suppress the 4.5-kY
then shut off. The applied ac power did not pulse to an average of 210 Y and was given
Gas-Discharge Tubes sustain the ionization across the series- a rejection ratio of 26.62 dB, still very good
The advantage of using a gas-discharge connected tubes. performance.
tube is in its ability to handle large power Similarly, a gas tube and a varistor were The measured clamping voltages ranged
transients for short periods.' One of the connected in parallel to ground with an ac from a low of 120 Y (for a device rated at
disadvantages of gas tubes is that once they current in the circuit. When pulsed, the 120 Y) to a high of 720 Y (for a unit rated
begin to conduct, a continuous ac or de tube ionized and conducted the transient at 635 V). The coaxial-line protectors ex-

September 1986 25
hibited a very high rejection ratio to the tor were checked in an effort to find a devices that can be used alone (varistors)
4.5-kV high-impedance pulse, starting at a device that would clamp at a very low volt- or in combinations (gas-discharge
low of 16.15 dB for the Alpha Delta Transi- age level. The one with the lowest-rated tube/ varistor) to protect other points.
Trap R-T to a high of 30.14 dB for the clamping voltage is the lCTE-5 (7.1 V); the [Editor's Note: This series of articles is condensed
Polyphaser IS-NEMP devices. The Fisch- unit with the highest-rated clamping volt- from the National Communications System report
er FCC-250-350-UHF clamped 90 V below age is the LCE-130A (209 V). Average (NCS TIB 85-10) Electromagnetic PulsefTransient
Threat Testing of Protection Devices for
its rated clamping voltage of 350 V. This measured clamping voltages ranged from Amateur/Military Affiliate Radio System Equipment.
was not considered to be a problem, but a low of 124 V to a high of 250 V. Only A copy of the unabridged report is available from
a lower clamping voltage potentially could one of the units ' was accepted - the the NCS. Write (no SASE required) to Mr Dennis
Bodson, Acting Assistant Manager, Office of
interfere with the transmitted RF signal. LCE-130A. Rated at 209 V, it had an aver- Technology and Standards, National Communi·
age clamping voltage of 210 V. All of the cations System, Washington, DC 20305·2010, or
Power-Line Protectors other TransZorbs conducted only at levels call 202-692-2124 between the hours of 8:30 AM
and 5 PM Eastern.]
There are numerous ac power-line pro- considerably above their ratings.
tection devices available, but our selection Notes
was limited to the lowest-cost devices. Ten Test to Failure
'The published clamping voltage of a device is
devices from seven sources were tested. All The larger of the two pulse generators the average voltage level where the device
of the units, with the exception of the was used to generate a 25-kV pulse at 4 kA will change from a nonconducting state to a
Fischer FCC 120 F-P, Joslyn model for I This provided a total energy out- conducting state.
5Varistors are voltage-dependent devices that
1250-32 and the General Semiconductor put of 100 J. Up to five each of the 36 behave in a nonlinear electrical manner
models 587B051 and PHP 120, could be devices were tested with only three of them similar to back-to-back Zener diodes. When
plugged directly into an ac wall outlet. approaching failure. The three ac power- subjected to high-voltage transients, the varis-
tor's impedance changes over a large range
Internally, the devices consist of a com- line protection devices experienced exces- from a near open circuit to a highly conduc-
bination of gas-discharge tubes, varistors sive internal arcing, although they did not tive circuit, thereby switching the transient
or other protective circuitry. All except one fail completely. All of the other devices sur- voltage to ground or some other point.
Varistors are designed for a large assortment
were found to be acceptable. The published vived the 10 pulses and suppressed the volt- of switching (clamping) voltages.
clamping voltages ranged from a low of age transient voltage without failure. 6The tubes tested are sealed gas-discharge
190 V to a high of 650 V. For several tubes consisting of two or three electrodes
Conclusions properly separated by insulators and filled
devices, the designed clamping voltage was with a rare gas. These tubes are designed to
not known, so a 3OO-V level was assigned Of the 56 devices tested, there are many switch rapidly at a specific voltage level from a
to them for purposes of comparison. The that have acceptable transient-voltage sup- nonconductive to a conductive state (arc mode)
when subjected to a fast-rising voltage
measured clamping voltages ranged from pression capabilities and can be used for transient. When the voltage across the tube's
a low of 300 V to a high of I kV . the protection of Amateur Radio equip- electrodes is increased, ionization of the inert
ment. These include ready-made units for gas occurs and the tube conducts across the
TransZorbs electrode gap. The breakdown-voltage level is
direct connection to the ac power lines and determined by the design of the tube's elec-
Seven units from General Semiconduc- coaxial antenna lines as well as smaller trode spacing and the gas pressure. QST i
Electromagnetic Pulse and the
Radio Amateur
Part 3: In Part 2, we told how the EMP transient-protection
devices were tested individually under isolated conditions. Now,
the protectors are connected to Amateur Radio
equipment and retested. t
By Dennis Boelson, W4PWF
Acting Assistant Manager,
Technology and Standards
National Communications System
Washington, DC 20305-2010

..
he tests described in the previous

T installment subjected 56 selected


protection devices to several differ-
ent injection pulses that simulated the
Table 6
Commercial Protection Devices Tested
Manufacturer Part Number Description
waveforms and energies associated with Fischer FCC-250-300-UHF Coaxial line suppressor
EMP and lightning discharges. Those pro- Fischer FCC-250-350-UHF Coaxial line suppressor
tective devices found acceptable during the Fischer FCC-250-150-UHF Coaxial line suppressor
first test program were then connected to Fischer FCC-250-120-UHF Coaxial line suppressor
several types of radio equipment and test- Fischer FCC-450-120-UHF Coaxial line suppressor
Joslyn 2031-35-B Miniature gas-tube surge protector (MSP)
ed for their effectiveness in a typical
General Electric V36ZA80 Metal oxide varistor (GE-MOV)
Amateur Radio installation. Polyphaser Corp IS-NEMP Coaxial line protector
Since t here is a large number of possible Polyphaser Corp IS-NEMP-1 Coaxial line protector
combinations of protection devices and Polyphaser Corp IS-NEMP-2 Coaxial line protector
radio equipment, low-cost devices were Til Model 428 Plug-in power line protector
evaluated first. If they were found un- Siemens S14K130 Metal oxide varistor (SIOV)
acceptable, higher-cost protection devices Siemens B1-A350 Button type surge voltage protector
were installed and tested until an accept- Alpha Delta Transi-Trap R-T Coaxial line protector
Archer 61-2785 Three-outlet ac power strip/protector
able prolection scheme wa s developed.
After completing the testing of the low-cost
commercial devices (see Table 6), several
homemade units, assembled from pre-
viously tested components (see Table 7),
were checked. This was done with an eye
toward finding a very low-cost protection Table 7
device that could be built by the radio
Homemade Transient Protection Devices Tested
amateur. Six of these units will be described
Device Name Description
in the next installment of this series.
Sixteen system configuration s (see SIOV ac test box Three Siemens MOVs (S14K130) installed in an ac receptacle
Table 8) were tested at frequencies from 1.8 box. One MOV wired from hot to ground, one from neutral to
ground and one between hot and neutral
to 435 MHz. These systems included both
new and old gear (some no longer manufac- GE MOV One GE MOV (V36ZA80) installed across the 12-V dc power line
between hot and ground.
tured, but available on the used-equipment
market), and lube-type and transistorized SIOV RF test box The Siemens MOV (S14K130) installed in a metal box. The box
had UHF connectors attached to both ends and a wire
radios. The equipment tested was manufac-
connected between the center conductors of the two
tured by Drake, ICOM, Kenwood, Swan connectors. The MOV was connected to the wire on one side
and Yaesu. and to the box on the other side.
Measurements were taken of the radio Siemens UHF test box Two Siemens gas-gap tubes (BI-A350) installed in the UHF
system's performance before and after each connector box described above. The tubes were wired in
pulse or pulse series to compare the radio's series from the center conductor to the side of the box.
Joslyn UHF test box Two Joslyn gas-gap tubes (2031-35B) installed in the UHF
connector box in series from the center conductor to ground .
UHF coaxial T Two Siemens gas-gap tubes (BI-A350) installed in series between
tParts 1 and 2 appear in the Aug and Sep issues the center conductor and case, on one leg of a coaxial
of OST, respectively. Part 4 will appear in a T connector.
subsequent issue.

38 QST
grounded to the pulser ground plane at a
Table 8 single supply box within the transient field.
Amateur Radio System Configurations and Ancillary Equipment Tested A transient injection pulse was generated
System 1 System 11 by an L-shaped wire antenna within the test
Yaesu FP-757HF power supply Kenwood T8-430S HF transceiver
chamber. The antenna was connected to
FT-757GX all-mode transceiver PS-430 power supply the hot lead of a power plug inserted close
FC-757AT antenna matching network MC-80 microphone to the protective device under test. When
a commercial plug-in device was used, the
System 2 System 12
transient was injected into the same recep-
Yaesu FP-757HF Kenwood TR-7930 2-m mobile transceiver tacle into which the device was plugged. If
FT-757GX
System 13 a fabricated protection device was used, the
System 3 Kenwood TR-2600 2-m hand-held transient was injected into the device recep-
Yaesu FT-726 VHF/UHF all-mode transceiver tacle alongside the equipment power plug.
transceiver This maximized the stress on the equipment
System 14
System 4 while offering an opportunity for the free-
Drake T-4XC HF transceiver
field transient to couple with the equipment
ICOM IC-745 HF Transceiver R-4C HF receiver
IC-PS35 internal power supply 48 power supply power cord after the protection device. The
IC-SM6 desk microphone dimensions of the L-shaped antenna were
IC-AT100 antenna matching network System 15 (Not tested) adjusted until a current of 130 A was
IC-SP3 external speaker Collins KWM-2A HF transceiver produced in a 50-ohm load.
KWM-2A power supply
System 5 Antenna Transient Injection
ICOM IC-745 HF transceiver System 16
IC-PS35 internal power supply Swan 250 HF transceiver A larger L-shaped antenna was
117Z power supply constructed within the test chamber for
System 6 evaluation as an injection pulse generator
ICOM IC-27A 2-m mobile transceiver Antennas
for the antenna port of the equipment
Mosley JRS TA33 3-element tribander
System 7 Cushcraft AV-5 80- to 10-m vertical
under test. Current, measured through a
tCOM IC-02AT 2-m hand-held transceiver 50-ohm load resistor, was limited to about
Other Items 80 A when two short lengths of coaxial
System 8 Astron VS-35 power supply cable were used between the antenna and
ICOM IC-271 A 2-m transceiver Honda EG 650 generator load. Results of the removal of the cable
System 9 from the transient path led to the
ICOM IC-471A 430- to 450-MHz transceiver conclusion that the coaxial cable and
connectors greatly limit the magnitude of
System 10 the transient imposed on radio equipment.
Kenwood T8-430S HF transceiver The L antenna used in this test was con-
PS-430 power supply sidered adequate to stress any antenna con-
MC-SO desk microphone
nection terminal (at the equipment end)
AT-250 antenna matching network
ST-430 ex1ernal speaker with a pulse as large as the coaxial cable
could transmit. A possibility exists in a real
transient situation that the coaxial cable it-
self may be damaged if not protected at the
antenna end, but this condition could not
transmitter power output and receiver and two L-shaped wires were attached to be tested by the configuration used here.
sensitivity. First, stand-alone (equipment the equipment.
unwired) radio systems were subjected to Test Equipment
a field-pulse wave. This disclosed any Transient Injection Methods
A parallel-plate EMP simulator 24 feet
inherent design weaknesses and identified The working volume of the parallel-plate long, 20 feet wide and I I feet high (Fig 11)
the internal areas that required protection. simulator used for these tests, while large, was used. The Marx generator was charged
Damaged equipment was repaired and was not sufficient to house an entire radio by a high-power dc power supply and dis-
returned for further testing. After a series station including an antenna and residential charged through a spark-gap bank and out-
of field-only pulse tests, the simultaneous power-line drop. Therefore, the station put capacitor into the simulator's wire
field and injection pulse tests were made. equipment was placed in the chamber, and elements. These wire elements extended
pulses were injected that simulated the from the Marx generator through a
Test Program stresses carried to the equipment by the I6-foot-Iong transitional section to a bank
Threat Definition power lines and antenna. The maximum of copper-sulfate load resistors, which
transient expected from the power line was provided a termination load resistance
The peak values used in these tests were: about 6 kV since household wiring should (110-130 ohms) for the pulser. A 30-kV
EMP simulator pulse field: 50 kV 1m limit the transient to this level. Antenna charge to the Marx generator was sufficient
RF drive pulse: 275 A, 13.75 kV connections, however, are limited only by to provide a 50-kV 1m field strength with
Ac drive pulse: t30 A, 6.5 kV the spark-over levels of the installed a pulse rise time near IOns inside the
In the Simulator Field Tests, the radio antenna cabling. working volume. The 30-kV charge to the
system was placed in the working volume Marx generator produced a 240-kV charge
of a large parallel-plate EMP simulator. Power-Source Transient Injection on the pulser elements.
The simulator's Marx pulse generator was Power for the systems in the test A round and a square H-field sensor
discharged into the pulser wire elements chamber was provided by an isolated gen- were used to provide daily calibration of
with sufficient energy to produce a erator that would prevent interaction with the simulator and to measure the field
50 kV 1m field strength with a lO-nano- the pulser and data links used in the experi- strength during each test. Normally, only
second pulse rise time. For the Simul- ment. To simulate the connection of a typi- one sensor was used during the actual test.
taneous Field and Injection Pulse Tests, the cal residential supply, the neutral and Four current sensors measured the output
radios were kept in the same environment ground leads of the isolated system were of Amateur Radio antennas erected in the

October 1986 39
WIRE TERMINATOR
ELEMENTS

16' 24' '

- -- - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
Fig ll-A drawing of the large parallel-plate EMP simulator used in the tests. The Marx generator is a high-voltage pulse generator in
which several capacitors are charged in parallel through a high-resistance network. When the charge reaches a critical value, discharge
occurs through spark gaps.

pulser field . The sensors also measured the exposure to a field pulse. All radios (with result of this report, Alpha Delta has a new
. output of the L-shaped wire antennas that the exception of one, System 15, that was "EMP series" R-T and LT design . The new
were used to drive the ac power lines and dropped from the test for prolonged main- version has a clamping level three times
antenna coaxial cables. A shielded coaxial tenance problems) passed these tests with lower than previous designs for maximum
probe and a fiber-optic system with a no measurable degradation. safety-Ed.]
battery-powered, shielded transmitter took Another protective device failed a post-
H- and E-field measurements. Sensor Series B test check. The Fischer FCC 450-120-UHF
measurements were recorded on an Again, the radios were placed on the would not pass RF signal power. It was
oscilloscope. Photographs of the wooden carts. They were unpowered and replaced.
oscilloscope display were taken for each ungrounded, but this time the inter-
simulator pulse . Other test equipment in- connecting wiring and power cords were in Series E
cluded four signal generators and a place. This second test was designed to Now, five assembled (experimental)
wattmeter. evaluate the radio's susceptibility to transient-protection devices were tested (see
transient pulses generated by the internal Table 7). Of these five, one was an ac-Iine
Radio System Tests wiring, and any external wires including unit and four were RF assemblies. These
Each radio system was checked before microphone and power cords. All radios tests were designed to find a low-cost
and after each pulse. Transmitter power passed this test except for two, Systems 3 solution to the transient-protection require-
output was measured in the CW mode. and 8. The receivers in these two systems ments of the radio systems under test. All
This was done with and without any exhibited decreased sensitivity: that of of the units provided ad~uate protection
transient-protection devices in the feed line. System 3 by 26 dBm and 8 dBm for System of the radio equipment during the test
That provided an evaluation of the pro- 8. Since a strong signal was still audible, pulse. Further testing revealed that three of
tection device's suitability for that the two systems were considered not to be the devices blocked the transmitted signal.
particular radio system, by showing its seriously degraded and were accepted for The Siemens Metal Oxide Varistor (SlOV)
ability to pass the transmitted signal further testing . RF Test Box containing a large-capacitance
without clamping or without contributing varistor blocked the signal over a wide fre-
a substantial loss of power output. Voice Series C quency range . The Siemens UHF Test Box
modulation was checked by observing the Only System 2 was used for this test. The and Joslyn UHF Test Box containing the
deflection of the wa ttmeter needle while transceiver was placed on the pulser floor · gas gaps were adequate at HF, but blocked
speaking into the microphone. In some and grounded to the pulser ground plane. the signal at higher frequency ranges.
tests, the transmitter was monitored on a All wiring was attached except for the Although these three devices are adequate
similar radio. coaxial feed line to the antenna . Tests were for receiver use, they are not recommended
Receivers were placed on a set frequency performed first with no ac power applied, for use with a transmitter.
in the USB mode with the RF amplifier on then with power on. No degradation of the The UHF coaxial T was the best
(if selectable) and the RF gain control set transceiver performance was measured . assembled device; it provided transient
to maximum. The output of a signal protection and could pass the transmitted
generator was increased until the receiver's Series D signal over the full range of test frequen-
S meter read S5. (Receivers without an S This was a power-on test of the cies. Also, the SIOV AC Test Box repeat-
meter were measured by listening for an equipment with all external wiring and edly provided necessary power protection
audible signal in the speaker.) peripherals in place, including the coaxial required by the radio equipment. These two
antenna cable. Commercial transient-pro- devices will be discussed in more detail in
Series A tection devices were installed in the ac the next installment.
For these tests, the radio equipment was power and antenna feed lines. Then, the ac
placed on wooden carts 34 inches above the power line and coaxial antenna cable were Series F
simulator floor. No interconnecting wires driven by an injected signal at the threat This series of field and injection tests had
were attached to the equipment. All per- levels described earlier. All the devices, ex- three configurations. First, the radio
manently attached external wires (such as cept one, provided adequate protection. systems were fully protected. Then, tran-
power cords) were coiled and placed under System 2 sustained some internal damage sient protection was removed from the
the case of the radio equipment. This test during a test when the Alpha Delt a R-T coaxial feed line. Finally, protection was
evaluated the susceptibility of the radio's Transi-Trap was in the circuit. The Transi- removed from the ac power line as well . As
internal wiring and components to self- Trap devices had performed satisfactorily expected , some equipment damage was
generated transient pulses resulting from during the first test program. [Note: As a experienced. However, the most surprising

40 QST
result of this test series was that only one side of the cable, large currents (250- unprotected power source. A hand-held
radio system (System 2) experienced signifi- 290 A) could be found, but at the opposite transceiver's (lCOM lC-02AT) display was
cant, permanent performance degradation. end-with the 50-ohm resistor connected permanently damaged when the radio was
The other radios suffered various amounts to ground-only 50-110 A was measured. plugged into its battery charger and then
of lowered transmitter power output and We suspected that the coaxial cable was into an unprotected ac power source. The
receiver sensitivity, but were still operation- arcing. To test this, a piece of RG/8 cable battery charger was also damaged. A
al in their damaged state. A contributing was connected to a high-voltage dc supply Honda portable power generator was fully
factor in the survivability of the equipment and the supply voltage was slowly stressed with field and injection pulses and
was the influence the RG-8 coaxial cable increased. Arcing between the center was unharmed. System I sustained damage
had on the RF injection pulse (discussed conductor and the coaxial connector began to its antenna matching network, but the
later). at a potential of 4 kV; the cable began attached transceiver was unhurt. (In this
arcing internally at 5.5 kV. We concluded case, the matching network may have pro-
Antenna Tests that the RG/8 cable was acting as a spark- tected the transceiver.) When System 4 was
Measurements were taken of the gap protector for the equipment under test. pulsed in an unprotected configuration, its
response of two amateur antennas to the Given this condition, the protection devices matching network did not provide adequate
simulator pulse field in several different installed in the feed line were needed only protection for the transceiver; the
configurations. These included measure- to suppress the approximate 4.4-kV pulse transceiver's frequency display was
ments taken with a 75-foot length of RG/8 that would get through the cable. temporarily disrupted.
cable attached and with a connection to the
pulser ground plane directly through a Observations Conclusions
50-ohm resistor. The Mosley JRS TA33 J r Most of the solid-state, and all of the Most Amateur Radio equipment should
antenna generated a maximum of 152 A tube-type, radios were not susceptible to the be protected from Iightnirig and EMP to
through 50 ohms for a 7.6 kV pulse level. simulator field pulses until long, external prevent damage that can degrade the
The Cushcraft AV-5 produced a maximum wires were attached. Short wires- equipment's performance. Adequate
output of 170 A through the 50-ohm microphone, power cord and internal transient-pulse protection for most radio
resistor for an 8.67 kV pulse level. wiring-did not generate sufficient systems can be obtained by adding the
An L-shaped wire antenna was placed in transient pulse energy to produce proper protection devices to the ac power
the pulser field to generate a drive current observable damage to the radio equipment. lines and the transmission line. Battery
that could be injected into the coaxial cable When power lines and antennas are chargers for hand-held transceivers and
attached to the radio equipment under test. attached to radio equipment, however, pro- line-operated dc power supplies should also
The maximum measured output of this tection must be provided. With long be protected. With a minimum amount of
antenna was 175 A through a 50-ohm resis- external wires attached and no protection protection, radio systems should survive
tor for a maximum pulse level of 13.75 kV. provided, a single pulse could cause dis- transient pulses produced by lightning
Two "rubber ducks" were tested. The ruption of the microprocessor-controlled strikes and EMP. A direct lightning stri ke
maximum measured current was 8 A displays, cause frequency shifts and is another matter.
producing 400 V through 50 ohms. This permanently damage the radio's internal
low current was not sufficient to cause any components, Two notable exceptions are [Editor's Note: This series of articles is condensed
lrom the National Communications System report
degradation of the hand-held transceivers. the handheld and mobile radios. Even (NCS TIB 85-10) Electromagnetic PulselTransient
with antennas attached, no equipment Threat Testing of Protection Devices for Amateur/
Coaxial Cable Effects degradation was noted. Military Affiliate Radio System Equipment. A copy
of the unabridged report is available from the
Measurements were made to determine Other equipment used by the radio NCS. Write (no SASE required) to Mr Dennis
the response of RG/8 coaxial cable in the amateur can be damaged by transient Bodson, Acting Assistant Manager, Office of
pulse field alone and when attached to three pulses. A line-operated dc power supply Technology and Standards, National Communi-
cations System, Washington. DC 20305-2010, or
different antennas: two amateur antennas (Astron VS-35) failed when pulsed with an call 202-692-2124 between the hours of 8:30 AM
and the RF-drive antenna. At the antenna and 5 PM Eastern.] . QST
Electromagnetic Pulse and the
Radio Amateur
Part 4: What can be done to protect an Amateu r Radio station
from lightning and EMP transients? Here are some ideas on
procedu res and protective devices. t
By Dennis Bodson, W4PWF
Acting Assistant Manager
Office of Technology and Standards
National Communications System
Washington, DC 20305-2010

he equipment test program with a basic protection scheme. Most of the long metal conductors . Or, you can add

T described in the preceding three


articles demonstrates that most
Amateur Radio installations can be pro-
equipment is not susceptible to damage
when all external cabling is removed . You
can duplicate this stand-alone configura-
two transient-protection devices to the
interconnected system; that will also closely
duplicate the stand-alone configuration.
tected from lightning and EMP transients tion simply by unplugging the ac power The ac power line and antenna feed line
cord from the outlet, disconnecting the are the two important points that should
tparts 1-3 appear in Aug, Sep and Oct 1986 antenna feed line at the rear of the radio be outfitted with transient protection. This
OST. and isolating the radio gear from any other is the minimum basic protection scheme

\1/ ANTENNA

LEGEND:
P1-P2-PlUG-1N AC POWER
TRANSIENT SU PPRESSOR
Cl -C2-COAX,lAL LIN E RF TRANSIENT
SUPPRESSOR
AN T ENNA
Rl ·A2-VAAISTQR BOX ES AND
CONTROL CABLE CAN BE
ROTATOR
SHIELDED
ROTATOR

1 CONTROL
CABLE

COAX { RG - 81

GROUND PANEL ( BUS BARI


NO. 2 GAU GE SOLID WI R E OR SOLID STRAP j
GROUND GROUND GROUND GROUND GROUND

-= o00
oo 0
HAM
SHACK
GROUND o00 COA X oo 0
(SY STEM AC POWER (RG-8)
GROUNDI
AC
POWER AC
POWER
AUDIO CABLE COAX

[ [ ROTATOR
CONTROL
CABLE
ANTENNA ROTATOR REMOTE
POWER TRANSCEIVER MATCHING
SPEAKER
SUPPLY CONTROL UNIT
NETWORK

13 .8 V DC J
ANTENNA MATCH ING
NETWORK CONTROL CABLE

MICROPHONE

Fig 12-Transient suppression techniques applied to an Amateur Radio station.


30
recommended for all Amateur Radio in-
stallations. (For fixed installations, con- -----
sideration should also be given to the SOLID WIRE
NO.6 GAUGE /
antenna rotator connections-see Fig 12.) OR
Hand-held radios equipped with a "rubber BURIED I" DEEP /
-TOWER
duck" require no protection at the anten- /
na jack. If a larger antenna is used with the /
/
hand-held transceiver, however, a protec- I
tion device should be installed.
General Considerations SYSTEM
GROUND
Because of the unpredictable energy
content of a nearby lightning strike or other
TELEPHONE
large transient, it is possible for a metal- GROUND
oxide varistor (MOY) to be subjected to an (A)

energy surge in excess of its rated


capabilities. This may result in the
destruction of the MOY and explosive
rupture of the package. These fragments
can cause damage to nearby components
or operators and possibly ignite flammable TRANSIENT
material. Therefore, the MOY should be SUPPRESSORS
physically shielded . GROUND PANEL
A proper ground system is a key factor
COAXIAL CABLE
in achieving protection from lightning and
EMP transients . A low-impedance ground
RADIO
system should be installed to eliminate TRANSIENT PATH TO GROUND EQUIPMENT
transient paths through radio equipment
and to provide a good physical ground for
the transient-suppression devices. A single- GND

point ground system is recommended (see


Fig 13). Inside the station, single-point
grounding can be had by installing a BURIED GROUND WIRE
ground panel or bus bar. All external
conductors going to the radio equipment
should enter and exit the station through ANTENNA SYSTEM (8) AC POWER TELEPHONE CO
this panel. Install all transient-suppression GROUND GROUND GROUND GROUND

devices directly on the panel. Use the


shortest length(s) possible of no. 6 solid
wire to connect the radio equipment case(s) Fig 13-At A, the proper method of tying all ground points together. The transient path to
to the ground bus. ground with a single-point ground system and use of transient suppressors is shown at B.

Fixed Installations
Ac Power-Line Protection
Tests have indicated that household
electrical wiring limits the maximum Table 9
transient current that it will pass to approxi- Ac Power-Line Protection Devices
mately 120 A. Therefore, the amateur's Measured
station should, if possible, be installed High-Z
away from the house ac entrance panel and Manufacturer Device Approximate Clamping
breaker box to take advantage of these Cost Voltage
limiting effects. (US Dollars) (Volts)
Ac power-line protection can be pro- Modules
vided with easy-to-install, plug-in transient Fischer FCG-120F-P 55 420
protectors. Ten such devices were tested Joslyn 1250-32 31 940
(see Table 9). Six of these can be plugged General
directly into an ac outlet. Four are modular Semiconductor 587B051 56 600
devices that require more extensive General
Semiconductor PHP 120 50 400
installation and, in some cases, more than
one module. Plug-Ins
The plug-in-strip units are the best Joslyn 1270-02 49 600
overall choice for the typical amateur Til 428 45 410
installation . They provide the protection Electronic
needed, they're simple to install and can be Protection
moved easily with the equipment to other Devices Lemon 45 580
operating locations . The modular devices Electronic
are second choices because they all require Protection
Devices Peach 60 1000
some installation, and none of the units
S L Waber LG-10 13 600
tested provided full EMP protection for all Archer 61-2785 22 300
three wires of the ac power system .

November 1986 31
We consider the TIl model 428 Plug-In An emergency power generator should of an RF transient-protection device.
Powerline Protector to be the best overall be wired into the household circuit only by However, the lower-cost devices have the
protector. It provides transient paths to a qualified electrician. When so connected, higher clamping voltages, and the higher-
ground from the hot and neutral lines a switch is used to disconnect the com- cost devices have the lower clamping
(common mode) as well as a transient path mercial ac power source from the house voltages. Because of this, we selected
between the hot and neutral lines (normal lines before the generator is connected to medium-priced devices manufactured by
mode). The model 428 uses three MOVs them. This keeps the generator output from Fischer Custom Communications. The
and a 3-electrode gas-tube arrestor to feeding back into the commercial power Fischer Spikeguard Suppressors (about
provide fast operation and large power- system. If this is not done, death or injury $55) for coaxial lines can be made to order
dissipation capabilities. This unit was tested to unsuspecting linemen can result. to operate at a specific clamping voltage.
repeatedly and operated without failure. The Fischer devices satisfactorily sup-
Several other plug-in transient protectors Feed-Line Protection pressed the damaging transient pulses,
provide 3-wire protection, but all operate Coaxial cable is recommended for use as passed the transmitter RF output power
at higher clamping voltages. Other low-cost the transmission line because it provides a without interfering with the signal and
plug-in devices either lack the 3-wire certain amount of transient surge pro- operated effectively over a wide frequency
protection capability or have substantially tection for the attached equipment. The range.
higher clamping voltages. Some of these are outer conductor shields the center con- Polyphaser Corporation devices are also
the: ductor from the transient field . Also, the effective in providing the necessary
• Joslyn 1270-02. It provides fu1l3-wire cable limits the maximum conducted transient protection. However, the avail-
(common and normal mode) transient-path transient voltage on the center by arcing the able devices limited the transmitter RF
protection, but at a slightly higher cost and differential voltage from the center con- output power to 100 W or less. These units
at a higher clamping voltage . ductor to the grounded cable shield. cost approximately $83 each.
• Lemon and Peach protection devices By providing a path to ground ahead of The Alpha Delta Transi-Traps tested
manufactured by Electronic Protection the radio equipment, the gear can be were low-cost items, but not suitable for
Devices, Inc. The Lemon provides full protected from the large currents impressed EMP suppression because of their high
(command and normal mode) 3-wire pro- upon the antenna system by lightning and (over 7OO-V) clamping levels . [New Alpha
tection, but at a higher clamping voltage; EMP. A single protection device installed Delta "EMP" units have clamping voltages
the Peach has a dangerously high (1000 V) at the radio's antenna port will protect the about one-third that of the older units
clamping voltage. radio, but not the transmission line. To tested here.-Ed.)
• Archer (Radio Shack) 61-2785 [Re- protect the transmission line, another RF coaxial protectors should be mounted
placed by a new model.-Ed.] . This unit transient protector must be installed on the station ground bus bar. If the
provides excellent clamping performance at between the antenna and the transmission Fischer device is used, it should be attached
low cost, but it offers normal-mode line (see Fig 12). to a grounded UHF receptacle that will
protection only (a transient path between RF transient-protection devices from serve as a hold-down bracket. This creates
the hot and neutral leads). It will provide three manufacturers were tested (see Table a conductive path between the outer shield
some protection for lightning transients, 10) using RG-8 cable equipped with UHF of the protector and the bus bar. The
but not enough for EMP. connectors. All of the devices shown can Polyphaser device can be mounted directly
• S. L. Waber LG-IO. The lowest-cost be installed in a coaxial transmission line. to the bus bar with the bracket provided.
device does not provide full three-wire Recall that during the tests the RG-8 cable Attach the transceiver or antenna
protection (normal mode only) and has a acted like a suppressor; damaging EMP matching network to the grounded pro-
clamping voltage of 600. This unit can energy arced from the center conductor to tector with a short (6 foot or less) piece of
provide limited transient protection for the cable shield when the voltage level coaxial cable. Although the cable provides
lightning, but not the 3-wire protection approached 5.5 kV. a ground path to the bus bar from the radio
recommended for EMP transients. Low price and a low clamping-voltage equipment, it is not a satisfactory transient-
The transient suppressors require a rating have to be considered in the selection protection ground path for the transceiver.
3-wire outlet; the outlet should be tested to
ensure all wires are properly connected. In
older houses, an ac ground may have to be
installed by a qualified electrician. The ac
ground must be available for the plug-in Table 10
transient suppressor to function properly . RF Coaxial-Line Protectors
The ac ground of the receptacle should be Measured
attached to the station ground bus, and the High-Z
plug-in receptacle should be installed on the Manufacturer Device ApprOXimate Clamping
Cost Voltage
ground panel behind the radio equipment.
(US Dollars) (Volts)
Emergency Power Generators Fischer FCC-250-30o-UHF 55 393
Fischer FCG-250-350·UHF 55 260
Emergency power generators provide
Fischer FCC-250-150·UHF 55 220
two major transient-protection advantages. Fischer FCC-250-120-UHF 55 240
First, the station is disconnected from the Fischer FCC-450-120·UHF 55 120
commercial ac power system . This isolates Polyphaser IS-NEMP 83 140
the radio equipment from a major source Polyphaser IS-NEMP-1 83 150
of damaging transients. Second , tests have Polyphaser IS-NEMP-2 83 160
shown that the emergency power generator Alpha Delta LT 20 700'
may not be susceptible to EMP transients. Alpha Delta R-T 30 720'
When the radio equipment is plugged
directly into the generator's outlets, Note: The transmitter output power, frequency of operation and
transient protection may not be needed. If transmission line SWR must be considered when selecting any of
these devices.
an extension cord or household wiring is 'The newer Alpha Delta LT and R·T "EMP" models have clamping
used, transient protection should be voltages one-third of those shown here.
employed.

32
Another ground should be installed be-
tween the transceiver case and the ground
QUICK - OISCONNECT METAL -OXIOE VARISTOR
bus using solid no. 6 wire. The coaxial cable INSTALL FUSE HOLOER CONNECTOR ( KEEP LEAOS AS SHORT
IN POSITiVE LEAO
shield should be grounded to the antenna AS POSSIBLE)

tower leg at the tower base. Each tower leg CLIP


POSITiVE \
LEAO
should have an earth ground connection
and be connected to the single-point ground RAOIO COAXIAL
EQUIPMENT TRANSIENT
system as shown in Fig 13. SUPPRESSOR
BATTERY MOUNTEO TO
Antenna Rotators CHASSIS

Antenna rotators can be protected by


plugging the control box into a protected
ac power source and adding protection to POSITIVE LEAO
TO VEHICLE'S ELECTRICAL
the control lines to the antenna rotator. SYSTEM
When the control lines are in a shielded
cable, the shield must be grounded at both Fig 14-Recommended method of connecting mobile radio equipment to the vehicle bat-
ends. MOVs of the proper size should be tery and antenna.
installed at both ends of the control cable .
At the station end, terminate the control
cable in a small metal box that is connected disconnect connector. Although it would V = peak voltage across the cable
to the station ground bus. Attach MOVs help prevent alternator whine, connecting
This equation should be used to
from each conductor to ground inside the the negative power lead directly to the
determine the peak voltage present across
box. At the antenna end of the control battery post is not recommended from an
the transmission line. Because the RF
cable, place the MOVs inside the rotator EMP standpoint.
transient-protection devices use gas-dis-
case or in a small metal box that is properly An MOV should be installed between the
charge tubes, the voltage level at which they
grounded. two leads of the equipment power cord. A
clamp is not fixed; a safety margin must
For example, the Alliance HD73 antenna GE MOV (V36ZA80) is recommended for
be added to the calculated peak voltage.
rotator uses a 6-conductor unshielded this application. This MOV provides the
This is done by multiplying the calculated
control cable with a maximum control lowest measured clamping voltage (170 V)
value by a factor of three. This added
voltage of 24.7. Select an MOV with a and is low in cost.
safety margin is required to ensure that the
clamping voltage level 100/0 higher (27 V
Mobile Antenna Installation transmitter's RF output power will pass
or more) so the MOV won't clamp the
through the transient suppressor without
control signal to ground. Although tests indicate that the mobile
causing the device to clamp the RF signal
radios can survive an EMP transient
to ground. The final clamping voltage
DC Power-Supply Protection without protection for the antenna system,
obtained is then high enough to allow
protection from lightning transients is still
Mobile Installations normal operation of the transmitter while
required. A coaxial-line transient sup-
providing the lowest practical clamping
The mobile amateur station environment pressor should be installed on the vehicle
voltage for the suppression device. This
exposes radio equipment to other transient chassis between the antenna and the radio's
ensures the maximum possible protection
hazards in addition to those of lightning antenna connector. A Fischer suppressor
for the radio system.
and EMP. Currents as high as 300 A are can be attached to a UHF receptacle that
Here's how to determine the clamping
switched when starting the engine, and this is mounted on, and grounded to, the
voltage required. Let's assume the SWR is
can produce voltage spikes of over 200 V vehicle chassis. The Polyphaser protector
1.5 :1. The power output of the transceiver
on the vehicle's electrical system. Lightning can be mounted on, and grounded to, the
is 100 W PEP. RG/8 coaxial cable has an
and EMP are not likely to impact the vehicle chassis with its flange. Use a short
impedance of 52 ohms. Therefore
vehicle's electrical system as much as they length of coaxial cable between the radio
would that of a fixed installation because and the transient suppressor. P = 100 W
the automobile chassis is not normally Z = 52 ohms
grounded. This would not be the case if the Clamping Voltage Calculation SWR = 1.5
vehicle is inadvertently grounded; for When selecting any EMP-protection
Substituting these values in Eq 3:
example, when the vehicle is parked against device to be used at the antenna port of a
a grounded metal conductor. The mobile radio, several items must be considered. V 100 x 52 x 1.5 (Eq 4)
radio system has two advantages over a fix- These include: transmitter RF power out-
V 108. 17
ed installation: Lightning is almost never put, the SWR and the operating frequency.
a problem and the vehicle battery is a The protection device must allow the Note that the voltage, V, is a peak value
natural surge suppressor. outgoing RF signal to pass without since the power was measured in peak watts.
Mobile radio equrpment should be clamping. A clamping voltage calculation The final clamping voltage (FCY) is three
installed in a way that takes advantage of must be made for each amateur installation. times this value or 324.45 V. Therefore, a
the protection provided by the battery (see The RF-power input to a transmission coaxial-line transient suppressor that clamps
Fig 14). To do this, connect the radio's line develops a corresponding voltage that at or above 324 V should be used.
positive power lead directly to the positive becomes important when a voltage-surge The cost of a two-point basic protection
battery post, not to intermediate points in arrestor is in the line. SWR is important scheme is estimated to be $100 for each
the electrical system such as the fuse box because of its influence on the voltage level. fixed amateur station. This includes the
or the auxiliary contacts on the ignition The maximum voltage developed for a cost of one TIl model 428 plug-in power-
switch. To prevent equipment damage or given power input is determined by: line protector ($45) and one Fischer coaxial-
fire, should the positive lead short to line protector ($55).
ground, an in-line fuse should be installed
V = x SWR (Eq 3)
in the positive lead where it is attached to where Inexpensive Transient-Protection Devices
the battery post. P peak power in W Here are two low-cost protection devices
Connect the negative power lead to the Z = impedance of the coaxial cable you can assemble. They performed flaw-
chassis on the battery side of the quick- (ohms) lessly in the tests.

November 1986 33
SIOV AC Box
The SIOV (SIemens metal-Oxide
3 - WIRE PLUG

BLACK WIRE FUSE •


I power source should be completely isolated
from the commercial power lines.
10) Equipment power cords should be
Varistor) power-line protection device ( HOT) HOLDER
disconnected when the gear is idle. Or, the
shown in Fig 15 is fabricated by installing circuit breaker for the line feeding the
a duplex receptacle in a metal electrical box. METAL- equipment should be kept in the OFF
Power is brought into the box through a OXIDE position when the station is off the air.
6-foot-Iong, 3-conductor power cord. A VARISTOR
11) Disconnect the antenna lead-in when
fuse is installed in the incoming hot wire WIRE (3) the station is off the air. Or, use a
to guard against harmful effects if one of (NEUTRAL) GROUND
grounding antenna switch and keep it in the
the protective devices shorts. MOVs ~~
GROUND position when the equipment is
I
GREEN WIRE RECEPTACLE
(Siemens S14K130) are installed-with the (GROUND) BOX
not in use.
shortest possible lead lengths-between the 12) Have a spare antenna and transmis-
hot and neutral, hot and ground and Fig 15-Pictorial diagram of an sion line on hand to replace a damaged
neutral and ground leads . The estimated inexpensive, homemade ac power·line antenna .system.
cost of this unit is $11. transient protector. This approach may be 13) Install EMP surge arrestors and
applied to multiple outlets; see text.
UHF Coaxial T filters on all primary conductors attached
to the equipment and antenna.
The radio antenna connection can be 14) Retain tube type equipment and
protected by means of another simple spare components; keep them in good
device. As shown in Fig 16, two spark gaps working order.
(Siemens BI-A350) are installed in series at GAS GAPS
15) Do not rely on a microprocessor to
one end of a coaxial cable T connector. Use control the station after an EMP event. Be
the shortest practical lead length (about able to operate without microprocessor
in) between the two spark gaps . One lead control.
is bent forward and forced between the split
sections of the inner coaxial connector until Conclusion
the spark gaps approach the body of the UHF The recommendations contained in this
CONDUCTIVE
connector. A short length of insulating COAXIAL T TAPE report were developed with low cost in
material (we used Mylar® ) is placed be- mind; they are not intended to cover all
tween the spark gaps and the connector Fig 16-Pictorial diagram of an
possible combinations of equipment and
shell. The other spark-gap lead is folded inexpensive, homemade transmission-line
transient protector. See text for description installation methods found in the amateur
over the insulator, then conductive (metal- community. Amateurs should examine
of assembly.
lic) tape is wrapped around the assembly. their own requirements and use this report
This construction method proved durable as a guideline in providing protection for
enough to allow many insertions and the equipment.
removals of the device during testing . Es- frequencies should be useful for long-
timated cost of this assembly is $9. Simi- distance communications immediately after [Editor's Note: This series of articles is condensed
lar devices can be built using components an EMP event. Line-of-sight (LOS) VHF from the National Communications System report
from Joslyn, General Electric, General would be of value for local communica- (NCS TIB 85-10) Electromagnetic PulsefTransient
tions purposes. Threat Testing of Protection Devices for
Semiconductor or Siemens. AmateurlMilitary Affiliate Radio System Equipment.
What can be done to increase the . A copy of the unabridged report is available from
Summary survivability of an Amateur Radio station? the NCS. Write (no SASE reqUired) to Mr Dennis
Amateurs should be aware of which Here are some suggestions: Badson, Acting Assistant Manager, Office of
Technology and Standards, National
components in their radio system are most 1) If you have spare equipment, keep it Communications System, Washington, DC
likely to be damaged by EMP. They should disconnected; use only the primary station 20305-2010, or call 202-692-2124 between the
also know how to repair the damaged gear. The spare equipment would then be hours of 8:30 AM and 5 PM Eastern.]
equipment. Amateurs should know how to available after an EMP event.
reestablish communications after an EMP 2) Keep equipment turned off and
event, taking into consideration its adverse antenna and power lines disconnected when
effects on the earth's atmosphere and radio the equipment is not in use.
equipment. One of the first things that 3) Connect only those external
would be noticed, providing the radio conductors necessary for the current mode
equipment is operative, is a sudden silence of operation.
in radio transmissions across all frequencies 4) Tie all fixed equipment to a single-
below approximately 100 MHz. This silence point earth ground to prevent closed loops
would be due in part to the damage by the through the ground.
EMP transient to unprotected radio gear. 5) Obtain schematic diagrams of your
Transmissions from one direction, the equipment and tools for repair of the
direction of the nuclear blast, would be equipment.
completely out. RF signal loss by 6) Have spare parts on hand for sensitive
absorption and attenuation by the nuclear components of the radio equipment and
fireball are the reasons for this. antenna system.
After an EMP event, the amateur should 7) Learn how to repair or replace the
be prepared to operate CW. CW gives the sensitive components of the radio
most signal power under adverse con- equipment.
ditions. It also provides a degree of message 8) Use nonmetallic guy lines and antenna
security from the general public. structural parts where possible.
Amateurs should develop the capability 9) Obtain an emergency power source
and flexibility to operate in more than one and operate from it during periods of
frequency band. The lower ground-wave increased world political tension. The

34

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